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Article history:
Received 3 February 2010
Accepted 14 May 2011
Available online 28 June 2011
Accepted by Paul Levy
Keywords:
Cognition
Faking
Personality questionnaire
a b s t r a c t
Because faking poses a threat to the validity of personality measures, research has focused on ways of
detecting faking, including the use of response times. However, the applicability and validity of these
approaches are dependent upon the actual cognitive process underlying faking. This study tested three
competing cognitive models in order to identify the process underlying faking and to determine whether
response time patterns are a viable method of detecting faking. Specically, we used a within-subjects
manipulation of instructions (respond honestly, make a good impression, make a specic impression)
to examine whether the distribution of response times across response scale options (e.g., disagree,
agree) could be used to identify faking on the NEO PI-R. Our results suggest that individuals reference
a schema of an ideal respondent when faking. As a result, response time patterns such as the well-known
inverted-U cannot be used to identify faking.
2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Introduction
Personality measures have re-emerged in personnel selection
because research has supported their validity in such contexts
(Ones, Dilchert, Viswesvaran, & Judge, 2007). The ease and low cost
of administering these assessments, as well as the lower adverse
impact compared to other selection tools (Hough, Oswald, &
Ployhart, 2001), adds to their attraction. However, researchers
have questioned the validity of these measures in light of research
suggesting that individuals can (Grifth & McDaniel, 2006;
Viswesvaran & Ones, 1999) and do (Birkeland, Manson, Kisamore,
Brannick, & Smith, 2006) effectively distort their responses in
situations where it is advantageous to do so. Recent research suggests that distortions can come at a considerable cost to predictive
validity (Komar, Brown, Komar, & Robie, 2008), especially for those
who score at the high end of the distribution (Mueller-Hanson,
Heggestad, & Thornton, 2003).
Thus, faking undermines the use of personality scales as research instruments and in applied settings (Mesmer-Magnus &
Viswesvaran, 2006). Faking subverts the purpose of content-driven
personnel selection and instead may lead to the selection of applicants who are especially skilled at impression management rather
than especially noteworthy on the intended attribute. At an even
more basic level, faking on selection instruments raises questions
about the basic honesty of applicants and potential employees.
Corresponding author. Address: Department of Psychology, University of
Houston, Houston, TX 77024, USA.
E-mail address: mmkrischer@uh.edu (M.K. Shoss).
0749-5978/$ - see front matter 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2011.05.003
164
M.K. Shoss, M.J Strube / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 116 (2011) 163171
the nuanced predictions these models make for how response time
patterns associated with faking compare to the well-known inverted-U response time pattern for honest responding (Kuiper,
1981). As a result, we are not only able to test competing models
of faking, but are also able to examine whether response time patterns can be used to identify faking.
Our study, therefore, advances the literature on faking by shedding light on the cognitive processes underlying faking and, in
doing so, indicating whether response time patterns are a viable
way of detecting faking. As these models of faking take as their
starting point the cognitive processes presumed to underlie honest
responding, we begin by discussing cognitive models of honest
responding. We then describe the models of faking and the predictions that each makes for response time patterns across response
options.
Cognitive models of honest responding
Despite the fact that reading a 20-item scale takes about
1.5 min, the average administration time for the same length scale
is about 1015 min (Grifth & McDaniel, 2006). Therefore, other
cognitive processes are likely engaged when an individual responds to a personality assessment. For example, Holtgraves
(2004) argued that these cognitive processes include a retrieval
stage, during which one gathers the information necessary to formulate a response, and a judgment stage, during which one maps
the retrieved information onto the response options and selects the
appropriate response.
More specically, others have argued that honest responding
requires accessing a self-schema in the retrieval phase and comparing item responses to the exemplars that dene the individual
when making judgments about the response option to select (Kuiper, 1981). The endpoints of a response scale (e.g., strongly agree,
strongly disagree) are more likely to correspond to simple, clear,
and easily retrieved exemplars, leading to fast responses because
comparison to self-relevant information is accomplished with little
effort (see also Popham & Holden, 1990). In contrast, middle response options (e.g., agree somewhat, slightly disagree) correspond to more complex, conicting, or context-dependent
exemplars, requiring more thought (e.g., extensive retrieval) and
resulting in longer response times. The resulting inverted-U effect has now been conrmed by numerous studies (e.g., Casey &
Tyron, 2001; Mueller, Thompson, & Dugan, 1986). Recently,
Akrami, Hedlund, and Ekehammar (2007) reported its presence
for responses to the NEO Personality Inventory, the measure used
in the current study.
When individuals fabricate responses to questionnaire items,
additional processes are likely to be engaged as attempts are made
to manage or project an impression that deviates from the true or
honest self. Several models of impression-managed responding
have been proposed, each with implications for how response
times might deviate from the inverted-U pattern.
Cognitive models of impression-managed responding
Vasilopoulos, Reilly, and Leaman (2000) discussed three distinct, mutually exclusive models of the cognitive processes that
might guide impression-managed responding. In the self-schema
model, individuals access their self-schemas but decide to make responses inconsistent with those schemas, which requires some
deliberation while the social desirability of responses is considered. The adopted-schema model is similar to the self-schema model except that impression-managed responses involve referencing
a schema of an ideal respondent, not ones own self-schema. The
semantic-exercise model suggests that impression-managed responses require a simple semantic evaluation of how the trait
M.K. Shoss, M.J Strube / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 116 (2011) 163171
165
Table 1
Predicted response time patterns for models of impression-managed responding.
Model
Schema
Response process
Self-schema
Self
Ideal
Respondent
None
No difference
Adoptedschema
Semanticexercise
Note. The honest responding condition is expected to produce a signicant inverted-U pattern, consistent with past research.
A second, related problem is that these studies generally compare average response times between items (i.e., averaging together response times regardless of the response option
selected), eliminating the possibility of using more subtle patterns
such as the inverted-U effect to detect honest versus faked responses. Moreover, using response time distributions allows competing tests of the previously described cognitive models, as each
has distinct implications for the way impression-managed
responding should emerge with regard to the inverted-U pattern.
If response time distributions across response options are different
when individuals fabricate their responses compared to responding honestly, then response time distributions could be a viable
method to detect faking in applied settings. We describe implications of the three models for response latency distributions in
the following discussion. This information is also summarized in
Table 1.
Self-schema model
Recall that the self-schema model of impression-managed
responding suggests that individuals access their self-schemas
but decide to make responses inconsistent with these schemas in
an attempt to appear more socially desirable. This deliberation
about social desirability prolongs the judgment stage in Holtgraves (2004) conceptualization. Moreover, the self-schema model
suggests that extreme dissimulated responses should engage relatively more cognitive processes than less extreme responses. Responses on the end-points of the scales (e.g., strongly agree),
which ordinarily are retrieved and selected easily when the response is honest, require additional thought, especially if an individuals self-schema indicates that a moderate response would
be honest. On average, this process produces a atter response distribution than occurs for honest responding and one that is slower
overall due to the added deliberation about social desirability of responses relative to the self. Additionally, this model suggests no
differences between the distributions when individuals are trying
to make a general good impression versus a very specic impressionboth involve additional deliberation that takes additional
time, especially for extreme responses.
Adopted-schema model
According to the adopted-schema model, individuals access a
schema of an ideal respondent. Provided that individuals have a
schema of what a good applicant might look like, the adopted schema model predicts a pattern of response times that should be also
be inverted-U shaped because the responses are honest with respect to the referenced schemathe referenced schema is adopted
as if it were ones own. The adopted-schema model can be taken to
make a more extreme prediction, however, in line with the results
reported by Vasilopoulos et al. (2000) suggesting that schema
strength may affect response times. To the extent that a clear schema is available and is simpler than the self-schema or a general
good impression schema, the adopted schema model predicts an
even more pronounced inverted-U pattern for impression-managed responding and overall responses times that are faster.
Semantic-exercise model
The semantic-exercise model involves a social desirability
assessment of each item. In Holtgraves (2004) conceptualization,
this model corresponds to the elimination of the retrieval stage.
Responses are selected solely on the basis of social desirability,
rather than by the extent to which they are self-referent or reect
an ideal schema. Response times may show an inverted-U distribution to the extent that extreme responses more readily convey a
good impression. However, given that a semantic evaluation engages relatively few cognitive processes, moderate responses
(e.g., somewhat agree) should also be made relatively quickly.
Thus, although an inverted-U may emerge, this will be less pronounced than in the honest-responding condition, and response
times will be generally faster than is true for honest responding.
Because selection merely requires a semantic evaluation, this
model suggests there will no differences between the response
time distributions when individuals are trying to make a general
good impression versus a specic impression.
The current study
The present study employed a within-subjects design in which
participants responded to the NEO PI-R under each of three conditions: (a) honestly, (b) to make a good impression, and (c) to make
a specic impression. Both general and specic impression-managed conditions were included because the three models make
different predictions for the response time distributions under
fake-general and fake-specic instructions. Thus, including a
fake-specic condition is necessary to provide a complete test of
the models.
Within the specic impression condition, participants were given one of two sets of instructionsto respond as if applying for
a job in accounting or to respond as if applying for a job in public
relations. Given that popular stereotypes of these positions involve
greater differences in levels of extraversion than in levels of other
dimensions (e.g., openness), we expected this condition would primarily involve a manipulation of the extraversion dimension. Prior
research has found increased extraversion scores as a result of faking (Bagby & Marshall, 2003), but this may depend on the impression one is trying to make. Although faking to make a generally
favorable impression and specic impressions appropriate for
many jobs likely involve portraying oneself as extraverted, some
jobs may call for a more introverted nature. This study, in addition
to testing the aforementioned models, determined if respondents
could dissimulate in this way when the circumstances called for it.
As noted previously, the cognitive models have different implications for response time distributions, both their shape and their
overall level. Prior research does not make a strong case for a particular model, so we note here the predicted pattern for each of the
models (see Table 1). The self-schema model predicts a atter response time pattern for the fake-good and fake-specic conditions
compared to the honest response condition and overall response
times that are signicantly slower. The adopted-schema model
predicts an inverted-U pattern for the fake-good condition that
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M.K. Shoss, M.J Strube / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 116 (2011) 163171
should be indistinguishable from that found in the honestresponding condition. But, the adopted-schema model also makes
a more specic prediction with regard to the specic instruction
conditions (especially for the extraversion dimension that underlies these instructions) that allows it to be differentiated from honest responding. For the extraversion dimension, the inverted-U for
the fake-specic public relations condition should be more pronounced than for the other conditions. The instruction to fake
appropriateness for a public relations job represents a very specic
and clear ideal that, if adopted, should produce a particularly pronounced inverted-U pattern. Moreover, because both the public
relations and the accountant jobs likely represent clearer and more
specic ideals than faking to make a general positive impression,
the overall response times for them should be signicantly faster
than for honest responding or general fake-good responding. The
semantic-exercise model predicts generally faster response times
for the faking conditions than for honest responding, and a less
pronounced inverted-U effect.
Method
Participants
Measures
Personality
The Revised NEO Personality Inventory (Costa & McCrae, 1992)
is a 240-question assessment measuring the Five Factor Model
dimensions of personality: Neuroticism (Cronbachs a = .90), Extraversion (a = .93), Openness to Experience (a = .85), Agreeableness
(a = .91), and Conscientiousness (a = .91). Each dimension is measured using 48 items, each rated on a 5-point Likert scale ranging
from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5). This measure was
developed for use with adults without overt psychopathology
and has been found to have a high level of internal consistency
and testretest reliability over long periods of time. For this reason,
it has been translated into many different languages and used in
many different cultures.
Design
This experiment used a within-subjects manipulation of response instructions: honest, fake-good, and fake-specic. The
fake-specic response instructions were manipulated between
subjects, resulting in two fake-specic conditions that instructed
participants to dissimulate so as to obtain a position in either
accounting or public relations. Although we expected the fake-specic conditions to be primarily a manipulation of the extraversion
dimension, we used job positions in order to increase realism and
generalizability of our ndings to selection contexts. In addition,
individual difference assessments (NEO-PI-R dimension scores)
from the honest responding condition were incorporated into statistical analyses to determine if response-time patterns were moderated by particular personality characteristics.
Procedure
The experiment was administered by computer and required
approximately one hour for the rst session and half an hour for
the second session. In the rst session, participants were asked
to respond honestly to the NEO PI-R (Costa & McCrae, 1992) and
response times were recorded without participants knowledge.
At the end of the session, participants responded to a brief demographic questionnaire.
During the second session, participants completed the NEO PI-R
twice: (a) under non-specic instructions to give a good impression, and (b) under specic instructions to respond as an ideal candidate for one of two jobs. All participants responded to the general
instructions to fake good. Participants were randomly assigned to
just one of the specic instruction conditions. The computer program counterbalanced the instructions and measured response
times.
Results
Faking estimates and manipulation check
The effectiveness of the instructions was assessed by comparing
scores from the NEO scale administered under the three instruction conditions in a 2 (Specic Instructions: Extravert versus Introvert) 3 (Type of Instruction: Honest, Good Impression, Specic
Impression) analysis of variance with the latter factor treated as
a repeated measure. Results and specic comparisons among conditions for all scales are presented in Table 2. Based on previous research demonstrating that applicants responding to the NEO PI-R
exhibited higher mean conscientiousness than non-applicants
(Grifn, Hesketh, & Grayson, 2004), we expected a signicant increase in conscientiousness scores when participants attempted
to make a good impression compared to their honest responses.
Also, based on prior faking research (McFarland, Ryan, & Ellis,
2002; Vasilopoulos, Reilly, & Leaman, 2000), we expected elevated
extraversion and agreeableness scores and lower neuroticism
scores in the fake-good condition compared to the honest responding condition. However, we did not expect a signicant difference
in openness scores across conditions based on evidence suggesting
that openness to experience is considerably difcult to fake (Grifn
et al., 2004).
The most relevant NEO scale in our experiment was extraversion and the analysis of variance revealed a signicant specic
instruction by type of instruction interaction, F(2, 116) = 20.77,
p < .001. As expected, extraversion scores were signicantly higher
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Table 2
NEO dimension scores as a function of instruction condition.
Scale
Honest (H)
Fake-good (FG)
Fake-specic
Extravert (FSE)
Neuroticism1
Extraversion2
Openness3
Agreeableness4
Conscientiousness5
1
2
3
4
5
Introvert (FSI)
SD
SD
SD
SD
148.47
170.12
175.50
162.28
165.02
20.65
24.48
15.99
20.43
20.20
94.35
192.65
178.83
212.50
187.30
17.56
13.02
14.50
17.05
15.31
96.44
202.80
185.36
203.12
174.44
22.60
14.60
17.75
21.55
23.40
93.57
164.30
145.00
220.29
163.37
18.27
23.19
24.09
14.50
21.10
F(2, 116) = 3.24, p < .01; t-tests revealed signicant differences (p < .01) between H&FG, H&FSE, H&FSI.
F(2, 116) = 20.77, p < .01; t-tests revealed signicant differences (p < .01) between H&FG, H&FSE, FSE&FSI.
F(2, 116) = 36.94, p < .01; t-tests revealed signicant differences (p < .01) between H&FSI, FSE&FSI.
F(2, 116) = 9.37, p < .01; t-tests revealed signicant differences (p < .01) between H&FG, H&FSE, H&FSI, FSE&FSI.
F(2, 116) = 4.90, p < .01; t-tests revealed signicant differences (p < .01) between H&FG.
in the fake-good condition than in the honest responding condition, in the fake-specic-extraversion condition than in the honest
responding condition, and in the fake-specic-extraversion condition than the fake-specic-introvert condition. Additionally, neuroticism scores were lower in all of the faking conditions than in
the honest responding condition, F(2, 116) = 3.24, p < .01. Similarly,
agreeableness scores were higher in all of the faking conditions
than in the honest responding condition, F(2, 116) = 9.37, p < .01.
Conscientious scores were signicantly higher in the fake-good
condition than in the honest responding condition, F(2, 116) =
4.90, p < .01. The pattern of results clearly shows that participants
successfully implemented both the general instructions to make a
favorable impression and the more specic instructions targeted to
particular job characteristics.
HLM analysis
We used hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) to analyze the response time data because observations (i.e., response times) were
nested within individuals (Osborne, 2000). Specically, each individual had response times for each response option that he or
she selected while responding to the NEO questionnaire. After reverse coding appropriate items, we averaged the response times
for each response option (e.g., agree) for a given scale (e.g., extraversion) for each individual participant (and separately by condition). We examined the NEO scales individually so that the
honest and fake-good conditions could be easily compared to the
fake-specic condition, which we expected manipulated primarily
the extraversion dimension. Thus, each person had 25 dependent
variables (response time averages; 5 per each of the 5 NEO scales)
for each experimental condition. HLM uses the data available in the
case of individuals who did not select a given response option
when responding to items in a particular scale. The inverted-U effect was examined by testing for a quadratic trend in average response times across the ve response options. Then, we used
moderator variables to determine if the relationship between response times and response options was general to all participants
or depended on the experimental manipulations and individual
differences.
Honest responding model specication and analysis
The initial HLM analysis tested the presence of the inverted-U
pattern under the honest responding instructions. The Level 1
model represented the average response times for each participant
as predicted by the selected response options, modeled to include
the linear and quadratic relations between response option and response time:
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Table 3
Honest-responding xed effects estimation (with robust standard errors).
Scale
Fixed effect
Coefcient
Standard error
df
Neuroticism
Intercept, p0i
Linear, p1i
Quadratic, p2i
3624.36
62.16
137.41
92.51
27.15
22.98
39.18
2.29
5.98
59
271
271
.001
.023
.001
Extraversion
Intercept, p0i
Linear, p1i
Quadratic, p2i
3484.36
44.28
148.06
98.69
26.11
28.26
35.31
1.70
5.24
59
261
59
.001
.091
.001
Openness
Intercept, p0i
Linear, p1i
Quadratic, p2i
4081.31
37.79
181.07
98.93
40.18
34.38
41.25
0.94
5.27
59
59
59
.001
.351
.001
Agreeableness
Intercept, p0i
Linear, p1i
Quadratic, p2i
3516.84
25.57
87.75
92.19
36.38
30.09
38.15
0.70
2.92
59
59
59
.001
.485
.006
Conscientiousness
Intercept, p0i
Linear, p1i
Quadratic, p2i
3687.11
94.24
89.55
97.21
32.41
33.30
37.93
2.91
2.69
59
264
59
.001
.004
.010
4400
Honest Responding
4200
Good Impression
4000
3800
3600
3400
3200
3000
2800
2600
2400
2200
2000
1800
1
Response Option
Fig. 1. Response times as a function of response option for the extraversion dimension of the NEO PI-R under honest response, fake-good response, and fake-specic response
instructions.
M.K. Shoss, M.J Strube / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 116 (2011) 163171
169
Discussion
Extraversion response times for the specic instruction conditions were also examined in a three-level model that required a
modication at Levels 2 and 3. At Level 2, an additional parameter
was necessary to account for all three instruction conditions which
were dummy coded (specic: 0, 0; honest: 1, 0; fake-good: 0, 1):
The key parameter tests are for c010, c001, c211 and c221. The latter two indicate whether the inverted-U pattern is different between the two specic instruction conditions when the specic
2
The Level 3 model estimated individual variability in the Level 2 parameters. No
interpretable effects were found.
3
The Level 3 model also estimated individual variability in the Level 2 parameters.
No interpretable effects were found.
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Table 4
Analysis of Level-2 model (instruction as a predictor) xed effects estimation (with robust standard errors).
Fixed effect for:
Neuroticism
Intercept, p0i
Linear, p1i
Quadratic, p2i
Extraversion
Intercept, p0i
Linear, p1i
Quadratic, p2i
Openness
Intercept, p0i
Linear, p1i
Quadratic, p2i
Agreeableness
Intercept, p0i
Linear, p1i
Quadratic, p2i
Conscientiousness
Intercept, p0i
Linear, p1i
Quadratic, p2i
Coefcient
SE
df
b00
b01
b10
b11
b20
b21
(intercept)
(condition)
(intercept)
(condition)
(intercept)
(condition)
3625.38
141.09
61.09
181.34
134.92
48.89
92.87
109.27
27.13
65.10
22.86
48.90
39.04
1.29
2.25
2.79
5.90
1.00
59
118
118
118
118
118
.001
.199
.026
.007
.001
.320
b00
b01
b10
b11
b20
b21
(intercept)
(condition)
(intercept)
(condition)
(intercept)
(condition)
3484.35
119.94
42.37
112.47
148.06
33.79
98.52
116.75
26.74
47.89
27.96
41.62
35.37
1.03
1.59
2.35
5.30
0.81
59
118
512
512
118
118
.001
.307
.113
.019
.001
.419
b00
b01
b10
b11
b20
b21
(intercept)
(condition)
(intercept)
(condition)
(intercept)
(condition)
4080.90
406.43
40.68
71.66
179.03
20.04
99.07
91.01
40.43
42.07
34.54
42.19
41.19
4.47
1.01
1.70
5.18
0.48
59
118
118
118
118
118
.001
.001
.317
.091
.001
.635
b00
b01
b10
b11
b20
b21
(intercept)
(condition)
(intercept)
(condition)
(intercept)
(condition)
3513.86
143.10
20.12
85.51
86.85
90.84
91.76
95.41
36.18
50.15
30.05
42.08
38.29
1.50
0.56
1.71
2.89
2.16
59
118
59
118
59
118
.001
.136
.580
.090
.006
.033
b00
b01
b10
b11
b20
b21
(intercept)
(condition)
(intercept)
(condition)
(intercept)
(condition)
3688.12
153.91
85.45
31.97
88.71
109.91
96.96
111.30
32.49
64.66
33.62
53.79
38.04
1.38
2.63
0.49
2.64
2.04
59
118
118
118
118
118
.001
.169
.010
.621
.010
.043
in the fake-specic-public relations condition inated their extraversion scores above their fake-good scores. Those in the fake-specic accountant condition, however, reported essentially the same
level of extraversion as they did when they were responding honestly. This mirrors the results from the response-time analysis, and
suggests it may be more difcult to fake introversion than extraversion; that is, relatively more thought may need to go into selecting extreme responses. Perhaps it is difcult to fake introversion
because the general desire to make a good impression in any job
interview calls for a more outgoing and friendly demeanor. Therefore, the pressure to make a good impression and to appear to be
an ideal applicant for an accountant position may cancel each
other, resulting in baseline (honest responding) level scores and
a atter response time pattern than that for the fake-specic extraversion dimension. However, because this schema is likely less
complex than individuals self-schemas and schemas for a general
good impression, response times overall were faster. These results,
however, suggest that individuals are sensitive to stereotypes associated with different positions and may reference these stereotypes when engaging in impression-managed responding (Mahar
et al., 2006).
The analysis of the response time distributions for the impression-managed responses demonstrates that the inverted-U response time effect cannot be used to discern those who are
faking from those who are responding honestly. In fact, using an
individuals response time distribution could lead to false predictions on both the agreeableness and conscientiousness scales,
where the inverted-U effect was more pronounced in the fakegood condition than in the honest response condition. This suggests that a good-impression, in general, acts like a category and
individuals can access this category readily when responding. This
also suggests that the self-category is not privileged in any way, an
implication consistent with the adopted-schema model of impression-managed responding.
The prior literature on faking has suggested that a way to minimize the extent of faking would be to have individuals complete
the personality assessment with as few specics details of the
job made known as possible (Vasilopoulos et al., 2000). This study
suggests that doing so would not result in lower levels of faking. In
fact, for the conscientiousness scale, it could result in a higher level
of response distortion. It is also interesting to note that the standard deviations for the scale scores decreased in the fake good condition. This suggests that individuals shared a consolidated view of
not only what attributes are considered positive, but also at what
levels.
Practically, in addition to suggesting that response time distributions, such as the inverted-U, would be ineffective for detecting
faking, this study also casts doubt on the validity of response times
for detecting faking in general. As previously noted, response times
can depend on a number of different factors including attention
paid to each item, reading speed, time to search for information,
schema clarity, familiarity with questions, test anxiety, and so
forth. Moreover, in practical settings it is nearly impossible to acquire a baseline average response rate with which to compare, given the wide range of factors that can inuence an individuals
average response rate. Thus, it seems that researchers and practitioners interested in detecting and reducing faking would do well
to focus on other strategies.
Limitations
This study has a number of limitations that warrant additional
investigation. First, the fake-specic manipulation was not a direct
manipulation of extraversion. The manipulation used depended on
individuals stereotypes of these two positions, which are
inuenced by prior experience interacting with individuals in
these professions. Despite the fact that the strength of the manipulation depended on the participants schemas, the results suggest
M.K. Shoss, M.J Strube / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 116 (2011) 163171
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