To what extent has the political legitimacy of the CCP been affected by the

negative consequences of its rural policies?

Many of Chinas rural and socio-economic policies, which support rapid
urbanization and industrialization that contributed to the high growth, were
however, at the expense of the rural-agrarian community. As of 2005, about
40-50million farmers lost their lands to urbanization and industrialization,
with little or no compensation. The policies adopted by the CCP since 1978
hav egiven rise to negative consequences such as dwindling peasant
income, increasing urban-rural inequalities and resultant growing discontent.
The spikes in rural protests up to 2006, create social instability that
challenges the political legitimacy of the CCP. The CCP which had itself risen
to power based on the twin pillar of support from the workers and peasants
and on the promise of an egalitarian society, were undoubtedly aware of the
political time bomb that the rural discontent would constitute. This essay
seeks to argue that the political legitimacy of the CCP government is
affected, but not severely threatened, by the negative consequences of its
rural policies. While sporadic spikes in peasant protests due to the negative
consequences of Chinas rural policies challenged in the CCPs political
ideology and legitimacy, they do not threaten its leadership as they were
uncoordinated and were not targeted at seeking political changes. At the
same time, the CCP was able, through authoritative efficiency; to manage
the delicate balance between growing the economy and managing the
growing rural discontent through concerted effort at constant review and
revision of the rural policies to bring about social and economic development
in the rural regions. With a strong economy, the CCPs political leadership
looks secure.
Local misgovernance as a result of agrarian decentralization led to outright
exploitative of many peasants who in turn viewed the CCP government as
exploitative. Before 2006, development in the rural community was directly
impacted by a two-key policies, the privatization and grain procurement
policies. The early grain procurement policies suppressed grain prices, the
main form of rural productivity, in order to allow cities to sustain low costs of
living. This price suppression was made possible by the mandatory grain
contracts between farmers and the government. The system was
decentralized as each province was given the responsibility of ensuring its
own food supply. Lack of proper governance and corrupt by local officials in a
decentralized system resulted in high taxation of the farmers and illicit
acquisition of agrarian land for urban and industrial development. According
to a study by the UN Development Program, more than 50 million farmers
have been displaced by such land grabs with little or no compensation.
These landless peasants have been pushed to the bottom rung of Chinas
poverty ladder. The land seizure and diminishing income of the remaining
peasants due to high inflation which hit a high of 6.9% in 2005 resulted in
mass migration of rural workers to the cities and industrial regions. There

was a statistical rise in reported public order disturbances in the

countryside, from being virtually non-existent in Maos era to more than
87000 in 2005. The CCP rose to power predicated on promises of an
egalitarian society which was in the best interest of the peasant majority.
Instead of delivering the communist paradise the privatization of land
coupled with rural autonomy led to regressive and disproportionate
taxation of the peasants, environmental degradation of agrarian land due
to illicit industrial use and land seizure by local authorities without just
compensation.
From the ideology perspective, the rural policies and lop-sided development
strategy gave rise to consequences that contradicted the Marxist/Communist
egalitarian ideals. CCPs developmental strategy for China has been aimed at
stimulating urban growth at the expense of rural well-being. Such has
resulted in widening social and regional disparity. After three decades of procapitalist reform, rural China suffers from widening income gap between
urban and rural, which in 2005 was officially 3:1. When factors such as social
services, healthcare and education were taken into account, the difference
was an astounding 7:1. Between 2002 to2004, there was a rise from about
54000 to 74000 reports of rural unrests. This can be traced to Chinas
ascension into the WTO in 2001, when the removal of trade barriers on
agricultural imports has led to cheaper grains from overseas flooding the
Chinese market. The increased influx of FDI which helped spur the urban
development has in turn created high inflation which further diminished the
purchasing power and relative wealth of the farmers.
Mass migration into the cities in search of better prospects to escape from
rural poverty also created potentials of instability for the CCP regime.
Peasantry migration to the cities, which provided cheap labour to fuel the
labour-intensive industries in China hence attracting FDI created labour
shortages in the farmland and inevitably result in an impoverished
countryside. Each year, about 20million from the countryside would migrate
to the coastal cities. Domestic migrants as such caused social problems for
the coastal cities from Chinese policies where are understaffed to handle the
sudden population increase. Subsequently, millions have become
unemployed as numerous export-oriented factories are closed down due to
shrinking global demands given the 2008-2009 financial downturns. Hordes
of unemployed millions as such could be a major time bomb to the CCP
regime.
Meanwhile, diminishing food production relative to rapidly rising urban
populace could adversely threaten CCPs political legitimacy. Lack of
incentive and surplus capital for research and development of better farming
technologies have resulted in the relatively backwardness of Chinese
agricultural. Given the absence of private land ownership, amalgamation of
smaller estates to form larger farms are not common in China. This resulted

in Chinese farms not having the advantage of in EOS in their production

capacity, Chinese food reserves have plunged from a guaranteed three-year
supply to the current stock of less than three months. This could threaten the
political standing of the CCP as traditionally; the legitimacy of a Chinese
government is often based on its ability to deliver food to its people.
However, on closer analysis, the bulk of the peasant protests do not appear
to be politically motivated. They were mainly airing of local grievances
without the kind of politically aspirations that may pose a realistic threat to
the regime. The mass decentralization of rural activities, isolate and confine
such public disturbances to their region and percent their spread or the
formation of a unified mobilization by political adversaries. Simple pockets of
peasants airing materialistic grievances of dissatisfaction over local officials
cannot political changes. Local feedback mechanisms instituted by the
government further divide and isolate the magnitude and focus of rural
unhappiness. The fact that many brought their petitions to Beijing implied
common trust in the integrity of the central government, despite misrule by
the authorities.
The CCP, mindful that the rural unrest as a consequence of its failed rural
policies would adversely impact its political legitimacy and leadership, took
steps to appease the rural protestors. The Go West and the Socialist
Countryside policies implemented in 2006 were attempts to bring social,
health and educational benefits to the countryside through urbanization and
commercialization of the inland provinces. It is still left to be seen if these
again well-intended policies would be sufficient to appease the rural
majority. The 2008 Sichuan earthquake and Beijing Olympics had temporarily
diverted attention from the rural discount. Despite the urban-based
development, the peasants could have benefited from the economic growth,
had there been a trickle-down effect. Most developing countries such as
Japan, Korea and Taiwan underwent urban-based development as
industrialization involves transferring rural surplus to the urban areas for
industrial development. The economic wealth however failed to trickle down
to the peasants due to largely poor governance in the implementation of
policies and corruption at the regional level. The lack of good governance
and corruption are major issues for the CCP to address in order to maintain
political credibility and legitimacy.
Successful economic reforms as a result of CCPs urban-based strategy have
muted many strong and fierce criticisms of the governments problematic
rural policies. The CCPs political legitimacy hinges on its ability to bring
about sustained economic wealth and to find a balance between rapid
economic growth at the expense of peasants, and peasant welfare through
state subsidies, at the expense of the economy. This no doubt placed the
CCP in a limbo between two very similar but apparently mutually exclusive
macro-objectives. The tough authoritarian and pragmatic rural policies which

supported rapid urbanization and industrialization were seen as necessary to

fuel the competitive advantage of Chinese industry and economy. Swift
economic growth also led to rapid urbanization which in turn resulted in more
than half of Chinas population living in cities. The number of peasants
resulted in the magnitude of rural discontent hence diminished, while on the
other hand, most urban dwellers are largely grateful to and proud of their
governments economic achievements.
In conclusion, despite mass rural migration to the town and cities due to
growing disenchantment with the rural policies, there remain a significant
number in the rural community who collectively could still constitute a
serious challenge to the CCPs leadership. In the meantime, general
elevation of the peoples standard of living by the CCP and the partys
modification of its peasant-based ideology orthodoxy, have also contributed
to the relative insulation of the partys political legitimacy from the rural
unrests.