Remedial Law Review

Case No. 1: People vs. Monticalvo

Assignment 10.1

vs. REY MONTICALVO y MAGNO,

Accused-Appellant.

made her lie down. He then placed himself on

top of AAA and made push and pull
movements. Afterwards, appellant stopped,
allowed AAA to sit down for a while and then
sent her home. When AAA arrived at their
house around 7:30 p.m., she was asked by her
mother, BBB, where she came from and why
she came home late. AAA replied that she was
at the back of their house as appellant brought
her there and had sexual intercourse with her.

Facts:

Issue:

G.R. No. 193507

January 30, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PlaintiffAppellee,

AAA is a mental retardate and was 12

years and 11 months old at the time of the rape
incident. She and appellant, who was then 17
years old, are neighbors their respective
houses are adjoining each other.

On 9 December 2002, AAA and her

friend, Analiza, were in front of the sari-sari
store of AAAs mother, BBB, while appellant
was inside the fence of their house adjacent to
the said sari-sari store. Appellant invited AAA
to go with him to the kiln at the back of their
house. AAA acceded and went ahead.

Analiza, pretending to look for her one

peso coin, followed them until she reached a
papaya tree located three and a half meters
away from the place. Analiza hid under the
papaya tree and from there she saw appellant
undress AAA by removing the latters shorts
and panty. Appellant, however, glanced and
saw Analiza. Frightened, Analiza ran away and
went back to the sari-sari store of BBB without
telling BBB what she saw.

Appellant succeeded to satisfy his

bestial desire. After undressing AAA, appellant

Whether or not mentally deficient rape victim

may be presented as a credible witness

Held:
The Court held in the affirmative.
Despite the latters mental condition, AAA
narrated before the court in the best way she
could her ordeal in the hands of appellant. As
stated by the appellate court, AAA conveyed
her ideas by words and demonstrations. AAA
recounted how the appellant sexually abused
her on 9 December 2002 by inviting her to go
to the kiln at the back of their house.
Thereupon, appellant suddenly undressed her
by removing her shorts and panty. This fact was
attested to by Analiza, one of the prosecution
witnesses, who actually witnessed appellant
undressing AAA by removing the latters shorts
and panty. AAA further testified that after
undressing her, appellant made her lie down,
placed himself on top of her and made push and
pull movements. Thereafter, appellant stopped,
made her sit down and sent her home. This
testimony of AAA was correctly found by the
trial court and the appellate court as coherent
and given in a detailed manner.

Emphasis must be given to the fact that

the competence and credibility of mentally
deficient rape victims as witnesses have been

Remedial Law Review

upheld by this Court where it is shown that they
can communicate their ordeal capably and
consistently. Rather than undermine the gravity
of the complainants accusations, it even lends
greater credence to her testimony, that,
someone as feeble-minded and guileless could
speak so tenaciously and explicitly on the
details of the rape if she has not in fact suffered
such crime at the hands of the accused.
Moreover, it has been jurisprudentially settled
that when a woman says she has been raped,
she says in effect all that is necessary to show
that she has been raped and her testimony alone
is sufficient if it satisfies the exacting standard
of credibility needed to convict the accused.

Indeed, a mental retardate is not, by

reason of such handicap alone, be disqualified
from testifying in court. Mental retardation per
se does not affect credibility. A mentally
retarded may be a credible witness. The
acceptance of her testimony depends on the
quality of her perceptions and the manner she
can make them known to the court. If the
testimony of a mental retardate is coherent, the
same is admissible in court.

Case No.3: Philippine Long Distance

Telephone Company, Inc. v. Eastern Telecom
Philippines;
G.R. No. 163037 February 6, 2013
Facts:
PLDT and Estaern Telecomm entered
into a compromise agreement which was
approved by the court, stipulating that PLDT
guarantees that all the outgoing telephone
traffic to Hongkong destined to ETPIs
correspondent therein, Cable &
Wireless Hongkong Ltd., its successors and
assigns, shall be coursed by PLDT through the
ETPI provided circuits and facilities between
the Philippines and Hongkong. That, neither
party shall use or threaten to use its gateway or
any other facilities to subvert the purposes of
the Agreement and that the same shall take

Assignment 10.1
effect and shall continue
in effect until November 28, 2003, provided
that a written notice of termination is given by
one party to the other not later than November
28, 2001.
.
Then ETPI alleged that PLDT violated
the terms of the above Compromise Agreement.
For its part, PLDT claimed that it was ETPI
that breached their Compromise Agreement by
failing to pay the revenue shares of PLDT and
by engaging in toll bypass activities. PLDT and
ETPI jointly moved for a suspension of the
proceedings in order for them to explore the
possibility of an amicable settlement of the
case. They arrived to enter into a LetterAgreement. But the implementation was faced
with several issues. ETPI prayed for the trial
court to direct PLDT to comply with the
Compromise Agreement.
PLDT stated that the subject matter
sought to be enjoined by ETPI was beyond the
jurisdiction of the RTC. PLDT averred that the
Compromise Agreement was novated by the
Letter-Agreement, which provided that claims
between PLDT and ETPI were to be settled
amicably or through arbitration. Furthermore,
PLDT contended that the motion for the
issuance of a status quo order had no actual
and/or legal basis as ETPI had not established
that there was a clear violation of its right and
that PLDT was guilty of bad faith. PLDT also
argued that the issuance of the order sought by
ETPI would be tantamount to a prejudgment of
the accounting rate controversy between the
parties.
ETPI submits that the present petition
of PLDT is already moot and academic, given
the expiration of the Compromise Agreement
between the parties. Assuming that the petition
is not moot, ETPI argues that the Court of
Appeals correctly ruled that the RTC had
jurisdiction to enforce its own Decision based
on the Compromise Agreement. ETPI also
alleges that the Letter-Agreement did not
novate the Compromise Agreement between
the parties. Moreover, ETPI contends that the
flagrant violation of paragraph 11 of the

Remedial Law Review

Assignment 10.1

Compromise Agreement was not arbitrable and

that the Compromise Agreement could be
enforced by mere motion.
Issue:
Whether or not the case was already moot and
academic.
Held:
The Court ruled in the affirmative. It
was ruled in Gancho-on v. Secreatry of Labor
and Employment, the Court emphatically stated
that: It is a rule of universal application, almost,
that courts of justice constituted to pass upon
substantial rights will not consider questions in
which no actual interests are involved; they
decline jurisdiction of moot cases. And where
the issue has become moot and academic, there
is no justiciable controversy, so that a
declaration thereon would be of no practical
use or value. There is no actual substantial
relief to which petitioners would be entitled and
which would be negated by the dismissal of the
petition.
Applying the above pronouncement,
there was no justiciable controversy anymore in
the instant petition in view of the expiration of
the Compromise Agreement sought to be
enforced. There was no longer any purpose in
determining whether the Court of Appeals erred
in affirming the RTC Orders dated October 31,
2001 and April 10, 2002 since any declaration
thereon would be of no practical use or value.
By the very admission of PLDT, it can no
longer be compelled to undo its act of blocking
the telecommunication calls and data from the
Philippines to Hong Kong passing through the
REACH-ETPI circuits since, effectively, there
were no more circuits to speak of.
Clearly, any decision of this Court on
the present petition, whether it be an affirmance
or a reversal of the Amended Decision of the
Court of Appeals, would be equivalent in effect
to an affirmance or an invalidation of the
challenged Orders of the RTC. But as can be
gleaned from the above discussion, and as
succinctly put by PLDT in its Memorandum,
there is nothing more for the RTC to enforce
and/or act upon. As such, any discussion on the
matter would be a mere surplusage.

Case No. 4: People vs Bartolome

GR No. 191726: February 06, 2013
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
Vs.
NOEL BARTOLOME y BAJO, AccusedAppellant.

Facts:
The informant report accused-appellant
was arrested thru buy bust operation conducted
by PO1 Borban Paras, PO3 Rodrigo Antonio,
and another member of the team; Paras were
given a P100.00 bill that he marked with his
initials BP. It was agreed that the informant
would drop a cigarette butt in front of the
suspect to identify him to Paras; and that Paras
would scratch his head to signal to the buy-bust
team that the transaction with the suspect had
been consummated. As agreed plan the accused
was arrested and seized from him are the
marked money and one (1) plastic sachet
containing 0.06 gram of
MethylamphetamineHydrocnhloride. Paras
immediately marked the sachet at the crime
scene with Bartolomes initials NBB.
The buy-bust team did not literally
observe all the requirements in the custody of
seized prohibited and regulated drugs
prescribed under the implementing rules and
regulation of RA No. 9165.
The accused claimed that the arresting officers
had framed him up because they wanted to
extort a substantial amount from him in
exchange for his release. The version of the
accused tended to show the following.
RTC convicted Bartolome of the crime
charged, which was affirmed by Court of

Remedial Law Review

Appeals.
On appeal to CA accused argued that the
operation mounted against him was not an
entrapment but an instigation, contending that
without the proposal and instigation made by
poseur buyer Paras no transaction would have
transpired between them; that the police team
did not show that its members had conducted
any prior surveillance of him; and that the
Prosecution should have presented the
informant as a witness against him and the
police officers failed to comply with the
procedure in the custody of seized prohibited
and regulated drugs as prescribed by law.
Issues:

I. Whether or not the Regional Court gravely

erred in convicting the accused of the crime
charged since he was merely instigated by
the police doing it.

II. Whether or not failure to comply with the

procedure in the custody of seized
prohibited and regulated drugs prescribed
under the implementing rules and
regulation of RA No. 9165 can be raised
first time on appeal or Invalid.
Held:
The appeal was without merit.
1. The trial judge and the CA agreed in their
findings on the arrest of the accused being the
result of a legitimate entrapment procedure.
Such findings were based on the credible
testimonies of the poseur buyer and other
competent witnesses of the Prosecution.
Indeed, the trial judges assessment of the
credibility of the witnesses is entitled to
respect. This is because of the trial judges
unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of
the witnesses as they testified before him. The
rule applies even more if, like here, the trial
judges assessment was affirmed by the CA
upon review. Without the clear and convincing
indication of the lawmens ill motive and

Assignment 10.1
irregular performance of duty, it is always good
law to presume them to have performed their
official duties in a regular manner. That
presumption became conclusive for lack of
contravention.
There is a definite distinction between
instigation and entrapment. The Court
highlighted the distinction in People v. Bayani,
20 viz:
Instigation is the means by which the accused
is lured into the commission of the offense
charged in order to prosecute him. On the other
hand, entrapment is the employment of such
ways and means for the purpose of trapping or
capturing a lawbreaker. Thus, in instigation,
officers of the law or their agents incite, induce,
instigate or lure an accused into committing an
offense which he or she would otherwise not
commit and has no intention of committing.
But in entrapment, the criminal intent or design
to commit the offense charged originates in the
mind of the accused, and law enforcement
officials merely facilitate the apprehension of
the criminal by employing ruses and schemes;
thus, the accused cannot justify his or her
conduct. In instigation, where law enforcers act
as co-principals, the accused will have to be
acquitted. But entrapment cannot bar
prosecution and conviction. As has been said,
instigation is a "trap for the unwary innocent,"
while entrapment is a "trap for the unwary
criminal. As a general rule, a buy-bust
operation, considered as a form of entrapment,
is a valid means of arresting violators of
Republic Act No. 9165

2. It is notable that pursuant to the IRR, supra, the

non-observance of the requirements may be
excused if there is a justification, provided the
integrity of the seized items as evidence is
"properly preserved by the apprehending
officer/team.
Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the
first time on appeal; when a party desires the
court to reject the evidence offered, he must so
state in the form of objection. Without such
objection, he cannot raise the question for the
first time on appeal.

Remedial Law Review

Court point out that the non-adherence to
Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165
was not a serious flaw that would make the
arrest of the accused illegal or that would
render the shabu subject of the sale by him
inadmissible as evidence against him. What
were crucial were the proper preservation of the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
shabu, inasmuch as that would be significant in
the determination of the guilt or innocence of
the accused.
Case No.5: Po vs Department of Justice
G.R. No. 195198 : February 11, 2013
LORELI LIM
PO, Petitioner, v. DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE and JASPER T.
TAN, Respondents.
Facts:
Jasper T. Tan (Tan), is a stockholder of
Coastal Highpoint Ventures, Inc. (CHVI), a real
estate development company. Antonio Ng
Chiu1 (Chiu) is its President. Tan claimed that
Loreli Lim Po (Po) is Chius personal
accountant. Po asserted otherwise and instead
alleged that she is merely a consultant for
CHVI.
Tan alleged that pertinent information
relative to CHVIs operations were withheld
from him. His repeated requests for copies of
financial statements and allowance to inspect
corporate books proved futile. Consequently, he
filed before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Cebu a complaint against Chiu and Po for
violation of Section 74(2), in relation to
Section 144 of the Corporation Code of the
Philippines, the origin of the two consolidated
petitions now before us.
The Assistant City Prosecutor Anna Lou B.
Fernandez-Cavada (Prosecutor Fernandez-

Assignment 10.1
Cavada) issued a Resolution finding probable
cause to indict Chiu and Po based on the
following grounds:cralawlibrary
Complainant, as a stockholder, is
entitled to inspect the corporate books and
records of the CHVI. The record clearly shows
that complainant had been demanding to
inspect the corporate books, records of business
and corporate reports since 13 June 2007.
Noticeably, though several demands/requests
for inspection of corporate records have been
made by the complainant, the same werenot
(sic) granted until after the month of April 2008
or roughly 10 months thereafter. The December
15, 2007 collective inspection cannot be
regarded as compliance with the request as
complainant has never agreed thereto.
?? l?br?rOn April 30, 2009, Prosecutor
Fernandez-Cavada issued a Resolution denying
Chiu and Pos motions to reconsider the
foregoing.
A petition for review was filed before
the Department of Justice (DOJ). On March 2,
2010, then Undersecretary Ricardo R.
Blancaflor issued a resolution reversing
Prosecutor Fernandez-Cavadas findings.
The Acting DOJ Secretary Alberto C.
Agra
(Secretary
Agra)
issued
a
Resolutiongranting
Tans
motion
for
reconsideration. Secretary Agra reversed the
Resolution dated March 2, 2010 and instead
affirmed Prosecutor Fernandez-Cavadas earlier
disquisition. Chiu and Pos motions for
reconsideration were denied by Secretary Agra
through a Resolution

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Chiu and Po each filed before the Court
of Appeals (CA) a Petition for Certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Po and Chius
petitions were docketed as CA-G.R. SP Nos.
05351 and 05352, respectively.CA dismissed
with finality Pos petition on technical grounds.
Chius petition was denied for lack of
merit.13 The
CA
declared
that:cralawlibraryGrave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of the DOJ was not shown in the
present case.
Here, the petitioner was criminally
charged for violating Section 74 of the
Corporation Code in relation to Section 144 of
the same Code. The requisites in order for the
penal provision under Section 144 of the
Corporation Code to apply in a case of
violation of a stockholder or members right to
inspect the corporate books/records as provided
for under Section 74 of the Corporation Code,
are enumerated in the recent case of Sy Tiong
Shiou, et al. v[.] Sy Chim, et al., citing AngBaya, et al. v[.] Ang:cralawlibrary
First. A director, trustee, stockholder or
member has made a prior demand in writing for
a copy of excerpts from the corporations
records or minutes;
Second. Any officer or agent of the
concerned corporation shall refuse to allow the
said director, trustee, stockholder or member of
the corporation to examine and copy said
excerpts;?r?l??
Issue:
Whether or not CA gravely abused its

Assignment 10.1
discretion in denying his petition "considering
that there are clear and sufficient elements
allowing the courts to conduct a judicial
review.
Held:
In the case at bar, we find no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the CA when it
rendered its Decision dated January 11, 2011.
There is ample evidence on record to
support the said decision. To name one,
accountants Crest O. Morales and Jay Ar T.
Hernandez, who were part of the Inspection
Team sent by Tan to CHVI, executed a Joint
Affidavit stating that the documents made
available to them for inspection were limited.
Further, they claimed that on the day of the
inspection,
they
brought
a
portable
photocopying machine to CHVIs premises but
they were not allowed to use the same. The
offense punishable under Section 74, in relation
to Section 144 of the Corporation Code, for
which Chiu was indicted, requires the
unjustified disallowance or refusal by a suspect,
of a stockholders written request to examine or
copy excerpts of a corporations books or
minutes. The absence of any ascribed ill
motives on the part of the aforementioned
accountants to make statements adverse or
unfavorable to Chiu lends credibility to their
declarations.
Besides, as we ruled in Metrobank, in a
preliminary investigation, the prosecutor is
bound to determine merely the existence of
probable cause that a crime has been committed
and that the accused has committed the same.
The rules do not require that a prosecutor has

Remedial Law Review

moral certainty of the guilt of a person for the
latter to be indicted for an offense after the
conduct of a preliminary investigation. Further,
we have repeatedly ruled that the determination
of probable cause, for purposes of preliminary
investigation, is an executive function. Such
determination should be free from the courts
interference save only in exceptional cases
where the DOJ gravely abuses its discretion in
the issuance of its orders or resolutions.

Case No. 6: Serrano vs Ambassador Hotel

Inc.
G.R. No. 197003

February 11, 2013

NERIE C. SERRANO, Petitioner, vs.

AMBASSADOR HOTEL, INC. and
YOLANDA CHAN, Respondents.

Facts:
Serrano was hired by Ambassador
Hotel, Inc. (AHI) in 1969 as an accountant
when the hotel was still under construction.
When hotel operations began in I971, AHI
installed Serrano as the head of the accounting
department. In I972, Serrano was tasked to
assist in the canvass and purchase of
merchandise, as well as handle the random
checking of foodstuff and bar stock inventories,
as additional duties.

An intra-corporate controversy erupted

within AHI. At the time, Chan, then the general
cashier of AHI, brought to the attention of
AHIs President, her father Simeon, the alleged
commission by Serrano of acts of

Assignment 10.1
misappropriation. Thereafter, the AHI board
met and passed several resolutions, namely: (1)
Resolution No. 6, Series of 1998, dismissing
Simeon as the President and declaring all
executive positions vacant and abolished; (2)
Resolution No. 7, Series of 1998, designating
Chan as the new president of AHI; and (3)
Resolution No. 10, Series of 1998, dismissing
Serrano for insubordination and loss of trust
and confidence.

Simeon refused to honor the foregoing

resolutions and instead barred Yolanda Chan
from entering the hotel premises. Chan, in turn,
invoked her right as a stockholder of AHI and
demanded to be given the right to inspect the
books and records of the hotel. Upon the order
of Simeon, Serrano resisted Chans demand,
prompting the latter to file a case before the
(SEC). Chans right to inspect the books was
sustained by the SEC.

Chan assumed the presidency of, and

brought her own staff to work in AHI. Soon
after, she issued Memo No. YCC-2001-2002
dated April 16, 2001, directing Serrano to
prepare a detailed account report of AHIs
assets, to turn over all of AHIs cash and bank
accounts to Chan, and to stop dealing and/or
transacting for and in behalf of the hotel. Other
than the preparation of the account report,
Serrano alleged that she was not given any job
assignment but was told to report directly and
daily to Chan. Due to this new working
arrangement, Serrano, so she claimed, was
forced to file her retirement on July 31, 2001,
30 days before its effectivity. Thereafter, she
prepared all the necessary accounting
documents for a smooth turnover.

Remedial Law Review

Serrano received a letter from Chan
stating that the former can no longer avail of
her retirement pay from AHI, since she had
already received a lump sum amount of PhP
137,205.07, and has been receiving monthly
pensions, from the Social Security System
(SSS) for retiring in May 2000. Serrano
claimed that she was not paid her 13th month
pay for the years 1999, 2000, and 2001. Even
her salary from March 1, 2000 up to August 31,
2001, she added, was not paid, together with
allowances from May 16, 2000 to February 28,
2001, service charge from August 2000 to April
2001, and service incentive leave pay for the
year 2001.

Assignment 10.1
and respondents Chan and AHI.

Second, G.R. No. 189313 and CA-G.R. SP No.

100612 both deal with the same subject matter:
Serranos entitlement to monetary benefits
under the pertinent labor laws as an employee
of respondents AHI and Chan.

Lastly, both G.R. No. 189313 and CA-G.R. SP

No. 100612 originated from one and the same
complaint lodged before the labor arbiter where
Serrano alleged the nonpayment of her salaries,
13th month pay, and retirement benefits as the
cause of action.

Issue:
Whether or not res judicata is present in this
case.

Held:
The Court ruled in the affirmative. By
the doctrine of res judicata, "a final judgment
or decree on the merits by a court of competent
jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the
parties or their privies in all later suits on all
points and matters determined in the former
suit." To apply this doctrine in the form of a
"bar by prior judgment," there must be identity
of parties, subject matter, and causes of action
as between the first case where the first
judgment was rendered and the second case
that is sought to be barred. All these requisites
are present in the case at bar:

First, the parties in both G.R. No. 189313 and

CA-G.R. SP No. 100612, which is the subject
of Our present review, are petitioner Serrano

As a necessary corollary, it was a grave

error on the part of the appellate court to render
a decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 100612 that runs
counter to the final ruling in G.R. No. 189313.
Said CA Decision offends the principle of res
judicataa basic postulate to the end that
controversies and issues once decided on the
merits by a court of competent jurisdiction shall
remain in repose.
In Gallardo-Corro v. Gallardo, We explained
that this principle of the immutability of final
judgments is an important aspect of the
administration of justice as it ensures an end to
litigations:
Nothing is more settled in law than
that once a judgment attains finality it
thereby becomes immutable and
unalterable. It may no longer be modified in
any respect, even if the modification is meant
to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous
conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of
whether the modification is attempted to be
made by the court rendering it or by the highest

Remedial Law Review

court of the land. Just as the losing party has
the right to file an appeal within the prescribed
period, the winning party also has the
correlative right to enjoy the finality of the
resolution of his case. The doctrine of finality
of judgment is grounded on fundamental
considerations of public policy and sound
practice, and that, at the risk of occasional
errors, the judgments or orders of courts must
become final at some definite time fixed by
law; otherwise, there would be no end to
litigations, thus setting to naught the main role
of courts of justice which is to assist in the
enforcement of the rule of law and the
maintenance of peace and order by settling
justiciable controversies with finality.
Case No. 7: Jimenez vs Amdengan
A.M. No. MTJ-12-1818 : February 13, 2013
[Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 10-2265-MT J-P]
ATTY.
MANUEL
J.
JIMENEZ,
JR., Complainant, v. JUDGE MICHAEL M.
AMDENGAN, Presiding Judge, Municipal
Trial Court, Angono, Rizal, Respondents.
Facts:
The plaintiff Merced, through her Atty
in fact Atty Manuel Jimenez, filed with the
MTC an ejectment Complaint against the
defendant Nelson Cana. Due to the inability of
the parties to arrive at a settlement, the case
was referred back to the MTC for trial on the
merits.
Respondent ordered the parties to file
their respective position papers within 30 days,
after which the case was to be submitted for
resolution. The parties simultaneously filed
their Position Papers under the Rules of
Summary Procedure. It was only on 17
February 2010 that respondent judge issued an
order submitting the case for decision.
On 03 March 2010, he promulgated his
ruling,in which he noted that the plaintiff had
failed to refer her Complaint to the Lupon for
the mandatory barangay conciliation

Assignment 10.1
proceedings as required under the
Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law.
Thus, her ejectment Complaint was dismissed
without prejudice. On 07 April 2010,
complainant filed the instant administrative
case charging respondent judge with (1) gross
inefficiency and negligence and (2) gross
ignorance of law and jurisprudence.
Complainant specifically alleged that
respondent was guilty of gross inefficiency for
failing to resolve the ejectment case within a
period of 30 days as mandated under the Rules
of Summary Procedure. Likewise, the latter
was charged with gross ignorance of law for
having dismissed the case on the ground of
failure to comply with
the barangay conciliation procedure.
OCA promulgated its report and
recommendation on the case. It found
respondent judge guilty of gross inefficiency
for having failed to resolve the ejectment case
within the prescribed 30-day period after the
filing of the parties respective Position Papers,
pursuant to Rule 70 of the Rules of Court and
the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure. As he had incurred a one-month
delay in resolving the ejectment case, it
recommended that he be fined P20,000
pursuant to Sections 9 and 11, Rule 140 of the
Rules of Court. OCA promulgated its report
and recommendation on the case. It found
respondent judge guilty of gross inefficiency
for having failed to resolve the ejectment case
within the prescribed 30-day period after the
filing of the parties respective Position Papers,
pursuant to Rule 70 of the Rules of Court and
the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure. As he had incurred a one-month
delay in resolving the ejectment case, it
recommended that he be fined P20,000
pursuant to Sections 9 and 11, Rule 140 of the
Rules of Court.
Issue:
Whether or Not the respondent committed
undue delay in rendering a Decision in the
subject ejectment Complaint.
Held:
The Court ruled in the affirmative. An action

Remedial Law Review

Assignment 10.1

for ejectment is governed by the Rules of

Summary Procedure, Section 10 of which
provides:cralawlibrary

than one ( 1) nor more than three (3) months, or

a fine of more than P1 0,000 but not exceeding
P20,000.

Sec. 10. Rendition of judgment.- Within thirty

(30) days after receipt of the last affidavits and
position papers, or the expiration of the period
for filing the same, the court shall render
judgment.

Case No.8: People vs Valdez

However should the court find it necessary to

clarify certain material facts, it may, during the
said period, issue an order specifying the
matters to be clarified, and require the parties to
submit affidavits or other evidence on the said
matters within ten (10) days from receipt of
said order. Judgment shall be rendered within
fifteen (15) days after the receipt of the last
clarificatory affidavits, or the expiration of the
period for filing the same.
The court shall not resort to the clarificatory
procedure to gain time for the rendition of the
judgment. Such provision is mandatory,
considering the nature of an ejectment case.
Despite the simultaneous submissions of the
parties respective Position Papers on 04
January 2010, respondent judge through an
Order dated 17 February 2010 still submitted
the case for decision. By that time, the
mandatory period of 30 days within which to
render judgment on the case had already
lapsed. By issuing the Order dated 17 February
2010 purportedly submitting the case for
decision, he was subverting Section 10 of the
Rules on Summary Procedure. Respondent
considered his Order the start of the 30-day
period within which to render a decision. The
ruling was already due on 04 February 2010,
reckoned from the date the parties last filed
their respective Position Papers. He could not
have extended the period by the mere issuance
of an Order, when the rules clearly provide for
a mandatory period within which to decide a
case. Hence, he was guilty of undue delay in
rendering a decision.
Under Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of
Court, undue delay in rendering a decision or
an order is classified as a less serious charge,
punishable by either suspension from office
without salary and other benefits for not less

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

G.R. No. 175

Plaintiff-Appellee,
- versus
PO2 EDUARDO VALDEZ and EDWIN
VALDEZ,
Accused-Appellants.
Facts:
The accused Edwin and Eduardo were
tried for three counts of murder by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC). The RTC convicted them as
charged, prescribed on each of them the penalty
of reclusion perpetua for each count. The
Court of Appeals (CA) upheld the RTC.
The two accused then came to the Court
on final appeal, but on May 9, 2007, Edwin
Valdez
filed
a motion
to
withdraw
appeal, which the Court granted, thereby
deeming Edwins appeal closed and
terminated.1
The Court rendered its judgment on the
appeal of PO2 Eduardo Valdez, finding him
guilty of three counts of homicide, instead of
three counts of murder, and meting on him for
each count of homicide the indeterminate
sentence of 10 years of prision mayor as
minimum to 17 years of reclusion temporal as
maximum.
Subsequently, Edwin sent to the Court

Remedial Law Review

Administrator a self-explanatory letter, where
he pleaded for the application to him of the
judgment promulgated on Eduardo on the
ground that the judgment would be beneficial
to him as an accused.

Assignment 10.1
deny to him the benefit of the lessened criminal
responsibilities would be highly unfair,
considering that this Court had found the two
accused to have acted in concert in their deadly
assault against the victims, warranting their
equal liabiliy under the principle of conspiracy.

The Solicitor General interposed no

opposition to the plea for the reduction of
Edwins sentences for being in full accord with
the Rules of Court and pertinent jurisprudence.
Issue:
Whether or not the co-accused was
allowed to have his sentence reduced even
though his appeal was closed and terminated.
Held:The final judgment promulgated on
January 18, 2012 downgraded the crimes
committed by Eduardo from three counts of
murder to three counts of homicide, and
consequently prescribed lighter penalties in the
form of indeterminate sentences. As a result,
Eduardo would serve only an indeterminate
sentence of 10 years of prision mayor as
minimum to 17 years of reclusion temporal as
maximum, under which he can qualify for
parole in due course by virtue of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, instead of
suffering the indivisible penalty of reclusion
perpetua for each count.
Edwin cannot be barred from seeking
the application to him of the downgrading of
the crimes committed (and the resultant lighter
penalties) despite the finality of his convictions
for three counts of murder due to his
withdrawal of his appeal. The downgrading of
the crimes committed would definitely be
favorable to him. Worth pointing out is that to

Case No. 9: People vs Veloso

G.R. No. 188849
2013

February 13,

PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JONATHAN "UTO" VELOSO y
RAMA, Accused-Appellant.
Facts:
On April 4, 2002, at around 12:00 noon,
appellant went looking for BBBs brother.
He went to BBBs house asking her to
accompany him to her brothers house.
Since BBB was indisposed, she declined.
Appellant then insisted that AAA, BBBs
daughter, accompany him instead. BBB
consented. Thus, AAA with CCC, BBBs
nephew, left the house with appellant.
Instead of taking a padyak or
tricycle, appellant opted to take a boat. It
was while they were in the middle of the
river that appellant threatened to hit CCC
with a paddle if he would not jump off the
boat. Immediately after CCC jumped off
the boat, appellant steered the boat
towards the riverbank and pulled AAA out
of the boat. Thereafter, appellant made
AAA lie in the water lily- and grass-covered
banks and proceeded to violate her, all the
while threatening to drown her. AAA tried
to fight appellant but was unsuccessful.

Remedial Law Review

After satisfying his lust twice, appellant
boxed AAA on her face, lips, stomach and
thighs. Appellant kicked AAA on the
stomach, slapped and smashed her face to
the ground, and choked her until she
became unconscious.

After considering the evidence presented

by both parties, the RTC rendered the
March 6, 2007 Decision finding appellant
guilty of the crime of rape.
Issue:
Whether or not the appellant was guilty
beyond reasonable doubt.
Held:
The appellant was found guilty.
The applicable law in this case is Article
266-A of the Revised Penal Code, which
states that:
Art. 266-A. Rape, When and How
Committed. Rape is committed
1. By a man who shall have carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:
a. Through force, threat or intimidation;
b. When the offended party is deprived of
reason or is otherwise unconscious;
c. By means of fraudulent machination or
grave abuse of authority;
d. When the offended party is under twelve
(12) years of age or is demented, even
though none of the circumstances
mentioned above be present.
2. By any person who, under any of the
circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1
hereof, shall commit an act of sexual

Assignment 10.1
assault by inserting his penis into another
persons mouth or anal orifice, or any
instrument or object, into the genital or
anal orifice of another person.
The law does not impose a burden
on the rape victim to prove resistance.
What has to be proved by the prosecution
is the use of force or intimidation by the
accused in having sexual intercourse with
the victim.
Alibi is an inherently weak defense
because it is easy to fabricate and highly
unreliable. To merit approbation, the
accused must adduce clear and convincing
evidence that he was in a place other than
the situs criminis at the time the crime was
committed, such that it was physically
impossible for him to have been at the
scene of the crime when it was committed.
Since alibi is a weak defense for being
easily fabricated, it cannot prevail over and
is worthless in the face of the positive
identification by a credible witness that an
accused perpetrated the crime.
Being corrective in nature,
exemplary damages, therefore, can be
awarded, not only in the presence of an
aggravating circumstance, but also where
the circumstances of the case show the
highly reprehensible or outrageous conduct
of the offender. In much the same way as
Article 2230 prescribes an instance when
exemplary damages may be awarded,
Article 2229, the main provision, lays down
the very basis of the award. The Court
awarded exemplary damages to set a public
example, to serve as deterrent to elders
who abuse and corrupt the youth, and to
protect the latter from sexual abuse.
Case No.10: LandBank of the Philippines vs
Spouses Placido and Clara Dy Orilla
G.R. No. 194168 February 13, 2013

Remedial Law Review

Facts:
The Provincial DARAB affirmed the
valuation made by the LBP for the taking of the
parcel of land of Sps. Orilla. Not content with
the decision, Sps. Orillafiled an action for the
determination of just compensation before the
RTC sitting as a Special Agrarian Court
(SAC).
SAC fixed the just compensation of the
land of petitioner subject matter of the
instant action at P7.00 per square meter.
LBP filed a Notice of Appeal. On the other
hand,Sps. Orilla filed a Motion for
Execution Pending Appeal
The SAC issued an Order granting the
Motion for Execution Pending AppealThe
LBP filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
which was likewise denied Thus, the LBP
filed with the CA a special civil action for
certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court with prayer for issuance
of a temporary restraining order It
questioned the propriety of the SAC Order
granting the execution pending appeal.
The CA dismissed the petition on the
ground that the assailed SAC Order
granting execution pending appeal was
consistent with justice, fairness, and equity,
as respondents had been deprived of the use
and possession of their property and are
entitled to be immediately compensated
with the amount as determined by the SAC
under the principle of prompt payment of
just compensation.
Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, but it was
denied.Petitioner then sought recourse
before the SC, which affirmed the CA.
Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, but was denied with

Assignment 10.1
finality by the Court.
Meanwhile, the CA rendered a Decision
granting the appeal filed by the petitioner.
It held that there was no valid and sufficient
legal basis for the SAC in fixing the just
compensation for the subject property at
P1,479,023.00.
The SC affirmed the decision of the
SAC and the CA that should the SAC find
upon recomputation that the just
compensation previously rendered is bigger
than the recomputed value, the petitionersappellees are ordered to return the excess
considering that payment may already have
been given by LBP in pursuant to the
finality of the motion for execution pending
appeal. The LBP filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration
Argued that by annulling the SAC decision
and, consequently, remanding the case to the
trial court, the latters decision was voided and,
therefore, it could no longer be executed. The
CA denied LBPs motion. The CA held that the
issue of the validity of the writ of execution
was already resolved by the Supreme Court
with finality
Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in holding
that the RTCs decision, which was
annulled and set aside can still be the
subject of execution.
Held:
The Court ruled in the negative.
As a rule, avoid judgment or order has
no legal and binding effect, force or efficacy
for any purpose. In contemplation of law, it is

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non-existent. Accordingly, a void judgment is
no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of
any right nor of any obligation. All acts
performed pursuant to it and all claims
emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence,
it can never become final, and any writ of
execution based on it is void.
As correctly maintained by petitioner,
since the valuation made by the SAC in its
Decision having been annulled by the CA for
its lack of sufficient and legal basis, the void
judgment can never be validly executed.
It must be pointed out that the situation
contemplated by the CA in the assailed
Decision was one wherein payment has already
been made by petitioner to the respondents
during the pendency of the appeal. Nowhere in
the disquisition of the CA can it be inferred that
it is enjoining the LBP to enforce the writ of
execution in accordance with the valuation
made by the SAC. On the contrary, the CA
respected the finality of the motion for
execution pending appeal should the same have
already been enforced.
This is without prejudice to the outcome
of the case which was remanded to the SAC for
recomputation of just compensation. Should
the SAC find the said valuation too low and
determine a higher valuation for the subject
property, petitioner should pay respondents the
difference. Conversely, should the SAC
determine that the valuation was too high,
respondents should return the excess. To be
sure, the concept of just compensation
embraces not only the correct determination of
the amount to be paid to the owners of the land,
but also payment within a reasonable time from
its taking. Without prompt payment,
compensation cannot be considered just

Assignment 10.1
inasmuch as the property owner is made to
suffer the consequences of being immediately
deprived of his land while being made to wait
for a decade or more before actually receiving
the amount necessary to cope with his loss.

Case No 11. Fortun vs. Quinsayas

G.R. No. 188969 February 27, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PlaintiffAppellee,
v.
JOHN ALVIN PONDIVIDA, AccusedAppellant.
Facts:
The case involves a Petition for
Contempt filed against the collective
respondents following the publication of the
details surrounding a disbarment complaint
filed against herein petioner, who represents the
Respondents in the Maguindanao massacre
case.
The petitioner contends that disbarment
proceedings must be kept confidential, pursuant
to Sec 18, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court

Details of the case for disbarment filed against

Fortun was published and aired by the media
practitioners impleaded in the case. As their
defense, they pointed to Atty. Quinsayas as the
person who gave them copies of the disbarment
complaint on November 32, 2010, one year
after the Maguindanao massacre took place.
Most of the respondents also contended
that they deemed the complaint to be
newsworthy and thus should be covered by
freedom of the press and expression.
Other civilian respondents claimed the

Remedial Law Review

defense that they were not the ones responsible
for the dissimination of the complaint.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondents violated the
confidentiality rule of disbarment proceedings.
Held:The court held that the respondents, save
from Atty Quinsayas, who distributed copies of
the disbarment complaints to the media as she
was filing such complaint was not guilty.
With regard to the media practitioners
impleaded in the proceedings, the court deemed
the publication and airing of the details of the
disbarment proceedings as being protected by
the Constitution. The court said that Contempt
charge filed by the petitioner is in the nature of
criminal contempt and hence, there should be
evidence of intention to commit it. Meaning,
good faith, which most of the respondents were
able to prove absolves the respondents.
Further, the court, in citing People vs
Castelo, said that contempt is akin to libel and
the principle of privileged communication may
be invoked in contempt proceedings. It held,
The same safeguard should be extended to one
whether anchored in freedom of the press or
freedom of expression. Therefore, this principle
regarding privileged communications can also
be invoked in favor of appellant.
As for Atty. Quinsayas, her active participation
in the distribution of the complaint to the media
rendered her guilty of violation of Sec 18. Rule
139-B of the Rules of Court and was fined
P20,000.00.

Case No.13: Dela Cruz vs Planters Product

SPOUSES QUIRINO V. DELA CRUZ and
GLORIA
DELA
CRUZ,v.PLANTERS
PRODUCTS, INC.,
G.R. No. 158649, February 18, 2013

Assignment 10.1
Facts:
Petitioners
operated the Barangay
Agricultural Supply. At the time material to the
case, Quirino, a lawyer, was the Municipal
Mayor of Aliaga, Nueva Ecija.
Gloria applied for and was granted by
respondent Planters Products, Inc. (PPI) a
regular credit line of P200,000.00 for a 60- day
term, with trust receipts as collaterals. Spouses
submitted a list of their assets in support of her
credit application for participation in the
Special Credit Scheme (SCS) of PPI. Gloria
signed in the presence of the PPI distribution
officer/assistant sales representative "Trust
Receipt/Special Credit Scheme," indicating the
invoice number, quantity, value, and names of
the agricultural inputs she received "upon the
trust" of PPI. Gloria thereby subscribed to
specific undertakings.The products were
released to Gloria under the supervision of
Cristina G. Llanera of PPI.
The 60-day credit term lapsed without
Gloria paying her obligation under the Trust
Receipt/SCS. Hence, PPI wrote collection
letters to her. PPI issued a demand letter stating
that the total accountability of Gloria all of
which she should pay by June 18, 1980. PPI
warned that should she fail to do so, PPI would
file the "necessary civil and criminal cases"
against her "based on the Trust Receipts."
PPI brought against petitioner with the
Court of First Instance a complaint for the
recovery of a sum of money with prayer for a
writ of preliminary attachment. PPI alleged that
Gloria had violated the "fiduciary undertaking
in the Trust Receipt agreement covering
product withdrawals under the Special Credit

Remedial Law Review

Scheme which were subsequently charged to
defendant dealers regular credit line; therefore,
she is guilty of fraudulently misapplying or
converting to her own use the items delivered
to her as contained in the invoices." It charged
that Gloria did not return the goods indicated in
the invoices and did not remit the proceeds of
sales.
The RTC ordered the petitioners to pay
PPI. The RTC found that based on the terms
and conditions of the SCS Program, a creditordebtor relationship was created between Gloria
and PPI; that her liability was predicated on
Section 4 of the Trust Receipts Law
(Presidential Decree No. 115) and on the ruling
in Robles v. Court of Appeals to the effect that
the failure of the entrustee (Gloria) to turn over
to the entruster (plaintiff) the proceeds of the
sale of goods covered by the delivery trust
receipts or to return the goods constituted
estafa punishable under Article 315(1)(b) of the
Revised Penal Code; and that the petitioners
could not use as a defense the occurrence of
typhoon Kading because there was no privity of
contract between the participating farmers and
PPI. The CA affirmed the RTC judgment.It
ruled that petitioner is liable because a creditordebtor relationship existed between the parties.
A petition for review on certiorari was filed by
the petitioners with the SC.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA grave reversible error in
affirming the decision of the RTC
notwithstanding that the award to PPI was
based on hearsay evidence, leaving absolutely
no other evidence to support the award.
Held:

Assignment 10.1
With Exhibit V being a private document,
authentication pursuant to the rules on evidence
was a condition for its admissibility. Llanera,
admittedly the person who had prepared the
document, was competent to testify on the due
execution and authenticity of Exhibit V. Such
authentication was done in accordance with
Rule 132 of theRules of Court, whose Section
20 states:
Section 20. Proof of private document.
Before any private document offered as
authentic is received in evidence, its due
execution and authenticity must be proved
either:
(a)By anyone who saw the document
executed or written; or
(b)By evidence of the genuineness of
the signature or handwriting of the
maker.
Any other private document need only be
identified as that which it is claimed to be.
Further, the petitioners dispute the
contents of Exhibit V by invoking Section 43,
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which states
that Entries made at, or near the time of the
transactions to which they refer, by a person
deceased, or unable to testify, who was in a
position to know the facts therein stated, may
be received as prima facie evidence, if such
person made the entries in his professional
capacity or in the performance of duty and in
the ordinary or regular course of business.
The invocation of the rule is misplaced,
however, because the rule speaks of a situation
where the person who made the entries is dead
or unable to testify, which was not the situation
here. Regardless, we have to point out that

Remedial Law Review

entries made in the course of business enjoy the
presumption
of
regularity. If
properly
authenticated, the entries serve as evidence of
the status of the account of the petitioners.
In Land Bank v. Monets Export and
Manufacturing Corporation, the Court has
explained that such entries are accorded
unusual reliability because their regularity and
continuity are calculated to discipline record
keepers in the habit of precision; and that if the
entries are financial, the records are routinely
balanced and audited; hence, in actual
experience, the whole of the business world
function in reliance of such kind of records.
Nor have the petitioners proved that the
entries contained in Exhibit V were incorrect
and untruthful. They cannot be permitted to do
so now at this stage of final appeal, especially
after the lower courts found and accepted the
statement of account contained therein to be
properly authenticated and trustworthy. Indeed,
the Court is in no position to review and
overturn the lower courts unanimous finding
and acceptance without strong and valid
reasons because they involved an issue of fact.

Assignment 10.1
presented for payment on 13 April 2000, the
check was dishonored for having been drawn
against insufficient funds. Despite three (3)
written demands, petitioner failed to make good
of the check. This prompted SMC to file a
criminal case for violation of Batas
PambansaBlg. 22 and estafa against petitioners
with the Office of the Prosecutor in Quezon
City on 14 March 2001.
Petitioners maintained that their
checking account was funded under an
automatic transfer arrangement, whereby funds
from their joint savings account with AsiaTrust
Bank were automatically transferred to their
checking account with said bank whenever a
check they issued was presented for payment.
Petitioners filed an action for specific
performance and damages against AsiaTrust
Bank, Guevarra, SMC, etc . Petitioners alleged
that AsiaTrust Bank and Guevarra unlawfully
garnished and debited their bank accounts; that
their obligation to SMC had been extinguished.
Petitioners assert that the issues they have
raised in the civil action constitute a bar to the
prosecution of the criminal case for violation of
Batas PambansaBlg. 22 and estafa.
Issue:
Whether or not there is a prejudicial
question that justifies the order of the DOJ to
suspend the criminal proceedings.
Held:

Case No.15: SPOUSES ARGOVAN AND

FLORIDA GADITANO, Petitioners, v. SAN
MIGUEL CORPORATION, Respondent.
G.R. No. 188767, July 24, 2013
Facts:
Spouses ArgovanGaditano (Argovan)
and Florida Gaditano (Florida), who were
engaged in the business of buying and selling
beer and softdrink products, purchased beer
products from San Miguel Corporation (SMC)
in the amount of P285,504.00 on 7 April 2000.
Petitioners paid through a check signed by
Florida and drawn against ArgovansAsiaTrust
Bank Current Account. When said check was

The Court agreed with the Court of

Appeals that the DOJ abused its discretion
when it affirmed the prosecutors suspension of
the criminal investigation due to the existence
of an alleged prejudicial question.
The material facts surrounding the civil
case bear no relation to the criminal
investigation being conducted by the
prosecutor. The prejudicial question in the civil
case involves the dishonor of another check.
SMC is not privy to the nature of the alleged
materially altered check leading to its dishonor
and the eventual garnishment of petitioners
savings account. The source of the funds of
petitioners savings account is no longer SMCs
concern. The matter is between petitioners and

Remedial Law Review

AsiaTrust Bank. On the other hand, the issue in
the preliminary investigation is whether
petitioners issued a bad check to SMC for the
payment of beer products.
The Court ruled that the resolution of
the issue raised in the civil action is not
determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
accused in the criminal investigation against
them. There is no necessity that the civil case
be determined first before taking up the
criminal complaints.
Case No. 17: MACARIO DIAZ CARPIO,
Petitioner, vs COURT OF APPEALS,
SPOUSES GELACIO G. ORIA AND
MARCELINA PRE ORIA, Respondents.
GR 183102; February 27, 2013
Facts:
Spouses Gelacio and Marcelina Oria
(respondents Oria) encroached on a land
belonging to Petitioner Macario Carpio
(Carpio) who demanded that respondents return
the allegedly encroached portion and pay
monthly rent. Petitioner filed an action for
unlawful detainer before the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC) of Muntinlupa City, Branch 80,
which dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction. The case was appealed to the RTC
which affirmed the dismissal. However, in a
Petition for Review before it, the CA held that
the RTC should not have dismissed the case,
but should have tried it as one for accion
publiciana, as if it had originally been filed
with the RTC, pursuant to paragraph 1 of
Section 8, Rule 40 of the 1997 Rules of Court.

The case was remanded to the RTC

pursuant to the CA ruling. The trial court
rendered a Decision finding that respondents
Oria had encroached on the property of
Carpio.Petitioner then filed a Motion for
Immediate Execution. Thereafter, the
respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration

Assignment 10.1
of the Decision of the RTC. The RTC issued its
assailed Omnibus Order denying the Motion
for Reconsideration and simultaneously
granting the Motion for Immediate Execution
of the judgment.
The respondents questioned the findings
of the RTC and appealed before the CA.
Pending appeal; the Sheriff implemented the
writ and levied the subject properties. Petitioner
is now, in the instant Petition, seeking the
dismissal of the appeal filed by the respondents
on the ground of mootness.
Issue: Whether the case for accion publiciana
on appeal with the CA has been rendered moot
and academic by the intervening
implementation of the writ of execution of the
RTC Decision pursuant to the trial courts
Omnibus Order, although the Order was later
annulled with finality by this Court.
Held:
Under Section 2, Rule 39:The trial
court, in the exercise of its discretionary power
to issue a writ of execution pending appeal,
must strictly comply with the requirement for
the statement of a good reason. In the case at
hand, the RTC did not state and specify the
basis for the issuance of such writ. No cause
was written in the order granting the writ
thereby violating substantial law.
Since the writ of execution was
manifestly void for having been issued without
compliance with the rules, it is without any
legal effect. In other words, it is as if no writ
was issued at all. Consequently, all actions
taken pursuant to the void writ of execution
must be deemed to have not been taken and to
have had no effect.Hence, petitioners argument
that the appeal is moot and academic, because
what it seek to prevent has already been
executed, does not hold water. On the contrary,
the practical effect of the voidness of the writ
of execution is that it would be as if the levy,

Remedial Law Review

and the auction held pursuant to it, never
happened. That the void writ has already been
satisfied does not perforce clothe it, and all
actions taken pursuant to it, with validity.
Moreover, even assuming that the writ
of execution in the instant case were not void,
the execution of the RTC judgment cannot be
considered as a supervening event that would
automatically moot the issues in the appealed
case for accion publiciana, which is pending
before the CA. On the contrary, the Rules of
Court in fact provides for cases of reversal or
annulment of an executed judgment. Section 5
of Rule 39 provides that in those cases, there
should be restitution or reparation as warranted
by justice and equity. Therefore, barring any
supervening event, there is still the possibility
of the appellate courts reversal of the appealed
decision even if already executed.

Case No.18: Limocem Inc vs Abainza

G.R. No. 199781

February 18, 2013

LICOMCEN, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
ENGR. SALVADOR ABAINZA, doing
business under the name and style "ADS
INDUSTRIAL EQUIPMENT", Respondent.

Facts:

Assignment 10.1
Respondent filed an action for sum of
money and damages against Liberty
Commercial Center, Inc. (Liberty). Respondent
alleged that in 1997 and 1998, he was hired by
Liberty to do various projects in their
commercial centers, mainly at the LCC Central
Mall, Naga City, for the supply, fabrication, and
installation of air-conditioning ductworks.
Respondent completed the project, which
included some changes and revisions of the
original plan at the behest of Liberty. However,
despite several demands by respondent, Liberty
failed to pay the remaining balance due on the
project in the sum of P1,777,202.80. Liberty
denied the material allegations of the complaint
and countered that the collection suit was not
filed against the real party-in-interest. Thus,
respondent amended his complaint to include
petitioner
as
defendant.5
The
HRD
Administrative Manager of Liberty testified
that petitioner LICOMCEN, Inc. is a sister
company of Liberty and that the incorporators
and directors of both companies are the same.

The trial court rendered its decision in

favor of the plaintiff and against defendant
LICOMCEN, Inc. ordering the latter to pay the
plaintiff the sum of Php1,777,202.80 as its
principal obligation with interest at 12% per
annum until the amount is fully paid, the sum
of Php50,000.00 as attorneys fess and
Php20,000.00 as litigation and incidental
expenses. The Court of Appeal affirmed
decision of the Regional Trial Court.

Issue:

Remedial Law Review

Whether or not the petitioner is liable

for the additional costs incurred for labor,
materials, and equipment on the revised
project.

Held:
In this case, petitioner invoked Article
1724 of the Civil Code as a defense against
respondents claim. Petitioner alleged that
respondent cannot recover additional costs
since the agreement in the change of plans and
specifications of the project, the pricing and
cost of materials and labor was not in writing.

The Court of Appeals mistakenly stated

that petitioner only raised Article 1724 of the
Civil Code as a defense on appeal. A perusal of
the records reveals that, although petitioner did
not invoke Article 1724 of the Civil Code as a
defense in its answer or in its pre-trial brief,
petitioner belatedly asserted such defense in its
Memorandum filed before the trial court. Thus,
from its previous defense that it has fully paid
its obligations to respondent, petitioner
changed its theory by adding that since the
additional work done by respondent was not
authorized in writing, then respondent cannot
recover additional costs. In effect, petitioner
does not deny that additional costs were
incurred due to the change of plans in the
original project, but justifies not paying for
such expense by invoking Article 1724 of the
Civil Code.

Assignment 10.1
It is evident from the records that the
original contract agreement, submitted by
respondent as evidence, which stated a total
contract price of P5,300,000, was never signed
by the parties considering that there were
substantial changes in the plan imposed by
petitioner in the course of the work on the
project. Petitioner admitted paying P6,700,000
to respondent which was allegedly the agreed
cost of the project. However, petitioner did not
submit any written contract signed by both
parties which would substantiate its claim that
the agreed cost of the project was only
P6,700,000. Clearly, petitioner cannot invoke
Article 1724 of the Civil Code to avoid paying
its obligation considering that the alleged
original contract was never even signed by both
parties because of the various changes imposed
by petitioner on the original plan. The fact that
petitioner paid P1,400,000 more than the
amount stated in the unsigned contract
agreement clearly indicates that there were
indeed additional costs during the course of the
work on the project. It is just unfortunate that
petitioner is now invoking Article 1724 of the
Civil Code to avoid further payment of the
additionaal costs incurred on the project.

What was established in the trial court

was that petitioner ordered the changes in the
original plan which entailed additional costs in
labor and materials. The work done by
respondent was closely monitored and
supervised
by
petitioners
engineering
consultant and all the paper works relating to
the project were approved by petitioner through
its representatives. We find no justifiable reason
to deviate from the findings and ruling of the

Remedial Law Review

trial court, which were also upheld by the Court
of Appeals. Thus, petitioner should be held
liable for the additional costs incurred for labor,
materials, and equipment on the revised
project.
Case No.19: Fernandez vs CA
ETHELWOLDO E. FERNANDEZ,
ANTONIO A. HENSON AND ANGEL S.
ONG, Complainants, v. COURT OF
APPEALS ASSOCIATE JUSTICES
RAMON M. BATO, JR., ISAIAS P.
DICDICAN AND EDUARDO B. PERALTA,
JR., Respondents.
Facts:
Plaintiffs claimed to be stockholders of
record of the Nationwide Development
Corporation (NADECOR), sought to annul the
stockholders meeting dated 15 August 2011 by
filing SEC Case No. 11-164 in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 159.
Plaintiffs alleged that they were not given prior
notice of the stockholders meeting, and thus
failed to attend the same and to exercise their
right to participate in the management and
control of NADECOR. The RTC agreed with
the plaintiffs Ricafort and declared that the
Stockholders Meeting held on August 15, 2011
is NULL and VOID.
Four separate petitions for certiorari
were forthwith filed in the CA by some
members of the new Board and by NADECOR
to assail the validity of the RTC order, all with
application for a temporary restraining order
(TRO) and/or a writ of preliminary injunction.
th

The 15 Division of the CA denied the

application for TRO and/or preliminary
injunction in CA-G.R. SP No. 122782. On the
same day, however, the 11th Division issued a
TRO in CA-G.R. SP No. 122784. The 15th
Division ordered the consolidation of all four

Assignment 10.1
CA petitions.
On June 13, 2012, the announced
annual meeting of NADECORs stockholders
was held. Midway through the meeting,
however, they received a facsimile copy of the
now assailed Resolution of the CAs Special
14th Division, granting the writ of preliminary
injunction.
Complainants Fernandez, Henson and
Ong filed with the Supreme Court a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition, G.R. No. 202257,
seeking to annul the writ of preliminary
injunction issued by the CAs Special 14th
Division. The Supreme Court dismissed the
complainants petition for lack of personality
because they were non-parties and strangers to
the consolidated CA petitions.
The complainants also filed with the
Supreme Court the present Administrative
Case, A.M. OCA IPI No. 12-201-CA-J, against
the members of the former Special 14th
Division of the CA, namely: Justices Dicdican,
Chairman; Bato, Senior Member; and Peralta,
Junior Member, charging them with grave
misconduct, conduct detrimental to the service,
gross ignorance of the law, gross incompetence,
and manifest partiality
Issue:
Whether or not Complainants have
personality to assail the writ of preliminary
injunction, and thus institute administrative
proceedings against the justices of the CA.
Held:
The Court ruled in the negative. Under
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, there are three
ways by which administrative proceedings may
be instituted against justices of the CA and the
Sandiganbayan and judges of regular and
special courts: (1) motu proprio by the

Remedial Law Review

Assignment 10.1

Supreme Court; (2) upon verified complaint (as

in this complaint) with affidavits of persons
having personal knowledge of the facts alleged
therein or by documents which may
substantiate said allegations; or (3) upon an
anonymous complaint supported by public
records of indubitable integrity.

Facts:

In this case, complainants have no

personality to assail the writ of preliminary
injunction issued by the CAs former Special
14th Division since they were not parties in the
lower court. Thus, they are not permitted to
harass the CA Justices who issued the same.
For even granting that the issuance of the writ
was erroneous, as a matter of public policy a
magistrate cannot be held administratively
liable for every discretionary but erroneous
order he issues. The settled rule is that a Judge
cannot be held to account civilly, criminally or
administratively for an erroneous decision
rendered by him in good faith. The issuance of
the writ of preliminary injunction in the
consolidated CA petitions was discretionary,
interlocutory and preservative in nature, and
equally importantly, it was a collective and
deliberated action of the former Special 14th
Division. Moreover, as an established rule, an
administrative, civil or criminal action against a
judge cannot be a substitute for an appeal.

Agra provided a different version of the

facts. He represented that he was the then
Government Corporate Counsel when President
Arroyo designated an Acting Solicitor General
and he then relinquished his position as the
Government Corporate Counsel, and that the
pending appointment of her successor, Agra
continued to perform his duties as Acting
Solicitor General.

Case No. 20: Funa vs Agra

Dennis A.B. Funa, Petitoner,
vs.
Acting Secretary of Justice Alberto C. Agra
GR No. 191644

President Gloria Macapagal appointed Agra

as acting Secretary of Justice following the
resignation of Secretary Agnes in order to vie
for the congressional seat in Quezon Province.
The petitioner, in his capacity as tax payer,
concerned citizen and a lawyer, filed a suit to
challenge the constitutionality of Agra's
concurrent appointment and claimed that it was
prohibited under Sec. 13, Art VII of the 1987
Constitution.

Notwithstanding the conflicting versions

of the parties, the fact that Agra has admitted
the two offices was sufficient to resolve the
subject of the action.

Issue:
Whether the designation of Agra as Acting
Secretary of Justice concurrently with his
position as Acting Solicitor General violated
the constitutional prohibition against dual or
multiple offices for the members of the cabinet,
and their deputies and assistants.
Held:
The Court ruled in the affirmative. The
power of judicial review is subject to
limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual
controversy calling for the exercise of judicial
review; (2) the person challenging the act must
prove standing to avail the validity of the
subject act or issuance, that is, he must have a
personal and interest in the case or will sustain
direct injury as a result of the enforcement; (3)
the question of constitutionality must be raised
at the earliest opportunity, and (4) the issue of
constitutionality must be the list mota of the

Remedial Law Review

case.
Here the OSG does not dispute the
justifiability and ripeness for consideration on
the court of the matter received by the
petitioner. Also, locus standing of the petitioner
as a tax payer, concerned citizen and a lawyer
to bring the suit of this nature has already been
settled
The primary functions of the DOJ
considering that the nature and duties of the
two officer are ought to render it improper for
one person to retain both an incompatibility
between the officers exist further warranting
the declaration of Agra's designation as void for
being in express violation of the provisions of
the Constitution.

Case No.21: Tejada vs People

REYNANTE TADEJA, RICKYT A DEJA,
RICARDO TADEJA andFERDINAND
TADEJA,Petitioners,
vs
PEOPLEOF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
Facts:
Petitioners alleged that Ruben and his
sons, Russell and Robenson Bernardo, went to
the barangay plaza shortly after Rusell had
been twice prevented by barangay tanods from
entering the dance hall due to his drunken state
and inappropriate attire (no upper garment).
Ruben was brandishing a knife and cursing at
the crowd. The Bernardos challenged
Reynante,.Reynante's brothers (Ricky, Ricardo,
and Ferdinand) testified that they were together
at their mother's house at the time.
An Information for homicide for the

Assignment 10.1
death of Ruben was filed against Reynante,
Ricky, Ricardo, Ferdinand, and Plaridelwas
filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 44,
Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro (RTC).
Meanwhile, Reynante filed a complaint for
frustrated homicide against Russell and
Robensonbefore the RTC. Both cases were
tried jointly.
The RTC issued a Decision inthe
homicide case finding Reynante, Ferdinand,
Plaridel, Ricardo and Ricky gCuilty beyond
reasonable doubt of homicide.
The RTC acquitted Russell and Robenson of
frustrated homicide in its 14 July 1997
Decision. Except for Plaridel, who absconded,
all the other accused (petitioners herein)
appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA
issued a decision affirming the findings and
Decision of the RTC in . Petitioners moved for
reconsideration and submitted the transcripts of
the testimonies of Leticia Bernardo, Maria
Regina Cortuna (Regina), and Eduardo Eraso,
whose testimonies were missing from the
records of the case forwarded to the CA. The
CA denied the motion for reconsideration.
Petitioners then filed with the Supreme Court a
Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, seeking to set aside the CA Decision
and Resolution. The Court affirmed the
decision and resolution of CA.

Petitioners filed a Motion with Leave of

Courtto Vacate Judgment, invoking the power
of the Supreme Court to suspendits own rules
for the purpose of substantial justice and to
remand the case tothe RTC for further reception
of evidence.
Later, petitioners filed a Supplemental Motion
to Motion with Leaveof Court to Vacate
Judgment Due to Supervening Event alleging
that on 29November 2006, the Mamburao
Municipal Police Force of OccidentalMindoro

Remedial Law Review

finally arrested Plaridel. Attached was the Spot
Report Re Apprehension of a Long Time
Wanted Person. Also attached was a statement,
executed by Plaridel with theassistance of Atty.
CiriloTejoso, Jr. admitting therein that he had
killedRuben. With the arrest of Plaridel and his
account of what happened, petitioners argued
that the situation called for the application of
the rules onnewly discovered evidence, which
provided grounds for a new trial. Sincethe
statement of Plaridel was obtained only after
his arrest, it was notproduced or presented
during the trial and even during the pendency
of theappeal. Petitioners then reiterated their
prayer that the judgment ofconviction meted
out to them be vacated and the entire records of
thecriminal case remanded to the RTC for the
conduct of a new trial.
Issue:
Whether or not the confession of
Plaridel constitutes as a newly-discovered
evidence thus warrants the reopening of the
case.
Held:
The Court denied the petitioners
motion to reopen the case forreception of
further evidence in the trial court.It held that
fundamental considerations of public policy
and sound practicenecessitate that, at the risk of
occasional errors, the judgment or orders
ofcourts should attain finality at some definite
time fixed by law. Otherwise,there would be no
end to litigation. It held further that this is the
reason why they have consistently denied
petitionersmotions for reconsideration of this
Courts Decision and subsequent pleas for the
reopening of the case.
Section 1 of Rule 121 of the Rules of
Court provides that a new trial may only be
granted by the court on motion of the accused,
or motu proprio with the consent of the accused
(a)t any time before a judgment of conviction

Assignment 10.1
becomes final. In this case, petitioners
judgment of conviction already became final
and executory on 26 July 2007 the date on
which the Decision of this Court denying the
petition and affirming the ruling of theCA was
recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments.
Thus, pleas for the remand of this case to the
trial court for the conduct of a new trial may
nolonger be entertained. Newly discovered
evidence refers to that which (a) is discovered
aftertrial; (b) could not have been discovered
and produced at the trial even withthe exercise
of reasonable diligence; (c) is material, not
merely cumulative, corroborative or
impeaching; and (d) is of such weight that it
wouldprobably change the judgment if
admitted. The most important requisite is that
the evidence could not have beendiscovered
and produced at the trial even with reasonable
diligence; hence,the term newly discovered.
The confession of Plaridel does not meet
thisrequisite. He participated in the trial before
the RTC and even gavetestimony as to his
defense.59 It was only after he and petitioners
had beenconvicted by the trial court that he
absconded. Thus, the contention that
hisconfession could not have been obtained
during trial does not hold water.
Case No.22: Bordomeo vs CA
G.R. No. 161596

February 20, 2013

Roberto Bordomeo, Jayme Sarmiento and

Gregorio Barredo, Petitioners
vs
CA, Hon. Secretary of Labor, and
International Pharmaceuticals Inc,
Respondents
Facts:
In 1989, the IPI Employees UnionAssociated Labor Union, representing the
workers, had a bargaining deadlock with the
International Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
management. This deadlock resulted in the

Remedial Law Review

Union staging a strike and IPI ordering a
lockout. Thereafter, labor cases were filed
before the Department of Employment.
Petitioners having obtained favorable
judgment, Assistant Regional Director
Jalilodela Torre of DOLE Region VII issued a
writ of execution On May 24, 1995, for the
amount of P4,162,361.50 (which covered
monetary claims corresponding to the period
from January 1, 1989 to March 15, 1995) in
favor of ROBERTO BORDOMEO, JAYME
SARMIENTO and GREGORIO BARREDO,
among others. IPI challenged the May 24, 1995
writ of execution and subsequently, DOLE
recalled and quashed the May 24, 1995 writ of
execution, and declared and considered the case
closed and terminated.
On MR, DOLE Secretary and reinstated
the May 24, 1995 writ of execution, subject to
the deduction of the sum of P745,959.39
already paid pursuant to quitclaims from the
award of P4,162,361.50.Despite other motions
for execution filed by the petitioners, on July 4,
2001, DOLE Secretary Patricia Sto. Tomas
issued her Order affirming the order issued on
March 27, 1998, and declaring that the full
execution of the order of March 27, 1998
"completely CLOSED and TERMINATED this
case."
On petition for certiorari by the
petitioners, the CA denied giving due course
and dismissed the same for lack of merit.
Issue:
Whether petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is
proper in this case; and whether petitioners are
entitled to backwages and separation pay.
Held:
The Court ruled in the negative.
We dismiss the petition for certiorari. An
appeal by petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, to be taken to this Court within 15 days
from notice of the judgment or final order

Assignment 10.1
raising only questions of law, was the proper
remedy available to the petitioners. Hence,
their filing of the petition for certiorari on
January 9, 2004 to assail the CAs May 30,
2003 decision and October 30, 2003 resolution
in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 65970 upon their
allegation of grave abuse of discretion
committed by the CA was improper. The
averment therein that the CA gravely abused its
discretion did not warrant the filing of the
petition for certiorari, unless the petition
further showed how an appeal in due course
under Rule 45 was not an adequate remedy for
them. By virtue of its being an extraordinary
remedy, certiorari cannot replace or substitute
an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law, like an appeal in due course.43
We remind them that an appeal may also
avail to review and correct any grave abuse of
discretion committed by an inferior court,
provided it will be adequate for that purpose.
Respondent is entitled to
backwages and separation pay as his
reinstatement has been rendered impossible due
to strained relations. As correctly held by the
appellate court, the backwages due respondent
must be computed from the time he was
unjustly dismissed until his actual
reinstatement, or from February 1999 until June
30, 2005 when his reinstatement was rendered
impossible without fault on his part.
The Court, however, does not find the
appellate court's computation of separation pay
in order. The appellate court considered
respondent to have served petitioner company
for only eight years. Petitioner was hired in
1990, however, and he must be considered to
have been in the service not only until 1999,
when he was unjustly dismissed, but until June
30, 2005, the day he is deemed to have been
actually separated (his reinstatement having
been rendered impossible) from petitioner
company or for a total of 15 years.
Case No.23
G.R. No. 174385

February 20, 2013

Remedial Law Review

REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. RAMON S. CAGUIOA, Presiding
Judge, Branch 74, Regional Trial Court,
Third Judicial Region, Olongapo City,
META TRANS TRADING
INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, and
HUNDRED YOUNG SUBIC
INTERNATIONAL, INC., Respondents.
Facts:
Indigo Distribution Corporation and
thirteen other petitioners filed before the
respondent judge a petition for declaratory
relief with prayer for temporary restraining
order (TRO) and
preliminary
mandatory
injunction against the Honorable Secretary of
Finance, et al. The petition sought to nullify the
implementation of Section 6 of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9334.
The present petition alleged that the
respondent judge acted with manifest partiality
and with grave abuse of discretion when he
issued his August 11, 2005 and July 5, 2006
orders. In particular, the Republic contends that
the respondent judge violated its right to due
process when he peremptorily allowed the
private respondents motions and complaintsin-intervention and proceeded with their
hearing ex parte despite the absence of any
prior notice to it. The Republic maintains that it
never received any notice of hearing, nor any
copy of the questioned motions and
complaints-in-intervention.
The Republic posits that the respondent
judge abused his discretion when he extended
to the private respondents the benefits of the

Assignment 10.1
preliminary injunction earlier issued to the
lower
court
petitioners
under
the
sameP1,000,000.00 bond the lower court
petitioners posted. The Republic labels this
action as a violation of Section 4, Rule 58 of
the Rules of Court.
In support of its prayer for the issuance
of a TRO and/or a writ of preliminary
injunction, the Republic stresses that the
assailed orders continue to cause it multimillion tax losses. It justifies its prayer for the
respondent judges inhibition by pointing to the
latters act of continuously allowing parties to
intervene despite the absence of notice and to
the inclusion of non-parties to the original case.
In their defense, the private respondents
point to the procedural defects in the petition,
specifically: first, the petition was filed out of
time, arguing that the Republic only had 53
remaining days to file the petition from notice
of the denial of its motion for reconsideration,
maintaining that the 60-day period within
which to file the petition is counted from the
notice of the denial of the August 11, 2005
order; second, the petition did not comply with
the rules on proof of filing and
service; third, the Republic failed to properly
serve their counsel of record a copy of the
petition; and fourth, the Republic did not
observe the hierarchy of courts in filing the
instant petition.
The private respondents further contend
that the respondent judge correctly allowed
their complaints-in-intervention as the matter of
intervention is addressed to the courts
discretion; as noted in the assailed orders, the
records show that the notice of hearing was

Remedial Law Review

addressed to all of the parties in the original
case.
Issue:
Whether or not Hon. Ramon S. Caguiao acted
with manifest partiality and with grave abuse of
discretion.

Assignment 10.1
G.R. No. L-1661

April 28, 1949

THE PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
TEODORO CANTOS (alias TEODORO
TATISHI), defendant-appellant.

Held:

Facts:

Service of Pleadings; petition should be

served on counsel of party; effect of service on
party represented by counsel of record;
exceptions. Lastly, under
our
rules
of
procedure, service of the petition on a party,
when the party is represented by a counsel of
record, is a patent nullity and is not binding
upon the party wrongfully served. This rule,
however, is a procedural standard that may
admit of exceptions when faced with
compelling reasons of substantive justice
manifest in the petition and in the surrounding
circumstances of the case. Procedural rules can
bow to substantive considerations through a
liberal construction aimed at promoting their
objective of securing a just, speedy, and
inexpensive disposition of every action and
proceeding.

The prosecution tried to prove by its

witnesses that on December 24, 1941, four days
after the Japanese had captured the City of
Davao, Vicente Tatishi appeared in the house of
Segundo Basalo in Ilang, where the spouses
SixtoBabao and Justina Larracoechea were
living. Not finding Basalo, Vicente left word
that SixtoBabao should surrender his firearms
to the Japanese army, and Francisco Cabling
DalmacioBabao, Martin Marquez, then living
with Sixto, should get at the same house and
told Justina Larracoechea that if her husband
failed to present his firearms to the Japanese,
Soldier would be sent to kill them all. In the
morning of December 28, 1941, SixtoBabao
bringing with him his shotgun and revolver and
displaying a white flag and DalmacioBabao,
Francisco Cabling and Martin Marquez went to
the Japanese garrison in the premises of the
Tibungco Lumber Company in Ilang. The
Japanese herded them in the office of the
company, tied their hands at the back and at
about 4 o'clock in the afternoon brought them
to the pier of the Tibungco Lumber Co. where
with their faces covered, they were made to
stand facing the water, with their backs towards
the firing squad composed of the Fuji, a
Japanese, Masahiro Tatishi and his children
Vicente and TeodoroTatishi. Ichida Matsuda,
another Japanese ordered the firing. Three shots
were fired, killing DalmacioBabao, Martin
Marquez and Francisco Cabling. As
SixtoBabao continued still standing, three other
shots were fired by Teodoro, Vicente and
Masahiro Tatishi, felling him down. Okabe,
another Japanese, chopped off Sixto's head and,

Special civil action for certiorari (Rule

65); reglementary period. First, we find that the
present petition was filed within the
reglementary period. Contrary to the private
respondents position, the 60-day period within
which to file the petition for certiorari is
counted from the Republics receipt of the July
5, 2006 order denying the latters motion for
reconsideration. Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court is clear on this point In case a
motion for reconsideration or new trial is
timely filed, whether such motion is required or
not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted
from notice of the denial of said motion.

Case No. 24 People vs Teodoro

Remedial Law Review

thereafter, the corpses of the four victims were
thrown into the sea. The news of the killing
itself were confirmed by appellant on January
7, 1942, when he personally told about it to the
widow of Sixto, adding that the reason for
Sixto's killing was because he was a
parashooter of the volunteer guards, while the
three others were shot so they could not reveal
the death of Sixto.
The prosecution also offered evidence
to show that at about 10 o'clock in the morning
of January 7, 1942, appellant and his father
Masahiro and brothers Juan and Vicente, all
armed with shotguns and accompanied by other
persons similarly armed, appeared in the house
of Justina Larracoechea and asked for
foodstuffs. As Justina refused to accede to the
demand, Teodoro searched the house stating
that he was a volunteer in the Japanese army
and as such he had the right to confiscate
properties of Filipinos or kill them. The group
appropriated canned goods, toiled articles,
shoes, eyeglasses and two police dogs, and left
with a loot valued at P500.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court is right to
remandedthe case to the Supreme Court in view
of the death penalty imposed to the accused.
Held:
The evidence presented by the
prosecution appears to be convincing and the
mere denials of the appellant and his weak
defense of alibi, supported only by the
corroboration of his wife, is not enough to
shake the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses, it appearing, as admitted by
appellant himself, they had absolutely no
reason for testifying happened as narrated by
the witnesses for the prosecution, the substance
of whose testimonies in above-stated.

Assignment 10.1
The trial court erred in finding appellant guilty
of the crime of treason because, as pointed out
in the prosecution's brief itself, the evidence
failed to satisfy the two-witness rule provided
by article 114 of the Revised Penal Code.
Napoleon Zapanta is the only witness who
testified as to appellant's actual participation in
the killing of SixtoBabao, DalmacioBabao,
Francisco Cabling and Martin Marquez and no
one of the other witnesses for the prosecution
had seen the actual killing.
Upon the evidence, appellant appears
also to be guilty of robbery with intimidation
committed in the house of Justina Larracoechea
on January 7, 1942, with the aggravating
circumstance of in band.
The lower court's judgment is modified
and appellant is sentenced to reclusion
perpetua for each of the four murders of
SixtoBabao, DalmacioBabao, Francisco
Cabling and Martin and Marquez, and to
indemnify the heirs of each one of the four
victims in The sum of P6.000 in accordance
with the decision in People vs. Amansec1 (L927, 45 Off. Gaz. [Supp. to No. 9], 51), and for
the crime of robbery he is sentenced to an
indefinite penalty of not less than one month
and one day of arresto mayor and not morethan
six (6) years, ten (10) months and one day of
prision mayor, or, and to indemnify the heirs of
SixtoBabao in the sum of P500, with costs.
Case No.25: Casilang vs Casilang Dizon
G.R. No. 180269

February 20, 2013

JOSE Z. CASILANG, SR., substituted by

his heirs, namely: FELICIDAD CUDlAMAT
VDA. DE CASILANG, et al vs. ROSARIO
Z. CASILANG-DIZON et al.

Facts:

Remedial Law Review

The spouses Liborio Casilang (Liborio)

and Francisca Zacarias (Francisca) had eight
(8) children, namely: Felicidad Casilang
(Felicidad), Ireneo Casilang (Ireneo),
Marcelina Casilang (Marcelina), Jacinta
Casilang (Jacinta), Bonifacio Casilang
(Bonifacio), Leonora Casilang (Leonora), Jose
Casilang (Jose) and Flora Casilang (Flora).
Liborio died intestate followed not long after
by his wife Francisca. Their son Bonifacio also
died in 1986, survived by his child Bernabe
Casilang (Bernabe), while son Ireneo died on
June 11, 1992, survived by his four (4)
children, namely: Mario Casilang (Mario),
Angelo Casilang (Angelo), Rosario CasilangDizon (Rosario) and Rodolfo Casilang
(Rodolfo), herein respondents.

The estate of Liborio, which left no

debts, consisted of three (3) parcels of land
located in Barangay Talibaew, Calasiao,
Pangasinan, namely: (1) Lot No. 4676, with an
area of 4,164 square meters; (2) Lot No. 4704,
containing 1,164 sq m; and (3) Lot No. 4618,
with 897 sq m.

Respondent Rosario filed with (MTC)

of Calasiao, Pangasinan a complaint for
unlawful detainerto evict her uncle, petitioner
Jose from Lot No. 4618. Rosario claimed that
Lot No. 4618 was owned by her father Ireneo,
as evidenced by Tax Declaration (TD) No. 555
issued in 1994 under her fathers name. The
respondents executed a Deed of Extrajudicial
Partition with Quitclaim whereby they
adjudicated Lot No. 4618 to themselves. In the
same instrument, respondents Mario, Angelo
and Rodolfo renounced their respective shares
in Lot No. 4618 in favor of Rosario.

Assignment 10.1

Jose raised the defense that he was the

"lawful, absolute, exclusive owner and in actual
possession" of the said lot, and that he acquired
the same "through intestate succession from his
late father." For some reason, however, he and
his lawyer, failed to appear at the scheduled
pre-trial conference, and Jose was declared in
default; thus, the adverse judgment against him.

The MTC rendered judgment finding

Rosario to be the owner of Lot No. 4618, and
ordering Jose to remove his house, vacate Lot
No. 4618, and pay Rosario P500.00 in monthly
rentals from the filing of the complaint until
she was placed in possession, plus attorneys
fees of P5,000.00, litigation expenses and costs.
On March 23, 1998, the MTC issued a writ of
execution; and later on a Writ of Demolition6
was issued.

The petitioners, counting 7 of the 8 children of

Liborio and Francisca, filed with the RTC of
Dagupan City a Complaint for "Annulment of
Documents, Ownership and Peaceful
Possession with Damages" against the
respondents. The petitioners moved for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order, which the RTC
however denied. Among the documents sought
to be annulled was the 1997 Deed of
Extrajudicial Partition executed by Ireneos
children over Lot No. 4618, as well as TD No.
555, and by necessary implication its
derivatives which were issued in 1998 in the
name of Rosario Casilang-Dizon.

The petitioners alleged in their complaint that

all eight (8) children of Liborio entered into a

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Assignment 10.1

verbal partition of his estate

Case No.27: Abraza vs Sandiganbayan
Issue:
Whether or not inferior courts are empowered
to rule on the question of ownership raised by
the defendant in an ejectment suit

Isabelo A Braza, Petitioner

vs
The Honorable Sandiganbayan, Respondent
G.R. No. 195032 February 20, 2013
Facts:

Held:
The court ruled in the affirmative.
Inferior courts are empowered to rule on the
question of ownership raised by the defendant
in an ejectment suit, but only to resolve the
issue of possession; its determination is not
conclusive on the issue of ownership.

It is well to be reminded of the settled

distinction between a summary action of
ejectment and a plenary action for recovery of
possession and/or ownership of the land. What
really distinguishes an action for unlawful
detainer from a possessory action (accion
publiciana) and from a reinvindicatory action
(accion reinvindicatoria) is that the first is
limited to the question of possession de facto.
Unlawful detainer suits (accion interdictal)
together with forcible entry are the two forms
of ejectment suit that may be filed to recover
possession of real property. Aside from the
summary action of ejectment, accion
publiciana or the plenary action to recover the
right of possession and accion reinvindicatoria
or the action to recover ownership which also
includes recovery of possession, make up the
three kinds of actions to judicially recover
possession.

Department of Public Works and

Highways (DPWH) identified projects relative
to the improvement and rehabilitation of roads
and installation of traffic safety devices and
lighting facilities. Braza, being the president of
FABMIK, was impleaded as one of the
respondents in a case alleging that the ASEAN
Summit street lighting projects were
overpriced. It was alleged therein that Braza
acted in conspiracy with the public officials and
employees in the commission of the crime for
violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practice Act. He pleaded not
guilty.
Braza filed his Manifestation, informing
the Sandiganbayan of his intention to abandon
his previous motion for reinvestigation. Braza
filed a motion in support of the abandonment of
reinvestigation with a plea to vacate
Information, insisting that the further
reinvestigation of the case would only afford
the prosecution a second round of preliminary
investigation which would be vexatious,
oppressive and violative of his constitutional
right to a speedy disposition of his case,
warranting its dismissal with prejudice. OMBVisayas issued its Resolution which upheld the
finding of probable cause but modified the
charge from violation of Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No.
3019 to violation of Sec. 3(e) of the same law.
Sandiganbayan issued the first assailed
resolution admitting the Amended Information.
The Sandiganbayan ruled that Braza would not
be placed in double jeopardy should he be
arraigned anew under the second information
because his previous arraignment was
conditional. It continued that even if he was
regularly arraigned, double jeopardy would still

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not set in because the second information
charged an offense different from, and which
did not include or was necessarily included in,
the original offense charged.
Issue:
Whether or not Sandiganbayan acted
with grave abuse of discretion in denying
Braza's plea for the dismissal of the case and
his subsequent motion to quash the second
Information.
Held:
The Sandiganbayan's June 6, 2008
Order clearly and unequivocally states that the
conditions for Braza's arraignment as well as
his travel abroad, that is, that if the Information
would be amended, he shall waive his
constitutional right to be protected against
double jeopardy and shall allow himself to be
arraigned on the amended information without
losing his right to question the same. It
appeared that these conditions were duly
explained to Braza and his lawyer by the antigraft court. He was afforded time to confer and
consult his lawyer. Thereafter, he voluntarily
submitted himself to such conditional
arraignment and entered a plea of "not guilty"
to the offense of violation of Sec. 3(g) of R.A.
No. 3019. Having given his conformity and
accepted the conditional arraignment and its
legal consequences, Braza is now estopped
from assailing its conditional nature just to
conveniently avoid being arraigned and
prosecuted of the new charge under the second
information.

Assignment 10.1
that may be considered and balanced are as
follows: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the
reasons for the delay; (3) the assertion or
failure to assert such right by the accused; and
(4) the prejudice caused by the delay.
The delay in the determination of
probable cause in this case should not be cause
for an unfettered abdication by the anti-graft
court of its duty to try and determine the
controversy of the case.a The protection under
the right to a speedy disposition of cases should
not operate to deprive the government of its
inherent prerogative in prosecuting criminal
cases

Case No.28: People vs Lamsen

G.R. No. 198338 : November 13, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PlaintiffAppellee,
Vs.
P/SUPT. ARTEMIO E. LAMSEN, PO2
ANTHONY D. ABULENCIA, and SPO1
WILFREDO L. RAMOS, AccusedAppellants.

Facts:

There is simply no double jeopardy

when the subsequent information charges
another and different offense, although arising
from the same act or set of acts. Prosecution for
the same act is not prohibited. What is
forbidden is the prosecution for the same
offense.

Motions for Reconsideration was filed

by accused-appellants SPO 1 Wilfredo L.
Ramos and PO2 Anthony D. Abulencia and the
Motion for New Trial Due to. Newly
Discovered Evidence and for Reconsideration
was filed by accused-appellant P/Supt. Artemio
E. Lamsen (Motions). The foregoing Motions
assail the Court's Resolution, which upheld the
conviction of accused-appellants of the crime
of robbery with homicide

The concept of speedy disposition is

relative or flexible. A mere mathematical
reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient.
Particular regard must be taken of the facts and
circumstances peculiar to each case. Hence, the
doctrinal rule is that in the determination of
whether that right has been violated, the factors

In their respective Motions, accusedappellants state, inter alia that they obtained
affidavits from prosecution witnesses Amel F.
Reyes (Reyes) and Domingo Marcelo
(Marcelo) whose testimonies implicated
accused-appellants of the crime of robbery with
homicide. In their affidavits, the aforesaid

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prosecution witnesses claim that they made
their testimonies under duress as they were
forced by elements of the Philippine National
Police, the National Bureau of Investigation,
and the former mayor of San Carlos City,
Pangasinan, Julian Resuello, to point at
accused-appellants as perpetrators of the
aforesaid crime. They equally claim that they
did not actually see who committed the crime
and that they only testified against accusedappellants out of fear of their own lives.
Issue:
Whether or not recantation of witness/s
testimonies can be considered.

Assignment 10.1
by the law enforcers, executing a criminal
complaint-affidavit against the accused,
attending trial and testifying against the
accused, the said complaining witness would
later on declare that all the foregoing is actually
a farce and the truth is now what he says it to
be in his affidavit of recantation. And in
situations, like the instant case, where
testimony is recanted by an affidavit
subsequently executed by the recanting
witness, we are properly guided by the wellsettled rules that an affidavit is hearsay unless
the affiant is presented on the witness stand and
that affidavits taken ex-parte are generally
considered inferior to the testimony given in
open court.

Held:
The Court ruled in the negative.
Only when exist special circumstances,
as in the case which when coupled with the
retraction raise doubts as to the truth of the
testimony or statement given, can retractions be
considered and upheld.The Court looks with
disfavor upon retractions of testimonies
previously given in court. The rationale for the
rule is obvious: affidavits of retraction can
easily be secured from witnesses, usually
through intimidation or for a monetary
consideration. Recanted testimony is
exceedingly unreliable.
The rule is settled that in cases where
previous testimony is retracted and a
subsequent different, if not contrary, testimony
is made by the same witness, the test to decide
which testimony to believe is one of
comparison coupled with the application of the
general rules of evidence. A testimony
solemnly given in court should not be set aside
and disregarded lightly, and before this can be
done, both the previous testimony and the
subsequent one should be carefully compared
and juxtaposed, the circumstances under which
each was made, carefully and keenly
scrutinized, and the reasons or motives for the
change, discriminatingly analyzed. The
unreliable character of the affidavit of
recantation executed by a complaining witness
is also shown by the incredulity of the fact that
after going through the burdensome process of
reporting to and/or having the accused arrested

Case No.29: Mercado vs Espina

G.R. No. 173987

February 25, 2012

PADILLA
MERCADO,
ZULUETA
MERCADO, BONIFACIA MERCADO,
DAMIAN MERCADO and EMMANUEL
MERCADO
BASCUG, Petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES
AGUEDO
ESPINA
and
LOURDES ESPINA, Respondents.
Facts:
Petitioners filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Maasin, a Complaint for
Recovery of Property and Declaration of
Nullity of Deed of Sale, Certificate of Title and
Damages. Petitioners alleged in their
Complaint that they are the heirs of the late
spouses Santiago and Sofronia Mercado, who
were the owners of the subject parcel of land;
after the death of Santiago and Sofronia,
petitioners inherited the disputed lot,
possessing the same as owners; sometime in
1996, herein respondents claimed ownership

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over the subject parcel of land, alleging that
they bought the same from one Josefa Mercado
Espina (Josefa) who, in turn, previously bought
the same in 1939 from a certain Genivera
Mercado Kavanaugh; that Genivera supposedly
purchased the same property from one
Escolastico Mercado in 1937 who, in turn,
allegedly bought it from Santiago Mercado.
Petitioners further alleged that in 1962, Josefa,
through fraudulent machinations, was able to
obtain a title (Original Certificate of Title No.
35) over the subject property in her name.
Asserting that the above-mentioned contracts of
sale never happened, petitioners prayed for the
declaration of nullity of the deeds of sale
between Santiago and Escolastico, Escolastico
and Genivera, and between Genivera and
Josefa. They prayed that the Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of herein
respondents be nullified and that petitioners be
declared as the owners of the disputed lot. They
asked that the court award them actual, moral
and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.
Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss
on grounds that the RTC has no jurisdiction
over the case due to the failure of the
complainant to state the assessed value of the
property, that petitioners' cause of action is
barred
by
prescription,
laches
and
indefeasibility of title, and that the complaint
does not state sufficient cause of action against
respondents who are buyers in good faith.
The RTC denied respondents' Motion to
Dismiss. Respondents then filed a motion for
reconsideration, but the same was denied by the
RTC. Respondents then filed a special civil
action for certiorari with the CA assailing the
above orders of the RTC.

Assignment 10.1
In its Resolution4 dated March 13, 2001,
the CA denied due course and dismissed
respondents' petition forcertiorari. Respondents
filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same
was denied by the CA in its Resolution dated
October 21, 2003.Meanwhile, on August 17,
2000, petitioners, by leave of court, filed an
Amended Complaint to include the assessed
value of the subject property.5
Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss
Amended
Complaint
on
grounds
of
prescription, laches, indefeasibility of title and
lack of cause of action. The RTC issued an
Order7 denying respondents' Motion to Dismiss
Amended Complaint. Respondents filed a
motion for reconsideration, but the RTC denied
it in its Order dated April 19, 2004.
Respondents filed a special civil action
for certiorari with the CA praying that the
February 18, 2004 and April 19, 2004 Orders of
the RTC be set aside and petitioners' complaint
dismissed.The CA ruled that respondents' title
has become indefeasible and incontrovertible
by lapse of time and that petitioners' action is
already barred by prescription. The CA also
held that since petitioners did not allege that
respondents were not buyers in good faith, the
latter are presumed to be purchasers in good
faith and for value.Petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration, but the CA denied it in its
Resolution10 dated July 12, 2006.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in
giving due course to respondents second
motion to dismiss filed on November 21, 2003
on the amended complaint

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Assignment 10.1

Held:

Case No. 30: Salupuddin vs CA

The petition lacks merit.There is no dispute

that the issue of timeliness of respondents'
Motion to Dismiss petitioners' Amended
Complaint was not raised by petitioners before
the RTC. Neither was this issue raised in their
Comment
to
respondents'
petition
for certiorari filed with the CA. It was only in
their Motion for Reconsideration of the CA
Decision that this matter was raised. It is well
established that issues raised for the first time
on appeal and not raised in the proceedings in
the lower court are barred by estoppel.12 Points
of law, theories, issues, and arguments not
brought to the attention of the trial court ought
not to be considered by a reviewing court, as
these cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal.13 Basic considerations of due process
impel the adoption of this rule.

G.R. No. 184681

Respondents filing of their Motion to

Dismiss Amended Complaint may not be
considered as a circumvention of the rules of
procedure. Under Section 8, Rule 10 of the
Rules of Court, an amended complaint
supersedes an original one. As a consequence,
the original complaint is deemed withdrawn
and no longer considered part of the record.15 In
the present case, the Amended Complaint is,
thus, treated as an entirely new complaint. As
such, respondents had every right to move for
the dismissal of the said Amended Complaint.
Were it not for the filing of the said Motion,
respondents would not have been able to file a
petition for certiorari before the CA which, in
turn, rendered the presently assailed judgment
in their favor.

February 25, 2013

GERRY A. SALAPUDDIN, Petitioner, vs.

THE COURT OF APPEALS, GOV. JUM
AKBAR, and NOR-RHAMA J. INDANAN,
Respondents.
Facts:
A bomb exploded near the entrance of
the South Wing lobby of the House of
Representatives (HOR) in the Batasan
Complex, Quezon City. The blast led to the
death of Congressman Akbar, Marcial Taldo,
Jul-Asiri Hayudini, Maan Gale Bustalio and
Dennis Manila, and the inflicting of serious
injuries on Representatives Henry Teves and
Luzviminda Ilagan, Ismael Lim, Vercita Garcia,
Kumhar Indanan, Larry Noda and Paula
Dunga.
The post-blast investigation revealed
that the explosion was caused by an improvised
bomb planted on a motorcycle that was parked
near the entrance stairs of the South Wing
lobby.
Acting on a confidential information
that the person who parked the motorcycle near
the South Wing lobby of the HOR was staying
with members of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)
and learning that one ASG member, Abu Jandal
alias "Bong," has standing warrants of arrest
for kidnapping and serious illegal detention,
police officers raided an alleged ASG safehouse
located at Payatas, Quezon City (Parkwood).
During the course of the operation, a firefight
ensued killing three persons: Bong, Redwan
Indama (Redwan) and Saing Indama.
Meanwhile, Caidar Aunal (Aunal), Ikram
Indama (Ikram) and Adham Kusain (Kusain)
were arrested and then brought to Camp Crame
in Quezon City. Several items were likewise
seized from the premises, including two (2)
Cal. 45 pistols, one motor vehicle plate number

Remedial Law Review

"8," an I.D. of HOR issued to Ikram, and a
black wallet with a GSIS ID card issued to
Aunal with calling cards of Salapuddin. One of
the Cal. 45 pistols found was traced back to
Julham S. Kunam, Political Affairs Assistant of
Salapuddin.
A day after the raid, Kusain executed a
Sinumpaang Salaysay. In it, he stated that he is
from Tipo-Tipo, Basilan and came to Manila in
March 2005, staying when he first arrived in
Manila in the house of Salapuddin, his fathers
friend. Salapuddin paid for one year of his
college education and helped him be employed
as a building attendant at the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport. He explained that he was
in the house at Parkwood Hills because
Redwan asked him to get the payment for his
black XRM Honda motorcycle that Redwan
took from his house. He claimed that Redwan
did not disclose the purpose for which the
motorcycle will be used and it was only after
the raid that he learned that his motorcycle was
the very same motorcycle used during the
bombing at the Batasan Complex.
Ikram executed the first of his several
affidavits. He stated that he is a driver working
for Salapuddin since July 2002 and was staying
in a house at Batasan Hills, Quezon City
(Greenbucks), owned by Salapuddin, from June
2004 until he went home to Isabela City,
Basilan. He maintained that he returned to
Manila and before returning to Manila, his
cousin Redwan talked to him about a mission
to kill Congressman Akbar of Basilan by means
of a bomb to be planted on a motorcycle. He
was not, however, informed of the reason for
the mission or the identity of the person who
gave the order. He stated that upon arrival in
Manila, he stayed at Greenbucks where the
bombing was planned. He stated that those who
took part in the planning of the bombing
included: Redwan and his wife Saing; Jang,
who was a cousin and member of the staff of
Congressman Mujiv Hataman; Bong, who

Assignment 10.1
made the bomb; Aunal; and Kusain.
Issue:
Whether or not Extrajudicial confession
is binding only on the confessant
Held:
A review of the records show that the
only direct material evidence against
Salapuddin is the confession made by Ikram.
While the confession is arguably relevant, this
is not the evidence competent to establish the
probability that Salapuddin participated in the
commission of the crime. On the contrary, as
pointed out by the Secretary of Justice, this
cannot be considered against Salapuddin on
account of the principle of res inter alios acta
alteri nocere non debet. Clearly thus, an
extrajudicial confession is binding only on the
confessant. It cannot be admitted against his or
her co-accused and is considered as hearsay
against them.The exception provided under
section 30, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court to
the rule allowing the admission of a conspirator
requires the prior establishment of the
conspiracy by evidence other than the
confession. In this case, there is a dearth of
proof demonstrating the participation of
Salapuddin in a conspiracy to set off a bomb in
the Batasan grounds and thereby kill
Congressman Akbar. Not one of the other
persons arrested and subjected to custodial
investigation professed that Salapuddin was
involved in the plan to set off a bomb in the
Batasan grounds. Instead, the investigating
prosecutors did no more than to rely on
Salapuddins association with these persons to
conclude that he was a participant in the
conspiracy. The Supreme Court, however, has
previously stressed that mere association with
the principals by direct participation, without
more, does not suffice. Relationship,
association and companionship do not prove
conspiracy. Salapuddins complicity to the
crime, if this be the case, cannot be anchored

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on his relationship, if any, with the arrested
persons or his ownership of the place where
they allegedly stayed while in Manila. It must
be shown that the person concerned has
performed an overt act in pursuance or
furtherance of the complicity. In fact, mere
knowledge, acquiescence or approval of the
act, without the cooperation or approval to
cooperate, is not sufficient to prove conspiracy.

Case No 31: Baguio Regreening Movement

vs Masweng
G.R. No. 180882

February 27, 2013

Facts:
Private respondents claimed that their
parents inherited from their ancestors several
parcels of land in what is now known as the
Busol Watershed Reservation, filed before the
NCIP a Petition for Injunction, with an
application for a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO), and thereafter a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction seeking to enjoin the Baguio District
Engineers Office, the Office of the City
Architect and Parks Superintendent, and
petitioners The Baguio Regreening Movement,
Inc. and the Busol Task Force from fencing the
Busol Watershed Reservation. In their Petition
before the NCIP, private respondents claim that
they are members of the Ibaloi and Kankanaey
tribes of Baguio City. Their ancestors
ownership of the properties now known as the
Busol Watershed Reservation was allegedly
expressly recognized in Proclamation No. 15
issued by Governor General Leonard Wood.
NCIP Regional Hearing Officer Brain S.
Masweng issued a TRO. Petitioners move to
dissolve the TRO but Atty. Masweng denied
petitioners motion to dissolve the TRO,
explaining that a TRO may be issued motu
proprio where the matter is of extreme urgency
and the applicant will suffer grave injustice and

Assignment 10.1
irreparable injury. He also issued a writ of
preliminary injunction.

The Court of Appeals upheld the

conclusion of Atty. Masweng that the NCIP can
issue injunctive writs as a principal relief
against acts adversely affecting or infringing on
the rights of ICCs or IPs, because "(t)o rule
otherwise would render NCIP inutile in
preventing acts committed in violation of the
IPRA.
Issue:
Whether or Not NCIP has jurisdiction to issue
petition for injunction and temporary
restraining order.
Held:
The Court ruled in the affirmative, the
Supreme Court upheld the jurisdiction of the
NCIP on the basis of the allegations in private
respondents Petition for Injunction. It was
similarly claimed in said Petition for Injunction
that private respondents were descendants of
Molintas and Gumangan whose claims over the
portions of the Busol Watershed Reservation
had been recognized by Proclamation No. 15.
This Court thus ruled in G.R. No. 180206 that
the nature of the action clearly qualify it as a
dispute or controversy over ancestral
lands/domains of the ICCs/IPs. On the basis of
Section 69(d)o the IPRA and Section 82, Rule
XV of NCIP Administrative Circular No. 1-03,
the NCIP may issue temporary restraining
orders and writs of injunction without any
prohibition against the issuance of the writ
when the main action is for injunction
The Court ruled that although the NCIP
has the authority to issue temporary restraining
orders and writs of injunction, it was not
convinced that private respondents were
entitled to the relief granted by the
Commission. Proclamation No. 15 does not

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appear to be a definitive recognition of private
respondents ancestral land claim, as it merely
identifies the Molintas and Gumangan families
as claimants of a portion of the Busol Forest
Reservation, but does not acknowledge vested
rights over the same. Since it is required before
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
that claimants show the existence of a right to
be protected, this Court, in G.R. No. 180206,
ultimately granted the petition of the City
Government of Baguio and set aside the writ of
preliminary injunction issued therein

Assignment 10.1
while the rest of the group was 15 meters away,
asked Jesus and his guests to cease firing their
guns as it was already late at night. He claimed
he was met with hostility by Jesus and his
guests. Jesus, who appeared drunk, abruptly
drew his magnum pistol and poked it directly at
his chest and then fired it. By a twist of fate, he
was able to partially parry Jesus right hand,
which was holding the pistol. Defendant
interposed self defense.
Issue:
Whether or not the claim of self-defense
shifted he burden of evidence to the accused?
Held:

Case No. 32: Flores vs People

G.R. No. 181354, February 27, 2013
Simon A. Flores, Petitioner
vs
People of the Philippines, Respondent

Generally, "the burden lies upon the

prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt rather than upon the
accused that he was in fact innocent." If the
accused, however, admits killing the victim, but
pleads self-defense, the burden of evidence is
shifted to him to prove such defense by clear,
satisfactory and convincing evidence that
excludes any vestige of criminal aggression on
his part. To escape liability, it now becomes
incumbent upon the accused to prove by clear
and convincing evidence all the elements of
that justifying circumstance.29

Facts:
During the eve of the barangay fiesta in
San Roque, Alaminos, Laguna, certain visitors,
Ronnie de Mesa, Noli de Mesa, Marvin
Avenido, and Duran, were drinking at the
terrace of the house of Jesus Avenido (Jesus).
The drinking at the terrace was ongoing when
Flores arrived with an M-16 Armalite rifle.
Jesus stood up from his seat and met Flores
who was heading towards the terrace.
Flores claimed that he, together with
four members of the CAFGU and Civil Service
Unit (CSU), upon the instructions of Mayor
Samuel Bueser of Alaminos, Laguna,
conducted a ronda in Barangay San Roque. He
claimed that they heard gunshots seemingly
emanating from the house of Jesus, and that he,

In this case, Flores does not dispute that

he perpetrated the killing of Jesus by shooting
him with an M16 armalite rifle. To justify his
shooting of Jesus, he invoked self-defense. By
interposing self-defense, Flores, in effect,
admits the authorship of the crime. Thus, it was
incumbent upon him to prove that the killing
was legally justified under the circumstances.
To successfully claim self-defense, the
accused must satisfactorily prove the
concurrence of the elements of self-defense.
Under Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code,
any person who acts in defense of his person or
rights does not incur any criminal liability
provided that the following circumstances
concur: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable

Remedial Law Review

necessity of the means employed to prevent or
repel it; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation
on the part of the person defending himself.
Case No. 33: Carpio vs CA
G.R. No. 183102

February 27, 2013

MACARIO DIAZ CARPIO, Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES
GELACIO G. ORIA and MARCELINA
PRE ORIA, Respondents.

Facts:
Macario Carpio (Carpio) informed
respondentspouses Gelacio and Marcelina Oria
(respondents Oria) of their alleged
encroachment on his property to the extent of
137.45 square meters. He demanded that
respondents return the allegedly encroached
portion and pay monthly rent therefor.
However, the spouses refused.
Petitioner filed an action for unlawful
detainer before the Metropolitan Trial Court
(MeTC) of Muntinlupa City, Branch 80, which
dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. The
case was appealed to the RTC of Muntinlupa
City, Branch 256, which affirmed the MeTCs
Decision in toto. However, in a Petition for
Review before it, the CA held that the RTC
should not have dismissed the case, but should
have tried it as one for accion publiciana, as if
it had originally been filed with the RTC,
pursuant to paragraph 1 of Section 8, Rule 40
of the 1997 Rules of Court.
The case was remanded to the RTC
pursuant to the CA ruling. The trial court

Assignment 10.1
rendered a Decision dated 11 November 2003
finding that respondents Oria had encroached
on the property of Carpio by an area of 132
square meters; and requiring respondents to
vacate the property and pay monthly rentals to
petitioner from the time he made the demand in
1978 until they would vacate the subject
property. It also awarded attorneys fees to
petitioner and ordered respondents to pay the
costs of suit.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Immediate
Execution. Thereafter, on 2 December 2003,
respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration
of the Decision. On 17 March 2004, the RTC
issued its assailed Omnibus Order denying the
Motion for Reconsideration and simultaneously
granting the Motion for Immediate Execution
of the judgment.
On 6 April 2004, respondents filed their Notice
of Appeal of the RTC Decision and filed, as
well, a Petition for Certiorari questioning the
RTCs Omnibus Order.
Issue:
Whether the case for accion publiciana on
appeal with the CA has been rendered moot and
academic by the intervening implementation of
the writ of execution of the RTC pursuant to the
trial courts Omnibus Order, although the Order
was later annulled with finality by this Court.
Held:
Since the writ of execution was
manifestly void for having been issued without
compliance with the rules, it is without any
legal effect. In other words, it is as if no writ
was issued at all. Consequently, all actions
taken pursuant to the void writ of execution
must be deemed to have not been taken and to
have had no effect. Otherwise, the Court would
be sanctioning a violation of the right to due
process of the judgment debtors respondent-

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spouses herein.
A case or issue is considered moot and
academic when it ceases to present a justiciable
controversy by virtue of supervening events, so
that an adjudication of the case or a declaration
on the issue would be of no practical value or
use. In such instance, there is no actual
substantial relief which a petitioner would be
entitled to, and which would be negated by the
dismissal of the petition. Courts generally
decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it
on the ground of mootness ~save when, among
others, a compelling constitutional issue raised
requires the formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar and the
public; or when the case is capable of repetition
yet evading judicial review.
It is obvious that there remains an
unresolved justiciable controversy in the
appealed case for accion publiciana. In
particular, did respondent-spouses Oria really
encroach on the land of petitioner? If they did,
does he have the right to recover possession of
the property? Furthermore, without preempting
the disposition of the case for ace ion
publiciana pending before the CA, we note that
if respondents built structures on the subject
land, and if they were builders in good faith,
they would be entitled to appropriate rights
under the Civil Code. This Court merely points
out that there are still issues that the CA needs
to resolve in the appealed case before it.
Case No. 35: Ramos vs. Obispo
Spouses Nilo Ramos and Eliadira Ramos,
petitioners
vs
Raul Obispo and Far East Bank and Trust
Company, respondents
Facts:
Ramos and Obispo became friends after

Assignment 10.1
they met overseas as OFW's Upon their return
to the Philippines the former still kept on
visiting the latter on account of their friendship.
Sometime in August, 1996, Ramos executed
and REM in favor of Far East Bank and Trust
Company to secure a credit obtained by Obispo
in the amount of P1.2M. Such REM was
registered and annotated in the title.

FRBTC received a letter from the petitioners

informing them that Obispo, whom they
entrusted their property to obtain a P250K loan
in their behalf instead took the aforementioned
P1.2M loan and refused to return the title to the
subject property even after full payment of the
P250K loan they obtained from Obispo, and
demanding that the bank release the subject
property from the REM.
The petitioners file a case for annulment
of REM which the RTC granted in their favor.
The CA reversed the said decision on the
ground that the petitioners are deemed to be
accommodation mortgagors who are not
considered pricipal parties to the principal
obligation. The CA also averred that the
petitioners failed to prove their allegations. The
MR yielded the same results.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners were able
to prove that they were not accommodation
mortgagors.
Held:
The petition was without merit. The law
allows accommodation mortgage under Art.
2085 of the civil code which provides that third
parties not part or a principal obligation are
allowede to secure such obligation by pledging
or mortgaging their own property. The
petitioners' claim that they are not
accommodation mortgagors must be proved
and backed by preponderance of evidence.

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Allegation alone is not evidence. And the
petitioners failed to prove their allegation by
preponderance of evidence.
The court held that, In civil cases, basic
is the rule that the party making allegations has
the burden of proving them by a preponderance
of evidence. Moreover, parties must rely on the
strength of their own evidence, not upon the
weakness of the defense offered by their
opponent. This principle equally holds true,
even if the defendant had not been given the
opportunity to present evidence because of a
default order. The extent of the relief that may
be granted can only be as much as has been
alleged and proved with preponderant evidence
required under Section 1 of Rule 133 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence.
Preponderance of evidence is the
weight, credit, and value of the aggregate
evidence on either side and is usually
considered to be synonymous with the term
"greater weight of the evidence" or "greater
weight of the credible evidence."
Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which,
in the last analysis, means probability of the
truth. It is evidence which is more convincing
to the court as worthier of belief than that
which is offered in opposition thereto.
As to fraud, the rule is that he who
alleges fraud or mistake affecting a transaction
must substantiate his allegation, since it is
presumed that a person takes ordinary care of
his concerns and that private transactions have
been fair and regular. The Court has stressed
time and again that allegations must be proven
bysufficient evidence because mere allegation
is definitely not evidence. Moreover, fraud is
not presumed it must be proved by clear and
convincing evidence.
In this case, petitioners testimonial
evidence failed to convince that Obispo
deceived them as to the debt secured by the
REM. Petitioners factual allegations are not

Assignment 10.1
firmly supported by the evidence on record and
even inconsistent with ordinary experience and
common sense.
Case No. 37: Castigador vs Nicolas
LORNA CASTIGADOR v. DANILO M.
NICOLAS
G.R. No. 184023, March 4, 2013
Facts:
Petitioner Lorna Castigador was the
previous registered owner of a piece of land in
Tagaytay. The City Treasurer of Tagaytay sold
the property to Respondent Danilo Nicolas at a
public auction for non-payment of real estate
taxes. The RTC of Tagaytay City granted
Nicolas petition to issue a certificate of title to
the property in his name after Castigador failed
to redeem the property. Castigador claimed that
she was not notified of the public auction, the
sale, and the petition for the issuance of a
certificate of title. The Register of Deeds of
Tagaytay City denied Castigadors notice of
adverse claim on the ground of lack of privity
between Castigador and Nicolas.
Castigador filed a petition for
annulment of judgment with the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition on the grounds that: 1) the petition is
defective for failure to comply with Rule 7,
Section 4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
as amended; and (2) there is no allegation in the
petition that it is based on extrinsic fraud and
lack of jurisdiction, in violation of Rule 47,
Section 2 of the Rules. Castigador filed a
Motion for Reconsideration with Motion for
Leave to Admit Amended Petition which the
CA denied stating that the the arguments
posed by Castigador in support of the grounds
cited for the allowance of the petition are bereft
of merit, as they do not constitute extrinsic
fraud to annul the questioned decision.

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Issue:
Whether or not the CA was justified in
dismissing the petition
Held:
Petition granted. Under Section 5, Rule 47 of
the Rules of Court, it is incumbent that when a
court finds no substantial merit in a petition for
annulment of judgment, it may dismiss the
petition outright but the specific reasons for
such dismissal shall be clearly set out.
The petition need not categorically state
the exact words extrinsic fraud; rather, the
allegations in the petition should be so crafted
to easily point out the ground on which it was
based.
The allegations in the petition filed with
the CA sufficiently identify the ground upon
which the petition was based extrinsic fraud.
Fraud is extrinsic where it prevents a party
from having a trial or from presenting his entire
case to the court, or where it operates upon
matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but
to the manner in which it is procured. The
overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is
alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the
prevailing litigant prevented a party from
having his day in court.

Case No.39: Stronghold Insurance vs

Cuenca
STRONGHOLD INSURANCE COMPANY,
INC., v. TOMAS CUENCA, MARCELINA
CUENCA, MILAGROS CUENCA,
BRAMIE T. TAYACTAC, and MANUEL D.
MARANON, JR.,
G.R. No. 173297 : March 6, 2013
Facts:

Assignment 10.1
Maraon filed a complaint in the RTC
against the Cuencas for the collection of a sum
of money and damages. His complaint,
included an application for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary attachment. the RTC
granted the application for the issuance of the
writ of preliminary attachment conditioned
upon the posting of a bond of P1,000,000.00
executed in favor of the Cuencas. Less than a
month later, Maraon amended the complaint
to implead Tayactac as a defendant.
Maraon posted Stronghold Insurance
bond in the amount of P1,000,000.00 issued by
Stronghold Insurance, the RTC issued the writ
of preliminary attachment.The sheriff served
the writ, the summons and a copy of the
complaint on the Cuencas on the same day. The
service of the writ, summons and copy of the
complaint were made on Tayactac on February
16, 1998.
The sheriff levied upon the equipment,
supplies, materials and various other personal
property belonging to Arc Cuisine, Inc. The
sheriff submitted a report on his proceedings,
and filed an ex parte motion seeking the
transfer of the levied properties to a safe place.
The RTC granted the ex parte motion.
Cuencas and Tayactac presented in the
RTC a Motion to Dismiss and to Quash Writ of
Preliminary Attachment on the grounds that:
(1) the action involved intra-corporate matters
that were within the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC); and (2) there was another
action pending in the SEC as well as a criminal
complaint in the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Paraaque City. This was denied by the
RTC, stating that the action, being one for the
recovery of a sum of money and damages, was
within its jurisdiction.
Cuencas and Tayactac went to the CA on
certiorari and prohibition to challenge orders of
the RTC on the basis of being issued with grave

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abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction.
The CA remanded to the RTC for hearing and
resolution of the Cuencas and Tayactacs claim
for the damages sustained from the
enforcement of the writ of preliminary
attachment.
The Cuencas and Tayactac then filed a Motion
to Require Sheriff to Deliver Attached
Properties and to Set Case for Hearing, praying,
among others that: (1) Stronghold Insurance be
directed to pay them the damages being sought
in accordance with its undertaking under the
surety bond for P1,000,0000.00; (3) Maraon
be held personally liable to them considering
the insufficiency of the amount of the surety
bond; etc.
After trial, the RTC rendered its judgment
holding Maraon and Stronghold Insurance
jointly and solidarily liable for damages to the
Cuencas and Tayactac,
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Cuenca et al., are
the owners of the properties attached and thus,
the real parties-in interest to claim any
purported damages arising therefrom.
Held:
There is no dispute that the properties
subject to the levy on attachment belonged to
Arc Cuisine, Inc. alone, not to the Cuencas and
Tayactac in their own right. They were only
stockholders of Arc Cuisine, Inc., which had a
personality distinct and separate from that of
any or all of them. The damages occasioned to
the properties by the levy on attachment,
wrongful or not, prejudiced Arc Cuisine, Inc.,
not them. As such, only Arc Cuisine, Inc. had
the right under the substantive law to claim and
recover such damages. This right could not also
be asserted by the Cuencas and Tayactac unless
they did so in the name of the corporation

Assignment 10.1
itself. But that did not happen herein, because
Arc Cuisine, Inc. was not even joined in the
action either as an original party or as an
intervenor.
The personality of a corporation is
distinct and separate from the personalities of
its stockholders. Hence, its stockholders are not
themselves the real parties in interest to claim
and recover compensation for the damages
arising from the wrongful attachment of its
assets. Only the corporation is the real party in
interest for that purpose.
Case No. 40: Heirs of Lorenzo Buensuceso vs
Perez
HEIRS
OF
LORENZO
BUENSUCESO,
represented by
German
Buensuceso, as
substituted by
IluminadaBuens
uceso,
Ryan
Buensuceso and
Philip
Buensuceso,
Petitioners,
vs.
LOVY PEREZ,
substituted by
Erlinda PerezHernandez,
Teodoro
G.
Perez
and
Candida PerezAtacador,
Respondents.
Facts:
The petitioner (German Buensuceso)
anchors its claim pursuant to Certificate of
Land Transfer under PD No. 27. It was alleged
that German immediately occupied the disputed
lot upon Lorenzos death. However, in 1989,

Remedial Law Review

Lovy Perez forcibly enteredthe disputed lot,
thus compelling the petitioner to file for a
petition for recovery of possession with the
PARAD.
The PARAD dismissed the petition
ruling that the petitioner (German) who failed
to prove that his father Lorenzo was the helper
of the regular tenant lessee of the disputed lot.
Case was appealed to the DARAB. The appeal
was granted and the earlier decision was set
aside. It was ordered that Lovy surrender
possession of the disputed lot to German.
DARAB considered the CLT was a clear
indication that the Government recognized
Lorenzo as a tenant beneficiary.
Lovy filed for a petition for
review with the CA. While the case was
pending, Lovy was substituted by her
heirs (respondents) upon her death. The
CA granted the appeal and reversed the
earlier decision of the DARAB.
The CA declared that the CLT is not
sufficient to constitute him as the owner of the
disputed lot since Lorenzo failed to pay the
lease rentals that section 26 of Republic Act
(RA) No 3844 requires, hence the present
recourse.
Issues:
Whether or not rule 45 of the Rules of Court is
the proper remedy of the disputed lot which is a
question of fact and is not proper in a rule 45
petition.
Whether or not the CLT is sufficient to
constitute ownership in the disputed property.
Held:
1. The Court said that, although Rule 45 is
a petition limited to questions of Law,
the case at bar is an exception. This is
because of the lower tribunals conflict
in the factual findings.
2.

The court ruled that mere issuance of

the CLT does not vest full ownership on

Assignment 10.1
the holder.
Likewise, the Court saw that Lorenzo had
long abandoned the disputed lot. Abandonment
is a ground for the termination of tenancy
relations.
However, for a cancellation or forfeiture to
take place, the proper procedures must be
observed and a final judgment rendered
declaring a cancellation of forfeiture.The Court
remands the case to the DAR for the conduct of
investigation and to determine the qualified
beneficiary of the disputed lot.

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Assignment 10.1