QUINTO vs COMELEC

G.R. No. 189698 February 22, 2010

ELEAZAR P. QUINTO and GERINO A. TOLENTINO, JR., Petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PUNO, C.J.:
ETO DIGEST NG CASE PRIOR TO THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. RESOLUTION YUNG ASSIGNED
CASE SA ATIN
Facts:
Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce and administer election laws, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8678, the
Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of Candidacy (CoC) and Nomination of Official Candidates of Registered Political Parties
in Connection with the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections. Sections 4 and 5 of Resolution No. 8678 provide:
SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.a) Any person holding a public appointive office or position including
active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and employees in government-owned or controlled
corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be considered resigned upon the filing of his
certificate of candidacy for the same or any other elective office or position.
Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices the moment they file their CoCs, petitioners Eleazar P.
Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr., who hold appointive positions in the government and who intend to run in the coming
elections, filed the instant petition for prohibition and certiorari, seeking the declaration of the afore-quoted Section 4(a) of
Resolution No. 8678 as null and void. Petitioners also contend that Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, the basis of the
assailed COMELEC resolution, contains two conflicting provisions. These must be harmonized or reconciled to give effect
to both and to arrive at a declaration that they are not ipso facto resigned from their positions upon the filing of their CoCs.
Issue: whether the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and Section 4(a) of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8678 are violative of the equal protection clause
Held: Yes.
In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their posts upon the filing of their CoCs, but
not considering as resigned all other civil servants, specifically the elective ones, the law unduly discriminates against the
first class. The fact alone that there is substantial distinction between those who hold appointive positions and those
occupying elective posts, does not justify such differential treatment.
In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental act may pass the constitutional norm of
equal protection, it is necessary that the four (4) requisites of valid classification be complied with, namely:
(1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;
(2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.
The first requirement means that there must be real and substantial differences between the classes treated differently. As
illustrated in the fairly recent Mirasol v. Department of Public Works and Highways, a real and substantial distinction exists
between a motorcycle and other motor vehicles sufficient to justify its classification among those prohibited from plying the
toll ways. Not all motorized vehicles are created equala two-wheeled vehicle is less stable and more easily overturned than
a four-wheel vehicle.
Nevertheless, the classification would still be invalid if it does not comply with the second requirementif it is not germane to
the purpose of the law.
The third requirement means that the classification must be enforced not only for the present but as long as the problem
sought to be corrected continues to exist. And, under the last requirement, the classification would be regarded as invalid if
all the members of the class are not treated similarly, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.
Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court finds that the differential treatment of persons holding appointive
offices as opposed to those holding elective ones is not germane to the purposes of the law.
The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a governmental position to promote ones candidacy,
or even to wield a dangerous or coercive influence on the electorate. The measure is further aimed at promoting the
efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the public service by eliminating the danger that the discharge of official duty would be
motivated by political considerations rather than the welfare of the public. The restriction is also justified by the proposition
that the entry of civil servants to the electoral arena, while still in office, could result in neglect or inefficiency in the
performance of duty because they would be attending to their campaign rather than to their office work.
If we accept these as the underlying objectives of the law, then the assailed provision cannot be constitutionally rescued on
the ground of valid classification. Glaringly absent is the requisite that the classification must be germane to the purposes of
the law. Indeed, whether one holds an appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the measure
remain. For example, the Executive Secretary, or any Member of the Cabinet for that matter, could wield the same influence
as the Vice-President who at the same time is appointed to a Cabinet post (in the recent past, elected Vice-Presidents were
appointed to take charge of national housing, social welfare development, interior and local government, and foreign affairs).
With the fact that they both head executive offices, there is no valid justification to treat them differently when both file their
CoCs for the elections. Under the present state of our law, the Vice-President, in the example, running this time, let us say, for
President, retains his position during the entire election period and can still use the resources of his office to support his
campaign.
As to the danger of neglect, inefficiency or partisanship in the discharge of the functions of his appointive office, the inverse
could be just as true and compelling. The public officer who files his certificate of candidacy would be driven by a greater
impetus for excellent performance to show his fitness for the position aspired for.
There is thus no valid justification to treat appointive officials differently from the elective ones. The classification simply fails
to meet the test that it should be germane to the purposes of the law. The measure encapsulated in the second proviso of the
third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and in Section 66 of the OEC violates the equal protection clause.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of
Republic Act No. 9369, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are
declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Facts:
This is a motion for reconsideration filed by the Commission on Elections. The latter moved to question an earlier decision of
the Supreme Court declaring the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369, the basis of the
COMELEC resolution, and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 unconstitutional. The resolution provides that, Any
person holding a public appointive office or position including active members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, and other officers and employees in government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy. RA 9369 provides
that
For this purpose, the Commission shall set the deadline for the filing of certificate of candidacy/petition of
registration/manifestation to participate in the election. Any person who files his certificate of candidacy within this period
shall only be considered as a candidate at the start of the campaign period for which he filed his certificate of candidacy:
Provided, That, unlawful acts or omissions applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the aforesaid
campaign period: Provided, finally, That any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active
members of the armed forces, and officers and employees in government-owned or -controlled corporations,
shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his/her office and must vacate the same at the start of the day of
the filing of his/her certificate of candidacy.
Issue: Issue: whether the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and Section 4(a) of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8678 are violative of the equal protection clause and therefore unconstitutional
Held: No
To start with, the equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without
distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. The test
developed by jurisprudence here and yonder is that of reasonableness, which has four requisites:
(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
Our assailed Decision readily acknowledged that these deemed-resigned provisions satisfy the first, third and fourth requisites
of reasonableness. It, however, proffers the dubious conclusion that the differential treatment of appointive officials vis--vis
elected officials is not germane to the purpose of the law, because "whether one holds an appointive office or an elective one,
the evils sought to be prevented by the measure remain."
In the instant case, is there a rational justification for excluding elected officials from the operation of the deemed resigned
provisions? There is.
An election is the embodiment of the popular will, perhaps the purest expression of the sovereign power of the people. It
involves the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote. Considering that elected officials are put in
office by their constituents for a definite term, it may justifiably be said that they were excluded from the ambit of the
deemed resigned provisions in utmost respect for the mandate of the sovereign will. In other words, complete deference is
accorded to the will of the electorate that they be served by such officials until the end of the term for which they were
elected. In contrast, there is no such expectation insofar as appointed officials are concerned.
The dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective officials is therefore germane to the purposes of the law. For the law
was made not merely to preserve the integrity, efficiency, and discipline of the public service; the Legislature, whose wisdom
is outside the rubric of judicial scrutiny, also thought it wise to balance this with the competing, yet equally compelling,
interest of deferring to the sovereign will.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court RESOLVES to GRANT the respondents and the intervenors Motions for Reconsideration;
REVERSE and SET ASIDE this Courts December 1, 2009 Decision; DISMISS the Petition; and ISSUE this Resolution declaring as
not UNCONSTITUTIONAL (1) Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678, (2) the second proviso in the third paragraph of
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9369, and (3) Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code.
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Note: Not applicable sa barangay office: Any elective or appointive municipal, city, provincial or national official or
employee, or those in the civil or military service, including those in government-owned or-controlled corporations, shall be
considered automatically resigned upon the filing of certificate of candidacy for a barangay office.
Since barangay elections are governed by a separate deemed resignation rule, under the present state of law, there would be
no occasion to apply the restriction on candidacy found in Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, and later reiterated in the
proviso of Section 13 of RA 9369, to any election other than a partisan one. For this reason, the overbreadth challenge raised
against Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and the pertinent proviso in Section 13 of RA 9369 must also fail.