[G.R. No. 86889. December 4, 1990.

]
LUZ
FARMS, petitioner, vs. THE
HONORABLE
SECRETARY
OF
THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
AGRARIAN
REFORM, respondent.
Enrique M. Belo for petitioner.
DECISION
PARAS, J p:
This is a petition for prohibition with prayer
for restraining order and/or preliminary and
permanent injunction against the Honorable
Secretary of the Department of Agrarian
Reform for acting without jurisdiction in
enforcing the assailed provisions of R.A. No.
6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 and in
promulgating the Guidelines and Procedure
Implementing Production and Profit Sharing
under R.A. No. 6657, insofar as the same
apply to herein petitioner, and further from
performing an act in violation of the
constitutional rights of the petitioner.
As gathered from the records, the factual
background of this case, is as follows:
On June 10, 1988, the President of the
Philippines approved R.A. No. 6657, which
includes the raising of livestock, poultry and
swine in its coverage (Rollo, p. 80).
On January 2, 1989, the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform promulgated the Guidelines
and Procedures Implementing Production and
Profit Sharing as embodied in Sections 13 and
32 of R.A. No. 6657 (Rollo, p. 80).
On January 9, 1989, the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform promulgated its Rules and
Regulations implementing Section 11 of R.A.
No. 6657 (Commercial Farms). (Rollo, p. 81).
Luz Farms, petitioner in this case, is a
corporation engaged in the livestock and
poultry business and together with others in the
same business allegedly stands to be
adversely affected by the enforcement of
Section 3(b), Section 11, Section 13, Section

16(d) and 17 and Section 32 of R.A. No. 6657

otherwise known as Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law and of the Guidelines and
Procedures Implementing Production and Profit
Sharing under R.A. No. 6657 promulgated on
January 2, 1989 and the Rules and
Regulations Implementing Section 11 thereof
as promulgated by the DAR on January 9,
1989 (Rollo, pp. 2-36).
Hence, this petition praying that aforesaid
laws, guidelines and rules be declared
unconstitutional. Meanwhile, it is also prayed
that a writ of preliminary injunction or
restraining order be issued enjoining public
respondents from enforcing the same, insofar
as they are made to apply to Luz Farms and
other livestock and poultry raisers.
This Court in its Resolution dated July 4,
1939 resolved to deny, among others, Luz
Farms' prayer for the issuance of a preliminary
injunction in its Manifestation dated May 26,
and 31, 1989. (Rollo, p. 98).
Later, however, this Court in its Resolution
dated August 24, 1989 resolved to grant said
Motion for Reconsideration regarding the
injunctive relief, after the filing and approval by
this Court of an injunction bond in the amount
of P100,000.00. This Court also gave due
course to the petition and required the parties
to file their respective memoranda (Rollo, p.
119).
The petitioner filed its Memorandum on
September 6, 1989 (Rollo, pp. 131-168).
On December 22, 1989, the Solicitor
General adopted his Comment to the petition
as his Memorandum (Rollo, pp. 186-187).
Luz Farms questions the following
provisions of R.A. 6657, insofar as they are
made to apply to it:
(a) Section 3(b) which includes the "raising
of livestock (and poultry)" in the definition of
"Agricultural,
Agricultural
Enterprise
or
Agricultural Activity."
(b) Section 11 which defines "commercial
farms" as "private agricultural lands devoted to

1 | Page

commercial, livestock, poultry and swine

raising . . ."
(c) Section 13 which calls upon petitioner to
execute a production-sharing plan.
(d) Section 16(d) and 17 which vest on the
Department of Agrarian Reform the authority to
summarily determine the just compensation to
be paid for lands covered by the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
(e) Section 32 which spells out the
production-sharing plan mentioned in Section
13
". . . (W)hereby three percent (3%) of the gross
sales from the production of such lands are
distributed within sixty (60) days of the end of
the fiscal year as compensation to regular and
other farmworkers in such lands over and
above the compensation they currently receive:
Provided, That these individuals or entities
realize gross sales in excess of five million
pesos per annum unless the DAR, upon proper
application, determine a lower ceiling.
In the event that the individual or entity realizes
a profit, an additional ten (10%) of the net profit
after tax shall be distributed to said regular and
other farmworkers within ninety (90) days of
the end of the fiscal year . . ."
The main issue in this petition is the
constitutionality of Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32
of R.A. No. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988), insofar as the said law
includes the raising of livestock, poultry and
swine in its coverage as well as the
Implementing
Rules
and
Guidelines
promulgated in accordance therewith.
The
constitutional
provision
consideration reads as follows:

under

ARTICLE XIII
xxx
xxx
xxx
AGRARIAN AND NATURAL RESOURCES
REFORM
Section 4.
The State shall, by law,
undertake an agrarian reform program founded
on the right of farmers and regular
farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly
or collectively the lands they till or, in the case
of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of
the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall
encourage and undertake the just distribution

of all agricultural lands, subject to such

priorities and reasonable retention limits as the
Congress may prescribe, taking into account
ecological,
developmental,
or
equity
considerations, and subject to the payment of
just compensation. In determining retention
limits, the State shall respect the rights of small
landowners. The State shall further provide
incentives for voluntary land-sharing.
xxx
xxx
xxx"
Luz Farms contended that it does not
seek the nullification of R.A. 6657 in its entirety.
In fact, it acknowledges the correctness of the
decision of this Court in the case of the
Association of Small Landowners in the
Philippines, Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform (G.R. 78742, 14 July 1989) affirming
the constitutionality of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law. It, however, argued that
Congress in enacting the said law has
transcended the mandate of the Constitution, in
including land devoted to the raising of
livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage
(Rollo, p. 131). Livestock or poultry raising is
not similar to crop or tree farming. Land is not
the primary resource in this undertaking and
represents no more than five percent (5%) of
the total investment of commercial livestock
and poultry raisers. Indeed, there are many
owners of residential lands all over the country
who use available space in their residence for
commercial livestock and raising purposes,
under
"contract-growing
arrangements,"
whereby processing corporations and other
commercial livestock and poultry raisers (Rollo,
p. 10). Lands support the buildings and other
amenities attendant to the raising of animals
and birds. The use of land is incidental to but
not the principal factor or consideration in
productivity in this industry. Including backyard
raisers, about 80% of those in commercial
livestock and poultry production occupy five
hectares or less. The remaining 20% are
mostly corporate farms (Rollo, p. 11).
On the other hand, the public respondent
argued that livestock and poultry raising is
embraced in the term "agriculture" and the
inclusion of such enterprise under Section 3(b)
of R.A. 6657 is proper. He cited that Webster's
2 | Page

International Dictionary, Second Edition (1954),

defines the following words:
"Agriculture the art or science of cultivating
the ground and raising and harvesting crops,
often, including also, feeding, breeding and
management of livestock, tillage, husbandry,
farming.
It includes farming, horticulture, forestry,
dairying, sugarmaking . . .
Livestock domestic animals used or raised
on a farm, especially for profit.
Farm a plot or tract of land devoted to the
raising of domestic or other animals." (Rollo,
pp. 82-83).
The petition is impressed with merit.
The question raised is one of
constitutional construction. The primary task in
constitutional construction is to ascertain and
thereafter assure the realization of the purpose
of the framers in the adoption of the
Constitution (J.M. Tuazon & Co. vs. Land
Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413 [1970]).
Ascertainment of the meaning of the
provision of Constitution begins with the
language of the document itself. The words
used in the Constitution are to be given their
ordinary meaning except where technical terms
are employed in which case the significance
thus attached to them prevails (J.M. Tuazon &
Co. vs. Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA
413 [1970]).
It is generally held that, in construing
constitutional provisions which are ambiguous
or of doubtful meaning, the courts may
consider the debates in the constitutional
convention as throwing light on the intent of the
framers of the Constitution. It is true that the
intent of the convention is not controlling by
itself, but as its proceeding was preliminary to
the adoption by the people of the Constitution
the understanding of the convention as to what
was meant by the terms of the constitutional
provision which was the subject of the
deliberation, goes a long way toward explaining
the understanding of the people when they
ratified it (Aquino, Jr. v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183
[1974]).

The transcripts of the deliberations of the

Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the
meaning of the word "agricultural," clearly show
that it was never the intention of the framers of
the Constitution to include livestock and poultry
industry in the coverage of the constitutionallymandated agrarian reform program of the
Government.
The Committee adopted the definition of
"agricultural land" as defined under Section
166 of R.A. 3844, as laud devoted to any
growth, including but not limited to crop lands,
saltbeds, fishponds, idle and abandoned land
(Record, CONCOM, August 7, 1986, Vol. III, p.
11).
The intention of the Committee is to limit
the application of the word "agriculture."
Commissioner Jamir proposed to insert the
word "ARABLE" to distinguish this kind of
agricultural land from such lands as
commercial and industrial lands and residential
properties because all of them fall under the
general classification of the word "agricultural".
This proposal, however, was not considered
because the Committee contemplated that
agricultural lands are limited to arable and
suitable agricultural lands and therefore, do not
include commercial, industrial and residential
lands (Record, CONCOM, August 7, 1986, Vol.
III, p. 30).
In the interpellation, then Commissioner
Regalado (now a Supreme Court Justice),
posed several questions, among others,
quoted as follows:
xxx
xxx
xxx
"Line 19 refers to genuine reform program
founded on the primary right of farmers and
farmworkers. I wonder if it means that
leasehold tenancy is thereby proscribed under
this provision because it speaks of the primary
right of farmers and farmworkers to own
directly or collectively the lands they till. As also
mentioned
by
Commissioner
Tadeo,
farmworkers include those who work in
piggeries and poultry projects.
I was wondering whether I am wrong in my
appreciation that if somebody puts up a piggery
or a poultry project and for that purpose hires
3 | Page

farmworkers therein, these farmworkers will

automatically have the right to own eventually,
directly or ultimately or collectively, the land on
which the piggeries and poultry projects were
constructed. (Record, CONCOM, August 2,
1986, p. 618).
xxx
xxx
xxx
The questions were answered and
explained in the statement of then
Commissioner Tadeo, quoted as follows:
xxx

xxx

xxx

"Sa pangalawang katanungan ng Ginoo ay

medyo hindi kami nagkaunawaan. Ipinaaalam
ko kay Commissioner Regalado na hindi namin
inilagay
ang
agricultural
worker
sa
kadahilanang kasama rito ang piggery, poultry
at livestock workers. Ang inilagay namin dito ay
farm worker kaya hindi kasama ang piggery,
poultry
at
livestock
workers
(Record,
CONCOM, August 2, 1986, Vol. II, p. 621).
It is evident from the foregoing discussion
that Section II of R.A. 6657 which includes
"private agricultural
lands devoted
to
commercial livestock, poultry and swine
raising" in the definition of "commercial farms"
is invalid, to the extent that the aforecited agroindustrial activities are made to be covered by
the agrarian reform program of the State.
There is simply no reason to include livestock
and poultry lands in the coverage of agrarian
reform. (Rollo, p. 21).
Hence, there is merit in Luz Farms'
argument that the requirement in Sections 13
and 32 of R.A. 6657 directing "corporate farms"
which include livestock and poultry raisers to
execute and implement "production-sharing
plans" (pending final redistribution of their
landholdings) whereby they are called upon to
distribute from three percent (3%) of their gross
sales and ten percent (10%) of their net profits
to their workers as additional compensation is
unreasonable for being confiscatory, and
therefore violative of due process (Rollo, p. 21).
It has been established that this Court will
assume jurisdiction over a constitutional
question only if it is shown that the essential
requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a

question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be

an actual case or controversy involving a
conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial
determination, the constitutional question must
have been opportunely raised by the proper
party, and the resolution of the question is
unavoidably necessary to the decision of the
case itself (Association of Small Landowners of
the Philippines, Inc. v. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform, G.R. 78742; Acuna v. Arroyo, G.R.
79310; Pabico v. Juico, G.R. 79744; Manaay v.
Juico, G.R. 79777, 14 July 1989, 175 SCRA
343).
However, despite the inhibitions pressing
upon the Court when confronted with
constitutional issues, it will not hesitate to
declare a law or act invalid when it is convinced
that this must be done. In arriving at this
conclusion, its only criterion will be the
Constitution and God as its conscience gives it
in the light to probe its meaning and discover
its purpose. Personal motives and political
considerations are irrelevancies that cannot
influence its decisions. Blandishment is as
ineffectual as intimidation, for all the awesome
power of the Congress and Executive, the
Court will not hesitate "to make the hammer fall
heavily," where the acts of these departments,
or of any official, betray the people's will as
expressed in the Constitution (Association of
Small Landowners of the Philippines, Inc. v.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. 78742;
Acuna v. Arroyo, G.R. 79310; Pabico v. Juico,
G.R. 79744; Manaay v. Juico, G.R. 79777, 14
July 1989).
Thus, where the legislature or the executive
acts beyond the scope of its constitutional
powers, it becomes the duty of the judiciary to
declare what the other branches of the
government had assumed to do, as void. This
is the essence of judicial power conferred by
the Constitution "(I)n one Supreme Court and
in such lower courts as may be established by
law" (Art. VIII, Section 1 of the 1935
Constitution; Article X, Section I of the 1973
Constitution and which was adopted as part of
the Freedom Constitution, and Article VIII,
Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution) and which
power this Court has exercised in many
4 | Page

instances (Demetria v. Alba, 148 SCRA 208

[1987]).
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant
petition is hereby GRANTED. Sections 3(b),
11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 insofar as the
inclusion of the raising of livestock, poultry and
swine in its coverage as well as the
Implementing
Rules
and
Guidelines
promulgated in accordance therewith, are
hereby DECLARED null and void for being
unconstitutional and the writ of preliminary
injunction issued is hereby MADE permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (C.J.), Narvasa, MelencioHerrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Gancayco,
Padilla,
Bidin,
Grio-Aquino,
Medialdea andRegalado, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

SARMIENTO, J., concurring:

I agree that the petition be granted.
It is my opinion however that the main
issue on the validity of the assailed provisions
of R.A. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988) and its Implementing
Rules and Guidelines insofar as they include
the raising of livestock, poultry, and swine in
their coverage can not be simplistically reduced
to a question of constitutional construction.
It is a well-settled rule that construction
and interpretation come only after it has been
demonstrated that application is impossible or
inadequate without them. A close reading
however of the constitutional text in point,
specifically, Sec. 4, Art. XIII, particularly the
phrase, ". . . in case of other farmworkers, to
receive a just share of the fruits thereof,"
provides a basis for the clear and possible
coverage of livestock, poultry, and swine
raising within the ambit of the comprehensive
agrarian reform program. This accords with the
principle that every presumption should be

indulged in favor of the constitutionality of a

statute and the court in considering the validity
of a statute should give it such reasonable
construction as can be reached to bring it
within the fundamental law. 1
The
presumption
against
unconstitutionality, I must say, assumes greater
weight when a ruling to the contrary would, in
effect, defeat the laudable and noble purpose
of the law, i.e., the welfare of the landless
farmers and farmworkers in the promotion of
social justice, by the expedient conversion of
agricultural lands into livestock, poultry, and
swine raising by scheming landowners, thus,
rendering the comprehensive nature of the
agrarian program merely illusory.
The instant controversy, I submit, boils
down to the question of whether or not the
assailed provisions violate the equal protection
clause of the Constitution (Article II, section 1)
which teaches simply that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both
as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed. 2
There is merit in the contention of the
petitioner that substantial distinctions exist
between land directed purely to cultivation and
harvesting of fruits or crops and land
exclusively used for livestock, poultry and
swine raising, that make real differences, to wit:
xxx
xxx
xxx
No land is tilled and no crop is harvested in
livestock and poultry farming. There are no
tenants nor landlords, only employers and
employees.
Livestock and poultry do not sprout from land
nor are they "fruits of the land."
Land is not even a primary resource in this
industry. The land input is inconsequential that
all the commercial hog and poultry farms
combined occupy less than one percent (1%)
(0.4% for piggery, 0.2% for poultry) of the 5.45
million hectares of land supposedly covered by
the CARP. And most farms utilize only 2 to 5
hectares of land.
In every respect livestock and poultry
production is an industrial activity. Its use of an
inconsequential portion of land is a mere
5 | Page

incident of its operation, as in any other

undertaking, business or otherwise.
The fallacy of defining livestock and poultry
production as an agricultural enterprise is
nowhere more evident when one considers that
at least 95% of total investment in these farms
is in the form of fixed assets which are
industrial in nature.
These include (1) animal housing structures
and facilities complete with drainage, waterers,
blowers, misters and in some cases even
piped-in music; (2) feedmills complete with
grinders,
mixers,
conveyors,
exhausts,
generators, etc.; (3) extensive warehousing
facilities for feeds and other supplies; (4) antipollution equipment such as bio-gas and
digester plants augmented by lagoons and
concrete ponds; (5) deepwells, elevated water
tanks, pumphouses and accessory facilities; (6)
modern equipment such as sprayers,
pregnancy testers, etc.; (7) laboratory facilities
complete with expensive tools and equipment;
and a myriad other such technologically
advanced appurtances.
How then can livestock and poultry farmlands
be arable when such are almost totally
occupied by these structures?
The fallacy of equating the status of livestock
and poultry farmworkers with that of agricultural
tenants surfaces when one considers
contribution to output. Labor cost of livestock
and poultry farms is no more than 4% of total
operating cost. The 98% balance represents
inputs not obtained from the land nor provided
by the farmworkers inputs such as feeds
and biochemicals (80% of the total cost), power
cost, cost of money and several others.
Moreover, livestock and poultry farmworkers
are covered by minimum wage law rather than
by tenancy law. They are entitled to social
security benefits where tenant-farmers are not.
They are paid fixed wages rather than crop
shares. And as in any other industry, they
receive additional benefits such as allowances,
bonuses, and other incentives such as free
housing privileges, light and water.
Equating livestock and poultry farming with
other agricultural activities is also fallacious in
the sense that like the manufacturing sector, it
is a market for, rather than a source of
agricultural output. At least 60% of the entire

domestic supply of corn is absorbed by

livestock and poultry farms. So are the byproducts of rice (rice-bran), coconut (copra
meal), banana (banana pulp meal), and fish
(fish meal). 3
xxx

xxx

xxx

In view of the foregoing, it is clear that

both kinds of lands are not similarly situated
and hence, can not be treated alike. Therefore,
the assailed provisions which allow for the
inclusion of livestock and poultry industry within
the coverage of the agrarian reform program
constitute invalid classification and must
accordingly be struck down as repugnant to the
equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Footnotes
SARMIENTO, J., concurring:
1.
In re Guarina, 24 Phil. 37; Yu Cong Eng
v. Trinidad, 70 L. ed., p. 1059.
2.

Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155.

3.

Rollo, 29-30.

====================================
====================================
====================================
THIRD DIVISION
FROILAN DE GUZMAN, G.R. No. 156965
ANGEL MARCELO and
NICASIO MAGBITANG, Present:
Petitioners,
QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.
THE COURT OF APPEALS,
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
and the MUNICIPALITY OF Promulgated:
BALIUAG, BULACAN,
Respondents. October 12, 2006
x -------------------------------------------------------------x
6 | Page

DECISION
TINGA, J.:
On appeal via a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure are the Decision[1] and Resolution[2] of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 55710.
The Decision affirmed the Resolution dated 4
October 1999 of the Office of the President
dismissing petitioners appeal from the Order of
the Secretary of Agrarian Reform declaring that
the disputed property cannot be placed under the
coverage of the agrarian reform program or the
Operation Land Transfer.
The following factual antecedents are matters of
record.
Petitioners Froilan De Guzman, Angel Marcelo
and Nicasio Magbitang were among the tenants
of a parcel of land situated at Barangay Pagala,
Baliuag, Bulacan. The land, measuring six (6)
hectares, was formerly owned by the Vergel De
Dios family. Sometime in 1979, respondent
Municipality of Baliuag, Bulacan (municipality)
sought the expropriation of the land before the
now defunct Court of Agrarian Relations. During
the pendency of the expropriation proceedings,
the municipality and petitioners entered into a
compromise agreement, whereby petitioners
irrevocably withdrew their opposition to the
expropriation of the land in consideration of the
payment of a disturbance compensation
of P25,000.00 per hectare or P2.50 per square
meter. Petitioners also waived all claims and
demands against the municipality. The Court of
Agrarian Relations approved said compromise
agreement in its decisions dated 16 April
1979 and 9 August 1979.[3]
From the records, it can be gathered that the
municipality eventually acquired ownership of the
land through expropriation but allowed petitioners
to continue cultivating their lots pending the
construction of the Baliuag Wholesale Complex
Market. For this arrangement, petitioners
remitted rentals to the municipal treasurer.
Despite the lapse of several years, construction
of the market did not push through. This
prompted petitioners, who had continually
occupied and cultivated the land, to file in 1996 a

petition with the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office

(MARO) of Baliuag, praying that the land be
placed under the Operation Land Transfer (OLT)
in accordance with Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
27.[4]
Following the filing of their petition for CARP
coverage before the MARO, petitioners filed a
complaint on 13 May 1997 with the Department
of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB)
against the municipality. In their complaint
docketed as DARAB Case No. 03-02-505497,
petitioners prayed for the issuance of a
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining
order to secure their peaceful possession over
the land. The Provincial Adjudicator rendered
judgment in favor of petitioners on 17 July 1997.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE,
premises
considered, the Board finds the
plaintiffs
a
[sic]
bona-fide
farmer[-]beneficiaries of agrarian
reform[.] [A]ccordingly, judgment is
hereby rendered as follows:
1.
Directing
the
the
[sic]
respondent, Municipality of Baliuag,
Bulacan[,]
represented
by
Honorable Mayor Edilberto Tengco
and all other persons acting in their
behalf to permanently cease and
desist from dumping garbage in the
premises in question;
2. Directing the respondent to
maintain petitioners in peaceful
possession over the disputed
property.
SO ORDERED.[5]

On 6 January 1997, the Regional Director of the

Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) issued an
order granting the petition and declaring the land
as covered by OLT.[6] The municipality moved for
its reconsideration in vain. Following the denial of
its motion for reconsideration, the municipality
elevated the matter to the DAR Secretary who, in
7 | Page

his Order dated 8 August 1997, reversed the

Order of 6 January 1997 of the Regional Director.
[7]
Petitioners, aggrieved this time, filed an appeal
with the Office of the President. On 1 July 1999,
Executive Secretary Ronaldo B. Zamora, by
authority of the President, dismissed petitioners
appeal and affirmed the order of the DAR
Secretary.[8]
Undaunted, petitioners filed a petition for review
with the Court of Appeals, which prayed for the
reversal of the Order of 1 July 1999 issued by the
Office of the President on the grounds that the
land remained agricultural and that the Office of
the President erred in relying upon the
certification issued by the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB) classifying the land
as commercial. They also argued that under the
provisions of Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 20,
series of 1992, the conversion of the land for
non-agricultural purposes was disallowed.

On 30 January, 2002, the Court of Appeals

rendered the assailed Decision, dismissing
petitioners appeal. Upholding the non-agricultural
classification of the land, the Court of Appeals
ruled that the land could no longer be subject of
the comprehensive agrarian reform law (CARL).
The Court of Appeals also denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration in the assailed
Resolution dated January 20, 2003.
Hence, the instant petition, imputing the following
errors to the Court of Appeals:
I.
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE
COURT
OF
APPEALS
COMMITTED
GRAVE
AND
MANIFEST ERROR IN LAW
WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER
THAT
THE
SUBJECT
LANDHOLDING SHOULD HAVE
BEEN COVERED BY OPERATION
LAND TRANSFER PURSUANT TO
P.D. NO. 27 DUE TO THE
FAILURE OF THE LANDOWNER

TO
CARRY
OUT
ITS
CONVERSION
FROM
AGRICULTURAL LAND FOR A
LONG PERIOD OF TIME.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR
WHEN IT UPHOLD (sic) THE
RECLASSIFICATION
OF THE
SUBJECT LANDHOLDING.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION
WHEN
IT
DISREGARDED
THE
PROVISIONS OF THE O.P.
ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 20
SERIES
OF
1992
WHICH
CLEARLY PROVIDES THE NON
NEGOTIABILITY OF IRRIGATED
PRIME AGRICULTURAL LANDS
TO
NON-AGRICULTURAL
PURPOSES.[9]

Essentially, the main issue to be resolved is

whether the subject land can be reclassified to
agricultural after the purpose of its conversion to
a non-agricultural land had not materialized.
Petitioners contend that despite the conversion
of the land for a commercial purpose, they have
remained tenants of the land devoting it for
agricultural production. Though the earlier
tenancy relationship had been terminated upon
the payment of disturbance compensation
pursuant to the 1979 compromise agreement,
petitioners posit that a tenancy relationship was
created anew between them and the municipality
when the latter allowed petitioners to cultivate the
land after the expropriation proceeding.
The petition has no merit.
Under Section 3(c) of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), an agricultural
8 | Page

land refers to land devoted to agricultural activity

as defined therein and not classified as mineral,
forest, residential, commercial or industrial land.
The
deliberations
of
the
Constitutional
Commission confirm this limitation. Agricultural
lands are only those lands which are arable and
suitable agricultural lands and do not include
commercial, industrial and residential lands.[10]

In Natalia Realty, Inc. vs. Department of

Agrarian Reform,[11] it was held that lands not
devoted to agricultural activity are outside the
coverage of CARL including lands previously
converted to non-agricultural uses prior to the
effectivity of CARL by government agencies
other than the DAR. This rule has been reiterated
in a number of subsequent cases. Despite claims
that the areas have been devoted for agricultural
production, the Court has upheld the nonagricultural classification made by the NHA over
housing and resettlements projects, [12] zoning
ordinances passed by local government units
classifying residential areas,[13] and certifications
over watershed areas issued by the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
[14]

The DAR itself has recognized the

prospective application of R.A. No. 6657, insofar
as it provides under Section 3(c) thereof that
lands classified as non-agricultural prior to the
effectivity of the CARL are not covered by the
CARL. Thus, DAR Administrative Order No. 1,
series of 1990 provides:
Agricultural land refers to
those devoted to agricultural activity
as defined in R.A. [No.] 6657 and
not classified as mineral or forest
by the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR)
and its predecessor agencies,
and not classified in town plans and
zoning ordinances as approved by
the Housing Land Use Regulatory
Board (HLURB) and its preceding
competent authorities prior to 15
June
1988
for
residential,

commercial
or
industrial
use. (Emphasis supplied.}
That the subject land had been
reclassified from agricultural to non-agricultural is
not disputed. The records reveal that as early as
1980, the municipality had passed a zoning
ordinance which identified the subject land as the
site of the wholesale market complex. As per
certification issued by the HLURB, the land is
within the zoning plan approved by the National
Coordinating Council for Town Planning, Housing
and Zoning.
Petitioners also theorize that they earned
a vested right over the land when a tenancy
relationship was established anew between them
and the municipality subsequent to the latters
acquisition of the land. In support of this theory,
petitioners cite minutes of meetings and
resolutions
passed
by
the
municipalitys Sanggunian, purportedly indicating
the municipalitys recognition of their status as
tenants of the subject landholding.
Petitioners theory does not persuade the
Court.
A segment of the minutes of the meeting
of the municipalitys Sanggunian dated 27 May
1988, which petitioners cite to bolster their
theory, is quoted below:
Tumindig din at namahayag
ang ating Punong Bayan Kgg.
Reynaldo S. del Rosario at sinabing
sa kasulukuyan ay hindi pa naman
kailanganng Pamahalaang Bayan
ang nasabing lupa ngunit kung ito a
y kakailangan na ay kinakailangang
umalis sila dito ng mahinusay, wala
ng pasubali atmaluwag sa kanilang
kalooban,
kung kayat iminungkahi niya na gu
mawa ng isang nakasulat na kasun
duan na ang nakasaad ay kusangloob silangaalis sa nasabing lupa p
agdating ng panahon na ito ay kaila
nganin na ng Pamahalaang Bayan.
[15]

9 | Page

The aforequoted minutes clearly show that

petitioners use and possession of the land was
by mere tolerance of the municipality and subject
to the condition that petitioners would voluntarily
vacate the land when the need would arise. In
the same minutes, the Sanggunian resolved to
authorize then Mayor Reynaldo S. del Rosario to
enter into an agreement in writing with petitioners
concerning the latters temporary cultivation of the
land as hired labor.
As discussed earlier, the land had ceased
to be classified as agricultural when the
municipality extended petitioners occupation of
the land. After the municipality acquired
ownership over the land through expropriation
and passed the ordinance converting said land
into a commercial area, any transaction entered
into by the municipality involving the land was
governed by the applicable civil law in relation to
laws on local government. At this point, agrarian
laws no longer governed the relationship
between petitioners and the municipality. While it
was not established whether the relationship
between petitioners and the municipality was that
of a lessor and lessee or that of an employer and
laborer, as the supposed written agreement was
not offered in evidence, the fact remains that the
subject land had already been identified as
commercial in the zoning ordinance.
Certainly, petitioners occupation of the
land, made possible as it was by the tolerance of
the municipality, was subject to its peremptory
right to terminate. As absolute owner of the land,
the municipality is entitled to devote the land for
purposes it deems appropriate.

It is noteworthy that even prior to its

expropriation and reclassification, the land was
never placed under the coverage of the agrarian
reform program. Although it appears that
petitioners had been tilling the land as tenants of
the Vergel De Dios family, the municipalitys
predecessor-in-interest, the records do not show
that petitioners had applied for coverage of the
land under the agrarian reform program. Before a
claimant becomes a qualified beneficiary of
agrarian reform, the administrative process for
coverage under the CARP must be initiated. The
mere fact of cultivating an agricultural land does

not ipso jure vest ownership right in favor of the

tiller. Since petitioners had not applied for CARP
coverage prior to the reclassification of the land
to commercial, their occupation by mere
tolerance cannot ripen into absolute ownership.
Petitioners further argue that the
municipalitys failure to realize the commercial
project operates to reinstate the original status of
the land as agricultural. In support of this theory,
petitioners cite Section 36 (1) of R.A. No. 3844,
or the Agriculture Land Reform Code, unaware
that the provision had been amended by R.A.
6389, entitled, An Act Amending Republic Act
Numbered Thirty Eight Hundred and Forty Four,
As Amended, Otherwise Known As the
Agricultural Land Reform Code and For Other
Purposes.
Before its amendment, Section 36 (1),
R.A. No. 3844 provided:
SEC. 36. Possession
of
Landholding;
Exceptions.Notwithstanding
any
agreement as to the period or
future surrender, of the land, an
agricultural lessee shall continue in
the enjoyment and possession of
his landholding except when his
dispossession has been authorized
by the Court in a judgment that is
final and executory if after due
hearing it is shown that:

(1) The agricultural lessorowner or a member of his

immediate family will personally
cultivate the landholding or will
convert the landholding, if suitably
located, into residential, factory,
hospital or school site or other
useful
non-agricultural
purposes: Provided,
That
the
agricultural lessee shall be entitled
to
disturbance
compensation
equivalent to five years rental on
his landholding in addition to his
rights under Sections twenty-five
and thirty-four, except when the
land owned and leased by the
10 | P a g e

agricultural lessor, is not more than

five hectares, in which case instead
of disturbance compensation the
lessee may be entitled to an
advanced notice of at least one
agricultural year before ejectment
proceedings are filed against
him:Provided, further, That should
the landholder not cultivate the land
himself for three years or fail to
substantially
carry
out
such
conversion within one year after the
dispossession of the tenant, it shall
be presumed that he acted in bad
faith and the tenant shall have the
right to demand possession of the
land and recover damages for any
loss incurred by him because of
said dispossessions.
With the enactment of the amendatory
law, the condition imposed on the landowner to
implement the conversion of the agricultural land
to a non-agricultural purpose within a certain
period was deleted. Section 36 (1), R.A. No.
3844, as amended, now reads:
SEC. 36. Possession
of
Landholding;
Exceptions.
Notwithstanding any agreement as
to the period or future surrender, of
the land, an agricultural lessee
shall continue in the enjoyment and
possession of his landholding
except when his dispossession has
been authorized by the Court in a
judgment that is final and executory
if after due hearing it is shown that:
(1) The landholding is
declared by the department head
upon recommendation of the
National Planning Commission to
be
suited
for
residential,
commercial, industrial or some
other urban purposes: Provided,
That the agricultural lessee shall be
entitled
to
disturbance
compensation equivalent to five
times the average of gross harvests
on his landholding during the last
five preceding calendar years;

x x x x[16]
The amendment is the Legislatures
recognition that the optimal use of some lands
may not necessarily be for agriculture. Thus,
discretion is vested on the appropriate
government agencies to determine the suitability
of a land for residential, commercial, industrial or
other purposes. With the passage of the CARL,
the conversion of agricultural lands to nonagricultural uses was retained and the imposition
on the landowner to implement within a time
frame the proposed non-agricultural use of the
land was done away with.
Moreover, in Pasong Bayabas Farmers
Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[17] the Court
declared categorically that the failure of the
landowner therein to complete the housing
project did not have the effect of reverting the
property to its classification as agricultural land,
although the order of conversion issued by the
then Minister of Agrarian Reform obliged the
landowner
to
commence
the
physical
development of the housing project within one
year from receipt of the order of conversion. [18] In
said case, a vast tract of land claimed to be
cultivated by its tenants formed part of the
subdivision plan of a housing project approved
by the National Planning Commission and
Municipal Council of Carmona and subsequently
declared by the Provincial Board of Cavite as
composite of the industrial areas of Carmona,
Dasmarias, Silang and Trece Martirez. Because
the reclassification of the property by the
Municipal Council of Carmona to non-agricultural
land took place before the effectivity of the
CARL, the Court held that Section 65 of R.A. No.
6657 cannot be applied retroactively.[19]
More importantly, the Court in Pasong
Bayabas recognized the power of local
government units to adopt zoning ordinances,
citing Section 3 of R.A. No. 2264,[20] to wit:
Section 3 of Rep. Act No.
2264,
amending
the
Local
Government Code, specifically
empowers municipal and/or city
councils to adopt zoning and
subdivision
ordinances
or
regulations in consultation with the
11 | P a g e

National Planning Commission. A

zoning
ordinance
prescribes,
defines, and apportions a given
political subdivision into specific
land uses as present and future
projection of needs. The power of
the local government to convert or
reclassify lands to residential lands
to
non-agricultural
lands
reclassified is not subject to the
approval of the Department of
Agrarian Reform. Section 65 of
Rep. Act No. 6657 relied upon by
the petitioner applies only to
applications by the landlord or the
beneficiary for the conversion of
lands previously placed under
agrarian reform law after the lapse
of five years from its award. It does
not apply to agricultural lands
already converted as residential
lands prior to the passage of Rep.
Act No. 6657.[21]

No. 55710
petitioners.

are AFFIRMED.

Costs

against

SO ORDERED.

D
ANTE O. TINGA
A
ssociate Justice

WE CONCUR:
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
[1]
Rollo, pp. 28-39. Penned by Justice Amelita G.
Tolentino and concurred in by JJ. Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr.,
Chairman, Tenth Division, and Andres B. Reyes, Jr.

Thus, the zoning ordinance passed by the

municipality sometime in 1980 reclassifying the
subject land as commercial and future site of a
market complex operated to take away the
agricultural status of the subject property.
Subsequent events cited by petitioners such as
their continuous tillage of the land and the noncommencement of the construction of the market
complex did not strip the land of its classification
as commercial.

[2]

Id. at 41-49.

[3]

Id. at 29-30.

[4]

Id. at 30.

[5]

Id. at 48.

[6]

CA rollo, pp. 32-33.

[7]

Id. at 42-47.
Id. at 17-21.

[8]

[9]

Rollo, p. 9.

[10]

Petitioners reliance on the provisions of

A.O. No. 20, series of 1992, issued by then
President Fidel Ramos is misplaced. A.O. No.
20, which sets forth the guidelines to be
observed by local government units and
government agencies on agricultural land use
conversion, cannot be applied to the subject land
for the reason that the land had already been
classified as commercial long before its
issuance. Indeed, A.O. No. 20 cannot be applied
retroactively.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for
review on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP

Natalia Realty, Inc. v. Department of Agrarian

Reform, G.R. No. 103302, 12 August 1993, 225 SCRA
278, 283.
[11]

G.R. No. 103302, 12 August 1993, 225 SCRA

278.
[12]

National Housing Authority v. Hon. Allarde, 376

Phil. 147 (1999).
[13]

Pasong Bayabas Farmers Association, Inc. v.

Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142359, 25 May 2004, 429
SCRA 109; Junio v. Garilao, G.R. No. 147146, 29 July
2005, 465 SCRA 173.
[14]

Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation v.

Court of Appeals, 419 Phil. 457 (2001.
[15]

CA rollo, p. 48.

12 | P a g e

[16]

R.A. No. 3844, Section 36 (1), as amended by

R.A. No. 6389.
[17]

Supra note 13.

[18]

Supra note at 136.

[19]

Supra note 13 at 135.

[20]

Power to adopt zoning and planning ordinances.

Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding,
Municipal Boards or City Councils in cities, and Municipal
Councils in municipalities are hereby authorized to adopt
zoning and subdivision ordinances or regulations for their
respective cities and municipalities subject to the approval
of the City Mayor or Municipal Mayor, as the case may be.
Cities and municipalities may, however, consult the
National Planning Commission on matters pertaining to
planning and zoning.

HERMINIGILDO GUSTILO, PAULINO D.

TOLENTINO and PLANTERS' COMMITTEE,
INC., Victorias Mill District, Victorias, Negros
Occidental, petitioners,
vs.
JOKER ARROYO, PHILIP E. JUICO and
PRESIDENTIAL AGRARIAN REFORM
COUNCIL, respondents.
G.R. No. 79744 July 14, 1989

====================================
====================================
====================================

INOCENTES PABICO, petitioner,

vs.
HON. PHILIP E. JUICO, SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, HON.
JOKER ARROYO, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, and
Messrs. SALVADOR TALENTO, JAIME
ABOGADO, CONRADO AVANCENA and
ROBERTO TAAY, respondents.

EN BANC

G.R. No. 79777 July 14, 1989

G.R. No. 78742 July 14, 1989

NICOLAS S. MANAAY and AGUSTIN

HERMANO, JR., petitioners,
vs.
HON. PHILIP ELLA JUICO, as Secretary of
Agrarian Reform, and LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES,respondents.

[21]

Pasong Bayabas Farmers Association, Inc. v.

Court of Appeals, supra note 13 at 134-35.

ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN

THE PHILIPPINES, INC., JUANITO D. GOMEZ,
GERARDO B. ALARCIO, FELIPE A. GUICO,
JR., BERNARDO M. ALMONTE, CANUTO
RAMIR B. CABRITO, ISIDRO T. GUICO,
FELISA I. LLAMIDO, FAUSTO J. SALVA,
REYNALDO G. ESTRADA, FELISA C.
BAUTISTA, ESMENIA J. CABE, TEODORO B.
MADRIAGA, AUREA J. PRESTOSA,
EMERENCIANA J. ISLA, FELICISIMA C.
ARRESTO, CONSUELO M. MORALES,
BENJAMIN R. SEGISMUNDO, CIRILA A. JOSE
& NAPOLEON S. FERRER,petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN
REFORM, respondent.
G.R. No. 79310 July 14, 1989
ARSENIO AL. ACUNA, NEWTON JISON,
VICTORINO FERRARIS, DENNIS JEREZA,

SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SUPREME COURT;
ROLE. Although holding neither purse nor
sword and so regarded as the weakest of the
three departments of the government, the
judiciary is nonetheless vested with the power to
annul the acts of either the legislative or the
executive or of both when not conformable to the
fundamental law. This is the reason for what
some quarters call the doctrine of judicial
supremacy.
2. ID.; SEPARATION OF POWERS;
CONSTRUED. The doctrine of separation of
powers imposes upon the courts a proper
restraint, born of the nature of their functions and
of their respect for the other departments, in
13 | P a g e

striking down the acts of the legislative and the

executive as unconstitutional. The policy, indeed,
is a blend of courtesy and caution. To doubt is to
sustain. The theory is that before the act was
done or the law was enacted, earnest studies
were made by Congress or the President, or
both, to insure that the Constitution would not be
breached.
3. ID.; SUPREME COURT; POWER TO
DECLARE AN ACT OR LAW
UNCONSTITUTIONAL; CONSTITUTIONS.
The Constitution itself lays down stringent
conditions for a declaration of unconstitutionality,
requiring therefor the concurrence of a majority
of the members of the Supreme Court who took
part in the deliberations and voted on the issue
during their session en banc.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; JUDICIAL INQUIRY;
REQUISITES. The Court will assume
jurisdiction over a constitutional question only if it
is shown that the essential requisites of a judicial
inquiry into such a question are first satisfied.
Thus, there must be an actual case or
controversy involving a conflict of legal rights
susceptible of judicial determination, the
constitutional question must have been
opportunely raised by the proper party, and the
resolution of the question is unavoidably
necessary to the decision of the case itself.
5. REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; PROPER
PARTY; CASE AT BAR. With particular regard
to the requirement of proper party as applied in
the cases before us, we hold that the same is
satisfied by the petitioners and intervenors
because each of them has sustained or is in
danger of sustaining an immediate injury as a
result of the acts or measures complained of.
6. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SUPREME COURT;
POWER TO DECLARE AN ACT OR LAW
UNCONSTITUTIONAL; TRIBUNAL WITH WIDE
DISCRETION TO WAIVE REQUIREMENT.
Even if, strictly speaking, they are not covered by
the definition, it is still within the wide discretion
of the Court to waive the requirement and so
remove the impediment to its addressing and
resolving the serious constitutional questions
raised.
7. ID.; ID.; JUDICIAL SUPREMACY. . . . When

the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional

boundaries, it does not assert any superiority
over the other departments; it does not in reality
nullify or invalidate an act of the Legislature, but
only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation
assigned to it by the Constitution to determine
conflicting claims of authority under the
Constitution and to establish for the parties in an
actual controversy the rights which that
instrument secures and guarantees to them. This
is in truth all that is involved in what is termed
"judicial supremacy" which properly is the power
of judicial review under the Constitution.
8. ID.; 1973 CONSTITUTION; PRESIDENT;
EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE POWER DURING
MARTIAL LAW, SUSTAINED. The
promulgation of P.D. No. 27 by President Marcos
in the exercise of his powers under martial law
has already been sustained in Gonzales v.
Estrella and we find no reason to modify or
reverse it on that issue.
9. ID.; 1987 CONSTITUTION; PRESIDENT;
LEGISLATIVE POWER, AUTHORIZED. As for
the power of President Aquino to promulgate
Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, the
same was authorized under Section 6 of the
Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution,
quoted above. The said measures were issued
by President Aquino before July 27, 1987, when
the Congress of the Philippines was formally
convened and took over legislative power from
her. They are not "midnight" enactments intended
to pre-empt the legislature because E.O. No. 228
was issued on July 17, 1987, and the other
measures, i.e., Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229,
were both issued on July 22, 1987.
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; MEASURES PROMULGATED
REMAINS VALID EVEN AFTER LOST OF
LEGISLATIVE POWER; RATIONALE. Neither
is it correct to say that these measures ceased to
be valid when she lost her legislative power for,
like any statute, they continue to be in force
unless modified or repealed by subsequent law
or declared invalid by the courts. A statute does
not ipso facto become inoperative simply
because of the dissolution of the legislature that
enacted it. By the same token, President
Aquinos loss of legislative power did not have
the effect of invalidating all the measures
enacted by her when and as long as she
14 | P a g e

possessed it.
11. ID.; STATUTES; PROCLAMATION REMAINS
VALID EVEN AFTER LOST OF LEGISLATIVE
POWER; RATIONALE. Proc. No. 131 is not
an appropriation measure even if it does provide
for the creation of said fund, for that is not its
principal purpose. An appropriation law is one the
primary and specific purpose of which is to
authorize the release of public funds from the
treasury. The creation of the fund is only
incidental to the main objective of the
proclamation, which is agrarian reform.
12. ID.; ID.; PROCLAMATION NO. 131 AND
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 229; ABSENCE OF
RETENTION LIMIT PROVIDED FOR IN
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6657. The argument of
some of the petitioners that Proc. No. 131 and
E.O. No. 229 should be invalidated because they
do not provide for retention limits as required by
Article XIII, Section 4 of the Constitution is no
longer tenable. R.A. No. 6657 does provide that
in no case shall retention by the landowner
exceed five (5) hectares. three (3) hectares may
be awarded to each child of the landowner,
subject to two (2) qualification which is now in
Section 6 of the law.
13. ID.; ID.; TITLE OF A BILL NEED NOT BE
CATALOGUED. The title of the bill does not
have to be a catalogue of its contents and will
suffice if the matters embodied in the text are
relevant to each other and may be inferred from
the title.
14. CIVIL LAW; EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF
LAWS; ISSUANCES FROM THE PRESIDENT
REQUIRE PUBLICATION FOR EFFECTIVITY.
But for all their peremptoriness, these
issuances from the President Marcos still had to
comply with the requirement for publication as
this Court held in Taada v. Tuvera. Hence,
unless published in the Official Gazette in
accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code, they
could not have any force and effect if they were
among those enactments successfully
challenged in that case. (LOI 474 was published,
though, in the Official Gazette dated November
29, 1976.)
15. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION;
MANDAMUS; OFFICE. Mandamus will lie to

compel the discharge of the discretionary duty

itself but not to control the discretion to be
exercised. In other words, mandamus can issue
to require action only but not specific action.
16. ID.; ID.; ID.; GENERALLY NOT AVAILABLE
WHERE THERE IS A PLAIN, SPEEDY
REMEDY; EXCEPTION. While it is true that
as a rule the writ will not be proper as long as
there is still a plain, speedy and adequate
remedy available from the administrative
authorities, resort to the courts may still be
permitted if the issue raised is a question of law.
17. POLITICAL LAW; POLICE POWER AND
EMINENT DOMAIN; TRADITIONAL
DISTINCTIONS. There are traditional
distinctions between the police power and the
power of eminent domain that logically preclude
the application of both powers at the same time
on the same subject. The cases before us
present no knotty complication insofar as the
question of compensable taking is concerned. To
the extent that the measures under challenge
merely prescribe retention limits for landowners,
there is an exercise of the police power for the
regulation of private property in accordance with
the Constitution. But where, to carry out such
regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such
owners of whatever lands they may own in
excess of the maximum area allowed, there is
definitely a taking under the power of eminent
domain for which payment of just compensation
is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a
mere limitation of the use of the land. What is
required is the surrender of the title to and the
physical possession of the said excess and all
beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of
the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an
exercise not of the police power but of the power
of eminent domain.
18. BILL OF RIGHTS; EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSE; CLASSIFICATION; DEFINED.
Classification has been defined as the grouping
of persons or things similar to each other in
certain particulars and different from each other
in these same particulars.
19. ID.; ID.; ID.; REQUISITES.; EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE; CLASSIFICATION;
DEFINED. To be valid, it must conform to the
following requirements: (1) it must be based on
15 | P a g e

substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to

the purposes of the law; (3) it must not be limited
to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply
equally to all the members of the class.
20. ID.; ID.; ID.; MEANING. Equal protection
simply means that all persons or things similarly
situated must be treated alike both as to the
rights conferred and the liabilities imposed.
21. POLITICAL LAW; EMINENT DOMAIN;
NATURE. Eminent domain is an inherent
power of the State that enables it to forcibly
acquire private lands intended for public use
upon payment of just compensation to the owner.
22. ID.; ID.; WHEN AVAILED OF. Obviously,
there is no need to expropriate where the owner
is willing to sell under terms also acceptable to
the purchaser, in which case an ordinary deed of
sale may be agreed upon by the parties. It is only
where the owner is unwilling to sell, or cannot
accept the price or other conditions offered by
the vendee, that the power of eminent domain
will come into play to assert the paramount
authority of the State over the interests of the
property owner. Private rights must then yield to
the irresistible demands of the public interest on
the time-honored justification, as in the case of
the police power, that the welfare of the people is
the supreme law.
23. ID.; ID.; REQUIREMENTS. Basically, the
requirements for a proper exercise of the power
are: (1) public use and (2) just compensation.
24. ID.; POLITICAL QUESTION; DEFINED.
The term "political question" connotes what it
means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question
of policy. It refers to "those questions which,
under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to
which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch
of the government." It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a
particular measure. (Taada v. Cuenco, 100 Phil.
1101)
25. ID.; EMINENT DOMAIN JUST
COMPENSATION; DEFINED. Just
compensation is defined as the full and fair
equivalent of the property taken from its owner

by the expropriator.
26. ID.; ID.; ID.; WORD "JUST", EXPLAINED.
It has been repeatedly stressed by this Court that
the measure is not the takers gain but the
owners loss. The word "just" is used to intensify
the meaning of the word "compensation" to
convey the idea that the equivalent to be
rendered for the property to be taken shall be
real, substantial, full, ample.
27. ID.; ID.; ID.; COMPENSABLE TAKING;
CONDITIONS. There is compensable taking
when the following conditions concur: (1) the
expropriator must enter a private property; (2) the
entry must be for more than a momentary period;
(3) the entry must be under warrant or color of
legal authority; (4) the property must be devoted
to public use or otherwise informally appropriated
or injuriously affected; and (5) the utilization of
the property for public use must be in such a way
as to oust the owner and deprive him of
beneficial enjoyment of the property.
28. ID.; ID.; ID.; DEPOSIT NOT NECESSARY
WHERE THE EXPROPRIATOR IS THE ESTATE.
Where the State itself is the expropriator, it is
not necessary for it to make a deposit upon its
taking possession of the condemned property, as
"the compensation is a public charge, the good
faith of the public is pledged for its payment, and
all the resources of taxation may be employed in
raising the amount."cralaw virtua1aw library
29. ID.; ID.; ID.; DETERMINATION THEREOF,
ADDRESSED TO THE COURTS OF JUSTICE.
The determination of just compensation is a
function addressed to the courts of justice and
may not be usurped by any other branch or
official of the government.
30. ID.; ID.; ID.; EMINENT DOMAIN UNDER
THE COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM
LAW; DETERMINATION MADE BY THE
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN RELATIONS,
ONLY PRELIMINARY. The determination of
the just compensation by the DAR is not by any
means final and conclusive upon the landowner
or any other interested party, for Section 16 (f)
clearly provides: Any party who disagrees with
the decision may bring the matter to the court of
proper jurisdiction for final determination of just
compensation. The determination made by the
16 | P a g e

DAR is only preliminary unless accepted by all

parties concerned. Otherwise, the courts of
justice will still have the right to review with
finality the said determination in the exercise of
what is admittedly a judicial function.
31. ID.; ID.; ID.; PAYMENT IN MONEY ONLY
NOT APPLICABLE IN REVOLUTIONARY KIND
OF EXPROPRIATION. We do not deal here
with the traditional exercise of the power of
eminent domain. This is not an ordinary
expropriation where only a specific property of
relatively limited area is sought to be taken by
the State from its owner for a specific and
perhaps local purpose. What we deal with here is
a revolutionary kind of expropriation. The
expropriation before us affects all private
agricultural lands whenever found and of
whatever kind as long as they are in excess of
the maximum retention limits allowed their
owners. Such a program will involve not mere
millions of pesos. The cost will be tremendous.
Considering the vast areas of land subject to
expropriation under the laws before us, we
estimate that hundreds of billions of pesos will be
needed, far more indeed than the amount of P50
billion initially appropriated, which is already
staggering as it is by our present standards. The
Court has not found in the records of the
Constitutional Commission any categorial
agreement among the members regarding the
meaning to be given the concept of just
compensation as applied to the comprehensive
agrarian reform program being contemplated. On
the other hand, there is nothing in the records
either that militates against the assumptions we
are making of the general sentiments and
intention of the members on the content and
manner of the payment to be made to the
landowner in the light of the magnitude of the
expenditure and the limitations of the
expropriator. Therefore, payment of the just
compensation is not always required to be made
fully in money.
32. ID.; ID.; ID.; PRINCIPLE THAT TITLE SHALL
PASS ONLY UPON FULL PAYMENT OF JUST
COMPENSATION, NOT APPLICABLE. Title to
the property expropriated shall pass from the
owner to the expropriator only upon full payment
of the just compensation. The CARP Law, for its
part, conditions the transfer of possession and
ownership of the land to the government on

receipt by the landowner of the corresponding

payment or the deposit by the DAR of the
compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an
accessible bank. Until then, title also remains
with the landowner. No outright change of
ownership is contemplated either. Hence, that
the assailed measures violate due process by
arbitrarily transferring title before the land is fully
paid for must also be rejected.
33. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; EXHAUSTION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES; CASE AT BAR.
It does not appear in G.R. No. 78742 that the
appeal filed by the petitioners with the Office of
the President has already been resolved.
Although we have said that the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies need not
preclude immediate resort to judicial action, there
are factual issues that have yet to be examined
on the administrative level, especially the claim
that the petitioners are not covered by LOI 474
because they do not own other agricultural lands
than the subjects of their petition. Obviously, the
Court cannot resolve these issues.

CRUZ, J.:
In ancient mythology, Antaeus was a terrible
giant who blocked and challenged Hercules for
his life on his way to Mycenae after performing
his eleventh labor. The two wrestled mightily and
Hercules flung his adversary to the ground
thinking him dead, but Antaeus rose even
stronger to resume their struggle. This happened
several
times
to
Hercules'
increasing
amazement. Finally, as they continued grappling,
it dawned on Hercules that Antaeus was the son
of Gaea and could never die as long as any part
of his body was touching his Mother Earth. Thus
forewarned, Hercules then held Antaeus up in
the air, beyond the reach of the sustaining soil,
and crushed him to death.
Mother Earth. The sustaining soil. The giver of
life, without whose invigorating touch even the
powerful Antaeus weakened and died.

17 | P a g e

The cases before us are not as fanciful as the

foregoing tale. But they also tell of the elemental
forces of life and death, of men and women who,
like Antaeus need the sustaining strength of the
precious earth to stay alive.
"Land for the Landless" is a slogan that
underscores the acute imbalance in the
distribution of this precious resource among our
people. But it is more than a slogan. Through the
brooding centuries, it has become a battle-cry
dramatizing the increasingly urgent demand of
the dispossessed among us for a plot of earth as
their place in the sun.
Recognizing this need, the Constitution in 1935
mandated the policy of social justice to "insure
the well-being and economic security of all the
people," 1 especially the less privileged. In 1973,
the new Constitution affirmed this goal adding
specifically that "the State shall regulate the
acquisition, ownership, use, enjoyment and
disposition of private property and equitably
diffuse
property
ownership
and
2
profits." Significantly, there was also the specific
injunction to "formulate and implement an
agrarian reform program aimed at emancipating
the tenant from the bondage of the soil." 3
The Constitution of 1987 was not to be outdone.
Besides echoing these sentiments, it also
adopted one whole and separate Article XIII on
Social Justice and Human Rights, containing
grandiose but undoubtedly sincere provisions for
the uplift of the common people. These include a
call in the following words for the adoption by the
State of an agrarian reform program:
SEC. 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an
agrarian reform program founded on the right of
farmers and regular farmworkers, who are
landless, to own directly or collectively the lands
they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to
receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this
end, the State shall encourage and undertake
the just distribution of all agricultural lands,

subject to such priorities and reasonable

retention limits as the Congress may prescribe,
taking into account ecological, developmental, or
equity considerations and subject to the payment
of just compensation. In determining retention
limits, the State shall respect the right of small
landowners. The State shall further provide
incentives for voluntary land-sharing.
Earlier, in fact, R.A. No. 3844, otherwise known
as the Agricultural Land Reform Code, had
already been enacted by the Congress of the
Philippines on August 8, 1963, in line with the
above-stated principles. This was substantially
superseded almost a decade later by P.D. No.
27, which was promulgated on October 21, 1972,
along with martial law, to provide for the
compulsory acquisition of private lands for
distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify
maximum retention limits for landowners.
The people power revolution of 1986 did not
change and indeed even energized the thrust for
agrarian reform. Thus, on July 17, 1987,
President Corazon C. Aquino issued E.O. No.
228, declaring full land ownership in favor of the
beneficiaries of P.D. No. 27 and providing for the
valuation of still unvalued lands covered by the
decree as well as the manner of their payment.
This was followed on July 22, 1987 by
Presidential Proclamation No. 131, instituting a
comprehensive
agrarian
reform
program
(CARP), and E.O. No. 229, providing the
mechanics for its implementation.
Subsequently, with its formal organization, the
revived Congress of the Philippines took over
legislative power from the President and started
its own deliberations, including extensive public
hearings, on the improvement of the interests of
farmers. The result, after almost a year of spirited
debate, was the enactment of R.A. No. 6657,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988, which President Aquino
signed on June 10, 1988. This law, while
considerably changing the earlier mentioned
18 | P a g e

enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory

effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its
provisions. 4
The above-captioned cases have been
consolidated because they involve common legal
questions, including serious challenges to the
constitutionality of the several measures
mentioned above. They will be the subject of one
common discussion and resolution, The different
antecedents of each case will require separate
treatment, however, and will first be explained
hereunder.
G.R. No. 79777
Squarely raised in this petition is the
constitutionality of P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos. 228
and 229, and R.A. No. 6657.
The subjects of this petition are a 9-hectare
riceland worked by four tenants and owned by
petitioner Nicolas Manaay and his wife and a 5hectare riceland worked by four tenants and
owned by petitioner Augustin Hermano, Jr. The
tenants were declared full owners of these lands
by E.O. No. 228 as qualified farmers under P.D.
No. 27.
The petitioners are questioning P.D. No. 27 and
E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 on grounds inter alia of
separation of powers, due process, equal
protection and the constitutional limitation that no
private property shall be taken for public use
without just compensation.
They contend that President Aquino usurped
legislative power when she promulgated E.O.
No. 228. The said measure is invalid also for
violation of Article XIII, Section 4, of the
Constitution, for failure to provide for retention
limits for small landowners. Moreover, it does not
conform to Article VI, Section 25(4) and the other
requisites of a valid appropriation.

same may be made only by a court of justice and

not by the President of the Philippines. They
invoke
the
recent
cases
of EPZA
v.
5
Dulay and Manotok
v.
National
Food
6
Authority. Moreover, the just compensation
contemplated by the Bill of Rights is payable in
money or in cash and not in the form of bonds or
other things of value.
In considering the rentals as advance payment
on the land, the executive order also deprives the
petitioners of their property rights as protected by
due process. The equal protection clause is also
violated because the order places the burden of
solving the agrarian problems on the owners only
of agricultural lands. No similar obligation is
imposed on the owners of other properties.
The petitioners also maintain that in declaring the
beneficiaries under P.D. No. 27 to be the owners
of the lands occupied by them, E.O. No. 228
ignored judicial prerogatives and so violated due
process. Worse, the measure would not solve the
agrarian problem because even the small
farmers are deprived of their lands and the
retention rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
In his Comment, the Solicitor General stresses
that P.D. No. 27 has already been upheld in the
earlier cases ofChavez v. Zobel, 7 Gonzales v.
Estrella, 8 and Association of Rice and Corn
Producers of the Philippines, Inc. v. The National
Land Reform Council. 9 The determination of just
compensation by the executive authorities
conformably to the formula prescribed under the
questioned order is at best initial or preliminary
only. It does not foreclose judicial intervention
whenever sought or warranted. At any rate, the
challenge to the order is premature because no
valuation of their property has as yet been made
by the Department of Agrarian Reform. The
petitioners are also not proper parties because
the lands owned by them do not exceed the
maximum retention limit of 7 hectares.

In connection with the determination of just

compensation, the petitioners argue that the
19 | P a g e

Replying, the petitioners insist they are proper

parties because P.D. No. 27 does not provide for
retention limits on tenanted lands and that in any
event their petition is a class suit brought in
behalf of landowners with landholdings below 24
hectares. They maintain that the determination of
just compensation by the administrative
authorities is a final ascertainment. As for the
cases invoked by the public respondent, the
constitutionality of P.D. No. 27 was merely
assumed in Chavez, while what was decided
in Gonzales was the validity of the imposition of
martial law.
In the amended petition dated November 22,
1588, it is contended that P.D. No. 27, E.O. Nos.
228 and 229 (except Sections 20 and 21) have
been impliedly repealed by R.A. No. 6657.
Nevertheless, this statute should itself also be
declared unconstitutional because it suffers from
substantially the same infirmities as the earlier
measures.
A petition for intervention was filed with leave of
court on June 1, 1988 by Vicente Cruz, owner of
a 1. 83- hectare land, who complained that the
DAR was insisting on the implementation of P.D.
No. 27 and E.O. No. 228 despite a compromise
agreement he had reached with his tenant on the
payment of rentals. In a subsequent motion
dated April 10, 1989, he adopted the allegations
in the basic amended petition that the abovementioned enactments have been impliedly
repealed by R.A. No. 6657.
G.R. No. 79310
The petitioners herein are landowners and sugar
planters in the Victorias Mill District, Victorias,
Negros Occidental. Co-petitioner Planters'
Committee, Inc. is an organization composed of
1,400 planter-members. This petition seeks to
prohibit the implementation of Proc. No. 131 and
E.O. No. 229.

The petitioners claim that the power to provide

for a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
as decreed by the Constitution belongs to
Congress and not the President. Although they
agree that the President could exercise
legislative power until the Congress was
convened, she could do so only to enact
emergency measures during the transition
period. At that, even assuming that the interim
legislative power of the President was properly
exercised, Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 would
still have to be annulled for violating the
constitutional provisions on just compensation,
due process, and equal protection.
They also argue that under Section 2 of Proc.
No. 131 which provides:
Agrarian Reform Fund.-There is hereby created
a special fund, to be known as the Agrarian
Reform Fund, an initial amount of FIFTY
BILLION PESOS (P50,000,000,000.00) to cover
the estimated cost of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program from 1987 to 1992
which shall be sourced from the receipts of the
sale of the assets of the Asset Privatization Trust
and Receipts of sale of ill-gotten wealth received
through the Presidential Commission on Good
Government and such other sources as
government may deem appropriate. The
amounts collected and accruing to this special
fund
shall
be
considered
automatically
appropriated for the purpose authorized in this
Proclamation the amount appropriated is in
futuro, not in esse. The money needed to cover
the cost of the contemplated expropriation has
yet to be raised and cannot be appropriated at
this time.
Furthermore, they contend that taking must be
simultaneous with payment of just compensation
as it is traditionally understood, i.e., with money
and in full, but no such payment is contemplated
in Section 5 of the E.O. No. 229. On the contrary,
Section 6, thereof provides that the Land Bank of
the Philippines "shall compensate the landowner
20 | P a g e

in an amount to be established by the

government, which shall be based on the owner's
declaration of current fair market value as
provided in Section 4 hereof, but subject to
certain controls to be defined and promulgated
by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council."
This compensation may not be paid fully in
money but in any of several modes that may
consist of part cash and part bond, with interest,
maturing periodically, or direct payment in cash
or bond as may be mutually agreed upon by the
beneficiary and the landowner or as may be
prescribed or approved by the PARC.
The petitioners also argue that in the issuance of
the two measures, no effort was made to make a
careful study of the sugar planters' situation.
There is no tenancy problem in the sugar areas
that can justify the application of the CARP to
them. To the extent that the sugar planters have
been lumped in the same legislation with other
farmers, although they are a separate group with
problems exclusively their own, their right to
equal protection has been violated.
A motion for intervention was filed on August
27,1987 by the National Federation of Sugarcane
Planters (NASP) which claims a membership of
at least 20,000 individual sugar planters all over
the country. On September 10, 1987, another
motion for intervention was filed, this time by
Manuel Barcelona, et al., representing coconut
and riceland owners. Both motions were granted
by the Court.
NASP alleges that President Aquino had no
authority to fund the Agrarian Reform Program
and that, in any event, the appropriation is invalid
because of uncertainty in the amount
appropriated. Section 2 of Proc. No. 131 and
Sections 20 and 21 of E.O. No. 229 provide for
an initial appropriation of fifty billion pesos and
thus specifies the minimum rather than the
maximum authorized amount. This is not
allowed. Furthermore, the stated initial amount

has not been certified to by the National

Treasurer as actually available.
Two additional arguments are made by
Barcelona, to wit, the failure to establish by clear
and convincing evidence the necessity for the
exercise of the powers of eminent domain, and
the violation of the fundamental right to own
property.
The petitioners also decry the penalty for nonregistration of the lands, which is the
expropriation of the said land for an amount
equal to the government assessor's valuation of
the land for tax purposes. On the other hand, if
the landowner declares his own valuation he is
unjustly required to immediately pay the
corresponding taxes on the land, in violation of
the uniformity rule.
In his consolidated Comment, the Solicitor
General first invokes the presumption of
constitutionality in favor of Proc. No. 131 and
E.O. No. 229. He also justifies the necessity for
the expropriation as explained in the "whereas"
clauses of the Proclamation and submits that,
contrary to the petitioner's contention, a pilot
project to determine the feasibility of CARP and a
general survey on the people's opinion thereon
are not indispensable prerequisites to its
promulgation.
On the alleged violation of the equal protection
clause, the sugar planters have failed to show
that they belong to a different class and should
be differently treated. The Comment also
suggests the possibility of Congress first
distributing public agricultural lands and
scheduling
the
expropriation
of
private
agricultural lands later. From this viewpoint, the
petition for prohibition would be premature.
The public respondent also points out that the
constitutional prohibition is against the payment
of public money without the corresponding
appropriation. There is no rule that only money
21 | P a g e

already in existence can be the subject of an

appropriation law. Finally, the earmarking of fifty
billion pesos as Agrarian Reform Fund, although
denominated as an initial amount, is actually the
maximum sum appropriated. The word "initial"
simply means that additional amounts may be
appropriated later when necessary.

which had not been acted upon when E.O. Nos.

228 and 229 were issued. These orders rendered
his motion moot and academic because they
directly effected the transfer of his land to the
private respondents.

On April 11, 1988, Prudencio Serrano, a coconut

planter, filed a petition on his own behalf,
assailing the constitutionality of E.O. No. 229. In
addition to the arguments already raised,
Serrano contends that the measure is
unconstitutional because:

(1) E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 were invalidly issued

by the President of the Philippines.

(1) Only public lands should be included in the

CARP;
(2) E.O. No. 229 embraces more than one
subject which is not expressed in the title;
(3) The power of the President to legislate was
terminated on July 2, 1987; and
(4) The appropriation of a P50 billion special fund
from the National Treasury did not originate from
the House of Representatives.

The petitioner now argues that:

(2) The said executive orders are violative of the

constitutional provision that no private property
shall be taken without due process or just
compensation.
(3) The petitioner is denied the right of maximum
retention provided for under the 1987
Constitution.
The petitioner contends that the issuance of E.0.
Nos. 228 and 229 shortly before Congress
convened is anomalous and arbitrary, besides
violating the doctrine of separation of powers.
The legislative power granted to the President
under the Transitory Provisions refers only to
emergency measures that may be promulgated
in the proper exercise of the police power.

G.R. No. 79744

The petitioner alleges that the then Secretary of
Department of Agrarian Reform, in violation of
due process and the requirement for just
compensation, placed his landholding under the
coverage of Operation Land Transfer. Certificates
of Land Transfer were subsequently issued to the
private respondents, who then refused payment
of lease rentals to him.
On September 3, 1986, the petitioner protested
the erroneous inclusion of his small landholding
under Operation Land transfer and asked for the
recall and cancellation of the Certificates of Land
Transfer in the name of the private respondents.
He claims that on December 24, 1986, his
petition was denied without hearing. On February
17, 1987, he filed a motion for reconsideration,

The petitioner also invokes his rights not to be

deprived of his property without due process of
law and to the retention of his small parcels of
riceholding as guaranteed under Article XIII,
Section 4 of the Constitution. He likewise argues
that, besides denying him just compensation for
his land, the provisions of E.O. No. 228 declaring
that:
Lease rentals paid to the landowner by the
farmer-beneficiary after October 21, 1972 shall
be considered as advance payment for the land.
is an unconstitutional taking of a vested property
right. It is also his contention that the inclusion of
even small landowners in the program along with
other landowners with lands consisting of seven
hectares or more is undemocratic.
22 | P a g e

In his Comment, the Solicitor General submits

that the petition is premature because the motion
for reconsideration filed with the Minister of
Agrarian Reform is still unresolved. As for the
validity of the issuance of E.O. Nos. 228 and
229, he argues that they were enacted pursuant
to Section 6, Article XVIII of the Transitory
Provisions of the 1987 Constitution which reads:
The incumbent president shall continue to
exercise legislative powers until the first
Congress is convened.
On the issue of just compensation, his position is
that when P.D. No. 27 was promulgated on
October 21. 1972, the tenant-farmer of
agricultural land was deemed the owner of the
land he was tilling. The leasehold rentals paid
after that date should therefore be considered
amortization payments.
In his Reply to the public respondents, the
petitioner maintains that the motion he filed was
resolved on December 14, 1987. An appeal to
the Office of the President would be useless with
the promulgation of E.O. Nos. 228 and 229,
which in effect sanctioned the validity of the
public respondent's acts.
G.R. No. 78742
The petitioners in this case invoke the right of
retention granted by P.D. No. 27 to owners of rice
and corn lands not exceeding seven hectares as
long as they are cultivating or intend to cultivate
the same. Their respective lands do not exceed
the statutory limit but are occupied by tenants
who are actually cultivating such lands.
According to P.D. No. 316, which was
promulgated in implementation of P.D. No. 27:
No tenant-farmer in agricultural lands primarily
devoted to rice and corn shall be ejected or
removed from his farmholding until such time as
the respective rights of the tenant- farmers and
the landowner shall have been determined in

accordance with the rules and regulations

implementing P.D. No. 27.
The petitioners claim they cannot eject their
tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of
retention because the Department of Agrarian
Reform has so far not issued the implementing
rules required under the above-quoted decree.
They therefore ask the Court for a writ of
mandamus to compel the respondent to issue
the said rules.
In his Comment, the public respondent argues
that P.D. No. 27 has been amended by LOI 474
removing any right of retention from persons who
own other agricultural lands of more than 7
hectares in aggregate area or lands used for
residential, commercial, industrial or other
purposes from which they derive adequate
income for their family. And even assuming that
the petitioners do not fall under its terms, the
regulations implementing P.D. No. 27 have
already been issued, to wit, the Memorandum
dated July 10, 1975 (Interim Guidelines on
Retention by Small Landowners, with an
accompanying
Retention
Guide
Table),
Memorandum Circular No. 11 dated April 21,
1978, (Implementation Guidelines of LOI No.
474), Memorandum Circular No. 18-81 dated
December 29,1981 (Clarificatory Guidelines on
Coverage of P.D. No. 27 and Retention by Small
Landowners), and DAR Administrative Order No.
1, series of 1985 (Providing for a Cut-off Date for
Landowners to Apply for Retention and/or to
Protest the Coverage of their Landholdings under
Operation Land Transfer pursuant to P.D. No.
27). For failure to file the corresponding
applications for retention under these measures,
the petitioners are now barred from invoking this
right.
The public respondent also stresses that the
petitioners have prematurely initiated this case
notwithstanding the pendency of their appeal to
the President of the Philippines. Moreover, the
issuance of the implementing rules, assuming
23 | P a g e

this has not yet been done, involves the exercise

of discretion which cannot be controlled through
the writ of mandamus. This is especially true if
this function is entrusted, as in this case, to a
separate department of the government.
In their Reply, the petitioners insist that the
above-cited measures are not applicable to them
because they do not own more than seven
hectares of agricultural land. Moreover, assuming
arguendo that the rules were intended to cover
them also, the said measures are nevertheless
not in force because they have not been
published as required by law and the ruling of
this Court in Tanada v. Tuvera. 10 As for LOI 474,
the same is ineffective for the additional reason
that a mere letter of instruction could not have
repealed the presidential decree.
I
Although holding neither purse nor sword and so
regarded as the weakest of the three
departments of the government, the judiciary is
nonetheless vested with the power to annul the
acts of either the legislative or the executive or of
both when not conformable to the fundamental
law. This is the reason for what some quarters
call the doctrine of judicial supremacy. Even so,
this power is not lightly assumed or readily
exercised. The doctrine of separation of powers
imposes upon the courts a proper restraint, born
of the nature of their functions and of their
respect for the other departments, in striking
down the acts of the legislative and the executive
as unconstitutional. The policy, indeed, is a blend
of courtesy and caution. To doubt is to sustain.
The theory is that before the act was done or the
law was enacted, earnest studies were made by
Congress or the President, or both, to insure that
the Constitution would not be breached.
In addition, the Constitution itself lays down
stringent conditions for a declaration of
unconstitutionality,
requiring
therefor
the
concurrence of a majority of the members of the

Supreme Court who took part in the deliberations

and voted on the issue during their session en
banc. 11 And as established by judge made
doctrine, the Court will assume jurisdiction over a
constitutional question only if it is shown that the
essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such
a question are first satisfied. Thus, there must be
an actual case or controversy involving a conflict
of
legal
rights
susceptible
of
judicial
determination, the constitutional question must
have been opportunely raised by the proper
party, and the resolution of the question is
unavoidably necessary to the decision of the
case itself. 12
With particular regard to the requirement of
proper party as applied in the cases before us,
we hold that the same is satisfied by the
petitioners and intervenors because each of
them has sustained or is in danger of sustaining
an immediate injury as a result of the acts or
measures complained of. 13 And even if, strictly
speaking, they are not covered by the definition,
it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to
waive the requirement and so remove the
impediment to its addressing and resolving the
serious constitutional questions raised.
In the first Emergency Powers Cases, 14 ordinary
citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question
the constitutionality of several executive orders
issued by President Quirino although they were
invoking only an indirect and general interest
shared in common with the public. The Court
dismissed the objection that they were not proper
parties and ruled that "the transcendental
importance to the public of these cases demands
that they be settled promptly and definitely,
brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of
procedure." We have since then applied this
exception in many other cases. 15
The other above-mentioned requisites have also
been met in the present petitions.

24 | P a g e

In must be stressed that despite the inhibitions

pressing upon the Court when confronted with
constitutional issues like the ones now before it,
it will not hesitate to declare a law or act invalid
when it is convinced that this must be done. In
arriving at this conclusion, its only criterion will be
the Constitution as God and its conscience give it
the light to probe its meaning and discover its
purpose. Personal motives and political
considerations are irrelevancies that cannot
influence its decision. Blandishment is as
ineffectual as intimidation.
For all the awesome power of the Congress and
the Executive, the Court will not hesitate to
"make the hammer fall, and heavily," to use
Justice Laurel's pithy language, where the acts of
these departments, or of any public official,
betray the people's will as expressed in the
Constitution.
It need only be added, to borrow again the words
of Justice Laurel, that
... when the judiciary mediates to allocate
constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments; it does
not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the
Legislature, but only asserts the solemn and
sacred obligation assigned to it by the
Constitution to determine conflicting claims of
authority under the Constitution and to establish
for the parties in an actual controversy the rights
which that instrument secures and guarantees to
them. This is in truth all that is involved in what is
termed "judicial supremacy" which properly is the
power of judicial review under the Constitution. 16
The cases before us categorically raise
constitutional questions that this Court must
categorically resolve. And so we shall.
II
We proceed first to the examination of the
preliminary issues before resolving the more

serious challenges to the constitutionality of the

several measures involved in these petitions.
The promulgation of P.D. No. 27 by President
Marcos in the exercise of his powers under
martial law has already been sustained
in Gonzales v. Estrella and we find no reason to
modify or reverse it on that issue. As for the
power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc.
No. 131 and E.O. Nos. 228 and 229, the same
was authorized under Section 6 of the Transitory
Provisions of the 1987 Constitution, quoted
above.
The said measures were issued by President
Aquino before July 27, 1987, when the Congress
of the Philippines was formally convened and
took over legislative power from her. They are not
"midnight" enactments intended to pre-empt the
legislature because E.O. No. 228 was issued on
July 17, 1987, and the other measures, i.e., Proc.
No. 131 and E.O. No. 229, were both issued on
July 22, 1987. Neither is it correct to say that
these measures ceased to be valid when she lost
her legislative power for, like any statute, they
continue to be in force unless modified or
repealed by subsequent law or declared invalid
by the courts. A statute does not ipso
facto become inoperative simply because of the
dissolution of the legislature that enacted it. By
the same token, President Aquino's loss of
legislative power did not have the effect of
invalidating all the measures enacted by her
when and as long as she possessed it.
Significantly, the Congress she is alleged to have
undercut has not rejected but in fact substantially
affirmed the challenged measures and has
specifically provided that they shall be suppletory
to R.A. No. 6657 whenever not inconsistent with
its provisions. 17 Indeed, some portions of the
said measures, like the creation of the P50 billion
fund in Section 2 of Proc. No. 131, and Sections
20 and 21 of E.O. No. 229, have been
incorporated by reference in the CARP Law.18

25 | P a g e

That fund, as earlier noted, is itself being

questioned on the ground that it does not
conform to the requirements of a valid
appropriation as specified in the Constitution.
Clearly, however, Proc. No. 131 is not an
appropriation measure even if it does provide for
the creation of said fund, for that is not its
principal purpose. An appropriation law is one the
primary and specific purpose of which is to
authorize the release of public funds from the
treasury.19 The creation of the fund is only
incidental to the main objective of the
proclamation, which is agrarian reform.
It should follow that the specific constitutional
provisions invoked, to wit, Section 24 and
Section 25(4) of Article VI, are not applicable.
With particular reference to Section 24, this
obviously could not have been complied with for
the simple reason that the House of
Representatives, which now has the exclusive
power to initiate appropriation measures, had not
yet been convened when the proclamation was
issued. The legislative power was then solely
vested in the President of the Philippines, who
embodied, as it were, both houses of Congress.
The argument of some of the petitioners that
Proc. No. 131 and E.O. No. 229 should be
invalidated because they do not provide for
retention limits as required by Article XIII, Section
4 of the Constitution is no longer tenable. R.A.
No. 6657 does provide for such limits now in
Section 6 of the law, which in fact is one of its
most controversial provisions. This section
declares:
Retention Limits. Except as otherwise
provided in this Act, no person may own or
retain, directly or indirectly, any public or private
agricultural land, the size of which shall vary
according to factors governing a viable familysized farm, such as commodity produced, terrain,
infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by
the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC)
created hereunder, but in no case shall retention

by the landowner exceed five (5) hectares. Three

(3) hectares may be awarded to each child of the
landowner, subject to the following qualifications:
(1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age;
and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or
directly managing the farm; Provided, That
landowners whose lands have been covered by
Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to
keep the area originally retained by them
thereunder, further, That original homestead
grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own
the original homestead at the time of the
approval of this Act shall retain the same areas
as long as they continue to cultivate said
homestead.
The argument that E.O. No. 229 violates the
constitutional requirement that a bill shall have
only one subject, to be expressed in its title,
deserves only short attention. It is settled that the
title of the bill does not have to be a catalogue of
its contents and will suffice if the matters
embodied in the text are relevant to each other
and may be inferred from the title. 20
The Court wryly observes that during the past
dictatorship, every presidential issuance, by
whatever name it was called, had the force and
effect of law because it came from President
Marcos. Such are the ways of despots. Hence, it
is futile to argue, as the petitioners do in G.R. No.
79744, that LOI 474 could not have repealed P.D.
No. 27 because the former was only a letter of
instruction. The important thing is that it was
issued by President Marcos, whose word was
law during that time.
But for all their peremptoriness, these issuances
from the President Marcos still had to comply
with the requirement for publication as this Court
held in Tanada v. Tuvera. 21 Hence, unless
published in the Official Gazette in accordance
with Article 2 of the Civil Code, they could not
have any force and effect if they were among
those enactments successfully challenged in that

26 | P a g e

case. LOI 474 was published, though, in the

Official Gazette dated November 29,1976.)
Finally, there is the contention of the public
respondent in G.R. No. 78742 that the writ of
mandamus cannot issue to compel the
performance of a discretionary act, especially by
a specific department of the government. That is
true as a general proposition but is subject to one
important
qualification.
Correctly
and
categorically stated, the rule is that mandamus
will lie to compel the discharge of the
discretionary duty itself but not to control the
discretion to be exercised. In other words,
mandamus can issue to require action only but
not specific action.
Whenever a duty is imposed upon a public
official and an unnecessary and unreasonable
delay in the exercise of such duty occurs, if it is a
clear duty imposed by law, the courts will
intervene by the extraordinary legal remedy of
mandamus to compel action. If the duty is purely
ministerial, the courts will require specific action.
If the duty is purely discretionary, the courts
by mandamus will require action only. For
example, if an inferior court, public official, or
board should, for an unreasonable length of time,
fail to decide a particular question to the great
detriment of all parties concerned, or a court
should refuse to take jurisdiction of a cause when
the law clearly gave it jurisdiction mandamus will
issue, in the first case to require a decision, and
in the second to require that jurisdiction be taken
of the cause. 22
And while it is true that as a rule the writ will not
be proper as long as there is still a plain, speedy
and adequate remedy available from the
administrative authorities, resort to the courts
may still be permitted if the issue raised is a
question of law. 23
III

There are traditional distinctions between the

police power and the power of eminent domain
that logically preclude the application of both
powers at the same time on the same subject. In
the case of City of Baguio v. NAWASA, 24 for
example, where a law required the transfer of all
municipal waterworks systems to the NAWASA in
exchange for its assets of equivalent value, the
Court held that the power being exercised was
eminent domain because the property involved
was wholesome and intended for a public use.
Property condemned under the police power is
noxious or intended for a noxious purpose, such
as a building on the verge of collapse, which
should be demolished for the public safety, or
obscene materials, which should be destroyed in
the interest of public morals. The confiscation of
such property is not compensable, unlike the
taking of property under the power of
expropriation, which requires the payment of just
compensation to the owner.
In the case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon, 25 Justice Holmes laid down the limits of
the police power in a famous aphorism: "The
general rule at least is that while property may be
regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes
too far it will be recognized as a taking." The
regulation that went "too far" was a law
prohibiting mining which might cause the
subsidence of structures for human habitation
constructed on the land surface. This was
resisted by a coal company which had earlier
granted a deed to the land over its mine but
reserved all mining rights thereunder, with the
grantee assuming all risks and waiving any
damage claim. The Court held the law could not
be sustained without compensating the grantor.
Justice Brandeis filed a lone dissent in which he
argued that there was a valid exercise of the
police power. He said:
Every restriction upon the use of property
imposed in the exercise of the police power
deprives the owner of some right theretofore
enjoyed, and is, in that sense, an abridgment by
27 | P a g e

the State of rights in property without making

compensation. But restriction imposed to protect
the public health, safety or morals from dangers
threatened is not a taking. The restriction here in
question is merely the prohibition of a noxious
use. The property so restricted remains in the
possession of its owner. The state does not
appropriate it or make any use of it. The state
merely prevents the owner from making a use
which interferes with paramount rights of the
public. Whenever the use prohibited ceases to
be noxious as it may because of further
changes in local or social conditions the
restriction will have to be removed and the owner
will again be free to enjoy his property as
heretofore.
Recent trends, however, would indicate not a
polarization but a mingling of the police power
and the power of eminent domain, with the latter
being used as an implement of the former like
the power of taxation. The employment of the
taxing power to achieve a police purpose has
long been accepted. 26 As for the power of
expropriation, Prof. John J. Costonis of the
University of Illinois College of Law (referring to
the earlier case of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
272 US 365, which sustained a zoning law under
the police power) makes the following significant
remarks:
Euclid, moreover, was decided in an era when
judges located the Police and eminent domain
powers on different planets. Generally speaking,
they viewed eminent domain as encompassing
public acquisition of private property for
improvements that would be available for public
use," literally construed. To the police power, on
the other hand, they assigned the less intrusive
task of preventing harmful externalities a point
reflected in the Euclid opinion's reliance on an
analogy to nuisance law to bolster its support of
zoning. So long as suppression of a privately
authored harm bore a plausible relation to some
legitimate "public purpose," the pertinent
measure need have afforded no compensation

whatever. With the progressive growth of

government's involvement in land use, the
distance between the two powers has contracted
considerably. Today government often employs
eminent domain interchangeably with or as a
useful complement to the police power-- a trend
expressly approved in the Supreme Court's 1954
decision in Berman v. Parker, which broadened
the reach of eminent domain's "public use" test to
match that of the police power's standard of
"public purpose." 27
The Berman case sustained a redevelopment
project and the improvement of blighted areas in
the District of Columbia as a proper exercise of
the police power. On the role of eminent domain
in the attainment of this purpose, Justice Douglas
declared:
If those who govern the District of Columbia
decide that the Nation's Capital should be
beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing in
the Fifth Amendment that stands in the way.
Once the object is within the authority of
Congress, the right to realize it through the
exercise of eminent domain is clear.
For the power of eminent domain is merely the
means to the end. 28
In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York
City, 29 decided by a 6-3 vote in 1978, the U.S
Supreme Court sustained the respondent's
Landmarks Preservation Law under which the
owners of the Grand Central Terminal had not
been allowed to construct a multi-story office
building over the Terminal, which had been
designated a historic landmark. Preservation of
the landmark was held to be a valid objective of
the police power. The problem, however, was
that the owners of the Terminal would be
deprived of the right to use the airspace above it
although other landowners in the area could do
so over their respective properties. While
insisting that there was here no taking, the Court
28 | P a g e

nonetheless recognized certain compensatory

rights accruing to Grand Central Terminal which it
said would "undoubtedly mitigate" the loss
caused
by
the
regulation.
This
"fair
compensation," as he called it, was explained by
Prof. Costonis in this wise:
In return for retaining the Terminal site in its
pristine landmark status, Penn Central was
authorized to transfer to neighboring properties
the authorized but unused rights accruing to the
site prior to the Terminal's designation as a
landmark the rights which would have been
exhausted by the 59-story building that the city
refused to countenance atop the Terminal.
Prevailing bulk restrictions on neighboring sites
were proportionately relaxed, theoretically
enabling Penn Central to recoup its losses at the
Terminal site by constructing or selling to others
the right to construct larger, hence more
profitable buildings on the transferee sites. 30
The cases before us present no knotty
complication insofar as the question of
compensable taking is concerned. To the extent
that the measures under challenge merely
prescribe retention limits for landowners, there is
an exercise of the police power for the regulation
of private property in accordance with the
Constitution. But where, to carry out such
regulation, it becomes necessary to deprive such
owners of whatever lands they may own in
excess of the maximum area allowed, there is
definitely a taking under the power of eminent
domain for which payment of just compensation
is imperative. The taking contemplated is not a
mere limitation of the use of the land. What is
required is the surrender of the title to and the
physical possession of the said excess and all
beneficial rights accruing to the owner in favor of
the farmer-beneficiary. This is definitely an
exercise not of the police power but of the power
of eminent domain.
Whether as an exercise of the police power or of
the power of eminent domain, the several

measures before us are challenged as violative

of the due process and equal protection clauses.
The challenge to Proc. No. 131 and E.O. Nos.
228 and 299 on the ground that no retention
limits are prescribed has already been discussed
and dismissed. It is noted that although they
excited many bitter exchanges during the
deliberation of the CARP Law in Congress, the
retention limits finally agreed upon are, curiously
enough, not being questioned in these petitions.
We therefore do not discuss them here. The
Court will come to the other claimed violations of
due process in connection with our examination
of the adequacy of just compensation as required
under the power of expropriation.
The argument of the small farmers that they have
been denied equal protection because of the
absence of retention limits has also become
academic under Section 6 of R.A. No. 6657.
Significantly, they too have not questioned the
area of such limits. There is also the complaint
that they should not be made to share the burden
of agrarian reform, an objection also made by the
sugar planters on the ground that they belong to
a particular class with particular interests of their
own. However, no evidence has been submitted
to the Court that the requisites of a valid
classification have been violated.
Classification has been defined as the grouping
of persons or things similar to each other in
certain particulars and different from each other
in these same particulars. 31 To be valid, it must
conform to the following requirements: (1) it must
be based on substantial distinctions; (2) it must
be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) it
must not be limited to existing conditions only;
and (4) it must apply equally to all the members
of the class. 32 The Court finds that all these
requisites have been met by the measures here
challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory.
Equal protection simply means that all persons or
things similarly situated must be treated alike
29 | P a g e

both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities

imposed. 33 The petitioners have not shown that
they belong to a different class and entitled to a
different treatment. The argument that not only
landowners but also owners of other properties
must be made to share the burden of
implementing land reform must be rejected.
There is a substantial distinction between these
two classes of owners that is clearly visible
except to those who will not see. There is no
need to elaborate on this matter. In any event,
the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in
providing for a valid classification. Its decision is
accorded recognition and respect by the courts
of justice except only where its discretion is
abused to the detriment of the Bill of Rights.
It is worth remarking at this juncture that a statute
may be sustained under the police power only if
there is a concurrence of the lawful subject and
the lawful method. Put otherwise, the interests of
the public generally as distinguished from those
of a particular class require the interference of
the State and, no less important, the means
employed are reasonably necessary for the
attainment of the purpose sought to be achieved
and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. 34 As
the subject and purpose of agrarian reform have
been laid down by the Constitution itself, we may
say that the first requirement has been satisfied.
What remains to be examined is the validity of
the method employed to achieve the
constitutional goal.
One of the basic principles of the democratic
system is that where the rights of the individual
are concerned, the end does not justify the
means. It is not enough that there be a valid
objective; it is also necessary that the means
employed to pursue it be in keeping with the
Constitution. Mere expediency will not excuse
constitutional shortcuts. There is no question that
not even the strongest moral conviction or the
most urgent public need, subject only to a few
notable exceptions, will excuse the bypassing of
an individual's rights. It is no exaggeration to say

that a, person invoking a right guaranteed under

Article III of the Constitution is a majority of one
even as against the rest of the nation who would
deny him that right.
That right covers the person's life, his liberty and
his property under Section 1 of Article III of the
Constitution. With regard to his property, the
owner enjoys the added protection of Section 9,
which reaffirms the familiar rule that private
property shall not be taken for public use without
just compensation.
This brings us now to the power of eminent
domain.
IV
Eminent domain is an inherent power of the
State that enables it to forcibly acquire private
lands intended for public use upon payment of
just compensation to the owner. Obviously, there
is no need to expropriate where the owner is
willing to sell under terms also acceptable to the
purchaser, in which case an ordinary deed of
sale may be agreed upon by the parties. 35 It is
only where the owner is unwilling to sell, or
cannot accept the price or other conditions
offered by the vendee, that the power of eminent
domain will come into play to assert the
paramount authority of the State over the
interests of the property owner. Private rights
must then yield to the irresistible demands of the
public interest on the time-honored justification,
as in the case of the police power, that the
welfare of the people is the supreme law.
But for all its primacy and urgency, the power of
expropriation is by no means absolute (as indeed
no power is absolute). The limitation is found in
the constitutional injunction that "private property
shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation"
and
in
the
abundant
jurisprudence that has evolved from the
interpretation of this principle. Basically, the

30 | P a g e

requirements for a proper exercise of the power

are: (1) public use and (2) just compensation.
Let us dispose first of the argument raised by the
petitioners in G.R. No. 79310 that the State
should first distribute public agricultural lands in
the pursuit of agrarian reform instead of
immediately disturbing property rights by forcibly
acquiring
private
agricultural
lands.
Parenthetically, it is not correct to say that only
public agricultural lands may be covered by the
CARP as the Constitution calls for "the just
distribution of all agricultural lands." In any event,
the decision to redistribute private agricultural
lands in the manner prescribed by the CARP was
made by the legislative and executive
departments in the exercise of their discretion.
We are not justified in reviewing that discretion in
the absence of a clear showing that it has been
abused.
A becoming courtesy admonishes us to respect
the decisions of the political departments when
they decide what is known as the political
question. As explained by Chief Justice
Concepcion in the case of Taada v. Cuenco: 36
The term "political question" connotes what it
means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question
of policy. It refers to "those questions which,
under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity; or in regard to
which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch
of the government." It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a
particular measure.
It is true that the concept of the political question
has been constricted with the enlargement of
judicial power, which now includes the authority
of the courts "to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch
or
instrumentality
of
the
37
Government." Even so, this should not be

construed as a license for us to reverse the other

departments simply because their views may not
coincide with ours.
The legislature and the executive have been
seen fit, in their wisdom, to include in the CARP
the redistribution of private landholdings (even as
the distribution of public agricultural lands is first
provided for, while also continuing apace under
the Public Land Act and other cognate laws). The
Court sees no justification to interpose its
authority, which we may assert only if we believe
that the political decision is not unwise, but
illegal. We do not find it to be so.
In U.S. v. Chandler-Dunbar
Company, 38 it was held:

Water

Power

Congress having determined, as it did by the Act

of March 3,1909 that the entire St. Mary's river
between the American bank and the international
line, as well as all of the upland north of the
present ship canal, throughout its entire length,
was "necessary for the purpose of navigation of
said waters, and the waters connected
therewith," that determination is conclusive in
condemnation proceedings instituted by the
United States under that Act, and there is no
room for judicial review of the judgment of
Congress ... .
As earlier observed, the requirement for public
use has already been settled for us by the
Constitution itself No less than the 1987 Charter
calls for agrarian reform, which is the reason why
private agricultural lands are to be taken from
their owners, subject to the prescribed maximum
retention limits. The purposes specified in P.D.
No. 27, Proc. No. 131 and R.A. No. 6657 are
only an elaboration of the constitutional injunction
that the State adopt the necessary measures "to
encourage and undertake the just distribution of
all agricultural lands to enable farmers who are
landless to own directly or collectively the lands
they till." That public use, as pronounced by the
fundamental law itself, must be binding on us.
31 | P a g e

The second requirement, i.e., the payment of just

compensation, needs a longer and more
thoughtful examination.
Just compensation is defined as the full and fair
equivalent of the property taken from its owner
by the expropriator. 39 It has been repeatedly
stressed by this Court that the measure is not the
taker's gain but the owner's loss. 40 The word
"just" is used to intensify the meaning of the word
"compensation" to convey the idea that the
equivalent to be rendered for the property to be
taken shall be real, substantial, full, ample. 41
It bears repeating that the measures challenged
in these petitions contemplate more than a mere
regulation of the use of private lands under the
police power. We deal here with an actual taking
of private
agricultural
lands that has
dispossessed the owners of their property and
deprived them of all its beneficial use and
enjoyment, to entitle them to the just
compensation mandated by the Constitution.
As held in Republic of the Philippines v.
Castellvi, 42 there is compensable taking when
the following conditions concur: (1) the
expropriator must enter a private property; (2) the
entry must be for more than a momentary period;
(3) the entry must be under warrant or color of
legal authority; (4) the property must be devoted
to public use or otherwise informally appropriated
or injuriously affected; and (5) the utilization of
the property for public use must be in such a way
as to oust the owner and deprive him of
beneficial enjoyment of the property. All these
requisites are envisioned in the measures before
us.

Where the State itself is the expropriator, it is not

necessary for it to make a deposit upon its taking
possession of the condemned property, as "the
compensation is a public charge, the good faith
of the public is pledged for its payment, and all
the resources of taxation may be employed in
raising the amount." 43 Nevertheless, Section
16(e) of the CARP Law provides that:
Upon receipt by the landowner of the
corresponding payment or, in case of rejection or
no response from the landowner, upon the
deposit with an accessible bank designated by
the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP
bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall
take immediate possession of the land and shall
request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of
the Republic of the Philippines. The DAR shall
thereafter proceed with the redistribution of the
land to the qualified beneficiaries.
Objection is raised, however, to the manner of
fixing the just compensation, which it is claimed
is entrusted to the administrative authorities in
violation of judicial prerogatives. Specific
reference is made to Section 16(d), which
provides that in case of the rejection or disregard
by the owner of the offer of the government to
buy his land... the DAR shall conduct summary administrative
proceedings to determine the compensation for
the land by requiring the landowner, the LBP and
other interested parties to submit evidence as to
the just compensation for the land, within fifteen
(15) days from the receipt of the notice. After the
expiration of the above period, the matter is
deemed submitted for decision. The DAR shall
decide the case within thirty (30) days after it is
submitted for decision.
To be sure, the determination of just
compensation is a function addressed to the
courts of justice and may not be usurped by any
other branch or official of the government. EPZA
32 | P a g e

v. Dulay 44 resolved a challenge to several

decrees promulgated by President Marcos
providing that the just compensation for property
under expropriation should be either the
assessment of the property by the government or
the sworn valuation thereof by the owner,
whichever was lower. In declaring these decrees
unconstitutional, the Court held through Mr.
Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr.:

courts under P.D. No. 1533, which contains the

same provision on just compensation as its
predecessor decrees, still have the power and
authority to determine just compensation,
independent of what is stated by the decree and
to this effect, to appoint commissioners for such
purpose.

The method of ascertaining just compensation

under the aforecited decrees constitutes
impermissible
encroachment
on
judicial
prerogatives. It tends to render this Court inutile
in a matter which under this Constitution is
reserved to it for final determination.

xxx

Thus, although in an expropriation proceeding

the court technically would still have the power to
determine the just compensation for the property,
following the applicable decrees, its task would
be relegated to simply stating the lower value of
the property as declared either by the owner or
the assessor. As a necessary consequence, it
would be useless for the court to appoint
commissioners under Rule 67 of the Rules of
Court. Moreover, the need to satisfy the due
process clause in the taking of private property is
seemingly fulfilled since it cannot be said that a
judicial proceeding was not had before the actual
taking. However, the strict application of the
decrees during the proceedings would be nothing
short of a mere formality or charade as the court
has only to choose between the valuation of the
owner and that of the assessor, and its choice is
always limited to the lower of the two. The court
cannot exercise its discretion or independence in
determining what is just or fair. Even a grade
school pupil could substitute for the judge insofar
as the determination of constitutional just
compensation is concerned.
xxx
In the present petition, we are once again
confronted with the same question of whether the

This time, we answer in the affirmative.

It is violative of due process to deny the owner

the opportunity to prove that the valuation in the
tax documents is unfair or wrong. And it is
repulsive to the basic concepts of justice and
fairness to allow the haphazard work of a minor
bureaucrat or clerk to absolutely prevail over the
judgment of a court promulgated only after expert
commissioners have actually viewed the
property, after evidence and arguments pro and
con have been presented, and after all factors
and considerations essential to a fair and just
determination have been judiciously evaluated.
A reading of the aforecited Section 16(d) will
readily show that it does not suffer from the
arbitrariness that rendered the challenged
decrees constitutionally objectionable. Although
the proceedings are described as summary, the
landowner and other interested parties are
nevertheless allowed an opportunity to submit
evidence on the real value of the property. But
more importantly, the determination of the just
compensation by the DAR is not by any means
final and conclusive upon the landowner or any
other interested party, for Section 16(f) clearly
provides:
Any party who disagrees with the decision may
bring the matter to the court of proper jurisdiction
for final determination of just compensation.
The determination made by the DAR is only
preliminary unless accepted by all parties
concerned. Otherwise, the courts of justice will
still have the right to review with finality the said
33 | P a g e

determination in the exercise

admittedly a judicial function.

of

what

is

(3) Tax credits which can be used against any tax

liability;

The second and more serious objection to the

provisions on just compensation is not as easily
resolved.

(4) LBP bonds, which shall have the following

features:

This refers to Section 18 of the CARP Law

providing in full as follows:
SEC. 18. Valuation and Mode of Compensation.
The LBP shall compensate the landowner in
such amount as may be agreed upon by the
landowner and the DAR and the LBP, in
accordance with the criteria provided for in
Sections 16 and 17, and other pertinent
provisions hereof, or as may be finally
determined by the court, as the just
compensation for the land.
The compensation shall be paid in one of the
following modes, at the option of the landowner:
(1) Cash payment, under the following terms and
conditions:
(a) For lands above fifty (50) hectares, insofar as
the excess hectarage is concerned Twentyfive percent (25%) cash, the balance to be paid
in government financial instruments negotiable at
any time.
(b) For lands above twenty-four (24) hectares
and up to fifty (50) hectares Thirty percent
(30%) cash, the balance to be paid in
government financial instruments negotiable at
any time.

(a) Market interest rates aligned with 91-day

treasury bill rates. Ten percent (10%) of the face
value of the bonds shall mature every year from
the date of issuance until the tenth (10th) year:
Provided, That should the landowner choose to
forego the cash portion, whether in full or in part,
he shall be paid correspondingly in LBP bonds;
(b) Transferability and negotiability. Such LBP
bonds may be used by the landowner, his
successors-in- interest or his assigns, up to the
amount of their face value, for any of the
following:
(i) Acquisition of land or other real properties of
the government, including assets under the Asset
Privatization Program and other assets
foreclosed by government financial institutions in
the same province or region where the lands for
which the bonds were paid are situated;
(ii) Acquisition of shares of stock of governmentowned or controlled corporations or shares of
stock owned by the government in private
corporations;
(iii) Substitution for surety or bail bonds for the
provisional release of accused persons, or for
performance bonds;

(c) For lands twenty-four (24) hectares and below

Thirty-five percent (35%) cash, the balance to
be paid in government financial instruments
negotiable at any time.

(iv) Security for loans with any government

financial institution, provided the proceeds of the
loans shall be invested in an economic
enterprise, preferably in a small and mediumscale industry, in the same province or region as
the land for which the bonds are paid;

(2) Shares of stock in government-owned or

controlled corporations, LBP preferred shares,
physical assets or other qualified investments in
accordance with guidelines set by the PARC;

(v) Payment for various taxes and fees to

government: Provided, That the use of these
bonds for these purposes will be limited to a
certain percentage of the outstanding balance of
34 | P a g e

the financial instruments; Provided, further, That

the PARC shall determine the percentages
mentioned above;
(vi) Payment for tuition fees of the immediate
family of the original bondholder in government
universities, colleges, trade schools, and other
institutions;
(vii) Payment for fees of the immediate family of
the original bondholder in government hospitals;
and
(viii) Such other uses as the PARC may from
time to time allow.
The contention of the petitioners in G.R. No.
79777 is that the above provision is
unconstitutional insofar as it requires the owners
of the expropriated properties to accept just
compensation therefor in less than money, which
is the only medium of payment allowed. In
support of this contention, they cite jurisprudence
holding that:
The fundamental rule in expropriation matters is
that the owner of the property expropriated is
entitled to a just compensation, which should be
neither more nor less, whenever it is possible to
make the assessment, than the money
equivalent of said property. Just compensation
has always been understood to be the just and
complete equivalent of the loss which the owner
of the thing expropriated has to suffer by reason
of the expropriation . 45 (Emphasis supplied.)
In J.M. Tuazon Co. v. Land
Administration, 46 this Court held:

Tenure

It is well-settled that just compensation means

the equivalent for the value of the property at the
time of its taking. Anything beyond that is more,
and anything short of that is less, than just
compensation. It means a fair and full equivalent
for the loss sustained, which is the measure of
the indemnity, not whatever gain would accrue to
the expropriating entity. The market value of the

land taken is the just compensation to which the

owner of condemned property is entitled, the
market value being that sum of money which a
person desirous, but not compelled to buy, and
an owner, willing, but not compelled to sell, would
agree on as a price to be given and received for
such property. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the United States, where much of our
jurisprudence on the subject has been derived,
the weight of authority is also to the effect that
just compensation for property expropriated is
payable only in money and not otherwise. Thus

The medium of payment of compensation is

ready money or cash. The condemnor cannot
compel the owner to accept anything but money,
nor can the owner compel or require the
condemnor to pay him on any other basis than
the value of the property in money at the time
and in the manner prescribed by the Constitution
and the statutes. When the power of eminent
domain is resorted to, there must be a standard
medium of payment, binding upon both parties,
and the law has fixed that standard as money in
cash. 47 (Emphasis supplied.)
Part cash and deferred payments are not and
cannot, in the nature of things, be regarded as a
reliable
and
constant
standard
of
48
compensation.
"Just compensation" for property taken by
condemnation means a fair equivalent in money,
which must be paid at least within a reasonable
time after the taking, and it is not within the
power of the Legislature to substitute for such
payment future obligations, bonds, or other
valuable advantage. 49 (Emphasis supplied.)
It cannot be denied from these cases that the
traditional medium for the payment of just
compensation is money and no other. And so,
conformably, has just compensation been paid in
the past solely in that medium. However, we do
35 | P a g e

not deal here with the traditional excercise of the

power of eminent domain. This is not an ordinary
expropriation where only a specific property of
relatively limited area is sought to be taken by
the State from its owner for a specific and
perhaps local purpose.
What we deal with here is a revolutionary kind of
expropriation.
The expropriation before us affects all private
agricultural lands whenever found and of
whatever kind as long as they are in excess of
the maximum retention limits allowed their
owners. This kind of expropriation is intended for
the benefit not only of a particular community or
of a small segment of the population but of the
entire Filipino nation, from all levels of our
society, from the impoverished farmer to the
land-glutted owner. Its purpose does not cover
only the whole territory of this country but goes
beyond in time to the foreseeable future, which it
hopes to secure and edify with the vision and the
sacrifice of the present generation of Filipinos.
Generations yet to come are as involved in this
program as we are today, although hopefully only
as beneficiaries of a richer and more fulfilling life
we will guarantee to them tomorrow through our
thoughtfulness today. And, finally, let it not be
forgotten that it is no less than the Constitution
itself that has ordained this revolution in the
farms, calling for "a just distribution" among the
farmers of lands that have heretofore been the
prison of their dreams but can now become the
key at least to their deliverance.
Such a program will involve not mere millions of
pesos. The cost will be tremendous. Considering
the vast areas of land subject to expropriation
under the laws before us, we estimate that
hundreds of billions of pesos will be needed, far
more indeed than the amount of P50 billion
initially appropriated, which is already staggering
as it is by our present standards. Such amount is
in fact not even fully available at this time.

We assume that the framers of the Constitution

were aware of this difficulty when they called for
agrarian reform as a top priority project of the
government. It is a part of this assumption that
when they envisioned the expropriation that
would be needed, they also intended that the just
compensation would have to be paid not in the
orthodox way but a less conventional if more
practical method. There can be no doubt that
they were aware of the financial limitations of the
government and had no illusions that there would
be enough money to pay in cash and in full for
the lands they wanted to be distributed among
the farmers. We may therefore assume that their
intention was to allow such manner of payment
as is now provided for by the CARP Law,
particularly the payment of the balance (if the
owner cannot be paid fully with money), or
indeed of the entire amount of the just
compensation, with other things of value. We
may also suppose that what they had in mind
was a similar scheme of payment as that
prescribed in P.D. No. 27, which was the law in
force at the time they deliberated on the new
Charter and with which they presumably agreed
in principle.
The Court has not found in the records of the
Constitutional Commission any categorical
agreement among the members regarding the
meaning to be given the concept of just
compensation as applied to the comprehensive
agrarian reform program being contemplated.
There was the suggestion to "fine tune" the
requirement to suit the demands of the project
even as it was also felt that they should "leave it
to Congress" to determine how payment should
be made to the landowner and reimbursement
required from the farmer-beneficiaries. Such
innovations as "progressive compensation" and
"State-subsidized compensation" were also
proposed. In the end, however, no special
definition of the just compensation for the lands
to be expropriated was reached by the
Commission. 50

36 | P a g e

On the other hand, there is nothing in the records

either that militates against the assumptions we
are making of the general sentiments and
intention of the members on the content and
manner of the payment to be made to the
landowner in the light of the magnitude of the
expenditure and the limitations of the
expropriator.
With these assumptions, the Court hereby
declares that the content and manner of the just
compensation provided for in the afore- quoted
Section 18 of the CARP Law is not violative of
the Constitution. We do not mind admitting that a
certain degree of pragmatism has influenced our
decision on this issue, but after all this Court is
not a cloistered institution removed from the
realities and demands of society or oblivious to
the need for its enhancement. The Court is as
acutely anxious as the rest of our people to see
the goal of agrarian reform achieved at last after
the frustrations and deprivations of our peasant
masses during all these disappointing decades.
We are aware that invalidation of the said section
will result in the nullification of the entire
program, killing the farmer's hopes even as they
approach realization and resurrecting the spectre
of discontent and dissent in the restless
countryside. That is not in our view the intention
of the Constitution, and that is not what we shall
decree today.
Accepting the theory that payment of the just
compensation is not always required to be made
fully in money, we find further that the proportion
of cash payment to the other things of value
constituting the total payment, as determined on
the basis of the areas of the lands expropriated,
is not unduly oppressive upon the landowner. It is
noted that the smaller the land, the bigger the
payment in money, primarily because the small
landowner will be needing it more than the big
landowners, who can afford a bigger balance in
bonds and other things of value. No less
importantly, the government financial instruments
making up the balance of the payment are

"negotiable at any time." The other modes, which

are likewise available to the landowner at his
option, are also not unreasonable because
payment is made in shares of stock, LBP bonds,
other properties or assets, tax credits, and other
things of value equivalent to the amount of just
compensation.
Admittedly, the compensation contemplated in
the law will cause the landowners, big and small,
not a little inconvenience. As already remarked,
this cannot be avoided. Nevertheless, it is
devoutly hoped that these countrymen of ours,
conscious as we know they are of the need for
their forebearance and even sacrifice, will not
begrudge us their indispensable share in the
attainment of the ideal of agrarian reform.
Otherwise, our pursuit of this elusive goal will be
like the quest for the Holy Grail.
The complaint against the effects of nonregistration of the land under E.O. No. 229 does
not seem to be viable any more as it appears
that Section 4 of the said Order has been
superseded by Section 14 of the CARP Law. This
repeats the requisites of registration as
embodied in the earlier measure but does not
provide, as the latter did, that in case of failure or
refusal to register the land, the valuation thereof
shall be that given by the provincial or city
assessor for tax purposes. On the contrary, the
CARP Law says that the just compensation shall
be ascertained on the basis of the factors
mentioned in its Section 17 and in the manner
provided for in Section 16.
The last major challenge to CARP is that the
landowner is divested of his property even before
actual payment to him in full of just
compensation, in contravention of a wellaccepted principle of eminent domain.
The recognized rule, indeed, is that title to the
property expropriated shall pass from the owner
to the expropriator only upon full payment of the
just compensation. Jurisprudence on this settled
37 | P a g e

principle is consistent both here and in other

democratic jurisdictions. Thus:
Title to property which is the subject of
condemnation proceedings does not vest the
condemnor until the judgment fixing just
compensation is entered and paid, but the
condemnor's title relates back to the date on
which the petition under the Eminent Domain Act,
or the commissioner's report under the Local
Improvement Act, is filed.51
... although the right to appropriate and use land
taken for a canal is complete at the time of entry,
title to the property taken remains in the owner
until payment is actually made. 52 (Emphasis
supplied.)
In Kennedy v. Indianapolis, 53 the US Supreme
Court cited several cases holding that title to
property does not pass to the condemnor until
just compensation had actually been made. In
fact, the decisions appear to be uniformly to this
effect. As early as 1838, in Rubottom v.
McLure, 54 it was held that "actual payment to the
owner of the condemned property was a
condition precedent to the investment of the title
to the property in the State" albeit "not to the
appropriation of it to public use." In Rexford v.
Knight, 55 the Court of Appeals of New York said
that the construction upon the statutes was that
the fee did not vest in the State until the payment
of the compensation although the authority to
enter upon and appropriate the land was
complete prior to the payment. Kennedy further
said that "both on principle and authority the rule
is ... that the right to enter on and use the
property is complete, as soon as the property is
actually appropriated under the authority of law
for a public use, but that the title does not pass
from the owner without his consent, until just
compensation has been made to him."
Our
own
Supreme
in Visayan Refining Co.
Paredes, 56 that:

Court
has
v.
Camus

held
and

If the laws which we have exhibited or cited in

the preceding discussion are attentively
examined it will be apparent that the method of
expropriation adopted in this jurisdiction is such
as to afford absolute reassurance that no piece
of land can be finally and irrevocably taken from
an unwilling owner until compensation is
paid ... . (Emphasis supplied.)
It is true that P.D. No. 27 expressly ordered the
emancipation of tenant-farmer as October 21,
1972 and declared that he shall "be deemed the
owner" of a portion of land consisting of a familysized farm except that "no title to the land owned
by him was to be actually issued to him unless
and until he had become a full-fledged member
of a duly recognized farmers' cooperative." It was
understood, however, that full payment of the just
compensation also had to be made first,
conformably to the constitutional requirement.
When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its
Section 1 that:
All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now
deemed full owners as of October 21, 1972 of
the land they acquired by virtue of Presidential
Decree No. 27. (Emphasis supplied.)
it was obviously referring to lands already validly
acquired under the said decree, after proof of
full-fledged membership in the farmers'
cooperatives and full payment of just
compensation. Hence, it was also perfectly
proper for the Order to also provide in its Section
2 that the "lease rentals paid to the landowner by
the farmer- beneficiary after October 21, 1972
(pending transfer of ownership after full payment
of just compensation), shall be considered as
advance payment for the land."
The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the
transfer of possession and ownership of the land
to the government on receipt by the landowner of
the corresponding payment or the deposit by the
DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds
38 | P a g e

with an accessible bank. Until then, title also

remains with the landowner. 57 No outright
change of ownership is contemplated either.
Hence, the argument that the assailed measures
violate due process by arbitrarily transferring title
before the land is fully paid for must also be
rejected.
It is worth stressing at this point that all rights
acquired by the tenant-farmer under P.D. No. 27,
as recognized under E.O. No. 228, are retained
by him even now under R.A. No. 6657. This
should counter-balance the express provision in
Section 6 of the said law that "the landowners
whose lands have been covered by Presidential
Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area
originally retained by them thereunder, further,
That original homestead grantees or direct
compulsory heirs who still own the original
homestead at the time of the approval of this Act
shall retain the same areas as long as they
continue to cultivate said homestead."
In connection with these retained rights, it does
not appear in G.R. No. 78742 that the appeal
filed by the petitioners with the Office of the
President has already been resolved. Although
we have said that the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies need not preclude
immediate resort to judicial action, there are
factual issues that have yet to be examined on
the administrative level, especially the claim that
the petitioners are not covered by LOI 474
because they do not own other agricultural lands
than the subjects of their petition.
Obviously, the Court cannot resolve these issues.
In any event, assuming that the petitioners have
not yet exercised their retention rights, if any,
under P.D. No. 27, the Court holds that they are
entitled to the new retention rights provided for
by R.A. No. 6657, which in fact are on the whole
more liberal than those granted by the decree.

The CARP Law and the other enactments also

involved in these cases have been the subject of
bitter attack from those who point to the
shortcomings of these measures and ask that
they be scrapped entirely. To be sure, these
enactments are less than perfect; indeed, they
should be continuously re-examined and
rehoned, that they may be sharper instruments
for the better protection of the farmer's rights. But
we have to start somewhere. In the pursuit of
agrarian reform, we do not tread on familiar
ground but grope on terrain fraught with pitfalls
and expected difficulties. This is inevitable. The
CARP Law is not a tried and tested project. On
the contrary, to use Justice Holmes's words, "it is
an experiment, as all life is an experiment," and
so we learn as we venture forward, and, if
necessary, by our own mistakes. We cannot
expect perfection although we should strive for it
by all means. Meantime, we struggle as best we
can in freeing the farmer from the iron shackles
that have unconscionably, and for so long,
fettered his soul to the soil.
By the decision we reach today, all major legal
obstacles to the comprehensive agrarian reform
program are removed, to clear the way for the
true freedom of the farmer. We may now glimpse
the day he will be released not only from want
but also from the exploitation and disdain of the
past and from his own feelings of inadequacy
and helplessness. At last his servitude will be
ended forever. At last the farm on which he toils
will be his farm. It will be his portion of the Mother
Earth that will give him not only the staff of life
but also the joy of living. And where once it bred
for him only deep despair, now can he see in it
the fruition of his hopes for a more fulfilling
future. Now at last can he banish from his small
plot of earth his insecurities and dark
resentments and "rebuild in it the music and the
dream."
WHEREFORE, the Court holds as follows:

V
39 | P a g e

1. R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and
E.O. Nos. 228 and 229 are SUSTAINED against
all the constitutional objections raised in the
herein petitions.

11 Art. VIII, Sec. 4(2).

2. Title to all expropriated properties shall be

transferred to the State only upon full payment of
compensation to their respective owners.

14 Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368.

3. All rights previously acquired by the tenantfarmers under P.D. No. 27 are retained and
recognized.
4. Landowners who were unable to exercise their
rights of retention under P.D. No. 27 shall enjoy
the retention rights granted by R.A. No. 6657
under the conditions therein prescribed.

12 Dumlao v. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 392.

13 Ex Parte Levitt, 303 US 633.

15 Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phil. 331; PHILCONSA v.

Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479; Sanidad v. COMELEC, 73 SCRA 333.
16 Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139.
17 R.A. No. 6657, Sec. 75.
18 Ibid., Sec. 63.
19 Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice, 299 US 410.
20 Alalayan v. NPC, 24 SCRA 172; Sumulong v. COMELEC, 73 Phil. 288.
Tio v. Videogram Regulatory Board, 151 SCRA 208.
21 Supra.

5. Subject to the above-mentioned rulings all the

petitions
are
DISMISSED,
without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera,
Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco,
Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Grio-Aquino,
Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

22 Lamb v. Phipps, 22 Phil. 456.

23 Malabanan v. Ramento, 129 SCRA 359; Espanol v. Chairman,
Philippine Veterans Administration, 137 SCRA 314.
24 106 Phil. 144.
25 260 US 393.
26 Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 US 678: Lutz v. Araneta, 98 Phil. 148; Tio
v. Videogram Regulatory Board, supra.
27 John J. Costonis "The Disparity Issue: A Context for the Grand Central
Terminal Decision," Harvard Law Review, Vol. 91:40,1977, p. 404.

Footnotes
1 Art. 11, Sec. 5.
2 1973 Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 6.
3 Ibid., Art. XIV, Sec. 12.
4 R.A. No. 6657, Sec. 15.
5 149 SCRA 305.
6 150 SCRA 89.
7 55 SCRA 26.
8 91 SCRA 294.
9 113 SCRA 798.

28 348 US 1954.
29 438 US 104.
30 See note 27.
31 International Harvester Co. v. Missouri, 234 US 199.
32 People v. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12.
33 Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155.
34 US v. Toribio, 15 Phil. 85; Fable v. City of Manila, 21 Phil. 486; Case v.
Board of Health, 24 Phil. 256.
35 Noble v. City of Manila, 67 Phil. 1.
36 100 Phil. 1101.
37 1987 Constitution, Art. VIII, Sec. 1.

10 136 SCRA 271; 146 SCRA 446.

40 | P a g e

38 57 L ed. 1063.
39 Manila Railroad Co. v. Velasquez, 32 Phil. 286.
40 Province of Tayabas v. Perez, 66 Phil. 467; J.M. Tuazon & Co., Inc. v.
Land Tenure Administration, 31 SCRA 413; Municipality of Daet v. Court of
Appeals, 93 SCRA 503; Manotok v. National Housing Authority, 150 SCRA
89.

49 City of Waterbury v. Platt Bros. & Co., 56 A 856, 76 Conn, 435 citing
Butler v. Ravine Road Sewer Com'rs, 39 N.J.L. 665; Bloodgood v.
Mohawk v. H.R.R. Co., N.Y. 18 Wend. 9 35, 31 Am. Dec. 313; Sanborn v.
Helden, 51 Cal 266; Burlington & C.R. Co. v. Schweikart, 14 p. 329, 10
Colo, 178; 23 Words and Phrases, pl. 460.
50 Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 2, pp. 647, 704; Vol. 3,
pp. 16-20, 243-247.

41 City of Manila v. Estrada, 25 Phil. 208.

51 Chicago Park Dist. v. Downey Coal Co., 1 Ill. 2d 54.

42 58 SCRA 336.

52 Kennedy v. Indianapolis, 103 US 599, 26 L ed 550.

43 Lewis, Law of Eminent Domain, 3rd Edition, pp. 1166- 1167.

53 Ibid.

44 149 SCRA 305.

54 4 Blkf., 508.

45 Manila Railroad Co. v. Velasquez, 32 Phil. 286; Province of Tayabas v.

Perez, supra, at note 40.

55 11 NY 314.
56 40 Phil. 550.

46 31 SCRA 413.
57 Sec. 16(d).
47 Mandl v. City of Phoenix, 18 p 2d 273.
48 Sacramento Southern R. Co. v. Heilbron 156 Cal. 408,104 pp. 979,
980.

41 | P a g e