Case No.

1
In Re Estate of Johnson
[G.R. No. 12767. November 16, 1918. ]
Judicial Notice of Foreign Law.
FACTS: In the hearing for the probate of the will of Emil H. Johnson, a native of Sweden and a
naturalized citizen of the United States who died in the city of Manila, alleged to be made in
accordance with the laws of Illinois, the trial court judge took judicial notice of the said foreign
law.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court judge is correct in ruling that the will was properly executed
by examining Section 1874 of the Revised Statutes of Illinois.
HELD: Trial court judge erred in taking judicial notice of the acts of the Legislative Department
of US particularly the various laws of the American states. The courts of the Philippine Islands
are not authorized to take judicial notice of the laws of the various States of the American Union,
although they may take judicial notice of the laws enacted by Congress.
Case No. 2
Cadalin vs. POEA Administrator
(G.R. No. L-104776, Dec. 5, 1994)
FACTS: Cadalin et al. instituted a class suit with the POEA for money claims arising from their
recruitment by AIBC and BRII for pre-termination of employment contracts. Under Bahrain law
where some of the complainants were deployed, the prescriptive period for claims arising out of
a contract of employment is one year.
Issue: Whether or not Bahrain law should be applied on the question of prescription of action
based on the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 or a Philippine law on prescription that shall be the
governing law?
HELD: Even though a law on prescription may be considered as substantial or procedural, its
characterization as either becomes irrelevant when the country of the forum has a borrowing
statute. Said statute has the practical effect of treating the foreign statute of limitation as one of
substance. Under the ROC of the Philippines, it is provided that if by the laws of the state or
country where the cause of action arose, the action is barred, it is also barred in the Philippines.
The Bahrain law on prescription should apply. However, it cannot be enforced as it would
contravene the public policy on the protection to labor. Philippine law will then be applied.

Case No. 3
Zalamea vs. CA
[G.R. No. 104235. November 18, 1993.]
Processual presumption

FACTS: Zalamea filed action for damages against TWA. RTC awarded actual and moral
damages. CA denied award of moral damages because there was no fining of bad faith and
because overbooking was an allowed practice in US airlines.
Issue: Whether or not e CA is correct in ruling that theres no fraud nor bad faith could be
imputed on TransWorld Airlines, because overbooking of flights is a common and accepted
practice of airlines in the US and is specifically allowed under the Code of Federal Regulations
by the Civil Aeronautics Board?
HELD: CA was wrong. The US law or regulation authorizing overbooking was not proved in
accordance with our laws. TWA relied solely on the statement of its agent that the Code of Fed.
Regulations of Civil Aeronautics Board allows overbooking. No official publication of the said
code was presented as evidence.
Written law maybe evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the
officer having legal custody of the record or by his deputy, accompanied by a certificate (made
by a Phil. consular officer and authenticated by his seal of office) that such officer has legal
custody.

Case No. 4
Suntay vs. Suntay
(G.R. Nos. L-3087 and L-3088

July 31, 1954)

FACTS: A will executed in Amoy by the deceased is sought to be allowed in the Philippines. The
will was allegedly recorded and probated by a district court in Amoy.
Issue: Whether or not CFI Bulacan is correct in disallowing the subject will based on the
aforestated grounds?

HELD: Will cannot be allowed. Silvino was unable to adduce the necessary proof under Secs. 13 of Rule 78 in order to probate the will in the Philippines, specifically:
a the fact that the municipal court of Amoy is a probate court
b the procedural law of China regarding probate of wills
c the legal requirements for the execution of a valid will
Although there were unverified answers of the Consul General of China, his answers are
inadmissible because:
a he does not qualify as an expert on Chinese law on probate procedure (usu. attend to trade
matters), and
b if admitted, the adverse party will be deprived of their right to cross-examine him
Thus, in the absence of proof, it may be presumed that the probate laws of China are the same as
ours and the will in question does not comply with our probate laws.

Case No. 5
Miciano vs. Brimo
(1924)
FACTS: Action for partition of estate of Brimo, a Turkish citizen. Oppositor claims that proposed
partition is contrary to Turkish law but he failed to prove & present evidence on the said Turkish
law.
HELD: In the absence of evidence on foreign law, they are to be presumed the same as those of
the Phils. Oppositor, himself, acknowledges that the foreign law was not proven when he asked
for opportunity to present evidence. He was granted ample opportunity to present competent
evidence and there was no GAOD when the court refused to grant him another opportunity.
Case No. 6
CIR vs. Fisher
(1961)
FACTS: Spouses Stevenson are British subjects. H dies leaving W as sole heir. CIR assessed
estate tax on the whole properties of the spouses because English law does not recognize
conjugal partnership.
HELD: English law cannot be applied. The pertinent English law that allegedly vests in husband
full ownership of properties acquired during the marriage was not proved by CIR (petitioner). In
the absence of proof, the Court is justified in indulging in processual presumption in
presuming that the law of England on the matter is the same as our law.
Case No. 7
Board of Commissioners vs. CID
(1991)

FACTS: Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, was recognized by the Bureau
of Immigration as a native born Filipino citizen. Board sought the deportation of WG who is
alleged to be an alien on the ground that the marriages of WGs grandfather to a Chinese woman
and of WGs father all performed in China were not properly proven. Only self-serving
testimonies were allegedly presented. Also, marriages are claimed to be void according to
Chinese law.
Issues:
1.Whether or not the marriage of Gatchalian in China is valid in accordance with Philippine law.

2. Whether or not William Gatchalian is to be declared as a Filipino citizen.

HELD: In the absence of evidence to the contrary, foreign laws are presumed to be the same as
those of the Phils. In the case at bar, there being no proof of Chinese law relating to marriage,
there arises the presumption that it is the same as that of Philippine law. The Philippines adhere
to the presumption of validity of marriage (A.220 FC). He who asserts that the marriage is not
valid under our laws bears the burden of proof to present the foreign law. William Gatchalian is
declared as a Filipino Citizen. Having declared the assailed marriage as valid, respondent
William Gatchalian follows the citizenship of his father, a Filipino, as legitimate child. William
Gatchalian belongs to a class of Filipinos who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the
adoption of the constitution.

Case No. 8
Talaroc vs. Uy
(1952)
FACTS: Uy was elected mayor of Manticao, but one of the defeated candidates filed a petition for quo
warranto, alleging that Uy was a Chinese citizen and therefore ineligible for the office.
HELD: Uy is a Filipino citizen, following the citizenship of his mother, who reacquired her Filipino
citizenship upon the death of her Spanish husband. A wife reverts to her former status upon dissolution of
the marriage by the death of her husband, and where the widowed mother herself thus reacquired her
former nationality, her children (she being their natural guardian) should follow her nationality with the
proviso that they may elect for themselves upon reaching majority.

Case No. 9
Oh Hek How vs. Republic
(1969)
FACTS: Oh Hek How, a Chinese citizen, applied for naturalization in the Philippines which was
granted. A certificate of naturalization was issue in his favor but the Government appealed,

claiming that it was issued before the Minister of the Interior of Nationalist China issued the
permission for a valid renunciation of Chinese citizenship. Oh Hek How argues that such
permission is not among the requirements under our law for the naturalization of an alien.
HELD: The permission of the Minister of the Interior of China is required before a certificate of
naturalization can be issued in favor of Oh Hek How. The question of how a Chinese citizen may
strip himself of that status is necessarily governed by the laws of China, not that of the
Philippines. As a consequence, a Chinese national cannot be naturalized as a citizen of the
Philippines, unless he has complied with the laws of China requiring previous permission of its
Minister of the Interior for renunciation of nationality.