Rights and Obligations Between Spouses

*Article 68 and 69 FC: RIGHTS
Consitution and Articles 68 and 69 of
AND
the Family Code.
OBLIGATIONS
BETWEEN
HUSBAND AND WIFE
Issue:
Ilusorio vs Bildner
Whether
G.R. No. 139789, July 19, 2001
or
not
Potenciano
should be compelled to live with

Erlinda
Ponente: PARDO, J
Ruling: NO
Contributor: Naferteri S. Kuit
The
Facts:
law
provides
that
the
husband and the wife are obliged to
Erlinda K. Ilusorio filed a petition
live together, observe mutual love,
before the CA for habeas corpus to
respect and fidelity.
have the custody of her husband
therefor is the "spontaneous, mutual
Potenciano Ilusorio. The petition was
affection between husband and wife
dismissed by the CA.
and not any legal mandate or court
Erlinda filed an appeal with the

SC
pursuing
Potenciano.
the
SC
order" to enforce consortium.
of
Obviously, there was absence of
Erlindas
empathy between spouses Erlinda and
custody
dismissed
Potenciano,
appeal.
Erlinda
filed
reconsideration
The sanction
motion
reiterating
for
her
arguments that have been resolved in

the decision rendered by the SC.
bed
and
having
board
separated
since
from
1972. We
defined empathy as a shared feeling

between
husband
experienced
not
only
and
wife
by
having
spontaneous sexual intimacy but a
One of the issues raised by
deep
sense
of
spiritual
Erlinda is that they (Potenciano and
communion. Marital union is a two-
Erlinda)
way process.
are
duty
bound
to
live
together and care for each other as

stated under Article XII of the 2987
Marriage is definitely for two

loving adults who view the relationship
Ateneo de Davao University

Jacinto St., Davao City
with "amor gignit amorem respect,
care of his house as well as the store
sacrifice and a continuing commitment
insde.
to togetherness, conscious of its value

as a sublime social institution.
Leticia claims that Francisco and

Cirila are lovers. One of Franciscos
nieces
claims
that
Cirila
is
his
mistress. Cirila, on the other hand,

said that she is a mere helper.
*Article 87 FC: DONATION
Before Francisco died, the latter

executed a Donation Inter Vivos in
Arcaba vs Tabancura
which he donated his house and a

G.R. No. 146683, November 22,
portion of Lot 437-A, consisting of 150
2001
sqm to Cirila.
Ponente: MENDOZA, J
Herein respondents, Franciscos

nephews and nieces and his heirs by
intestate succession alleged the Cirila

Facts:
is Franciscos common-law wife and
Spouses Francisco Comille and

Zosima Montallana were registered
owners of Lot 437-A which has total
the donation made by the latter is void

under Article 87 of the FC.
RTC
ruled
in
favor
area of 418 sqm. After the death of the
respondents.
latter,
decision. Hence, this petition.
Francisco
gained
Zosimas
CA
affirmed
of
the
RTCs
portion of the said lot through an

extrajudicial partition with waiver of
rights executed by the latters mother.
Franciscos
Leticia
Bellosillo,
cousin
Luzviminda
asked
and
his
the
neice
latters
Paghacian,
and
Issue:
Whether or not the donation
executed by Francisco is void under
Article 87 of the FC
Ruling: YES
herein petitioner Cirila Arcaba to take

At the very least, cohabitation
Seigfredo Tabancura presented
is public assumption by a man and a
documents apparently signed by Cirila
woman of the marital relation, and
using the surname "Comille. These
dwelling together as man and wife,
documents
show
thereby holding themselves out to the
herself
Francisco's
public as such. Secret meetings or
wife, otherwise, she would not have
nights clandestinely spent together,
used his last name. Similarly, in the
even
not
answer filed by Francisco's lessees in
constitute such kind of cohabitation;
"Erlinda Tabancura, et al. vs. Gracia
they are merely meretricious.
Adriatico Sy and Antonio Sy," RTC Civil
if
often
repeated,
do
Was Cirila Francisco's employee

or
his
common-law
admitted
that
she
wife?
and
Cirila
Francisco
resided under one roof for a long time.

It
is
very
possible
that
the
two
consummated their relationship, since

Cirila
gave
Francisco
therapeutic
massage and Leticia said they slept in

the same bedroom. At the very least,
their public conduct indicated that
Case
as
No.4719
rentals),
that
(for
these
Cirila
saw
common-law
collection
lessees referred
of
to
Cirila as "the common-law spouse of

Francisco." Finally, the fact that Cirila
did not demand from Francisco a
regular cash wage is an indication that
she
was
not
simply
caregiver-
employee, but Francisco's common

law spouse. She was, after all, entitled
to a regular cash wage under the law.
theirs was not just a relationship of

caregiver and patient, but that of
exclusive partners akin to husband
and wife.
*Article
Aside from Erlinda Tabancura's

testimony that her uncle told her that
105-133
FC:
CONJUGAL
PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS
Munoz, Jr vs Carlos
Cirila was his mistress, there are other

indications that Cirila and Francisco
G.R. No. 156125, August 25, 2010
were common-law spouses.
Ponente: BRION, J

Facts:
signature is immaterial and the sale is
A 77-sqm land was registered in
valid.
the name of Erlinda Ramirez, married
RTC
ruled
in
favor
of
the
to Eliseo Carlos. The said land was
petitioner. The CA applying the second
covered by TCT 1427.
paragraph of Article 158 of the Civil
On
April
6,
1989,
Eliseo
mortgaged TCT 1427 to GSIS, with

Erlindas consent, to obtain a housing
loan.
The
housing
loan
was
successfully approved.
On
July
(TCT1427)
14,
was
Code and Calimlim-Canullas v. Hon.

Fortun, held that the subject property,
originally
paraphernal
1993,
the
title
to
the
transferred
Erlinda for herself and as attorney-infact of Eliseo. Respondents asked for

of
the
deed
of
was no sale but a mortgage.
Issue:
Whether or not the subject lot is
conjugal
Ruling:
the RTC a scientific examination which

Eliseos
As a general rule, all property

acquired during the marriage, whether
Respondents presented before

that
signature
was
forged in the SPA.
the acquisition appears to have been

made, contracted or registered in the
name of one or both spouses, is
presumed to be conjugal unless the
contrary is proved.
Petitioner, on the other hand,

presented
became
paid through conjugal funds.
absolute sale. They alleged that there
shows
property,
conjugal property when it was used as
of Deed of Absolute Sale, executed by
nullification
exclusive
collateral for a housing loan that was
petitioner Francisco Munoz, Jr by virtue
the
Erlindas
evidence
on
the
paraphernal nature of the subject lot.

The latter claims that the lot is the
sole owner of the lot, thus, Eliseos
In
the
present
case,
clear
evidence that Erlinda inherited the

residential lot from her father has
sufficiently rebutted this presumption
of
conjugal

ownership. Pursuant
to
Articles 92 and 109 of the Family
*Article
Code,
properties
gratuitous
title
acquired
by
either
by
spouse,
during the marriage, shall be excluded
105-133
G.R. No.
the
1998
property
of
each
spouse. The residential lot, therefore,

is
Erlindas
exclusive
paraphernal
property.
CONJUGAL
Ayala Investments vs CA
from the community property and be

exclusive
CC:
118305, February
12,
Ponente: MARTINEZ, J
SC said that CAs reliance on
Facts:
Article 158 of the CC and CalimlimCanullas is misplaced.

As
the
Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM)

obtained
respondents
were
P50,300M
Investment
and
from
Ayala
Development
married during the effectivity of the
Corporation (AIDC). The Executive Vice
Civil Code, its provisions on conjugal
President of PBM, Alfredo Ching, herein
partnership of gains (Articles 142 to
private
189)
jointly and severally answerable with
should
have
governed
their
property relations. However, with the

3,
1989,
the
Civil
Code
provisions on conjugal partnership of

gains, including Article 158, have been
superseded by those found in the
Family Code (Articles 105 to 133).
Thus, in determining the nature
the Civil Code, except with respect to

rights then already vested.
himself
PBM failed to pay its load. AIDC

filed a case for sum of money against
PBM and Alfredo. RTC ordered PBM and
Alfredo to pay the loan with interests.
RTC, pending appeal of the said civil
case, issued a writ of execution of
pending appeal.
of the subject property, we refer to the

provisions of the Family Code, and not
made
PBMs indebtedness to AIDC.
enactment of the Family Code on

August
respondent,
Thereafter, petitioner Abelardo

Magsajo, Sr., Deputy Sheriff of Rizal
and
appointed
sheriff
in
aforementioned civil case, caused the

issuance
and
service
upon
payment of personal debts contracted
respondents-spouses of a notice of
by the husband or the wife before or
sheriff sale on three (3) of their
during
conjugal properties.
charged to the conjugal partnership
Private respondents filed a case

of injuction to enjoin the auction sale
alleging
enforce
that
the
petitioners
judgment
except
to
marriage
the
shall
extent
not
that
be
they
redounded to the benefit of the family.
cannot
Here, the property in dispute
the
also involves the family home. The
conjugal partnership levied on the
loan is a corporate loan not a personal
ground
the
one. Signing as a surety is certainly
subject loan did not redound to the
not an exercise of an industry or
benefit
profession nor an act of administration
that,
of
among
the
against
the
others,
said
conjugal
partnership.
for the benefit of the family.
The auction took place. AIDC

filed a motion to dismiss the injunction
case filed by private respondents on
the ground that the same had been
Ching vs CA
moot and academic. RTC denied the

motion. RTC also declared the sale on
G.R. No. 124642, February 23,
execution null and void. CA affirmed
2004
RTCs decision.
Ponente: CALLEJO, SR. J
Issue:
Whether or not the conjugal
Facts:
partnership of SPS Ching should be

Philippine
held liable
Blooming
Mills
Company, Inc. (PBMCI) obtained a loan

Ruling: NO
of P9M
from
the
Allied
Banking
Article 121, paragraph 3, of the
Corporation (ABC). PBMCI Executive
Family Code is emphatic that the
Vice-President Alfredo Ching executed

a promissory note for the said amount

promising to pay on December 22,
the
1978. Alfredo Ching, together with
continuing
Emilio Taedo and Chung Kiat Hua,
suretyship
bound
petitioner
themselves
to
jointly
and
indebtedness
covered
by
the
guaranty/comprehensive
contract
Alfredo
executed
Ching
for
by
the
severally guarantee the payment of all
account of PBMCI did not redound to
the PBMCI obligations owing the ABC
the
to the extent of P38M.
partnership. She attached therewith a
ABC extended another loan to

the PBMCI in the amount of P13M.
The
PBMCI
defaulted
payment of all its loans.
in
the
ABC filed a
complaint for sum of money against

the
PBMCI
to
the trial court levied on attachment

100,000
common
the
conjugal
Alfredo Ching.
RTC ruled in favor of SPS Ching. CA set
aside and assailed RTCs decision.
Issue:
partnership of SPS Ching is liable on
Meanwhile, the deputy sheriff of

the
of
copy of her marriage contract with
collect
the P12,612,972.88.
benefit
shares
of
the said account of PBMCI

Ruling: NO
Citycorp stocks in the name of Alfredo

Ching.
For the conjugal partnership to

be liable for a liability that should
Encarnacion T. Ching, assisted

by her husband Alfredo Ching, filed a
Motion to Set Aside the levy on
attachment. She
appertain to the husband alone, there

must
be
showing
that
some
advantages accrued to the spouses.
alleged inter
In
this
case,
the
private
alia that the 100,000 shares of stocks
respondent failed to prove that the
levied on by the sheriff were acquired
conjugal partnership of the petitioners
by her and her husband during their
was
marriage out of conjugal funds after
husbands
the Citycorp Investment Philippines
continuing guaranty and suretyship
was established in 1974. Furthermore,
agreement
benefited

act
by
of
with
the
petitioner-
executing
the
private
respondent
for
and
in
behalf
PBMCI. The
contract
of
loan
of
was
between the private respondent and
Francisco vs Gonzales
the PBMCI, solely for the benefit of the
G.R. No. 177667, September 17,
latter. No presumption can be inferred
2008
from the fact that when the petitionerhusband
entered
accommodation
contract
of
partnership
into
an
agreement
or
surety,
the
would
thereby
conjugal
be
Ponente: AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J
Facts:
benefited.
This
Petitioners Cleodia U. Francisco

is
different
from
the
situation where the husband borrows

money or receives services to be used
for his own business or profession. In
the Ayala case, we ruled that it is such
a contract that is one within the term
obligation
for
the
benefit
of
the
conjugal partnership.
and Ceamantha U. Francisco are the

minor
children
Francisco
of Cleodualdo M.
(Cleodualdo)
and
Michele Uriarte Francisco (Michele). In

a Partial Decision rendered by the RTC
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, the
Compromise Agreement entered into
by
couple
was
approved.
In
the
Compromise Agreement, the conjugal
The Court held in the same case
home
(Taal
St.
property)
was
that the rulings of the Court in Cobb-
transferred by way of a deed of
Perez and G-Tractors,
donation to Cleodia and Ceamantha.
Inc. are
not
controlling because the husband, in

those cases, contracted the obligation
for his own business. In this case, the
petitioner-husband acted merely as a
surety for the loan contracted by the
PBMCI from the private respondent.
Meanwhile,
in
Unlawful Detainer with
case
for
Preliminary
Attachment filed by spouses Jorge C.

Gonzales and Purificacion W. Gonzales
(respondents)
George ZoltanMatrai (Matrai)
against
and
Michele, the Metropolitan Trial Court

(MeTC) ordered Matrai and Michele to

vacate the premises in Lanka Drive.
A notice of sale by execution
was
then
issued
by
the
sheriff
Whether
in
the
name
of Cleodualdo M. Francisco, married to

Michele U. Francisco.
Petitioners'
not
the
Taal
property should be held liable for

Michele and Matris obligation
Ruling: NO
covering a real property (Taal St.

Property)
or
It should be noted that the

judgment debt for which the subject
property was being made to answer
was incurred by Michele and her
grandmother
filed
partner,
Matrai. Respondents
allege
with the RTC an Affidavit of Third Party
that the lease of the property in Lanka
Claim and a Very Urgent Motion to
Drive redounded to the benefit of the
Stop Sale by Execution but this was
family. By
denied.
imagination can it be concluded that
Petitioners then filed a petition

for certiorari with the CA.
no
stretch
of
one's
said debt/obligation was incurred for

the benefit of the conjugal partnership
or that some advantage accrued to
Pending resolution by the CA,
the welfare of the family.
the RTC issued an Order dated July 8,

2005, granting respondents' petition
for the issuance of a new certificate of
title.
In this case, Michele, who was

then
already
from Cleodualdo,
living
rented
separately
the
house
in Lanka Drive for her and Matrais own

The CA dismissed the petition.
Petitioners argue that: xxx (3)
the adjudged obligation of Michele in

the ejectment case did not redound to
the benefit of the family.
Issue:
benefit. In fact, when they entered

into the lease agreement, Michele
and Matrai purported
themselves
to
be husband and wife. Respondents

bare allegation that petitioners lived
with Michele on the leased property is
not sufficient to support the conclusion
that
the
Michele
judgment
debt
against
and Matrai in
the ejectment suit redounded to the
originated from Erlinda Nicols civil
benefit
liability
of
the
family
of
Michele
and Cleodualdo and petitioners.

To
hold
the
property
against
and Matrai would

the
spirit
and
be
from
the
criminal
offense of slander filed against her by
in Taal St. liable for the obligations of

Michele
arising
going
avowed
petitioners.
decision
The
RTC
ordering
damages.
The
rendered
Erlinda
CA
to
pay
affirmed
the
decision.
objective of the Civil Code to give the
RTC commanded that of the
utmost concern for the solidarity and
goods and chattels of the defendant
well-being of the family as a unit.
Erlinda Nicol, or from her estates or
The RTC astonishingly ruled that

Michele is now the owner of the
property
inasmuch
as Cleodualdo already
waived
his
rights over the property.
legal heirs, you cause the sum in the

amount
of
forty
(P40,000.00),
representing
thousand
Philippine
the
moral
pesos
Currency,
damages,
attorneys fees and litigation expenses

and exemplary damages and the cost
of suit of the plaintiff aside from your
lawful fees on this execution and do
likewise return this writ into court
within sixty (60) days from date, with
Buado vs Nicol
your proceedings endorsed hereon.

G.R. No. 145222, April 24, 2009
Finding Erlinda Nicols personal
Ponente: TINGA, J
properties insufficient to satisfy the

judgment, the Deputy Sheriff issued a
Contributor: Edward Nerosa
notice of levy on real property on

Facts:
execution addressed to the Register of
SPS Roberto and Venus Buado

(petitioners)
filed
complaint
for
damages against Erlinda Nicol with
Deeds of Cavite.
On 20 November 1992, a notice
of sheriffs sale was issued.
RTC of Bacoor, Cavite. Said action

Two (2) days before the public
There
is
no
contested
affidavit of third-party claim from one
nature.
Arnulfo F. Fulo was received by the
Code explicitly provides that payment
deputy sheriff prompting petitioners to
of personal debts contracted by the
put up a sheriffs indemnity bond. The
husband or the wife before or during
auction
the marriage shall not be charged to
proceeded
with
petitioners as the highest bidder.

On
February
the
1993,
certificate of sale was issued in favor
Article
conjugal
122
is
that
auction sale on 28 January 1993, an
sale
property
dispute
of
conjugal
the
partnership
in
Family
except
insofar as they redounded to the

benefit of the family.
of petitioners.
Unlike in the system of absolute

community where liabilities incurred
Issue:
by either spouse by reason of a crime
Can the conjugal property of the
orquasi-delict is
chargeable
to
the
spouses be subject to indemnity, even
absolute community of property, in
though the other spouse is stranger
the absence or insufficiency of the
to the suit?
exclusive
property
of
the
debtor-
spouse, the same advantage is not

Ruling: No
accorded in the system of conjugal

partnership of gains. The conjugal
In
determining
whether
the
husband is a stranger to the suit, the

character of the property must be
partnership of gains has no duty to

make
advance
payments
for
the
liability of the debtor-spouse.
taken into account.

Parenthetically, by no stretch of
Petitioners
argue
that
the
obligation of the wife arising from her

criminal liability is chargeable to the
conjugal
partnership,
with
this
contention, the Court did not agree.
imagination can it be concluded that

the civil obligation arising from the
crime of slander committed by Erlinda
redounded
to
the
conjugal partnership.

benefit
of
the
To reiterate, conjugal property
moral damages and actual damages.
cannot be held liable for the personal
The award of civil indemnity and moral
obligation contracted by one spouse,
damages were affirmed but the award
unless some advantage or benefit is
for actual damages was deleted. The
shown to have accrued to the conjugal
decision became final and executory
partnership.
A notice of levy and a notice of sale on

execution were issued.
On April 3, 2002, petitioner Efren and
his wife Melecia filed a motion to
quash the writ of execution, claiming
Pana vs Heirs of Juanite
that
the
levied
assets,
properties
not
were
G.R. No. 164201
conjugal
paraphernal
December 10, 2012
assets of Melecia. On September 16,

2002 the RTC denied the motion.10
Ponente: ABAD, J
The
moved
for
reconsideration but the RTC denied the
same on March 6, 2003.
Facts:
Issue:
The prosecution accused petitioner

Efren Pana (Efren), his wife Melecia,
and others of murder before the RTC of
Surigao City.
Efren
spouses
was

properties of spouses can be levied
and executed upon for the satisfaction
of Melecias civil liability in the murder
acquitted
but
finding
case
Melecia and another person was guilty

Ruling: YES
as charged.
The RTC ordered those found guilty to
This refers to the Family Code
pay each of the heirs of the victims,
provisions in deciding whether or not
jointly and severally, civil indemnity,
the conjugal properties of Efren and

Melecia may be held to answer for the

civil liabilities imposed on Melecia in
the murder case.
The civil indemnity that the decision in
the murder case imposed on her may
be enforced against their conjugal
assets
after
the
responsibilities
BA Finance vs CA
G.R. No. L-61464, May 28, 1988
Ponente: GUTIERREZ, JR., J
Facts:
enumerated in Article 121 of the

Family
Code
have
been
covered.
Those responsibilities are as follows:
Augusto Yulo secured a loan

from the BA Finance in the amount of
P591,003.59
Contrary to Efrens contention, Article

121 above allows payment of the
criminal indemnities imposed on his
even
before
by
behalf and as a representative of A&L

Industries.
Augusto presented an alleged
are
special power of attorney executed by
liquidated. Indeed, it states that such
his wife, Lily Yulo, who managed the
indemnities may be enforced against
business and under whose name the
the
the
said
the
purportedly authorized the husband to
partnership
responsibilities
these
evidenced
promissory note he signed in his own
wife, Melecia, out of the partnership

assets
as
assets
after
enumerated
in
business
preceding article have been covered.
procure
No prior liquidation of those assets is
promissory note.
required. This is not altogether unfair

since Article 122 states that at the
time of liquidation of the partnership,
such
[offending]
spouse
shall
be
charged for what has been paid for the

purposes above-mentioned.
the
was
loan
and
registered,
sign
the
When the obligation became

due and demandable, Augusto failed
to pay the same.
The petitioner prayed for the
issuance
of
writ
of
attachment
alleging that said spouses were guilty

of fraud consisting of the execution of
Deed of Assignment executed by and
between the spouses and A. Soriano
of the conjugal partnership of the
Corporation. The writ hereby prayed
spouses and be held liable for the
for was issued by the trial court and
obligations
not contented with the order.
husband. However, for the property to
Lily filed her answer, alleging

that although Augusto Yulo and she
are husband and wife, the former had
abandoned her and their five (5)
children five (5) months before the
filing of the complaint; that they were
already
separated
when
the
promissory note was executed.
contracted
by
the
be liable, the obligation contracted by

the husband must have redounded to
the
benefit
partnership.
of
the
The
conjugal
obligation
was
contracted by Augusto for his own

benefit
because
incurred
such
at
the
obligation,
time
he
he
had
already abandoned his family and left

their
conjugal
home.
He
likewise
RTC rendered judgment dismissing the
made it appear that he was duly
complaint
authorized by his wife in behalf of the
of
the
petitioner.
CA
company to procure such loan from
affirmed RTCs decision.
the petitioner. Clearly, there must be
Issue:
the
Whether or not A&L Industries

can be held liable for the obligations
contracted by the husband as an
Industries
proprietorship,
owner
Supreme
obligation
A&L
is
Lily
whose
Yulo.
is
single
registered
The
said
proprietorship was established during
that
some
the spouses.
petitioner
Ruling:
showing
advantage accrued to the welfare of
The
administrator
requisite
Court
cannot
contracted
ruled
that
enforce
the
by
Augusto
against his conjugal properties with

Lily.
Furthermore,
the
writ
of
attachment cannot be issued against

the said properties.
the marriage and assets were also

acquired during the same. Hence, it is
presumed that the property forms part
Heirs of Ayuste vs CA
cancellation of the title issued in the

1999
name of private respondent. She also

alleges that her signature on the deed
of sale was forged and that her
husband
Ponente: GONZAGA-REYES, J
Rafael
sold
the
property
without her knowledge and consent.
RTC declared the Deed of Absolute
Facts:
Sale null and void.
Christina
Ayuste
married
Rafael
Ayuste.
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial

courts ruling by holding that Christina
The couple purchased on a parcel of
Ayustes right to bring an action for
land with an area of 180 square
the annulment of the sale is barred by
meters.
laches because of her failure to file it
A deed of absolute sale was executed

by Rafael Ayuste in favor of private
respondent whereby the former sold
the abovementioned parcel of land to
the latter for P40K, which amount
Rafael
Ayuste
received
in
acknowledge
the
having
deed. Christinas
signature was allegedly on the deed.

After Rafael Ayustes death on October
13, 1989, Christina discovered that the
during the existence of the marriage in

accordance with article 173 of the Civil
Code.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioners are
entitled
to
the
annulment
of
the
contract of sale entered into by Rafael

Ayuste
Ruling: NO
title to the land in Lucena was missing.
Under the Civil Code, although
She learned from her employees about
the husband is the administrator of
the sale of the house and lot by her
the conjugal partnership, he cannot
husband to private respondent.
alienate
Christina filed a complaint with the

RTC for the annulment of the sale,
or
encumber
any
real
property of the conjugal partnership

without
his

wifes
consent, subject
only to certain exceptions specified in
years from the questioned transaction
the law. The remedy available to the
by the wife. Where the law speaks in
wife
should
clear and categorical language, there
property
is no room for interpretation there is
in
dispose
case
of
her
their
husband
conjugal
without her consent is laid down in

Article 173 of the Civil Code which
states thatThe
room only for application.

The fact that Christina Ayuste only
learned of the sale after the death of
wife
may,
during
the
her husband is not material. We affirm
marriage, and within ten years from
public
the transaction questioned, ask the
registration
courts
any
Register of Deeds constitutes a notice
contract of the husband entered into
to the whole world. Precisely, the
without
such
purpose of the legislature in providing
consent is required, or any act or
a system of registration is to afford a
contract of the husband which tends
means of publicity so that persons
to defraud her or impair her interest in
dealing with real property may search
the
the
for
the
her
annulment
consent,
when
conjugal
property. Should
the
of
partnership
wife
fail
to
respondents
records
security
of
the
and
against
ruling
sale
thereby
that
with
the
acquire
instruments
the
exercise this right, she or her heirs,
execution of which have not been
after the dissolution of the marriage,
revealed to them. Since the deed of
may demand the value of property
sale was registered on March 5, 1987,
fraudulently
Christina Ayuste is presumed to have
alienated
by
the
husband. (emphasis supplied)

There is no ambiguity in the
constructive notice of the sale from

such date.
wording of the law. A sale of real

made by the husband without the
Heirs of Reyes vs Mijares
consent of his wife is voidable. The

action for annulment must be brought
during the marriage and within ten
Ponente:

Contributor: Behnice Tesiorna
The RTC declared the sale void

in its entirety in view of the absence of
Facts:
the wifes consent and ordered Vicente
Vicente
married
separated
in
and
1960,
de
Ignacia
but
facto
had
since
were
been
1974.
Sometime in 1984, Ignacia learned

that on March 1, 1983, Vicente sold
the subject property to respondent
spouses
Cipriano
and
Florentina
Mijares for P40k.
Mijares demanding the return of her

share in the lot. Failing to settle the
matter amicably, Ignacia filed on June
4, 1996 a complaint for annulment of
against
Sps.
Mijares.
The
complaint included Vicente as one of

the defendants.
In
spouses
their
The Court of Appeals reversed

and set aside the decision of the trial
court.
It ruled that notwithstanding
the absence of Ignacias consent to

the sale, the same must be held valid
in favor of respondents because they
were innocent purchasers for value.
Ignacia sent a letter to Sps
sale
to reimburse Sps Mijares 110k.
answer,
claimed
that
respondent
they
The CA set aside the RTC decision.

Petitioners
filed
the
instant
petition.
Issue:
1) What is the status of the sale of
the subject property?
Ruling: VOIDABLE
are
Articles 166 and 173 of the Civil
purchasers in good faith and that the
Code, the governing laws at the time
sale was valid because it was duly
the assailed sale was contracted.
approved by the court. Vicente Reyes,

on the other hand, contended that
what he sold to the spouses was only
his share in the subject property,
excluding the share of his wife, and
that he never represented that the
latter was already dead.
Pursuant to the provisions, the

husband
could
not
alienate
or
encumber any conjugal real property

without
the
consent,
express
or
implied, of the wife otherwise, the

contract
is
voidable.
Indeed,
in
several cases the Court had ruled that

such alienation or encumbrance by the
declared void and not merely voidable,
husband is void.
the rationale for the annulment of the
The better view,
however, is to consider the transaction
whole transaction is the same thus
as merely voidable and not void. This

is consistent with Article 173 of the
Civil Code pursuant to which the wife
could, during the marriage and within
10
years
from
the
questioned
transaction, seek its annulment.
The plain meaning attached to

the plain language of the law is that
the contract, in its entirety, executed
by the husband without the wife's
consent, may be annulled by the wife.
Had Congress intended to limit such
Issue:
annulment in so far as the contract
2.) Assuming that the sale is

annullable, should it be annulled in its
entirety or only with respect to the
shall
prejudice
the
wife,
such
limitation should have been spelled

out in the statute.
share of Ignacia?
Ruling:
ANNULED
IN
ITS
Pelayo vs Perez
ENITERETY
Anent the second issue, the trial
court correctly annulled the voidable
sale of Lot No. 4349-B-2 in its entirety.
In Bucoy v. Paulino, a case involving
the annulment of sale with assumption
of
mortgages
executed
by
Ponente:
Facts:
the
David Pelayo conveyed to Melki Perez
husband without the consent of the
(Perez) two parcels of agricultural land
wife, it was held that the alienation or
(the lots) situated in Panabo, Davao.
encumbrance must be annulled in its

entirety and not only insofar as the
share of the wife in the conjugal
property is concerned.
transaction
in
the
Although the
said
case
was
Loreza Pelayo (Loreza), wife of Pelayo,

and another one whose signature is
illegible witnessed the execution of the
deed.

Perez thereupon asked Loreza to sign
consent, hence, in light of Art. 166 of
on the first and second pages of the
the Civil Code it is null and void.
deed
but she
refused,
hence,
he
instituted the instant complaint for

specific performance against her and
her husband Pelayo.
In
their
Answer,
the
Sps
Pelayo
The trial court held that the deed was

null and void and accordingly rendered
judgment.
Perez appealed to the CA.
claimed that as the lots were occupied
The CA reversed and set aside the RTC
illegally
Decision.
by
some
persons
against
whom they filed an ejectment case.

SPS Pelayo further allege that they
and Perez just made it appear in the
deed that the lots were sold to him in
order
to
frighten
occupants,
with
the
said
illegal
intentional
omission of Lorezas signature so that
Sps. Pelayo filed the instant petition

arguing, among others, that the CA
made a novel ruling that there was
implied marital consent of the wife of
petitioner David Pelayo.
Issue:
the deed could not be registered; and

that the deed being simulated and
bereft
of
consideration
is
Was the Deed of Sale null and

void for lack of marital consent?
void/inexistent.
Ruling: NO
Perez countered that the lots were
Sale is a consensual contract that is
given to him by defendant Pelayo in
perfected by mere consent, which may
consideration of his services as his
either be express or implied. A wifes
attorney-in-fact to make the necessary
consent to the husbands disposition
representation and negotiation with
of conjugal property does not always
the illegal occupants-defendants in the
have to be explicit or set forth in any
ejectment suit.
particular document, so long as it is
Defendant Pelayo claimed that the

deed was without his wife Lorezas
shown by acts of the wife that such

consent or approval was indeed given.
In
the
present

case,
although
it
appears on the face of the deed of
conjugal property does not make the
sale that Lorenza signed only as an
contract void ab initio but merely
instrumental witness, circumstances
voidable. Hence, it has been held that
leading
to
of
said
the contract is valid until the court
fact
that
annuls the same and only upon an
Lorenza was fully aware of the sale of
action brought by the wife whose
their conjugal property and consented
consent was not obtained. In the
to the sale.
present
document
the
point
execution
to
the
Petitioners do not deny that Lorenza

Pelayo
was
present
during
the
execution of the deed of sale as her

signature appears thereon. Neither do
they claim that Lorenza Pelayo had no
knowledge whatsoever about
the
case,
despite
respondents
repeated demands for Lorenza to affix

her signature on all the pages of the
deed of sale, showing respondents
insistence on enforcing said contract,
Lorenza still did not file a case for
annulment of the deed of sale.
contents of the subject document.

Thus, it is quite certain that she knew
of the sale of their conjugal property
Aguete vs PNB
between her husband and respondent.
G.R. No. 170166 , April 6, 2011
If Lorenza had any objections over the
Ponente: CARPIO, J
conveyance of the disputed property,

she could have totally refrained from
having any part in the execution of the
deed of sale.
Instead, Lorenza even
affixed her signature thereto.

Moreover,
Under
Article

Facts:
SPS
Jose
A. Ros and Estrella Aguete filed

173,
in
complaint for the annulment of the
relation to Article 166, both of the New
Real Estate Mortgage and all legal
Civil Code, which was still in effect on
proceedings taken thereunder against
January 11, 1988 when the deed in
PNB
question was executed, the lack of
appellee Jose A. Ros obtained a loan
marital consent to the disposition of
of P115K from PNB Laoag Branch, Ros
Laoag

Branch.
Plaintiff-
executed
mortgage
RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. CA
involving a parcel of land with all the
reversed the decision and granted
improvements.
PNBs appeal.
Upon maturity, the loan remained
Issue:
outstanding.
instituted
real
estate
As
result,
extrajudicial
proceedings
on
PNB
foreclosure
the
mortgaged
property. After the extrajudicial sale

thereof, a Certificate of Sale was
issued in favor of PNB Laoag as the
highest bidder. After the lapse of one
(1) year without the property being
redeemed,
the
property
was
consolidated and registered in the

name of PNB Laoag Branch.
Whether or not the mortgage,

sale and consolidation of the property
were null and void on the ground that
the wife did not give her consent
Ruling: NO
There is no doubt that the property
was acquired during Ros and Aguetes
marriage.
Ros and Aguete were
married on 16 January 1954, while the

subject
property
was
acquired
in
Plaintiff-appellee Estrella Aguete
1968. There
claimed that she has no knowledge of
that Ros encumbered
the loan obtained by her husband nor
property when he mortgaged it for
she
P115,000.00 on
consented
to
the
mortgage
is
also
the
23
instituted on the conjugal property. A
1974. PNB Laoag does
complaint
was
to
doubt
subject
October
not
doubt
annul
the
that Aguete,
to
the
signature, consented to Ros mortgage
mortgage, sale and consolidation of
to PNB of the subject property. On the
the property interposing the defense
other hand, Aguete denies ever having
that her signatures affixed on the
consented to the loan and also denies
documents were forged and that the
affixing her signature to the mortgage
loan did not redound to the benefit of
and loan documents.
the family.
The
proceedings
filed
no
pertaining
as
husband
evidenced
cannot
by
alienate
her
or
encumber any conjugal real property

without
the

consent,
express
or
implied,
of
the
wife.
Should
the
husband do so, then the contract is
that Aguetes signatures
were
really
forged.
voidable. In the present case, we

follow the conclusion of the appellate
court and rule that Aguete gave her
consent to Ros encumbrance of the
De Leon vs De Leon
subject property.
The
documents
disavowed
by Aguete are acknowledged before a

notary public, hence they are public
Ponente:
Contributor: Lexi Singanon
duly
Facts: Bonifacio O. De Leon, then
as
single, and the Peoples Homesite and
provided by law may be presented in
Housing Corporation (PHHC) entered
evidence without further proof, the
into a Conditional Contract to Sell a
certificate
of
191.30
being prima
facie evidence
documents.
Every
acknowledged
execution
of
instrument
and
certified
acknowledgment
the
of
instrument
square-meter
the
lot. Subsequently, on April 24, 1968,
or
Bonifacio married Anita de Leon in a
document involved.18 The execution of

a document that has been ratified
before a notary public cannot be
disproved by the mere denial of the
alleged signer.19 PNB was correct when
it stated that petitioners omission to
present other positive evidence to
civil rite.
PHHC executed a Final Deed of Sale in
favor
of
Bonifacio. Accordingly,
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.

173677 was issued o in the name of
Bonifacio, single.
substantiate their claim of forgery was
Subsequently, Bonifacio, for P19K, sold
fatal to petitioners cause.20 Petitioners
the subject lot to her sister, Lita, and
did
husband Felix Rio Tarrosa (Tarrosas),
not
present
any
corroborating
witness, such as a handwriting expert,
petitioners
who
Deed of Sale did not bear the written
could
authoritatively
declare
herein. The
conveying
consent and signature of Anita. Three

months after Bonifacios death, the
Tarrosas registered the Deed of Sale

and had TCT No. 173677 canceled.
Danilo
and
Vilma,
Article 160 of the 1950 Civil Code, the

and
governing provision in effect at the
Anitas children, filed a Notice of
time Bonifacio and Anita contracted
Adverse Claim before the Register of
marriage, provides that all property of
Deeds to protect their rights over the
the marriage is presumed to belong to
subject
her
the conjugal partnership unless it is
children alleged, among other things,
proved that it pertains exclusively to
that fraud attended the execution of
the husband or the wife. For the
the Deed of Sale and that subsequent
presumption to arise, it is not, as Tan
acts of Bonifacio would show that he
v. Court of Appeals[9] teaches, even
was still the owner of the parcel of
necessary to prove that the property
land.
was
property.
Bonifacio
Ruling: NO
Anita
and
The Tarrosas averred that the lot

Bonifacio
sold
to
them
was
his
exclusive property inasmuch as he

was still single when he acquired it
from PHHC. As further alleged, they
were
not
aware
of
the
supposed
marriage between Bonifacio and Anita

at the time of the execution of the
Deed of Sale.
RTC rendered judgment in favor of
Anita and her children. The decision
was affirmed by the CA.
with
funds
of
the
partnership. Only proof of acquisition

during the marriage is needed to raise
the presumption that the property is
conjugal. In
fact,
even
when
the
manner in which the properties were

acquired
does
not
appear,
the
presumption will still apply, and the

properties
will
still
be
considered
conjugal.
Evidently, title to the property in
question only passed to Bonifacio after
he had fully paid the purchase price on
June 22, 1970. This full payment, to
stress, was made more than two (2)
Issue:
Whether or not the Deed of Sale
valid
acquired
years after his marriage to Anita on

April 24, 1968. In net effect, the
property
was

acquired
during
the
existence of the marriage; as such,

ownership to the property is, by law,
presumed to belong to the conjugal
partnership.
What
the time when
is
the
material
property
Facts:
is
The subject matter of the action is a
was
parcel of land with an area of 520.50
acquired.
square meters registered in the name
It cannot be over-emphasized that the

1950 Civil Code is very explicit on the
consequence
of
the
husband
alienating or encumbering any real

without
the
wifes
consent.
To
of Domingo B. Hernandez, Sr. married

to Sergia V. Hernandez. Later on, said
TCT No. 107534 was cancelled and in
lieu thereof, TCT No. 290121 was
issued in favor of Melanie Mingoa.
A
complaintwas
filed
by
herein
specific point, the sale of a conjugal
petitioners,
piece of land by the husband, as
Hernandez, Sr., namely, SPS Sergia
administrator, must, as a rule, be with
Hernandez
the wifes consent. Else, the sale is not
children,
valid. So it is that in several cases we
herein,
ruled that the sale by the husband of
Mingoa, Atty. Plaridel Mingoa, Sr. and
property belonging to the conjugal
all persons claiming rights under the
partnership without the consent of the
latter, and the Quezon City Register of
wife
Deeds.
is
showing
void ab
that
initio,
the
absent
any
latter
is
incapacitated, under civil interdiction,

or like causes.
The
heirs
and
against
Dolores
petitioners
of
Domingo
their
the
surviving
respondents
Camisura,
asked
for
Melanie
(a) the
annulment and/or declaration of nullity

of TCT No. 290121 including all its
derivative
Heirs of Fernandez vs Mingoa
titles,
the
Irrevocable
Special Power of Attorney (SPA) in

favor of Dolores Camisura, the SPA in
G.R. No. 146548, December 18,
favor of Plaridel Mingoa, Sr., and the
2009
Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Estate
Ponente: LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J
executed by Plaridel Mingoa, Sr. in

favor
of
Melanie
Mingoa for
being
products of forgery and falsification;

and
(b)
the
reconveyance
and/or
issuance to them (petitioners) by the

Quezon City Register of Deeds of the
certificate of title covering the subject
property.
Ruling: YES
It bears stressing that the subject
matter
herein
involves
conjugal
property. Said property was awarded

to
Domingo
1958. The
Hernandez,
assailed
Sr.
SPAs
in
were
executed in 1963 and 1964. Title in
Respondents argue that: the claim or
the name of Domingo Hernandez, Sr.
demand
waived,
covering the subject property was
abandoned or otherwise extinguished;
issued on May 23, 1966. The sale of
lack
of
the property to Melanie Mingoa and
jurisdiction over the person of the
the issuance of a new title in her name
defendants or over the subject or
happened in 1978. Since all these
nature
events
of
has
been
cause
of
of
paid,
action;
the
prescription. The
lack
suit;
RTC
and
denied
respondents motion to dismiss.

On
the
basis
of
Code
occurred
took
provisions
technicality,
respondents appeal was dismissed.

The parties having failed to amicably
settle during the scheduled pre-trial
conference, the case proceeded to
trial.
before
the Family
effect
in
1988,
the
New
Civil
of
the
Code
govern these transactions.

The plain meaning attached to the
plain language of the law is that the
contract, in its entirety, executed by
the
husband
without
the
wifes
consent, may be annulled by the wife.

(emphasis ours)
RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. CA

reversed
and
set
asisde
RTCs
decision. Hence, this petition.
In succeeding cases, we held that

alienation
and/or
encumbrance
of
conjugal property by the husband

without the wifes consent is not null
Issue:
Whether or not the land was
and void but merely voidable.
validly transferred
Indeed, in several cases the Court has
was made in favor of Hernandez, Sr. in
ruled
or
1958; full payment made in 1963; and
is
title issued in 1966. It would thus be
void. The better view, however, is to
contrary to ordinary human conduct
consider the transaction as merely
(and prudence dictates otherwise) for
voidable
any awardee of real property not to
that
such
encumbrance
by
and
alienation
the
not
husband
void. This
is
consistent with Article 173 of the Civil
visit
Code pursuant to which the wife could,
property awarded to him and find out
during the marriage and within 10
if there are any transgressors in his
years from the questioned transaction,
property.
seek its annulment.
and
inspect
even
once,
the
Furthermore, Hernandez, Sr.'s inaction
The fact that the Mingoa's were able
during
to
the
credence to the defendants-appellants
subject property for such a long period
assertion that the said property was
without any form of cognizable protest
indeed sold by Hernandez, Sr. by way
from Hernandez, Sr. and the plaintiffs-
of the SPAs, albeit without the consent
appellees
of his wife. xxx
take
actual
possession
strongly
application
of
of
calls
the
for
doctrine
the
of
laches. It is common practice in the

real
estate
industry,
an
ocular
inspection of the premises involved is

a
safeguard
to
the
cautious
and
prudent purchaser usually takes, and

should he find out that the land he
intends to buy is occupied by anybody
else other than the seller who is not in
actual possession, it could then be
incumbent
upon
the
purchaser
to
verify the extent of the occupant's

possessory
rights. The
plaintiffs-
appellees asseverate that the award
his
lifetime
lends
more
In sum, the rights and interests of the

spouses Hernandez over the subject
property were validly transferred to
respondent Dolores Camisura. Since
the sale of the conjugal property by
Hernandez,
Sr.
was
without
the
consent of his wife, Sergia, the same is

voidable;
thus,
binding
annulled. Considering
that
unless
Sergia
failed to exercise her right to ask for

the annulment of the sale within the
prescribed period, she is now barred
from
questioning

the
validity
thereof. And more so, she is precluded
Judie Corpuz sold one-half portion of
from
their lot to the defendants-spouses
assailing
the
validity
of
the
subsequent transfers from Camisura

to Plaridel Mingoa and from the latter
to Melanie Mingoa. Therefore, title to
the subject property cannot anymore
Antonio and Luzviminda Guiang.

Gilda Corpuz left for Manila sometime
in June 1989.
be reconveyed to the petitioners by
Harriet Corpuz learned that her father
reason of prescription and laches. The
intended to sell the remaining one-half
issues
prescription
portion including their house, of their
and laches having been resolved, it is
homelot to defendants Guiangs. She
no longer necessary to discuss the
wrote a letter to her mother informing
other issues raised in this petition.
her. She [Gilda Corpuz] replied that
of
she was objecting to the sale.

*Article
105-133
FC:
CONJUGAL
However, in the absence of his wife

Gilda Corpuz, defendant Judie Corpuz
pushed
Guiang vs CA
through
the
sale
of
the
remaining one-half portion. Transferor
G.R. No. 125172, June 26, 1998
Judie
Corpuzs
Harriet
signed
children
the
Junie
document
and
as
Ponente: PANGANIBAN, J
witnesses.
Contributor:
Sometime on March 11, 1990, plaintiff

returned home.
Facts:
Plaintiff Gilda Corpuz and defendant
Judie
Corpuz
are
legally
married
spouses. Gilda and Judie Corpuz, with

plaintiff-wife Gilda Corpuz as vendee,
bought a 421 sq. meter lot located in
For staying in their house sold by her

husband,
plaintiff
against
by
Guiang
and
was
complained
defendant
Luzviminda
her
husband
Antonio
Guiang.
Barangay Gen. Paulino Santos (Bo. 1),
Private Respondent Gilda Corpuz filed
Koronadal, South Cotabato. Gilda and
an Amended Complaint against her

husband Judie Corpuz and Petitioners-
of
Spouses
Philippines.Under Article 166 of the
Antonio
and
Luzviminda
the
Civil
declaration of a certain deed of sale,
generally alienate or encumber any
which involved the conjugal property
real
of
partnership
and
her
husband, null and void.
property
husband
the
Civil
respondent
the
of
Guiang. The said Complaint sought the
private
Code,
Code
of
without
consent. The
RTC ruled in favor of Gilda. CA affirmed

RTCs decision.
the
cannot
conjugal
the
wifes
alienation
or
encumbrance if so made however is

not
null
and
void. It
is
merely
voidable. The offended wife may bring

an action to annul the said alienation
Issue:
or encumbrance. Thus, the provision
Whether or not the assailed

Deed of Transfer of Rights was validly
executed
of Article 173 of the Civil Code of the

Philippines, to wit:
Art. 173. The wife may, during the
Ruling: NO
marriage and within ten years from
This being the case, said contract
the transaction questioned, ask the
properly falls within the ambit of
courts
Article 124 of the Family Code, which
contract of the husband entered into
was correctly applied by the two lower
without
courts.
consent is required, or any act or
Comparing said law with its equivalent

provision in the Civil Code, the trial
court
adroitly
amendatory
explained
effect
of
the
the
above
provision in this wise:
for
the
her
annulment
consent,
of
when
any
such
contract of the husband which tends

to defraud her or impair her interest in
the
conjugal
property. Should
the
partnership
wife
fail
to
exercise this right, she or her heirs

after the dissolution of the marriage,
clear. The
may demand the value of property
disposition or encumbrance is void. It
fraudulently alienated by the husband.
becomes still clearer if we compare
(n)
The
legal
provision
is
the same with the equivalent provision

This particular provision giving the
constitute a valid contract, the Civil
wife ten (10) years x x x during [the]
Code requires the concurrence of the
marriage to annul the alienation or
following
encumbrance was not carried over to
object, and (3) consent,[14] the last
the Family Code. It is thus clear that
element being indubitably absent in
any alienation or encumbrance made
the case at bar.
elements: (1)
cause,
(2)
after August 3, 1988 when the Family

Code took effect by the husband of the
conjugal partnership property without
the consent of the wife is null and
void.
Furthermore, it must be noted that the
fraud and the intimidation referred to
by petitioners were perpetrated in the
execution of the document embodying
Manalo vs Camaisa
G.R. No. 147978, January 23, 2002
Ponente: KAPUNAN, J
Facts:
the amicable settlement. Gilda Corpuz
Petitioner was interested in buying the
alleged during
two properties so she negotiated for
authorities
trial that barangay

said
the purchase through a real estate
document through misrepresentation
broker, Mr. Proceso Ereno, authorized
and
made
coercion.
[13]
In
her
any
sign
event,
its
execution does not alter the void

character of the deed of sale between
the
husband
and
the
petitioners-
spouses, as will be discussed later. The

fact remains that such contract was
entered
into
without
the
wifes
consent.
by respondent spouses.
Petitioner met with the vendors who
turned
out
to
be
respondent
spouses. She made a definite offer to

buy
the
properties
to
respondent Edilberto Camaisa with the

knowledge and conformity of his wife,
respondent
Norma Camaisa in
the
In sum, the nullity of the contract of
presence
sale is premised on the absence of
broker. When petitioner pointed out
private
the
respondents
consent. To
of
conjugal

the
real
nature
estate
of
the
properties, Edilberto assured her of his
Issue:
wifes conformity and consent to the

sale.
dispose a conjugal property without
When
petitioner
respondent
met
spouses
again
and
the
with
real
estate broker at Edilbertos office for

the
Whether or not the husband can
formal
The law requires that the disposition of
signature, she was surprised when
a conjugal property by the husband as
respondent spouses informed her that
administrator
they
requires
backing
of
Ruling:
Normas
were
affixing
his wifes written consent
out
of
the
in
appropriate
the written
cases
consent of
the
agreement.
wife, otherwise, the disposition is void.
Petitioner filed a complaint for specific
The properties subject of the contracts
performance
and
against
in this case were conjugal; hence, for
respondent
spouses
compel
the contracts to sell to be effective,
respondent
damages
to
Norma Camaisa to
sign
the consent of both husband and wife
the contracts to sell.
must concur.
Respondent Norma F. Camaisa filed a
Petitioner is correct insofar as she
Motion
Summary
alleges that if the written consent of
Judgment asserting that there is no
the other spouse cannot be obtained
genuine issue as to any material fact
or is being withheld, the matter may
on the basis of the pleadings and
be brought to court which will give
admission of the parties considering
such
that the wifes written consent was not
warranted
obtained in the contract to sell, the
However, it should be stressed that
subject conjugal properties belonging
court authorization under Art. 124 is
to respondents; hence, the contract
only resorted to in cases where the
was null and void.
spouse who does not give consent is
for
RTC rendered judgment dismissing the

complaint. CA affirmed RTCs decision.
authority
by
if
the
the
same
is
circumstances.
incapacitated. In this case, petitioner

failed
to
allege
and
prove
that
respondent Norma was incapacitated

to give her consent to the contracts. In
The
abovementioned
the absence of such showing of the
including the execution of the SPA in
wifes incapacity, court authorization
favor of Gesmundo, took place without
cannot be sought.
the
knowledge
and
transactions,
consent
of
respondent.
Upon maturity, the loan remained
Homeowners Savings Bank vs
outstanding.
Dailo
G.R. No. 153802, March 11, 2005
Ponente: TINGA, J
Claiming that she had no knowledge of

the
mortgage
constituted
on
the
subject property, which was conjugal

in nature, respondent instituted with
the Regional Trial Court for Nullity of

Facts:
Respondent
Real Estate Mortgage and Certificate

Miguela
C.
Dailo
and
Marcelino Dailo, Jr. were married on

August 8, 1967. During their marriage,
the spouses purchased a house and lot
from a certain Sandra Dalida. The
of Sale, Affidavit of Consolidation of

Ownership,
Deed
of
Reconveyance
with
Prayer
Preliminary
Injunction
Sale,
for
and
Damages against petitioner.
Deed of Absolute Sale, however, was
In
executed only in favor of the late
Counterclaim, petitioner prayed for
Marcelino Dailo, Jr. as vendee thereof
the dismissal of the complaint on the
to the exclusion of his wife.
ground that the property in question
Marcelino Dailo, Jr. executed a Special

Power of Attorney (SPA) in favor of one
the
latters Answer
with
was the exclusive property of the late

Marcelino Dailo, Jr.
Lilibeth Gesmundo, authorizing the
RTC rendered judgment against the
latter to obtain a loan from petitioner
petitioner. RTC declared all documents
Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank
related to the transaction as null and
to be secured by the spouses Dailos
void. CA affirmed RTCs decision.
house and lot in San Pablo City.

Issue:
Whether or not the mortgage
respondent and the late Marcelino
constituted by Marcelino is valid as to
even
his undivided share
regime
of
gains
is
Ruling: NO
in
suppletory
conjugal
a
manner. The
partnership
special
type
of
of
partnership, where the husband and
In applying Article 124 of the Family
wife place in a common fund the
Code, this Court declared that the
proceeds, products, fruits and income
absence of the consent of one renders
from their separate properties and
the entire sale null and void, including
those
the portion of the conjugal property
spouses through their efforts or by
pertaining
chance. Unlike
to
the
husband
who
and
the
late
Marcelino.were married on August 8,

1967. In the absence of a marriage
settlement, the system of relative
community or conjugal partnership of
gains
governed
by
either
the
or
both
absolute
community of property wherein the
contracted the sale.

Respondent
acquired
the
property
relations between respondent and her

late husband. With the effectivity of
the Family Code on August 3, 1988,
Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership of
Gains in the Family Code was made
applicable to conjugal partnership of
gains already established before its
effectivity unless vested rights have
already been acquired under the Civil
Code or other laws.
rules on co-ownership apply in a

suppletory
manner,
the
conjugal
partnership shall be governed by the

rules on contract of partnership in all
that is not in conflict with what is
expressly determined in the chapter
(on conjugal partnership of gains) or
by the spouses in their marriage
settlements.
Thus,
the
property
relations of respondent and her late

husband shall be governed, foremost,
by Chapter 4 on Conjugal Partnership
of Gains of the Family Code and,
suppletorily,
by
the
rules
on
partnership under the Civil Code. In

case of conflict, the former prevails
because the Civil Code provisions on
The rules on co-ownership do not even
partnership
apply to the property relations of
Family Code is silent on the matter.

apply
only
when
the
The basic and established fact is that
single and which is registered solely in
during
his name under TCT No. T-26471 (Lot
his
lifetime,
without
the
knowledge and consent of his wife,

Marcelino constituted a real estate
mortgage on the subject property,
which formed part of their conjugal
partnership. By express provision of
8).
Through
their
joint
efforts,
they
obtained a loan from DBP and built a

house on Lot 7 and Pedros lot.
Article 124 of the Family Code, in the
By himself, Pedro offered to sell the
absence of (court) authority or written
house and the two lots to herein
consent of the other spouse, any
petitioners,
disposition or encumbrance of the
Ravina.
conjugal property shall be void.
notified
Patrocinia
Mary
the
Ann
and
Wilfredo
objected
petitioners
of
and
her
objections, but Pedro nonetheless sold

the house and the two lots without
Ravina vs Villa Abrille
Mary Anns consent.
G.R. No. 160708, October 16, 2009
Mary Ann and their children filed a
Ponente: QUISUMBING, Acting C.J
complaint
for
Annulment
of
Sale,
Specific Performance, Damages and

Facts:
Attorneys
Fees
with
Preliminary
Mandatory
Injunctionagainst
Pedro
and the Sps. Ravina in the RTC of

Respondent Mary Ann and Pedro Villa
Davao City.
Abrille are married. They are married,

who are also parties to this case.
During the trial, Pedro declared that

the house was built with his own
In 1982, the spouses acquired a 555-
money.
square meter parcel of land covered
testified that they bought the house
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
and lot from Pedro, and that her
No. T-88674 in their names. Said lot is
husband, petitioner Wilfredo Ravina,
adjacent to a parcel of land which
examined the titles when they bought
Pedro acquired when he was still
the property.
Petitioner Patrocinia Ravina

RTC: Ruled in favour of Mary Ann. CA:
obtained a loan from DBP to construct
Modified the ruling. Lot 8 is declared
the house.
VALID. Lot 7 is declared NULL and

VOID.
The sale concluded after the effectivity

of the Family Code and is governed by
Issue:
Art 124 which treats such disposition
Whether
or
not
the
sale
executed by Pedro is valid
to be VOID if done:
(a) without the consent of both the
husband and the wife, or (b) in
Ruling: NO
case of one spouses inability,
The lot covered by TCT No. T-88674

was
acquired
in
1982 during
the
the authority of the court.

(b) Hence, just like the rule in
absolute
marriage of Pedro and Mary Ann. No
property,
evidence was adduced to show that
of
The
evidence
to
and
wife,
sale
husband,
sells
was
knowledge
convincing
overcome
the
the
the property subsists in the absence of

satisfactory
the
conjugal
property, such sale is void.
presumption of the conjugal nature of

clear,
if
of
without knowledge and consent
the subject property was acquired

through exchange or barter.
community
but
with
without
If
the
the
approval of the wife, thereby
said
resulting
presumption or to prove that the
in
disagreement,
such sale is annullable at the
subject property is exclusively owned
instance of the wife who is
by Pedro.
given five (5) years from the
Petitioners bare assertion would not
date the contract implementing
suffice to overcome the presumption
the decision of the husband to
that TCT No. T-88674, acquired during
institute the case.
the marriage of Pedro and Mary Ann, is

conjugal.
Likewise, the house built
thereon is conjugal property, having

been constructed through the joint
efforts of the spouses, who had even
Here, respondent Mary Ann timely

filed the action for annulment of sale
within five (5) years from the date of
sale
and
execution

of
the
deed.
However, her action to annul the sale
worked on the other requirements of
pertains only to the conjugal house
the sale. According to the lawyer, he
and lot and does not include the lot
went to see Rosario in one of his trips
covered
to Manila and had her sign an affidavit
to
of consent. As soon as Tarciano met
Pedro and which he can dispose of
the other conditions, Atty. Plagata
freely without Mary Anns consent.
notarized
by
property
TCT
No.
exclusively
T-26471,
belonging
Rosarios
affidavit
in
Zamboanga City. On January 11, 1989

Tarciano executed a deed of absolute
Fuentes vs Roca
sale in favor of the Fuentes spouses.
G.R. No. 178902, April 21, 2010
Eight years later in 1998, the children

of Tarciano and Rosario filed a case to
Ponente: ABAD, J
annul the Deed of Sale and reconvey

the property on the ground that the

sale was void since the consent of
Facts:
Rosario was not attained and that her
Sabina Tarroza owned a titled 358square
meter
lot
in
Canelar,
Zamboanga City. On October 11, 1982

she sold it to her son, Tarciano T. Roca
signature was a mere forgery.

RTC: Ruled in favour of Sps Fuentes.
CA: CA reversed the RTC decision.
(Tarciano) under a deed of absolute

sale. But Tarciano did not for the
meantime have the registered title
Issue:
Was Rosarios signature forged?
transferred to his name.

Ruling: YES.
Six
years
later
in
1988,
Tarciano
offered to sell the lot to petitioners
The key issue in this case is whether
Manuel
or not Rosarios signature on the
and
Leticia
Fuentes
(the
document of consent had been forged.
Fuentes spouses).
For, if the signature were genuine, the

The
parties
left
their
signed
fact that she gave her consent to her
agreement with Atty. Plagata who then
husbands sale of the conjugal land

would render the other issues merely
is absolutely wanting in civil effects. It
academic.
cannot
Whether or not the sale is valid
either
by
Consequently, when Tarciano sold the

conjugal lot to the Fuentes spouses on
11,
1989,
the
law
that
governed the disposal of that lot was

already the Family Code.
In contrast to Article 173 of the Civil
Code, Article 124 of the Family Code
does not provide a period within which
the wife who gave no consent may
assail her husbands sale of the real
property.
It simply provides that
without the other spouses written

consent or a court order allowing the
sale, the same would be void. Under
provisions
governing
Here, the Rocas filed an action against

the
Fuentes
spouses
in
1997
for
annulment of sale and reconveyance
Ruling: NO.
the
validated
ratification or prescription.
Issue:
January
be
of
the
contracts,
Civil
a
Code
void
or
inexistent contract has no force and

effect from the very beginning.
of the real property that Tarciano sold

without their mothers (his wifes)
written consent. The passage of time
did not erode the right to bring such
an action.
Besides, even assuming that it is the
Civil
Code
that
applies
to
transaction as the CA held, Article 173

provides that the wife may bring an
action for annulment of sale on the
ground of lack of spousal consent
during the marriage within 10 years
from the transaction.
Consequently,
the action that the Rocas, her heirs,

brought in 1997 fell within 10 years of
the January 11, 1989 sale. It did not
yet prescribe.
And
this rule applies to contracts that are

declared void by positive provision of
law, as in the case of a sale of
Beumer vs Beumer
conjugal property without the other
G.R. No. 195670. December 3,

2012
spouses written consent.
Ponente: PERLAS-BERNABE, J
A void
the
contract is equivalent to nothing and

RTC ruled that in
their conjugal
partnership must be dissolved, all the
Facts:
parcels of land to respondent as her
Petitioner,
Dutch
National,
and
paraphernal
properties
must
be
respondent, a Filipina, were married.
awarded to Avelina; the tools and
Their
equipment in favor of petitioner as his
marriage
was
subsequently
declared by the RTC the nullity of their
exclusive
marriage
houses standing on Lots 1 and 2142 as
on
the
ground
of
filed
Petition
for
In defense, Avelina averred that, with

exception
of
their
two
(2)
residential houses on Lots 1 and 2142,

she and petitioner did not acquire any
conjugal
properties
during
their
marriage. She claims that she used

her own personal money to purchase
Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 out of her
personal funds and Lots 2055-A and
Willem appealed to the CA averring

were purchased by him, and it was
only named after his wife because of
the constitutional prohibition against
foreign ownership. He is willing to only
get reimbursement of the money he
purchased for those properties and the
other he waived it to his ex-wife.
The CA affirmed the decision of the
RTC in toto.
Is
During trial Willem testified that while

1,
2142,
5845
(2)
Issue:
2055-I by way of inheritance.
Lots
two
that the properties awarded to Avelina
Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership.
the
the
co-owned by the parties.
psychological incapacity.
Petitioner
properties;
and
were
registered in the name of respondent,

these properties were acquired with
William
entitled
for
even
the
reimbursement?
Ruling: NO.
the money he received from the Dutch
The
government as his disability benefit
grounds
since
have
reimbursement to petitioner given that
sufficient income to pay for their
he acquired no right whatsoever over
acquisition.
the subject properties by virtue of its
respondent
did
not
Court

cannot,
of
equity,
on
grant
unconstitutional purchase. It is well
Futile, too, is petitioner's reliance on
established that equity as a rule will
Article 22 of the New Civil Code which
follow the law and will not permit that
reads: Art. 22. Every person who
to be done indirectly which, because
through an act of performance by
of
done
another, or any other means, acquires
that
or comes into possession of something
violates the Constitution and the law is
at the expense of the latter without
null and void, vests no rights, creates
just or legal ground, shall return the
no obligations and produces no legal
same to him.
public
directly.
policy,
cannot
Surely,
be
contract
effect at all. Corollary thereto, under

Article
1412
of
the
Civil
Code,
petitioner cannot have the subject

properties deeded to him or allow him
to recover the money he had spent for
the purchase thereof. The law will not
aid either party to an illegal contract
or agreement; it leaves the parties
where it finds them. Indeed, one
cannot salvage any rights from an
unconstitutional transaction knowingly
entered into.
Neither
The provision is expressed in the

maxim: "MEMO CUM ALTERIUS DETER
DETREMENTO PROTEST" (No person
should unjustly enrich himself at the
expense of another). An action for
recovery
of
without
just
what
has
cause
been
has
paid
been
designated as an accion in rem verso.

This provision does not apply if, as in
this case, the action is proscribed by
the Constitution or by the application
of the pari delicto doctrine.
can
the
Court
grant
petitioners claim for reimbursement

on the basis of unjust enrichment. As
*Article
held in Frenzel v. Catito, a case also
SEPARATION OF PROPERTY
involving
foreigner
seeking
monetary reimbursement for money

spent on purchase of Philippine land,
the provision on unjust enrichment
does
not
apply
if
the
action
is
proscribed by the Constitution, to wit:
143
FC:
REGIME
Maquilan vs Maquilan
G.R. NO. 155409, June 8, 2007
Ponente: AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J

OF
Facts:
The
Virgilio and Dita private respondent

are spouses Petitioner discovered that
private respondent was having illicit
sexual affair with her paramour, which
aforementioned
petitioner
case
respondent
of
Motion
the
for
aforesaid
petitioner
filed
Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition with the
the
latters
CA under Rule 65 of the Rules of
private
Court. CA dismissed the Petition for
the
convicted of the crime charged and

sentenced
Displeased,
private
respondent and her paramour were

were
motion.
the
against
and
paramour. Both
denied
Order, but the same was denied.

The
adultery
Judge
filed
Reconsideration
thus, prompted the petitioner to file a

of
respondent
to
suffer
an
imprisonment.
lack of merit.
The CA held, among others, that the
conviction of the respondent of the
crime
of
adultery
does
not ipso
Private respondent, through counsel,
facto disqualify her from sharing in the
filed a Petition for Declaration
conjugal property.
of
Nullity of Marriage, Dissolution and

Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership of
Issue:
Gains and Damages in which Virgilio

and Dita had an agreement.
Whether a spouse convicted of

either concubinage or adultery, can
Virgilio prayed for the repudiation of
still share in the conjugal partnership
the Compromise Agreement and the

reconsideration of the Judgment on
Compromise
Agreement
by
the
respondent judge on the grounds that

his
previous
lawyer
did
not
intelligently and judiciously apprise

him of the consequential effects of the
Compromise Agreement.
Ruling: YES
Virgilio contends that the Compromise
Agreement
is
void
because
it
circumvents the law that prohibits the

guilty spouse, who was convicted of
either adultery or concubinage, from
sharing in the conjugal property. Since
the
respondent

was
convicted
of
adultery, the petitioner argues that
MARRIAGE
her share should be forfeited in favor
MARRIAGE
of the common child under Articles

43(2) and
63 of
the
Family
Code.
These contentions of the petitioner is

untenable, Article 43 is the effect
when the absentee spouse reappeared
under Article 42 while article 63 is the
143
of
the
UNDER
VOID
Valdes vs RTC
G.R. No. 122749, July 31, 1996
Ponente: VITUG, J
Facts:
effect of legal separation.

Article
OR
Family
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo
Code,
be
Gomez were married on 05 January
effected voluntarily or for sufficient
1971. In a petition, dated 22 June
cause,
judicial
1992, Valdez sought the declaration of
questioned
nullity of the marriage pursuant to
Compromise Agreement which was
Article 36 of the Family Code. RTC
judicially approved is exactly such a
granted the petition. It also directed
separation of property allowed under
Antonio
the law. This conclusion holds true
proceedings on the liquidation of their
even
common
separation
of
property
subject
may
to
approval. The
if
the
proceedings
for
the
and
Consuelo
properties as
to
start
defined
declaration of nullity of marriage was
by Article 147 of the Family Code, and
still
to
must
pending. However,
stress
that
the
this
Court
voluntary
separation of property is subject to the

rights of all creditors of the conjugal
partnership of gains and other persons
with pecuniary interest pursuant to
Article 136 of the Family Code.
comply
with
the
provisions
of Articles 50, 51, and 52 of the same

code.
Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification
of that portion of the decision directing
compliance with Articles 50, 51 and 52
of the Family Code.
She asserted that the Family Code
*Article
REGIMES
147-148
OF
FC: PROPERTY
UNIONS
WITHOUT
contained
no
provisions
procedure
for
the

on
liquidation
the
of
common property in "unions without
together as husband and wife under a
marriage."
void marriage or without the benefit of
In his recourse to this Court, petitioner

Antonio submits that Articles 50, 51
and 52 of the Family Code should be
held controlling. He argues that Article
147 of the Family Code does not apply
to
cases
where
psychologically
the
parties
incapacitated;
assuming arguendo that
Article
are
and
147
marriage. The term "capacitated" in

the provision (in the first paragraph of
the law) refers to the legal capacity of
a party to contract marriage, i.e., any
"male or female of the age of eighteen
years or upwards not under any of the
impediments mentioned in Articles 37
and 38" 7 of the Code.
applies to marriages declared void ab
Under this property regime, property
initio on
acquired by both spouses through
the
ground
of
the
psychological incapacity of a spouse,
their
the same may be read consistently
governed by the rules on equal co-
with Article 129.
ownership.
during
Issue:
work
and
Any
industry
property
the
union
shall
be
acquired
is prima
facie presumed to have been obtained
Whether or not Article 147 of
through their joint efforts. A party who
the Family Code is applicable in the
did not participate in the acquisition of
case at bar
the property shall be considered as

having contributed thereto jointly if
Ruling: YES
said party's "efforts consisted in the
Article 147 of the Family Code is
care and maintenance of the family
applicable in marriages declared null
household." 8 Unlike
and
partnership of gains, the fruits of the
void
on
the
ground
of
the
conjugal
couple's separate property are not
psychological incapacity.
This particular kind of co-ownership
included in the co-ownership.
applies when a man and a woman,
Article 147 of the Family Code, in the
suffering no illegal impediment to
substance and to the above extent,
marry each other, so exclusively live
has clarified Article 144 of the Civil

Code;
in
addition,
the
law
now
expressly provides that

(a)
Neither
party
Buenaventura vs CA
can
dispose
or
encumber by act intervivos his or her

share
in
co-ownership
property,
without consent of the other, during
G.R. No. 127358, March 31, 2005

Ponente: AZCUNA, J
the period of cohabitation; and

Facts:
(b) In the case of a void marriage, any
party in bad faith shall forfeit his or
On July 4, 1979, Noel Buenaventura
her share in the co-ownership in favor
married Isabel Lucia Singh. On July 12,
of their common children; in default
1992, Noel filed a petition for the
thereof or waiver by any or all of the
declaration of nullity of marriage on
common children, each vacant share
the
shall
psychological incapacity of his wife,
belong
surviving
to
the
descendants,
respective
or
still
in
ground
of
the
alleged
which he later amended and stated
default thereof, to the innocent party.
that
The forfeiture shall take place upon
psychologically incapacitated.
the termination of the cohabitation 9 or

declaration of nullity of the marriage.
both
he
and
his
wife
were
On July 31, 1995, RTC declared the

marriage between Noel Buenaventura
The first paragraph of Articles 50 of
and Isabel Lucia Singh null and void.
the Family Code, applying paragraphs
The RTC ordered the liquidation of the
(2),
conjugal partnership property, among
(3),
(4)
and
(5)
of
Article
43, 13 relates only, by its explicit terms,

to voidable marriages
and,
exceptionally, to void marriages under

Article
40 14 of
the
Code, i.e.,
the
declaration of nullity of a subsequent

marriage contracted by a spouse of a
prior void marriage before the latter is
judicially declared void.
others.
CA, on the other hand said that since
the present case does not involve the
annulment of a bigamous marriage,
the provisions of Article 50 in relation
to Articles 41, 42 and 43 of the Family
Code, providing for the dissolution of

the absolute community or conjugal
ownership and not of the regime of
partnership of gains, as the case may
conjugal partnership of gains.
be, do not apply. Rather, the general

rule applies, which is that in case a
marriage is declared void ab initio, the
property regime applicable and to be
liquidated, partitioned and distributed
Abing vs Waeyan
G.R. No. 146294, July 31, 2006
is that of equal co-ownership.
Ponente: GARCIA, J
Issue:
Whether or not Article 147 of

the FC is the applicable property
regime in the case at bar
Facts:
John
Abing
and
Juliet
Waeyan
cohabited from 1986-1995 as husband

and
Ruling: YES
wife
without
the
benefit
of
marriage. During their cohabitation,

Since the properties ordered to be
distributed by the court a quo were
found, both by the trial court and the
Court
of
acquired
Appeals,
during
to
the
have
union
been
of
the
they bought a 2-storey residential

house. Consequent to the purchase,
the tax declaration of the 2-storey
house was transferred in the name of
Juliet.
parties, the same would be covered by

the
co-ownership.
No
fruits
of
separate property of one of the parties

appear to have been included or
involved
in
said
distribution.
The
liquidation, partition and distribution

of the properties owned in common by
the parties herein as ordered by the
court a
quo should,
therefore,
be
sustained, but on the basis of co-
In
1991,
Julia
left
for
Korea
for
overseas employment
In 1992, the 2-storey house underwent
renovation. To it was annexed a new
structure which housed a sari-sari
store. This new structure and the sarisari store thereat are the properties
involved in this case.

In 1994, Juliet returned from Korea and
was renovated thru their common
continued
She
funds and that the structure annexed
managed the sari-sari store while John
thereto was merely an attachment,
worked as a mine employee.
hence the same pertained to both of
to
live
with
John.
In 1995, their relationship went sour.
them in common.
Hence, they decided to partition their
MTC: Ruled in favor of John. Juliet
properties.
appealed.
executed
For
on
the
purpose,
October
7,
they
1995
RTC
affirmed
the
MTC
decision. Juliet appealed to the CA. CA:
Memorandum of Agreement. Under
Reversed the RTC and MTC decision.
their unsigned agreement, John shall
Hence, John filed instant petition .
leave the couples' dwelling with Juliet

paying him the amount of P428,870
representing John's share in all their
properties.
On
the
same
date
October 7, 1995 Juliet paid John the

sum of P232,397.66 by way of partial
payment of his share, with the balance
of P196,472.34 to be paid by Juliet in
twelve monthly installment beginning
November 1995.
Issue:
Does
the
subject
property
pertain to the exclusive ownership of

John?
Ruling: NO
Other than John's bare allegation that
he alone, thru his own funds and
money he borrowed from his relatives,
spent for the construction of the annex
structure,
evidence
is
wanting
to
Juliet failed to pay the balance. John
support such naked claim. There is a
demanded of her to vacate the annex
paucity of evidence, testimonial or
structure housing the sari-sari store.
documentary, to support petitioner's
Juliet refused, prompting John to file an
self-serving allegation that the annex
ejectment suit against.
structure which housed the sari-sari
In his complaint, John alleged that he

alone spent for the renovation of their
house with his exclusive funds and
money he borrowed from relatives.
Juliet averred that the original house
store was put up thru his own funds

and/or money borrowed by him. Sure,
petitioner has in his favor the tax
declaration
structure.

covering
the
subject
In this connection, Article 147 of the
shares." Being herself a co-owner of
Family Code is instructive. It reads:
the structure in question, Juliet, as
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are

capacitated
to
marry
each
other,
live
exclusively with each other as husband and

wife without the benefit of marriage or under a
correctly ruled by the CA, may not be

ejected therefrom.
The fact that they were unable to sign
void marriage, their wages and salaries shall
the MoA does not affect its binding
be owned by them in equal shares and the
effect between them.
property acquired by both of them through

their work or industry shall be governed by the
rules on co-ownership.
Metrobank vs Pascual
In the absence of proof to the contrary,

properties acquired while they lived together
shall be presumed to have been obtained by
their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be
owned by them in equal shares. For purposes
of this Article, a party who did not participate
G.R. No. 163744, February 29,

2008
Ponente: VELASCO, JR., J
in the acquisition by other party of any

property shall be deemed to have contributed
Facts:
jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former's

efforts consisted in the care and maintenance
Respondents
Nicholson
(Nelson)
of the family and of the household.
Pascual and Florencia Nevalga were
The law is clear. In the absence, as
married on Jan 19, 1985. During their
here, of proofs to the contrary, any
marriage, Florencia bought from Sps
property
acquired
Sering a 250-sqm lot with a 3-door
spouses
during
by
common-law
their
period
of
apartment
standing
thereon.
cohabitation is presumed to have been
Consequently, the TCT of the lot was
obtained thru their joint efforts and is
cancelled and transferred to the name
owned by them in equal shares. Their
of
property relationship is governed by
Pascual.
the rules on co-ownership. And under
In 1994, Florencia filed a suit for
this
declaration
regime,
properties
in
they
owned
common
"in
their
equal
Florencia,
of
married
nullity
to
of
Nelson
marriage
under Art 36. Their marriage was

declared null and avoid for Nelsons
the
psych incapacity. In the same decision,
Metrobank caused the publication of
the RTC ordered the dissolution and
the notice of sale. On Jan 21, 200,
liquidation
Metrobank emerged as the highest
of
ex-spouses
CPG.
Subsequent events saw the couple

going their separate ways without
liquidating their conjugal partnership.
properties.
Subsequently,
bidder.
Nelson filed on June 28, 2000 before
the RTC in Makati a complaint to
In 1997, Florencia together with Sps
declare the nullity of the mortgage of
Oliveros obtained a P58M loan from
the disputed property. In it, Nelson
Metobank. To secure the obligation,
alleged that the property, which is still
Florencia and the spouses Oliveros
conjugal in nature, was mortgaged
executed
without his consent.
several
real
estate
mortgages (REMs) on their properties,

including one involving the lot covered
by
TCT
No.
156283
(3-door
apartment). Among the documents

Florencia submitted to procure the
loan were a copy of TCT No. 156283, a
photocopy of the marriage-nullifying
RTC
decision,
denominated
Nicholson
and
as
document
"Waiver"
purportedly
executed
that
on
Metrobank,
in
its
Answer
with
Counterclaim and Cross-Claim alleged

that the disputed lot, being registered
in Florencias name, was paraphernal.
Metrobank
also
asserted
having
approved the mortgage in good faith.

Nicholson
counters
declaration
of
that
nullity
of
the
mere
marriage,
without more, does not automatically
April 9, 1995. The waiver, made in
result
favor
the
separation when it is shown that there
conjugal properties of the ex-spouses
was no liquidation of the conjugal
listed therein, but did not incidentally
assets.
of
Florencia,
covered
include the lot in question.
in
regime
of
complete
Issue:
Due to the failure of Florencia and Sps

Oliveros to pay their loan, Metrobank
initiated foreclosure proceedings on
Does
termination
of
the
conjugal
property regime ipso facto end the

nature of conjugal partnership?

Ruling: NO
he may therefore alienate, assign or
While the declared nullity of marriage

of Nicholson and Florencia severed
their marital bond and dissolved the
conjugal partnership, the character of
the properties acquired before such
declaration continues to subsist as
conjugal properties until and after the
liquidation
and
partition
of
the
partnership. This conclusion holds true

whether we apply Art. 129 of the
mortgage
another
except
it,
person
when
But
alienation
or
which
rights
effect
the
of
mortgage,
are
the
with
termination
of
the
co-ownership.
(Emphasis supplied.)
the
case
at
the
bar,
Florencia
mortgage
on
the
generally
disputed lot on April 30, 1997, or a
prospective in application, or Section
little less than two years after the
7, Chapter 4, Title IV, Book I (Arts. 179
dissolution of the conjugal partnership
to 185) of the Civil Code on the
on July 31, 1995, but before the
subject, Conjugal Partnership of Gains.
liquidation of the partnership. Be that
For, the relevant provisions of both
as it may, what governed the property
Codes first require the liquidation of
relations of the former spouses when
the
the
conjugal
regime
of
is
the
enjoyment,
allotted to him in the division upon the
constituted
liabilities
its
limited to the portion which may be
conjugal
and
in
substitute
respect to the co-owners, shall be
In
assets
even
personal
involved.
Family Code on liquidation of the

partnerships
and
properties
separation
before
of
property
reigns.
aforequoted
was
Art.
given
493.
is
Under
the
it,
Florencia has the right to mortgage or
In this pre-liquidation scenario, Art.

493 of the Civil Code shall govern the
property
mortgage
relationship
between
the
former spouses, where:
even sell her one-half (1/2) undivided

interest in the disputed property even
without
the
consent
of
Nicholson.
However, the rights of Metrobank, as

mortgagee, are limited only to the 1/2
Each co-owner shall have the full
undivided
portion
ownership of his part and of the fruits
owned.
and benefits pertaining thereto, and
contract insofar as it covered the
Accordingly,

that
Florencia
the
mortgage
remaining 1/2 undivided portion of the
January
lot is null and void, Nicholson not
Mayor Vergel Aguilar of Las Pias City.
having consented to the mortgage of

his undivided half.
Upon
the
perspective,
before
Petition filed an action for Declaration

of
foregoing
1998
Nullity
of
respondent,
Marriage
citing
against
psychological
Metrobanks right, as mortgagee and
incapacity under Article 36 of the
as the successful bidder at the auction
Family Code. In its 18 October 2006
of the lot, is confined only to the 1/2
Decision, the trial court granted the
undivided portion thereof heretofore
petitioner. In the same decision RTC
pertaining in ownership to Florencia.
stated that the decree shall only be
The other undivided half belongs to
issued upon compliance with Articles
Nicholson. As owner pro indiviso of a
50 and 51 of the FC.
portion
of
the
lot
in
question,
Metrobank may ask for the partition of

the lot and its property rights "shall be
limited to the portion which may be
allotted to [the bank] in the division
upon
the
termination
of
the
co-
ownership.
Petitioner filed a motion for partial

reconsideration
questioning
the
dissolution of the absolute community

of property and the ruling that the
decree of annulment shall only be
issued upon compliance with Articles
50 and 51 of the Family Code.
RTC granted the motion and stated
Dino vs Dino
that the decree shall be issued after
G.R. No. 178044, January 19, 2011
liquidation,, partition and distribution

of the parties properties under Art.
Ponente: CARPIO, J
147 of the FC.
Issue:
Facts:
Shall a decree of absolute nullity of
Alain M. Dio (petitioner) and Ma.

Caridad Dio were married on 14
marriage
only
be
issued
after
liquidation, partition, and distribution

of the parties properties under Article
3.
147 of the Family Code
benefit of marriage, or their

marriage is void.
Ruling: NO
The Court has ruled in Valdes v. RTC,
that in a void marriage, regardless of
its cause, the property relations of the
parties
during
the
period
of
cohabitation is governed either by

Article 147 or Article 148 of the Family
Code.7 Article 147 of the Family Code
applies to union of parties who are
legally capacitated and not barred by
any impediment to contract marriage,
but whose marriage is nonetheless
void,8 such
as
petitioner
and
respondent in the case before the

Court.
All these elements are present in this

case and there is no question that
Article 147 of the Family Code applies
to
the
property
relations
between
petitioner and respondent.

We agree with petitioner that the trial
court erred in ordering that a decree of
absolute nullity of marriage shall be
issued only after liquidation, partition
and
distribution
of
the
parties
properties under Article 147 of the

Family Code. The ruling has no basis
because Section 19(1) of the Rule
does not apply to cases governed
For Article 147 of the Family Code to

apply, the following elements must be
present:
1.
Their union is without the
under Articles 147 and 148 of the

Family Code.
It is clear from Article 50 of the Family
The man and the woman

must be capacitated to marry
Code that Section 19(1) of the Rule

applies only to marriages which are
declared void ab initio or annulled by
each other;
final judgment under Articles 40 and

2.
with
45 of the Family Code. In short, Article
other as husband and
50 of the Family Code does not apply
They
each
wife; and
live
exclusively
to
marriages
which
are
declared
void ab initio under Article 36 of the

Family Code, which should be declared
void without waiting for the liquidation
longer communicated with Aguila or
of the properties of the parties.
their daughter.
In this case, petitioners marriage to
Aguila filed a Petition for Declaration
respondent was declared void under
of Nullity of Marriage (petition) citing
Article 36
15
of the Family Code and not
psychological incapacity under Article
under Article 40 or 45. Thus, what
36 of the Family Code. The petition
governs the liquidation of properties
states that they have no conjugal
owned in common by petitioner and
properties whatsoever.
respondent
are
the
rules
on
co-
ownership. Under Article 496 of the
RTC rendered a Decision7declaring the
Civil Code, [p]artition may be made
nullity of the marriage of Salas and
by agreement between the parties or
Aguila
by judicial proceedings. x x x. It is not
Decision
necessary to liquidate the properties
dissolution
of the spouses in the same proceeding
partnership of gains, if any.
for declaration of nullity of marriage.
(RTC
Decision).
further
of
provides
their
The
for
RTC
the
conjugal
Aguila filed a Manifestation and Motion

stating
that
she
discovered
two
properties. The registered owner of

Salas, Jr. vs Aguila
the Discovered Properties is Juan S.

2013
When asked to clarify, Aguila testified

that Rubina C. Salas (Rubina) is Salas
Ponente: CARPIO, J
common-law wife.
According to Salas, Aguilas statement
Facts:
was a judicial admission and was not
Juan Sevilla Salas, Jr.

respondent
Salas, married to Rubina C. Salas.
Eden
(Salas) and
Villena
Aguila
(Aguila) were married. Salas left their
made through palpable mistake. Salas

claimed that Aguila waived her right to
the Discovered Properties.
conjugal dwelling. Since then, he no

The RTC ruled in favor of Aguila. The
evidence of the ownership of the land
CA affirmed the order of the RTC. The
referred to, because there is a strong
CA ruled that Aguilas statement in her
presumption
petition is not a judicial admission.
regularly issued. The phrase married
that
it
is
valid
and
to is merely descriptive of the civil

Issue:
status
Shall the discovered properties

be
partitioned
between
Salas
and
of
the
registered
owner.
Furthermore, Salas did not initially

dispute
the
ownership
of
the
Discovered Properties in his opposition
Aguila?
to the manifestation. It was only when

Ruling: YES
Rubina
Aguila proved that the Discovered

Properties were acquired by Salas
during their marriage. Both the RTC
and the CA agreed that the Discovered
Properties registered in Salas name
were acquired during his marriage
with
Aguila.
The
TCTs
of
the
Discovered Properties were entered on

2 July 1999 and 29 September 2003,
or during the validity of Salas and
Aguilas marriage.
On both Salas and Rubinas contention
that
Rubina
Properties,
owns
we
the
likewise
Discovered
find
the
contention unmeritorious. The TCTs

state that Juan S. Salas, married to
Rubina C. Salas is the registered
owner of the Discovered Properties. A
Torrens title is generally a conclusive
intervened
that
Salas
supported Rubinas statement that she

owns the Discovered Properties.
In Dio v. Dio, we held that Article
147 of the Family Code applies to the
union
of
parties
who
are
legally
capacitated and not barred by any

impediment to contract marriage, but
whose
marriage
is
nonetheless
declared void under Article 36 of the

Family Code, as in this case.
Under this property regime, property
acquired during the marriage is prima
facie presumed to have been obtained
through the couples joint efforts and
governed
by
the
rules
on
co-
ownership. In the present case, Salas

did not rebut this presumption. In a
similar case where the ground for
nullity
of

marriage
was
also
psychological incapacity, we held that
Socorros previous marriage was
the properties acquired during the
annulled,
union of the parties, as found by both
dissolved by virtue of his wifes death.
the
RTC
and
governed
the
by
Accordingly,
the
CA,
would
be
co-ownership.
partition
of
the
Discovered Properties as ordered by

the
RTC
and
the
CA
should
be
sustained, but on the basis of co-
Estebans
was
According to Edilberto, Esteban

purchased a lot (Vitas property). The
Vitas property was ssued to "Esteban
Abletes, of legal age, Filipino, married
to Socorro Torres."
ownership and not on the regime of

conjugal partnership of gains.
while
Edilberto
Evangeline
small
also
and
business
claimed
Esteban
that,
operated
establishments
in
Delpan property.
Venturan vs Abuda
Esteban
G.R. No. 202932, October 23, 2013
the
Vitas
and
Delpan properties to Evangeline and

her husband, Paulino Abuda (Paulino).
Ponente: CARPIO, J
Sometime in 2000, Leonora Urquila

(Leonora), the mother of Edilberto,
discovered the sale. Thus, Edilberto,
Facts:
Socorro
sold
represented
Torres
(Socorro)
and
by
Leonora,
filed
Petition for Annulment of Deeds of
Sale before the RTC-Manila. Edilberto
married couple. Both of them had
alleged that the sale of the properties
children from prior marriages: Esteban
was
had a daughter named Evangeline
signature on the deeds of sale was
Abuda (Evangeline), and Socorro had a
forged. Respondents, on the other
son, who was the father of Edilberto U.
hand,
Ventura, Jr. (Edilberto), the petitioner
Socorros prior marriage to Crispin, her
in this case.
subsequent marriage to Esteban was
Esteban Abletes (Esteban) were
fraudulent
argued
because
that
Estebans
because
of
null and void. Thus, neither Socorro

nor her heirs can claim any right or
interest over the properties purchased

by Esteban and respondents.
The Vitas and Delpan properties

can be considered common property
The RTC-Manila dismissed the

petition for lack of merit. The CA
sustained the decision of the RTC.
if: (1) these were acquired during the

cohabitation of Esteban and Socorro;
and (2) there is evidence that the
properties were acquired through the
parties actual joint contribution of
Issue:
Did Soccoro contribute in the
money, property, or industry.

Edilberto
properties allegedly co-owned by her

and Esteban during their cohabitation?
argues
that
the
certificate of title covering the Vitas

property shows that the parcel of land
Ruling: NO
is co-owned by Esteban and Socorro

in
because: (1) the Transfer Certificate of
unions between a man and a woman
Title was issued on 11 December
who are incapacitated to marry each
1980, or several months after the
other,
Edilberto
the
properties
admitted
over
the
parties were married; and (2) title to
during
the
the
ownership
acquired
that
land
was
subsistence of that relationship shall
Abletes,
be based on the actual contribution of
Socorro Torres."
the parties. It is necessary for each of

the partners to prove his or her actual
contribution
to
the
acquisition
of
property in order to be able to lay

claim
to
Presumptions
any
of
portion
of
it.
co-ownership
and
equal contribution do not apply.

This is a reiteration of Article
of
issued
legal
to
age,
"Esteban
married
to
The Court disagreed .The title

itself shows that the Vitas property is
owned by Esteban alone. The phrase
"married to Socorro Torres" is merely
descriptive of his civil status, and does
not show that Socorro co-owned the
property. The evidence on record also
shows
that
Esteban
acquired
148 of the Family Code, which the CA
ownership over the Vitas property
applied in the assailed decision.
prior to his marriage to Socorro, even

if the certificate of title was issued

after the celebration of the marriage.
Gina
Registration under the Torrens title
complaint, spouses Fernandez alleged
system merely confirms, and does not
that they are the absolute owners of
vest title.
an apartment building that through
Edilberto claims that Esteban s

actual contribution to the purchase of
the
Delpan
property
was
not
sufficiently proven since Evangeline

shouldered some of the amortizations.
Thus, the law presumes that Esteban
and Socorro jointly contributed to the
acquisition of the Del pan property.
evidence showing Socorro s alleged

absence
presumed
contributions.
of
In
such, it will
that
the
then
properties
Toto
tolerance
Tumlos.
they
In
the
allowed
the
Tumlos to occupy the apartment for

the last 7 years without payment of
any rent. It was agreed that Guillerma
will pay 1,600 a month while the other
defendants promised to pay 1,000 a
month which was not complied with.
Demand was made several times for
the defendants to vacate the premises
Edilberto failed to show any

monetary
their
and
as they are in need of the property for

the construction of a new building.
the
be
are
owned by Esteban.
The MTC thereafter promulgated

its judgment on January 22, 1997 in
favor of the respondents.
Petitioners appealed to RTC that
Mario and Guillerma had an amorous
relationship and that they acquired the
Tumlos vs Fernandez
property in question as their love

G.R. No. 137650, April 12, 2000
nest. It was likewise alleged that they
Ponente: PANGANIBAN, J
lived together in the said apartment

building with their 2 children for about
10
administered
Facts:
Mario and Lourdes Fernandez
were
years
plaintiffs
ejectment
filed
in
an
against
action
for
and
that
the
Gullerma
property
by
collecting rentals from the lessees

until
she
Guillerma,
discovered
that
Mario
deceived her as to the annulment of
contributions to the acquisitions of
their marriage.
common property by one who has no
RTC ruled that Guillerma is a coowner. The CA reversed and set aside
RTCs decision.
salary, income, work or industry. Such

is not included in Art 148. If actual
contribution is not proven then there
can
be
no
co-ownership
and
no
presumption of equal shares.
Issue:
Whether or not Guillerma is a
In this case, petitioner fails to
co-owner of the said apartment under
present any evidence that she had
Article 148 of the Family Code
made
contribution
to
she anchors her claim of co-ownership
The claim was not satisfactorily

proven by Guillerma since there was
other
actual
purchase the subject property. Indeed,
Ruling: NO
no
an
evidence
except
presented
for
the
to
validate
it
said
affidavit.
Even if the allegations of
having cohabited with Mario and that
merely
on
her
cohabitation
with
Respondent Mario Fernandez.

The
property
in
question
belongs to the conjugal partnership of

respondents.
she bore him two children were true,

the claim of co-ownership still cannot
be accepted. Mario is validly married
with Lourdes hence Guillerma and
Malilin, Jr vs Castillo
Mario are not capacitated to marry

each
other.
The
property
relation
governing their supposed cohabitation

is under Article 148 of the Family
Code. Actual contribution is required
by the said provision in contrast to Art
147 which states that efforts in the
care and maintenance of the family
and
household
are
regarded
as
G.R. No. 136803, June 16, 2000

Ponente: MENDOZA, J
Facts:
Eustaquio Mallilin Jr. and Ma.
Elvira Castillo were alleged to be both

married
and
separated
with
from
children
their
but
respective
The trial court ruled that it is

immaterial
whether
the
parties
spouses and cohabited in 1979 while
actually lived together as husband and
respective
wife because Art. 144 of the Civil Code
They
marriages
established
still
subsist.
Superfreight
cannot be made to apply to them as
Customs Brokerage Corporation during
they were both incapacitated to marry
their union of which petitioner was the
each other. Hence, it was impossible
President
and
and
for a co-ownership to exist between
respondent
as
and
them.
Chairman
Vice
President
Treasurer. They likewise acquired real

CA remanded the case to the
and personal properties which were

registered
solely
in
respondents
RTC.
name.
Respondent
The
couple
separated.
moved
for
reconsideration of the decision of CA.
Petitioner then demanded his share
CA granted the motion. Hence, this
from
petition.
respondent
properties
but
in
the
the
subject
latter
refused
alleging that said properties had been
Issue:
registered solely in her name and that
Whether or not petitioner can
she acquired it with her own money.
validly claim his share in the acquired
Furthermore, respondent denied that
properties registered
she and petitioner lived as husband

and
wife
because
they
were
still
Ruling:
The
SC
qualifies
its
answer.
legally married.
It was error for the trial court to rule
Eustaquio filed complaint for
the parties in this case
partition of co-ownership shares while
that, because
Ma. Elvira filed a motion for summary
were not capacitated to marry each
judgment.
other at the time that they were
Trial court dismissed the
former and granted the latter.
alleged to have been living together,

they could not have owned properties
in
common.

The
Family
Code,
in
addition
to
providing
that
co-
ownership exists between a man and a
The case was remanded to lower court

for further proceedings.
woman who live together as husband

and
wife
without
the
benefit
of
marriage, likewise provides that, if the

parties are incapacitated to marry
each other, properties acquired by
them through their joint contribution
of money, property or industry shall be
owned
by
proportion
them
to
in
their
common
in
contributions
Carino vs Carino
G.R. No. 132529, February 2, 2001
Ponente: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J
which, in the absence of proof to the

contrary, is presumed to be equal.
There
is
eventhough
thus
the
Facts:
co-ownership
couple
are
not
capacitated to marry each other.

In this case, there may be a coownership between the parties herein.
Consequently, whether petitioner and
respondent cohabited and whether the
properties involved in the case are
part of the alleged co-ownership are
genuine and material. All but one of
the properties involved were alleged
to have been acquired after the Family
Code took effect on August 3, 1988.
With respect to the property acquired
before the Family Code took effect if it
is shown that it was really acquired
under the regime of the Civil Code,
then it should be excluded.
In 1969, SPO4 Santiago Carino

married Susan Nicdao Carino. He had
2 children with her. In 1992, SPO4
contracted a second marriage, this
time with Susan Yee Carino. In 1988,
prior to his second marriage, SPO4 is
already bedridden and he was under
the care of Yee. In 1992, he died 13
days after his marriage with Yee.
Thereafter, Nicdao and Yee went on to
claim the benefits of SPO4. Nicdao was
able to claim a total of P146k while
Yee was able to collect a total of P21k
In
1993,
Yee
filed
an
action
for
collection of sum of money against

Nicdao. She wanted to have half of the
P146k. Yee admitted that her marriage
with SPO4 was solemnized during the

subsistence of the marriage between
remarriage,
SPO4
necessary to declare a marriage an
and
Nicdao
but
the
said
marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is
the
local
civil
registrar.
Yee
also
claimed that she only found out about

the
previous
marriage
on
SPO4s
funeral.
SPO4 is null and void due the absence

a
is
It does not follow from the

foregoing disquisition, however, that
since the marriage of Nicdao and
Santiago is declared void ab initio, the
death benefits under scrutiny would
valid
marriage
license.
The
Yee.
Issue:
marriage between Yee and SPO4 is

likewise null and void for the same has
been solemnized without the judicial
declaration
of
the
nullity
of
the
What
Article
40
of
the
FC,
the
the marriage of respondent Susan Yee
may
marriage,
for
purposes
of
property
Susan Yee: Considering that

and
invoked
their
Ruling:
absolute nullity of a previous marriage

be
governs
relations?
marriage between Nicdao and SPO4.

Under
action
now be awarded to respondent Susan
The marriage between Nicdao and

of
judicial
absolute nullity.
null and void due to the absence of a

valid marriage license as certified by
no
the
deceased
having
is a bigamous
been
solemnized
remarriage on the basis solely of a
during the subsistence of a previous
final judgment declaring such previous
marriage then presumed to be valid
marriage void.
(between
Meaning, where the
petitioner
and
the
absolute nullity of a previous marriage
deceased), the application of Article
is sought to be invoked for purposes of
148 is therefore in order.
contracting a second marriage, the

sole basis acceptable in law, for said
projected marriage to be free from
legal infirmity, is a final judgment
declaring the previous marriage void.
However,
for purposes
other than
Under Article 148 of the Family

Code, which refers to the property
regime
of
bigamous
marriages,
adulterous relationships, relationships

in
state

of
concubinage,
relationships where both man and
belong to the deceased alone and
woman are married to other persons,
respondent has no right whatsoever to
multiple alliances of the same married
claim
man -
succession, the said death benefits
... [O]nly the properties acquired by both of
the
same.
By
intestate
of the deceased shall pass to his legal
joint
heirs. And, respondent, not being the
contribution of money, property, or industry
legal wife of the deceased is not one
shall
of them.
the
parties
be
through
owned
by
their
them
actual
in
common
in
proportion to their respective contributions ...
In this property regime, the

properties acquired by the parties
through their actual joint contribution
shall
belong
to
the
co-ownership.
Wages and salaries earned by each

party belong to him or her exclusively.
Then too, contributions in the form of
care
of
the
home,
household,
or
inspiration,
are
children
spiritual
or
excluded
and
moral
in
this
regime.
Susan Nicdao: Art 147 of the

FC. Her and Santiago were capacitated
to marry, yet their marriage was void
for lack of ML. In contrast to Article
148,
under
the
foregoing
article,
wages and salaries earned by either

party during the cohabitation shall be
owned by the parties in equal shares
and will be divided equally between
them, even if only one party earned
the wages and the other did not
contribute thereto. Conformably, even
The disputed P146k are clearly
if the disputed death benefits were
renumerations, incentives and benefits
earned by the deceased alone as a
from governmental agencies earned
government
by the deceased as a police officer.
creates
a co-ownership
Unless respondent Susan Yee presents
thereto,
entitling
proof to the contrary, it could NOT be
share one-half thereof. As there is no
said
money,
allegation of bad faith in the present
property or industry in the acquisition
case, both parties of the first marriage
of these monetary benefits.
Hence,
are presumed to be in good faith.
they are not owned in common by
Thus, one-half of the subject death
respondent and the deceased, but
benefits under scrutiny shall go to the
that
she
contributed

employee,
the
Article
in
147
respect
petitioner
to
petitioner as her share in the property
that from her salary she was able to
regime, and the other half pertaining
contribute P70k in the completion of
to
their unfinished house. Also, , she was
the
deceased
shall
pass
by,
intestate succession, to his legal heirs,
able
namely,
appliances, pieces of furniture and
his
children
with
Susan
Nicdao.
to
acquire
and
accumulate
household effects. She prayed that

she be declared the sole owner of
Saguid vs CA
these personal properties and that the

amount
G.R. No. 150611, June 10, 2003
of
P70k,
representing
her
contribution to the construction of
Ponente: YNARES-SANTIAGO, J
their house, be reimbursed to her.
Contributor:
In his answerto the complaint,

Jacinto claimed that the expenses for
Facts:
the construction of their house were

Gina S. Rey was married,but
separated de facto from her husband,
when
she
met
petitioner
Jacinto
Saguid in Marinduque, sometime in

July 1987. The two decided to cohabit
as husband and wife in a house built
defrayed solely from his income as a

captain of their fishing vessel.
averred
that
private
meager
income
as
He
respondents
fish
dealer
rendered her unable to contribute in

the construction of said house.
on a lot owned by Jacintos father.

When their house was repaired
Jacinto made a living as the patron of

their fishing vessel Saguid Brothers.
and
Gina, on the other hand, worked as a
respondent
fish dealer, but decided to work as an
expenses.
entertainer in Japan from 1992 to

1994.
improved
did
sometime,
private
not
in
share
the
The RTC ruled in favour of Gina and

ordered Jacinto to reimburse her P70k.
Private
respondent
filed
complaint for Partition and Recovery of

Personal Property with Receivership
against the petitioner.
This was affirmed by the CA.

Issue:
She alleged
Was there actual contribution

from the parties?
only the properties acquired by both of

the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property, or
Ruling:
industry shall be owned by them in
There no sufficient proof of the exact
common
amount of
respective contributions ... Proof of
their respective
shares
therein. Pursuant to Article 148 of the

Family Code, in the absence of proof of
extent
of
the
contribution,
presumed
disputed
parties
their
to
share
be
personal
respective
shall
equal.Here,
properties
be
the
were
valued at P111,375.00, the existence

and
value
of
which
were
questioned by the petitioner.
not
Hence,
their share therein is equivalent to

one-half, i.e., P55,687.50 each.
in
proportion
to
their
actual contribution is required.

In the case at bar, although the
adulterous cohabitation of the parties
commenced in 1987, which is before
the date of the effectivity of the Family
Code on August 3, 1998, Article 148
thereof applies because this provision
was intended precisely to fill up the
hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code.
Before Article 148 of the Family Code
was enacted, there was no provision
It is not disputed that Gina and Jacinto
governing
were not capacitated to marry each
couples living in a state of adultery or
other because the former was validly
concubinage.
married to another man at the time of
cohabitation or the acquisition of the
her cohabitation with the latter. Their
property occurred before the Family
property regime therefore is governed
Code took effect, Article 148 governs.
by Article 148 of the Family Code,

which applies to bigamous marriages,
adulterous relationships, relationships
in
state
of
concubinage,
relationships where both man and

woman are married to other persons,
property
relations
of
Hence, even if the
Both parties claim that the money

used
to
purchase
the
disputed
personal properties came partly from

their joint account with First Allied
Development Bank.
and multiple alliances of the same
The Court of Appeals thus erred in
married man. Under this regime,
affirming the decision of the trial court

which granted the reliefs prayed for by

private respondent.
On the basis of
Lupo
Yolanda
for
complaint
against
judicial
partition
the
the evidence established, the extent
between them of a parcel of land with
of private respondents co-ownership
improvements
over the disputed house is only up to
Subdivision, Makati City.
In
his
the amount of P11,413.00, her proven
complaint,
that
the
contribution
subject property was acquired during
thereof.
in
the
Anent
construction
the
located
Lupo
in
alleged
Bel-Air
personal
his union with Yolanda as common-law
properties, her participation therein
husband and wife, hence the property
should be limited only to the amount
is co-owned by them.
of P55,687.50.
Lupo averred that the property

in question was acquired by Yolanda
sometime in using his exclusive funds
Atienza vs De Castro
and
that
the
title
thereto
was
G.R. No. L-25014, October 17,

1973
transferred by the seller in Yolandas
Ponente: TEHANKEE, J
consent.
name
without
his
knowledge
and
In her answer, Yolanda denied
Contributor:
Lupos allegations. According to her,
Facts:
she acquired the same property using
Lupo Atienza hired the services
her exclusive funds. The RTC rendered
of respondent Yolanda U. De Castro as
judgment for Lupo by declaring the
accountant for the two corporations.
contested
Despite Lupo being a married

man, he and Yolanda eventually lived
together in consortium However, after
the birth of their second child, their
relationship turned sour until they
parted ways.
property
as
owned
in
common by him and Yolanda and

ordering its partition between the two
in equal shares. The appellate court,
however, reversed and set aside that
of the trial court and adjudged the
litigated property as exclusively owned
by Yolanda.

Issue:
capacitated to marry each other, but
Does Lupo have the right of coownership on the subject property?
is
nonetheless
husband
and
properties
live
together
as
applies
to
wife,
acquired
during
said
cohabitation in proportion to their
Ruling: NO
It
who
not
disputed
that
the
parties herein were not capacitated to

marry each other because petitioner
respective contributions. Co-ownership

will only be up to the extent of the
proven actual contribution of money,
Lupo Atienza was validly married to
property or industry. Absent proof of
another woman at the time of his
the extent thereof, their contributions
cohabitation
and corresponding shares shall be
with
respondent. Their
the
property
regime,
presumed to be equal.
therefore, is governed by Article 148
Petitioners
claim
of
co-
of the Family Code, which applies to
ownership in the disputed property is
bigamous
without basis because not only did he
marriages,
adulterous
relationships, relationships in a state
fail
of concubinage, relationships where
contribution in the purchase thereof
both man and woman are married to
but
other persons, and multiple alliances
documents pertaining to its purchase
of the same married man. Under this
as evidentiary proof redounds to the
regime, only the properties acquired
benefit of the respondent. In contrast,
by both of the parties through their
aside from his mere say so and
actual joint contribution of money,
voluminous records of bank accounts,
property, or industry shall be owned
which sadly find no relevance in this
by them incommon in proportion to
case, the petitioner failed to overcome
their respective contributions. Proof of
his burden of proof. Allegations must
actual contribution is required.
be
to
substantiate
likewise
proven
by
the
his
very
sufficient
alleged
trail
of
evidence.
As it is, the regime of limited co-
Simply stated, he who alleges a fact
ownership of property governing the
has the burden of proving it; mere
union of parties who are not legally
allegation is not evidence.

However,
petitioners evidence in support of his
G.R. No. 159310

24, 2009
claim
Ponente: PUNO, C..J
is
as
either
already
stated,
insufficient
or
immaterial to warrant the trial courts

finding that the disputed property falls
under the purview of Article 148 of the
Family Code. In contrast to petitioners
dismal failure to prove his cause,
herein respondent was able to present
preponderant evidence of her sole
ownership. There can clearly be no coownership
when,
respondent
as
here,
sufficiently
the
established
that she derived the funds used to

purchase
the
property
from
her
February

Facts:
Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, met
respondent
Antonietta
Opalla-
Descallar. Jambrich and respondent fell

in love and decided to live together in
a
rented
house. Later,
they
transferred to their own house and lots

at
Agro-Macro
Subdivision,
Cabancalan, Mandaue City.
earnings, not only as an accountant
A Deed of Absolute Sale was likewise
but also as a businesswoman engaged
issued in in favour of Jambrich and
in foreign currency trading, money
respondent.
lending
She
Title
the
24792 over the properties were issued
promissory notes evincing substantial
in respondents name alone because
dealings with her clients. She also
Jambrich is an alien and could not
presented
acquire
and
presented
statements
jewelry
her
clientele
her
and
retail.
bank
bank
and
account
transactions,
which reflect that she had the financial

capacity to pay the purchase price of
the subject property.
(TCT) Nos. 24790, 24791 and
lands
of
public
domain.
Jambrich and respondent eventually

broke up.
Jambrich
met
petitioner
Camilo
F.
Borromeo sometime in 1986. Jambrich

purchased
Borromeo vs Descallar
Transfer Certificate of
accessories
petitioner,
an
for
for
engine
his
which
and
some
boat
from
he
became
indebted to. To pay for his debt, he

sold his rights and interests in the
Issue:
Agro-Macro properties to petitioner.

When petitioner sought to register the
deed of assignment, he discovered
that titles to the three lots have been
transferred in the name of respondent,
and that the subject property has
already been mortgaged.
Does the rule on co-ownership

apply in the case at bar?
Ruling: NO.
The
evidence
clearly
shows,
as
pointed out by the trial court, who

between
respondent
and
Jambrich
Petitioner filed a complaint against
possesses the financial capacity to
respondent
of
real
acquire the properties in dispute. At
alleged
that
the time of the acquisition of the
single
properties in 1985 to 1986, Jambrich
centavo of the purchase price and was
was gainfully employed at Simmering-
not in fact a buyer; that it was
Graz
Jambrich
property.
for
recovery
Petitioner
respondent
did
alone
not
who
pay
paid
for
the
properties using his exclusive funds;

that
Jambrich
was
the
real
and
absolute owner of the properties; and,

that
petitioner
acquired
absolute
Panker
A.G.,
an
company. He
was
earning
estimated
monthly
of P50,000.00. Then,
Jambrich
was
assigned to Syria for almost one year

where
Absolute
approximately P90,000.00.
which
an
salary
ownership by virtue of the Deed of

Sale/Assignment
Austrian
his
monthly
salary
was
Jambrich executed in his favor.

On the other hand, respondent was
Respondent claimed that she solely
employed as a waitress from 1984 to
and exclusively used her own personal
1985 with a monthly salary of not
funds to defray and pay for the subject

lots in question.
more than P1,000.00. In 1986, when

the parcels of land were acquired, she
The RTC ruled in favor of petitioner.
was unemployed, as admitted by her
The CA reversed the decision of the
during the pre-trial conference. Her
trial court.
allegations of income from a copra

business were unsubstantiated. The

supposed copra business was actually
the business of her mother and their
family, with ten siblings. She has no
license to sell copra, and had not filed
any income tax return.
Further, the fact that the disputed
properties were acquired during the
couples cohabitation also does not
help respondent. The rule that coownership applies to a man and a
woman living exclusively with each
other as husband and wife without the
benefit of marriage, but are otherwise
capacitated to marry each other, does
not
apply. In
the
instant
case,
respondent was still legally married to

another when she and Jambrich lived
together. In
such
an
adulterous
relationship, no co-ownership exists

between the parties. It is necessary
for each of the partners to prove his or
her
actual
contribution
to
the
acquisition of property in order to be

able to lay claim to any portion of
it. Presumptions of co-ownership and
equal contribution do not apply.


Rights and Obligations Between Spouses

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Rights and Obligations Between Spouses

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*Article 68 and 69 FC: RIGHTS

Consitution and Articles 68 and 69 of

the Family Code.

HUSBAND AND WIFE

G.R. No. 139789, July 19, 2001

should be compelled to live with

Contributor: Naferteri S. Kuit

husband and the wife are obliged to

Erlinda K. Ilusorio filed a petition

live together, observe mutual love,

before the CA for habeas corpus to

respect and fidelity.

have the custody of her husband

therefor is the "spontaneous, mutual

Potenciano Ilusorio. The petition was

affection between husband and wife

dismissed by the CA.

and not any legal mandate or court

Erlinda filed an appeal with the

order" to enforce consortium.

Obviously, there was absence of

empathy between spouses Erlinda and

arguments that have been resolved in

defined empathy as a shared feeling

spontaneous sexual intimacy but a

One of the issues raised by

Erlinda is that they (Potenciano and

communion. Marital union is a two-

together and care for each other as

Marriage is definitely for two

Ateneo de Davao University

with "amor gignit amorem respect,

care of his house as well as the store

sacrifice and a continuing commitment

to togetherness, conscious of its value

Leticia claims that Francisco and

mistress. Cirila, on the other hand,

Before Francisco died, the latter

which he donated his house and a

portion of Lot 437-A, consisting of 150

Herein respondents, Franciscos

Contributor: Naferteri S. Kuit

intestate succession alleged the Cirila

is Franciscos common-law wife and

Spouses Francisco Comille and

the donation made by the latter is void

area of 418 sqm. After the death of the

decision. Hence, this petition.

portion of the said lot through an

herein petitioner Cirila Arcaba to take

Ateneo de Davao University

At the very least, cohabitation

Seigfredo Tabancura presented

is public assumption by a man and a

documents apparently signed by Cirila

woman of the marital relation, and

using the surname "Comille. These

dwelling together as man and wife,

thereby holding themselves out to the

public as such. Secret meetings or

wife, otherwise, she would not have

nights clandestinely spent together,