Social Forces, University of North Carolina Press

Is Political Sociology Informed by Political Science?

Author(s): Alexander Hicks
Source: Social Forces, Vol. 73, No. 4 (Jun., 1995), pp. 1219-1229
Published by: University of North Carolina Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2580443 .
Accessed: 22/02/2011 17:04
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unless
you have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and you
may use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.
Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained at .
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=uncpress. .
Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed
page of such transmission.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Social Forces, University of North Carolina Press and University of North Carolina Press are collaborating
with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Social Forces.

http://www.jstor.org

Is Political Sociology
Informed by Political Science?*
ALEXANDERHICKS,Emory University

Abstract
T7hisarticle maps out some interdependenciesbetweenpolitical science and political
sociology.It then details some lessons that political sociologistsmight takefrom four
contemporaryliteratures in political science: (1) rational choice work on rational
individualaction in institutionalcontext;(2) the "nonlinearsocial systems"literature
on the contextual determinationof intensely embeddedsocial actions; (3) the gametheoreticliteratureon strategicinteractionsamonglargeemergentclass and stateactors;
and (4) a more qualitative,inductive, and contextualizedapproachto the analysis of
class and state actionextending the traditionof BarringtonMoore.Thefour literatures
share a commitmentto social action that is decreasinglycommonamong sociologists.
Yet they address questions of institutional constraint, contextual dynamics, and
macrosocialhistory akin to those that are engaging their sociologicalcontemporaries.
T7hisbalanceof attention betweenaction and its constraintsis the commonelement
drawnfrom the severalinstructivepoliticalscienceliteratures.

Political sociology and political science are deeply interdependent. Thus, there
is much relevant work in political science that should and does inform political
sociology. I will start out by mapping the interdependence between these two
disciplines. Then, I will detail some particular lessons that political sociologists
would be wise to take from political science.
Few differences in metatheory and method separate political sociology and
political science. A decade ago, the influence of rational choice theory appeared
so much greater within political science than within political sociology that this
influence alone might have served to sharply distinguish the two. However,
with the sociological assimilation of the rational choice perspective, this is no
longer the case. Indeed, the metatheories and methods of the two are almost
precisely the same: institutional and neoinstitutional; behaviorist and behavioralist; neofunctionalist and neo-Marxist; elite/managerial and pluralist and neopluralist; hermeneutic and postmodern; and multivariate, historicist and
comparative historical.
* I would like to thank CourtneyBrown,TimothyDowd, WalterGove,ThomasLancaster,and
Darren Sherkatfor their suggestions. Direct correspondenceto reprints to AlexanderHicks,
Departmentof Sociology, Emory University,Atlanta, GA 30322.

? The University of North CarolinaPress

Social Forces, June 1995, 73(4):1219-1229

1220 / Social Forces 73:4, June 1995

One of the principalreasonsfor such greatsimilaritiesshould alreadybe

apparent:politicalscience relies heavily upon sociology for muchbasic theory
and method.For example,duringthe 1960s,Michigansocial psychologistsand
HarvardParsonsiansfundamentallyshapedpoliticalscienceagendasin political
behaviorand politicaldevelopment,respectively.MorerecentlyThedaSkocpol
(1992) has crucially impacted upon the ongoing historicist turn in political
science. A second reason is that our two focal specialtiesdraw upon similar
thirdparties:economicsand history,biometricsand econometrics,psychology
and anthropology.Indeed,many importationsfrom thirdpartiesinto political
science - path analysis, "thick description"and the like - flow through
sociologicalintermediariesbeforeenteringthe politicalscience market.
So far my model of the interdependenciesof the two disciplines is too
heavily tilted toward a sociological subordinationof political science, but
political sociology also dependson politicalscience.First,despite a paucityof
basictheoreticalcontributionsfrompoliticalscienceto politicalsociology,it may
be claimedthatpoliticalsociologistslive off politicalscientists'reprocessingsof
politicallyraw sociologicalmaterials.Forexample,yearsago Michiganattitudebehaviortheory came back to us as TheAmericanVoter(Campbellet al. 1960)
while today, as we shall see, the ColumbiaSchool voting model of Berelson,
Lazersfeld,and McPhee(1954)retums to us as Brown's(1991)Ballotsof Tumult.
Secondly,many influencesfrom such disciplinarythirdpartiesas history and
economics come to us reprocessedby political science as well. For example,
political scientist Stephen Skowronek's (1982) history of American public
administrationappears to have been an importantconduit for the flow of
historiographicinformationon the Americanstate to Skocpol.To give a second
example,Douglas A. Hibbs's (1977)popularizationof ARIMAwas to sociologists what Otis Dudley Duncan's (1966)introductionto path analysis was to
politicalscientists.Finally,politicalscientistsdo regularlyproducecontributions
to the study of politics thatmust, from the perspectiveof politicalsociology as
a subfield,if not sociologyas a field and metatheory,be consideredbasic.These
contributionsrange from Truman (1951) and Dahl (1961) on pluralism to
Przeworski(1985)on class compromise.If politicalscienceis disproportionately
dependentupon sociology for basic theory,it is also true thatthe 500 members
of thePoliticalSociologysectionof theAmericanSociologicalAssociation(ASA)
are heavily dependent upon the 16,000 members of the AmericanPolitical
ScienceAssociation(APSA)for much of theirscholarlyknowledgeof politics.
Butis politicalsociologyinformedby the relevantworkin politicalscience?
Morespecifically,arewe abreastof what politicalsciencehas to offerus today?
Withouttryingto sampleour two specializationsextensivelyand systematically
enough to answer this question definitively,I shall examinefour domains of
politicalinvestigationchosen for theirrelevanceto sociology acrossa rangeof
specific subjectmattersand generaltheoreticalapproaches.
Lesson from a Sibling Discipline
Specifically,I address four types of inquiry displayedin Table1. These types
are defined by the cross-classificationof two simple distinctions.One is the
distinction between relatively individual and relatively emergent levels of

PoliticalSociologyand PoliticalScience/ 1221

analysis. The other is the distinctionbetween economisticallyoriented - or
rationalchoice - approacheson the one hand and more thoroughlysociologically orie4xtedtheoreticalapproacheson the otherhand. In using the individual/emergent (or micro/macro) distinction,I arbitrarilyallocateconcernswith
micro-macrolinkages and meso levels to the micro side of the divide. In
distinguishing between rational choice and more distinctively sociological
modes of theorizing,I recognizethe greatprominenceof rationalchoicewithin
political science. By cross-tabulatingthese distinctions,I arriveat the political
science literaturesin the four cells of Table1.
The four literaturesare these. In cell A of the TableI have placed rational
choicework on individualactionin institutionalcontext- principallythe work
of KennethShepsle (1979)and collaboratorson legislativeinstitutions.In cell B
is the so-callednonlinearsocial systemsliteratureassociatedwith JohnSprague
and his students(Huckefeld,Brown,and others).In cell C is macrorationalclass
analysis- principallythemathematicalmodelsof Przeworski,Wallerstein,and
collaborators(1988)on strategicinteractionsamong large emergentclass and
state actors. In cell D is work stressing more qualitative, inductive, and
contextualizedconceptionsof class and state action - conceptionscuriously
now more alive in political science than in sociology.
The New (RationalChoice) Institutionalism
A "new institutionalism' now thrives in political science that is curiously
opposite in key regardsto the new institutionalismin sociology. EI sociology,
the new institutionalismtypicallyhas tendedto eschew social actors,individuals above all, by subtendingthem to "institutionalrules"and "scripts"that,by
shaping ritual and routineforms of behavior,determineall action (see Meyer,
Boll & Thomas1987).Less often,if more recently,it has tendedto emphatically
stake out a place for the actor, only to leave this place, in most instances,a
thinlyarticulatedand marginallocale (seeDiMaggio&Powell 1991;but also see
Dobbin1994).In politicalscience,the new institutionalismhas sustaineda place
for the individual actor that resembles the central one allotted this actor in
orthodoxmicroeconomics,but it has done so while systematicallyembedding
individual action in institutional context. In particular,it has stressed the
instrumentalbehavior- perceivedas semiautonomous- of rationalindividuals under institutionalconstraint.
The key literatureis the literatureon how legislatorsprovide benefitsfor
the constituenciesback in their home districts. This problem is central to
legislative systems for reasons well attuned to a rationalchoice solution. All
legislatorsare underpressureto providebenefitsto those who elect them.This
is especiallytrueof legislators,like U.S.legislators,who representwinner-takesall electoraldistrictsand who also belong to relativelyundisciplinedpolitical
parties. Despite the pressure for "constituencyservice,"as it is called, many
governmental goods wanted by local constituents are so specific to and
heterogeneous across electoral district that they have no "naturalelectoral
majorities"thatfavor them.Of course,elaborate"logrolling"exercisesprovide
a possible solution to the problem of attendingto specialized local interests.

1222 / Social Forces 73:4,June1995

TABLE1: Some Innovative Areas in Contemporary Political Science
MetatheoreticalPerspective

Micro (and
Micro/Macro)
Level of
Analysis
Macro

Economic

Sociological

New
(Rationalchoice)
Institutionalism

Nonlinear
Contextual
Modeling

Macro-Rational
Class Analysis

MacroHistorical
Comparative
Social Action

However,logrollingarrangements- often dauntinglycomplexfor even small

numbersof actors - are far easier to propose than to enforce.Bills for which
supportis exchangedin the process of logrollingmust be voted upon in some
sequence,so beneficiariesof early votes may be inclined to defect from those
who hope to benefitfromvotes cominglaterin the sequence.Moreover,for any
group of legislators with interests in a set of bills planned for passage via
logrolling, there may be a larger group of other legislatorswho not only are
indifferentto logrollingbecauseit offersthemno benefitsbut who are actually
opposed to logrollingbecauseit imposes tax burdenson them.
One solution to the dilemma of logrolling has been proposed and, to a
considerableextent,found to hold. Thisresidesin the constraintsand incentives
facing legislators in the form of the rules of the committeeorganizationof the

For example,for the case of the U.S. House of Representatives,the

legislature.
rules for self-selectionto committeetype and the rules for seniorityassignment
to committee rank assure that some institutionalizedreputations,resources,
sanctioningpower, and expertisewill be mobilizedfor at least as many issues
as thereare committees,indeed as thereare subcommittees.Underthe brilliant
theorizingof KennethShepsle(1979,1989),BarryWeingast(1979),JohnFerejohn
(1974) and others, mathematicalmodels of the policy making actions of
individuallegislatorshave been developedin the rathergeneraltermsof the socalled "theory of structurallyinduced equilibria"(also see Krehbiel 1991;
Shepsle&Weingast1981,1987;Weingast&Marshall1988).Pursuingthis theory
and a kindredone thatGeorgeTsebelis(1990)has called the theoryof "institutionally embedded games," political scientists have devised explanationsof
questionsof politicalactionsin a wide rangeof institutionallyembeddedgamelike situations.Indeed, from the perspectiveof rationalchoice theory,which
claimsprescriptiveas well as descriptivevalueforits formulation,thesetheories
have allowed political scientiststo tacklethe riddle of individuallymotivated
effective collective action in a potentially extensive range of situations.The
literaturein questionofferspoliticalsociologistsformalmodels of behaviorin

PoliticalSociologyand PoliticalScience/ 1223

social context,of micro-macrolinkages,and of actorseffectiveenoughto devise
and create routines and rituals as well as reenactthem. Indeed, in its latest
incarnation,it offerstheorizingon the origins,and not just the consequences,of
institutions(Shepsle1989).In short,it offersus instructivemodels for the study
of individual action in social context,as well as for the study of institutional
structureas the outcomeof collectivebehavior.2
Nonlinear Social Systems
The literatureon nonlinear social systems provides a second contrastfrom
politicalscienceto the sociology'svirtuallyactorless'new institutionalism."
Like
"rationalinstitutionalism,"this approachaddressessocial institutionswith one
foot at the individual level of analysis. Unlike it, this theory tends toward a
stress on the orientingor energizingrole of the social - or, at least, of other
individuals- ratherthanstressingthe causalexogeneityof ego. Withits center
of gravityshifted outwardinto the social context,rationalitybecomesdifficult
to incorporateand is marginalizedwhen it is not eschewed.The focus here is
on each individualactingin the contextof a field of social forcesthatimpinges
on his or her action.Indeed,the focus is on each individualalso actingbackon
the impingingsocial field in ways that impacton the constitutionof the field.
The lensis a compoundof two varietiesof raw material,one sociological,the
secondbiological- bothnotablymathematical.Amongthetheory'ssociological
elements, we have the work of Bill McPhee entitled FormalTheoriesof Mass
Behavior(1963) and of James Coleman entitled Introduction
to Mathematical
Sociology(1964).Among the biologicalelements,we have, foremost,the recent
nonlinearmodellingframeworksand estimationtechniquesof biologistRobert
in ModelEcosystems
May's Stabilityand Complexity
(1973).The keywords of the
and embeddedapproach,viewed substantively,areactor,higher-level
organization,
ness, while, viewed more formally, they are interdependence,
complexity,and
nonlinearity.3
To radicallycondense matters,the approachframesthe specificationand
estimationof nonlinear(andmultiplicative)models thatcan representsome of
the complexityof interdependenciesbetween actorsand higher level systems.
It is able to do so thanks,in good part, to recentdevelopmentsin high-speed
computing,as well as May's modellinginnovations.The approachyields both
down-to-earthsolutionsto longstandingproblemsandnovel conceptualizations
of social reality.CourtneyBrown's(1987)articleon the perennialquestion,Who
voted for the Nazis in 1930and 1932?providesa fine exampleof the approach
crackingan old nut. It indicatesthatNazi voterscome principallyfromformer
partisansof Germany'snon-Catholiccentristparties- but contingently.Nazi
voterscome fromruralProtestantcontextsin 1930and urbanProtestantones in
1932. Brown's(1993)recent "NonlinearCatastropheTheoryin the Fall of the
WeimarRepublic"providesa memorableexampleof a novel conceptualization.
Specifically, it constructs a new puzzle for historical investigation:what
confluence of forces describes the highly complex, nonlinearsurfacesacross
which (Brownshows) Weimarvoterzoomed and plummetedduringthe period
from 1928 to 1932?

1224 / Social Forces 73:4,June1995

This new literatureon nonlinearsocial systems offerspoliticalsociologists
an operationallyviable returnto the social systemicsof such classic works as
McPhee's FormalTheoriesof Mass Behavior(1963) and Coleman's Introductionto

Mathematical
Sociology(1964). Moreover, the offer comes in such engaging
contemporary packages as Przeworski and Sprague's (1986) magnificent
reconstructionof the dynamicsof a half centuryof SocialDemocraticvoting in
PaperStonesand CourtneyBrown's(1991)enthrallingsummaryof U.S.electoral
history in Ballotsof Tumult.Indeed,it offersa generalframeworkfor modeling
behavioralchange in social context when theory stresses the causal force of
context over agent.
Macrorational Class Analysis

This specializationbuilds on a dual foundation.One part of this consists of

substantiveinsights for the neo-Marxistliteratureon the state.The second half
consistsof formalanalyticalmethodsfromorthodoxeconomics,game theoryin
particular.At its core, the approach involves game theory about strategic
interactionsamong capital,labor,state and mass electoratesunder constraints
imposed by their encompassing political-economicsystems. Neo-Marxist
insights are wedded to rationalchoice modes of formaltheorizingby means of
simplificationsof key actorsinto manageablenumberof game-theoreticplayers
and thenestingof actionwithinmacroeconomicmodels.Inparticular,capitalists
and workers(typicallyin the formof unifiedemployeror union confederations)
are viewed as unitaryactors,while unitarystate action is attributedto unified
governments.Rationalchoice analysis is accommodatedto neo-Marxistand
neoclassicaleconomic insights by means of an analyticalshift. This switches
attentionfrommodels of N-personcognitivemarketsin whichindividualactors
react to seemingly impersonal market mechanisms - the situation most
commonlystudied by economists- to models of two-to-fourperson games in
which the strategiesof collectiveactorsprevail.
Key works are Przeworskiand Wallerstein's(1982)"TheStructureof Class
and their"StructuralDependenceof
Conflictin DemocraticCapitalist-Societies"
the Stateon Capital"(1988).The formerpresentsa model in which unitaryand
encompassing organization of capital and labor seek to maximize their
temporallydiscountedlong-termincome flows; and it identifiesconditionsfor
positive-sum,as well as of zero-sum,relationsbetween capital and labor.For
example,pitchedbattlesover income sharesoccurin societies where capitalists
equilibriumresults from worker wage
consume profits, but a growth-oriented
restraint and capitalist investment of profits, reinforced by governments
disposed to enforce equitable redistributionof any aggregate gains from
Dependence"articleexamines
investmentout of forgonewages. The"Structural
the argument that the state is structurallydependent on capital to avoid
redistributionfrom capitalists to workers. 'This argument assumes - or
hypothesizes - that such dependenceobtainsin the sense thatno government
can simultaneouslyredistributeincomefromcapitaland containprices,sustain
profits and buoy investment. This article finds that such strictly structural
dependencedoes not hold when a governmentredistributesonly money raised

PoliticalSociologyand PoliticalScience/ 1225

throughtaxes on uninvestedprofits.4Elaborationsof such modellingexercises
in open economies are the latest developmentsin this literature,which weds
many of the problemsand conceptualizationsof the Marxisttheoryof the state
to methods(e.g.,game theory)and theoreticalformulations(e.g.,open-economy
macroeconomics)from orthodoxeconomics.5
Historical ComparativeSocial Action
Finally, I turn to a fourth literature,and a second macromodel,of actors in
social action.Thisliteratureis one that
context,to macrohistorical-comparative
substantiallybridges the politicalscience/politicalsociology divide, but that
may be slipping off the sociologicalmap at just the time that it is coming to
fruitionin politicalscience.Here,I referto works in the traditionof Barrington
andDemocracy
Moore'sTheSocialoriginsofDictatorship
(1966).Likemacrorational
class analysis,this approachfocuseson the strategicpursuitof interestsby class
actorsin institutionalcontext.However, its methods are not formalmodeling
but comparativeand historicalinduction.Thesemethodspermitconsideration
of endogenous,temporallyevolving actor identitiesand interests,ratherthat
positing exogenous ones. They are open to the contingenciesof historyand to
the revelationsof the historicalrecord.
Perhaps the most distinguishedrecentwork in this traditionis Ruescheand Democracy.
meyer, Stephens,and Stephens's (1992) CapitalistDevelopment
This work transcendsMoore'sseminal effortalong these lines by means of its
scope and thoroughness.In particular,it expandsMoore'strio of peasant,high
actorsinto a sextetof determinantsby adding
bourgeoisand landed-aristocratic
threenew social forces:the workingclass, the petty bourgeoisie,and the state.
This approach,furthermore,expands Moore's cases from the large Western
Europeanstates, the U.S., Russia and China by dropping the last two but
adding all the small nationsof WesternEuropeand the bulk of the Britishand
Iberiansettler colonies. Then,by means of literallydozens of meticulouscase
studies and an unprecedentednumberby systematiccomparison,it clarifies
such mattersas the origins of full-male-franchisedemocraciesthroughoutthe
WesternEuropeanand Anglo-Ibericworld, the fates of the Europeandemocracies between the WorldWars,and the century'scycles of democratization,dedemocratizationand re-democratizationin LatinAmericaand the Caribbean.
andDemocracy
have spent
Development
True,the three authorsof Capitalist
abouthalf of theirprofessionallives within departmentsof sociology.However,
the other contemporaryworks that are closest to theirsin approach- Lange,
Ross and Vanicelli's(1982)Union,Change,andCrisis,Alexis PeterGourevitch's
andMarkets,
(1986)Politicsin HardTimes,JohnR. Freeman's(1989)Democracy
SocialDemocracy
and Geoffrey
FritzScharpf's(1991)CrisisandChoicein European
- are the products
Garrett'sforthcomingPartisanPoliticsin theGlobalEconomy
of clear-cutpolitical scientists. They signal a migration of ambitious crossnationalhistoricalcomparativeclass analysis to politicalscience.Perhapsthis
migration is due to the push of sociology's recent turns in institutionalist,
historicist,and culturaldirectionswhich increasinglypoint to nonclassfoundations for social action when they do not, indeed, ignore the actor entirely.

1226 / Social Forces 73:4,June1995

Perhaps it is also due to the pull of the recent class analyticalturn and the
recentcomparative-historical
resurgencein politicalscience.Whatever,the case,
although the changes flattersociology as the more au courantdiscipline,they
transferthe maturationof a valuabletraditionaway from sociology, unless we
begin to claim a largershare of the traditionof BarringtonMoore.'
Thebroadoutlines of an explanationfor this shift or transferare suggested
by my overall sketch of four political science literaturesrelevant to political
sociology.Indeed,explanationof the class-analyticalshiftto politicalscienceand
the sociologicalneglect of the four literaturesthatI have reviewedstrikeme as
interlinked.Above all, as politicalscientistshave assimilatedthe latestemphasis
on institutions,cultureand historicity,they have done so without throwingout
the actor.Perhapsbecauseof theirsubstantively
definedmission, theirstress on
a particularpoliticaldomain of inquiry rather than a particular mode of
theorizing - sociological, economic, psychological,or whatever - political
scientistshave tended to gain ratherthanlose balanceas they have come under
the influenceof the new supraindividualapproachesto social science.Perhaps
becauseof the focus of theirlargenumberson a specificpoliticalareaof inquiry,
their traditional susceptibility to theoreticalinfluences from all the social
sciencesand theirvery extensiveappliedpressuresand responsibilities,political
scientistshave tended to respondtemperatelyto such theoreticalvogues as the
structuralist and poststructuralistrejection of the actor.7I think that the
literatures highlighted here make exemplary progress on two fronts: one
balancingthe generaland the concreteand the secondbalancingsocial structure
and social action.For these reasons - not to speak of theirdeep immersionin
their subject matter - I recommend these literaturesnot only to political
sociologists but to all sociologists.

Notes
1. Within the discipline of political science, only the large and influential political science
subfield of internationalrelationswith its origins in the politicalrealisttraditionof Machiavelli,
Hobbes, Clausewitz, Morgenthau, and Kissinger may be unique to the political science
discipline - despite realist interpretationsby such sociologicalforebearsas Paretoand Mosca.
True, political science differs dramaticallyfrom sociology in the prominenceof its explicitly
normative strand - devoted to theorizing about what ought to be rather than what is.
However, this differencerecedes from view if we focus attentionon the scienti.pc
cores of our
two contrastedgroups of scholars.
2. Sociological work that attempts to treat rational action in social context is increasingly
common, but seldom theorizes rigorously, much less formally, about the actual rational
calculationsthat tie context to choice and choice to action.However, some work of clear formal
rigor with regard to actors'calculationsis being done (e.g., Coleman1990;Heckathorn1990),
as well as work of rigor and inventiveness in its considerationof context (Hechter1987,1992;
Oliver & Marwell 1988).
3. Note that I am referringto the Colemanof Introduction
to Maathematical
Sociology(1964),who
is not the rationalchoice advocate and revisionistof Foundations
of Sociological
Theory(1990)but
who is, instead, a Columbia school formalizerand innovatorof an earlier era (see'Berelson,
Lazersfeld & McPhee 1954; McPhee 1963). Contemporarysociological work with close
theoretical affinities to the nonlinear social systems literature can be found in ecological

PoliticalSociologyand PoliticalScience/ 1227

demography(e.g.,Namboodiri1988).In addition,some action-orientedworks thatuse network
theories stressing nodes and actors over relations, and that also have clear substantive
relevanceto the nonlinearsocial systems literaturecan be found (e.g., Mizruchi1992;Oliver &
Marwell 1988).
4. This seemingly utopian arrangementactually approximatesthe Germanpolitical economic
system, althoughthat system's Bundesbankperhapseliminatesany capitalistneed for structural
control of the state (Przeworski1985).
5. I am not aware of any work by sociologists that is sufficiently involved in the rational
calculations of macroactors to qualify definitively as macrorational class analysis, but
applicationsof Heckathorn(1990) to macroscopicclass actors might qualify.
6. I do not mean to imply that the shift in the balance of macrocomparativestudies of class
action from sociology to political science has led or will lead to a complete evacuationof classcentered studies by sociologists. Excellentclass-centered,macrocomparativestudies of class
social action are stil done by sociologists, albeit seldom without strong statist and cultural
thrusts (e.g., Steinmetz 1993). Moreover,actions of classes and class segments still appear on
stage in works that are as emphaticallynon-class-analyticalas Skocpol (1992), even at stage
center (Mann1993). Needless to say, excellent studies by political scientists often marginalize
class, not to speak of social action (see Weir1993;and Skowronek,1982, respectively).The shift
class actionfromsociology to politicalscienceis perhaps
of emphasison comparative-historical
less pronounced if fundamentallyquantitativeworks are allowed to qualify as such studies
(cf. Huber, Stephens & Ragin 1993; Westem 1993). However, even for quantitativeworks a
"perhaps"is essential in light of the considerablerecentrate of increasein quantitativestudies
of cognitive-historicalclass action by political scientists (e.g., Alvarez, Garrett& Lange 1991;
Swank 1992).
7. 1 do not censure complications
or even diminutionsof the roles of actorshere, only rejections
of actors.
References
Alvarez, Michael R, and GeoffreyGarrett,and Peter Lang.1991. "GovernmentalPartnership,
Labor Organizationand MacroeconomicPerformance."AmericanPoliticalScienceReview
85:839-56.
BerelsonrBeniard, and Paul Lazersfeld, and William McPhee. 1954. Voting.University of
Chicago Press.
Brown, Courtney.1987. 'Voter Mobilizationand Party Competitionin a Volatile Electorate."
Review52:59-72.
AmericanSociological
_
. 1991. Ballotsof Tumult:A Portraitof Volatilityin AmericanVoting.University of Michigan
Press.
. 1993. "Nordinear Catastrophe Theory in the Fall of the Weimar Republic." Paper
presented at the annual meeting of the AmericanPoliticalScienceAssociation,Washington, D.C., 2-5 December.
Campbell, Angus, Phillip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes. 1960. 7he
AmericanVoter.Wiley.
to Mathematical
Sociology.Free Press.
Coleman,JamesS. 1964. Introduction
.1990. Foundations of SocialTheory.Belknap Press.
and Opposition.
Yale UniversityPress.
Participation
Dahl, RobertA. 1971. Polyarchy:
DiMaggio, Paul J., and Walter W. Powell. 1991. 'Introduction.' Pages 140 in The New
Institutionalismin OrganizationalAnalysis, edited by Walter W. Powell and Paul J.
Dimaggio. University of Chicago Press.
Dobbin,Frank 1994. ForgingIndustrialPolicy:TheUnitedStates,BritainandFrancein theRailway
Ae. CambridgeUniversity Press.

1228 / Social Forces 73:4, June 1995

Duncan, Otis Dudley. 1966. "Path Analysis: Sociological Examples."AmericanJournalof
Sociology72:1-16.
Ferejohn,John.1974. PorkBarrelPolitics.StanfordUniversityPress.
andMarkets.CornellUniversityPress.
Freeman,JohnR. 1989. Democracy
Garrett, Geoffrey. N.d. PartisanPolitics in the GlobalEconomy.Stanford University Press.
Forthcoming.
Gourevitch,Peter Alexis. 1986. Politicsin HardTimes.CornellUniversityPress.
Hechter,Michael.1987. Te Principlesof GroupSolidarity.Universityof CaliforniaPress.
Maintenance
and Effects.Aldine de Gruyter.
1992. SocialInstitutions:TheirEmergence,
Heckathorn, Douglas D. 1990. "Collective Action and Compliance to Norms." American
Review55:366-84.
Sociological
Ebbs, Douglas A. Jr.1977. "On Analyzing the Effectsof Policy Interventions:Box-Tiaoversus
Structural Intervention."Pp. 137-79 in SociologicalMethodology,edited by Herbert L.
Cosiner.Jossey-Bass.
Huber, Evelyne, John R. Stephens, and Charles Ragin. 1993. "Social Democracy, Christian
Democracy,ConstitutionalStructureand the WelfareState."AmericanJournalof Sociology
99:71149.
Huckefeld,RichardF. 1983. "TheSocial Contextof PoliticalChange:Durability,Volatilityand
Social Influence."AmericanPoliticalScienceReview77:92944.
and LegislativeOrganization.
Krehbiel,Keith.1991. Information
University of MichiganPress.
Lange, Peter, George Ross, and Maurizio Vanicelli. 1982. Unions,Changeand Crisis.Allen &
Unwin.
McPhee,William N. 1963. FormalTheoriesof MassBehavior.Free Press.
Mann,Michael.1993. TheSourcesof SocialPower.Vol. 2. CambridgeUniversityPress.
in Modelsof Ecological
May, Robert.1973. Stabilityand Complexity
Systems.PrincetonUniversity
Press.
Meyer, John W., John Boli, and George M. Thomas. 1987. "Ontologyand Rationalizationin
Structure:
WesternCulturalAccounts."Pages 12-37in Institutional
Constituting
State,Society
and the Individual,edited by George M. Thomas,John W. Meyer, Francisco0. Ramirez,
and JohnBoli. Sage Publications.
PoliticalAction.HarvardUniversityPress.
Mizruchi,Mark.1992. TheStructureof Corporate
andDemocracy.
BeaconPress.
Moore,BarringtonJr.1966. T7eSocialOriginsof Dictatorship
Review53:614-33.
Namboodini,Krishnan.1988. "EcologicalDemography."AmericanSociological
Przeworski,Adam. 1985. Capitalismand SocialDemocracy.
CambridgeUniversity Press.
Przeworski, Adam, and John Sprague. 1986. Paper Stones:A History of ElectoralSocialism.
University of Chicago Press. 1982.
Przeworski Adam, and Michael Wallerstein. 1982. "The Structure of Class Conflict in
DemocraticCapitalistSocieties."AmericanPoliticalScienceReview76:215-38.
. 1988. "StructuralDependence of the State on Capital."AmericanPoliticalScienceReview
82:11-31.
Oliver, Pamela,and GeraldMarwell.1988. "TheParadoxof GroupSize in CollectiveAction!'
AmericanSociological
Review53:1-8.
Rueschemeyer,Dietrich,Evelyns Stephens,and John D. Stephens.1992. CapitalistDevelopment
and Democracy.
University of ChicagoPress.
CornellUniversityPress.
Scharpf.Fritz.1991. Crisisand Choicein EuropeanSocialDemocracy.
Skocpol,Theda.1992. ProtectingSoldiersandMothers.BelknapPress.
Skowronek,Stephen.1982. Buildinga New AmericanState.CambridgeUniversityPress.

PoliticalSociologyand PoliticalScience/ 1229

Shepsle, KennethA. 1979. "InstitutionalArrangementsand Equilibriumin Multidimensional
Voting Models.' AmericanJournalof PoliticalScience23:27-60.
.1989. "StudyingInstitutions:Some Lessonsfrom the RationalChoice Approach.' ourna
of 7heoreticalPolitics1:13147.
Shepsle, Kenneth A., and Barry R. Weingast. 1981. "Structure-InducedEquilibria and
Legislative Choice."PublicChoice37:503-19.
.1987. "The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power." AmericanPoliticalScience
Review81:85-104.
Steinmetz, George. 1993. Regulatingthe Social:The WelfareStateand LocalPoliticsin Imperial
Germany.PrincetonUniversity Press.
Swank, Duane H. 1992. "Politics and the StructuralDependence of the State in Democratic
Capitalism.' AmericanPoliticalScienceReview86:38-54.
Process.Knopf.
Truman,David B. 1951. 7heGovernmental
Politics.University of
Tsebelis, George. 1990. Nested Games:RationalChoicein Comparative
CaliforniaPress.
Weingast, Barzy.1979. "A Rational Choice Perspective on CongressionalNorms." American
Journalof PoliticalScience23:245-62.
Weingast, Barrzy,and William Marshall. 1988. "The Industrial Organizationof Congress."
Journalof PoliticalEconomy96:132-64.
Weir, Margaret.1993. Politicsand Jobs:TheBoundaries
of Employment
Policyin the UnitedStates.
PrincetonUniversity Press.
Western, Bruce. 1993. "Postwar Unionization in Eighteen Advanced Capitalist Countries."
Review58:266-88.
AmericanSociological