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p
robably in 800 AD Charlemagne and his court received a letter,
the De substantia nihili et tenebrarum, written by a certain
Fredegisus. This letter has an at first sight strange topic:
nothing and darkness. More accurately said: Fredegisus tries to
prove in this letter that the word nothing (nihil) refers to a real
existing thing and that the word darkness (tenebrae) also has
an existing referent. Thus, where ancient as well as modern
philosophy of language considers these words to refer to
intramental concepts, Fredegisus claims that there are two
things outside the mind. We call one of these two things
nothing, the other darkness. In his proofs Fredegisus used an
array of techniques and theories from philosophy, but included
Scripture as well to get to his conclusion. Charlemagne was
confused. What was he to learn from this letter and from the
way that Fredegisus used the Bible? Especially since the
standard view was that the word nothing really had not extramental referent. That this view was the standard view can be
seen in the educational dialogue that Alcuin, an important court
scholar, wrote for young Peppin, the son and heir of
Charlemagne. Alcuin was not ashamed to teach Pippin the
following:
Alcuin: What is that which is and is not?
Pepin: Nothing.
Alcuin: How can it both be and not be?
Pepin: It exists in name, but not in fact.1
Charles therefore commanded that a letter was sent to the
astronomer Dungal for a second opinion and to divide the right
from the wrong in the De substantia. Furthermore it is very
interesting that Charles commanded Dungal to read the Bible
specifically in the literal way. Would we only have Dungals
Alcuin, Disputatio Pippini regalis et nobilissimi juvenis cum Alcuino
scholastico, ed. Frobenius PL vol. 101 (Paris 1863), p. 979. A. Quid est quod
est et on est? P. Nihil. A. Quomodo potest esse et non est? P. Nomine est, et re
non est.
1
Introduction
The name can be spelled in several ways. I will follow the orthography that
is given in the edition of David Howlett (forthcoming in Archivum Latinitatis
Medii Aevi). This orthography is also used in the Brussels manuscript (B1 in
Ttext tradition). Good biographical sketches are from Philippe Depreux
Prosopographie de lentourage de Louis le Pieux (781-840) (Sigmaringen
1997), pp. 199-203 and Mary Garrison Fridugisus [Frithugils, Nathanael] (d.
833), abbot and scholar in Oxford Dictionary of National Biography at
http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/61648, accessed 26 October 2005.
Especially Depreux has useful notes.
3
Cf. Roger Reynolds for a full description of the chores of an arch-deacon.
The Organization, Law and Liturgy of the Western Church, 700-900 in The
New Cambridge Medieval History, p. 606. In Alcuins letter to the patriarch
of Jerusalem, MGH Epist. IV nr. 210, p. 351 r. 7, a letter from Alcuin to the
patriarch of Jerusalem, is the first document in which Fredegisus is called an
arch-deacon.
4
Jozef Fleckenstein, Die Hofkapelle der deutchen Knige, MGH Schriften,
16/1(Stuttgart 1959), p. 43.
Introduction
For example Alcuin letter 135, ed. Ernst Dmmler MGH Epistolae Karolini aevi II (Berlin 1895),
p. 204. Mary Garrison, The Social World of Alcuin in L. Houwen and A. MacDonald (eds.),
Alcuin of York. Scholar at the Carolingian Court. Germania Latina III (Groningen 1998), p. 79.
6
Alcuin, In Evangelium Joannis, PL 100, 764d. novit enim Dominus, qui sunt
eius. Quorum salvationi ipsum quoque nomen Nathanael aptissime convenit;
Nathanael namque donum Dei interpretatur,Cf. Alcuin, MGH Epist. IV, nr.
262, pp. 419-420, r. 28-29/1-12.
7
Alcuin, MGH Epist. IV, nr. 135 204; nr. 289 p. 447-448.
8
Theodulf of Orlans, Ad Carolum regem Carmen XXV ed. Ernst Dmmler
MGH Poetae I (Berlin 1881), p. 487 r. 175-176. Transl. Peter Godman Poetry
of the Carolingian Renaissance (Londen 1985), p. 159 r. 175-176.
Stet levita decens Fredugis sociatus Osulfo,
Let the fine deacon Fredugis
stand in company with OswulfGnarus uterque artis, doctus uterque bene.
Both of them experts on
grammar, both of them highly learned
9
Alcuin, MGH Epist. IV, nr. 245 pp. 393-398. This is the case of the escaped
convict. A good introduction can be get in Luitpold Wallach Alcuin and
Charlemagne: Studies in Carolingian History and Literature (Ithaca 1959),
pp. 99-126.
10
Mary Garrison, Fridugisus.
Introduction
Introduction
18
Vassily, The hunt in Neil Gaiman The Sandman. Fables and reflections
(New York 1993), p. 89.
Introduction
Introduction
Introduction
Introduction
Introduction
10
Introduction
11
has tried to poison me with his brews and Bram van den Hoven
van Genderen with his cultural optimism. Nonetheless I thank
Wolfert for the daily conversations, his help, and his comics and
Bram for his tutorship in my career as student of medieval
history. But I should not forget Alisa Bredo, my native speaker.
For she has corrected my dunglish to American English. And
the thesis would have been less readable if not for her. My last
salute is to Gerja, whose love has supported me every single day.
PART I
Text tradition
Before we go to the translation of the text, a short note is
needed to address the critical edition that was used as basis for
the translation, and on the manuscripts on which this critical
edition is based. Concettina Gennaro has made an elaborate
comparison of the extant manuscripts and gave information on
previous editions in her chapters two and three, on which the
following is based.19
There are four copies of Fredegisus letter left, or at least,
known to us:
1)Paris BN Lat. 5577, fols. 134r-137r
(P)
2)Vatican Reg. Lat. 69 fols. 90v-93r.
(V)
3)Brussels, Bibl. Royale de Belgique 9587, fol 51v, r. 22 - fol 53r,
r. 5
(B1)
4)Brussels, Bibl. Royale de Belgique 9587, fol. 168r, r. 31 fol.
170r, r.18 (B2)20
As can be seen, B1 and B2 are contained in the same codex,
which has nr. 1372. B2 is a tenth century paper copy of B1; the
rest of the codex is made of parchment.
19
13
800-830
860-870
800-830
14
descendant of P.23 But B1 and P are not related and stem from
different branches. P and V have three lacunae that B1 has not,
and B1 has a lacuna that P and V have not. 24 This suggests that
the text constitution of B1 is better than that of P and V. This
last suggestion is corroborated by an important detail. In B1
(and its copy B2), Fredegisus letter is preceded by the letter
Charlemagne wrote to Dungal requesting his opinion on
Fredegisus claims. It is therefore very probable that B1 is
closer to the archetype than P.
When using the editions of the De substantia one has to
keep the following in mind: B1 was only discovered in the late
nineteenth century. Thus the editions that were made before the
late nineteenth century only used P and V, and therefore have
the three lacunae. It is better not to use them. 25 The edition in
the PL is one of these. After the discovery of B1, several other
editions on the basis of B1, P and V have come to light, among
them Dmmlers edition in the MGH Epistolae.26 Another critical
edition by David Howlett will be published in the Archivum
Latinitatis Medii Aevi. In my thesis I have used his text
constitution since he holds to contemporary norms (for example
of orthography).
There are a few things to say about the translation of the
text. In his article, David Howlett has also provided a translation
of the text. This translation is very literal, so that the Latin can
be followed very well. However, the understanding of the reader
who is not versed in Latin is sometimes impaired by this literal
Gennaro, Fridugiso di Tours, p. 28.
Gennaro, Fridugiso di Tours, p. 16, 25-26. The lacuna of B1 is in fol. 52r r.
24. The list of variants between Gennaros text and B1 is on p. 14-15. The list
of variants between P and B1 is on p. 23-24.
25
Gennaro, Fridugiso di Tours, pp. 6-7. This counts for the four following
editions: Stefan Baluz, Miscellaneorum Liber Primus (Paris 1678); reprinted
in Domenico Mansi, Miscellanea novo ordine degesta (Lucae 1761); reprinted
in Migne PL 105 (Paris 1864), cols. 751B-756B; and Max Ahners critical
edition in Fredegis von Tours. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Philosophie im
Mittlealter (Leipzig 1878) pp. 16-23.
26
Ernst Dmmler, MGH Epist. IV (Berlin 1895) pp. 552-555 nr. 36. He has
edited the letter from Charles to Dungal on p. 552 nr. 35. Other editions are
Francesco Corvino Il De nihilo et tenebris di Fredegiso di Tours in Rivista
Critica di Storia della Filosofia (july-december 1956) pp. 273-286; Concettina
Gennaro Fridugiso di Tours e il De substantia nihili et tenebrarum (Padova
1963) pp. 123-138. An edition of the letter of Charlemagne to Dungal was
included on pp. 121-122. Gennaros edition is also better left alone, since she
normalizes the text to her own standards, disregarding contemporary norms,
e.g. in orthography.
23
24
15
Latin text
INTERROGATIO DOMNI CAROLI SERENISSIMI IMPERATORIS
DE SUBSTANTIA NIHILI ET TENEBRARVM
17
DE SUBSTANTIA TENEBRARUM
Quoniam his breuiter dictis commode finem inposui mox ad
ea expedienda intentionem retuli quae curiosis lectoribus non
inmerito uidebantur digna quaesitu.
30 Est quidem quorundam opinio non esse tenebras et ut sint
inpossibile esse.
29
18
19
20
EXPLICIT.
21
Translation
TO ALL THE FAITHFUL MEN OF GOD AND OF OUR LORD THE MOST SERENE
PRINCE CHARLES
LIVING TOGETHER IN HIS SACRED PALACE
FREDEGISUS THE DEACON
ON THE SUBSTANCE OF NOTHING
They have left me the troubling question about nothing,
which has concerned many for a long time, however
undiscussed, unexamined as if impossible to explicate.
Yet it seemed up to me, who wishes fervently to treat the matter,
to tackle it.
I have untied the fierce knots in which it was tied, and clearing
away the obscuring cloud, I have restored it to light
and taken care that it is handed over to the memory of posterity
for all ages in the future.
2 The question, however, is this: is nothing something or not?
3 If anyone should respond It seems to me to be nothing this,
his negation which he maintains compels him to state that
nothing is something while he says,
It appears to me to be nothing.
1
Some are of the opinion that darkness does not exist, and that
it can impossibly exist.
31 How easily this can be refuted, the prudent reader
understands at once the authority of Scripture is brought into
the discussion.
32 And so it becomes clear what the history of the book Genesis
has to say about this question.
33 It says this: And the darkness was over the face of the deep.
[Gen.1:2].
34 If it did not exist, by what reasonint is it said that it was?
35 Who says that darkness exists posits by constituting a thing
who, however, [says that it] does not exist takes away by
negating a thing
just as when we say A man is we constitute a thing, that is, a
man
when we say A man is not we take away by denying a thing,
that is, a man.
36 For a substantial word has this in nature
that a thing joined to whatever subject it may be without
negation of the same subject declares a substance.
37 By predicating, therefore, in that which is said Darkness was
upon the face of the deep a thing has been constituted
which no negation separates or divides from existence.
38 In the same way darkness is the subject, was the
declarative
for it declares by predicating that darkness exist in whatever
manner.
39 Lo, with unconquered authority accompanied by reason,
reason also having confessed authority, they predicate one and
the same thing
understand, the darkness exists.
40 But though these things posited for the sake of example
suffice for demonstrating the things which we have proposed
nevertheless that an occasion of constradicting be left to no
envious men
let us make in the open, aggregating a few divine testimonies
from many
so that, shaken by fear, they will not dare to raise their inept
voices against them anymore.
41 When the Lord, because of the affliction of the people of
30
John Marenbon, From the Circle of Alcuin to the School of Auxerre. Logic,
Theology and Philosophy in the Early Middle Ages (Cambridge etc. 1981), p. 63.
28
Cf. Marcia Colish, Carolingian Debates over Nihil and Tenebrae: A Study in
Theological
Method. in Speculum 59/4 (1984), pp. 787-794.
with which he could connect the two terms of the question. These
third terms were nomen finitum, vox significata and significatio.
His aim was to find convincing arguments for his solution to the
question. It is in this way (convincing or trustworthy) that
probabile in 12 should be read. His use of probabilis in 82 and
especially 84 suggests that this aim was to be generalised over the
whole of the letter, not only over the first syllogism of 7-12. Finally,
it is in connection with the De topicis differentiis that the word
differentiam in 9 can be put into perspective. A differentia is a
technical term indicating a genus of third terms which can be used
in a syllogism. I doubt whether Fredegisus used differentiam in
exactly the same way, but it seems clear that he wanted to say that
a word like man could have a general meaning if there were no
other term with which it was connected (e.g. in Socrates is a man,
the proposition connecting the two terms Socrates and man, it is
clear that man does not mean man in general).
Then there is the question of why Fredegisus included three
syllogisms. Logically, they are redundant, but I presume that
Fredegisus believed them to be different. 43 Colish thinks that at
least the first and the second syllogisms are related. The first
syllogism would only make the existence of nothing probable or
possible. She thus reads probabile as something having a modal
force. Therefore he needed a second syllogism to close the gap. 44
In connection with Boethius idea that dialectic must yield
convincing, instead of demonstrative syllogisms, I find her idea
unlikely. Another speculation on the relation between the three
syllogisms is from Mignucci. He speculates that the second and the
third syllogisms in the discussion of nothing have backgrounds in
different fields of philosophy. The second syllogism would derive
from epistemology (we know that nothing is a meaningful word,
so there must be an extramental referent) and the third from
ontology (a meaningful word derives its meaning from an existing
extramental-referent).45 But then what is the background of the
first syllogism? Another speculation could be that there is a
hierarchy in the syllogisms. The first syllogism starts with the idea
that a name has a meaning. The second evolves around the idea
that a meaning involves a reference. The third syllogism states that
43
44
45
38
48
39
be a question that lived among his public, but I dont believe that
these questions were totally unrelated.
Colish thinks that darkness is examined as an example to
give more insight into the problem of nothing. 51 This might seem
convincing, since with the expansion of the grammatical apparatus
used, the insight in the problem might deepen. However, I dont
think this interpretation is correct. First of all, Fredegisus whole
point of 22-27 is that it is impossible to know the nature of nothing.
But in the study of darkness, Scripture seems to indicate the
nature of darkness (it is corporeal, it has a place, it can serve as a
material etc.) from which its existence is proved. Therefore it
cannot be a simpler example from which to learn by analogy how
to treat nothing. If this should serve as an example for something,
it is therefore not for the problem of nothing, but an example for
the method in which the existence of the referent of any other
word can be proved. This method should be just as useful in
dealing with the words that seem to deny their referent. I therefore
agree with Marenbon that it is the problem of negative concepts,
which connect the two parts.52 However, the words nothing and
darkness are not only negative concepts, but also perform an
important function in the story of Creation. In my opinion, Ahner
was correct in this respect (but not in the identification with prime
matter). Moreover, the study of these two words from a
cosmological context fits the cosmological interest which Charles
displayed in 797-800. This does not mean that there is a
relationship between the words other than that they are negative
concepts and perform a function in a cosmological context. My
hypothesis is that the two parts were written as if they are fairly
separate lemmata for an encyclopaedia, providing a concise
explanation of the arguments for the existence of their referents
(arguments are elaborated in chapter 5).
Fredegisus started right away with using authority to prove
that darkness is something. This does not mean, however, that he
neglected reason, for it was used in the next few lines.
29-30 The question that Fredegisus is going to answer concerning
darkness has a slightly different nuance. Fredegisus wanted to
prove the existence of darkness, not that it was a definite thing
(aliquid). This slight difference has no real implications, however.
51
52
40
53
41
41-42 This argument, and all the following except the one in 4350, all depend on a, which Colish calls materialistic reading of the
Bible.54 The idea is that everything that can be touched must be
corporeal. If we compare these sentences with 80-82, then we
encounter a similar argument: something that is corporeal must
exist. The difference between both arguments is of course in the
justification. The argument here is justified by perception to the
sense of touch, while the argument of 80-82 is justified by the
concept of accidens, i.e. that what is predicated of a real subject.
The idea that an accidens is applied to a subject springs from the
theory of the categories. Both the argument here and 80-82 can be
derived from the Categoriae Decem, which Fredegisus very likely
read (see chapter 4).
Fredegisus use of the categories is explained by the
following inference in the Categoriae Decem: A predicate can be
applied to a subject. In a true proposition this reflects a state of
affairs in reality. Therefore, in a true proposition the use of a
predicate is an indication of the existence of the subject.
Fredegisus found his set of true propositions in the Bible.
43-57 This argument derives from assumptions about language
from etymological theory (chapter 4). The idea is that words and
things both have their origin in God. Therefore both perception in
41-42 and language play a role in the acquisition of knowledge.
Added to this idea of a common origin of words and things is the
principle of economy. Every action that God takes is filled with
purpose; therefore the words He gave must have referents. Colish
remarks that Fredegisus consciously brushed over the fact that
there was no strict analogy between nothing and darkness. 55 The
problem that she addressed goes back to Genesis 1.1-5. In Genesis
1.3, God explicitly created the light (and in Genesis 1.4 even said it
was good), but there is no parallel creation of darkness. The
darkness just was over the abyss in Genesis 1.2. On the other hand,
in Genesis 1.5 God gave names to light as well as darkness and the
grammatical function of both the names in the sentence is the
same. This may suggest that, since day and night have the same
function, darkness and light are similarly linked. If one wants to
see a difference between light and darkness, then one must explain
ibidem, p. 764.
Colish, Carolingian Debates over Nihil and Tenebrae , pp. 761-762, 774, 785786.
54
55
why Gods names in the text have the same grammatical status. If,
on the other hand, one wants to state that Gods names refer to
entities that can be categorised together, then an explanation has
to be given for why Genesis has this difference in the creation of
light and darkness. Augustine, who chose the first option, has
taken a lot of effort to explain this grammatical parallelism. As
Colish observes, Augustines problem was that the darkness in
Genesis 1.2, not being explicitly created, was not a thing (aliquid)
like other created things.56 One of his solutions was to distinguish
between an uncreated primal darkness referring to prime matter
in Genesis 1.2, and a different darkness in Genesis 1.4 that was
created to enhance the order in the Creation.
Colish makes the following inference: Fredegisus opted for a
literal reading of the grammatical parallel between night and
day, and therefore had to explain why the Bible made a difference
in speaking about light and darkness. Colish stipulates that
Fredegisus must have known about this difficulty. However, instead
of treating the problem, he didnt even mention it, and instead
piled together both the uncreated and created darkness. Thus he
must have omitted it intentionally. I think that Colish is too
influenced by an Augustinian reading of the Bible in making this
inference. When would it have been important for Fredegisus to
address this difference in the first place? It would only have been
important if it made such a difference in Fredegisus mind that
darkness couldnt be considered a thing anymore. We have seen
that for Augustine, darkness was denied the status of a thing in
Genesis 1.2. For Fredegisus, however, on grammatical grounds it
was already apparent in 33-38 that darkness was considered a
thing in Genesis 1.2. So Augustines problem just did not affect
him.57 Therefore I also see no reason for Fredegisus to distinguish
between the darkness in Genesis 1.2 and 1.4. The grammatical
parallel between Gods baptism of light as day and darkness as
light is therefore justified for Fredegisus. It attests to the
wilfulness with which he used his grammatical tools.
ibidem, p. 772.
Augustine connects this problem with his reading of terram in Genesis 1.1 as
prime matter, to which the tenebrae in 1.2 also refer. In this case prime matter
cannot be a real thing, since it lacks form. If therefore Fredegisus had prime
matter in mind, then it would have been a problem for him. But neither in the
part on nihil (as Colish also says), nor in the part on tenebrae is there any sign of
Fredegisus speaking of prime matter.
56
57
58-63 These lines evolve around the idea that what exists must
have a location, because it would have been impossible to send the
darkness, if it was not something that could be located. This
argument is therefore related to 69-76. These arguments derive
from the theory of the categories, where place constitutes a
category of its own.
64-65 Anachronistically one could say that the darkness is here
interpreted as an Aristotelian material cause.
66-67 This is the category of or property, which is normally
reserved for human subjects.
68 On the relation between the Old Testament and the New
Testament, see the annotation to 6.
69-76 To read outer in this citation literally as a determination of
place instead of metaphorically seems strange. See the annotations
to 58-63.
77-79 If almighty God could choose to change his creation so that
darkness didnt exist, he still couldnt undo the fact that darkness
existed before his change.
80-82 Again, the idea that an accident is something that is
predicated of a subject derives from the theory of the categories.
New is the distinction which Fredegisus makes between asserting
something of and finding in.58 The former happens when a
universal is predicated of a subject, the latter when an individual
property is predicated of a subject (see chapter 4). Fredegisus says
here that quantity is a predicate that is found in a subject, thus
that it is a property. This means that the subject of which the
quantity is a property must exist.
On the use of the word probabilis see the annotation to 7-18.
84 Fredegisus again makes the distinction between reason and
authority (see the annotations to 6). In 84 he compares his letter to
a rule. In my opinion Fredegisus refers to a grammatical rule so
that he teaches his audience like a Latin teacher (see chapter 3 for
an elaboration).
58
PART II
Chapter 1
Historiography
t
here is a long tradition of research on the De substantia. From the
nineteenth century to the late seventies of the twentieth century,
historiography has counted/covered Fredegisus in the context of
the reason-faith debate.59 Adherents of reason interpreted
Fredegisus as an enlightened logician who used faith as a pretext
to follow his reason. The philosophically minded historians who
saw Fredegisus as such did not hold Fredegisus in high esteem: he
was a failed logician, because his mind was feeble and impeded by
Scripture.60 The faith side treated Fredegisus as a theologian who
used reason to clarify his faith. They thought that with his letter
Fredegisus was performing exegesis on Genesis 1. Due to
Fredegisus literal-mindedness, they judged him as a failed protoscholastic.61 Marcia Colish was right to deconstruct the images
that were created of Fredegisus in this debate. Fredegisus was
This opposition is nicely sketched by Marcia Colish, Carolingian Debates over
Nihil and Tenebrae , p. 764-765, but she has been too harsh on certain
historians. As much as Marenbon (just like Prantl, for that matter) would have
wanted to understand a Fredegisus position on universals, his whole point was
that Fredegisus evaded the problem. Ahner showed that Fredegisus ideas on
the relationship between faith and authority were consistent with Augustines,
since he wanted to reject the overstretched thesis that Reuter and the
enlighteners had put forth. Yet he did not try to prove that Fredegisus was
developing here a whole theory of a holistic system of truth, as Colish claimed
in her Carolingian Debates over Nihil and Tenebrae, p. 764. If Fredegisus
ideas were consistent with Augustines and Alcuins, it may be that Fredegisus
did have a theory of such sort. I also believe that Colish overinterpreted Corvino.
She ascribed to Corvino the view that Fredegisus was the herald of an
intramental and logical semantics, but I have not ben able to distill this claim
from his paper.
60
Colish, Carolingian Debates over Nihil and Tenebrae , p. 764, refers among
others to Gennaro, Fridugiso di Tours, p. 100, Ludovico Geymonat I problemi
del nulla e delle tenebre in Fredegiso di Tours in Rivista di Filosofia (july 1952),
pp. 101-111, Marenbon From the Circle of Alcuin, p. 62
59
working under the assumptions and the knowledge of his time, and
had no knowledge of the reason-faith categories as they were used
by these historians. Current research on Fredegisus therefore
benefits much more from the results of placing Fredegisus in the
contexts of three late-antique traditions of knowledge. These
traditions, along with chronology, will form the analytical
instruments with which I have ordered the historiographical
material. One tradition was the logical-philosophical tradition of
Augustine and Boethius, with its commentaries on Aristotle. This
tradition has recently been linked to the second tradition: the
grammatical tradition of Donatus and Priscianus. The third
tradition, with which Fredegisus is connected, is the tradition of
the exegesis of Genesis 1, in which Augustine again figures
prominently. In historiography Fredegisus has been successfully
connected with these traditions. He was first linked with the
exegetical tradition, and next viewed from the logical and
grammatical traditions. Furthermore, a chronological treatment of
the authors seems to show that in modern times research
traditions in different languages succeeded each other. First the
Germans researched Fredegisus, after which the Italians took over
(not accounting for the odd Frenchman) and eventually an interest
in the Anglo-Saxon world took hold.
I will let modern historiography on Fredegisus start in 1844,
when Ritter published his Geschichte der Philosophie. Ritters
important original point cannot be put into one of the three lateantique traditions of knowledge mentioned above. According to
him, Fredegisus attempted to give a description of the point of
contact between God and the creation in his concept of Nothing. 62
Since Nothing is the source of everything, including the soul which
is of a divine nature, Nothing itself has a divine nature. In other
words, it is God.63 Ritter herewith envisioned a line of negative
theology that runs from the Greek church fathers to Fredegisus
and John Scottus. His judgment of the mental powers of our author
is very positive, since he was gifted with a deep philosophical
Colish, Carolingian Debates over Nihil and Tenebrae , p. 764, refers among
others to Ahner, Fredegis von Tours, pp. 24-36, 57-58 and Corvino, Il De nihilo
et tenebris di Fredegiso di Tours, pp. 276-279.
62
Heinrich Ritter, Geschichte der Philosophie VII (Hamburg 1844), p. 192.
63
Ritter, Geschichte der Philosophie VII, p. 191.
61
ibidem, p. 46.
ibidem, p. 47.
Augustinus, De genesi ad litteram, I 2-3.
Ahner, Fredegis von Tours, p. 47.
know his opinion. Fredegisus was thus less inclined to look for a
connection between the two.
With Ahner, the German tradition of research on Fredegisus
discussed here came to a halt. It had tried to understand the letter
by placing its philosophical contents in two traditions: the logical
tradition and the exegetical tradition. Thereby it identified two
groups of sources which can be used in the study of Fredegisus.
Ahners study later exerted much more influence than Prantl. The
first serious study of Fredegisus in connection to this logical
tradition appeared only with Mignucci. German research thus
yielded a Fredegisus who had ascribed the characteristics of prime
matter to Nothing. Fredegisus goal in this would be to comment
on Genesis 1.1. This Fredegisus-as-exegist reflects the
disproportionate attention that Ahner gave to Nothing as opposed
to darkness.
After the German research tradition, an Italian surge of
interest in Fredegisus began. Ludovico Geymonat was responsible
for this Italian connection. For the historian, Geymonats article
seems only valuable as a curiosity. 76 Yet Geymonat did inspire
Francesco Corvino to take a closer look at our author. 77 He placed
Fredegisus in the context of the exegesis of Genesis 1 and totally
accepted Ahners idea that Fredegisus considered his Nothing to
be prime matter. He differed with Ahners views on the relationship
between the part on Nothing and the part on darkness. Corvino
perceived an intimate relationship between the two parts, since
Augustine interpreted the darkness in Genesis 1.2 as
unformedness. Being without form was the most important
feature of prime matter, and therefore of the interpretation of
Ahner, Fredegis von Tours 53-54. Ahner references to a suggestion of Werner,
Alcuin und sein Jahrhunderd (Paderborn 1876), p. 126.
76
I have only seen Gennaro Fridugiso di Tourss abstract of Geymonats study of
1952, but he seems to have tried anachronistically to apply Gottlob Freges
theory of sense and reference to Fredegisus text. (Gennaro Fridugiso di Tours
107-110. Ludovico Geymonat I problemi del nulla e delle tenebre in Fredegiso di
Tours in Rivista di Filosofia (july 1952) pp. 208-288. On Geymonats
interpretation, Fredegisus ascribed existence to Nothing because it is the human
think-act of total negation (Gennaro Fridugiso di Tours p. 108.). It is clear that
Fredegisus really did not entertain such an idea. Fredegisus ascribes an extramental existence to Nothing, if only because nothing existed before the human
mind did. Geymonat apparently was interested in theoretical points and not so
much in the historical context of Fredegisus.
77
Corvino, Il De nihilo et tenebris, p. 273
75
these other sources and also show how totally different sorts of
sources such as court letters, philosophical texts and glossaries
can be related to each other. I will therefore use these sources to
develop a hypothesis on the use of the De substantia in the final
chapter and to understand Fredegisus concern with words in the
next chapter. It is to prime matter and words that the thesis will
next turn.
Chapter 2: statement
62
63
there were three principles to this type of change: matter, form and
privation. Take, for example, shapeless bronze.134 Bronze can serve
as the material or substrate out of which many things can be made,
for example statues, coins or swords. But as yet the bronze is not
anything. This is because it lacks a shape which would compel an
observer to call it anything, namely a statue, a coin or a sword. 135
The shape which would ultimately make it anything of note is
called the form. But for now, it lacks a form; in other words, it has
a privation of form. Now Aristotles critique of Platos concept of
Space is that it conflates privation and matter. If matter lacks form
by nature (as it does in Space) then the following problem arises.
We know it is possible for form to be created out of shapeless
matter. We can change the shapeless bronze into statues or coins.
Thereby the form comes to be. Yet there must be something that
desires the form, since the form cannot come into being out of
nothing. To say this would violate the law of non-contradiction.
Therefore, form cannot be yearned for by privation, since with the
coming of the form, the privation will be destroyed (because it is
the opposite of form). In fact, privation is evil and tries to
counteract form. Something other then privation must desire the
form. The form itself does not yearn for form, since the form
already is perfect (otherwise it would change into itself and that
would in fact nullify the change). If the bronze were already a
statue, it could not yearn for the form of the statue and change
into one. Therefore there must be something else that yearns for
the change from a lack of shape to a thing. That something else,
of course, is matter. It is the matter of the bronze that desires the
form. So matter has to be distinguished from privation and from
form, since it can have both privation and form. Therefore neither
form nor privation (according to Plato) belongs to the nature of
matter. In other words, they are accidental.136
This is the clearest example, but the ultimate use for this theory is for
biological beings, where as opposed to artifacts- the maker is much less clear.
In this example I am going to talk of bronze as matter in an abstract way.
Aristotle no doubt would want to talk about a specific pile of bronze and not of
bronze in general.
135
Although looking at a lower level, this is not true, since the bronze itself has
a particular shape which differentiates bronze from other metals. Bronze itself
therefore has a matter of its own (the elements from which the bronze is formed)
and a form (the specific ratio in which these elements are mixed together).
134
two phases arose. The first phase of this creation account provided
a second possibility to derive Nothing from Calcidius. Matter still
was a container that could be regarded as Space. But the capacity
for this matter to receive forms and opposite qualities was seen in
terms of potentiality.141 This is important for another reason.
Remember the two ways in which Plato described the prime
matter: first as chaos of the sensible world before the ordering,
and second as Space. In Calcidius commentary on Platos story of
creation, which he sets out in paragraphs 352-354, Platos two
ways of describing coming to be (receptacle and chaos) evolved
into separate phases.142 First there is a phase in which uncreated
matter is without qualities (thus without the opposites hot-cold,
wet-dry) and motionless. It is the receptacle which can receive
forms but as yet has none. It can therefore be seen by Calcidius as
pure potentiality, ready to receive opposite qualities and forms. In
this phase Aristotles notion of potentiality and Platos notion of
Space are combined. Next qualities, or vestiges of bodies are
dropped into the matter, causing a disturbance. Calcidius
compares it with the dropping of pebbles into a still pond. Who it
was that dropped the qualities in the material pond remains a
mystery, by the way. Matter cannot counteract the qualities that
are dropped therein, since it has no opposing qualities of its own.
Therefore the whole surface of matter is brought into disorderly
motion, just like the whole surface of the pond eventually would be
in a turmoil from the pebbles (do not imagine nice circular waves).
This is the second stage of creation, which clearly resembles the
idea of a chaotic prime matter of the sensible, but turns it from a
mythical stage into something real. By this chaotic movement,
Providence can order the elements by their qualities and thereby
separate the materials of fire, water, earth and air. The other
bodies are made out of these elements.
Before I go into the usefulness of matter as potentiality for
Nothing, I first want to briefly consider another option arising from
Calcidius writings. This will provide us with the third
interpretative possibility for Nothing. In the introductory
paraphrase of the treatise on matter, there is the small paragraph
271, which is called Names of matter. In this paragraph, matter is
on Plato through the concept of matter.
141
See for example Calcidius paragraph 321.
142
Although this paragraph will be mainly based on Calcidius paragraph 352.
Augustine
Augustine treated prime matter mainly in the context of his
exegetical efforts on Genesis 1. The De genesi ad litteram, written
A.D. 401-415 A.D., was the latest of his commentaries on Genesis.
Another locus classicus for prime matter is Confessiones book 12,
which was written somewhat earlier, A.D. 397-401. 144 These two
works will serve here as the source for Augustines mature
opinions on the topic. Before we go into the works of Augustine, it
should be noted that Augustine developed his exegesis on Genesis
1 in opposition to the Manichees, who taught that there was an
evil, negative God or principle who opposed God and did not have
its origin in God.145 Therefore the negative God is uncreated and
coexistent with God. The negative and evil God is the God of
disunity or change and therefore the changing world in which we
live is in its grip.146 Augustine countered the idea of a negative God
in his exegesis of Genesis 1, stating that God had created the world
out of nothing. The catch here is how one interprets nothing. The
Manichee could say that nothing was the ontologically substantial
negative principle coexistent with God, but Augustine contradicted
this interpretation, explaining nothing or evil instead as a privation
or lack of being.147 In this way Augustine rejected the Manichees. 148
The question under discussion is, however, not whether
Augustines nothing was Fredegisus Nothing, but whether
Augustines prime matter is Fredegisus Nothing.
The implication of the creatio ex nihilo was that God was no
longer a Demiurge-craftsman, but a creator. This meant that the
Johansen, A History of Ancient Philosophy, p. 593.
Torchia takes it that with his attack on the Manichees, Augustine actually tries
to reject the whole gnostic outlook. p. 66-67. Augustine, Confessiones IV.15. For
an elaborate account of Manicheaism based on other sources than Augustine
himself, Torchia, Creatio ex nihilo, pp. 65-79. The question how much
Augustine knew of Manicheaism is irrelevant here. Even if Augustine knew little
of it, he still opposed his exegesis of Genesis 1 to his perception of Manicheaism.
146
Johanssen, A History of Ancient Philosophy, p. 596.
147
Augustine, Confessiones VII.12, 18.
148
And on an a historical scale, Fredegisus as well.
144
145
in order that it may not find its end in an unformed state. The
purpose of unformed matter is obviously that it must be formed, for
taken by itself it is not finished. Unformed matter is not merely
opposing formed matter, but is a logical first step towards it. If we
imagine that the same relation holds between Nothing and the
things created from it, Fredegisus keeps us in the dark. The
element of purpose in unformed matter is altogether lacking in
Nothing.
This uncovers a second argument for why Nothing shouldnt
be thought of as unformed matter. The reason why the analogous
relationship just mentioned (unformed-formed and Nothing-things)
is doubtful, points to an important difference between Nothing and
unformed matter. Nothing is a thing, but unformed matter is.
Augustines unformed matter is explicitly not a thing, for in his
ontology, to be a thing requires having a form. Following this
reasoning, unformed matter is less than a thing. Specifically,
Nothing has a nature, which comes closest to form, although it is
still intangible. Yet Augustines was that unformed matter is
natureless. In my opinion, this difference in ontology behind
Nothing and unformed matter makes an identification
impossible.160
Finally, there is a third argument against such identification.
Both Augustine and Fredegisus attach opposing moral values to
unformed matter and Nothing. As I observed earlier, Fredegisus
characterises Nothing with the lofty-sounding term noble
(praeclarum). He uses the same term as an adjective for things
created from Nothing, such as light and the souls of mankind.
Since angels and souls spring from Nothing, we can even
conjecture that Nothing is even more eminent than these
denote the rationes seminales. This in my view can hardly be distilled from the
De genesi ad litteram. But if primal darkness denotes the seminal reasons, then
the case I am making would even be stronger. There is no question about
nothing carrying the same seeds for later development as primal darkness, thus
unformed matter does. With this rationale she probably claimed that Nothing is
unassociated with primordial causes. The explanation for the difference between
Colishs view and mine may be that she uses the De genesi contra Manicheos, so
that this indicates a variance in Augustines voluminous oeuvre. Colish,
Carolingian Debates over Nihil and Tenebrae, pp. 772-773.
160
And so in my opinion Corvino is wrong in his 1950s elimination of prime
matter by Fredegisus, because of nothing and prime matter sharing the only
property of existence.
prime matter, and has not been entertained since. This neglect is
partly justified. Fredegisus epistle is in no way to be placed in the
same genre as exegesis. There was no biblical text that Fredegisus
is trying to explain in his letter, and nor did he use patristic biblical
commentary explicitly, which one would expect in exegesis.
Furthermore, where Scripture is used, it was not explained on any
of its literal or spiritual levels. Instead, Fredegisus used Scripture
to instrumentally in his argumentation. Finally, if it should be
exegesis, would not one expect an allusion to other biblical texts?
It is not in Genesis that the Bible states that the world is created
from nothing. There the story of Creation starts at the beginning.
It is only in 2 Maccabees 7:28 that Scripture declares that the
world is created from nothing. 165 It is not very likely that
Fredegisus overlooked such a biblical text in this respect. There is
therefore no question whatsoever that this text can be seen as
traditional exegesis. It is clear, even after a first reading of the text,
that it is about the two words nothing and darkness. All of the
attention that has been and will be spent on the interpretation of
Nothing should not blind us to the fact that two words are
scrutinised, not one, and that Fredegisus aim with those two
words is the same: to prove that there is something to which each
word refers. This is the most general observation that can be made
on the statement, or the aboutness of the De substantia. I contend
that full-blown research on the epistle will have to start with this
observation, and will further have to question how it can be that
someone could put separate words on trial. It will also have to
question how the object of the research, the words, determines the
methods to be used for the research. Finally the function this
research was supposed to fulfil in Fredegisus social context can be
considered. This will be the logical sequence of steps that will be
made in this thesis.
However I would like to skip of later findings of this thesis,
for a moment, and make some preliminary remarks about the
function the De substantia. Although Fredegisus did not practice
traditional exegesis in this particular letter, I maintain that he was
interested in cosmology.166 In a culture which took its reality as
revealed by the Bible, the words nothing and darkness were very
So I urge you, my child, to look up at the sky and the earth. Consider
everything you see there, and realize that God made it all from nothing, just as
He made the human race. Cf. Torchia, Creatio ex nihilo, p. 2.
165
Bible that made the Bible particularly useful for studying. This
included a book size suited for easy handling (33cm x 24cm), but
also variant readings from different text traditions. A Spanish
variant was preceded by an s (spanus), an a (albinus) preceded
Alcuins Bible and al (alia) stood for other sources.189 The depth
of Theodulfs critical awareness may be a matter of dispute, but his
consciousness that text traditions exert influence on texts is not
debatable.190 This consciousness and the need to study these
traditions led to the development of various Psalters in the ninth
century: the tripartite Psalter (Psalterium tripartitum) with
Jeromes Roman, Gallican and Hebrew Psalter; and the bilingual
Psalter (Psalterium duplex) with a Greek Septuagint version and
one of Jeromes translations. The veneration that Jerome received
in the eighth and ninth century for his textual approach to the
understanding of the Bible and for his competence in the original
languages was in step with the respect for texts of the time.191
The emendation and edition of the Bible texts especially
underline my point. The Carolingian corrector and editor implicitly
acknowledged that biblical texts changed during their
transmission. Yet at the same time, they had a realistic outlook
towards the meaning. For them there was but one holy truth and
the meaning of the Bible was fixed, however diverse the variants
produced by different text traditions. Therefore, the corrections
they made and the variants they found had to do with the
corruption or change of the language of the Bible, but not its
Laura Light reports this lay-out of a Paris manuscript, BN lat. 9380 Versions
et Rvisions du texte biblique, p 64. Contreni adds that the Roman numeral ii
preceded a reading common to both Alcuin and the Spanish tradition and h
preceded a reading based on Hebrew in Carolingian Biblical Studies, p. 78. He
bases himself on Bonifatius Fischer, Bibelausgaben des frhen Mittelalters in La
bibbia nellalto Medioevo. Settimane di Studio X (Spoleto 1963), pp. 593-596 and
Elisabeth Dahlhaus-Berg, Nova Antiquitas et Antiquita Novitas. Typologische
Exegese und Isidorianisches Geschichtsbild bei Theodulf von Orlans (Cologne
and Vienna 1975), p. 44. Dahlhaus-Berg ascribes this to ms. g. Two pages
earlier this turns out to be Paris BN lat. 11937.
190
John Contreni deems Theodulfs Bible a work of true critical editorial
scholarship, but Laura Light regrets the fact that still il nen a pas rsult une
meilleure qualit de son texte. Contreni, Carolingian Biblical Studies, p. 78,
Laura Light, Versions et rvisions du texte biblique, p. 64.
191
Bernice Kaczynski, Edition, Translation, and Exegesis in Richard Sullivan
(ed.), The Gentle Voices of Teachers. Aspects of Learning in the Carolingian Age
(Ohio 1995), pp. 173-174.
189
is that it is very clear what Alcuins letter was about. It was about
how to operate some specific words. Fredegisus wrote his letter in
the same vein: in order to use a word, one needs to know its
referent just as its gender or orthography. However philosophical
the jargon or methods were that Fredegisus used in his letter, his
question is a practical one.
Until now we have only seen external arguments that
Fredegisus shared in the linguistic focus, but there is an internal
argument as well. Fredegisus gave an important clue on how he
wanted to be read. In his last sentence he stated that he wanted
his text to be read as a regula. What did Fredegisus mean by this
word? The basic meaning of the word regula is rule, something
that is straight, like a stick or a ruler. 195 But regula can also have
a moral connotation. It can refer to a prescriptive statement, for
example a law.196 This way a regula can also mean a rule of faith,
or even a whole set of rules that guide monastic life, of which the
regula of St. Benedict is the most common. A final meaning of
regula is regularity or principle.197 The word can refer to a
descriptive model or a pattern, so that we can say that nature
abides by certain rules. One could claim that Fredegisus wanted to
compare his letter with a rule of Christian faith, but I do not find
such a claim convincing. Fredegisus had described the semantic
model by which words derive their meanings from things. In
addition, the use of the word probabilibus would have been
strange in this comparison: a rule of faith is not just convincing. It
seems therefore that in Fredegisus text the word regula should
be seen in the descriptive way, describing the relation between
words and things. On the other hand, the self-assured tone and
pedantic style make it hard to believe there is no prescriptive
content whatsoever. So how are we to understand Fredegisus
comparison of his text to a regula?
For a better understanding of this comparison, we must
return to the grammatical tradition. The school grammar, which
was discussed somewhat earlier, was not the only type of grammar
in late antiquity. There was another genre of grammatical tracts
Lewis and Short, A Latin Dictionary (1879), regula, I, p. 1553. Blaise,
Dictionnaire Latin-Franais des auteurs chrtiens (1954), regula, 1, p. 708.
196
Niermeyer, Mediae Latinitates Lexicon Minus (1984, 2nd ed.), regula 1-2, 711, p. 903. Blaise, 4-6.
197
Lewis and Short, II. Blaise 2-3.
195
Chapter 4: method
96
of their Latin. Yet some Carolingians did not stop at that. Alcuin
and his scholars, among them Candidus and Fredegisus, used
their knowledge of grammar and language as an analytical
method. This is understandable in a culture in which God was
revealed through text. Moreover, Alcuin introduced his pupils
to the theory of the categories through the Categoriae Decem.
These categories are eminently suited to the study of reality
through language, since they make a connection between
predicates and properties. John Marenbon has analysed the
appliance of logic and the categories to theology in Alcuins
circle.205 It is this use of logic, categories and grammar for the
purposes of analysis that constituted the grammatical method.
Such a grammatical method is only useful if one presumes that
language has a bearing on reality, though. The connection of
language to reality was a philosophical presupposition in the
early middle ages, although according to some philosophical
theories, e.g. Augustinian sign theory, this connection was
stronger than according to others, e.g. Boethian-Aristotelian
philosophy of language. John Marenbon has identified a
passage in Alcuins Dialectica which stresses this connection
between words and things. He thinks this is a likely passage to
have served as jumping-off point for Fredegisus ideas.206
Whether true or not, this was the context in which Fredegisus
operated and used the grammatical method to solve his
problem with nothing and darkness.
What were the theories from the grammatical method
supposed to do for Fredegisus? Evidently Fredegisus picked
those elements from the theories at his disposal that stressed
the connection between a word and a thing. 207 This observation
indicates first that with this concern Fredegisus shared in an
important early medieval presupposition: the word is the
carrier of the meaning. In the eleventh century, or in
Aristotelian philosophy of language, it is the proposition which
See the historiographical chapter. John Marenbon, From the Circle of
Alcuin, pp. 62-66.
206
John Marenbon, From the Circle of Alcuin, p. 63. Marcia Colish consideres
the passage likely as jumping-off point too in Carolingian Debates over Nihil
and Tenebrae, p. 784-785.
207
I choose to use the word thing instead of object since in medieval
philosophy the word object would refer to an intramental picture of a thing.
Yet thing is here meant as synonym of our modern object.
205
97
1. Categories.
In the historiography of Fredegisus epistle, the De
substantia nihili has received greater attention than the De
substantia tenebrarum. The paradox of theorizing on the
existence of nothing has appealed to many scholars. Yet this
means that an element of the grammatical method that
Fredegisus applied in his proof of the existence of darkness so
far has not received attention. This element is the theory of the
categories. The Categories was written by Aristotle and,
together with the De Interpretatione, was his only work to be
known in the early Middle Ages. Porphyry wrote an
introduction and Boethius wrote a commentary on the
Categories. Fredegisus probably was confronted with a
different treatise, the Categoriae Decem. This paraphrase of
the Categories was ascribed to Augustine, but was actually
98
99
100
101
102
103
2. Etymology.
Yet the proof of the existence of darkness did not hinge on
the categories alone. Fredegisus proof also echoes
etymological theory. I intentionally write echoes, since I do not
think that Fredegisus shared all the presuppositions behind the
etymological theory. Still, Fredegisus used some of its elements
in his proof of darkness. These elements will undoubtedly have
evoked the etymological theory in the heads of his readers.
Further, it is through his rejection of this theory that
Fredegisus position on nothing will be clarified. A short
description of this theory is therefore necessary.
Etymologia is a grammatical category, which was
developed by Greek and Roman grammar teachers along with
other categories such as pars orationis, analogia, figurae etc.
Categoriae Decem, par. 19-21, 27-28.
Categoriae Decem, par. 29. ,et id quod dinoscitur sensibus usian dici,
.
216
217
104
105
106
107
3. Vox Significativa.
The proof of the existence of darkness has now been
elucidated by the theory of the categories and the theory of
etymology. These theories provided Fredegisus with a sure
method to reason from (almost) any word to its referent. The
question is therefore why Fredegisus chose not to use these
theories when confronting the problem of nothing. Why did he
not use for example the citation from Job 26:7 Who appends
the earth above nothing which was given in Charles letter to
Dungal?230 With Fredegisus use of the categories one can
230
108
109
4. Divination
In the previous chapter I have shown that Fredegisus
Nothing cannot be identified with prime matter. Nonetheless,
just like prime matter, Nothing is a very special sort of thing.
This sui generis characteristic is consistent with the difference
in methods that the deacon used to reason from the word to the
thing. Fredegisus respect for the great and noble (magnum
quidam ac praeclarum) thing that he proved is also familiar.
What is that important and out of the ordinary thing? Especially
the fact that the categories cannot be applied to this something
is clarifying: it must be something which cannot be measured,
has no quality, has no bodyApart from existence, it lacks all
these properties. The definition of a thing by privation (i.e. by
saying which properties it lacks) was a Neo-Platonist way of
defining God and first matter.235 We have seen that Augustine
Colish, Carolingian Debates over Nihil and Tenebrae, p. 766.
Cf. Colish, Carolingian Debates over Nihil and Tenebrae, p. 779. That
Boethius excludes nothing from definition by privation would constitute no
argument that Fredegisus excludes it too.
234
235
110
111
Augustine God also did not create by speaking vocally. God can
speak directly in intelligibles, in the meaning of words without
sounds, with which he created the cosmos. 240 Yet this only
constitutes a counterargument if Fredegisus was interested in
these intelligibles. This is denied by Tetsuro since he holds the
view that Fredegisus view of names was that they are only
vocal sounds, and do not convey the nature of a thing (as for
Augustine). The fact that God imposed names on the things
after their creation is reason enough for Tetsuro.241
Here I have a strong second reservation: Fredegisus may
have held that God did not impose arbitrary vocal sounds, but
instead sounds that expressed the nature of the thing. In that
case a word is more than just a vocal sound, and the sound
would lead to the intelligibles in creation. In other words, God
imposed sounds on the intelligibles so that His names still led
to His intelligibles. The difference between creating and
naming would then be so small that it made no real difference.
How are we to find out what Fredegisus view was? A first
observation is that one would expect Fredegisus to perform
etymology if he believed that the sound expressed the
intelligible. Yet this is not the case, he only uses elements of the
theory of etymology. Second Alcuin at least adhered to the
Aristotelian-Boethian view that words are just arbitrary vocal
sounds, which signify intramental concepts.242 Alcuin even gave
an abstract of this theory in epistle 163: The words through
which we speak are nothing else if not signs for these things
which we comprehend with the mind, and [through which] we
want to arrive at the cognition of others.243 The fact that
Fredegisus uses the concept vox significata and applies the
Boethian specification finitum to nomen indicates that
Fredegisus shared this view of words as vocal sounds, not the
Stoic-Augustinian view of words reflecting natures. This of
course does not mean that Alcuin and Fredegisus would have
vero nihil praeteritum vel futurum, sed omnia praesentia sunt, qui servo suo
Moysi ait: Ego sum, qui sum.
240
Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram, cap 9, 17.
241
Shimizu Tetsuro Alcuins Theory of Signification, p. 15.
242
Ibidem, p. 13.
243
Alcuin, MGH Epist. IV, 163, p. 265, r. 16-18. Verba enim, quibus loquimur,
nihil aliud sunt, nisi signa rerum earum, quas mente concepimus, et [quibus]
ad cognitionem aliorum venire volumus.
112
denied the intelligibles of God, nor Christ the Word who existed
before creation. The intelligibles performed their function in a
different guise, as the forms that were used to inform prime
matter. These intelligibles as forms still could last forever in
Christ the Word. Alcuin points to this story of creation in
interrogation 19 of the Interrogationes et responsiones in
Genesim.244 Moreover, asked in interrogation 31 what was
meant in Genesis 1:3 by God said, Alcuin replied that it meant
God made and that the Bible read said in order to show the
speed and ease with which God created.245 There is, of course,
no real difference between the creation by words or forms,
since they are the same intelligibles with which God created.
Yet the implication is this: if the stress is on the intelligibles as
forms, if words are only vocal sounds, then the creative
principle that was at work in the creation of the world was not
the Word, but something else. This leaves room to posit some
other divine essence. Fredegisus with his vox significata and
nomen finitum adhered to this idea as well.
The next two steps of the argument (3 and 4) are
indisputable, yet the question is whether these statements are
enough to infer that Nothing was the divine essence for
Fredegisus. This inference stands or falls with the answer to
the following question: did Fredegisus imagine a distinction
between
God
and
the
referent
of
nothing?
The
counterargument against the inference that Nothing was the
divine essence, is that Nothing is distinct from God. It will
therefore be necessary to scrutinise Fredegisus text again to
see whether such a division is supported. He says that the
elements, light, angels and the souls of men are created from
Nothing in 20. This in itself is not very significant, since it still
might mean that there can be some sort of inert and neutral
Alcuin, Interrogationes et responsiones in Genesim, PL 100, 519a.
Interrogatio 19. Quot modis est operatio divina?
Responsio. Quatuor. Primo, quod in verbi [Dei] dispensatione omnia aeterna
sunt. Secundo, quod in material informi qui vivit in aeternum, creavit omnia
simul.
Cf. Shimizu p. 13.
245
Ibidem, 520a.
Interrogatio 31. Quid est quod dicitur : Dixit Deus, fiat lux?
Responsio. Dixit, pro fecit, scriptor posuit, ut celeritatem vel facilitatem
operis Dei ostenderet.
244
113
114
Chapter 4: use
116
117
writings and liturgical books. But among the books copied there
were also very different works, e.g. grammars and commentaries
on Roman literary classics.249 As book production expanded, the
library holdings rapidly increased from about 790 to 840. 250 This
expansion in size was mirrored by an expansion in function.
Whereas, for example libraries of monasteries prior to c. 790
mainly provided texts used for monastic reading and study, after
this date they were also used for broad educational purposes and
erudition.251
It was not only the production of manuscripts that surged.
The number of schools presumably increased from the late eighth
century onwards and some 70 centers of learning have been
identified in the ninth century. 252 Using the book of psalms, but also
grammars (from among others Donatus and Priscian) and Latin
poets (e.g. Virgil), the boys in the schools at these centers would be
instructed in basic chant, study Latin grammar, learn to write by
copying texts, learn rudimentary arithmetic and computus (useful
in the counting of tithes and dates for example) and some
explication of Scripture.253 Advanced studies for those destined to
become prelates or masters in their own right seems to have
comprised the artes liberales, the patristic tradition and eventually
advanced studies of Scripture. Of course specific needs and
interests of individual schools shaped specific circumstances for
each of the schools, but still the schools instilled some basic tools
for a shared literary culture over a geographic area that stretched
from the Rhone to the Rhine and from Rome to Utrecht. 254 Leaving
aside the works that were written in the fields of historiography,
hagiography and poetry, other works like the florilegia of patristic
works, educational dialogues and biblical commentaries attest to
Contreni, Learning in the Early Middle Ages, p. 11
Ganz, Book production in the Carolingian Empire, p. 788.
251
Idem, p. 801.
252
John Contreni, Education and Literary Culture in Rosamond McKitterick
(ed.), New Cambridge Medieval History vol. II (Cambridge 1995), p. 721.
253
A much discussed theme in the papers of John Contreni. Idem p. 720 and
Learning in the Early Middle Ages p. 11, The Carolingian Renaissance in
Waren Treadgold (ed.), Renaissances Before the Renaissance: Cultural Revivals
of Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages (Stanford 1984), pp. 66-67, 70-71.
254
For an account of structural differences or contradictions that the Carolingian
Renaissance would summon see John Contreni, Inharmonious Harmony:
Education in the Carolingian World in The Annals of Scholarship: Metastudies
of the Humanities and Social Sciences I (New York 1980), pp. 81-96.
249
250
118
the fact that the men of letters under the scepter of the
Carolingians not only received and preserved late antique and
classical culture, but digested and reworked their heritage as
well.255
119
120
121
122
from thy words thou shalt be justified or from thy words thou shalt
be condemned. 268 Having corrected liturgical books is not
enough if one does not recognize the imminent importance of
learning the right language. To perform correct prayers requires
study, but praying is only a part of life. It requires even more study
to know which course of action would be God-fearing in any given
situation. So De litteris colendis progresses with the thought that
For although correct conduct may be better than knowledge,
nevertheless knowledge precedes conduct.269 The goals of the
clergy were to achieve wisdom in matters of the Bible and to lead
correct lives and the value of learning was a derivative of these
goals. However, if learning was to be the main instrument for the
achievement, it meant that learning had to be stimulated.
The ideal of unification lacks such eloquent expressions. 270
Nonetheless, Claudio Leonardi ascribes to Alcuin the realisation
that there was much curiosity in the cultural traditions. 271 In this
context I take curiosity to mean an unwanted form of diversity.
Such a realisation leads to a need to root out these diversities (or
errors) and thus to unify. In any case, this ideal has a natural
alliance with the ideal of correction, since the correction of
activities or corpus of texts tend to produce a canon of orthodoxy
and authority, which in turn leads to a tendency to uniform the
activities and texts. It may be significant that the Admonitio not
only called for correctness, but also for orthodoxy: the 82 nd and last
Ibidem, r. 2a-3. ut, qui Deo placere appetunt recte vivendo, ei etiam placere
non neglegant recte loquendo. Scriptum est enim: Aut ex verbis iustificaberis,
aut ex verbis tuis condempnaberis.
269
Ibidem, r. 4. Quamvis enim melius sit bene facere quam nosse, prius tame
nest nosse quam facere.
270
Although Kottje speaks of the Council of Mainz in 813 in which the unity of the
people is wished for. Raymund Kottje, Einheit und Vielfalt des kirchlichen
Lebens in der Karolingerzeit, in Zeitschrift fr Kirchengeschichte 76 (1965), p.
323. Concordia Episcoporum, ed. Georg Pertz in MGH Leg. IV vol. 2 (Hannover
1837), articles 1 and 2, p. 552.
271
Claudio Leonardi, Alcuino e la scuola platina: le ambizioni di una cultura
unitaria in Settimane di studio del centro Italiano di studi sullalto medioevo
XXVII (1981), p 462. Alcuin states that there was much curiosity in the
defenders of the catholic faith in connection with the heresy of Felix of Urgel.
Leonardi generalizes this statement over the received traditions. Alcuin, MGH
Epist. IV, nr 193 p. 320 r.8. Multas habemus curiositates de fide catholica, quia
plurimi sunt impugnatores.
268
123
124
the fact that from the centre of power emanated similar liturgical
books to unify the service to God.
It was also through the service of God that the ideal of
unification for all the different regna of Charles could take hold. It
was an old and wide spread use that the unity of a realm was
thought of both in political terms and in religious terms.278 Thus the
ruler, magnates and bishops all were considered to share the
responsibility for the well-being of their people. Already under the
predecessors of Charles those responsible convened in synods to
discuss matters, which our modern eyes would be separated into
the categories politics and religion. The point is that this
separation would ring false to their ears. They did not held this
responsibility from their subjects, but were answerable to God, as
his servants. This way it was possible to refer to the monarch as a
minister, a servant.279 When Alcuin introduced the political art of
rhetorics to the court in the 790s, it was therefore only natural for
him to have it show that Charlemagne was the epithet of Christian
kingship.280
To see the duties of the king as a service to God opens the
possibility to see his people as the flock. When from the 780s
onwards under Charles leadership ever more synods were held, the
salvation of the flock of subjects was intensely considered. 281 The
subjects were seen as the populus christianus and the realm as an
ecclesia. This vision of the state meant that the universal claims of
the Christian religion could be used to unify the different gentes
that were brought under Charles rule. As long as they belonged to
the universal ecclesia of Charles reign all the different people
would be unified through the service of God. It was from this great
responsibility of the salvation of the populus christianus that the
third ideal of reform came forth.
An ideal of reformation implies that there is a certain object
that stands in need of reform. The object that Charles and Alcuin
de Jong, Charlemagnes Church, p. 108. Giles Brown, The Carolingian
Renaissance in Rosamond McKitterick (ed.), Carolingian Culture: Emulation
and Innovation (Cambridge 1994), p. 3. Kottje, Einheit und Vielfalt, p. 323.
279
Mayke de Jong, Sacrum palatium et ecclesia. Lautorit religieuse royale sous
les Carolingiens (790-840) in Annales. Histoire, sciences sociales. novembredcembre 2003 (6), pp. 1252-1253.
280
Liutpold Wallach, Alcuin and Charlemagne, p. 71. Wallach dates the treatise c.
800-804, p. 47.
281
de Jong, Charlemagnes Church, p. 110.
278
125
126
127
this light. This is the collection of canon law that Pope Hadrian
sent the first of April 774, and which served as an exemplar for
royally associated scriptoria.289 One of the consequences of this
conquest was that Charles, as the new king of both the Franks and
the Lombards, acquired new neighbours and developed new
diplomatic contacts. The Byzantine Empire, the Abbasid Caliphate
in Baghdad, and the Slavs were brought into the diplomatic
horizon. Whereas Pippin was occupied by the need to bring
stability to the Frankish realm during most of his government, the
success of which provided Charles with an excellent point of
departure, the latter worked out international relationships. 290 This
was one of the steps towards his later styling himself as Christian
emperor.
This is not to say that cumbersome campaigning to secure
the borders of his regna and to stabilize the territories beyond
didnt mark Charlemagnes reign. In fact, Charles spent vast
amounts of time leading his army from the Saxon border to the
Spanish March and back. Especially the Saxon wars were
sometimes extremely bloody affairs (to repay the demise in battle
of some overeager, inexperienced and under aged Frankish
noblemen, Charles had 4000 Saxons decapitated). 291 From 772 on
time and again the Saxons were suppressed by the superior
Frankish army, but revolted when it travelled elsewhere. This
lasted to 785 when their leader Widukind surrendered and
converted. Nonetheless the Saxons would remain a force to be
reckoned with. But however brutal these wars sometimes were, the
heathen Saxon neighbours provided an ideological opportunity to
see Charles as spreading the Christian message. And priests did
follow in the wake of Frankish troops, although questions were
raised as to the Christian calibre of an involuntary and littleunderstood baptism.292 The Admonitio generalis, with its command
Hen, The Royal Patronage of Liturgy in Frankish Gaul, pp. 66-68.
For a critical discussion of the historiographical sources on Peppin III,
Rosamond McKitterick, History and Memory in the Carolingian World
(Cambridge 2004), pp. 137-150.
291
Mayke de Jong provides a useful and very short overview in Het word en het
zwaard. Aan de grenzen van het vroegmiddeleeuwse christendom in Tijdschrift
voor Geschiedenis nr. 3 2005 (jrg. 118), pp. 464-466.
292
Alcuin, MGH Epist. IV, nr. 110 pp. 156-159. Cf. Mayke de Jong, Religion in
Rosamond McKitterick (ed.), The Early Middle Ages. Europe 400-1000 (Oxford
2001), p. 139.
289
290
128
129
this synod that Charles took military action against the Saxons.
With the help of the Slavs the Saxons were finally subdued in 794.
Pippins conspirators however had by then already paid the highest
price. The De litteris colendis, with its more elaborate program
then the 72nd article of the Admonitio, stems from this period of the
reign of Charles. The early nineties proved to be a fundamental
period in the progression towards royal religious authority.
The final stage of developments towards a full-blown
religious conception of Charlemagnes rule had then set in. After
the Saxons were put down, Charles neutralised the Avar threat. In
795 the central system of Avar fortifications, known as the Avar
Ring, was captured. With the forts a vast treasure fell into his
hands, which he put to good use, for example by greasing the joints
of his diplomatic relations. Another destination for the treasure
was found in the building program that Charles had started. In the
790s he decided to settle in a capital, fit for an empire. 298 The site
of one of his favourite palatia was chosen: Aachen with its hotmineral sources (and their healthy sulphuric smell and taste of
long aged eggs), where the court settled down in 794. 299 The rich
chapel crowns to this day its inner city. 300 In building this chapel
Charles followed King Solomon (Solomon was another nickname
Bullough states that the court settled in Aachen 794, and therefore predates
the capture of the Avar treasure, but I gather that the palace chapel was not yet
finished. Bullough, Aula Renovata: the Carolingian Court before the Aachen
Palace in his Carolingian Renewal: Sources and Heritage. (Manchester and New
York 1991), p. 142.
299
Janet Nelson, Aachen as a Place of Power in M. de Jong, F. Theuws & C. van
Rhijn (eds.), Topographies of Power in the Early Middle Ages (Leiden, Boston
and Kln, 2001), pp. 217-221.
300
Is it a coincidence that the inscription in the octagon of the Chapel, which is in
ninth century facsimile, is ambiguous in its statement?
1 Cum lapides vivi pacis compage ligantur,
2
Inque pares numeros omnia conveniunt;
3 Claret opus domini, totam qui construit aulam,
4
Effectusque piis dat studiis hominum,
5 Quorum perpetui decoris structura manebit,
6
Si perfecta auctor protegat atque regat,
7 Sic deus hoc tutum stabili fundamine templum,
8
Quod Carolus princeps condidit esse velit.
298
130
of Charles), who built Gods temple at His request. 301 But he also
emulated the Christian emperor Constantine, who built the eastern
capital Constantinople. Inspiration for the court chapel was
therefore taken from Byzantine examples, which were to be found
in Ravenna. In retrospect his coronation as emperor by Pope Leo
III on Christmas day 800 can hardly have been a surprise. He
confirmed his function as Christian emperor in 802 by issuing
another set of capitularies. It was in this political and ideological
climate that Fredegisus wrote his letter to Charles. He probably
wrote just before Charles coronation and the coronation had taken
place when the latter asked a second opinion of Dungal.
131
132
133
yet here we are only interested in the teaching of the liberal arts.
Older historiography has sought for a court school for this
reduced aspect of the teaching of the liberal arts. In his research of
the development of the Carolingian chapel Josef Fleckenstein also
paid some attention to the court school. A function of the school
was to provide the chapel of the court with scribes so that it could
perform its chancellery tasks. Lets not forget that Fredegisus was
a member of the chapel and headed the chancellery for a long
time. But even as Alcuin probably never was a member of the
chapel, so the school seems to have been separate.311 Fleckenstein
therefore seems to treat the school as a real existing institution.
This might however be a reflection of the older brand of
institutional history he was exercising. But can we prove that it
really was an institution? And there are other questions as well.
For example, what were the pretensions of the school? Is it to be
regarded as the kindergarten of court or more as a college or
polytechnic, in which research is combined with teaching? These
questions merit a thesis of their own, but an approach to an answer
can be made.
A first observation is that the teachings in the liberal arts
were considered to contribute to the moral education to be had at
court, since wisdom and conduct both influence the moral
condition of a person.312 Teachings in some of the liberal arts will
have been given at Charles court from a very early date. Yet Peter
Godman warns us not to dream of a school, that is in which the
liberal arts were taught, before the settlement of the court, since
the scholars had to operate amid the bustle of administration,
politics and travel.313 These are very unfavourable circumstances
for the structural operation of a school indeed. Moreover a
travelling court has difficulties building up an extensive library.
Especially in the 770s there were probably mainly liturgical texts,
psalters and gospel books at court. The only other text that was
surely at court was the collectio Dyonisio-Hadriana, although
Josef Fleckenstein, Die Hofkapelle der deutschen Knige I. Grundlegung. Die
Karolingische Hofkapelle (Stuttgart 1959), p. 70.
312
Innes, A Palace of Discipline, p. 69. Remember also the De Litteris Colendis,
r. 4: For although correct conduct may be better than knowledge, nevertheless
knowledge precedes conduct. Quamvis enim melius sit bene facere quam
nosse, prius tame nest nosse quam facere.
313
Peter Godman, Poetry of the Carolingian Renaissance (London 1985), p. 7. Cf.
John Contreni, Carolingian Biblical Studies, p. 83.
311
134
135
136
137
138
study for the study of Scripture. 329 Alcuin thereby also accorded
importance to the quadrivium in order to understand the Bible,
although the study of letters was of primary importance. This
move is sometimes referred to as the sacralization of the liberal
arts.330 It might seem a strong expression for the validation of use
of the arts for theology, but it can be understood by the following:
Alcuin defined the Christian wisdom as the study of all things
human and divine.331 Christian wisdom therefore encompasses all
things, the liberal arts included. Thus their scope was eventually
the domain of Christian wisdom. In the introduction to this chapter
Alcuins unification of theology and politics was recounted; here he
crossed the border between the secular arts and theology.
Moreover, this all-embracing definition of wisdom can be called
encyclopedic and it is this way that I want to interpret Claudio
Leonardis characterization of the cultura enciclopedica
alcuiniana.332 Perhaps not everyone will have followed Alcuin in his
broad definition; I already mentioned the resistance against the
appliance of the rules of grammar to the Bible. Many contemporary
scholars did indeed agree with Alcuin though, and it is significant
in this respect that DAlverny reports a picture in a Bible from the
Tours scriptorium under Fredegisus that recognises this broad
Leonardi, Alcuino e la scuola palatina, p. 475. The seven liberal arts were the
trivium (grammar, dialectic, rhetoric) and quadrivium (arithmetic, music,
geometry, astronomy) as described by Martianus Capella. This is not to say that
the scheme of Martianus Capella was the only scheme of liberal arts that was
current in the eigth and ninth century Other schemes for example left out
grammar but included medicine. cf John Contreni, John Scottus, Martin
Hiberniensis, the Liberal Arts, and Teaching. in Michael Herren (ed.), Insular
Latin Studies: Papers on Latin Texts and Manuscripts of the British Isles, 5501066 (Toronto 1981), p. 7. Of course Alcuin was not the first to recognize the
importance of propedeutic studies. For precursors to Alcuin compare Pierre
Rich, Instruments de travail et mthodes de lexgte lpoque carolingienne
in Pierre Rich and Guy Lobrichon (eds.), Le Moyen Age et la Bible (Paris 1984),
pp. 149-150.
330
Leonardi, Alcuino e la scuola palatina, p. 475.
331
Alcuin, De rhetorica, PL 101, p. 947. DAlverny, La sagesse et ses sept filles,
p. 246.
332
La sacralizzazione dellumano dunque la giustificazione ideologica della
cultura enciclopedica alcuiniana. Leonardi, Alcuino e la scuola palatina, p. 475.
DAlverny, La sagesse et ses sept filles, p. 246.
329
139
140
141
well. Another type of study tool, very similar to this second book of
Eucherius, is the glossary.
In the early Middle Ages, Virgil was read for his Latin and the
Bible for Gods will. In their repetitive teaching of the same texts,
the masters made glosses in their copies as a reminder what had to
be explained when reading certain words. These glosses, which
often sprang from Virgil copies and Bible studies, were collected
into glossaria, most of which were alphabetically organised.
However, the compiler of a glossary was not restricted to the
copies of monastic masters. He could consult any available text and
include excerpts thereof.341 In a world lacking internet,
encyclopedia and even dictionaries, these glossaries provided
powerful study tools. The most famous of these glossaries in the
early Middle Ages was the Liber Glossarum, which was composed
during Fredegisus lifetime. The terminus ante quem for this
glossary is 830, but if Charlemagne was really involved, it might
have been composed as early as the 790s. 342 The Liber Glossarum
was not just a short descriptive wordlist like other glossaries, such
as the Abstrusa or Abolita glossaries. It combined entranies of
other glossaries but also material from works of Isidore, Ambrose,
Augustine, Jerome, Gregory, Eucherius, Junilius, Orosius,
Eutropius, Oribasius, Phocas, Priscianus, and anonymous works. 343
Unfortunately Lindsay did not edited the full entries in this
glossary, which appears to be much longer than in a regular
glossary, but I wholeheartedly trust David Ganzs judgment that it
should be considered an encyclopedia of Carolingian learning.
Considering the massive size (the oldest manuscript has 361 folia
in two volumes), it is a major achievement and testament to the
drive with which the Carolingians constructed tools for their
(biblical)studies.344
Cf. Michael Lapidges foreword to his edition of Wallace Lindsay, Studies in
Early Mediaeval Latin Glossaries (Aldershot and Brookfield 1996), p. xiii. The
view of glossaries as products of monastic teaching is Lindsays view, that of
glossaries as quarries of ancient lore is Goetzs. If taken as extreme positions,
both are untenable.
342
David Ganz, The Liber Glossarum: A Carolingian Encyclopedia in Paul
Butzer and Dietrich Lohrmann (eds.), Science in Western and Eastern
Civilization in Carolingian Times (Basel, Boston and Berlin 1993), pp. 129, 131.
343
David Ganz, The Liber Glossarum, p. 127.
344
Ibidem, p. 133.
341
142
143
144
had left, but their places were taken by the new generation, of
which Einhard and Angilbert were examples. There is also another
group that must be taken into account. The proceres were also
formed by the prominent lay noblemen at court, and Sullivans
quest can be ascribed to members of their group as well. 346
Einhard, for example, was such a nobleman. Another hint of this
group is found in a letter of Alcuin to Charlemagne. In this letter, to
which we will return later, Alcuin tries to answer an exegetical
question about two contradicting statements on swords. 347 The
interesting point is that a lay soldier asked this question. 348 We do
not know much about this lay soldier, but the fact that he could
pose his question to Charles -who in turn delegated it to Alcuinsuggests that he was a member of the aristocracy. 349 Perhaps it was
soldiers of his sort, who belonged to a self conscious elite
surrounding the ruler in Aachen, that Fredegisus also had in mind
while writing. If Charles showed an interest in these matters,
which he most probably did, this would provide more than
sufficient incentive for the palatini to be interested as well. The
king, after all, gave the example of right behaviour, which the
competitive court society tried to emulate so that gifts and grants
from the king would come their way.350
Charles and these courtiers probably had ample opportunity
to (be) read the De substantia. It was the custom for public debates
to be held in which emerging topics were discussed. At least in
very important cases, we know that the court and those from
abroad whom it concerned gathered and debated. These important
topics could be theological and political. At the synod of Frankfurt
in 794 and on occasion of the filioque question in 809 (does the
Holy Spirit derive from the Father alone or from both the Father
and the Son?) Charles gathered his bishops and publicly debated
and decided what had to be thought and done. Yet matters could
Janet Nelson describes the formation of a palace elite in, Aachen as a Place of
Power, pp. 223-224. Mayke de Jong, Monastic Writing and Carolingian Court
Audiences, p. 183. Adalhard the former soldier, may serve as an example of
such a nobleman. Nelson, Aachen as a Place of Power, pp. 226-230.
347
Alcuin, MGH Epist. IV, nr. 136 pp. 205-210.
348
Cf. Mayke de Jong, Het woord en het zwaard, p. 474.
349
Alcuin himself had no idea who the soldier was. He remarks: Tamen iste
laicus, quisquis fuit, sapiens est corde, etsi manibus miles, MGH Epist. IV, nr.
136 p. 205 r. 28-29.
350
Innes, A Palace of Discipline, pp. 61-63.
346
145
146
147
Opus Caroli, one could question how much time Charles actually
invested in reading through intellectual biblical commentary, busy
though he was. Seen in this context, the size and method of
Fredegisus letter will not have posed problems to Charles.
Charles had a lively interest in many things, and Wigbods
commentary shows that theology was an important one of them.
Yet his interests were dictated in large measure by the necessities
of his government. We can see an example of this in the letter from
c. 798 that was prompted by the question of the aforementioned
laicus. The letter has been astutely discussed by Mayke de Jong. 358
The problem was that different moral values were attributed to the
sword. Jesus told the apostles to sell their cloak and buy a sword,
while Peter was commanded to refrain from the use of it after he
had chopped off Malchus ear, one of the soldiers who came to
arrest the Christ.359 Since Jesus said Put your sword back into its
place; for all who take the sword will perish by the sword. 360 The
situation is aggravated if we are told in Ephes 6:17 that we have to
understand the sword, which the apostles buy, as the word of
God.361 The implication would be that everyone who receives the
word of God perishes by it. 362 Alcuins answer was that the
different contexts of the Gospels had to be taken into account. The
sword could have very different meanings in these contexts and
thus they couldnt simply be interchanged. 363 Although this answer
may have been satisfactory, it must have left Charles with a nasty
taste, since he and his noble friends had to wield the sword
personally on a regular basis.364 This example clarifies that it was
the practical context that provided relevancy to this otherwise
Scriptural question. Yet to say otherwise in the previous sentence
Alcuin, MGH Epist. IV, nr. 136 pp. 205-210. Cf. Mayke de Jongs discussion in
Het woord en het zwaard. Aan de grenzen van het vroegmiddeleeuwse
christendom, p. 475.
359
Luke 22: 36-38, John 18:10.
360
Matthew 26:52.
361
Ephes. 6:17.
362
Alcuin, MGH Epist. IV, nr. 136, p. 206 r. 7-9. Si gladius est verbum Dei et
Dominus, quando gladium emere praecepit, verbum Dei significavit; quomodo
congruit, ut omnis, qui accipitat verbum Dei, verbo Dei pereat?
363
Ibidem, r. 10-12 Sed facilis est solution, si singulorum consideratur
evangelistarum huic loco circumstantial et diversae intellegunter gladii
significations. Non enim aequaliter ubique gladius significant,...
364
Mayke de Jong, Het woord en het zwaard. Aan de grenzen van het
vroegmiddeleeuwse christendom, p. 476.
358
148
149
When I write his letter, I do not want to imply that Charles himself wrote it,
merely that he commanded it written. David Howlett has kindly permitted to
read a draft of an article in which he will advance the thesis that it was
Fredegisus himself who wrote the letter, on the basis of a similar numerological
composition of both the De substantia and the letter to Dungal and on the basis
of an element of irony or autosubversion on the side of Fredegisus by using the
word nihil non referring in the letter to Dungal. Whether Fredegisus also wrote
the letter to Dungal or not is not relevant for this thesis, as long as Fredegisus
overall intentions were serious. Of this David Howlett is also convinced and
therefore an elaborated treatment of his manuscript is not necessary.
367
The text and translation of the letter are given in the first part of the thesis,
but the lines seemed critical enough to deserve extra attention.
366
150
151
152
153
154
155
ibidem, pp. 64-67. Dietrich Lohrmann, Alcuins Korrespondenz mit Karl dem
Grossen ber Kalender und Astronomie in Paul Butzer and Dietrich Lohrmann
(eds.), Science in Western and Eastern Civilization in Carolingian Times (Basel,
Boston and Berlin 1993), pp. 79-114.
393
Alcuin, MGH Epist. IV, nr. 145 p. 231 r. 21 p. 232 r. 5.
394
Dietrich Lohrmann, Alcuins Korrespondenz mit Karl dem Grossen, p. 100,
Arno Borst, Alkuin und die Enzykopdie von 809, p. 64.
395
Alcuin, MGH Epist. IV, nr. 148 p. 239 r. 30-33. Sed nunc pusillanimitas
multorum non curat scire rationes arithmetica, quam necessaria ad
cognoscendas scripturas divinas; quam iocunda est cognitio caelestium astrorum
et cursus illorum.
396
ibidem, r. 18-22. Nam philosophi non fuerunt conditores harum artium, sed
inventores. Nam creator omnium rerum condidit eas in naturis, sicut voluit; illi
vero, qui sapientiores erant in mundo, inventores erant harum artium in naturis
rerum; sicut de sole et luna et stellis facile potes intellegere.
392
156
157
the Bible, just like the Bibelwerk, and that it could have been part
of an official program, commanded by Charles. 402 The implication
of this hypothesis is that Wigbods pious effort was cut short after
Genesis. In this case, one could further suggest that Wigbod built
the rest of his commentaries around Isidore as a frame in which he
could later insert other material. Yet another hypothesis would be
that Charles commanded him to make only the part on Genesis
encyclopedic and literal, as a result of his heightened interest in
cosmology. 800 was the same year in which Wigbod offered his
work to Charles, and that the letter exchange between Charles and
Alcuin on astronomy ended. Gorman could be right, however,
asserting that the section on Genesis was finished since it was the
first part to be done and that it was offered to Charles in 800 when
he was crowned emperor. In this case one could say that the
commentary has nothing to do with Charles interest in cosmology.
This account, however, leaves the works focus on the literal
meaning in Genesis unexplained. It can only be made intelligible
with this interest in mind.
A concerted attention for cosmology is also apparent in a
letter that Alcuin sent to Charles in 799. This letter, which has
hitherto failed to attract the attention it deserves, is of key import
for this thesis for two reasons. First, if Wigbods encyclopedic
commentary on Genesis does not shown that Charles interest in
cosmology was wider than astronomy and computus, this letter
will. Secondly, it resembles the topics in Fredegisus letter but
details a different method or model with which to solve its
questions. Charles bewildered reaction to the De substantia makes
sense if he expected a similar letter from Fredegisus. The question
that Alcuin addresses is the difference between eternal
(aeternum)
and
everlasting
(sempiternum);
permanent
(perpetuum) and immortal (inmortale); and age (saeculum),
eternity (aevum) and time (tempus).403 These words all evolved
around qualitative differences between the temporal nature of the
cosmos and its eternal creator. The difference is that God is outside
Michael Gorman, The Encyclopedic Commentary on Genesis Prepared for
Charlemagne by Wigbod, p. 188 Wigbod and Biblical Studies under
Charlemagne, p. 73.
403
Alcuin, MGH Epist. IV, nr. 163 p. 263 r. 14-16. Haec ergo est interrogatio,
quae nobis ab eodem adlata est; scilicet: quid sit inter aeternum et
sempiternum; et perpetuum et inmortale et saeculum, et aevum, et tempus?
402
158
159
160
161
can speculate on the reasons for him to insert this letter. It might
be motivated by the urge to copy the complete conversation.
However, in this case we might ask why the copyist did not include
Dungals answer. Was the copyist close enough to the fire to obtain
Fredegisus text and Charles letter, but too far to get his hands on
Dungals answer? This is a possible scenario, and then we have to
imagine a scribe who had easy access to Fredegisus and Charles
letters but not to Dungals answer. A reason for this might be that
Dungals answer was sent to Charles and not directly to
Fredegisus. This would point in the direction of a scribe maybe in
Tours after Fredegisus had assumed the office of abbot. Yet other
scenarios are as likely. We might construe scenarios around the
idea that Dungals answer was at hand, but that the copyists
motivation did not necessitate to copy Dungals letter as well. A
second scenario is that Fredegisus himself wanted to preserve his
literary activity for posterity. Then we would certainly want to look
for a scribe in Tours. A reason why Dungals answer was not copied
may then be that Dungals answer totally ravaged Fredegisus
argumentation, leaving an unfavourable impression of Fredegisus
arguments. Then Fredegisus would have an interest in having
Charles letter copied, to show that he even rocked the emperors
world, but to exclude Dungals. In a third scenario the De
substantia and Charles letter to Dungal were copied by someone
who wanted to show that Charles was engaged in intellectual
activity, showing that Charles could respond with expert Scriptural
knowledge to such a strange argument of Fredegisus. Such a
motivation would provide less incentive to include Dungals answer
since this would be irrelevant for the image of Charles as an
intellectual ruler. These questions, however, need to be answered
by the historian who will write about the reception of the De
substantia.
I argued in this chapter that in the quest for Christian
wisdom, Fredegisus tried to solve a difficult question about the
meaning of nothing and darkness to the best of his abilities, and
presented it as two encyclopedic lemmata. This matched the
requirements of his courtly audience and probably would have
ensured Charles approval, but for one thing: Charles did not find
in Fredegisus letter the cosmological insights that he looked for at
the time.
Conclusion
I
n the three years prior to the composition of the De substantia,
Charles, his court and Alcuin, then abbot in Tours, had an interest
in cosmology. This interest did not only comprise the courses of
planets, but also the cosmogony. Alcuin explained to Charles, for
example, the difference between time-bound creation and Gods
timeless nature. In this explanation he not only focussed on the
difference itself, but chiefly on the right words that express this
difference, how to use these words and how these words are used
in Scripture. Thereby he presented Charles with a total-package
of what one needed to know theoretically and practically when
reading and using the words under discussion. Fredegisus also
wanted to tutor Charles on words that were important in the
Christian story of cosmogony; namely the words nothing and
darkness. His view was that these two words had extra-mental
referents, meaning that the words referred to real things. However,
Fredegisus in no way offered the total package that Charles had
learned to expect from Alcuin. The statement itself was strange
too: did not Augustine and Alcuin teach that nothing only was a
name of a negation? Charles therefore ordered a letter to be sent
to the astronomer Dungal to ask for a second opinion. Dungal was
to sort out the right from the wrong in Fredegisus letter, and to
recount only the story of the creation of the world, thus without the
moral Christian lessons that could be drawn from it. Whether
Fredegisus himself composed Charles letter or not, the request
was sent on Charles command and with his knowledge.
Charles surprise over Fredegisus letter did not stem from a
lack of effort on Fredegisus side. Quite to the contrary,
Fredegisus argument in the De substantia used the most novel and
progressive method of analysis to be had at the time: the
grammatical method. Maybe Fredegisus thought that his lord was
Conclusion
163
Conclusion
164
Conclusion
165
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