SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 111107. January 10, 1997]

LEONARDO A. PAAT, in his capacity as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Regional Executive
Director (RED), Region 2 and JOVITO LAYUGAN, JR., in his capacity as Community
Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO), both of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
HON. RICARDO A. BACULI in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 2, Regional
Trial Court at Tuguegarao, Cagayan, and SPOUSES BIENVENIDO and VICTORIA DE
GUZMAN, respondents.
DECISION
TORRES, JR., J.:
Without violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies, may an action for
replevin prosper to recover a movable property which is the subject matter of an
administrative forfeiture proceeding in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
pursuant to Section 68-A of P. D. 705, as amended, entitled The Revised Forestry Code of the
Philippines?
Are the Secretary of DENR and his representatives empowered to confiscate and forfeit
conveyances used in transporting illegal forest products in favor of the government?
These are two fundamental questions presented before us for our resolution.
The controversy on hand had its incipiency on May 19, 1989 when the truck of private
respondent Victoria de Guzman while on its way to Bulacan from San Jose, Baggao, Cagayan,
was seized by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR, for brevity)
personnel in Aritao, Nueva Vizcaya because the driver could not produce the required
documents for the forest products found concealed in the truck. Petitioner Jovito Layugan,
the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) in Aritao, Cagayan,
issued on May 23, 1989 an order of confiscation of the truck and gave the owner thereof
fifteen (15) days within which to submit an explanation why the truck should not be forfeited.
Private respondents, however, failed to submit the required explanation. On June 22, 1989,
Regional Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan of DENR sustained petitioner Layugans action
of confiscation and ordered the forfeiture of the truck invoking Section 68-A of Presidential
Decree No. 705 as amended by Executive Order No. 277. Private respondents filed a letter of
reconsideration dated June 28, 1989 of the June 22, 1989 order of Executive Director
Baggayan, which was, however, denied in a subsequent order of July 12, 1989. Subsequently,
the case was brought by the petitioners to the Secretary of DENR pursuant to private
respondents statement in their letter dated June 28, 1989 that in case their letter for
reconsideration would be denied then this letter should be considered as an appeal to the
Secretary. Pending resolution however of the appeal, a suit for replevin, docketed as Civil
Case 4031, was filed by the private respondents against petitioner Layugan and Executive
Director Baggayan with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2 of Cagayan, which issued a writ
ordering the return of the truck to private respondents. Petitioner Layugan and Executive
Director Baggayan filed a motion to dismiss with the trial court contending, inter alia, that
private respondents had no cause of action for their failure to exhaust administrative
remedies. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss in an order dated December 28, 1989.
Their motion for reconsideration having been likewise denied, a petition for certiorari was
filed by the petitioners with the respondent Court of Appeals which sustained the trial courts
order ruling that the question involved is purely a legal question. Hence, this present petition,
with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction, seeking to reverse
the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals was filed by the petitioners on September 9,
1993. By virtue of the Resolution dated September 27, 1993, the prayer for the issuance of
temporary restraining order of petitioners was granted by this Court.
Invoking the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, petitioners aver that the trial
court could not legally entertain the suit for replevin because the truck was under
administrative seizure proceedings pursuant to Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended by E.O.
277. Private respondents, on the other hand, would seek to avoid the operation of this
principle asserting that the instant case falls within the exception of the doctrine upon the
justification that (1) due process was violated because they were not given the chance to be
heard, and (2) the seizure and forfeiture was unlawful on the grounds: (a) that the Secretary
of DENR and his representatives have no authority to confiscate and forfeit conveyances
utilized in transporting illegal forest products, and (b) that the truck as admitted by
petitioners was not used in the commission of the crime.

Upon a thorough and delicate scrutiny of the records and relevant jurisprudence on the
matter, we are of the opinion that the plea of petitioners for reversal is in order.
This Court in a long line of cases has consistently held that before a party is allowed to seek
the intervention of the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means
of administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within the administrative
machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer concerned every
opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should
be exhausted first before courts judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of
courts intervention is fatal to ones cause of action. Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver
or estoppel the case is susceptible of dismissal for lack of cause of action. This doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies was not without its practical and legal reasons, for one
thing, availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides for a speedier
disposition of controversies. It is no less true to state that the courts of justice for reasons of
comity and convenience will shy away from a dispute until the system of administrative
redress has been completed and complied with so as to give the administrative agency
concerned every opportunity to correct its error and to dispose of the case. However, we are
not amiss to reiterate that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies as tested by
a battery of cases is not an ironclad rule. This doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is
called upon by the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a
case. Hence, it is disregarded (1) when there is a violation of due process, (2) when the issue
involved is purely a legal question, (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, (4) when there is estoppel on the part of the
administrative agency concerned, (5) when there is irreparable injury, (6) when the
respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the
implied and assumed approval of the latter, (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative
remedies would be unreasonable, (8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim, (9)
when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings, (10) when the rule does
not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances
indicating the urgency of judicial intervention.
In the case at bar, there is no question that the controversy was pending before the
Secretary of DENR when it was forwarded to him following the denial by the petitioners of the
motion for reconsideration of private respondents through the order of July 12, 1989. In their
letter of reconsideration dated June 28, 1989, private respondents clearly recognize the
presence of an administrative forum to which they seek to avail, as they did avail, in the
resolution of their case. The letter, reads, thus:
xxx
If this motion for reconsideration does not merit your favorable action, then this letter should
be considered as an appeal to the Secretary.
It was easy to perceive then that the private respondents looked up to the Secretary for the
review and disposition of their case. By appealing to him, they acknowledged the existence
of an adequate and plain remedy still available and open to them in the ordinary course of
the law. Thus, they cannot now, without violating the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies, seek courts intervention by filing an action for replevin for the grant of their relief
during the pendency of an administrative proceedings.
Moreover, it is important to point out that the enforcement of forestry laws, rules and
regulations and the protection, development and management of forest lands fall within the
primary and special responsibilities of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources.
By the very nature of its function, the DENR should be given a free hand unperturbed by
judicial intrusion to determine a controversy which is well within its jurisdiction. The
assumption by the trial court, therefore, of the replevin suit filed by private respondents
constitutes an unjustified encroachment into the domain of the administrative agencys
prerogative. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto
itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with
an administrative body of special competence. In Felipe Ismael, Jr. and Co. vs. Deputy
Executive Secretary, which was reiterated in the recent case of Concerned Officials of MWSS
vs. Vasquez, this Court held:
Thus, while the administration grapples with the complex and multifarious problems caused
by unbriddled exploitation of these resources, the judiciary will stand clear. A long line of
cases establish the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed

to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities
coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies.
To sustain the claim of private respondents would in effect bring the instant controversy
beyond the pale of the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies and fall within the
ambit of excepted cases heretofore stated. However, considering the circumstances
prevailing in this case, we can not but rule out these assertions of private respondents to be
without merit. First, they argued that there was violation of due process because they did not
receive the May 23, 1989 order of confiscation of petitioner Layugan. This contention has no
leg to stand on. Due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an
opportunity or right to be heard. One may be heard , not solely by verbal presentation but
also, and perhaps many times more creditably and practicable than oral argument, through
pleadings. In administrative proceedings moreover, technical rules of procedure and evidence
are not strictly applied; administrative process cannot be fully equated with due process in its
strict judicial sense. Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked where
a party was given the chance to be heard on his motion for reconsideration, as in the instant
case, when private respondents were undisputedly given the opportunity to present their side
when they filed a letter of reconsideration dated June 28, 1989 which was, however, denied in
an order of July 12, 1989 of Executive Director Baggayan. In Navarro III vs. Damasco, we ruled
that :
The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or trial type hearing is not at
all times and in all instances essential. The requirements are satisfied when the parties are
afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand.
What is frowned upon is the absolute lack of notice or hearing.
Second, private respondents imputed the patent illegality of seizure and forfeiture of the
truck because the administrative officers of the DENR allegedly have no power to perform
these acts under the law. They insisted that only the court is authorized to confiscate and
forfeit conveyances used in transporting illegal forest products as can be gleaned from the
second paragraph of Section 68 of P.D. 705, as amended by E.O. 277. The pertinent provision
reads as follows:
SECTION 68. xxx
xxx
The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any
forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery,
equipments, implements and tools illegaly [sic] used in the area where the timber or forest
products are found. (Underline ours)
A reading, however, of the law persuades us not to go along with private respondents
thinking not only because the aforequoted provision apparently does not mention nor include
conveyances that can be the subject of confiscation by the courts, but to a large extent,
due to the fact that private respondents interpretation of the subject provision unduly
restricts the clear intention of the law and inevitably reduces the other provision of Section
68-A , which is quoted herein below:
SECTION 68-A. Administrative Authority of the Department or His Duly Authorized
Representative To Order Confiscation. In all cases of violation of this Code or other forest
laws, rules and regulations, the Department Head or his duly authorized representative, may
order the confiscation of any forest products illegally cut, gathered, removed, or possessed or
abandoned, and all conveyances used either by land, water or air in the commission of the
offense and to dispose of the same in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations and policies
on the matter. (Underline ours)
It is, thus, clear from the foregoing provision that the Secretary and his duly authorized
representatives are given the authority to confiscate and forfeit any conveyances utilized in
violating the Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations. The phrase to dispose of the
same is broad enough to cover the act of forfeiting conveyances in favor of the
government. The only limitation is that it should be made in accordance with pertinent laws,
regulations or policies on the matter. In the construction of statutes, it must be read in such
a way as to give effect to the purpose projected in the statute. Statutes should be construed
in the light of the object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed, and they
should be given such construction as will advance the object, suppress the mischief, and

secure the benefits intended. In this wise, the observation of the Solicitor General is
significant, thus:
But precisely because of the need to make forestry laws more responsive to present
situations and realities and in view of the urgency to conserve the remaining resources of
the country, that the government opted to add Section 68-A. This amendatory provision is an
administrative remedy totally separate and distinct from criminal proceedings. More than
anything else, it is intended to supplant the inadequacies that characterize enforcement of
forestry laws through criminal actions. The preamble of EO 277-the law that added Section
68-A to PD 705-is most revealing:
WHEREAS, there is an urgency to conserve the remaining forest resources of the country for
the benefit and welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos;
WHEREAS, our forest resources may be effectively conserved and protected through the
vigilant enforcement and implementation of our forestry laws, rules and regulations;
WHEREAS, the implementation of our forestry laws suffers from technical difficulties, due to
certain inadequacies in the penal provisions of the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines;
and
WHEREAS, to overcome this difficulties, there is a need to penalize certain acts more
responsive to present situations and realities;
It is interesting to note that Section 68-A is a new provision authorizing the DENR to
confiscate, not only conveyances, but forest products as well. On the other hand,
confiscation of forest products by the court in a criminal action has long been provided for in
Section 68. If as private respondents insist, the power on confiscation cannot be exercised
except only through the court under Section 68, then Section 68-A would have no purpose at
all. Simply put, Section 68-A would not have provided any solution to the problem perceived
in EO 277, supra.
Private respondents, likewise, contend that the seizure was illegal because the petitioners
themselves admitted in the Order dated July 12, 1989 of Executive Director Baggayan that
the truck of private respondents was not used in the commission of the crime. This order, a
copy of which was given to and received by the counsel of private respondents, reads in part ,
viz. :
xxx while it is true that the truck of your client was not used by her in the commission of the
crime, we uphold your claim that the truck owner is not liable for the crime and in no case
could a criminal case be filed against her as provided under Article 309 and 310 of the
Revised Penal Code. xxx
We observed that private respondents misread the content of the aforestated order and
obviously misinterpreted the intention of petitioners. What is contemplated by the petitioners
when they stated that the truck "was not used in the commission of the crime" is that it was
not used in the commission of the crime of theft, hence, in no case can a criminal action be
filed against the owner thereof for violation of Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code.
Petitioners did not eliminate the possibility that the truck was being used in the commission
of another crime, that is, the breach of Section 68 of P.D.705 as amended by E.O. 277. In the
same order of July 12, 1989, petitioners pointed out:
xxx However, under Section 68 of P.D.705 as amended and further amended by Executive
Order No.277 specifically provides for the confiscation of the conveyance used in the
transport of forest products not covered by the required legal documents. She may not have
been involved in the cutting and gathering of the product in question but the fact that she
accepted the goods for a fee or fare the same is therefor liable. xxx
Private respondents, however, contended that there is no crime defined and punishable under
Section 68 other than qualified theft, so that, when petitioners admitted in the July 12, 1989
order that private respondents could not be charged for theft as provided for under Articles
309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, then necessarily private respondents could not have
committed an act constituting a crime under Section 68. We disagree. For clarity, the
provision of Section 68 of P.D. 705 before its amendment by E.O. 277 and the provision of
Section 1 of E.O. No.277 amending the aforementioned Section 68 are reproduced herein,
thus:
SECTION 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other products without license. Any person who shall cut , gather , collect , or remove timber or other forest products from
any forest land, or timber from alienable and disposable public lands, or from private lands,
without any authority under a license agreement, lease, license or permit, shall be guilty of

qualified theft as defined and punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code
xxx. (Underscoring ours; Section 68, P.D.705 before its amendment by E.O.277 )
SECTION 1. Section 68 of Presidential Decree No.705, as amended, is hereby amended to
read as follows:
Section 68. Cutting, gathering and/or collecting timber or other forest products without
license. -Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products
from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land,
without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents
as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties
imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code xxx." (Underscoring ours;
Section 1, E.O No. 277 amending Section 68, P.D. 705 as amended)
With the introduction of Executive Order No. 277 amending Section 68 of P.D. 705, the act of
cutting, gathering, collecting, removing, or possessing forest products without authority
constitutes a distinct offense independent now from the crime of theft under Articles 309 and
310 of the Revised Penal Code, but the penalty to be imposed is that provided for under
Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code. This is clear from the language of Executive
Order No. 277 when it eliminated the phrase shall be guilty of qualified theft as defined and
punished under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code and inserted the words
shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal
Code . When the statute is clear and explicit, there is hardly room for any extended court
ratiocination or rationalization of the law.
From the foregoing disquisition, it is clear that a suit for replevin can not be sustained against
the petitioners for the subject truck taken and retained by them for administrative forfeiture
proceedings in pursuant to Section 68-A of the P. D. 705, as amended. Dismissal of the
replevin suit for lack of cause of action in view of the private respondents failure to exhaust
administrative remedies should have been the proper course of action by the lower court
instead of assuming jurisdiction over the case and consequently issuing the writ ordering the
return of the truck. Exhaustion of the remedies in the administrative forum, being a condition
precedent prior to ones recourse to the courts and more importantly, being an element of
private respondents right of action, is too significant to be waylaid by the lower court.
It is worth stressing at this point, that a suit for replevin is founded solely on the claim that
the defendant wrongfully withholds the property sought to be recovered. It lies to recover
possession of personal chattels that are unlawfully detained. To detain is defined as to
mean to hold or keep in custody, and it has been held that there is tortuous taking
whenever there is an unlawful meddling with the property, or an exercise or claim of
dominion over it, without any pretense of authority or right; this, without manual seizing of
the property is sufficient. Under the Rules of Court, it is indispensable in replevin proceedings,
that the plaintiff must show by his own affidavit that he is entitled to the possession of
property, that the property is wrongfully detained by the defendant, alleging the cause of
detention, that the same has not been taken for tax assessment, or seized under execution,
or attachment, or if so seized, that it is exempt from such seizure, and the actual value of the
property. Private respondents miserably failed to convince this Court that a wrongful
detention of the subject truck obtains in the instant case. It should be noted that the truck
was seized by the petitioners because it was transporting forest products with out the
required permit of the DENR in manifest contravention of Section 68 of P.D. 705 as amended
by E.O 277. Section 68-A of P.D. 705, as amended, unquestionably warrants the confiscation
as well as the disposition by the Secretary of DENR or his duly authorized representatives of
the conveyances used in violating the provision of forestry laws. Evidently, the continued
possession or detention of the truck by the petitioners for administrative forfeiture proceeding
is legally permissible, hence , no wrongful detention exists in the case at bar.
Moreover, the suit for replevin is never intended as a procedural tool to question the orders of
confiscation and forfeiture issued by the DENR in pursuance to the authority given under
P.D.705, as amended. Section 8 of the said law is explicit that actions taken by the Director of
the Bureau of Forest Development concerning the enforcement of the provisions of the said
law are subject to review by the Secretary of DENR and that courts may not review the
decisions of the Secretary except through a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition. It
reads :
SECTION 8 . REVIEW - All actions and decisions of the Director are subject to review, motu
propio or upon appeal of any person aggrieved thereby, by the Department Head whose
decision shall be final and executory after the lapse of thirty (30) days from the receipt of the

aggrieved party of said decision, unless appealed to the President in accordance with
Executive Order No. 19, Series of 1966. The Decision of the Department Head may not be
reviewed by the courts except through a special civil action for certiorari or prohibition.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED; the Decision of the respondent Court of Appeals
dated October 16, 1991 and its Resolution dated July 14, 1992 are hereby SET ASIDE AND
REVERSED; the Restraining Order promulgated on September 27, 1993 is hereby made
permanent; and the Secretary of DENR is directed to resolve the controversy with utmost
dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 165448
July 27, 2009
ERNESTO AQUINO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for review 1 assailing the 5 June 1997 Decision 2 and 24
September 2004 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 17534.
The Antecedent Facts
On behalf of Teachers Camp, Sergio Guzman filed with the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) an application to cut down 14 dead Benguet pine trees within the
Teachers Camp in Baguio City. The trees, which had a total volume of 13.37 cubic meters,
were to be used for the repairs of Teachers Camp.
On 19 May 1993, before the issuance of the permit, a team composed of members from the
Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) and Michael Cuteng (Cuteng),
a forest ranger of the Forest Section of the Office of the City Architect and Parks
Superintendent of Baguio City, conducted an inspection of the trees to be cut.
Thereafter, Sabado T. Batcagan, Executive Director of the DENR, issued a permit allowing the
cutting of 14 trees under the following terms and conditions:
2. That the cut timber shall be utilized as lumber and fuel-wood by the permittee;
3. As replacement, the permittee shall plant one hundred forty (140) pine seedlings in
an appropriate place within the area. In the absence of plantable area in the property,
the same is required to plant within forest area duly designated by CENRO concerned
which shall be properly maintained and protected to ensure/enhance growth and
development of the planted seedlings;
4. Violation of any of the conditions set hereof is punishable under Section 68 of PD 705
as amended by E.O. No. 277, Series of 1987; and
5. That non-compliance with any of the above conditions or violations of forestry laws
and regulations shall render this permit null and void without prejudice to the
imposition of penalties in accordance with existing laws and regulations.
This PERMIT is non-transferable and shall expire ten (10) days from issuance hereof or as
soon as the herein authorized volume is exhausted whichever comes first. 4
On 23 July 1993, Forest Rangers Ramil Windo, Moises Sobrepea, Daniel Salamo, Pablo
Guinawan, Antonio Abellera, and Forester Paul Apilis received information that pine trees
were being cut at Teachers Camp without proper authority. They proceeded to the site where
they found Ernesto Aquino (petitioner), a forest ranger from CENRO, and Cuteng supervising
the cutting of the trees. They also found sawyers Benedicto Santiago (Santiago) and Mike
Masing (Masing) on the site, together with Clemente Salinas (Salinas) and Andrew Nacatab
(Nacatab), who were also supervising the cutting of the trees. The forest rangers found 23
tree stumps, out of which only 12 were covered by the permit. The volume of the trees cut
with permit was 13.58 cubic meters while the volume of the trees cut without permit was
16.55 cubic meters. The market value of the trees cut without permit was P182,447.20, and
the forest charges were P11,833.25.
An Information for violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705 5 (PD 705) was filed
against petitioner, Cuteng, Nacatab, Masing, and Santiago, as follows:

That on or about the 23rd day of July, 1993, and subsequent thereto, in the City of Baguio,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding one another, and without any authority, license
or permit, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously cut nine (9) pine trees with a
total volume and market price as P182,447.20 (Volume 16.55 M3 424 bd. ft./M3 and unit price
P26.00 bd. ft.) and with a total forest charge of P11,833.25 or having a total sum of
P194,280.45 at Teachers Camp, Baguio City, without the legal documents as required under
existing forest laws and regulations, particularly the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources Circular No. 05, Series of 1989, in violation of the aforecited law. 6lawphil
Masing alleged that he was not aware of the limitations on the permit as he was not given a
copy of the permit. Masing stated that he cut 10 pine trees under the supervision of petitioner
who claimed to be in possession of the necessary permit. He stated that three of the trees
were stumps about four or five feet high and were not fit for lumber. He stated that while he
was cutting trees, petitioner and Salinas were present.
Santiago testified that he cut trees under petitioners supervision. He stated that petitioner
was in possession of the permit. He stated that he cut 10 trees, six of which were cut into
lumber while two were stumps and two were rotten.
Salinas testified that Masing and Santiago were merely hired as sawyers and they merely
followed petitioners instructions.
Cuteng testified that he was part of the team that inspected the trees to be cut before the
permit was issued. He stated that the trees cut by Santiago were covered by the permit.
Nacatab testified that he only went to Teachers Camp on 13 July 1993 and he saw Santiago
and Masing cutting down the trees in petitioners presence.
Petitioner alleged that he was sent to supervise the cutting of trees at Teachers Camp. He
allegedly informed his superior, Paul Apilis, that he was not aware of the trees covered by the
permit. However, he still supervised the cutting of trees without procuring a copy of the
vicinity map used in the inspection of the trees to be cut. He claimed that he could not
prevent the overcutting of trees because he was just alone while Cuteng and Santiago were
accompanied by three other men.
The Decision of the Trial Court
In its 26 May 1994 Decision,7 the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 5 (trial court),
ruled as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds and declares the accused ERNESTO AQUINO y ESTIPULAR,
MICHAEL CUTENG y LESCAO and BENEDICTO SANTIAGO y DOCLES guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged and hereby sentences EACH of them to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of SIX (6) YEARS of prision correccional, as minimum, to TWENTY (20) YEARS of
reclusion temporal, as maximum; to indemnify, jointly and severally, the Government in the
amounts of P182,477.20 and P11,833.25, representing the market value of and forest charges
on the Benguet pine trees cut without permit; and to pay their proportionate shares in the
costs.
The chainsaw confiscated from the accused Santiago is hereby declared forfeited in favor of
the Government.
On the other hand, the accused ANDREW NACATAB y DODOY and MIKE MASING y GANAS are
acquitted on reasonable doubt, with costs de oficio, and the cash bonds they deposited for
their provisional liberty in the amount of P7,500.00 each under O.R. Nos. 139605 and 139646,
dated February 4, 1996 and February 23, 1994, respectively, are ordered released to them
upon proper receipt therefor.
SO ORDERED.8
The trial court ruled that the trees cut exceeded the allowed number of the trees authorized
to be cut. The trial court further ruled that the cutting of trees went beyond the period stated
in the permit.
Petitioner, Cuteng and Santiago appealed from the trial courts Decision.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
In its 5 June 1997 Decision, the Court of Appeals modified the trial courts Decision as follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the court a quo is MODIFIED. The accused-appellants Benedicto
Santiago and Michael Cuteng are hereby acquitted on reasonable doubt. The appellant
Ernesto Aquino is found guilty, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The award of damages is
deleted. No costs.

SO ORDERED.9
The Court of Appeals ruled that as a forest guard or ranger of the CENRO, DENR, petitioner
had the duty to supervise the cutting of trees and to ensure that the sawyers complied with
the terms of the permit which only he possessed. The Court of Appeals ruled that while it was
Teachers Camp which hired the sawyers, petitioner had control over their acts. The Court of
Appeals rejected petitioners claim that he was restrained from taking a bolder action by his
fear of Santiago because petitioner could have informed his superiors but he did not do so.
The Court of Appeals further rejected petitioners contention that the law contemplated
cutting of trees without permit, while in this case there was a permit for cutting down the
trees. The Court of Appeals ruled that the trees which were cut by the sawyers were not
covered by the permit.
The Court of Appeals ruled that conspiracy was not sufficiently proven. As such, the Court of
Appeals found that the prosecution failed to prove Cutengs guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The Court of Appeals likewise acquitted Santiago because he was only following orders as to
which trees to cut and he did not have a copy of the permit.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 24 September 2004 Resolution, the Court
of Appeals denied the motion for lack of merit.
Hence, the petition before this Court.
The Issue
The only issue in this case is whether petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation
of Section 68 of PD 705.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has merit.
The Solicitor General alleges that the petition should be denied because petitioner only raises
questions of facts and not questions of law. We do not agree.
A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts,
while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged
facts.10 For questions to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants. 11 The resolution of the issue must
rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances. 12
In this case, petitioner challenges his conviction under Section 68 of PD 705.
Section 68 of PD 705 provides:
Section 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber or Other Forest Products Without
License.-Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products
from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land,
without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents
as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties
imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, that in the case of
partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering,
collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to
the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation.
There are two distinct and separate offenses punished under Section 68 of PD 705, to wit:
(1) Cutting, gathering, collecting and removing timber or other forest products
from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or
from private land without any authority; and
(2) Possession of timber or other forest products without the legal documents
required under existing forest laws and regulations. 13
The provision clearly punishes anyone who shall cut, gather, collect or remove timber or
other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land,
or from private land, without any authority. In this case, petitioner was charged by CENRO to
supervise the implementation of the permit. He was not the one who cut, gathered, collected
or removed the pine trees within the contemplation of Section 68 of PD 705. He was not in
possession of the cut trees because the lumber was used by Teachers Camp for repairs.
Petitioner could not likewise be convicted of conspiracy to commit the offense because all his
co-accused were acquitted of the charges against them.
Petitioner may have been remiss in his duties when he failed to restrain the sawyers from
cutting trees more than what was covered by the permit. As the Court of Appeals ruled,
petitioner could have informed his superiors if he was really intimidated by Santiago. If at all,

this could only make petitioner administratively liable for his acts. It is not enough to convict
him under Section 68 of PD 705.
Neither could petitioner be liable under the last paragraph of Section 68 of PD 705 as he is
not an officer of a partnership, association, or corporation who ordered the cutting, gathering,
or collection, or is in possession of the pine trees.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the 5 June 1997 Decision and 24
September 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 17534. Petitioner
Ernesto Aquino is ACQUITTED of the charge of violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree
No. 705. Costs de officio.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 158182
June 12, 2008
SESINANDO MERIDA, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review1 of the Decision2 dated 28 June 2002 and the Resolution dated 14
May 2003 of the Court of Appeals. The 28 June 2002 Decision affirmed the conviction of
petitioner Sesinando Merida (petitioner) for violation of Section 68, 3 Presidential Decree No.
705 (PD 705),4 as amended by Executive Order No. 277. The Resolution dated 14 May 2003
denied admission of petitioner's motion for reconsideration. 5
The Facts
Petitioner was charged in the Regional Trial Court of Romblon, Romblon, Branch 81 (trial
court) with violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, for "cut[ting], gather[ing],
collect[ing] and remov[ing]" a lone narra tree inside a private land in Mayod, Ipil, Magdiwang,
Romblon (Mayod Property) over which private complainant Oscar M. Tansiongco (Tansiongco)
claims ownership.6
The prosecution evidence showed that on 23 December 1998, Tansiongco learned that
petitioner cut a narra tree in the Mayod Property. Tansiongco reported the matter to Florencio
Royo (Royo), the punong barangay of Ipil. On 24 December 1998, 7 Royo summoned petitioner
to a meeting with Tansiongco. When confronted during the meeting about the felled narra
tree, petitioner admitted cutting the tree but claimed that he did so with the permission of
one Vicar Calix (Calix) who, according to petitioner, bought the Mayod Property from
Tansiongco in October 1987 under a pacto de retro sale. Petitioner showed to Royo Calix's
written authorization signed by Calix's wife. 8
On 11 January 1999, Tansiongco reported the tree-cutting to the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR) forester Thelmo S. Hernandez (Hernandez) in Sibuyan,
Romblon. When Hernandez confronted petitioner about the felled tree, petitioner reiterated
his earlier claim to Royo that he cut the tree with Calix's permission. Hernandez ordered
petitioner not to convert the felled tree trunk into lumber.
On 26 January 1999, Tansiongco informed Hernandez that petitioner had converted the narra
trunk into lumber. Hernandez, with other DENR employees and enforcement officers, went to
the Mayod Property and saw that the narra tree had been cut into six smaller pieces of
lumber. Hernandez took custody of the lumber, 9 deposited them for safekeeping with Royo,
and issued an apprehension receipt to petitioner. A larger portion of the felled tree remained
at the Mayod Property. The DENR subsequently conducted an investigation on the matter. 10
Tansiongco filed a complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Romblon
(Provincial Prosecutor) charging petitioner with violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as
amended. During the preliminary investigation, petitioner submitted a counter-affidavit
reiterating his claim that he cut the narra tree with Calix's permission. The Provincial
Prosecutor11 found probable cause to indict petitioner and filed the Information with the trial
court (docketed as Criminal Case No. 2207).
During the trial, the prosecution presented six witnesses including Tansiongco, Royo, and
Hernandez who testified on the events leading to the discovery of and investigation on the

tree-cutting. Petitioner testified as the lone defense witness and claimed, for the first time,
that he had no part in the tree-cutting.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In its Decision dated 24 November 2000, the trial court found petitioner guilty as charged,
sentenced him to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to twenty (20) years
of reclusion temporal and ordered the seized lumber forfeited in Tansiongco's favor. 12 The trial
court dismissed petitioner's defense of denial in view of his repeated extrajudicial admissions
that he cut the narra tree in the Mayod Property with Calix's permission. With this finding and
petitioner's lack of DENR permit to cut the tree, the trial court held petitioner liable for
violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals reiterating his defense of denial. Petitioner also
contended that (1) the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case because it was
based on a complaint filed by Tansiongco and not by a forest officer as provided under
Section 80 of PD 705 and (2) the penalty imposed by the trial court is excessive.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its Decision dated 28 June 2002, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's ruling but
ordered the seized lumber confiscated in the government's favor. 13 The Court of Appeals
sustained the trial court's finding that petitioner is bound by his extrajudicial admissions of
cutting the narra tree in the Mayod Property without any DENR permit. The Court of Appeals
also found nothing irregular in the filing of the complaint by Tansiongco instead of a DENR
forest officer considering that the case underwent preliminary investigation by the proper
officer who filed the Information with the trial court.
On the imposable penalty, the Court of Appeals, in the dispositive portion of its ruling,
sentenced petitioner to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years of reclusion temporal.
However, in the body of its ruling, the Court of Appeals held that "the penalty to be imposed
on [petitioner] should be (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to twenty (20) years of
reclusion temporal,"14 the same penalty the trial court imposed.
Petitioner sought reconsideration but the Court of Appeals, in its Resolution dated 14 May
2003, did not admit his motion for having been filed late. 15
Hence, this petition. Petitioner raises the following issues:
I. WHETHER x x x SECTION 68 OF P.D. 705 AS AMENDED PROHIBITING THE CUTTING,
GATHERING, COLLECTING AND REMOVING TIMBER OR OTHER FOREST PRODUCTS
FROM ANY FOREST LAND APPLIES TO PETITIONER.
II. WHETHER x x x POSSESSION OF THE NARRA TREE CUT IN PRIVATE LAND CONTESTED
BY VICAR CALIX AND PRIVATE-COMPLAINANT OSCAR TANSIONGCO IS COVERED BY
SECTION 80 OF P.D. 705 AS AMENDED.
III. WHETHER PRIVATE-COMPLAINANT CAN INITIATE THE CHARGE EVEN WITHOUT THE
STANDING AUTHORITY COMING FROM THE INVESTIGATING FOREST OFFICER OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES AS MANDATED BY SECTION
80 OF P.D. 705 AS AMENDED.
[IV.] WHETHER x x x THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE CASE
FILED BY PRIVATE-COMPLAINANT BECAUSE IT WAS NOT THE INVESTIGATING OFFICER
AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 80 OF P.D. 705 AS AMENDED WHO MUST BE THE ONE TO
INSTITUTE THE FILING OF THE SAME.16
In its Comment to the petition, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) countered that (1) the
trial court acquired jurisdiction over the case even though Tansiongco, and not a DENR forest
officer, filed the complaint against petitioner and (2) petitioner is liable for violation of Section
68 of PD 705, as amended.
The Issues
The petition raises the following issues:17
1) Whether the trial court acquired jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 2207 even
though it was based on a complaint filed by Tansiongco and not by a DENR forest
officer; and
2) Whether petitioner is liable for violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition has no merit.
The Trial Court Acquired Jurisdiction Over
Criminal Case No. 2207
We sustain the OSG's claim that the trial court acquired jurisdiction over Criminal Case No.
2207. The Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (Revised Rules) list the cases which must be

initiated by a complaint filed by specified individuals, 18 non-compliance of which ousts the

trial court of jurisdiction from trying such cases. 19 However, these cases concern only
defamation and other crimes against chastity 20 and not to cases concerning Section 68 of PD
705, as amended. Further, Section 80 of PD 705 does not prohibit an interested person from
filing a complaint before any qualified officer for violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as
amended. Section 80 of PD 705 provides in relevant parts:
SECTION 80. Arrest; Institution of criminal actions. - x x x x
Reports and complaints regarding the commission of any of the offenses
defined in this Chapter, not committed in the presence of any forest officer or
employee, or any of the deputized officers or officials, shall immediately be
investigated by the forest officer assigned in the area where the offense was
allegedly committed, who shall thereupon receive the evidence supporting the report
or complaint.
If there is prima facie evidence to support the complaint or report, the
investigating forest officer shall file the necessary complaint with the
appropriate official authorized by law to conduct a preliminary investigation
of criminal cases and file an information in Court. (Emphasis supplied)
We held in People v. CFI of Quezon21 that the phrase "reports and complaints" in Section 80
refers to "reports and complaints as might be brought to the forest officer assigned to the
area by other forest officers or employees of the Bureau of Forest Development or
any of the deputized officers or officials, for violations of forest laws not committed in
their presence."22
Here, it was not "forest officers or employees of the Bureau of Forest Development or any of
the deputized officers or officials" who reported to Hernandez the tree-cutting in the Mayod
Property but Tansiongco, a private citizen who claims ownership over the Mayod Property.
Thus, Hernandez cannot be faulted for not conducting an investigation to determine "if there
is prima facie evidence to support the complaint or report." 23 At any rate, Tansiongco was not
precluded, either under Section 80 of PD 705 or the Revised Rules, from filing a complaint
before the Provincial Prosecutor for petitioner's alleged violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as
amended. For its part, the trial court correctly took cognizance of Criminal Case No. 2207 as
the case falls within its exclusive original jurisdiction. 24
Petitioner
is
Liable
for
Cutting
Timber
in
Private
Property Without Permit
Section 68, as amended, one of the 12 acts 25 penalized under PD 705, provides:
SECTION 68. Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products
Without License. - Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other
forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public
land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest
products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 310 of
the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations, or
corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession
shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be
deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration
and Deportation.
The court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber
or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed as well as the
machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the
timber or forest products are found. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 68 penalizes three categories of acts: (1) the cutting, gathering, collecting, or
removing of timber or other forest products from any forest land without any authority; (2)
the cutting, gathering, collecting, or removing of timber from alienable or disposable public
land, or from private land without any authority;26 and (3) the possession of timber or
other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and
regulations.27 Petitioner stands charged of having "cut, gathered, collected and removed
timber or other forest products from a private land 28 without x x x the necessary permit x x x
" thus his liablity, if ever, should be limited only for "cut[ting], gather[ing], collect[ing] and
remov[ing] timber," under the second category. Further, the prosecution evidence showed
that petitioner did not perform any acts of "gathering, collecting, or removing" but only the

act of "cutting" a lone narra tree. Hence, this case hinges on the question of whether
petitioner "cut x x x timber" in the Mayod Property without a DENR permit.29
We answer in the affirmative and thus affirm the lower courts' rulings.
On the question of whether petitioner cut a narra tree in the Mayod Property without a DENR
permit, petitioner adopted conflicting positions. Before his trial, petitioner consistently
represented to the authorities that he cut a narra tree in the Mayod Property and that he did
so only with Calix's permission. However, when he testified, petitioner denied cutting the tree
in question. We sustain the lower courts' rulings that petitioner's extrajudicial admissions bind
him.30 Petitioner does not explain why Royo and Hernandez, public officials who testified
under oath in their official capacities, would lie on the stand to implicate petitioner in a
serious criminal offense, not to mention that the acts of these public officers enjoy the
presumption of regularity. Further, petitioner does not deny presenting Calix's authorization to
Royo and Hernandez as his basis for cutting the narra tree in the Mayod Property. Petitioner
has no use of Calix's authorization if, as he claimed during the trial, he did not cut any tree in
the Mayod Property.
We further hold that the lone narre tree petitioner cut from the Mayod Property constitutes
"timber" under Section 68 of PD 705, as amended. PD 705 does not define "timber," only
"forest product" (which circuitously includes "timber.") 31 Does the narra tree in question
constitute "timber" under Section 68? The closest this Court came to defining the term
"timber" in Section 68 was to provide that "timber," includes "lumber" or "processed log."32
In other jurisdictions, timber is determined by compliance with specified dimensions 33 or
certain "stand age" or "rotation age."34 In Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 35 this
Court was faced with a similar task of having to define a term in Section 68 of PD 705 "lumber" - to determine whether possession of lumber is punishable under that provision. In
ruling in the affirmative, we held that "lumber" should be taken in its ordinary or common
usage meaning to refer to "processed log or timber," thus:
The Revised Forestry Code contains no definition of either timber or lumber. While the
former is included in forest products as defined in paragraph (q) of Section 3, the latter
is found in paragraph (aa) of the same section in the definition of "Processing plant,"
which reads:
(aa) Processing plant is any mechanical set-up, machine or combination of
machine used for the processing of logs and other forest raw materials into
lumber, veneer, plywood, wallboard, blackboard, paper board, pulp, paper or
other finished wood products.
This simply means that lumber is a processed log or processed forest raw material.
Clearly, the Code uses the term lumber in its ordinary or common usage. In the 1993
copyright edition of Webster's Third New International Dictionary, lumber is defined,
inter alia, as "timber or logs after being prepared for the market." Simply put, lumber is
a processed log or timber.
It is settled that in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, words
and phrases used in a statute should be given their plain, ordinary, and
common usage meaning. And in so far as possession of timber without the required
legal documents is concerned, Section 68 of PD No. 705, as amended, makes no
distinction between raw and procesed timber. Neither should we. 36 x x x x (Italicization
in the original; boldfacing supplied)
We see no reason why, as in Mustang, the term "timber" under Section 68 cannot be taken in
its common acceptation as referring to "wood used for or suitable for building or for carpentry
or joinery."37 Indeed, tree saplings or tiny tree stems that are too small for use as posts,
panelling, beams, tables, or chairs cannot be considered timber. 38
Here, petitioner was charged with having felled a narra tree and converted the same into
"several pieces of sawn lumber, about three (3) pcs. 2x16x6 and three (3) pcs. 2x18x7 x x x
consisting of 111 board feet x x x." These measurements were indicated in the apprehension
receipt Hernandez issued to petitioner on 26 January 1999 which the prosecution introduced
in evidence.39 Further, Hernandez testified that the larger portion of the felled log left in the
Mayod Property "measured 76 something centimeters [at the big end] while the smaller end
measured 65 centimeters and the length was 2.8 meters." 40 Undoubtedly, the narra tree
petitioner felled and converted to lumber was "timber" fit "for building or for carpentry or
joinery" and thus falls under the ambit of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended.
The Penalty Imposable on Petitioner

Violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, is punishable as Qualified Theft under Article

310 in relation to Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), thus:
Art. 310. Qualified theft. - The crime of qualified theft shall be punished by the
penalties next higher by two degrees than those respectively specified in the next
preceding article x x x.
Art. 309. Penalties. - Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
1. The penalty of prisin mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value
of the thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos;
but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount, the penalty shall
be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year
for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may
be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and in connection with
the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other
provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prisin mayor or reclusin
temporal, as the case may be.
2. The penalty of prisin correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the
value of the thing stolen is more than 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000
pesos.
3. The penalty of prisin correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the
value of the property stolen is more than 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000
pesos.
4. Arresto mayor in its medium period to prisin correccional in its minimum
period, if the value of the property stolen is over 50 pesos but does not exceed
200 pesos.
5. Arresto mayor to its full extent, if such value is over 5 pesos but does not
exceed 50 pesos.
6. Arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if such value does not
exceed 5 pesos.
7. Arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, if the theft is committed
under the circumstances enumerated in paragraph 3 of the next preceding
article and the value of the thing stolen does not exceed 5 pesos. If such value
exceeds said amount, the provisions of any of the five preceding subdivisions
shall be made applicable..
8. Arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding 50 pesos, when
the value of the thing stolen is not over 5 pesos, and the offender shall have
acted under the impulse of hunger, poverty, or the difficulty of earning a
livelihood for the support of himself or his family.
The Information filed against petitioner alleged that the six pieces of lumber measuring 111
board feet were valued at P3,330. However, if the value of the log left at the Mayod Property
is included, the amount increases to P20,930.40. To prove this allegation, the prosecution
relied on Hernandez's testimony that these amounts, as stated in the apprehension receipt he
issued, are his "estimates" based on "prevailing local price." 41
This evidence does not suffice. To prove the amount of the property taken for fixing the
penalty imposable against the accused under Article 309 of the RPC, the prosecution must
present more than a mere uncorroborated "estimate" of such fact. 42 In the absence of
independent and reliable corroboration of such estimate, courts may either apply the
minimum penalty under Article 309 or fix the value of the property taken based on the
attendant circumstances of the case. 43 In People v. Dator44 where, as here, the accused was
charged with violation of Section 68 of PD 705, as amended, for possession of lumber without
permit, the prosecution's evidence for the lumber's value consisted of an estimate made by
the apprehending authorities whose apparent lack of corroboration was compounded by the
fact that the transmittal letter for the estimate was not presented in evidence. Accordingly,
we imposed on the accused the minimum penalty under Article 309(6) 45 of the RPC.46
Applying Dator in relation to Article 310 of the RPC and taking into account the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, we find it proper to impose on petitioner, under the circumstances obtaining
here, the penalty of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to three
(3) years, four (4) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correcional, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision dated 28 June 2002 and the Resolution dated 14 May
2003 of the Court of Appeals with the modification that petitioner Sesinando Merida is

sentenced to four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to three (3)
years, four (4) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correcional, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Chairperson, Corona, Azcuna, Leonardo-de Castro, JJ., concur.