DiannaTaylor2014

ISSN:18325203
FoucaultStudies,No.17,pp.117133,April2014

ARTICLE

UncertainOntologies
DiannaTaylor,JohnCarrollUniversity

ABSTRACT: This following essay explores the meaning and implications of philosophical
critiqueandcreativitywithintheworkofGillesDeleuzeandMichelFoucault.Thetwophi
losophers appeals to ontology, as an important site upon which their ethicopolitical com
mitmentstocritiqueandcreativitysimultaneouslyconvergeanddiverge,framethisexplora
tion. The first part of the essay shows how Deleuzes and Foucaults respective ontologies
furthercritiqueandcreativity.Thesecondpartoftheessayfocusesonapointofdivergence
in the two thinkers appeals to ontology: the relationship between philosophy and history.
FromaFoucauldianperspective,theahistoricalcharacterofDeleuzesontologyofdifference
threatens to undermine its transformative potential, whereas from a Deleuzian perspective,
the historical character of Foucaults ontology of the present, while it may not undermine
transformation,certainlydoesnotfacilitateit.Inconclusion,Iarguethatitispreciselyfrom
withinthesetensionsthatimportant,productive,andtransformativeaspectsofDeleuzesand
Foucaultsworkemerge.

Keywords:MichelFoucault,GillesDeleuze,Ontology,Ethics,Politics

Thehistoryofphilosophy,ratherthanrepeatingwhataphilosophersays,hastosaywhathemusthave
takenforgranted,whathedidntsaybutisnonethelesspresentinwhathedidsay.1~GillesDeleuze

Thereisalwayssomethingludicrousinphilosophicaldiscoursewhenittries,fromtheoutside,todictate
toothers,totellthemwheretheirtruthisandhowtofinditbut[philosophy]isentitledtoexplore
whatmightbechanged,initsownthought,throughapracticethatisforeigntoit.2~MichelFoucault

IamgratefultoMichaelEngforprovidinghelpfulcommentsonanearlierversionofthisessay.
1GillesDeleuze,OnPhilosophy,inNegotiations:19721990,(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1995),
135155.
2MichelFoucault,IntroductiontoTheHistoryofSexuality,VolumeII:TheUseofPleasure,trans.RobertHur
ley,(NewYork:VintageBooks,1990),9.

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Taylor:UncertainOntologies

Introduction
Beginning in the 1960s, according to Gary Gutting, French philosophy acquired a new and
distinctivecharacter.Youngphilosophersfoundhumanisticnarrativespositingtheinevitabil
ityofhumanprogresstobefundamentallyinconsistentwiththe[postWar]worldtheysaw
as irredeemable.3 These philosophers therefore began challenging such narratives and the
normativevaluestowhichtheyhadgivenrise,aswellasendeavoringtoarticulateifnotal
ternativesthemselves,thenatleastconditionsfortheirpossibility.4Thisphilosophicalproject,
whichGuttingreferstoasthinkingtheimpossible,isnotamerethoughtexperimentaimed
atrejectinghumanism.Frenchphilosophyhasexpressedabroadethicopoliticalcommitment
toarticulatingandfurtheringsomesortofguidingvisionspecifically,alivablevisionthat
neither eliminates the distinctively human nor makes human beings the center of the uni
verse.5Fromtheperspectiveofthinkingtheimpossible,Guttingwrites,theultimatepoint
andtestofphilosophicalthoughtisseeninitsrelevancetopoliticalgoals.6
Gutting shows that philosophers have developed multiple and sometimes conflicting
approachestothinkingtheimpossible.Twosuchapproachesaretobefoundintheworkof
Gilles Deleuze and Michel Foucault, both of who figure prominently in Guttings analysis.
Consistent with the aim of thinking the impossible, as Gutting conceives of it, Deleuze and
Foucault critique prevailing norms, institutions, and practices, including the Western philo
sophicaltradition.Throughtheirrespectivecritiques,boththinkersalsoaimtopromotethe
creation and proliferation of (possibilities for) alternative ways of living in the world for
waysofliving,thatis,whichdonotreproduceandinfactcounterthosewaysofliving,which
gaverisetothedevastatingcrisesofthetwentiethcentury.
The following essay seeks to explore more preciselythe meaning and implications of
philosophicalcritiqueandcreativitywithinthecontextofDeleuzesandFoucaultswork.The
twophilosophersappealstoontologyframethisexploration,insofarasIseetheseappealsas
asiteuponwhichtheirethicopoliticalcommitmentstothinkingtheimpossiblesimultaneous
lyconvergeanddiverge.Inthefirstpartoftheessay,IshowhowDeleuzesandFoucaults
respectiveontologiescanbeseenasfurtheringtheireffortstothinktheimpossible.Thecriti
cal and creative aspects of Deleuzes ontology of difference and Foucaults ontology of the
present are apparent in large part through each thinkers utilization of the work of Nie
tzscheathinkerwhoemployedcritiquespecificallyinordertopavethewayforthecreation
ofsomethingnew.Thesecondpartoftheessayidentifiesoneimportantpointofdivergence
inDeleuzesandFoucaultsrespectiveappealstoontologyandthenfocusesonasecondthat
in some ways emerges from the first: the relationship between philosophy and history or,
morespecifically,whetherandtowhatextentappealingtohistoryfacilitateseffortstothink
the impossible. I show that from a Foucauldian perspective, the ahistorical character of
Gary Gutting, Thinking the Impossible: French Philosophy Since 1960, (New York: Oxford University Press,
2011),22.
4ItismyviewthatDeleuzeandFoucaultseektoidentifyandfosterconditionsunderwhichalternativesto
prevailingmodesofthoughtandexistencemaybecreatedandexperimentedwith,andthattheythemselves
actuallycreatealternatives.ThroughouttheessayIthereforerefertothemasdoingboth.
5Gutting,ThinkingtheImpossible,22.
6Ibid,19.
3

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Deleuzesontologyofdifferencethreatenstoundermineitstransformativepotential.Froma
Deleuzianperspective,bycontrast,thehistoricalcharacterofFoucaultsontologyofthepre
sent, while it may not undermine transformation, certainly does not facilitate it. By way of
conclusion,IarguethatthetensionproducedbythesedivergencesdoesnotinhibitDeleuzes
andFoucaultseffortstothinktheimpossible.Rather,itispreciselywithinthistensionthat
themostimportant,productive,andtransformativeaspectsofthinkingtheimpossibleemerge.

I
Deleuzes ethicopolitical commitment to creating and cultivating possibilities for alternative
modes of thought and existencefor the remarkable, the new, and the important7is re
flectedinhisengagementwiththequestionof,asToddMayputsit,howonemightlive.8
WhileDeleuzeengagesthisquestionperhapsmostovertlyinhiscollaborativeworkwithFelix
Guattari(especiallyinAntiOedipusandAThousandPlateaus),italsocanbeseenasframinghis
analysesofthinkerssuchasSpinoza,Nietzsche,Bergson,andevenKant,allofwhomhebe
lievedtobethinkingdifferently,orwhoseworkhesawopeningontothepossibilityofdoing
so.ThequestionofhowonemightlivealsomotivatesDeleuzesworkinDifferenceandRepeti
tion.Therehedevelopsanontologythatisbothcharacterizedbyandpromotestheprolifera
tionofdifferenceandwhich,throughdoingso,generatesconditionsforthepossibilityofand
thusfacilitatesnotmerelythinking,butalsoliving,differently.
According to Constantin Boundas, [f]or Deleuze, philosophy is ontology.9 While
Boundas identifies Deleuze as one of the only philosophers of his generation who does not
eschew ontology, he also makes note of the nontraditional nature of Deleuzes ontology of
difference.AsBoundasdescribesit,Deleuzesontologyisarigorousattempttothinkofpro
cessandmetamorphosisbecomingnotasatransitionortransformationfromonepointto
another,butratherasanattempttothinkoftherealasaprocess.10UnderstandingDeleuzes
ontologyofdifferenceinthiswayhelpsmakesenseoftheprominentroleNietzschesdoctrine
ofeternalrecurrenceplaysinitsarticulation.Deleuzerejectstheviewthateternalrecurrence
entails perpetually reexperiencing the events of ones life exactly as one has already lived
them.Hearguesthatreadingswhichposittheeternalreturnofthesame,ontheonehand,
and particular events,on the other, are erroneousat least in partbecause they relyupon a
conventional understanding of the passage of time. In Nietzsche and Philosophy, Deleuze ar
guesthateternalrecurrencecallsintoquestionandrecaststhetraditionalrelationshipbetween
past,present,andfuture.Thiscritiqueandrecastinginturnunderminesthetraditionalrela
tionship between being and becoming. According to Deleuze, Nietzsche shows that for the

GillesDeleuzeandFelixGuattari,WhatisPhilosophy?,trans.HughTomlinsonandGrahamBurchell,(New
York:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1994),82.CitedinToddMay,GillesDeleuze:AnIntroduction,(NewYork:
CambridgeUniversityPress,2005),22.
8May,GillesDeleuze:AnIntroduction,1.
9ConstantinV.Boundas,Ontology,inTheDeleuzeDictionary,ed.AdrianParr,(NewYork:ColumbiaUni
versityPress,2005),191192.
10Ibid.
7

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Taylor:UncertainOntologies

passage of time to take place at all, and hence for the past to be constituted in time,11 the
presentcannotbeastaticstateofbeing.12Thepassingmoment,Deleuzewrites,couldnev
erpassitifwerenotalreadypastandyettocomeatthesametimeasbeingpresent.Ifthe
presentdidnotpassofitsownaccord,ifithadtowaitforanewpresentinordertobecome
the past, the past in general would never be constituted in time, and this particular present
wouldnotpass[t]hepresentbemustcoexistwithitselfaspastandyettocome.13
Byrevealingthepresentasmovement,asinpassing,eternalrecurrencereconfigures
past,present,andfutureascoexistingcycles.14Deleuzearguesthat,forNietzsche,itthere
forecannotbethecasethatbeingconstruedassomeonethingiswhatreturns,forbe
ingisnotastaticstateorfixedidentitybutitselfadynamicpassing.15Ifthereisnootherbe
ingthanthispassing,whatreturnsisnothingmorethanwhatDeleuzereferstoasthebeing
of becoming, or recurrence itself. Moreover, given the dynamic nature of this being of be
coming,whatreturnscanbesaidtobethesameonlyintermsofitsdifferencethediffer
ence between as well as within cycles.16 Through illustrating that becoming is all that there
is, Deleuze thus sees eternal recurrence providing the ultimate affirmation of difference.
Eternalrecurrence,heargues,mustbethoughtofasasynthesisoftimeanditsdimensions
ofdiversityanditsreproductionofbecomingandthebeingwhichisaffirmedinbecom
ingasynthesisofdoubleaffirmation.17Inturn,thisaffirmationillustratesthateternalre
currenceitselfmustbethoughtofastheexpressionofaprinciplewhichservesasanexplana
tionofdiversityanditsreproduction,ofdifferenceanditsrepetition.18
Theprincipleinquestioniswilltopower,aprinciplewhosearticulation,Deleuzecon
tends,Nietzsche saw as effectively undermining prevailingmodes of thought and existence:
willtopower,accordingtoNietzsche,cannotbethoughtoutofthemechanisticorderwith
outthinkingawaythisorderitself.19TotheextentthatDeleuzesownontologyofdifference
incorporateskeyaspectsofeternalrecurrence,itshouldnotbesurprisingthatitsarticulation
produces similar effects. That is, Deleuzes ontology reveals as contingent and thereby calls
into question a modern Western meaningmaking system that has endowed itself with the
authoritytoprovideadefinitiveaccountofthenatureofreality.20AsDeleuzedescribesit,this
Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, trans. High Tomlinson, (New York: Columbia University Press,
1983),48.
12SeeDeleuzesanalysisinChapterTwo,RepetitionforItself,ofDifferenceandRepetition,trans.PaulPat
ton,(NewYork:ColumbiaUniversityPress,1994),70128.
13Deleuze,NietzscheandPhilosophy,48.
14Ibid,49.
15Ibid.
16Ibid.
17Ibid,48.
18Ibid.
19Deleuze,NietzscheandPhilosophy,49.
20InAThousandPlateaus,DeleuzeandGuattariimplicatetheWesternphilosophicaltraditioninasystemof
thoughtthatreducesdifferencetosameness.Theyalsoanalyzethespecificallypoliticaleffectsofthisimpli
cation. See Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Chapter Twelve, 1227: Treatise on Nomadology The War
Machine,inAThousandPlateaus,trans.BrianMassumi(Minneapolis:UniversityofMinnesotaPress,1987),
351422.
11

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systemthatofrepresentationreliesuponandinturninvokessameness,specificallyinthe
formofidentity.Anobjectcanberepresentedandthereforeknownonlyifitpossessesapre
existing,recognizable,andunchangingidentity.Withrespecttobothindividualobjects(finite
representation)andbeingitself(infiniterepresentation),thesystemisonlycapableofmaking
senseofwhatitcanrenderknowablebywayofrepresentationalconcepts;anythingelse,any
thing that cannot be subsumed under the existing meaningmaking systemdifference, in
other wordsis denied and negated. On what condition, Deleuze writes, is difference
tracedorprojectedontoaflatspace?Preciselywhenithasbeenforcedintoapreviouslyes
tablishedidentity,whenithasbeenplacedontheslopeoftheidenticalwhichmakesitreflect
ordesireidentity,andnecessarilytakesitwhereidentitywantstogonamelyintothenega
tive.21
Thus,whileasystemofrepresentationisabletomediatewhatalreadyexists,itisin
capable of creating anything new.22 To the extent that this is the case, such a system cannot
begineventoentertainthequestionofhowonemightlive;allitcandoisgiveanaccountof
prevailingwaysoflivingandrearticulateexistingconditionsforthepossibilityofmoreofthe
same.AsIhaveshown,however,likeNietzschebeforehimDeleuzeseekstoconceiveofreali
tyinwaysthatcannotbearticulatedbymeansoftraditionalconcepts,categories,andprinci
ples, and which therefore unsettle these same meaningmaking tools. Deleuze makes it im
possibletouncriticallyacceptformulationsofbeingandbecoming,samenessanddifference,
that are generated by way of a traditional system of representation that relies upon pre
determined concepts in order to make sense of the world. Every object, every thing,
Deleuze argues, must see its own identity swallowed up in difference, each being no more
than a difference between differences.23 Just as Nietzsches notion of eternal recurrence re
caststhepresentasapassingasopposedtoastateofbeing,soforDeleuzewhatisispre
cisely a process of differenciation, where difference is shown differing.24 Just as for Nie
tzscheallthatreturnsis difference, so is it thatwithinDeleuzes ontology, being is univocal
onlyintermsofwhatisequivocal.25Whatunifiesbeingisdifference,whichsimultaneously
undoesanysenseofbeingasstaticandhencedeniesanywayofmakingsensebywayofrep
resentation.Inotherwords,allthatcanberelieduponwithinaDeleuzianontologyofdiffer
enceisthatwhichcontinuallydestabilizesandunsettles.Openingisanessentialfeatureof
univocity, Deleuze writes. Only there does the cry resound, Everything is equal! and
Everythingreturns!Suchassertionscanbemadeonlyonconditionthateachbeinghas
reachedastateofexcessinwhichwhatisassertedissimultaneouslycalledintoquestion:the
differencethatcausesassertionsabouttheworldtoreturnsimultaneouslydisplacesand
disguisesthem.26
ThequestionthatguidesFoucaultsethicopoliticalcommitmenttothinkingtheimpos
sible is that of how and to what extent it might be possible to think differently than one
Deleuze,DifferenceandRepetition,51.
Ibid,56.
23Ibid.
24Ibid.
25Ibid,304.
26Ibid.
21
22

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thinks, and perceive differently than one sees.27 Foucault does not simply want to see and
thinkdifferentlyhimself.Throughhisphilosophyhealsoendeavorstofosterwidespreadcre
ationofandexperimentationwithnewmodesofthoughtandexistence.Inordertodothis,he
firstillustratestheneedforsucharticulationandexperimentationbyconductinggenealogical
analyses.Throughinquiringintohowprevailingnorms,institutions,andpracticeshavede
veloped historically and takenhold, genealogies showthat current conditions are notneces
saryconditionsand,therefore,thattheyareopentocriticalanalysis.Engagingcriticallywith
thepresentinturnfacilitatesidentificationandcounteringofnorms,institutions,andpractices
thatgeneratenormalizingeffects.Simplyput,normalizationasFoucaultconceivesofitrefers
to the modern Western phenomenon whereby human beings critical and creative capacities
are merely channeled back into the rearticulation of prevailing modes of thought and exist
ence.Thiscurtailmentofcritiqueandcreativityinturnreinforcesexistingpowerrelationsand
isthereforecountertofreedom.ForFoucault,freedomentailsnavigatingexistingpowerrela
tionsinwaysthatdonotreinforcethemintheircurrentformbutratherkeepthemopenand
fluid.28Powerrelationsarekeptopenandfluidwhencapacitiesaredirectedtowardinnova
tion,theoutcomeofwhichcannotbeanticipatedinadvance,suchthatalternative,multiple,
andpotentiallyconflictingwaysoflivingproliferate.
Itisnotdifficulttoseehowthepressuretowardobedienceinthefaceofandconformi
tywithprevailingmodesofthoughtandexistencethatcharacterizesmodernWesternsocieties
posesamajorobstacletothekindofethicopoliticalengagementFoucaultaimstopracticeand
encourage. Normalizing societies hone persons ability to effectively, efficiently, and obedi
entlyreproducewhatalreadyexists.Indoingso,theysimultaneously(andjustaseffectively)
inhibitthinking and perceiving differently; cultivationof critical and creative capacities;and
identificationandcounteringof,anddevelopmentofalternativesto,normalizingnorms,insti
tutions,andpractices.Totheextentthattheyproduceconformityandobedience,suchsocie
tiesriskdeterioratingintostatesofdominationstaticconditionsofinequalitywherethesub
stanceofpersonslives(especiallythosewhodonotforwhateverreasontoadheretoprevail
ingnorms)issimplydictatedtothem.
As I have described it here, Foucauldian genealogy clearly reflects Nietzsches influ
ence.Eveninhisearlywork,Nietzscheendeavorstoelucidatethehistoricalnatureandharm
fuleffects(inthesenseofpromotingressentimentordecadence)ofconcepts,categories,princi
ples, and practices that are considered to be not only fundamental but also valuable and
emancipatory(inthesenseofpromotingmoralandintellectualprogress)aspectsofthemod
ernWest.InhisessayOnTruthandLiesinaNonmoralSense,forexample,Nietzscheillus
tratesthatapreoccupationwiththetruthaswellas,andmorefundamentally,theconceptof
truth itself, emerges at a particular point in historyspecifically, at the point where human
beingsundertaketolivetogetherincommunities.[F]romboredomandnecessity,Nietzsche

Foucault,IntroductiontoTheHistoryofSexuality,VolumeII:TheUseofPleasure,8.
Foucault,Power,MoralValues,andtheIntellectual.Iamreferringheretotheversionofthisinterview,
Power, Moral Values, and the Intellectual. An Interview with Michel Foucault by Michael Bess,
November 3, 1980, that is housed in the IMEC Archive (folder number FCL2. A0206). The interview is
also
available
in
History
of
the
Present
4
(Spring
1988)
and
online
at
http://www.vanderbilt.edu/historydept/michaelbess/Foucault%20Interview.
27
28

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writes,manwishestoexistsociallyandwiththeherd.29Thismovetowardorganizedsocial
itymarksthefirststeptowardacquiringthatpuzzlingtruthdrivewhatcountsastruth
fromnowonisestablished.30Moreover,justashedoesinOntheGenealogyofMoralswiththe
conceptofmorality,Nietzscheshowsthattheconceptoftruth,largelyacceptedasnecessary
forthepurposesofbothmakingsenseofandimprovingtheworld,isnotonlygroundedin
butalsoproducesdetrimentaleffects.Truthandthedesireforitstemfromthenegativeemo
tionoffear(specificallyfearofuncertainty),andinturnreduceacomplex,uncertain,unpre
dictable reality to what we already know, even if that known reality is itself negative in the
sensethatitlacksvalueandmeaning.Putdifferently,Nietzschesworkrevealsthatwhatper
sons in fact know and engage is not the world in which we live, but rather the meaning
makingsystemsthatwehaveimposedupontheworld.31Obviously,fearofuncertaintyand
attachmenttowhatbelievewealreadyknowgreatlyhinderspersonsabilitytocriticallyana
lyzeexistingmeaningmakingsystemsand,therefore,toidentify,analyze,andcounterharm
fulpractices.
Havingemployedgenealogyinordertocritiqueprevailingmodesofthoughtandex
istence,andthusalsotoillustratetheneedfordevelopmentofandexperimentationwithnew
suchmodes,Foucaultengagesinpreciselythiskindofdevelopmentandexperimentationin
hislaterwork:heformulatesaphilosophicalmodeofexistenceawayoflivingorconducting
ourselvesintheworld.Inamovethatappearsatfirstparadoxical,Foucaultinitiateshisfor
mulationnotthroughanalysisofNietzscheswork,butofKants.Thisapparentparadoxre
solves itself, however, when Foucault identifies two philosophical traditions stemming from
Kants work. The first and more readily recognizable, which is concerned with articulating
the conditions under which true knowledge is possible, Foucault refers to as the Kantian
critical tradition.32 It is within the second Kantian tradition that Foucault situates both Nie
tzsche and himself. This tradition stems from Kants conceptualization of enlightenment, is
concernedwiththequestionofthepresentthequestionofouractualityandthepresent
fieldofpossibleexperiences,33andopensonto(andtosomeextentengages)34questionsthat
bothNietzscheandFoucaulttakeupanddevelop.Thesequestionsinclude,Howhavepre
vailingmodesofthoughtandexistencecometobeestablished?,Towhatextentareprevail
ingmodes(norms)acceptedasnecessary?,Whataretheeffectsofbothpowerofprevailing
normsandtheiruncriticalacceptance?

FriedrichNietzsche,OnTruthandLiesinaNonmoralSense,inPhilosophyandTruth:SelectionsfromNie
tzschesNotebooksoftheEarly1870s,ed.andtrans.DanielBreazeale,(Amherst,NY:HumanityBooks,1979),
81.
30Ibid.
31Nietzschewrites,Ifweareforcedtocomprehendallthingsonlyundertheseforms,thenitceasestobe
amazingthatinallthingsweactuallycomprehendnothingbuttheseforms.SeeOnTruthandLiesina
NonmoralSense,87.
32Foucault,WhatisRevolution?,inThePoliticsofTruth,eds.SylvreLotringerandLysaHochroth,(New
York:Semiotexte,1997),99.
33Ibid,100.
34FoucaultandDeleuzebothseemtoseeKantsworkopeningontoimportantphilosophicalquestionsand
possibilitiesthatKantdoesnotnecessarilyexplorehimself.
29

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Foucaultreferstoamodeofexistencecharacterizedbysuchcriticalquestioningalter
nativelyasanethos,anattitude,anontologyofourselves,andanontologyofthepre
sent.ThattheontologyofwhichFoucaultconceivesextendsbeyondamethodofphilosophi
calinquiryisapparentinhisdescriptionofanattitudeasamodeofrelatingtocontemporary
realityawayofthinkingandfeelingofactingandbehaving.35Foucaultalsomakesclear
that this attitude entails not simply engaging, but more specifically engaging critically, with
the present. Insofar as anontology of the presententails adoptinga criticalattitude toward
contemporaryreality,itisimplicatedinthepracticeoffreedom.Thisimplicationisapparent
inFoucaultscharacterizationofanontologyofthepresentintermsofacritiqueofwhatwe
are[that]isatoneandthesametimethehistoricalanalysisofthelimitsthatareimposedon
us,andanexperimentwiththepossibilityofgoingbeyondthem.36Anontologyofthepre
sent is a mode of conduct concerned with identifying, analyzing, and challenging the con
straintspersonsfacewithinnormalizingsocietiesrelativetoboththeirselfrelationandtheir
broaderrelationswithintheworld.Itentailsquestioningprevailingnormsandpractices,crit
icallyengagingthepresentinwaysthatyieldinsightintotheworkingsofexistingpowerrela
tions,andendeavoringtonavigatethoserelationssothatnewwaysoflivingcanbecreated
and explored. It is thus a way of living in the world that resists and in turn facilitates re
sistanceagainstpressuretowardnormalization,whilealsofacilitatingalternativestonormal
izingmodesofexistence.

II
SeveralpointsofintersectionmaybeidentifiedbetweenDeleuzesandFoucaultsrespective
appealstoontologyastheseappealsexpressanethicopoliticalcommitmenttocritiquingpre
vailing modes of thought and existence and creating (possibilities for) alternatives to those
modes. First, Deleuze and Foucault both see pressure toward conformity with prevailing
ways of thinking and acting inhibiting the kind of critical and creative capacities that foster
innovationand,therefore,possibilitiesforthinkingandlivingotherwise.Thisviewisappar
entinDeleuzescritiqueofsystemsofrepresentationandFoucaultsconcernwithnormaliza
tion.Second,evenastheycritiquethetraditionofWesternphilosophy,boththinkersnone
theless identify philosophical resources for countering this pressure toward conformity.
Deleuze posits an ontology of difference that undermines the selfascribed authority of sys
temsofrepresentationtosettlequestionsaboutthenatureofrealityandtherebyprovidecer
taintyabouttheworldinwhichwelive.Foucaultconceivesofanontologyofthepresentthat
facilitatesidentificationandcriticalanalysisof,aswellascreationofalternativesto,normaliz
ingmodesofthoughtandexistence.Finally,DeleuzesontologyofdifferenceandFoucaults
ontology of the present are informed by the work of Nietzsche.37 Deleuze draws upon Nie
Foucault, What is Enlightenment?, in The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow, (New York: Pantheon,
1984),39.
36Ibid,50.
37 I am not suggesting that in developing their respective ontologies Deleuze and Foucault are influenced
merelybyNietzscheonlythatheisanimportantinfluence.AstheIndextoDifferenceandRepetitionmakes
clear, Deleuze draws upon the work of a variety of thinkers, including Kant, whose work in fact figures
prominentlyinFoucaultsarticulationofanontologyofthepresent.
35

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tzschesdoctrineoftheeternalrecurrence,whereasFoucaultisinfluencedbyNietzscheange
nealogy.
Despitethesesimilarities,substantivepointsofdepartureexistbetweenDeleuzesand
Foucaultsrespectiveeffortstothinktheimpossiblewhichinturnaffecthowtheirrespective
appealstoontologyfunctionrelativetosuchaphilosophicalproject.Divergentviewsareap
parent,first,inhoweachphilosopherengagestheguidingquestionIhaveidentified.AsMay
points out, Deleuze conceives of the question of how one might live in very broad terms,
whereevennotionsofwhatitmeanstoliveandtheonedoingthislivingareintentionally
leftopen.38Aspresentedinthefirstsectionofthisessay,Deleuzesworkfocusesmoreongiv
inganaccountoftheconditionsfromwhichlivingandtheonesdoingitmightemergethan
onenumeratinghowlivingmightactuallyoccurorwhatitmightlooklikewithinanyparticu
larcontext.Deleuzepresentsarealitythatislessinfluxthansimplyfluxitself:allthatex
istsistherepetitionofdifference,whichinturngeneratesaproliferationofdynamicdiffer
encesthatstemfrombutdonotreplicatetherealityfromwhichtheyspring.Multiplemani
festationsoflivingandwhoorwhatisdoingitperpetuallyfoldandunfold.Hence,therefore,
MaysobservationthatinDeleuzeshandsontologyisnotaboutdiscoveringwhatisalready

outtherewaitingtobefound,itisaboutcreatingsomethingnew.39
Foucaultsengagementwiththequestionofthinkingandseeingdifferently,andhisar
ticulationofanontologyofthepresentthisengagementfacilitates,makeclearthatheiscon
cerned with how human freedom can be maximized within the context of human existence.
Heperceiveshumanbeingsastheoneswhoareactivelychallengingwhatispresentedtous
asnaturalandnecessaryandstrivingtocreatealternatives.[O]neofthemeaningsofhuman
existencethe source of human freedom, Foucault asserts, is never to accept anything as
definitive,untouchable,obvious,orimmobile.Noaspectofrealityshouldbeallowedtobe
come a definitive and inhuman law for us.40 It is also clear, insofar as normalization and,
therefore,effortstocounterit,arespecificallymodernphenomena,thatFoucaultsontologyof
thepresentisconcernedwithmaximizinghumanfreedomwithinaparticularsociohistorical
context.
DeleuzesandFoucaultsdifferentwaysofengagingtheseguidingquestionspointto
divergentattitudesconcerningwhetherandtowhatextenthistorymightfigurewithinaphil
osophicalprojectofthinkingtheimpossible.NeitherthecriticalaspectsofDeleuzesworknor
theontologyofdifferencehedevelopsarehistoricallyspecific.Incontrast,Foucaultcritiques
modernnorms,practices,andinstitutionsthatgaverisetoandinturnreproducethespecifi
cally modern forms of power within which we currently find ourselves embedded, the nor
malizing effects of which Foucault aims to counter. Moreover, for Deleuze, history simply
SeeMay,GillesDeleuze:AnIntroduction.
Ibid,17.
40Foucault,Power,MoralValues,andtheIntellectual.WhileitillustratesthatFoucaultisspecificallycon
cernedwithcounteringnormalizationandpromotingfreedomwithinthecontextofhumanexistence,this
statementalsoshowsthathedoesnotsituateideasaboutwhatitmeanstobehumanoutsideoftherealmof
criticalinterrogation.Indeed,Foucaultscritiqueofthehumansciencesaswellashisgenealogyofthemod
ernWesternsubjectindicatethedegreetowhichheseestraditionalnotionsofhumannessbeingimplicated
intheproliferationofnormalizingpowerrelations.
38
39

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provides a context for making sense of, but itself neither facilitates nor delimits, transfor
mation.Foucault,however,associatesahistoricalclaimswithnormalization;forhim,histori
calanalysisfacilitatesidentificationofpossibilitiesfortransformation.Inwhatfollows,Ishall
examinethissecondpointofdivergenceconcerningthequestionofwhetherappealstohistory
inhibitorenhanceeffortstothinktheimpossibleinmoredetail.IndoingsoIhopetoshow
thatalthoughDeleuzeandFoucaultpartcompanyonthisissue,thetensionbetweentheirtwo
viewpointsisaproductiveonethatultimatelyfacilitatesthecriticalandcreativephilosophical
practicethatcharacterizesthinkingtheimpossible.

III
FromaFoucauldianperspective,theextenttowhichtheahistoricalnatureofDeleuzesontol
ogyofdifferenceinhibitsthinkingtheimpossiblehingesinpartonwhetherDeleuzedeploys
orinvokesontologywhether,thatis,heusestheconceptstrategicallyinorderto[openup]
newavenuesforlivingoractuallyaimstoofferanaccountofwhatis.41AsIreadDifference
and Repetition, it is not completely clear whether Deleuze simply deploys or in fact invokes
ontology.Asnotedearlier,partofwhatDeleuzefindsobjectionableaboutthephilosophyof
representationisitsunbridledconfidenceinitsownabilitytoprovideadefinitiveaccountof
thenatureofreality,aswellasintheaccountitprovides.Positingandpromotingadherence
toasinglewayofmakingsenseoftheworldandtheinsightitaffordsclearlysettlesfunda
mentalphilosophicalquestions.Indoingso,suchaphilosophicalapproachprovidesasense
of certainty about the world that inhibits creation and cultivation of new and unexpected
modesofliving.Givenhiscritique,itispossibletoseeDeleuzeappealingtoontologysolely
for the purpose of unsettling ways of perceiving and hence navigating the world that have
beenuncriticallyacceptedandtherebyfacilitatingtheproliferationofdifference.Onthisread
ing,Deleuzeisnotconcernedwithgivinganaccountofwhatis,asanysuchaccountwouldbe
called into question along with everything else by way of the continual repetition of differ
ence.Hisappealtoontologywouldthenfunctionsimplyasonemorelineofflight.
Atthesametime,Deleuzedoesappeartogiveanaccountofthenatureofreality.This
account is ahistorical: Deleuze does not assert that difference is behind everything, but be
hinddifferencethereisnothingspecificallywithinthecontextof,forexample,modernWest
ernsocieties.42Hesimplydescribesthenatureofrealityinthisway.Evenifitisimpossibleto
know whether difference will in fact be cultivated, what that cultivation will look like, and
whatitseffectswillbe,Deleuzesappealtoontologypresentstheconditionsunderwhichdif
ference may be cultivated as an aspect of what is.43 In other words, and this is the crucial
point,whetherdifferenceisinfactcultivatedornotwithinanyparticularsociohistoricalcon
text,itisalwaysthecasethatitcouldhavebeen,canbe,orwillbeabletobe.Inarticulating
May,personalcommunication,July2012.
Deleuze,DifferenceandRepetition,57.
43Inpresentingdifferenceasanahistoricalgroundandtherebysecuringtheconditionsforthepossibilityof
differences,Deleuzemightappeartobeinvokingdifferenceassomekindoftranscendentalrealm.PaulPatton
argues,however,thatthisisnotthecase.Deleuze,hecontends,positsatranscendentalempiricismwhere
in differential conditions. .. must beunderstood as transcendental but entirelyimmanent to real experi
ence.SeePaulPatton,DeleuzeandthePolitical,(NewYork:Routledge,2000),40
41
42

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FoucaultStudies,No.17,pp.117133.

his ontology of difference, Deleuze thus appears to understand the relationship between the
empirical and the transcendental, differences and difference, as being analogous to the rela
tionship he posits between the actual and the virtual.44 Insofar as the actualization of differ
ence as differences is never fully captured or realized in those differences, difference can be
seentofunction,asPattonputsit,asapurereservethatprovidestheguaranteeofanopen
future.45Onthisreading,totheextentthatDeleuzesontologyofdifferencesettlesquestions
regarding possibilities for the proliferation ofdifferencesto the extent that, as May puts it,
ontologyisforDeleuzetheveryrouteonemusttakeinordertoadequatelyposetheques
tionofhowonemightliveitisanontologythatprovidesalevelofcertaintyaboutthenature
ofrealitywhichinhibitstoatleastsomedegreepreciselythatproliferationitself.46
From a Foucauldian perspective, ahistorical assurances of an open future
assurances, that is, not of transformation itself but of the conditions for its actualization
underminetheveryethicopoliticalcommitmenttocritiqueandcreativitytheyaimtosecure.
(The same can be said about the desire for such assurances). For this reason, Foucault pro
vides no guarantees, and his sustained philosophical perspective is critical of the desire for
them.Whilesomeofhisreadershavesuggestedthathecannotprovideguaranteesbecause
hisworklacksthenecessarynormativefoundations,onmyviewFoucaultintentionallyrefus
estoarticulatewhathereferstoasblueprintsforchange.Fromhisperspective,anyenter
prisethatpresumestotellotherswhattodo,andwhichindoingsoexacerbatestheexisting
desireinthemodernWesttobedirectedinonesactionswhich,inotherwords,exacerbates
existing tendencies toward conformity and obediencereinforces normalization and is thus
countertothepracticeoffreedom.Theresaterriblegamehere,Foucaultasserts,agame
which conceals a trap, in which the intellectuals tend to say what is good, and people ask
nothing better than to be told what is goodand it would be better if they started yelling,
Howbaditis!47Foucaultdoesnotperceivemererejectioninsuchvehementcriticism.Ra
ther, it constitutes refusalspecifically, refusal to uncritically accept prevailing modes of
thoughtandexistencethefirstofthreepracticesthattogetherIseecharacterizingthework
of freedom as Foucault conceives of it. Along with curiosity (the need to analyze and to
know) and innovation (seek[ing] out in our reflection those things that have never been
thoughtorimagined,)refusal(re)createsconditionsforthepossibilityofopenness,whichare
alwayssociohistoricallyspecificandthereforecanneverbedefinitivelydefinedorsecured.48
Foucaultsgenealogies,theinsighthedrawsfromthem,andrealityasheperceivesit,areradi
callyhistorical;analyzingthepastelucidateshowwehavecometobewherewepresentlyare
and,therefore,thefactthatthingscanbedifferentwithinthecontextofadynamicpresentthat
opensontoanuncertainfuture.Claimstohaveidentified(ortobeabletoidentify)aswellas
thedesireforahistoricalguaranteesofsettlednessandcertaintywithinsuchaframeworkare
SeeforexampleDeleuzesaccountoftherelationshipbetweenthevirtualandtheactualinPartIVofDif
ferenceandRepetition.
45Patton,DeleuzeandthePolitical,27;myemphasis.Pattonisreferringherenottodifferenceanddifferences,
butrathertotherelationshipbetweentheempiricalandthetranscendental.
46May,GillesDeleuze:AnIntroduction,15;myemphasis.
47Foucault,Power,MoralValues,andtheIntellectual.
48Ibid.
44

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thereforeemptyatbest.Atworsttheyarenormalizing,insofarastheymasktheneedforand
therebyinhibitcultivationofcriticalandcreativecapacitiesthatbothfacilitateandcharacter
izetheworkoffreedom.
Giventhatitsahistoricalcharacterinhibitscritiqueandcreativity,invokingaDeleuzian
ontologyofdifferenceis,fromaFoucauldianperspective,incompatiblewithaphilosophical
projectofthinkingtheimpossible.Likewise,Foucaultseemstosuggest,oratleastheworries,
that simply deploying ontology does not get around the problems created by ahistoricity.
Foucaultexpressesthisconcern,interestinglyenough,inacommentaboutDeleuzeandGuat
taris reconceptualization of the notion of desire. Deleuze and Guattari obviously use the
notion[ofdesire]inacompletelydifferentway,Foucaultobserves.ButtheproblemIhave
isthatImnotsureif,throughthisveryword,despiteitsdifferentmeaning,wedontrunthe
risk,despiteDeleuzeandGuattarisintention,ofallowingsomeofthemedicopsychological
presuppositions that were built into desire, in its traditional sense, to be reintroduced.49
FoucaultseemstoseeDeleuzeandGuattariattemptingtodeploybutnotinvoketheconcept
ofdesire,aswellastosuggestthatthisdeploymentrunstheriskofinadvertentlyrearticulat
ingtheverynormalizingaspectsoftheconceptitisintendedtocounter.AsIseeit,hiscon
cernrelativetodeployinganontologyofdifferenceisthesame:thatdoingsoretainsandthus
rearticulates the normalizing ahistoricity, built into ontology in its traditional sense, that
underminesthetransformationthatdeploymentisintendedtopromote.Insum,fromaFou
cauldianperspective,totheextentthatineitherinvokingordeployinghisontology,Deleuze
preservesdifferenceastheahistoricalconditionofexistencethatcanguaranteetheprolifera
tion of differences and therefore transformation, both approaches rearticulate a will to and
promiseofcertaintythatunderminessuchproliferation.AsMayobserves,forFoucault,any
[ahistorical] approach to the question of being that goes by means of an account of an un
changing,purenatureoressenceisnotmerelymisguidedbutalsoharmful,preciselybe
causesuchanaccountconstrain[s]humanbehaviortoanarrowconformity.50
Inlightofhisconcernsaboutthepotentiallynormalizingeffectsofevenanontologyof
difference,onemightaskwhyFoucaultcharacterizeshisownworkintermsofontologyatall.
Myviewisthatheusestheterminorderto,assuggestedearlier,markadistinctionbetween
genealogyasapurelyphilosophicalmethodofengagingthepresentcriticallyandcreatively,
andabroadermodeoflivingthatreflectssuchengagement.Througharticulatinganontology
ofthepresent,heaimstoexplorehowthecriticalandcreativeaspectsofgenealogymightbe
actualized as an ethos or philosophical way of life characterized by the proliferation of new
ways of thinking and seeing. Foucault is interested in possibilities for cultivating anti
normalizingmodesofexistencewithinthecontextofcontemporaryreality;heisnotinterest
ed,inotherwords,indescribingthenatureofrealityormakingclaimsaboutwhatis.The
limited scope of the ontology of the present Foucault articulates is apparent in his essay,
What is Enlightenment?, where he describes it as partial and local, critical and creative,
andpertainingspecificallytohumanexistence:

MichelFoucault,TheGayScience,CriticalInquiry37(Spring2011),385403.
May,15.

49
50

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FoucaultStudies,No.17,pp.117133.

Thecriticalontologyofourselveshastobeconsiderednot,certainly,asatheo
ry,adoctrine,norevenasapermanentbodyofknowledgethatisaccumulat
ing;ithastobeconceivedasaattitude,anethos,aphilosophicallifeinwhich
thecritiqueofwhatweareisatoneandthesametimethehistoricalanalysisof
thelimitsthatareimposedonusandanexperimentwiththepossibilityofgo
ingbeyondthem.51

IV
Insofar as he sees the critique and creativity which characterize thinking the impossible
(whetherintermsofgenealogyoramodeofliving)ashistorical,itisclearthatFoucaultlo
cates possibilities for social transformation within history as well. This view, taken at face
value, directly opposes Deleuzes. Just as Foucault sees Deleuzes ahistoricity undermining
hisefforttothinktheimpossible,forDeleuzeitishistoryitselfthatproducessuchaneffect.
Deleuzeisquiteadamantinhisviewthathistoryisnotasourceoftransformation.According
to Patton, Deleuze subscribes to a violent antihistoricism, an attitude that becomes clear

whenoneconsidersthedistinctionDeleuzedrawsbetweenhistoryandbecoming.52
Deleuzelocatesthepotentialforchange,andthusfortransformation,notwithinhisto
ry but within becoming, and he argues that becoming transcends historical limits: history
simplyaccountsforthecontextofbecomingspossibility.Whathistorygraspsinanevent,
Deleuzeasserts,isthewayitsactualizedinparticularcircumstances;theeventsbecomingis
beyondthescopeofhistory.Historyisntexperimental,itsjustthesetofmoreorlessnega
tivepreconditionsthatmakeitpossibletoexperimentwithsomethingbeyondhistory.53As
DanielW.Smithexplains,eventsasDeleuzeconceivesofthemarenotreducibletothehistori
cal contexts from which they spring; rather, they are unpredictable eruption[s] of pure be
comingthatoccurnotduetoandperhapspreciselyinspiteofconcretehistoricalconditions.54
DeleuzereferstothestudentproteststhattookplaceinMayof1968asjustsuchanhistorically
transcendentevent.Theemergenceandunfoldingoftheprotests,Deleuzewrites,cannotbe
viewedaspartofacausalchain,theoriginsandtrajectoryofwhichcanbetracedlinearly
throughtime.Rather,May68wasabifurcation,adeviationwithrespecttolaws,anunsta
bleconditionwhichopen[ed]ontoanewfieldofthepossible.55
Insofar as Deleuze conceives of a philosophical project of thinking the impossible in
termsofontologyandinoppositiontohistory,howdoesheviewtheworkofFoucault?Does
Deleuzebelieve,asGuttingdoes,thatFoucaultsimplyanddeliberatelyeschewsphilosophy

Foucault,WhatisEnlightenment?,50.
Paul Patton, Deleuzes Political Philosophy, in The Cambridge Companion to Deleuze (New York: Cam
bridgeUniversityPress,2012),199.
53Deleuze,ControlandBecoming,inNegotiations:19721990,trans.MartinJoughin(NewYork:Columbia
UniversityPress,1995),170.
54DanielW.Smith,DeleuzeandtheHistoryofPhilosophy,inTheCambridgeCompaniontoDeleuze(New
York:CambridgeUniversityPress,2012),26.
55GillesDeleuze,May68didnottakeplace,inTwoRegimesofMadness:TextsandInterviews,19751995,
ed.DavidLapoujade,trans.AmesHodgesandMikeTaormina,(NewYork:Semiotexte,2007),233.
51
52

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forhistory?56DoesDeleuzebelievethatFoucaultundermineshisowneffortstothinktheim
possible by drawing a connection between history and transformation? In addressing these
questions it is important to first acknowledge that despite his radical historicism, something
akintoaDeleuzianeventseemstohaveheldsomeappealforFoucault,andthatitdidsopre
ciselyasasourceoftransformation.OneexampleofthisappealmaybefoundinFoucaults
treatmentoftheIranianRevolution.57InhiswritingsonIran,Foucaultmarksadistinctionsim
ilartothatwhichheseesKantmarkinginhisanalysisoftheFrenchRevolution:betweenthe
revolutionitself,ontheonehand,anditseffects,ontheother.OnFoucaultsreading,Kant
locatesthetransformativepotentialoftherevolutionnotinitsownsuccessorfailure,butin
steadintherevolutionaryspirit(awishfulparticipationthatbordersonenthusiasm)the
revolutioninspiresinthosewhowitnessit.58Thisrevolutionaryspiritisaproductof,butnot
reducibleto,concretehistoricalconditions:itcanhavenoothercause,Kantwrites,thana
moralpredispositioninthehumanrace.59Becausetheconditionsforitsactualizationarelo
catedwithinhumanityandnotinfleetingmomentswithinhistory,Kantseesthisrevolution
aryspiritsignifyingandtherebyofferinghopeforhumanadvancementfor,inotherwords,
intellectualandmoralprogressand,therefore,positivesocialtransformation.60
Despite readily apparent differences,61 Foucaults (initial) interpretation of the Iranian
Revolutionreflectsa key aspect of Kants interpretationof itsFrench counterpart.62 Foucault
seestheIranianRevolutionexpressingacollectivewillthat,likeKantsrevolutionaryspirit,
isactualizedbybutnotreducibletoconcretehistoricaloccurrences.63Foucaultarguesthatthe
ideaofacollectivewillhasbeentheorizedbutneveractuallyobservedintheWest.Hesays
thathehimselfalwaysconsideredthecollectivewilltobelikeGod,likethesoul,something
onewouldneverencounter.64Andyet,hecontends,theIranianRevolutioninfactbrought
outanabsolutelycollectivewillthiscollectivewill,accordingtoFoucault,haserupt
Gutting,202.
IamgratefultoChloTaylorforencouragingmetothinkaboutinstancesinwhichFoucaultappearsto
identifysourcesoftransformationandthereforefreedomessentiallyorpartiallyoutsideofpowerrelations
(andthereforeofhistory).ShepointstohisanalysesofHerculineBarbinandPierreRivereastwoadditional
examplesofsuchidentification.
58ImmanuelKant,ThePhilosophyFacultyversustheFacultyofLaw,inTheConflictoftheFaculties,trans.
MaryGregor(Lincoln,NE:UniversityofNebraskaPress,1992),153.
59Ibid.
60Ibid.
61SuchdifferencesincludethefactthatFoucaultsituatestheIranianRevolutionwithinitsparticularsocio
historical context, contrasting it to other revolutions (including the French), and marking distinctions be
tweenWesternandIslamicreligion,culture,andpolitics.Also,Foucaultseesthecollectivewillasamanifes
tationoftheIranianpeopleandRevolutioningeneral,notmerelyoftheRevolutionsspectators.
62Foucaultsinitial,optimisticinterpretationofeventsinIranwasobviouslyinerrorandhelaterrevisedhis
views.ForaninformativeandconciseanalysisofFoucaultswritingsonIranseeRichardLynch,Reviewof
Janet Afary and Kevin B. Anderson, Foucault and the Iranian Revolution: Gender and the Seducations of Islam
ism,FoucaultStudies4(February2007):169176.
63 Michel Foucault, Iran: The Spirit of a World without Spirit, in Appendix to Janet Afary and Kevin B.
Anderson,FoucaultandtheIranianRevolution:GenderandtheSeducationsofIslamism,(Chicago:Universityof
ChicagoPress,2005),252.
64Ibid,253.
56
57

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FoucaultStudies,No.17,pp.117133.

edintohistory.65Itisnotclear,atleastnottome,fromwhenceFoucaultseesthecollective
willerupting.Sinceithasappearedinhistory,thecollectivewillclearlydiffersfromGodand
thesoul.Moreover,thedistinctionFoucaultdrawsbetweenKantscriticalandenlightenment
projects, his identification of his own work with the latter, as well as his critique of modern
Westernsubjectivity,makeclearthatFoucaultwouldnotlocatethecollectivewillinsomein
herent human predisposition. The fact that the collective will erupts into history, however,
suggeststhat,likeaDeleuzianevent,itisaphenomenonforwhichhistorycannot(atleastnot
fully) account. Moreover, like May 68 for Deleuze and the French Revolution for Kant, the
Iranian Revolution for Foucault is a hopeful sign of positive social transformation. Specific
manifestations of this transformation include the Shahs overthrow and the potential for an
Islamicgovernment;amoregeneralmanifestationtakestheformofamovementthatwould
allow the introduction of a spiritual dimension into political lifea movement, in other
words, that facilitates the emergence of what Foucault refers to as political spirituality.66
FoucaultsviewoftheIranianRevolutionthusparallelsinimportantwaysDeleuzesviewof
May68asaneruptionofpurebecomingthatisnotreducibletohistoricalconditions.
A second source of insight into whether Deleuze believes that the relationship Fou
caultpositsbetweentransformationandhistoryundermineshiseffortstothinktheimpossible
areDeleuzesowncommentsonFoucaultsrelationshiptohistory.Deleuzeovertlystatesthat
Foucaultsappealtohistoryisnotatoddswiththeaimsandobjectivesnotonlyofphilosophy,
butofaphilosophyconcernedwiththinkingtheimpossible.Whileheacknowledgesthathis
torywascertainlypartof[Foucaults]method,DeleuzenonethelessbelievesthatFoucault
neverbecameahistorian:

Foucaultsaphilosopherwhoinventsacompletelydifferentrelationtohistory
thanwhatyoufindinphilosophersofhistory.History,accordingtoFoucault,
circumscribes us and sets limits, it doesnt determine what we are, but what
wereintheprocessofdifferingfrom;itdoesntfixouridentity,butdispersesit
intoouressentialothernessHistory,inshort,iswhatseparatesusfromour
selvesandwhatwehavetogothroughandbeyondinordertothinkwhatwe
are.67

DeleuzedescribeshistoryforFoucaultfunctioninginamannerthatisverysimilartotheway
inwhichtheeventfunctionswithinthecontextofhisownwork.HeseesFoucaultreconcep
tualizinghistoryinsuchawaythatitdoesnot,asDeleuzebelievestraditionalhistorydoes,
merely provide a context out of or despite which transformation may occur. For Foucault,
Deleuzecontends,historyitselfperformsthistransformativefunction;itdoessobyproviding
the grounds for its own transgression, where transgression is understood in the specifically
Ibid.
MichelFoucault,WhataretheIraniansDreamingAbout?,inAppendixtoFoucaultandtheIranianRevolu
tion,207.
67GillesDeleuze,LifeasaWorkofArt,inNegotiations:19721990,trans.MartinJoughin(NewYork:Co
lumbiaUniversityPress,1995),9495.
65
66

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Taylor:UncertainOntologies

Foucauldian sense of clarifying limits, but doing so precisely so as not to be determined by

them.

Conclusion
InthisessayIhaveshownthatbothDeleuzeandFoucaultappealtothenotionofontologyin
theirrespectiveeffortstothinktheimpossible.IhavealsoshownthatDeleuzesontologyof
difference and Foucaults ontology of the present differ in significant ways. Indeed, each
thinkerviewsakeyaspectoftheothersontology(ahistoricityinFoucaultscase,historicityin
Deleuzes)asunderminingoratleastfailingtofacilitateitsowncriticalandcreativepotential
and, therefore, as countering rather than facilitating efforts to think the impossible. At the
sametime,however,wehavealsoseenthatFoucaultsandDeleuzespositionsinthisregard
are not absolute. Foucault appears to locate transformative potential within the notion of a
collectivewillwhich,whileitmaynotbetotallyahistorical,isatleastnotreducibletoconcrete
historical events; Deleuze believes that Foucault reconceptualizes history in transformative
ways.
PointingtotensionswithinandbetweenDeleuzesandFoucaultsrespectiveeffortsto
think the impossible is neither to portray their work as merely contradictory nor to suggest
thateitherofthemfailsinhisefforts.Rather,asnotedattheoutsetofthisessay,itisprecisely
thesetensionsthatillustratetheextenttowhichbothDeleuzeandFoucaultsucceednotonly
inengagingincriticalandcreativethinking,butalso,therefore,incultivatingconditionswith
inwhichcriticalandcreativemodesoflivingintheworldmightbefostered.Guttingsuggests
thatDeleuzeandFoucaultappealtoontologybecause,despitetheirrespectivecritiquesofthe
Westernphilosophicaltradition,boththinkersaimtocontinuedoingphilosophy.Iconcuron
thispoint,withoneimportantcaveat:weneedtoseeDeleuzeandFoucaultnotasuncritically
reproducingthetraditionofWesternphilosophybut,rather,asrethinkingit.
DeleuzeandFoucaultarecommittedtopreciselythekindofcriticalandcreativework
thatdoesnothesitatetoturnitsowncritiquebackontoitself.So,asIseeit,thesetwothinkers
are doing philosophy, but they are also, and perhaps more importantlyfor themselves as
wellasforustodaydoingsomethingwithphilosophy.Thisdoingwithasopposedtosimp
lydoingisreflectedinthetwoepigraphsthatbeginthisessay.Inthosepassagesfromtheir
work, Deleuze and Foucault express the view that approaching the tradition and history of
philosophy differently opens onto the possibility of philosophy itself becoming different
becomingothertoitself.AsIhaveshowninthisessay,theybelievethatdoingsomethingdif
ferentwithphilosophyinturnopensontopossibilitiesforbroadersocialtransformation,the
natureofwhichwecannotpredict,butwhichwecantrytoshapeintosomethinglivable.
Thiscommitmenttoputtingphilosophytothetestofcontemporaryreality68isper
haps what Deleuze and Foucault hold most in common with Nietzsche, who wanted not
merelytoreconfigurebuttoundermineandthereforenolongerbeboundbyprevailingways
ofmakingsenseofandlivingintheworld.InHowtheRealWorldatLastBecameaMyth,
Nietzschedoesnotmerelyarguethatallofwhatphilosophershavecalledrealityisinfactap
pearance. Rather, in revealing the emptiness of the concept of reality, Nietzsche shows that
Ibid,46.

68

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FoucaultStudies,No.17,pp.117133.

the concept of appearance lacks meaning as well. He shows that the real/apparent dualism
doesnothelpusmakesenseoftheworldbutratherdistancesusfromtheonlyworldwehave
(theactualworld),andthatwethereforeneedtodevoteourcriticalandcreativecapacities
todevelopingnewwaysofmakingsense.ThatDeleuzeandFoucaultshareNietzschescom
mitment and take up his challenge frames the tensions within and between their efforts to
thinktheimpossiblepreciselyasevidencethatboththinkersstillhavesomethingimportantto
saytous,providedthatwe,too,arewillingtoriskthinking,living,andseeinginnewways.

DiannaTaylor
JohnCarrollUniversity
1JohnCarrollBlvd.
UniversityHeights,OH
USA
dtaylor@jcu.edu

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