Pp. vs.

Que Po Lay
TITLE: People of the Phils v Que Po Lay
CITATION: 94 Phil 640 | GR No. 6791, March 29, 1954
FACTS: The appellant was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of US dollars, US checks and
US money orders amounting to about $7000 but failed to sell the same to the Central Bank as required
under Circular No. 20. Circular No. 20 was issued in the year 1949 but was published in the Official
Gazette only on Nov. 1951 after the act or omission imputed to Que Po Lay. Que Po Lay appealed from
the decision of the lower court finding him guilty of violating Central Bank Circular No. 20 in connection
with Sec 34 of RA 265 sentencing him to suffer 6 months imprisonment, pay fine of P1,000 with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
ISSUE: Whether or not publication of Circular 20 in the Official Gazette is needed for it to become
effective and subject violators to corresponding penalties.
HELD: It was held by the Supreme Court, in an en banc decision, that as a rule, circular and
regulations of the Central Bank in question prescribing a penalty for its violation should be published
before becoming effective. This is based on the theory that before the public is bound by its contents
especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published for the people to be
officially and specifically informed of such contents including its penalties. Thus, the Supreme Court
reversed the decision appealed from and acquit the appellant, with costs de oficio.

Taada vs. Tuvera (Decision)

TITLE: Tanada v Tuvera
CITATION: L-63915, April 24, 1985| 136 SCRA 27
FACTS:
Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus in compelling respondent public officials to publish
and/ or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letter
of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation
and administrative orders.
The general rule in seeking writ of mandamus is that it would be granted to a private
individual only in those cases where he has some private or particular interest to be
subserved, or some particular right to be protected, independent of that which he holds
with the public at large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ
when public rights are to be subserved.
The legal capacity of a private citizen was recognized by court to make the said petition
for the reason that the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right
recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land.
ISSUE: Whether publication in the Official Gazette is still required considering the clause
in Article 2 unless otherwise provided.
HELD:
Unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not with the
publication requirement which cannot be omitted as public needs to be notified for the
law to become effective. The necessity for the publication in the Official Gazette of all
unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, was affirmed by the
court on April 24, 1985. This is necessary to provide the general public adequate notice
of the various laws which regulate actions and conduct as citizens. Without this, there
would be no basis for Art 3 of the Civil Code Ignorance of the law excuses no one from
compliance therewith.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all
unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so
published, they shall have no binding force and effect.

Taada vs. Tuvera (Resolution)

146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)
FACTS:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent argued that while
publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was otherwise as when the decrees themselves declared
that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not as to their
publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.
HELD:
The clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication
itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective
immediately upon approval, or in any other date, without its previous publication.
Laws should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking, all laws relate to the
people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A law without any bearing on the public
would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid,
the law must invariably affect the public interest eve if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of
the people only, and not to the public as a whole.
All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity,
which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public of the content of the law.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere,
as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to
repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical.
The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.
J. Cruz:
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep
secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and
contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people.
The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.

La Bugal vs. Ramos

LA BUGAL BLAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION INC., et. al. v. VICTOR O. RAMOS, Secretary Department of
Environment and Natural Resources; HORACIO RAMOS, Director, Mines and Geosciences Bureau (MGBDENR); RUBEN TORRES, Executive Secretary; and WMC (PHILIPPINES) INC.
G.R. No. 127882, 27 January 2004, En Banc (Carpio-Morales, J.)
The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAA is a exception to the rule that
participation in the nations natural resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Provision must be
construed strictly against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos.

FACTS: RA 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act) took effect on April 9, 1995. Before the effectivity of RA 7942, or on
March 30, 1995, the President signed a Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) with WMCP, a
corporation organized under Philippine laws, covering close to 100,000 hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan
Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato. On August 15, 1995, the Environment Secretary Victor Ramos issued
DENR Administrative Order 95-23, which was later repealed by DENR Administrative Order 96-40, adopted on
December 20, 1996.
Petitioners prayed that RA 7942, its implementing rules, and the FTAA between the government and WMCP be
declared unconstitutional on ground that they allow fully foreign owned corporations like WMCP to exploit, explore and
develop Philippine mineral resources in contravention of Article XII Section 2 paragraphs 2 and 4 of the Charter.
In January 2001, WMC - a publicly listed Australian mining and exploration company - sold its whole stake in WMCP
to Sagittarius Mines, 60% of which is owned by Filipinos while 40% of which is owned by Indophil Resources, an
Australian company. DENR approved the transfer and registration of the FTAA in Sagittarius name but Lepanto
Consolidated assailed the same. The latter case is still pending before the Court of Appeals.
EO 279, issued by former President Aquino on July 25, 1987, authorizes the DENR to accept, consider and evaluate
proposals from foreign owned corporations or foreign investors for contracts or agreements involving wither technical
or financial assistance for large scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals which upon appropriate
recommendation of the (DENR) Secretary, the President may execute with the foreign proponent. WMCP likewise
contended that the annulment of the FTAA would violate a treaty between the Philippines and Australia which provides
for the protection of Australian investments.
ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not the Philippine Mining Act is unconstitutional for allowing fully foreign-owned corporations to
exploit the Philippine mineral resources.
2.
Whether or not the FTAA between the government and WMCP is a service contract that permits fully
foreign owned companies to exploit the Philippine mineral resources.
HELD:
First Issue: RA 7942 is Unconstitutional
RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 is unconstitutional for permitting fully foreign owned corporations to
exploit the Philippine natural resources.
Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution retained the Regalian Doctrine which states that All lands of the public
domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the
State. The same section also states that, the exploration and development and utilization of natural resources shall
be under the full control and supervision of the State.
Conspicuously absent in Section 2 is the provision in the 1935 and 1973 Constitution authorizing the State to grant
licenses, concessions, or leases for the exploration, exploitation, development, or utilization of natural resources. By
such omission, the utilization of inalienable lands of the public domain through license, concession or lease is no
longer allowed under the 1987 Constitution.
Under the concession system, the concessionaire makes a direct equity investment for the purpose of exploiting a
particular natural resource within a given area. The concession amounts to complete control by the concessionaire
over the countrys natural resource, for it is given exclusive and plenary rights to exploit a particular resource at the
point of extraction.

The 1987 Constitution, moreover, has deleted the phrase management or other forms of assistance in the 1973
Charter. The present Constitution now allows only technical and financial assistance. The management and the
operation of the mining activities by foreign contractors, the primary feature of the service contracts was precisely the
evil the drafters of the 1987 Constitution sought to avoid.
The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAAs is an exception to the rule that participation in
the nations natural resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Accordingly, such provision must be construed
strictly against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos. Therefore, RA 7942 is invalid insofar as the said act authorizes
service contracts. Although the statute employs the phrase financial and technical agreements in accordance with
the 1987 Constitution, its pertinent provisions actually treat these agreements as service contracts that grant beneficial
ownership to foreign contractors contrary to the fundamental law.
The underlying assumption in the provisions of the law is that the foreign contractor manages the mineral resources
just like the foreign contractor in a service contract. By allowing foreign contractors to manage or operate all the
aspects of the mining operation, RA 7942 has, in effect, conveyed beneficial ownership over the nations mineral
resources to these contractors, leaving the State with nothing but bare title thereto.
The same provisions, whether by design or inadvertence, permit a circumvention of the constitutionally ordained 6040% capitalization requirement for corporations or associations engaged in the exploitation, development and
utilization of Philippine natural resources.
When parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected as conditions, considerations, inducements or
compensations for each other as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, then if some parts
are unconstitutional, all provisions that are thus dependent, conditional or connected, must fail with them.
Under Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Charter, foreign owned corporations are limited only to merely technical or
financial assistance to the State for large scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum and
other mineral oils.
Second Issue: RP Government-WMCP FTAA is a Service Contract
The FTAA between he WMCP and the Philippine government is likewise unconstitutional since the agreement itself is
a service contract.
Section 1.3 of the FTAA grants WMCP a fully foreign owned corporation, the exclusive right to explore, exploit, utilize
and dispose of all minerals and by-products that may be produced from the contract area. Section 1.2 of the same
agreement provides that EMCP shall provide all financing, technology, management, and personnel necessary for the
Mining Operations.
These contractual stipulations and related provisions in the FTAA taken together, grant WMCP beneficial ownership
over natural resources that properly belong to the State and are intended for the benefit of its citizens. These
stipulations are abhorrent to the 1987 Constitution. They are precisely the vices that the fundamental law seeks to
avoid, the evils that it aims to suppress. Consequently, the contract from which they spring must be struck down.

Umali vs. Estanislao May 29, 1992

Facts: Congress enacted Republic Act 7167 amending the NIRC (adjusting the basic and additional exemptions allowable to
individuals for income tax purposes to the poverty threshold level). The said Act was signed and approved by the President on 19
December 1991 and published on 14 January 1992 in "Malaya" a newspaper of general circulation. On 26 December 1991, the
CIR promulgated Revenue Regulations No. 1-92 stating that the regulations shall take effect on compensation income from
January 1, 1992. Petitioners filed a petition for mandamus to compel the CIR to implement RA 7167 in regard to income earned or
received in 1991, and prohibition to enjoin the CIR from implementing the revenue regulation.

Issue:
Assuming that Rep. Act 7167 took effect on 30 January 1992 (15 days after its publication
in Malaya), whether or not the said law nonetheless covers or applies to compensation income
earned or received during calendar year 1991.
Ratio: The Court is of the considered view that Rep. Act 7167 should cover or extend to compensation
income earned or received during calendar year 1991. Sec. 29, par. [L], Item No. 4 of the National
Internal Revenue Code, as amended, provides:
Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, the President shall automatically adjust not more often than once
every three years, the personal and additional exemptions taking into account, among others, the movement in consumer
price indices, levels of minimum wages, and bare subsistence levels.
The exemptions were last adjusted in 1986. The president could have adjusted it in 1989 but did not do so. The poverty threshold
level refers to the level at the time Rep. Act 7167 was enacted by Congress. The Act is a social legislation intended to alleviate in
part the present economic plight of the lower income taxpayers.
Rep. Act 7167 says that the increased personal exemptions shall be available after the law shall have become effective. These
exemptions are available upon the filing of personal income tax returns, done not later than the 15th day of April after the end of a
calendar year. Thus, under Rep. Act 7167, which became effective, on 30 January 1992, the increased exemptions are literally
available on or before 15 April 1992 [though not before 30 January 1992]. But these increased exemptions can be available on 15
April 1992 only in respect of compensation income earned or received during the calendar year 1991. The personal exemptions as
increased by Rep. Act 7167 are not available in respect of compensation income received during the 1990 calendar year; the tax
due in respect of said income had already accrued, and been presumably paid (The law does not state retroactive application). The
personal exemptions as increased by Rep. Act 7167 cannot be regarded as available as to compensation income received during
1992 because it would in effect postpone the availability of the increased exemptions to 1 January-15 April 1993. The
implementing regulations collide with Section 3 of Rep. Act 7167 which states that the statute "shall take effect upon its
approval.
The revenue regulation should take effect on compensation income earned or received from 1 January 1991. Since this decision is
promulgated after 15 April 1992, those taxpayers who have already paid are entitled to refunds or credits.

Fortune vs. Metropolitan

FORTUNE MOTORS (PHILS.) INC., petitioner, vs. METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, and THE
COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
DECISION
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 38340 entitled
Fortune Motors (Phils.) Inc., v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company et al.[1] The appellate courts decision reversed
the decision in Civil Case No. 89-5637 of Branch 150 of the Regional trial Court of Makati City.
It appears that Fortune Motors (Phils.) Inc. obtained the following loans from the Metropolitan Bank and Trust
company: (1) P20 Million, on March 31, 1982; (2) P8 Million, on April 30, 1983; (3) P2,500,000.00, on June 8,
1983 and; (4) P3 Million, on August 16, 1983.
On January 6, 1984, respondent bank consolidated the loans of P8 Million and P3 Million into one promissory
note, which amounted to P12,650,000.00. This included the interest that had accrued thereon in the amount
of P1,650,000.00.
To secure the obligation in the total amount of P34,150,000.00, petitioner mortgaged certain real estate in favor of
respondent bank.
Due to financial constraints, petitioner failed to pay the loan upon maturity. Consequently on May 25, 1984,
respondent bank initiated extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings and in effect, foreclosed the real estate mortgage.
The extrajudicial foreclosure was actually conducted by Senior Deputy Sheriff Pablo Y. Sy who had sent copies of
the Notice of Extrajudicial Sale to the opposing parties by registered mail. In accordance with law, he posted copies of
the Notice of Sheriffs Sale at three conspicuous public places in Makati -- the office of the Sheriff, the Assessors
office and the Register of Deeds in Makati. He thereafter executed the Certificates of Posting on May 20, 1984. The

said notice was in fact published on June 2, 9 and 16, 1984 in three issues of The New Record. An affidavit of
publication, dated June 19, 1984,[2] was executed by Teddy F. Borres, publisher of the said newspaper.
Subsequently, the mortgaged property was sold at public auction for P47,899,264.91 to the mortgagee bank, the
highest bidder.
Petitioner failed to redeem the mortgaged property within the one-year redemption period and so, the titles
thereto were consolidated in the name of respondent bank by which token the latter was entitled to the possession of
the property mortgaged and, in fact possessed the same.
Petitioner then filed a complaint for the annulment of the extrajudicial foreclosure, which covered TCT Nos.
461087, 432685, 457590, 432684, S-54185, S-54186, S-54187, and S-54188.
On December 27, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment annulling the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage.
On May 14, 1992, an appeal was interposed by the respondent to the Court of Appeals. Acting thereon, the
Court of Appeals reversed the decision rendered by the lower court. Subsequently, the motion for Reconsideration
filed by petitioner was denied on April 26, 1994.
Aggrieved by the decision rendered by the Court of appeals, petitioner appealed before this Court. On May 30,
1994, however, we issued a Resolution denying said petition. Hence, this motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner raises the following issues before us, to wit:
I
THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE PUBLICATION OF THE NOTICE OF
EXTRAJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE WAS VALID. [3]
II
THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE NOTICES OF
EXTRAJUDICIAL FORECLOSURE, AND SALE WERE DULY RECEIVED BY THE PETITIONER.[4]
III
THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO ADJUDGE THE IRREGULARITIES IN THE
BIDDING, POSTING, PUBLICATION, AND THE SALE OF FORTUNEBUILDING. [5]
IV
THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RENDERING A JUDGMENT BASED ON
PRESUMPTION.[6]
Petitioner contends that the newspaper Daily Record [7] where the notice of extrajudicial foreclosure was
published does not qualify as a newspaper of general circulation.
It further contends that the population that can be reached by the Daily Record is only .004% as its circulation
in Makati in 1984, was 1000 to 1500 per week. Hence, it concludes that only 1648 out of a population of 412,069
were probable readers of the Daily Record, and that this is not the standard contemplated by law when it refers to a
newspaper of general circulation.
In the case of Bonnevie v. Court of Appeals,[8] we had already made a ruling on this point:
The argument that the publication of the notice in the Luzon Weekly Courier was not in accordance with law as said
newspaper is not of general circulation must likewise be disregarded. The affidavit of publication, executed by the
publisher, business/advertising manager of the Luzon Weekly Courier, states that it is a newspaper of general
circulation in x x x Rizal; and that the notice of Sheriffs sale was published in said paper on June 30, July 7 and July
14, 1968. This constitutes prima facie evidence of compliance with the requisite publication. (Sadang v. GSIS, 18
SCRA 491).

To be a newspaper of general circulation, it is enough that it is published for the dissemination of local news and
general information; that it has a bona fide subscription list of paying subscribers; that it is published at regular
intervals. (Basa v. Mercado, 61 Phil. 632). The newspaper need not have the largest circulation so long as it is of
general circulation. (Banta v. Pacheco, 74 Phil. 67).
In the case at bench, there was sufficient compliance with the requirements of the law regarding publication of the
notice in a newspaper of general circulation. This is evidenced by the affidavit of publication executed by the New
Records publisher, Teddy F. Borres, which stated that it is a newspaper edited in Manila and Quezon City and of
general circulation in the cities of Manila, Quezon City et al., and in the Provinces of Rizal xxx, published every
Saturday by the Daily Record, Inc. This was affirmed by Pedro Deyto, who was the executive editor of the said
newspaper and who was a witness for petitioner. Deyto testified: a) that the New Record contains news; b) that it has
subscribers from Metro Manila and from all over the Philippines; c) that it is published once a week or four times a
month ; and d) that he had been connected with the said paper since 1958, an indication that the said newspaper had
been in existence even before that year.[9]
Another contention posited by petitioner is that the New Record is published and edited in Quezon City and not in
Makati where the foreclosed property is situated, and that, when New Records publisher enumerated the places
where said newspaper is being circulated, Makati was not mentioned.
This contention of petitioner is untenable. In 1984, when the publishers affidavit relied upon by petitioner was
executed, Makati, Mandaluyong, San Juan, Paraaque et. al., were still part of the province of Rizal. Apparently, this
is the reason why in the New Records affidavit of publication executed by its publisher, the enumeration of the places
where it was being circulated, only the cities of Manila, Quezon, Caloocan, Pasay, Tagaytay, et. al., were
named. Furthermore, as aptly ratiocinated by the Court of Appeals:
The application given by the trial court to the provisions of P.D. No. 1079 is, to our mind, too narrow and restricted
and could not have been the intention of the said law. Were the interpretation of the trial court (sic) to be followed,
even the leading dailies in the country like the Manila Bulletin, the Philippine Daily Inquirer, or The Philippine
Star which all enjoy a wide circulation throughout the country, cannot publish legal notices that would be honored
outside the place of their publication. But this is not the interpretation given by the courts. For what is important is
that a paper should be in general circulation in the place where the properties to be foreclosed are located in order that
publication may serve the purpose for which it was intended.[10]
Petitioner also claims that the New Record is not a daily newspaper because it is published only once a week.
A perusal of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1079 and Act 3135 shows that the said laws do not require that the
newspaper which publishes judicial notices should be a daily newspaper. Under P.D. 1079, for a newspaper to qualify,
it is enough that it be a newspaper or periodical which is authorized by law to publish and which is regularly published
for at least one (1) year before the date of publication which requirement was satisfied by New Record. Nor is there a
requirement, as stated in the said law, that the newspaper should have the largest circulation in the place of
publication.
Petitioner claims that, when its representative went to a newspaper stand to look for a copy of the new Record,
he could not find any. This allegation can not be made a basis to conclude that the newspaper New Record is not of
general circulation. By its own admission, petitioners representative was looking for a newspaper named Daily
Record. Naturally, he could not find a newspaper by that name as the newspapers name is New Record and not
Daily Record. Although it is the Daily Record Inc. which publishes the New Record, it does not mean that the name
of the newspaper is Daily Record.
Petitioner contends that, since it was the Executive Judge who caused the publication of the notice of the sale
and not the Sheriff, the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage should be deemed annulled.
Petitioners contention in this regard is bereft of merit, because Sec. 2 of P.D. No. 1079 clearly provides that:
The executive judge of the court of first instance shall designate a regular working day and a definite time each week
during which the said judicial notices or advertisements shall be distributed personally by him[11] for publication to
qualified newspapers or periodicals xxx, which distribution shall be done by raffle.
The said provision of the law is clear as to who should personally distribute the judicial notices or advertisements
to qualified newspapers for publication. There was a substantial compliance with the requirements when it was the
Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati who caused the publication of the said notice by the newspaper
selected by means of raffle.

With regard to the second assigned error wherein petitioner claims that it did not personally receive the notices of
extrajudicial foreclosure and sale supposedly sent to it by Metrobank, we find the same unmeritorious.
Settled is the rule that personal notice to the mortgagor in extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings is not
necessary. Section 3 of Act No. 3135 governing extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgages, as amended by Act
No. 4118, requires only the posting of the notice of sale in three public places and the publication of that notice in a
newspaper of general circulation. It is pristine clear from the above provision that the lack of personal notice to the
mortgagor, herein petitioner, is not a ground to set aside the foreclosure sale. [12]
Petitioners expostulation that it did not receive the mailed notice to it of the sale of the mortgaged property
should be brushed aside. The fact that respondent was able to receive the registry return card from the mail in regular
course shows that the postal item presented by the return card had been received by the addressee. Otherwise, as
correctly contended by respondent, the mailed item should have been stamped Returned to Sender, still sealed with
all the postal markings, and the return card still attached to it.
As to the contention that the signature appearing on the registry return card receipt appears to be only a dot and
that the photostat copy does not contain a signature at all we find, after a close scrutiny of the registry return card, that
there are strokes before and after the dot. These strokes appear to be a signature which signifies: a) that the registry
claim card was received at the given address; b) that the addressee had authorized a person to present the claim card
at the post office and receive the registered mail matter; and c) that the authorized person signed the return card to
acknowledge his receipt of the mail matter. Even the trial court in its decision ruled that:
x x x the Court finds no cogent reason to overcome the presumption that Sheriff Pablo Sy performed his task
regularly and in accordance with the rules. A closer look at the assailed xerox copy of the registry receipt and the
original form which said xerox was admittedly copied would indeed show that the xerox is not a faithful reproduction
of the original since it does not bear the complete signature of the addressee as appearing on the original. It does not,
however, follow that the xerox is a forgery. The same bears slight traces of the signature appearing on the original but,
there is no indication that the one was altered to conform to the other. Rather, there must have been only a misprint of
the xerox but not amounting to any attempt to falsify the same.[13]
Petitioner also claims that it had transferred to a different location but the notice was sent to its old
address. Petitioner failed to notify respondent of its supposed change of address. Needless to say, it can be surmised
that respondent had sent the notice to petitioners official address.
Anent its third assigned error, petitioner assails the posting of the notices of sale by the Sheriff in the Office of the
Sheriff, Office of the Assessor and the Register of Deeds as these are not the conspicuous public places required by
law. Furthermore, it also questions the non-posting of the notice of sale on the property itself which was to be sold.
Apparently, this assigned error of petitioner is tantamount to a last ditch effort to extricate itself from the quagmire
it is in. Act 3135 does not require posting of the notice of sale on the mortgaged property. Section 3 of the said law
merely requires that the notice of the sale be posted for not less than twenty days in at least three public places of the
municipality or city where the property is situated. The aforementioned places, to wit: the Sheriffs Office, the
Assessors Office and the Register of Deeds are certainly the public places contemplated by law, as these are places
where people interested in purchasing real estate congregate.
With regard to the fourth assigned error of petitioner, we do not subscribe to the latters view that the decision of
the Court of Appeals was mainly based on the presumption of the regularity of the performance of official function of
the officers involved. A perusal of the records indubitably shows that the requirement of Act No. 3135 on the
extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgage had been duly complied with by Senior Deputy Sheriff Sy.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision rendered in CA-G.R. CV No. 38340 is hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, (Chairman), Bellosillo, Vitug, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

Albino Co vs. CA

ALBINO S. CO, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Antonio P. Barredo for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for the people.
Ponente: NARVASA
FACTS:
A criminal complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 was filed by the salvage company against petitioner
with the Regional Trial Court. The case eventuated in petitioners conviction of the crime charged on the basis that a
check issued merely to guarantee the performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22. Pending
litigation, Ministry of Justice Circular No. 4 (which excludes guarantee check from application of B.P. Blg. 22) was
subsequently reversed by Ministry Circular No. 12 which ruled that a check issued merely to guarantee the
performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals.
There he sought exoneration upon the theory that it was reversible error for the Regional Trial Court but the Court of
Appeals affirmed his conviction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ministry Circular No. 12 dated August 8, 1984 declaring the guarantee check will no longer be
considered as a valid defense be retroactively applied.
HELD:
NO. Decision of the Court of Appeals and RTC were set aside. Criminal prosecution against accused-petitioner was
dismissed.
RATIO:
It would seem that the weight of authority is decidedly in favor of the proposition that the Courts decision of
September 21, 1987 in Que v. People, 154 SCRA 160 (1987) that a check issued merely to guarantee the
performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. Blg. 22 should not be given retrospective effect to the
prejudice of the petitioner and other persons situated, who relied on the official opinion of the Minister of Justice that
such a check did not fall within the scope of B.P. Blg. 22.
This is after all a criminal action all doubts in which, pursuant to familiar, fundamental doctrine, must be resolved in
favor of the accused. Everything considered, the Court sees no compelling reason why the doctrine of mala
prohibita should override the principle of prospectivity, and its clear implications as herein above set out and
discussed, negating criminal liability.

Cui vs Arellano University

TITLE: Emetrio Cui v Arellano University
CITATION: GR NO. L15127, May 30, 1961 | 112 Phil 135
FACTS:
Emetrio Cui took his preparatory law course at Arellano University. He then enrolled in its
College of Law from first year (SY1948-1949) until first semester of his 4 th year. During
these years, he was awarded scholarship grants of the said university amounting to a
total of P1,033.87. He then transferred and took his last semester as a law student at
Abad Santos University. To secure permission to take the bar, he needed his transcript of
records from Arellano University. The defendant refused to issue the TOR until he had
paid back the P1,033.87 scholarship grant which Emetrio refunded as he could not take
the bar without Arellanos issuance of his TOR.
On August 16, 1949, the Director of Private Schools issued Memorandum No. 38
addressing all heads of private schools, colleges and universities. Part of the

memorandum states that the amount in tuition and other fees corresponding to these
scholarships should not be subsequently charged to the recipient students when they
decide to quit school or to transfer to another institution. Scholarships should not be
offered merely to attract and keep students in a school.
ISSUE: Whether or not Emetrio Cui can refund the P1,033.97 payment for the scholarship
grant provided by Arellano University.
HELD:
The memorandum of the Director of Private Schools is not a law where the provision set
therein was advisory and not mandatory in nature. Moreover, the stipulation in question,
asking previous students to pay back the scholarship grant if they transfer before
graduation, is contrary to public policy, sound policy and good morals or tends clearly to
undermine the security of individual rights and hence, null and void.
The court sentenced the defendant to pay Cui the sum of P1,033.87 with interest thereon
at the legal rate from Sept.1, 1954, date of the institution of this case as well as the costs
and dismissing defendants counterclaim.

PEOPLE VS. JUDGE DONATO [198 SCRA 130; G.R. NO.79269; 5 JUN 1991]
Facts: Private respondent and his co-accused were charged of rebellionon October 2, 1986 for acts
committed before and after February 1986. Private respondent filed with a Motion to Quash alleging
that: (a) the factsalleged do not constitute an offense; (b) the Court has no jurisdiction over the
offense charged; (c) the Court has no jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants; and (d) the
criminal action or liability has been extinguished. This was denied. May 9, 1987 Respondent filed a
petition for bail, which was opposed that the respondent is not entitled to bail anymore
since rebellion became a capital offense under PD 1996, 942 and 1834 amending ART. 135 of RPC. On
5 June 1987 the President issued Executive Order No. 187 repealing, among others, P.D. Nos. 1996,
942 and 1834 and restoring to full force and effect Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code as it existed
before the amendatory decrees. Judge Donato now granted the bail, which was fixed at P30,000.00
and imposed a condition that he shall report to the court once every two months within the first ten
days of every period thereof. Petitioner filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration indirectly
asking the court to deny bail to and to allow it to present evidence in support thereof considering the
"inevitable probability that the accused will not comply with this main condition of his bail. It was
contended that:

1. The accused has evaded the authorities for thirteen years and was an escapee from detention when
arrested; (Chairman of CPP-NPA)
2. He was not arrested at his residence as he had no known address;
3. He was using the false name "Manuel Mercado Castro" at the time of his arrest and presented a
Driver's License to substantiate his false identity;
4. The address he gave "Panamitan, Kawit, Cavite," turned out to be also a false address;
5. He and his companions were on board a private vehicle with a declared owner whose identity and

address were also found to be false;

6. Pursuant to Ministry Order No. 1-A dated 11 January 1982 , a reward of P250,000.00 was offered
and paid for his arrest.

This however was denied. Hence the appeal.

Issue: Whether or Not the private respondent has the right to bail.

Held: Yes. Bail in the instant case is a matter of right. It is absolute since the crime is not a capital
offense, therefore prosecution has no right to present evidence. It is only when it is a capital offense
that the right becomes discretionary. However it was wrong for the Judge to change the amount of bail
from 30K to 50K without hearing the prosecution.

Republic Act No. 6968 approved on 24 October 1990, providing a penalty of reclusion perpetua to the
crime of rebellion, is not applicable to the accused as it is not favorable to him.

Accused validly waived his right to bail in another case(petition for habeas corpus). Agreements were
made therein: accused to remain under custody, whereas his co-detainees Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo
Concepcion will be released immediately, with a condition that they will submit themselves in the
jurisdiction of the court. Said petition for HC was dismissed. Bail is the security given for the release of
a person in custody of the law. Ergo, there was a waiver. We hereby rule that the right to bail is
another of theconstitutional rights which can be waived. It is a right which is personal to the accused
and whose waiver would not be contrary to law, public order,public policy, morals, or good customs, or
prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.

Iloilo Palay v. Feliciano

Iloilo palay and corn Planters assn. vs Feliciano 13 SCRA 377
Facts:
On December 26, 1964, Jose y. Feliciano, chairman and general manager of the Rice and Corn Administration, wrote
the President of the Philippines urging the immediate importation of 595,400 metric tons of rice, thru a government
agency which the president may designate, pursuant to the recommendation of the national economic council as
embodied in its resolution no. 70, series of 1964.
On December 28,1964, the cabinet approve d the needed importation after the said referral of the president. The
chairman Jose y. Feliciano of the rice and corn administration announced an invitation to bid for said importation and
set the bidding for February 1, 1965. The said facts were all pursuant to a certain provision in republic act 2207.
Considering the said importation is contrary to RA 3452 which prohibits the government from importing rice and that
there is no law appropriating funds to finance the same, the petitioners together with Ramon A. Gonzales, in his
capacity as taxpayer, filed the instant petition before this court asking for a writ of preliminary injunction against the
respondents.
Issue:
WON RA 2207 was impliedly repealed by RA 3452?
Held:
Republic Act 2207 still stands. RA 3452 only authorizes importation during normal times, but when there is shortage in
the local supply of such gravity as to constitute a national emergency, we have to turn to RA 2207. These two laws,

therefore, are not inconsistent and so implied repeal does not ensue.
A repealing clause in an Act which provides that all laws or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this act
are hereby repealed or modified accordingly is certainly not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify or
designate the act or acts that are intended to be repealed. Rather, it is a clause which predicates the intended repeal
upon the condition that a substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior Acts.
The failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law, unless an
irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and old laws. Here there is no such
inconsistency.
Wherefore, petition is dismissed. The writ of preliminary injunction issued by this court is hereby dissolved. Cost
against petitioners.

This Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 seeks to annul the August 17, 2006 Decision 1 and March 27,
2007 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 93206, which affirmed the Order dated March
4, 20053 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 46 in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, in Agrarian Case No.
1390 for the fixing of just compensation, entitled Land Bank of the Philippines v. Josefina S. Lubrica, in her
capacity as assignee of Federico Suntay, and Hon. Teodoro A. Cidro, as Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro. The RTC Order affirmed the Decision dated March 21, 2003 4 of the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of San Jose, Occidental Mindoro in Case No. DCN-0405-0022-02,
entitled Josefina S. Lubrica, in her capacity as Assignee of Federico Suntay v. Hon. Hernani A. Braganza, in his
capacity as Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, and Land Bank of the Philippines.
The Facts
On October 21, 1972, the 3,682.0286-hectare Suntay Estate, consisting of irrigated/unirrigated rice and corn
lands covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-31(1326) located in the Barangays of Gen. Emilio Aguinaldo,
Sta. Lucia, and San Nicolas in Sablayan, Occidental Mindoro, was subjected to the operation of Presidential
Decree No. 27, under its Operation Land Transfer (OLT), with the farmer-beneficiaries declared as owners of the
property. However, a 300-hectare portion of the land was subjected to the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP) instead of the OLT. Thus, Certificates of Landownership Award were issued to the farmerbeneficiaries in possession of the land.5 Such application of the CARP to the 300-hectare land was later the
subject of a case before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudicatory Board (DARAB), which ruled that the
subject land should have been the subject of OLT instead of CARP. The landowner admitted before the PARAD
that said case was pending with this Court and docketed as G.R. No. 108920, entitled Federico Suntay v. Court
of Appeals.
Meanwhile, the owner of the land remained unpaid for the property. Thus, Josefina S. Lubrica, in her capacity as
assignee of the owner of the property, Federico Suntay, filed a Petition for Summary Determination of Just
Compensation with the PARAD, docketed as Case No. DCN-0405-0022-2002. Thereafter, the PARAD issued its
Decision dated March 21, 2003, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Fixing the preliminary just compensation for 431.1407 hectare property at P166,150.00 per hectare or
a total of P71,634,027.30.
2. Directing the Land Bank of the Philippines to immediately pay the aforestated amount to the
Petitioner;
3. Directing the DAR to immediately comply with all applicable requirements so that the subject property
may be formally distributed and turned over to the farmer beneficiaries thereof, in accordance with the
Decision of the DARAB Central in DARAB Case No. 2846.
No cost.
SO ORDERED.6
Petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated April 10, 2003 of the
above decision, but the PARAD denied the motion in an Order dated December 15, 2003. 7
The LBP then filed a Petition dated March 4, 2004 with the RTC docketed as Agrarian Case No. 1390, appealing
the PARAD Decision. In the Petition, the LBP argued that because G.R. No. 108920 was pending with this Court

in relation to the 300-hectare land subject of the instant case, the Petition for Summary Determination of Just
Compensation filed before the PARAD was premature. The LBP argued further that the PARAD could only make
an award of up to PhP 5 million only. The PARAD, therefore, could not award an amount of PhP 71,634,027.30.
The LBP also contended that it could not satisfy the demand for payment of Lubrica, considering that the
documents necessary for it to undertake a preliminary valuation of the property were still with the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR).
By way of answer, Lubrica filed a Motion to Deposit the Preliminary Valuation under Section 16(e) of Republic
Act No. (RA) 6657 and Ad Cautelam Answer dated June 18, 2004. 8 In the said motion, Lubrica claimed that
since the DAR already took possession of the disputed property, the LBP is duty-bound to deposit the
compensation determined by the PARAD in a bank accessible to the landowner.
In an Order dated March 4, 2005, the RTC resolved Lubricas motion, as follows:
The foregoing considered and as prayed for by the respondent-movant The Land Compensation Department,
Land Bank of the Philipines, is hereby directed to deposit the preliminary compensation as determined by the
PARAD, in case and bonds in the total amount of Php 71,634,027.30, with the Land Bank of the Philippines,
Manila, within seven (7) days from receipt of this order, and to notify this Court of compliance within such period. 9
Thus, the LBP filed an Omnibus Motion dated March 17, 2005 praying for the reconsideration of the above order,
the admission of an amended petition impleading the DAR, and the issuance of summons to the new
defendants. In the Omnibus Motion, the LBP contended:
In this AMENDED PETITION, Land Bank impleaded the DAR as respondent because DAR is the lead agency of
the government in the implementation of the agrarian reform. It is the one which is responsible in identifying the
lands to be covered by agrarian reform program, placing/identifying the farmer beneficiaries, parcellary mapping
of the land, and determining the land value covered by PD 27/EO 228. The documents DAR prepares is placed
in a folder called "claim folder" which it forwards to Land Bank for processing and payment.
21. At present there is no claim folder prepared and submitted by DAR to Land Bank, and therefore Land Bank
has no claim folder to process and no basis to pay the landowner.10
In an Order dated December 8, 2005,11 the RTC denied the Omnibus Motion finding no reversible error in its
Order dated March 4, 2005 and denying the motion to amend the petition for being unnecessary towards land
valuation.
Thus, the LBP appealed the RTC Orders dated March 4, 2005 and December 8, 2005 to the CA through a
Petition for Certiorari dated February 13, 2006. The LBP argued that without the claim folder from the DAR, it
could not preliminarily determine the valuation of the covered lands and process the compensation claims.
Moreover, it said that the amount to be deposited under Sec. 16 of RA 6657, or the Agrarian Reform Law of
1988, is the offered purchase price of DAR for the land contained in the notice of acquisition and not the price
determined in an administrative proceeding before the PARAD.
Afterwards, on August 17, 2006, the CA issued the assailed decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE, and subsequently
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.12
The LBP moved for reconsideration of the CA Decision, but the CA did not reconsider it, as stated in its
Resolution dated March 27, 2007.
Hence, the LBP filed this petition.
The Issue
What is the proper amount to be deposited under Section 16 of Republic Act No. 6657? Is it the PARAD/DARAB
determined valuation or the preliminary valuation as determined by the DAR/LBP? 13
The Ruling of the Court

The petition is meritorious.

Private respondent Lubrica argues that, under the doctrines of res judicata and stare decisis, the instant case
must be dismissed in light of the decision of this Court in Lubrica v. Land Bank of the Philippines, 14 the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Amended Decision dated October
27, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 77530 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated
May 26, 2004 of the Court of Appeals affirming (a) the March 31, 2003 Order of the Special Agrarian Court
ordering the respondent Land Bank of the Philippines to deposit the just compensation provisionally determined
by the PARAD; (b) the May 26, 2003 Resolution denying respondents Motion for Reconsideration; and (c) the
May 27, 2003 Order directing Teresita V. Tengco, respondents Land Compensation Department Manager to
comply with the March 31, 2003 Order, is REINSTATED. The Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental
Mindoro, Branch 46, acting as Special Agrarian Court is ORDERED to proceed with dispatch in the trial of
Agrarian Case Nos. R-1339 and R-1340, and to compute the final valuation of the subject properties based on
the aforementioned formula.
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis supplied.)
The principles of res judicata and stare decisis do not apply to the case at bar.
In Lanuza v. Court of Appeals,15 the Court discussed the principle of res judicata, to wit:
Res judicata means a matter adjudged, a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by
judgment. The doctrine of res judicata provides that a final judgment, on the merits rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies and constitutes an absolute
bar to subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand, or cause of action. The elements of res judicata
are (a) identity of parties or at least such as representing the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights
asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c) the identity in the two (2)
particulars is such that any judgment which may be rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration. (Emphasis supplied.)
In Lubrica, the issue was as follows:
Petitioners insist that the determination of just compensation should be based on the value of the expropriated
properties at the time of payment. Respondent LBP, on the other hand, claims that the value of the realties
should be computed as of October 21, 1972 when P.D. No. 27 took effect. 16
While the Court directed that the valuation made by the PARAD be the amount to be deposited in favor of the
landowner, it was done only because the PARADs valuation was based on the time the payment was made.
The issue before Us is whether the RTC acted properly in ordering the deposit or payment to the landowner of
the preliminary valuation of the land made by the PARAD. This is considering that Sec. 16(e) of RA 6657 clearly
requires the initial valuation made by the DAR and LBP be deposited or paid to the landowner before taking
possession of the latters property, not the preliminary valuation made by the PARAD.
Evidently, the second element of res judicata is not present. The relief prayed for in Lubrica is that the amount for
deposit in favor of the landowner be determined on the basis of the time of payment and not of the time of
taking. But here, the prayer of the LBP is for the deposit of the valuation of the LBP and DAR and not that of the
PARAD. These are two distinct and separate issues. Res judicata, therefore, cannot apply.
We cannot apply the principle of stare decisis to the instant case, too. The Court explained the principle in Ting v.
Velez-Ting:17
The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules established by this Court in its
final decisions. It is based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should
be deemed settled and closed to further argument. Basically, it is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same
issues, necessary for two simple reasons: economy and stability. In our jurisdiction, the principle is entrenched in
Article 8 of the Civil Code. (Emphasis supplied.)
To reiterate, Lubrica and the instant case have different issues. Hence, stare decisis is also inapplicable here.

The LBP posits that under Sec. 16(e) of RA 6657, and as espoused in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of
Appeals,18 it is the purchase price offered by the DAR in its notice of acquisition of the land that must be
deposited in an accessible bank in the name of the landowner before taking possession of the land, not the
valuation of the PARAD.
The Court agrees with the LBP. The RTC erred when it ruled:
Under Section 16 (e) the payment of the provisional compensation determined by the PARAD in the summary
administrative proceedings under Section 16 (d) should precede the taking of the land. In the present case, the
taking of the property even preceded the mere determination of a provisional compensation by more than 30
years.19
Sec. 16 of RA 6657 contains the procedure for the acquisition of private lands, viz:
SEC. 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private Lands.For purposes of acquisition of private lands, the following
procedures shall be followed:
(a) After having identified the land, the landowners and the beneficiaries, the DAR shall send its notice to
acquire the land to the owners thereof, by personal delivery or registered mail, and post the same in a
conspicuous place in the municipal building and barangay hall of the place where the property is located.
Said notice shall contain the offer of the DAR to pay a corresponding value in accordance with the
valuation set forth in Sections 17, 18, and other pertinent provisions hereof.
(b) Within thirty (30) days from the date of receipt of written notice by personal delivery or registered
mail, the landowner, his administrator or representative shall inform the DAR of his acceptance or
rejection of the offer.
(c) If the landowner accepts the offer of the DAR, the LBP shall pay the landowner the purchase price of
the land within thirty (30) days after he executes and delivers a deed of transfer in favor of the
Government and surrenders the Certificate of Title and other muniments of title.
(d) In case of rejection or failure to reply, the DAR shall conduct summary administrative proceedings to
determine the compensation of the land by requiring the landowner, the LBP and other interested parties
to submit evidence as to the just compensation for the land, within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of
the notice. After the expiration of the above period, the matter is deemed submitted for decision. The
DAR shall decide the case within thirty (30) days after it is submitted for decision.
(e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or in case of rejection or no response
from the landowner, upon the deposit with an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the
compensation in cash or LBP bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall take immediate
possession of the land and shall request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) in the name of the Republic of the Philippines. The DAR shall thereafter proceed with the
redistribution of the land to the qualified beneficiaries.
(f) Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction for
final determination of just compensation. (Emphasis supplied.)
Conspicuously, there is no mention of the PARAD in the foregoing Sec. 16(e) when it speaks of "the deposit with
an accessible bank designated by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds in accordance with this
Act." Moreover, it is only after the DAR has made its final determination of the initial valuation of the land that the
landowner may resort to the judicial determination of the just compensation for the land. Clearly, therefore, it is
the initial valuation made by the DAR and LBP that is contained in the letter-offer to the landowner under Sec.
16(a), said valuation of which must be deposited and released to the landowner prior to taking possession of the
property.
This too was the Courts interpretation of the above provision in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Heir of Trinidad
S. Vda. De Arieta:20
It was thus erroneous for the CA to conclude that the provisional compensation required to be deposited as
provided in Section 16 (e) is the sum determined by the DARAB/PARAD/RARAD in a summary administrative
proceeding merely because the word "deposit" appeared for the first time in the sub-paragraph immediately

succeeding that sub-paragraph where the administrative proceeding is mentioned (sub-paragraph d). On the
contrary, sub-paragraph (e) should be related to sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) considering that the taking of
possession by the State of the private agricultural land placed under the CARP is the next step after the
DAR/LBP has complied with notice requirements which include the offer of just compensation based on the initial
valuation by LBP. To construe sub-paragraph (e) as the appellate court did would hamper the land redistribution
process because the government still has to wait for the termination of the summary administrative proceeding
before it can take possession of the lands. Contrary to the CAs view, the deposit of provisional compensation is
made even before the summary administrative proceeding commences, or at least simultaneously with it, once
the landowner rejects the initial valuation ("offer") by the LBP. Such deposit results from his rejection of the DAR
offer (based on the LBPs initial valuation). Both the conduct of summary administrative proceeding and deposit
of provisional compensation follow as a consequence of the landowners rejection under both the compulsory
acquisition and VOS. This explains why the words "rejection or failure to reply" and "rejection or no response
from the landowner" are found in sub-paragraphs (d) and (e). Such "rejection"/"no response from the landowner"
could not possibly refer to the award of just compensation in the summary administrative proceeding considering
that the succeeding sub-paragraph (f) states that the landowner who disagrees with the same is granted the
right to petition in court for final determination of just compensation. As it is, the CAs interpretation would have
loosely interchanged the terms "rejected the offer" and "disagrees with the decision", which is far from what the
entire provision plainly conveys.
xxxx
Under the law, the LBP is charged with the initial responsibility of determining the value of lands placed under
land reform and the compensation to be paid for their taking. Once an expropriation proceeding or the
acquisition of private agricultural lands is commenced by the DAR, the indispensable role of LBP begins. EO No.
405, issued on June 14, 1990, provides that the DAR is required to make use of the determination of the land
valuation and compensation by the LBP as the latter is primarily responsible for the determination of the land
valuation and compensation. In fact, the LBP can disagree with the decision of the DAR in the determination of
just compensation, and bring the matter to the RTC designated as [Special Agrarian Court] for final
determination of just compensation.
The amount of "offer" which the DAR gives to the landowner as compensation for his land, as mentioned in
Section 16 (b) and (c), is based on the initial valuation by the LBP. This then is the amount which may be
accepted or rejected by the landowner under the procedure established in Section 16. Perforce, such initial
valuation by the LBP also becomes the basis of the deposit of provisional compensation pending final
determination of just compensation, in accordance with sub-paragraph (e). (Emphasis supplied.)
It is clear from Sec. 16 of RA 6657 that it is the initial valuation made by the DAR and the LBP that must be
released to the landowner in order for DAR to take possession of the property. Otherwise stated, Sec. 16 of RA
6657 does not authorize the release of the PARADs determination of just compensation for the land which has
not yet become final and executory.
Moreover, it bears pointing out that, pursuant to DAR Administrative Order No. 02, Series of 1996, entitled
Revised Rules and Procedures Governing the Acquisition of Agricultural Lands subject of Voluntary Offer to Sell
and Compulsory Acquisition pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657, the DAR Municipal Office (DARMO) first
prepares a claim folder (CF) containing the necessary documents for the valuation of the land. The DARMO then
forwards this claim folder to the DAR Provincial Office (DARPO) which, in turn, has the following duties:
"Receives claim folder and forwards to the DAR-LBP Pre-Processing Unit (PPU) for review/evaluation of
documents. Gathers lacking documents, if any."21 The DAR-LBP PPU then forwards the CF to the LBP-Land
Valuation and Landowners Compensation Office (LVLCO) which "receives and evaluates the CF for
completeness, consistency and document sufficiency. Gathers additional valuation documents." 22 Thereafter, the
LBP-LVLCO "determines land valuation based on valuation inputs" and "prepares and sends Memo of Valuation,
Claim Folder Profile and Valuation Summary (MOV-CFPVS)" to the DARPO.23 The DARPO then "sends Notice
of Valuation and Acquisition to LO [landowner] by personal delivery with proof of service or by registered mail
with return card, attaching copy of MOV-CFPVS and inviting LOs attention to the submission of documents
required for payment of claim."24
Notably, DAR failed to prepare the claim folder which is necessary for the LBP to make a valuation of the land to
be expropriated. The proper remedy would have been to ask the DAR and LBP to determine such initial
valuation and to have the amount deposited to his account, in accordance with Sec. 16 of RA 6657.
Nevertheless, it was erroneous for private respondent to have filed a Petition for Determination of Just
Compensation with PARAD when the remedy that she was seeking was for the deposit of the initial valuation
that the DAR and LBP should have made.

Contrary to the CAs ruling, the RTCs failure to distinguish between the initial valuation that is contemplated in
Sec. 16 of RA 6657 and the just compensation subject of judicial determination is a gross and patent error that
can be considered as grave abuse of discretion. Gross abuse of discretion is defined, as follows:
A special civil action for certiorari, under Rule 65, is an independent action based on the specific grounds therein
provided and will lie only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law. A petition for certiorari will prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is alleged and proved to exist.
"Grave abuse of discretion," under Rule 65, has a specific meaning. It is the arbitrary or despotic exercise of
power due to passion, prejudice or personal hostility; or the whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious exercise of power
that amounts to an evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation
of law. For an act to be struck down as having been done with grave abuse of discretion, the abuse of discretion
must be patent and gross.25 x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
It should also be pointed out that in the related Land Bank of the Philippines v. Pagayatan, 26 the Court had found
the presiding judge of the RTC, Branch 16 in San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, herein respondent Judge Ernesto P.
Pagayatan, guilty of Gross Ignorance of the Law or Procedure and Gross Misconduct for holding Teresita V.
Tengco, Acting Chief of the Land Compensation Department of the LBP, and Leticia Lourdes A. Camara, Chief of
the Land Compensation Department of the LBP, guilty of indirect contempt for allegedly disobeying the very
same Order dated March 4, 2005 of the RTC. In that case, Court ruled:
The partiality of respondent was highlighted when, out of his selective invocation of judicial courtesy, he refused
to resolve Leticia and Teresitas February 14, 2007 Urgent Manifestation of Compliance and Motion and other
pending incidents in view of the pendency before the appellate court of the LBPs Omnibus Motion praying for,
among other things, the quashal of the warrant of arrest, whereas he had earlier found Leticia and Teresita guilty
of contempt despite the pendency before the appellate court of LBPs motion for reconsideration of the dismissal
of the petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 93206.
Evidently, the RTC had already acted with partiality in deciding the case and with grave abuse of discretion.
Moreover, in order to give life and breath to Sec. 16 of RA 6657, as well as DAR Administrative Order No. 02,
Series of 1996, the Court is constrained to direct the DAR and the LBP to make the initial valuation of the subject
land as of the time of its taking and to deposit the valuation in the name of the landowner or his estate, in
accordance with RA 6657 and the pertinent decisions of this Court on the matter.
1avvphi1

The length of time that has elapsed that the landowner has not received any compensation for the land cannot
justify the release of the PARAD valuation to the landowner. Sec. 16 of RA 6657 only allows the release of the
initial valuation of the DAR and the LBP to the landowner prior to the determination by the courts of the final just
compensation due. Besides, it must be stressed that it was only sometime in 2003 that the assignee of the
landowner filed a petition for determination of just compensation with the PARAD. Clearly, the landowner slept
on his right to demand payment of the initial valuation of the land. Nevertheless, such lapse of time demands
that the DAR and the LBP act with dispatch in determining such initial valuation and to deposit it in favor of the
landowner at the soonest possible time.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The CAs August 17, 2006 Decision and March 27, 2007 Resolution in
CA-G.R. SP No. 93206 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The DAR and the LBP are hereby given three
(3) months from receipt of notice that this Decision has become final and executory, within which to determine
the initial valuation of the subject lot and to deposit its initial value to the account of private respondent Lubrica.
The PARAD Decision dated March 21, 2003 in Case No. DCN-0405-0022-02 is hereby ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. The RTC Order dated March 4, 2005 in Agrarian Case No. 1390 is also ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

Pesca v. Pesca, G.R. No. 136921, April 17, 2001

FACTS: The petitioner and respondent were married and had four children. Lorna filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of her husband. She alleged that he is

emotionally immature and irresponsible. He was cruel and violent. He was a habitual drinker. Whenever she tells him
to stop or at least minimize his drinking, her husband would hurt her. There was even a time when she was chased by
a loaded shotgun and threatened to kill her in the presence of their children. The children also suffered physical
violence. Petitioner and their children left the home. Two months later, they returned upon the promise of respondent
to change. But he didnt. She was battered again. Her husband was imprisoned for 11 days for slight physical injuries.
RTC declared their marriage null and void. CA reversed RTCs ruling. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N the guidelines for psychological incapacity in the case of Republic vs CA & Molina should be taken in
consideration in deciding in this case.

HELD: Yes. In the Molina case, guidelines were laid down by the SC before a case would fall under the category of
psychological incapacity to declare a marriage null and void. This decision has force and effect of a law. These
guidelines are mandatory in nature. Petition denied.
The "doctrine of stare decisis," ordained in Article 8 of the Civil Code, expresses that judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the law shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. The rule follows the settled legal maxim
legis interpretado legis vim obtinet that the interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the
force of law.

SALVACION VS. CENTRAL BANK Leave a comment

KAREN E. SALVACION, minor, thru Federico N. Salvacion, Jr., father and Natural Guardian, and Spouses
FEDERICO N. SALVACION, JR., and EVELINA E. SALVACION vs. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,
CHINA BANKING CORPORATION and GREG BARTELLI y NORTHCOTT
G.R. No. 94723 August 21, 1997

FACTS: Greg Bartelli, an American tourist, was arrested for committing four counts of rape and serious illegal
detention against Karen Salvacion. Police recovered from him several dollar checks and a dollar account in the
China Banking Corp. He was, however, able to escape from prison. In a civil case filed against him, the trial court
awarded Salvacion moral, exemplary and attorneys fees amounting to almost P1,000,000.00.
Salvacion tried to execute the judgment on the dollar deposit of Bartelli with the China Banking Corp. but the
latter refused arguing that Section 11 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 exempts foreign currency deposits from
attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any
administrative body whatsoever. Salvacion therefore filed this action for declaratory relief in the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Should Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, as amended
by PD 1246, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency Deposit Act be made applicable to a foreign transient?
HELD: NO.
The provisions of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246, insofar as it amends Section 8 of
Republic Act No. 6426, are hereby held to be INAPPLICABLE to this case because of its peculiar circumstances.
Respondents are hereby required to comply with the writ of execution issued in the civil case and to release to
petitioners the dollar deposit of Bartelli in such amount as would satisfy the judgment.
Supreme Court ruled that the questioned law makes futile the favorable judgment and award of damages that
Salvacion and her parents fully deserve. It then proceeded to show that the economic basis for the enactment of
RA No. 6426 is not anymore present; and even if it still exists, the questioned law still denies those entitled to due
process of law for being unreasonable and oppressive. The intention of the law may be good when enacted. The
law failed to anticipate the iniquitous effects producing outright injustice and inequality such as the case before us.

The SC adopted the comment of the Solicitor General who argued that the Offshore Banking System and the
Foreign Currency Deposit System were designed to draw deposits from foreign lenders and investors and,
subsequently, to give the latter protection. However, the foreign currency deposit made by a transient or a tourist
is not the kind of deposit encouraged by PD Nos. 1034 and 1035 and given incentives and protection by said laws
because such depositor stays only for a few days in the country and, therefore, will maintain his deposit in the
bank only for a short time. Considering that Bartelli is just a tourist or a transient, he is not entitled to the
protection of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246 against attachment, garnishment or
other court processes.
Further, the SC said: In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its justice. Eventually, if we rule
that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 which exempts from attachment, garnishment,
or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body
whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign transient, injustice would result especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign
guest like accused Greg Bartelli. This would negate Article 10 of the New Civil Code which provides that in case of
doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and
justice to prevail.

National Marketing Corporation, plaintiff-appellant vs. Miguel Tecson, defendant-appellee

GR no. L-20131
27 August 1969
Facts:
December 21, 1965, National Marketing Corporation filed a complaint, docketed as civil case no.
63701 on the same court, as successor of the Price Stabilization Corporation, against the same
defendant from 10 years ago (December 21, 1955, Price Stabilization Corporation vs. Tecson).
Defendant Miguel Tecson moved to dismiss the said complaint upon the ground lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter of that and prescription of action.
More than ten years have passed a year is a period of 365 days (Art. 13, CCP). Plaintiff forgot that
1960 and 1964 were both leap years so that when this present case was filed it was filed two days
too late.
The lower court, then, issued an order of dismissal with regards the article 13 of the civil code.
Pursuant to Art. 1144(3) of our Civil Code, an action upon a judgment must be brought within ten
years from the time the right of action accrues, the issue thus confined to the date on which ten
years from December 21, 1955 had expired.
However, National Marketing Corporation insists that the same is erroneous because a year
means a calendar year. There is no question that when it is not a leap year, December 21 to
December 21 of the following year is one year. The case reached its conclusion with the
appellants theory that contravenes the explicit provision of Article 13 of the civil code.
Issues:
Whether or not the term year as used in the article 13 of the civil code is limited to 365 days.
Ruling: Yes. The term year as used in the article 13 of the civil code is limited to 365 days.
However, it is said to be unrealistic and if public interest demands a reversion to the
policy embodied in the revised administrative code, this may be done through legislative process
and not by judicial decree.

CIR v.Primetown, GR 162155, August 28, 2007

FACTS: Gilbert Yap, Vice Chair of Primetown applied on March 11, 1999 for a refund or credit of income tax which
Primetown paid in 1997. He claimed that they are entitled for a refund because they suffered losses that year due to
the increase of cost of labor and materials, etc. However, despite the losses, they still paid their quarterly income tax
and remitted creditable withholding tax from real estate sales to BIR. Hence, they were claiming for a refund. On May
13, 1999, revenue officer Elizabeth Santos required Primetown to submit additional documents to which Primetown
complied with. However, its claim was not acted upon which prompted it to file a petition for review in CTA on April 14,
2000. CTA dismissed the petition as it was filed beyonf the 2-year prescriptive period for filing a judicial claim for tax
refund according to Sec 229 of NIRC. According to CTA, the two-year period is equivalent to 730 days pursuant to Art
13 of NCC. Since Primetown filed its final adjustment return on April 14, 1998 and that year 2000 was a leap year, the
petition was filed 731 days after Primetown filed its final adjusted return. Hence, beyond the reglementary period.
Primetown appealed to CA. CA reversed the decision of CTA. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: W/N petition was filed within the two-year period

HELD: Pursuant to EO 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987, a year shall be understood to be 12 calendar months.
The SC defined a calendar month as a month designated in the calendar without regard to the number of days it may
contain. The court held that Administrative Code of 1987 impliedly repealed Art 13 of NCC as the provisions are
irreconcilable. Primetown is entitled for the refund since it is filed within the 2-year reglementary period.

Miciano vs Brimo
TITLE: Juan Miciano v Andre Brimo
CITATION: GR No.22595, November 1, 1927| 50 Phil 867
FACTS:
Juan Miciano, judicial administrator of the estate in question, filed a scheme of partition.
Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased (Joseph Brimo) opposed Micianos
participation in the inheritance. Joseph Brimo is a Turkish citizen.
ISSUE: Whether Turkish law or Philippine law will be the basis on the distribution of
Joseph Brimos estates.
HELD:
Though the last part of the second clause of the will expressly said that it be made and
disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine Island, this condition,
described as impossible conditions, shall be considered as not imposed and shall not
prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the testator
otherwise provide. Impossible conditions are further defined as those contrary to law or
good morals. Thus, national law of the testator shall govern in his testamentary
dispositions.
The court approved the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator, in
such manner as to include Andre Brimo, as one of the legatees.

AZNAR VS GARCIA
AZNAR vs. GARCIA
G.R. No. L-16749
January 31, 1963

FACTS: EDWARD Christensen died testate. The estate was distributed by Executioner Aznar according to the will,
which provides that: Php 3,600 be given to HELEN Christensen as her legacy, and the rest of his estate to his
daughter LUCY Christensen, as pronounced by CFI Davao.
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen, insofar as it deprives her of her legitime
as an acknowledged natural child, she having been declared by Us an acknowledged natural child of the deceased
Edward in an earlier case.
As to his citizenship, we find that the citizenship that he acquired in California when he resided in Sacramento
from 1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in the Philippines, and the deceased appears to have considered
himself as a citizen of California by the fact that when he executed his will he declared that he was a citizen of that
State; so that he appears never to have intended to abandon his California citizenship by acquiring another. But at
the time of his death, he was domiciled in the Philippines.
ISSUE: what law on succession should apply, the Philippine law or the California law?
HELD: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case returned to the lower court with
instructions that the partition be made as the Philippine law on succession provides.
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, which is as follows:
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount
of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law
of the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless
of the country where said property may be found.
The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the meaning of the term national
law is used therein.
The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of personal property?
The decision of CFI Davao, sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that under the California Probate
Code, a testator may dispose of his property by will in the form and manner he desires. But HELEN invokes the
provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code of California, which is as follows:
If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow the
person of its owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile.
It is argued on executors behalf that as the deceased Christensen was a citizen of the State of California, the
internal law thereof, which is that given in the Kaufman case, should govern the determination of the validity of
the testamentary provisions of Christensens will, such law being in force in the State of California of which
Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the other hand, insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and in
accordance therewith and following the doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the validity of the testamentary
provision in question should be referred back to the law of the decedents domicile, which is the Philippines.
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while the rule applied in In re
Kaufman, its internal law. If the law on succ ession and the conflict of laws rules of California are to be enforced
jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re Kaufman should apply to citizens
living in the State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as are not domiciled in California but in other
jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to the law of the domicile in the determination of matters with foreign
element involved is in accord with the general principle of American law that the domiciliary law should govern in
most matters or rights which follow the person of the owner.

Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as the national law is the
internal law of California. But as above explained the laws of California have prescribed two sets of laws for its
citizens, one for residents therein and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions.
It is argued on appellees (Aznar and LUCY) behalf that the clause if there is no law to the contrary in the place
where the property is situated in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines and that the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the provision in said Article 16 that the national
law of the deceased should govern. This contention can not be sustained.
As explained in the various authorities cited above, the national law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the
law on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the reference or return of the
question to the law of the testators domicile. The conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code,
precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the
Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile can not and should not refer the case back to California;
such action would leave the issue incapable of determination because the case will then be like a football, tossed
back and forth between the two states, between the country of which the decedent was a citizen and the country
of his domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of
the decedent, if the question has to be decided, especially as the application of the internal law of California
provides no legitime for children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines,
makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them.
We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Edward, a citizen of California, is the Philippines, the
validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child, the appellant HELEN, should be
governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the
internal law of California..
NOTES: There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United States,
each state of the Union having its own private law applicable to its citizens only and in force only within the state.
The national law indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted can not, therefore, possibly mean or apply
to any general American law. So it can refer to no other than the private law of the State of California.

Bellis vs. Bellis

FACTS:
Amos G. Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States. He had five legitimate children with
his first wife (whom he divorced), three legitimate children with his second wife (who survived him) and, finally,
three illegitimate children.
6 years prior Amos Bellis death, he executed two(2) wills, apportioning the remainder of his estate and
properties to his seven surviving children. The appellants filed their oppositions to the project of partition
claiming that they have been deprived of their legitimes to which they were entitled according to the Philippine
law. Appellants argued that the deceased wanted his Philippine estate to be governed by the Philippine law, thus
the creation of two separate wills.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Philippine law be applied in the case in the determination of the illegitimate childrens
successional rights
RULING:
Court ruled that provision in a foreigners will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance
with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be ignored in view
of those matters that Article 10 now Article 16 of the Civil Code states said national law should govern.

Where the testator was a citizen of Texas and domiciled in Texas, the intrinsic validity of his will should be
governed by his national law. Since Texas law does not require legitimes, then his will, which deprived his
illegitimate children of the legitimes, is valid.
The Supreme Court held that the illegitimate children are not entitled to the legitimes under the texas law, which
is the national law of the deceased.

Hermosisima vs. CA
In 1950, Soledad Cagigas, 33 years old (then a school teacher, later she became an insurance underwriter), and
Francisco Hermosisima, 23 years old (apprentice ship pilot), fell in love with each other. Since 1953, both had a
refular intimate and sexual affair with each other. In 1954, Soledad got pregnant. Francisco then promised to
marry Soledad. In June 1954, Soledad gave birth to a baby girl. The next month, Francisco got married but with
a different woman named Romanita Perez.
Subsequently, Soledad filed an action against Francisco for the latter to recognize his daughter with Soledad
and for damages due to Franciscos breach of his promise to marry Soledad. The trial court ruled in favor of
Soledad. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court and even increased the award of damages.
TheCourt of Appeals reasoned that Francisco is liable for damages because he seduced Soledad. He exploited
the love of Soledad for him in order to satisfy his sexual desires that being, the award of moral damages is
proper.
ISSUE: Whether or not moral damages are recoverable under our laws for breach of promise to marry.
HELD: No. Breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong per se. The Court of Appeals based its award
of damages on Article 2219 of the Civil Code which says in part that Moral damages may be recovered from
(3) Seduction, xxx However, it must be noted that the Seduction being contemplated in the said Civil Code
provision is the same Seduction being contemplated in Article 337 and 338 of the Revised Penal Code. Such
seduction is not present in this case.
Further, it cannot be said that Francisco morally seduced (in lieu of criminal seduction) Soledad given the
circumstances of this case. Soledad was 10 years older than Francisco. Soledad had a better job experience
and a better job overall than Francisco who was a mere apprentice. Further still, it was admitted by Soledad
herself that she surrendered herself to Francisco and that she wanted to bind by having a fruit of their
engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy.

Wassmer vs. Velez

In 1954, Francisco Velez and Beatriz Wassmer planned their marriage. They decided to schedule it on
September 4, 1954. And so Wassmer made preparations such as: making and sending wedding invitations,
bought her wedding dress and other apparels, and other wedding necessities. But 2 days before the scheduled
day of wedding, Velez sent a letter to Wassmer advising her that he will not be able to attend the wedding
because his mom was opposed to said wedding. And one day before the wedding, he sent another message to
Wassmer advising her that nothing has changed and that he will be returning soon. However, he never returned.
This prompted Wassmer to file a civil case against Velez. Velez never filed an answer and eventually judgment
was made in favor of Wassmer. The court awarded exemplary and moral damages in favor of Wassmer.
On appeal, Velez argued that his failure to attend the scheduled wedding was because of fortuitous events. He
further argued that he cannot be held civilly liable for breaching his promise to marry Wassmer because there is
no law upon which such an action may be grounded. He also contested the award of exemplary and moral
damages against him.

ISSUE: Whether or not the award of damages is proper.

HELD: Yes. The defense of fortuitous events raised by Velez is not tenable and also unsubstantiated. It is true
that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. However, in this case, it was not a simple
breach of promise to marry. because of such promise, Wassmer made preparations for the wedding. Velezs
unreasonable withdrawal from the wedding is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. Wassmers
cause of action is supported under Article 21 of the Civil Code which provides in part any person who wilfully
causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage.
And under the law, any violation of Article 21 entitles the injured party to receive an award for moral damages as
properly awarded by the lower court in this case. Further, the award of exemplary damages is also proper. Here,
the circumstances of this case show that Velez, in breaching his promise to Wassmer, acted in wanton, reckless,
and oppressive manner this warrants the imposition of exemplary damages against him.

Gashem vs. CA

In August 1986, while working as a waitress in Dagupan City, Pangasinan, Marilou Gonzales, then 21 years old,
met Gashem Shookat Baksh, a 29 year old exchange student from Iran who was studying medicine in Dagupan.
The two got really close and intimate. On Marilous account, she said that Gashem later offered to marry her at
the end of the semester. Marilou then introduced Gashem to her parents where they expressed their intention to
get married. Marilous parents then started inviting sponsors and relatives to the wedding. They even started
looking for animals to slaughter for the occasion.
Meanwhile, Marilou started living with Gashem in his apartment where they had sexual intercourse. But in no
time, their relationship went sour as Gashem began maltreating Marilou. Gashem eventually revoked his
promise of marrying Marilou and he told her that he is already married to someone in Bacolod City. So Marilou
went home and later sued Gashem for damages.
The trial court ruled in favor of Marilou and awarded her P20k in moral damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the decision of the trial court.
On appeal, Gashem averred that he never proposed marriage to Marilou and that he cannot be adjudged to
have violated Filipino customs and traditions since he, being an Iranian, was not familiar with Filipino customs
and traditions.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct.
HELD: Yes. Gashem is liable to pay for damages in favor of Marilou not really because of his breach of promise
to marry her but based on Article 21 of the Civil Code which provides:
Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong per se. In this case, it is the deceit and fraud employed by
Gashem that constitutes a violation of Article 21 of the Civil Code. His promise of marrying Marilou was a
deceitful scheme to lure her into sexual congress. As found by the trial court, Marilou was not a woman of loose
morals. She was a virgin before she met Gashem. She would not have surrendered herself to Gashem had
Gashem not promised to marry her. Gashems blatant disregard of Filipino traditions on marriage and on the
reputation of Filipinas is contrary to morals, good customs, and public policy. As a foreigner who is enjoying the

hospitality of our country and even taking advantage of the opportunity to study here he is expected to respect
our traditions. Any act contrary will render him liable under Article 21 of the Civil Code.
The Supreme Court also elucidated that Article 21 was meant to expand the concepts of torts and quasi delict. It
is meant to cover situations such as this case where the breach complained of is not strictly covered by existing
laws. It was meant as a legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which is impossible for human
foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books such as the absence of a law penalizing a
the breach of promise to marry.
The Supreme Court however agreed with legal luminaries that if the promise to marry was made and there was
carnal knowledge because of it, then moral damages may be recovered (presence of moral or criminal
seduction), Except if there was mutual lust; or if expenses were made because of the promise (expenses for the
wedding), then actual damages may be recovered.

Amonoy vs. Sps. Gutierrez

In 1965, Atty. Sergio Amonoy represented Alfonso Fornilda (Formida in some records) in a partition case. Since
Fornilda had no money to pay, he agreed to make use of whatever property he acquires as a security for the
payment of Amonoys attorneys fees which amounts to P27k. In July 1969, Fornilda died. A month later, the
property was finally adjudicated and Fornilda, through his heirs, got his just share from the property in dispute.
Fornilda was however unable to pay Amonoy. Hence, Amonoy sought to foreclose the property in 1970. The heirs
of Fornilda, the spouses Jose Gutierrez and Angela Fornilda then sued Amonoy questioning the validity of
his mortgage agreement with Fornilda. It was their claim that the attorneys fees he was collecting was
unconscionable and that the same was based on an invalid mortgage due to the existing att0rney-client
relationship between him and Fornilda at the time the mortgage was executed.
The spouses lost in the trial court as well as in the Court of Appeals but they appealed to the Supreme Court,
docketed as G.R.No. L-72306. Meanwhile, in 1973, Amonoy was able to foreclose the property. Amonoy was
also the highest bidder in the public sale conducted in view of the foreclosure. He was able to buy the property of
Fornilda for P23k. But constructed on said property was the house of the spouses Gutierrez.
Pending the spousess appeal with the Supreme Court, Amonoy was able to secure a demolition order and so
on May 30, 1986, Amonoy started demolishing the houses of the spouses. But on June 2, 1986, the Supreme
Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) against the demolition order. On June 4, 1986, Amonoy
received a copy of the TRO. Finally, on June 24, 1989, the Supreme Court promulgated a decision on G.R.No.
L-72306 where it ruled that the mortgage between Amonoy and Fornilda is void, hence, Amonoy has no right
over the property. But by this time, the house of the spouses was already demolished because it appears that
despite the TRO, Amonoy continued demolishing the house until it was fully demolished in the middle of 1987.
The spouses then sued Amonoy for damages. It is now the contention of Amonoy that he incurred no liability
because he was merely exercising his right to demolish (pursuant to the demolition order) hence what happened
was a case of damnum absque injuria (injury without damage).
ISSUE: Whether or not Amonoy is correct.
HELD: No. Amonoy initially had the right to demolish but when he received the TRO that right had already
ceased. Hence, his continued exercise of said right after the TRO was already unjustified. As quoted by the
Supreme Court: The exercise of a right ends when the right disappears, and it disappears when it is abused,
especially to the prejudice of others.
What Amonoy did is an abuse of right. Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle
of abuse of rights, sets certain standards which may be observed not only in the exercise of ones rights but also

in the performance of ones duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his
due; recognizes the primordial limitation on all rights: that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth
in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must
be held responsible.
Clearly then, the demolition of the spousess house by Amonoy, despite his receipt of the TRO, was not only an
abuse but also an unlawful exercise of such right.

Nikko Hotel vs. Reyes

One evening in October 1994, an exclusive party was being held at the Nikko Hotel Manila Garden. The
partywas being held for a prominent Japanese national. The person in charge at the party was Ruby Lim who
was also the executive secretary of the hotel. Later during the party, she noticed Robert Reyes (popularly known
as Amay Bisaya). Reyes was not on the list of exclusive guests. Lim first tried to find out who invited Reyes
to the party. When she ascertained that the host celebrant did not invite Reyes, Lim approached Reyes and told
the latter, in a discreet voice, to finish his food and leave the party. Reyes however made a scene and began
shouting at Lim. Later, a policeman was called to escort Reyes out of the party.
Reyes then sued Lim and Nikko Hotel Manila Garden for damages. In his version, he said that he was invited by
another party guest, Dr. Violeta Filart. He said that while he was queuing to get his food, Lim approached him
and ordered him in a loud voice to leave the party immediately. He told Lim he was invited by Dr. Filart however
when he was calling for Dr. Filart the latter ignored him. Later, he was escorted out of the party like a common
criminal.
The trial court ruled in favor of Lim and Nikko Hotel. However, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Reyes as it
ruled that Lim abused her right and that Reyes deserved to be treated humanely and fairly. It is true that Lim had
the right to ask Reyes to leave the party but she should have done it respectfully.
ISSUE: Whether or not Lim acted with abuse of rights.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court found the version of Lim more credible. She has been employed by the hotel for
more than 20 years at that time. Her job requires her to be polite at all times. It is very unlikely for her to make a
scene in the party she was managing. That would only make her look bad.
Reyes based his complaint on Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Art. 19 which provides:
Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
was not violated by Lim as it appears that even Reyes testified in court that when Lim told him to leave, Lim did
so very close to him so close that they could almost kiss. This only proves that Lim intended that only Reyes
shall hear whatever is it that shes going to tell Reyes and exclude other guests from hearing.
Article 21 on the other hand is commonly known as contra bonus mores:
Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
This article is likewise not violated. Lim, as proven by evidence on record, did not demean Reyes. They do not
know each other personally. She has no reason to treat him wrongfully especially so that Reyes himself is a
prominent person.

On the other hand, Reyes brought whatever damage he incurred upon himself. Under the doctrine of volenti non
fit injuria, by coming to the party uninvited, Reyes opens himself to the risk of being turned away, and thus being
embarrassed. The injury he incurred is thus self-inflicted. Evidence even shows that Dr. Filart herself denied
inviting Reyes into the party and that Reyes simply gate-crashed. Reyes did not even present any supporting
evidence to support any of his claims. Since he brought injury upon himself, neither Lim norNikko Hotel can be
held liable for damages.

Pe vs Pe
TITLE: Pe vs. Pe
CITATION: 5 SCRA 200
FACTS:
Alfonso Pe, the defendant, was a married man, agent of La Perla Cigar and Cigarette
Factory in Gasan Marinduque who was treated like a son by Cecilio Pe, one of the
petitioners. Cecilio introduced Alfonso to his children and was given access to visit their
house. Alfonso got fond of Lolita, 24 year old single, daughter of Cecilio. The defendant
frequented the house of Lolita sometime in 1952 on the pretext that he wanted her to
teach him how to pray the rosary. Eventually they fell in love with each other.
Plaintiff brought action before lower court of Manila and failed to prove Alfonso
deliberately and in bad faith tried to win Lolitas affection. The case on moral damages
was dismissed.
ISSUE: Whether or not defendant is liable to Lolitas family on the ground of moral, good
custom and public policy due to their illicit affair.
HELD:
Alfonso committed an injury to Lolitas family in a manner contrary to morals, good
customs and public policy contemplated in Article 20 of the civil code. The defendant
took advantage of the trust of Cecilio and even used the praying of rosary as a reason to
get close with Lolita. The wrong caused by Alfonso is immeasurable considering the fact
that he is a married man.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. Defendant is hereby sentenced to
pay the plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00 as damages and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees and
expenses of litigations. Costs against appellee.

Bunag v. CA G.R. No. 101749

G.R. No. 101749 July 10, 1992
CONRADO BUNAG, JR., v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, First Division, and ZENAIDA B. CIRILO,
REGALADO, J.:
FACTS:
On the afternoon of September 8, 1973, defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. brought plaintiff-appellant to a motel or hotel
where they had sexual intercourse. Later that evening, said defendant-appellant brought plaintiff-appellant to the
house of his grandmother Juana de Leon in Pamplona, Las Pias, Metro Manila, where they lived together as
husband and wife for 21 days, or until September 29, 1973. On September 10, 1973, defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr.
and plaintiff-appellant filed their respective applications for a marriage license with the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of Bacoor, Cavite. On October 1, 1973, after leaving plaintiff-appellant, defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr. filed
an affidavit withdrawing his application for a marriage license.

Plaintiff-appellant contends that on the afternoon of September 8, 1973, defendant-appellant Bunag, Jr., together with
an unidentified male companion, abducted her in the vicinity of the San Juan de Dios Hospital in Pasay City and
brought her to a motel where she was raped.
ISSUE:
Whether, since action involves a breach of promise to marry, the trial court erred in awarding damages.
RULING:
It is true that in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the time-honored rule that an action for breach of promise to marry has
no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of
such promise. 8 Generally, therefore, a breach of promise to marry per se is not actionable, except where the plaintiff
has actually incurred expenses for the wedding and the necessary incidents thereof.
However, the award of moral damages is allowed in cases specified in or analogous to those provided in Article 2219
of the Civil Code. Correlatively, under Article 21 of said Code, in relation to paragraph 10 of said Article 2219,
any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy shall compensate the latter for moral damages. 9 Article 21 was adopted to remedy the countless
gaps in the statutes which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless even though they have actually suffered
material and moral injury, and is intended to vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs
which is impossible for human foresight to specifically provide for in the statutes. 10
Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, the acts of petitioner in forcibly abducting private respondent
and having carnal knowledge with her against her will, and thereafter promising to marry her in order to escape
criminal liability, only to thereafter renege on such promise after cohabiting with her for twenty-one days, irremissibly
constitute acts contrary to morals and good customs. These are grossly insensate and reprehensible
transgressions which indisputably warrant and abundantly justify the award of moral and exemplary damages,
pursuant to Article 21 in relation to paragraphs 3 and 10, Article 2219, and Article 2229 and 2234 of Civil Code.
Petitioner would, however, belabor the fact that said damages were awarded by the trial court on the basis of a finding
that he is guilty of forcible abduction with rape, despite the prior dismissal of the complaint therefor filed by private
respondent with the Pasay City Fiscal's Office.
Generally, the basis of civil liability from crime is the fundamental postulate of our law that every person criminally
liable for a felony is also civilly liable. In other words, criminal liability will give rise to civil liability ex delicto only if the
same felonious act or omission results in damage or injury to another and is the direct and proximate cause
thereof. 11 Hence, extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability unless the extinction
proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. 12
In the instant case, the dismissal of the complaint for forcible abduction with rape was by mere resolution of the fiscal
at the preliminary investigation stage. There is no declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil case
might arise did not exist. Consequently, the dismissal did not in any way affect the right of herein private respondent to
institute a civil action arising from the offense because such preliminary dismissal of the penal action did not carry with
it the extinction of the civil action.
The reason most often given for this holding is that the two proceedings involved are not between the same parties.
Furthermore, it has long been emphasized, with continuing validity up to now, that there are different rules as to the
competency of witnesses and the quantum of evidence in criminal and civil proceedings. In a criminal action, the State
must prove its case by evidence which shows the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, while in a civil action
it is sufficient for the plaintiff to sustain his cause by preponderance of evidence only. 13 Thus, in Rillon, et al. vs.
Rillon, 14 we stressed that it is not now necessary that a criminal prosecution for rape be first instituted and prosecuted
to final judgment before a civil action based on said offense in favor of the offended woman can likewise be instituted
and prosecuted to final judgment.

Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC
TITLE: Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC
CITATION: 248 SCRA 300
FACTS:
Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her domicile in Tacloban,
Leyte where she studied and graduated high school in the Holy Infant Academy from 1938
to 1949. She then pursued her college degree, education, in St. Pauls College now Divine
Word University also in Tacloban. Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese School still
in Tacloban. She went to manila during 1952 to work with her cousin, the late speaker
Daniel Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she married late
President Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a Congressman of Ilocos Norte and was
registered there as a voter. When Pres. Marcos was elected as Senator in 1959, they lived
together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when Marcos won
presidency, they lived in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel

Manila. She served as member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila
during 1978.
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of the First
District of Leyte for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative
of the First District of Leyte and also a candidate for the same position, filed a Petition for
Cancellation and Disqualification" with the Commission on Elections alleging that
petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. The petitioner, in an
honest misrepresentation, wrote seven months under residency, which she sought to
rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of
Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as
her domicile or residence. She arrived at the seven months residency due to the fact that
she became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa in said months.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement to be eligible in
running as representative of the First District of Leyte.
HELD:
Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The court are in
favor of a conclusion supporting petitoners claim of legal residence or domicile in the
First District of Leyte despite her own declaration of 7 months residency in the district for
the following reasons:
1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imeldas domicile of origin
by operation of law when her father brought them to Leyte;
2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of domicile, a
bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and establishing a new one, and
acts which correspond with the purpose. In the absence and concurrence of all these,
domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.
3. A wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile because the term
residence in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law. When Imelda
married late President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained
a new home and not domicilium necessarium.
4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and acquired right to
choose a new one only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her actions upon returning to the
country clearly indicated that she chose Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile
of choice. To add, petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban,
Leyte while living in her brothers house, an act, which supports the domiciliary intention
clearly manifested. She even kept close ties by establishing residences in Tacloban,
celebrating her birthdays and other important milestones.
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence
qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of
Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25,
1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the
Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative
of the First District of Leyte.