Araneta v Dinglasan

G.R. No. L-2044 August 26, 1949

Tuason, J.:
Facts:
1. The petitions challenged the validity of executive
orders issued by virtue of CA No. 671 or the
Emergency Powers Act. CA 671 declared a state of
emergency as a result of war and authorized the
President to promulgate rules and regulations to
meet such emergency. However, the Act did not fix
the duration of its effectivity.
2.

EO 62 regulates rentals for houses and lots for

residential buildings. The petitioner, Araneta, is
under prosecution in the CFI for violation of the
provisions of this EO 62 and prays for the issuance
of the writ of prohibition.

3.

EO 192, aims to control exports from the

Philippines. Leon Ma. Guerrero seeks a writ
of mandamus to compel the Administrator of the
Sugar Quota Office and the Commissioner of
Customs to permit the exportation of shoes. Both
officials refuse to issue the required export license
on the ground that the exportation of shoes from the
Philippines is forbidden by this EO.

4.

EO 225, which appropriates funds for the

operation of the Government during the period from
July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, and for other
purposes was assailed by petitioner Eulogio
Rodriguez, Sr., as a tax-payer, elector, and president
of the Nacionalista Party. He applied for a writ of
prohibition to restrain the Treasurer of the
Philippines from disbursing the funds by virtue of this
EO.

5.

Finally, EO 226, which appropriated P6M to defray

the expenses in connection with the national
elections in 1949. was questioned by Antonio
Barredo, as a citizen, tax-payer and voter. He asked
the Court to prevent "the respondents from
disbursing, spending or otherwise disposing of that
amount or any part of it."

ISSUE: Whether or not CA 671 ceased to have any

force and effect
YES.
1. The Act fixed a definite limited period. The Court
held that it became inoperative when Congress
met during the opening of the regular session on
May 1946 and that EOs 62, 192, 225 and 226
were issued without authority of law . The
session of the Congress is the point of expiration
of the Act and not the first special session after
it.
2.

Executive Orders No. 62 (dated June 21, 1947)

regulating house and lot rentals, No. 192 (dated

December 24, 1948) regulating exports, Nos.

225 and 226 (dated June 15,1949) the first
appropriation funds for the operation of the
Government from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950,
and the second appropriating funds for election
expenses in November 1949, were therefore
declared null and void for having been issued
after Act No. 671 had lapsed and/or after the
Congress had enacted legislation on the same
subjects. This is based on the language of Act
671 that the National Assembly restricted the life
of the emergency powers of the President to the
time the Legislature was prevented from holding
sessions due to enemy action or other causes
brought on by the war.

G.R. No. 170139, August 05, 2014

Case is dismissed Rationale: Complaint is based

SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY,

INC., Petitioner, v. JOY C. CABILES, Respondent.

on mere allegations.
No excess payment of placement fees, based on the

official receipt presented by petitioner

Transfer of obligation to Pacific is immaterial

FACTS OF THE CASE:

Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., is
a recruitment and placement agency. Responding to an
ad it published, respondent, Joy C. Cabiles, submitted
her application for a quality control job in Taiwan, and
signed with a one-year employment contract for a
monthly salary of NT$15,360.00.
The agency required her to pay a placement fee
of 70,000.00 when she signed the employment contract.

NLRC Ruling:

She was deployed to work in Taiwan for Wacoal, but was

given a position as a cutter.
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency claims that on July
14, 1997, a certain Mr. Huwang from Wacoal informed
Joy, without prior notice, that she was terminated and
that she should immediately report to their office to get
her salary and passport. She was asked to prepare for
immediate repatriation.

Joy claims that she was told that from June 26 to July
14, 1997, she only earned a total of
NT$9,000. According to her, Wacoal deducted NT$3,000
to cover her plane ticket to Manila.
She filed a filed a complaint with the National Labor
Relations Commission against petitioner and Wacoal for
illegal dismissal.
Sameers Defense:

Respondents termination was due to her

inefficiency, negligence in her duties, and her failure
to comply with the work requirements [of] her foreign
[employer];
The agency also claimed that it did not ask for a
placement fee of NT$70,000.00 (evidenced by an
OR bearing NT% 20,360.00);
Petitioner added that Wacoals accreditation with
petitioner had already been transferred to the Pacific
Manpower & Management Services, Inc. (Aug. 06,
1997) thus, obligation is substituted with Pacific,
which the latter denied

Labor Arbiter Ruling:

Joy is illegally dismissed

Reiterated the doctrine that the burden of proof to
show that the dismissal was based on a just or valid
cause belongs to the employer
It found that Sameer Overseas Placement Agency
failed to prove that there were just causes for
termination.
There was no sufficient proof to show that
respondent was inefficient in her work and that she
failed
to
comply
with
company
41
requirements. Furthermore,
procedural
due
process was not observed in terminating
respondent.
Did not rule on the issue of reimbursement of
placement fees for lack of jurisdiction
It refused to entertain the issue of the alleged
transfer of obligations to Pacific.
It did not acquire jurisdiction over that issue because
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency failed to
appeal the Labor Arbiters decision not to rule on the
matter.

Sameer filed for MR but NLRC dismissed; filed for

petition for certiorari at CA
CA Ruling:

Affirmed NLRC with respect to the finding of illegal

dismissal, Joys entitlement to the equivalent of three

months worth of salary, reimbursement of withheld
repatriation expense, and attorneys fees.
Remanded case to NLRC to address the validity of
petitioners allegations against Pacific.

ISSUE OF THE CASE:

1. WON the Court of Appeals erred when it
affirmed the ruling of the National Labor
Relations Commission finding respondent
illegally dismissed and awarding her three
months worth of salary, the reimbursement of
the cost of her repatriation, and attorneys fees

despite the alleged existence of just causes of

termination;
2. WON there was a just cause for termination
because there was a finding of Wacoal that
respondent was inefficient in her work;
3. WON Pacific that should now assume
responsibility
for
Wacoals
contractual
obligations to the workers originally recruited by
petitioner
SC RULING/RATIONALE:

orders of his employer or representative in

connection with his work;(b) Gross and habitual
neglect by the employee of his duties;(c) Fraud or
willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in
him by his employer or duly authorized
representative;(d) Commission of a crime or offense
by the employee against the person of his employer
or any immediate member of his family or his duly
authorized
representatives;(e)
Other
causes
analogous to the foregoing.
Petitioners allegation that respondent was inefficient

in her work and negligent in her duties may,

therefore, constitute a just cause for termination
under Article 282(b), but only if petitioner was able to
prove it.
The burden of proving that there is just cause for

termination is on the employer. The employer must

affirmatively show rationally adequate evidence that
the dismissal was for a justifiable cause. Failure to
show that there was valid or just cause for
termination would necessarily mean that the
dismissal was illegal.
To show that dismissal resulting from inefficiency in

1.) JUST CAUSE:

o

Sameer Overseas Placement Agencys petition is

without merit. SC find for respondent.

Sameer Overseas Placement Agency failed to show

that there was just cause for causing Joys

dismissal. The employer, Wacoal, also failed to
accord her due process of law.
Indeed, employers have the prerogative to impose

productivity and quality standards at work. They may

also impose reasonable rules to ensure that the
employees comply with these standards.59 Failure to
comply may be a just cause for their
dismissal. Certainly, employers cannot be compelled
to retain the services of an employee who is guilty of
acts that are inimical to the interest of the
employer. While the law acknowledges the plight
and vulnerability of workers, it does not authorize
the oppression or self-destruction of the
employer. Management prerogative is recognized
in law and in our jurisprudence.This prerogative,
however, should not be abused. It is tempered with
the employees right to security of tenure. Workers
are entitled to substantive and procedural due
process before termination. They may not be
removed from employment without a valid or just
cause as determined by law and without going
through the proper procedure.Security of tenure for
labor is guaranteed by our Constitution
With respect to the rights of overseas Filipino

workers, follow the principle of lex loci contractus.

Pinned Triple Eight Integrated Services, Inc. v.

NLRC
Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the just

o
o

causes of termination by the employer. Thus:

Art. 282. Termination by employer.
An employer may terminate an employment for any
of the following causes: (a) Serious misconduct or
willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful

work is valid, it must be shown that:

1.
the employer has set standards of conduct
and workmanship against which the employee
will be judged;
2.
the standards of conduct and workmanship
must have been communicated to the employee;
and
3.
the communication was made at a
reasonable time prior to the employees
performance assessment.
o

The

regular

employee

must

constantly attempt to prove to his or her employer

that he or she meets all the standards for
employment. Courts should remain vigilant on
allegations of the employers failure to communicate
work standards that would govern ones employment
if [these are] to discharge in good faith [their] duty to
adjudicate.
2.) DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENT
o

Petitioner failed to comply with the due process

requirement
A valid dismissal requires both a valid cause and
adherence to the valid procedure of dismissal.The

employer is required to give the charged employee

at least two written notices before termination.

1997, respondent is entitled to her salary from July

15, 1997 to June 25, 1998. To rule otherwise
would be iniquitous to petitioner and other OFWs,
and would, in effect, send a wrong signal that
principals/employers and recruitment/manning
agencies may violate an OFWs security of tenure
which an employment contract embodies and
actually profit from such violation based on an
unconstitutional provision of law.

One of the written notices must

inform the employee of the particular acts that may

cause his or her dismissal.77 The other notice must
[inform] the employee of the employers
decision. Aside from the notice requirement, the
employee must also be given an opportunity to be
heard.
o
3.) Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as the
Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995

an interest of 6% per annum on her money claims

from the finality of this judgment.

Respondent Joy Cabiles, having been illegally

dismissed, is entitled to her salary for the unexpired

portion of the employment contract that was violated
together with attorneys fees and reimbursement of
amounts withheld from her salary.
o

Sec 10 of RA 1082 MONEY CLAIMS

SEC.

15.

REPATRIATION

4.) LIABILITIES OF EMPLOYER

SC clarify the liabilities of Wacoal as principal

and petitioner as the employment agency that facilitated

respondents overseas employment.

Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 provides that the

foreign employer and the local employment agency
are jointly and severally liable for money claims
including claims arising out of an employer-employee
relationship and/or damages. This section also
provides that the performance bond filed by the local
agency shall be answerable for such money claims or
damages if they were awarded to the employee.

OF

The reinstatement of the clause in

Republic Act No. 8042 was not yet in effect at the
time of respondents termination from work in
1997. Republic Act No. 8042 before it was
amended by Republic Act No. 10022 governs this
case.

constitutional rights to equal protection and due

process.
o

policy of affording protection to labor and alleviating

workers plight.

Filipinos Act of 1995 ensures that overseas workers

have recourse in law despite the circumstances of
their employment. By providing that the liability of the
foreign employer may be enforced to the full
extent against the local agent, the overseas worker
is assured of immediate and sufficient payment of
what is due them.

SC reiterate their finding in

Respondent

Joy

Cabiles

is

entitled to her salary for the unexpired portion of

her contract, in accordance with Section 10 of
Republic Act No. 8042. The award of the threemonth equivalence of respondents salary must be
modified accordingly. Since she started working on
June 26, 1997 and was terminated on July 14,

The Migrant Workers and Overseas

Serrano v. Gallant Maritime that limiting wages

that should be recovered by an illegally
dismissed overseas worker to three months is
both a violation of due process and the equal
protection clauses of the Constitution.
o

This provision is in line with the states

Republic Act. No. 10022, violates the

Section 10 of the Migrant Workers and

WORKERS; EMERGENCY REPATRIATION FUND

o

Respondent is also entitled to

Pinned Prieto vs NLRC

o
o

The Court is not unaware of the

many abuses suffered by our overseas workers in
the foreign land where they have ventured, usually
with heavy hearts, in pursuit of a more fulfilling
future. Breach of contract, maltreatment, rape,

insufficient nourishment, sub-human lodgings,

insults and other forms of debasement, are only a
few of the inhumane acts to which they are
subjected by their foreign employers, who
probably feel they can do as they please in their
own country. While these workers may indeed
have relatively little defense against exploitation
while they are abroad, that disadvantage must not
continue to burden them when they return to their
own territory to voice their muted complaint. There
is no reason why, in their very own land, the
protection of our own laws cannot be extended to
them in full measure for the redress of their
grievances.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED
with modification. Petitioner Sameer Overseas
Placement Agency is ORDERED to pay respondent
Joy C. Cabiles the amount equivalent to her salary
for the unexpired portion of her employment
contract at an interest of 6% per annum from the
finality of this judgment. Petitioner is also ORDERED
to reimburse respondent the withheld NT$3,000.00
salary and pay respondent attorneys fees of
NT$300.00 at an interest of 6% per annum from the
finality of this judgment.
The clause, or for three (3) months for every year of
the unexpired term, whichever is less in Section 7
of Republic Act No. 10022 amending Section 10 of
Republic Act No. 8042 is declared unconstitutional
and, therefore, null and void.

Ruling:
There being no specific provision governing
substitution of candidates in barangay elections, a
prohibition against said substitution cannot be said
to exist.
Petitioners letter-request was considered a
certificate of candidacy when COMELEC issued its
resolution denying the same. In the contested
election, it was petitioner who obtained the plurality
of votes. Technicalities and procedural niceties in
election cases should not be made to stand in the
way of the true will of the electorate. Laws
governing election contests must be liberally
construed to the end that the will of the people in
G.R. No. 154198

January 20, 2003

PETRONILA S. RULLODA vs. COMELEC and

REMEGIO PLACIDO
Facts:
Comelec denied petitioners request to substitute
her deceased husband in the Barangay Chairman
Candidacy despite the fact that petitioner
apparently garnered the highest votes when
constituents wrote her name in the ballots.
Respondents cited resolution 4801 and Section 7 of
the Omnibus Election Code which prohibits
substitution of candidates. Private respondent
Placido contended that it was only right that he be
proclaimed winner since he was the only one who
filed a certificate of candidacy and, hence, the only
candidate running.
Issue:
Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion
when Comelec denied petitioners request that she
be allowed to run for elections.

the choice of public officials may not be defeated by

mere technical objections.

HELD:
Unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date
of effectivity and not with the publication
requirement which cannot be omitted as public
needs to be notified for the law to become effective.
The necessity for the publication in the Official
Gazette of all unpublished presidential issuances
which are of general application, was affirmed by
the court on April 24, 1985. This is necessary to
provide the general public adequate notice of the
various laws which regulate actions and conduct as
citizens. Without this, there would be no basis for
Art 3 of the Civil Code Ignorance of the law
excuses no one from compliance therewith.
WHEREFORE,
the
Court
hereby
orders
respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all
unpublished presidential issuances which are of
general application, and unless so published, they
shall have no binding force and effect.

Tanada vs Tuvera
L-63915, April 24, 1985| 136 SCRA 27
FACTS:
Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus in compelling
respondent public officials to publish and/ or cause
the publication in the Official Gazette of various
presidential decrees, letter of instructions, general
orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of
implementation and administrative orders.
The general rule in seeking writ of mandamus is
that it would be granted to a private individual only
in those cases where he has some private or
particular interest to be subserved, or some
particular right to be protected, independent of that
which he holds with the public at large," and "it is
for the public officers exclusively to apply for the
writ when public rights are to be subserved.
The legal capacity of a private citizen was
recognized by court to make the said petition for
the reason that the right sought to be enforced by
petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no
less than the fundamental law of the land.
ISSUE: Whether publication in the Official Gazette
is still required considering the clause in Article 2
unless otherwise provided.

TAADA VS. TUVERA

146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)
FACTS:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision
promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent argued
that while publication was necessary as a rule, it
was not so when it was otherwise as when the
decrees themselves declared that they were to
become effective immediately upon their approval.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a distinction be made between
laws of general applicability and laws which are not
as to their publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in
publications of general circulation.
HELD:
The clause unless it is otherwise provided refers
to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement
of publication itself, which cannot in any event be
omitted. This clause does not mean that the
legislature may make the law effective immediately
upon approval, or in any other date, without its
previous publication.
Laws should refer to all laws and not only to those
of general application, for strictly speaking, all laws
relate to the people in general albeit there are some

that do not apply to them directly. A law without any

bearing on the public would be invalid as an
intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an
ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law
must invariably affect the public interest eve if it
might be directly applicable only to one individual,
or some of the people only, and not to the public as
a whole. All statutes, including those of local
application and private laws, shall be published as
a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15
days after publication unless a different effectivity
date is fixed by the legislature.Publication must be
in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose
is to inform the public of the content of the law.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication
of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and
not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity.
The Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon
the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it
finds it impractical.
The publication must be made forthwith, or at least
as soon as possible.

When questioned, Vega argued that R.A. 7169 did

not immediately take effect and that it only took
effect 15 days after publication in the Official
Gazette or on March 10, 1992.
ISSUE: Whether or not Judge Benjamin Vega is
correct.
HELD: No. R.A. 7169 provides in its effectivity
clause that:
Sec. 10. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect
upon its approval.
As a rule, laws take effect after 15 days following
completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in
the Philippines. However, the legislature has the
authority to provide for exceptions as indicated in
the clause unless otherwise provided. Hence, it is

PHILIPPINE

VETERANS

BANK

UNION

VS.

BENJAMIN VEGA
360 SCRA 32
In 1985, the Central Bank of the Philippines filed a
petition for assistance in the liquidation of the
Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB), in the RTC of
Manila, Branch 39. Thereafter, the PVB Employees
Union filed claim for accrued and unpaid employee
wages and benefits.
On January 2, 1992, R.A. 7169 (An Act to
Rehabilitate the PVB) was signed into law by then
Pres. Corazon Aquino and was published in the
Official Gazette on February 24, 1992. This law
sought the rehabilitation of the PVB which means
that Congress mandated that the PVB be not
dissolved.
However, the liquidation judge, Judge Benjamin
Vega, did not immediately stop the liquidation
proceeding. In fact he went on with it.

clear that the legislature intended to make the law

effective immediately upon its approval. It is
undisputed that R.A. No. 7169 was signed into law
by President Corazon C. Aquino on January 2,
1992. Therefore, said law became effective on said
date.
Assuming for the sake of argument that publication
is necessary for the effectivity of R.A. No. 7169,
then it became legally effective on February 24,
1992, the date when the same was published in the
Official Gazette, and not on March 10, 1992.

No. 66, approved on October 18, 1946, amended

section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 689 so as to
read as follows: "Section 14. This Act shall be in
force for a period of four years after its approval."
Issue:
Whether or not there is retroactivity of the
amendment of Commonwealth Act No. 689 By RA
No. 66.
Held:
Commonwealth Act No. 689, as amended by
Republic Act No. 66, cannot be given retroactive
effect. The provision of Republic Act No. 66
amending section 14 of Commonwealth Act No.
689, related back to, and should be computed from
the date of the approval of the amended act, that is
October 15, 1945. The period as thus construed
expired on October 15, 1949.
The cause of action in the case at bar arose before
the passage of the Acts. An amended act is
ordinarily to be construed as if the original statute
had been repealed, and a new and independent act
in the amended form had been adopted in its
stead.

ESTRADA, vs CASEDA
G.R. No. L-1560

TAC-AN vs. CA
G.R. No. L-38736, May 21, 1984

Facts:

FACTS:
Eleuterio Acopiado and Maximo Acopiado
conveyed a parcel of land to Tac-an through a
document entitled Deed of Quitclaim as payment
for legal services. After the execution of the deed,
the Acopiados told Tac-an that they were
terminating his services because their wives and
parents did not agree that the land be given to pay
for his services and that they had hired another
lawyer, a relative, to defend them. But Tac-an
continued to represent them. Moreover, Eleuterio
Acopiado sold his share of the land previously
conveyed to Tac-an to Jesus Paghasian and Pilar
Libetario.
On July 2, 1964, Tac-an secured the approval of
the Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Norte to
the Deed of Quitclaim. And on October 7, 1964,
he filed a complaint against the Acopiado brothers,
Paghasian and Pilar Libetario in CFI of Zamboanga
del Norte praying that he be declared the owner of

On September 5, 1945, plaintiff brought this suit, for

unlawful detainer, because one of her married
daughters was going to occupy them by the first of
the following month; that defendant refused to
leave. On October 13, 1945, Judge Mariano Nable,
then of the municipal court, gave judgment for
plaintiff with order for defendant to pay the rent
from October 1, 1945, at the rate of P26 a month.
On the case being appealed to the CFI, Judge
Rafael Dinglasan presiding, cited "Commonwealth
Act No. 689. The court correctly held that the fact
that the premises under lease were needed by
plaintiff's married daughter was not comprehended
in the said Act. The requirements to evict occupants
were provided in above-mentioned Act, which was
approved on October 15, 1945. Section 14 of that
Act provided that the same "shall be in force for a
period of two years after its approval." Republic Act

the land and that the sale made in favor of

Paghasian and Libetario be annulled and he be
paid for damages, attorney s fee, etc. The CFI
decided in favor of Tac-an whereupon the
Acopiados, et.al appealed to CA. The CA voided
the transfer of the land to Tac-an applying section
145 of the Administrative Code of Mindanao and
Sulu Contracts w/ Non-Christians Requisites.
On April 12, 1965 while Tac-an suit was pending in
the trial court, the Governor of Zamboanga del
Norte, revoked his approval to the deed of quitclaim
for the reason of Sec. 145 being the Acopiados as
non-Christians. The petitioner asserts that the
revocation of the approval which had been given by
the Provincial Governor has no legal effect and
cannot affect his right to the land which had already
vested.

On February 10, 1981, one of the private

respondents (Pangonatan Cosna Tagol), filed
another ex-parte motion praying that the legal
interest of the just compensation awarded to her by
the court be computed at 12% per annum as
allegedly authorized under and by virtue
of Circular No. 416 of the Central Bank, in the
absence of express contract.

ISSUE:
Are the requisites in Sec. 145 of the Administrative
Code of Mindanao & Sulu still necessary when it is
already repealed by RA 4252?

Issue:
Whether or not, in the computation of the legal rate
of interest on just computation for expropriated
lands, the law applicable is Article 2209 of the Civil
Code which prescribes a 6% legal interest rate or
Central Bank Circular No. 416 which fixed the
legal interest rate at 12% per annum.

HELD:
Yes, because when the deed of quitclaim was
executed, when the approval by the Provincial
Governor was given and when the approval was
revoked, Section 145 of the Administrative Code of
Mindanao and Sulu were in full force and effect and
since they were substantive in nature, the repealing
statute cannot be given retroactive effect. All
requisites are still necessary.
National Power Corporation vs. Angas
May 8, 1992
Facts: On April 13, 1974 and December 3, 1974,
petitioner National Power Corporation filed two
complaints for eminent domain against private
respondents before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Lanao del Sur, for the purpose of the
development of hydro-electric power and
production of electricity as well as the erection of
such subsidiary works and constructions.
On May 16, 1980, one of the private respondents
(Sittie Sohra Batara) filed an ex-parte motion
praying that petitioner be directed to pay her the
unpaid balance for the lands expropriated, including
the legal interest which she computes 6% per
annum as being contemplated in Art. 2209 of the
Civil Code.

Petitioner contended that the legal interest for just

compensation of the lands condemned should be
6% per annum as contemplated in Art. 2209 of the
Civil Code and not Central Bank Circular No. 416
which allows 12% interest per annum.

Ruling:
Central Bank Circular No. 416 and Art. 2209 of the
Civil Code contemplate different situations and
apply to different transactions.
In transactions involving loan or forbearance of
money, goods or credits and the rate allowed in
judgments, in the absence of express contract, the
Central Bank circular applies. Private respondents,
however, take exception to the inclusion of the term
"judgments" in the said circular, claiming that such
term refers to any judgment directing the payment
of legal interest.
Applying ejusdem generis to Central Bank Circular
No. 416, the term "judgments" only refer to
judgments in cases involving loans or forbearance
of any money, goods or credits.
On the other hand, in cases requiring the payment
of indemnities as damages, in connection with any
delay in the performance of an obligation other than
those involving loan or forbearance of money,
goods or credits, Art. 2209 of the Civil Code
applies.

In the case at bar, the transaction involved is clearly

not a loan or forbearance of money, goods or
credits but expropriation of certain parcels of land
for a public purpose, and the legal interest
required to be paid on the amount of just
compensation for the properties expropriated is
manifestly in the form of indemnity for damages for
the delay in the payment thereof. Obviously, Art.
2209 of the Civil Code shall apply, declaring that
the computation of legal interest be at 6% per
annum, which is the correct and valid legal interest.
Judgment annulled and set aside.

because making them perform manual labor

outside office premises exposes them to contempt
and ridicule and constitutes a violation of the
traditional dignity and respect accorded Filipino
womanhood.
The said Memorandum was denied by the Office of
the President and that it has no force and effect
therefore Villegas had no legal basis in trying to
remove the 91 women from their jobs.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Commissioner through
Memorandum-circular No. 18 violated the rights
of women in the Philippine Constitution
(Particularly Article 2, Section 14)
HELD:

G.R. No. L-27714 November 5, 1981ANTONIO J.

VILLEGAS, in his capacity as Mayor of the City
of Manila,
petitioner-appellee, vs.
ABELARDO SUBIDO, in his capacity as
Commissioner of Civil Service,
respondent-appellant.
S e c t i o n 1 4 . The State recognizes the
role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure
the fundamental equality before the law of women
and men.
FACTS:
Pursuant to Memorandum Circular No. 18, s. 1964,
on the subject: "Women in Laborer Positions
issued by Villegas, he said that this Office ( Manila
City ) will disapprove all appointments extended to
females as street sweepers, when the same are
submitted to this Office.
In pursuant to the same memorandum he said that
the 91 women working as street sweepers
or women laborers must be replaced by men

It might be said by way of a concluding observation

that for the past six years at least, Filipino women
have been serving in that capacity among others as
Metro Aides, an innovation introduced by the First
Lady. They have contributed along with the male
employees in keeping Metro Manila clean,
attractive, and hygienic. There has been no offense
to the well known Filipino tradition of holding the
women in high esteem and respect. Moreover, as is
quite obvious in civic parades where a contingent of
them usually takes part, they take pride and justly
so in what they are doing. There would even be
less justification then even from the policy
standpoint for a Memorandum Circular similar to
that issued by respondent and justifiably nullified by
the Office of the President. Moreover, the trend
towards greater and greater recognition of equal
rights for both sexes under the shelter of the equal
protection clause argues most strongly against this
kind of discrimination. WHEREFORE, the appealed
decision is affirmed. No cost.

without authority from Sangguniang Panlungsod of

Mandaue.
The respondent officials prayed for the dismissal of
the complaint on the ground that the Ombudsman
supposedly was bereft of jurisdiction to try, hear
and decide the administrative case filed against
them since, under Section 63 of the Local
Government Code of 1991, the power to investigate
and impose administrative sanctions against said
local officials, as well as to effect their preventive
suspension, had now been vested with the Office of
the President. On September 1992, a TRO against
Hagad was filed and granted to the petitioners by
RTC Mandaue to restrain him from enforcing
suspension.
Issue:
Whether or not the Ombudsman under RA 6770
(Ombudsman Act of 1898) has been divested of his
authority to conduct administrative investigations
over local elective official by virtue of subsequent
enactment of RA 7160.
Hagad v. Gozo-Dadole
Facts:
On July 22, 1992, criminal and administrative
complaints were filed against Mayor Ouano, Vice
Mayor Canete and Councilor Mayol, all public
officials of Mandaue City by Councilors Dionson,
Baricede. There respondents were charged with
having violated R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act), as amended,Articles 170
(falsification of legislative documents) and 171
(falsification by public officers) of the Revised
Penal Code; and R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct
and Ethical Standards of Public Officers). The
respondent officials were allegedly causing
alteration of Ordinance No. 018/92 by increasing
the allotted appropriation from P3.5M to P7M

Held:
No. The authority of the Ombudsman over local
officials pursuant to RA 6770 is not removed by LG
Code of 1991.
There is nothing in the Local Government
Code to indicate that it has repealed, whether
expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions of
the Ombudsman Act. The two statutes on the
specific matter in question are not so inconsistent,
let alone irreconcilable, as to compel us to only
uphold one and strike down the other . Well settled
is the rule that repeals of laws by implication are
not favored, 16 and that courts must generally
assume their congruent application. The two laws
must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear
finding thereof must surface, before the inference of
implied repeal may be drawn. The rule is expressed

in the maxim, interpretare et concordare legibus est

optimus interpretendi, i.e., every statute must be so
interpreted and brought into accord with other laws

The lower held that the information is

basically deficient because it does not describe the

as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. The

circumstances under which the cavans of palay

fundament is that the legislature should be

were found in the possession of the accused

presumed to have known the existing laws on the

tenants; it does not specify the date agreed upon

subject and not to have enacted conflicting

statutes. Hence, all doubts must be resolved
against any implied repeal, and all efforts should be

for the threshing of the harvests, and it does not

allege that the palay found in the tenants'

exerted in order to harmonize and give effect to all

possession exceeded ten percent of their net share

laws on the subject.

based on the last normal harvest.

The authority to conduct administrative

investigation and to impose preventive suspension

ISSUE:

over elective provincial or city officials was at that

Whether or not the tenant's act of pre- reaping and

time entrusted to the Minister of Local Government

pre-threshing without notice to the landlord is

until it became concurrent with the Ombudsman

punishable pursuant to Sec. 39 of the Agricultural

upon the enactment of R.A. No. 6770, specifically

under Sections 21 and 24 thereof, to the extent of

Tenancy Law.

the common grant. The Local Government Code of

1991 (R.A. No. 7160), in fine, did not effect a

HELD:

change from what already prevailed, the

No. The prohibition against pre-reaping or pre-

modification being only in the substitution of the

Secretary (the Minister) of Local Government by
the Office of the President.
People v. Almuete
G.R. No. L-26551, February 27, 1976

threshing found in section 39 of the Agricultural

Tenancy Law of 1954 is premised on the existence
of the rice share tenancy system. The evident
purpose is to prevent the tenant and the landholder
from defrauding each other in the division of the

FACTS:
Wenceslao Almuete, Fernando Fronda, Cipriano
Fronda and Fausto Durion were charged with a
violation of section 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy
Law. It was alleged in the information that the
accused being tenants of Margarita Fernando in
her riceland, without notice to her or without her
consent, pre-threshed a portion of their respective
harvests of five cavans of palay each to her
damage.

harvests. Thus, the legal maxim, cessante ratione

legis, cessat ipsa lex (the reason for the law
ceasing, the law itself also ceases). applies to this
case.
Section 4 of the Code of Agrarian Reforms
declared agricultural share tenancy throughout the
country

as

contrary

to

public

policy

and

automatically converted it to agricultural leasehold.

Presidential Decree No. 2 proclaimed the entire
country "as a land reform area".

The legislative intent not to punish anymore

the tenant's act of pre- reaping and pre-threshing

without notice to the landlord is inferable from the

fact that the Code of Agrarian Reforms did not
reenact section 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Law
and that it abolished share tenancy which is the
basis for penalizing clandestine pre-reaping and
pre-threshing.
As held in the Adillo case, the act of prereaping and pre-threshing without notice to the
landlord, which is an offense under the Agricultural
Tenancy Law, had ceased to be an offense under
the subsequent law, the Code of Agrarian Reforms.

to defray the costs and expenses in holding the

1997 barangay elections.
Petitioners contend that under RA 6679, the
term of office of barangay officials is 5 years.
Although the LGC reduced the term of office of
all local elective officials to three years, such
reduction does not apply to barangay officials.
As amicus curiae, former Senator Aquilino Q.
Pimentel, Jr. urges the Court to deny the
petitions.

ISSUES & HELD:

Which law governs the term of office of
barangay officials: RA 7160 or RA 6679? (RA
7160 3 years)
Is RA 7160 insofar as it shortened such term to
only three years constitutional? (YES)
Are petitioners estopped from claiming a term
other than that provided under RA 7160? (YES)
RATIO:

To prosecute it as an offense when the Code of

Agrarian Reforms is already in force would be
repugnant or abhorrent to the policy and spirit of
that

Code

and

would

subvert

the

manifest

legislative intent not to punish anymore pre-reaping

and pre-threshing without notice to landholder.

David v COMELEC
Panganiban, 1997
FACTS:
David, in his capacity as barangay chairman
and as president of the Ligangmga Barangay
saPilipinas, filed a petition to prohibit the
holding of the barangay election scheduled on
the second Monday of May 1997. Meanwhile,
Ligangmga Barangay Quezon City Chapter also
filed a petition to seek a judicial review by
certiorari to declare as unconstitutional: (1)
Section 43(c) of R.A. 7160; (2) COMELEC
Resolution Nos. 2880 and 2887 fixing the date
of the holding of the barangay elections on May
12, 1997 and other activities related thereto;
and, (3) The budgetary appropriation of P400
million contained in Republic Act No. 8250
(General Appropriations Act of 1997) intended

Clear Legislative Intent and Design to Limit

Term to Three Years
RA 7160 was enacted later than RA 6679. It is
basic that in case of an irreconciliable conflict
between two laws, the later enactment prevails.
(Legisposteriorespriorescontrariasabrogant.)
During the barangay elections held on May 9,
1994 (second Monday), the voters actually and
directly elected one punong barangay and
seven kagawads (as in the Code).
In enacting the general appropriations act of
1997,Congress appropriated the amount of
P400 million to cover expenses for the holding
of barangay elections this year. Likewise, under
Sec. 7 of RA 8189, Congress ordained that a
general registration of voters shall be held
immediately after the barangay elections in
1997. These are clear and express
contemporaneous statements of Congress that
barangay officials shall be elected this May, in
accordance with Sec. 43-c of RA 7160.
In Paras vs. Comelec,this Court said that the
next regular election involving the barangay
office concerned is barely 7 months away, the
same having been scheduled in May, 1997.
This judicial decision is part of the legal system
of the Philippines (NCC 8).
RA 7160 is a codified set of laws that
specifically applies to local government units. It
specifically and definitively provides in its Sec.
43-c that the term of office of barangay officials
shall be for three years. It is a special provision

that applies only to the term of barangay

officials who were elected on the second
Monday of May 1994. With such particularity,
the provision cannot be deemed a general law.
Three-Year Term Not Repugnant to Constitution
The Constitution did not expressly prohibit
Congress from fixing any term of office for
barangay officials. It merely left the
determination of such term to the lawmaking
body, without any specific limitation or
prohibition, thereby leaving to the lawmakers
full discretion to fix such term in accordance
with the exigencies of public service. It must be
remembered that every law has in its favor the
presumption of constitutionality. The petitioners
have miserably failed to discharge this burden
and to show clearly the unconstitutionality they
aver.
Constitutional Commission on how long the
term of barangay officials is: As may be
determined by law; more precisely, as
provided for in the Local Autonomy Code (Sec
43-c limits their term to 3 years).
Petitioners Estopped From Challenging Their
Three-Year Terms
Barangay officials are estopped from asking for
any term other than that which they ran for and
were elected to, under the law governing their
very claim to such offices: namely, the LGC.
Petitioners belated claim of ignorance as to
what law governed their election to office in
1994 is unacceptable because under NCC 3,
ignorance of the law excuses no one from
compliance therewith.
Laguna Lake Development Authority vs CA
GR No. 120865-71; Dec. 7 1995

ISSUE:
Who should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna
Lake and its environs insofar as the issuance of
permits for fishing privileges is concerned, the
LLDA or the towns and municipalities comprising
the region?
HELD:
LLDA has jurisdiction over such matters because
the charter of the LLDA prevails over the Local
Government Code of 1991. The said charter
constitutes a special law, while the latter is a
general law. It is basic in statutory construction that
the enactment of a later legislation which is a
general law, cannot be construed to have repealed
a special law. The special law is to be taken as an
exception to the general law in the absence of
special circumstances forcing a contrary
conclusion.
In addition, the charter of the LLDA embodies a
valid exercise of police power for the purpose of
protecting and developing the Laguna Lake region,
as opposed to the Local Government Code, which
grants powers to municipalities to issue fishing
permits for revenue purposes.
Thus it has to be concluded that the charter of the
LLDA should prevail over the Local Government
Code of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.

MAGTAJAS VS. PRYCE PROPERTIES CORP.,

GR # 111097 July 20, 1994

FACTS:
The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA)
was created through Republic Act No. 4850. It was
granted, inter alia, exclusive jurisdiction to issue
permits for the use of all surface water for any
project or activity in or affecting the said region
including navigation, construction, and operation of
fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like.
Then came RA 7160, the Local Government Code
of 1991. The municipalities in the Laguna Lake
region interpreted its provisions to mean that the
newly passed law gave municipal governments the
exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges
within their municipal waters.

FACTS: Petitioners opposed the opening of a

casino in Cagayan de Oro and enacted Ordinance
No. 3353, prohibiting the issuance of business
permit and cancelling existing business permit to
establishment for the operation of casino, and
Ordinance No. 3375-93, prohibiting the operation of
casino and providing penalty for its violation.

Respondents assailed the validity of the ordinances

on the ground that both violated P.D. 1869,
permitting the operation of casinos centralized and
regulated by PAGCOR.
Petitioners contends that pursuant to the Local
Government Code, they have the police power
authority to prohibit the operation of casino for the
general welfare.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance No. 3353 and
Ordinance No. 3375-93 are valid exercise of police
power.
HELD: No. The ordinances violate P.D. 1869,
which has the character and force of a statute as
well as the public policy expressed in the decree
allowing the playing of certain games of chance
despite the prohibition of gambling in general.
Ordinances should not contravene a statute
because local councils exercise only delegated
legislative powers conferred to them by Congress.
Petition is denied.

candidacy on September 10, 1963, he was 24

years, 3 months and 22 days; on election day,
November 12, 1963, he was 24 years, 5 months
and 24 days; and at the time he took his oath of
office as councilor on January 1, 1964,3 he was 24
years, 7 months and 13 days. Whether his age be
reckoned as of the date of the filing of certificate of
candidacy, or the election date, or the date set by
law for the assumption of office the - result is the
same. Whichever date is adopted, still, respondent
was below 25 years of age. The judgment held
Catubig ineligible and declared his seat vacant.
Catubig appealed and alleged that the question of
age eligibility should be governed not by R.A. 170,
and not by R.A. 2259. Republic Act No. 484
amending, inter alia, Section 12 of the Dagupan
City Charter, took effect on June 10, 1950;
whereas, Republic Act No. 2259 became law on
June 19, 1959 - nine years later.
R .A . 170, as amended
Sec. 12 x xx the elective members of the
Municipality Board shall be qualified
electors of the city, residents therein for at least
one year, and not less than twenty- three years
of age. xxx"
R .A .2 2 5 9
Sec. 6.No person shall be a City Mayor, ViceMayor, or Councilor unless he is at least twentyfive years of age, resident of the city for one
year prior to his election and is a qualified
voter.
Issue:
Whether or not Sec. 12 of R.A. 170 of the Dagupan
City Charter, as amended, has been repealed by
Sec. 6 of R.A. 2259

Gaerlan vs Catubig
GR No. 23964, June 1, 1966
Facts:
In the 1963 elections, among the registered
candidates for councilors in the eight -seat City
Council of Dagupan were Gregorio Gaerlan and
Luis Catubig. The latter obtained the third highest
number of votes and was proclaimed one of the
elected councilors while the former lost his bid.
Gaerlan went to the Court to challenge Catubigs
eligibility for office on the averment of non-age.
Catubig was born in Dagupan City on May 19,
1939. At the time he presented his certificate of

Decision:
Yes. The judgment appealed from was affirmed.
The question of whether or not a special law has
been repealed or amended by one or more
subsequent general laws is dependent mainly on
the intent of the Congress in enacting the latter.
The discussions on the floor of Congress show
beyond doubt that its members intended to amend
o r repeal all provisions of special laws inconsistent
with the provisions of Republic Act No. 2259,
except those which are expressly excluded from
the operation thereof. In fact, Section 9 of R.A.
2259 states that
All Acts or parts of Acts, Executive Orders, rules

and regulations in consistent with theprovisions of

thisAc t, are hereby repealed.
Section 1 of R.A. 2259 makes reference to "all
chartered cities in the Philippines, whereas Section
8 excludes from the operation of the Act "the cities
of Manila, Cavite, Trece Martires and Tagaytay",
and Section 4 contains a proviso exclusively for the
City of Baguio, thus showing clearly that all cities
not particularly excepted from the provisions of said
Act are subject thereto. The only reference to
Dagupan City in R.A. 2259 is found in Section 2
stating that voters in said city, and in the City of
Iloilo, are expressly precluded to vote for provincial
officials.
Since Dagupan City is removed from the
exceptions of R.A. 2259, it stands to reason itself
that its charter provision on the age limit is thereby
repealed. Until Congress decrees otherwise, we
are not to tamper with the present statutory set-up.
Rather, we should go by what the legislative body
has expressly ordained.
It is accordingly held that respondent is disqualified
on the ground of non -age because at the time he
filed his certificate of candidacy, at the time of the
election, and at the time he took his oath of office,
he was below the age of 25 years.

catch basin or manhole on P. Burgos Avenue. Due

to the fall, Teotico suffered injuries. Teotico filed
with the CFI Mla complaint against the City which
dismissed the same. On appeal, CA sentenced the
City of Manila to pay damages.
Issue: WON the City of Manila have control or
supervision over P. Burgos Ave making it
responsible for the damages suffered by Teotico.
Ruling: Decision affirmed.
In its answer to the complaint, the City, alleged that
"the streets aforementioned were and have been
constantly kept in good conditionand manholes
thereof covered by the defendant City and the
officers concerned" Thus, the City had, in effect,
admitted that P. Burgos Avenue was and is under
its control and supervision.
Under Article 2189 CC, it is not necessary for the
liability therein established to attach that the
defective roads or streets belong to the province,
city or municipality from which responsibility is
exacted. What said article requires is that the
province, city or municipality have either "control or
supervision" over said street or road. Even if P.
Burgos Avenue were, therefore, a national highway,
this circumstance would not necessarily detract
from the City's "control or supervision."

City of Manila vs. Genaro N. Teotico and CA

G.R. No. L-23052. 29 January 1968.
City Government of San Pablo v. Reyes
Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the CA
FACTS: Sec. 1 PD 551 provides that any provision
Concepcion, J.:
Facts: On January 27, 1958, Teotico was at the
corner of the Old Luneta and P. Burgos Avenue,
Manila, within a "loading and unloading" zone,
waiting for a jeepney. As he stepped down from the
curb to board the jeepney he hailed, and took a few
steps, he fell inside an uncovered and unlighted

of law or local ordinance to the contrary, the

franchise tax payable by all grantees of franchise to
generate, distribute, and sell electric current for
light, heat, and power shall be 25 of their gross
receipts.

Sec. 137 of the LGC states: Notwithstanding any

exemption granted by any law or other special law,
the province may impose a tax on business
enjoying a franchise at a rate not exceeding 50% of
1% of the gross annul receipts.
RULING: the phrase is all-encompassing and clear
that the legislature intended to withdraw all tax
exemptions enjoyed by franchise holders and this

Transit, began operating twelve (12) passenger

buses along his authorized line.
On june 17, 1964, the Municipal Board of
respondent City of Manila, in pursuance to section
18, paragraph hh, of RA no. 409, as amended
(otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the
City of Manila), enacted ordinance no. 4986,
entitled an ordinance Rerouting Traffic on Roads
and Streets within the City of Manila, and for other
purposes, which the city mayor approved. The
pertinent provisions of said ordinance includes;

intent is made more manifest by Sec. 193 of the

Code, when it provides that unless otherwise
provided in this code tax exemptions or incentives
granted to or presently enjoyed by all persons,
except local water districts, cooperatives, and nonstock and non-profit hospitals and educational
institutions, are withdrawn upon the effectivity of the
Code.

Section 1. As a positive measure to relieve the

critical congestion in the City of Manila, which has
grown to alarming and emergency proportions, and
in the best interest of public welfare and
convenience, xxx
Petitioner Lagman claims that the enactment and
enforcement of ordinance no. 4986 is
unconstitutional, illegal, ultra vires, and null and
void. He contends that regulation and control
relating to the use of and traffic of which are vested,
under Commonwealth Act no. 548, in the Director
of Public Works, subject to the approval of the
Secretary of Public Works and Communications.
He also contends that the public Service
Commission has the only right to enact Ordinance
amending or modifying a certificate of public
convenience granted by the said office. In
compliance with Sec. 16(m), public service Act.
Issue:
WON R.A. no. 409, as amended (Revised charter
of the City of Manila) prevails over Commonwealth
Act no. 598 and Public Service law (C.A. no. 146,
as amended)?

Lagman vs. City of Manila

17 SCRA 579 (1966)
Facts:
Petitioner was granted a certificate of public
convenience by the Public service Commission to
operate for public service fifteen (15) auti trucks
with fixed routes and regular terminal for the
transportation of passengers and freight. Pursuant
to the said certificate, petitioner who is doing
business under the name and style of Marco

Held:
Republic act no. 409 prevails. The said act is a
special law and of later enactment than C.A. no 548
and the Public Service law (C.A. no 146, as
amended) so that even if a conflict exist between
the provisions of the former and the latter acts,
Republic Act no. 409 should prevail.
Although the Public Service Commission is
empowered, under Sec. 16(m) of C.A. no 146 to
amend, modify or revoke certificates of public

convenience after notice and hearing, there is no

provision which can be found in this statute vesting
power in the Public Service Commission to
superintend, regulate or control the streets of the
city of manila or suspend its power to license or
prohibit the occupancy thereof. On the other hand,
this authority is conferred upon the city of manila.
The power vested in the public service commission
under section 16(m) is, therefore, subordinate to
the authority granted to the said city under section
18(hh) of its revised charter.
Furthermore, C.A. no. 548 does not confer an
exclusive power or authority upon the Director of
public works------to promulgate rules and
regulations relating to the use of and traffic on
national roads and streets. This being the case,
section 18(m) of the revised charter of the city of
manila is deemed enacted as an exception to the
provisions of C.A. no. 548, for repeals by
implication are not favored, and special law must
be taken as intended to constitute an exception to
the general law, in the absence of special
circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion.
Wherefore, petition for prohibition is hereby
dismissed. With cost against petitioner Benedicto
C. Lagman.

JG SUMMIT HOLDINGS, INC., vs. COURT OF

APPEALS, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION,
ASSET PRIVATIZATION TRUST and PHILYARDS
HOLDINGS
G.R. No. 124293.
November 20, 2000
FACTS:
National Investment and Development Corporation

(NIDC) and Kawasaki Heavy Industries entered into

a Joint Venture Agreement in a shipyard business
named PHILSECO, with a shareholding of 60-40
respectively. NIDCs interest was later transferred
to the National Government.
Pursuant to President Aquinos Proclamation No.5,
which established the Committee on Privatization
(COP) and Asset Privatization Trust (APT), and
allowed for the disposition of the governments nonperforming assets, the latter allowed Kawasaki
Heavy Industries to choose a company to which it
has stockholdings, to top the winning bid of JG
Summit Holdings over PHILSECO. JG Summit
protested alleging that such act would effectively
increase Kawasakis interest in PHILSECOa
shipyard is a public utility--and thus violative of the
Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents act is valid.
HELD:
No. A shipyard such as PHILSECO being a public
utility as provided by law, the following provision of
the Article XII of the Constitution applies:
Sec. 11. No franchise, certificate, or any other form
of authorization for the operation of a public utility
shall be granted except to citizens of the
Philippines or to corporations or associations
organized under the laws of the Philippines at least
sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such
citizens, nor shall such franchise, certificate, or
authorization be exclusive in character or for a
longer period than fifty years. Neither shall any
such franchise or right be granted except under the
condition that it shall be subject to amendment,
alteration, or repeal by the Congress when the
common good so requires. The State shall
encourage equity participation in public utilities by
the general public. The participation of foreign
investors in the governing body of any public utility
enterprise shall be limited to their proportionate
share in its capital, and all the executive and
managing officers of such corporation or
association shall be citizens of the Philippines.
xxx
Notably, paragraph 1.4 of the JVA accorded the
parties the right of first refusal under the same
terms. This phrase implies that when either party
exercises the right of first refusal under paragraph
1.4, they can only do so to the extent allowed them
by paragraphs 1.2 and 1.3 of the JVA or under the
proportion of 60%-40% of the shares of stock.

Thus, should the NIDC opt to sell its shares of

stock to a third party, Kawasaki could only exercise
its right of first refusal to the extent that its total
shares of stock would not exceed 40% of the entire
shares of stock of SNS or PHILSECO. The NIDC,
on the other hand, may purchase even beyond
60% of the total shares. As a government
corporation and necessarily a 100% Filipino-owned
corporation, there is nothing to prevent its purchase
of stocks even beyond 60% of the capitalization as
the Constitution clearly limits only foreign
capitalization.
MR, September 24, 2003

land on installment with a certain Josefa A. Jopson

for P11, 250.00. In accordance with the contract,
Jopson paid petitioner P1, 650.00 as her down
payment, leaving a balance of P9, 600.00.
Sometime in December 1983, Jopson assigned
and transferred all her rights and interests over the
property in question in favor of the respondent
Ulyssis Guides.In the deed of transfer, respondent
undertook to assume the balance of Jopsons
account and to pay the same in accordance with

MR, January 31, 2005

the terms and conditions of the Contract to Sell

.After reimbursing Jopson P1,650.00, respondent
acquired possession of the lot and paid petitioner
the stipulated amortizations which were in turn
acknowledged by petitioner through receipts Issued
in the name of respondent.

Believing that she had fully paid the purchase price

of the lot, respondent verified the status of the lot
with the Register of Deeds, only to find out that title
thereto was not in the name of the petitioner as it
was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
105742 Issued on 26 September 1978 in the name
of a certain Carissa T. de Leon. Respondent went
to petitioners office to secure the title to the lot, but
petitioner informed her that she could not
as she still had unpaid accounts. Thereafter,
respondent, through a lawyer, sent a letter to
PALANCA VS. GUIDES

petitioner demanding compliance with his obligation

and the release of the title in her name. As

452 SCRA 461

petitioner did not heed her demands, respondent,

joined by her husband, filed a Complaint for specific

Facts: On 23 August 1983, petitioner Simplicio

Palanca executed a Contract to Sell a parcel of

performance with damages on 16 December 1987.

P1,650.0 down payment paid by Jopson at the

commencement of the contract. There is no
Issue: WON there was substantial payment made.

indication that he informed respondent of the

alleged forfeiture, much more demanded the
payment again of the amount previously paid by

Ruling: Primarily preventing petitioner from

Jopson.

recovering the amounts claimed from respondent is

the effective waiver of these charges. Assuming
that said charges are due, petitioner waived the
same when he accepted respondents payments
without qualification, without any specific demand
for the individual charges he now seeks to recover.
The same goes true for the alleged forfeiture of the
down payment made by Jopson. From its own
Statement of Accounts & Payments Made,
petitioner credited to respondents account the

Thus, when petitioner accepted respondents

installment payments despite the alleged charges
incurred by the latter, and without any showing that
he protested the irregularity of such payment, nor
demanded the payment of the alleged charges,
respondents liability, if any for said charges, is
deemed fully satisfied.