Public Administrative Theory and the Separation of Powers

Author(s): David H. Rosenbloom

Source: Public Administration Review, Vol. 43, No. 3 (May - Jun., 1983), pp. 219-227
Published by: Wiley on behalf of the American Society for Public Administration
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/976330
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219

THE EPA/TVA AIR POLLUTION CONTROL EXPERIENCE

cond ed. (Boston: Little,Brownand Company, 1976), p. 177.
69. E. E. Schattschneider,
The SemisovereignPeople, p. 2.
70. See, for example, SeymourScher, "Conditions for Legislative
Control," Journal of Politics, Vol. 25 (August 1963), pp.
526-551; and John S. Saloma, Congressand the New Politics
(Boston: Little,Brownand Company, 1969), pp. 140-151.
71. See, forexample,Michael W. Kirst,GovernmentWithoutPassing Laws (Chapel Hill: Universityof North Carolina Press,
1969).
72. For example, Wilson and Rachal, "Can GovernmentRegulate
Itself?"

73. Thanks to an anonymousreviewerforhis/hersuggestionof the

term"preemptivecreativeredundance."
74. The concept "polycentricproblem" refersto the tendencyof
and consequentlyforthepolicysolutions
issuesto be interrelated
of one problemto have implicationsfortheothers.For thefrustrationsinvolvedin dealingwiththeseproblemsas seen through
theeyesof policymakerssee: David S. Broder,Changingof the
Guard: Power and Leadershipin America (New York: Penguin
Books, 1981).

Theoryand the
Public Administrative
Separationof Powers
David H. Rosenbloom,SyracuseUniversity

* Public administrative
It has beenrecognized
theorycontainsat least threedistinctive
forsometimethatthedisciapproaches.These can be labeled "managerial," "political," and
plineof publicadministration
is plaguedbya weakor
"legal." Each has relatively
separateorigins,emphasizesdifferent
absenttheoretical
core.Thishas led someto conclude,
values,promotesdifferent
organizationalstructures,
and viewsinalongwithRobertParker,1
that"thereis reallyno such
in differentterms.These threeapproaches reflectthe
dividuals
subjectas 'publicadministration.'
No scienceorartcan
constitutional
separationof powers,whichhas tendedto collapse
be identified
bythistitle,leastof all anysingleskillor
into the administrative
branchas a consequenceof theriseof the
coherentintellectualdiscipline." Others,including
contemporaryadministrative
state. The developmentof a more
Frederick
C. Mosher,2
haveconsidered
ita "resource,"
coherentbody of publicadministrative
theorymustrecognizethe
thatpublicadministration
"is morean area of interest
utilityof each of theseapproachesas theyapplyto variousaspects
thana discipline,"sincethisenablesthefieldto draw
of administration.
The experienceof practitioners,
who are often
upon a varietyof disciplines.Still others,such as
perforcecompelledto integratetheseapproacheson thejob, can
be an invaluableguide to such theory-building.
HerbertKaufman3
and JamesQ. Wilson,4
haveargued
thatpublicadministration
facesa seriousandseemingly
irresolvable
problem
incontinually
seeking
to maximize
The ManagerialApproach
to
the attainment
of mutuallyincompatible
values.The
Public
Administration
contention
of thisessayis thatthecentralproblemof
contemporary
publicadministrative
theoryis thatit is
andValues
derivedfromthreedisparateapproachesto the basic Origin
questionofwhatpublicadministration
is. Each ofthese
In the UnitedStatesthe managerialapproachto
approacheshas a respected
intellectual
tradition,
em- publicadministration
grewlargelyout of thecivilserphasizesdifferent
values,promotesdifferent
typesof vicereform
movement
of thelate 19thcentury.
In the
organizationalstructure,and views individualsin
reformers'
words,
"What
civil
service
reform
markedlydistinctterms.These approachesare con[was]thatthebusinesspartofthegovernvenientlylabeled "managerial,9""political," and demandledi,
ment
shall
be
"legal." Theyhave influenced
one anotheroverthe manner."'6 The carriedon in a sound businesslike
idea of "businesslike"public adyears,and at somepointstheyoverlap.Yet,theirpriministration
was
most
self-consciously
andinfluentially
maryinfluence
on publicadministration
has been to discussedby Woodrow
Wilson
in
his
pullit in threeseparatedirections.
Furthermore,
these Studyof Administration."'There, essayon "The
Wilsonconsidered
directions
tendto followthepattern
oftheseparation
of
powersestablished
bytheConstitution.
Consequently, David H. Rosenbloomis professorof publicadministration,theMaxit is unlikely
thatthethreeapproachescan be synthe- well School, SyracuseUniversity.He specializesin the politics,persizedwithoutviolatingvaluesdeeplyingrained
in the sonnel,and law of publicbureaucracyand is author,mostrecently,of
UnitedStatespoliticalculture.'
Public Administration
and Law (Marcel Dekker, 1983).

1983
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220

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW

derivedin theinto be "a fieldof business"and pay scales are to be systematically

publicadministration
tobe effiemployees
andmotivating
ofeconomy
endeavor.He also set terests
a managerial
largely
consequently
is to be made
approach cient.Selectionof publicadministrators
forththethreecorevaluesof themanagerial
on thebasisof merit.Theyareto be politically
"It istheobjectofadministra- strictly
topublicadministration:
canprop- neutralin their competence.Relationshipsamong
whatgovernment
first,
tivestudyto discover,
andpublicagenciesareto be forhowit can do publicadministrators
do, and, secondly,
erlyand successfully
and,in all events,thepublic'sbusitheseproperthingswiththeutmostpossibleefficiency malizedin writing
fashion.'"
orderly
ina smooth,
and at the least possiblecost eitherof moneyor of nessis tobe administered
wasto be geared
energy."'Thus,publicadministration
efficiency, ViewoftheIndividual
of effectiveness,
towardthe maximization
and economy.
The managerialapproachto publicadministration
Thisis true
viewofindividuals.
an impersonal
promotes
.w. . public administratorsmake rules (legisin questionare theemployees,
theindividuals
whether
lation),implementthese rules (an executive clients,
agenorthe"victims"'ofpublicadministrative
function), and adjudicate questions con- cies.One neednotgo so faras Max Weberinconsiderto be the "special virtue"of
cerning their application and execution (a ing "dehumanization"
as a "cog" inan
bureaucrat
the
view
or
to
judicial function). The collapsing of the bureaucracy
overwhichhe/shehas virtually
machine
organizational
separation of powers has been well recog- no control."7
Yet therecan be no doubtthata strong
nized.
was to turntheinmanagement
of scientific
tendency
dividualworkerinto an appendageto a mechanized
this view of the
byFred- means of production.By 1920, principles
approachwas strengthened
The managerial
ofposiin
the
embodied
clearly
was
employee
movement.'
management
erickTaylorandthescientific
"The individual
sector:
in
the
public
tion
classification
thevaluesof efficiency
Taylorismsoughtto enshrine
of an employeeoccupyinga position
to achieve characteristics
and economyin a worldviewthatpromised
oftheposino
bearingon theclassification
have
should
amongmankind.Later,Leonand affluence
harmony
tion."1" Indeed, the strong"position-orientation"of
to the Studyof
Introduction
ard White'sinfluential
conapproachto publicadministration
that"thestudyof ad- themanagerial the importance
asserted
PublicAdministration1
of the individual
to
diminish
tinues
shouldstartfromthebase ofmanagement employee
ministration
to theoverallorganization.
of law, and is, therefore,
ratherthanthe foundation
andturned
too,havebeen"depersonalized"
Clients,
Managemoreabsorbedin theaffairsof theAmerican
to promotethe managerial
in
effort
an
"cases"
into
mentAssociationthanin thedecisionsof thecourts." valuesofefficiency,
Ralph
andeffectiveness.
economy,
approachtopublicadministration Hummelexplains,
Whenthemanagerial
in the1930s,it was
was at thepinnacleof itsinfluence
widelyheld, along withLutherGulick,that "effiAt the intakelevel of the bureaucracy,individualpersonalitiesare
ciency"was "axiomnumberone in thevaluescaleof convertedintocases. Onlyifa personcan qualifyas a case, is he or she
and thatpoliticscouldnotenter"the allowed treatmentby the bureaucracy.More accurately,a bureaucadministration"
withoutproducingin- racyis neverset up to treator deal withpersons:it "processes" only
structureof administration
11
efficiency."

approach'svalueswas
The essenceof themanagerial
capturedby Simmonsand Dvorinin the following
terms:"The 'goodness'or 'badness' of a particular
relationship
was a mathematical
pattern
organizational
of'inputs'to 'outputs.'Wherethelatterwasmaximized
Vira moral'good' resulted.
minimized,
andtheformer
equatedwiththerelatueor 'goodness'was therefore
or
tionshipof thesetwo factors,thatis, 'efficiency,'
into
'inefficiency.'Mathematicswas transformed
ethics."12

Structure
Organizational

"cases.'"19

that
to suchan extent
"Victims"maybe depersonalized
wherephysiespecially
sub-human,
theyareconsidered
cal forceor coercionis employedas in mentalhealth
and policefunctions."
facilities
theory
approachto organization
Thehumanrelations
onimviewsarguethatreliance
andsomecontemporary
becauseit
tendsto be counter-productive
personality
the
Nevertheless,
generates"bureaupathologies."21
is
viewofindividuals
approach'simpersonal
managerial
essentialto themaxiand considered
deeplyingrained
and effectiveness.
economy,
mizationof efficiency,

to
The PoliticalApproach
The managerialapproachto publicadministration
Administration
Public
alongthelinesofMax
essentially
organization
promotes
theimporIt stresses
bureaucracy."3
Weber'sideal-type
andValues
Hier- Origins
forefficiency.
specialization
tanceof functional
coordination.'4
archyis thenreliedupon foreffective
was
The politicalapproachto publicadministration
are to be clearlyassignedto
Programsand functions
stated
and
by
most
succinctly
forcefully
perhaps
minimized.
to
be
are
units.
Overlaps
organizational
intoa rationalschemeand WallaceSayre:
Positionsareto be classified
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PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIVE THEORY AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS

221

Publicadministration
isultimately
a problem
inpolitical
to promotepoliticalactheory:
the also examplesof theattempt
fundamental
ina democracy
is responsibility
problem
topopularcon- countability.
Thereis alsoa growing
academicliterature
trol;theresponsibility
andresponsiveness
oftheadministrative
agen- on theneedto promote
representativeness,
responsiveciesandthebureaucracies
totheelectedofficials
(thechiefexecutives, ness,and accountability
in themodernadministrative
thelegislators)
is ofcentral
ina government
basedincreasimportance
state.30
inglyon theexerciseof discretionary
powerby theagenciesof ad-

It is important
to notethatthevaluessoughtbythe
politicalapproachto public administration
are freThis approachgrewout of the observation
of some, quentlyin tensionwiththoseof the managerialapinthemanagerial
efficiency
sense
suchas Paul Appleby,
thatpublicadministration
during proach.Forinstance,
servedthrough
sunshineregulations
the New Deal and WorldWar II was anything
but is not necessarily
fromtaking
devoidofpolitics.3Thus,unliketheoriginofthemana- whichcan dissuadepublicadministrators
theymaybethemostefgerialapproach,whichstressed
whatpublicadministra- somecoursesofaction,though
andcandivert
timeandresources
fromprogram
tionoughtto be,thepoliticalapproachdevelopedfrom ficient,
implementation
to the deliverance
of information
to
an analysisof apparentempirical
reality.
withadvisorycommittees
and
Once publicadministration
is considered
a political outsiders.Consultation
endeavor,emphasisis inevitably
placedon a different "citizenparticipants"can be time consumingand
publicservicemaynot
setofvaluesthanthosepromoted
bythemanagerial
ap- costly.A sociallyrepresentative
one.3"Noris theintended
proach. "Efficiency,"in particular,
shuffling
becomeshighly be themostefficient
suspect,as JusticeBrandeispointedout in dissentin of SeniorExecutiveServantsfromagencyto agency
likelyto enhanceefficiency
in the managerialsense.
Myersv. UnitedStates(1926):
Ratherit is thought
thatbyproviding
thiscadreoftop
Thedoctrine
oftheseparation
ofpowerswasadoptedbytheConven- publicadministrators
a widervariety
ofexperience,
they
tionof 1787,nottopromote
efficiency
buttopreclude
theexercise
of
maycometo definethepublicinterest
inmorecomprearbitrary
power.The purposewas, not to avoid friction,
but,by hensive
termsandtherefore
becomemoreresponsive
to
meansoftheinevitable
friction
incident
tothedistribution
ofgovern- thenation'soverallpolitical
interests.
Moreover,
while
mentalpowersamongthreedepartments,
to save thepeoplefrom
variousbudgeting
strategies
and sunsetprovisions
can
autocracy.24
promoteeconomyin one sense,theamountof paperandtheextent
towhichtheymayreRather,thepoliticalapproachto publicadministrationworktheygenerate
stressesthe values of representativeness,
political quireagenciesto justifyand argueon behalfof their
andexpenditures
canbecomequitecostly.Inresponsiveness,
and accountability
through
electedof- programs
deed,
a
quarter
century
ago,
MarverBernstein
reported
ficialsto thecitizenry.
Theseareviewedas crucialtothe
that
"many
officials
complain
that
they
must
spend
so
maintenance
of constitutional
democracy,
in
especially
forappearingat Congressional
view of the rise of the contemporary
administrativemuchtimepreparing
theirprograms
beforethe
state,whichmaybe likenedunto"bureaucratic
govern- hearingsand in presenting
Bureauof the Budgetand otherbodiesthatit often
ment. '25
the operationsof their
One can findmanyexamplesof governmental
re- leaveslittletimefordirecting
is difficult
forms
to
aimedat maximizing
thepoliticalvaluesofrepre- agencies."32Managerialeffectiveness
havelongcomsentativeness,
responsiveness,
andaccountability
within gauge,of course,butfederalmanagers
is hampered
bythelarge
publicadministration.
For instance,thewideranging plainedthattheireffectiveness
roleinpublicadministration
andtheneed
academiccontroversy
concerning
theconceptof "repre- congressional
witha variety
ofpartieshavinga
sentativebureaucracy" notwithstanding,
the Federal to consultcontinually
legitimate
concern
with
theiragencies'operations.33
CivilServiceReform
Actof 1978madeit"thepolicyof
ministration.22

the United States . . . to providea Federal workforce

reflective
oftheNation'sdiversity"
byendeavoring
"to Organizational
Structure
achievea workforcefromall segments
of society.""
TheFederalAdvisory
Committee
Actof 1971soughtto
Publicadministration
organized
aroundthepolitical
enhanceresponsiveness
through
theuse of "represen- values of representativeness,
responsiveness,
and actative"advisory
Earlier,thepoverty
committees.25
and countability
alsotendstobe at oddswiththemanagerial
model citiesprogramsof the 1960s soughtto use approachto organization.Ratherthan emphasizing
"citizen participation"as a means of promoting clearlinesof functional
specialization,
hierarchy,
unity,
politicalresponsiveness
in administrative
operations. andrecruitment
basedon politically
neutral
administraThe questforresponsiveness
has also blendedintoat- tivecompetence,
thepoliticalapproachstresses
theextemptsto promotetheaccountability
of publicadmin- tentand advantages
ofpoliticalpluralism
within
public
istratorsto politicalofficialsthrougha varietyof administration.
Thus, Harold Seidmanarguesthat,
measures
including
greater
use oftheGeneralAccount- "Executivebranchstructure
is in facta microcosm
of
ingOffice,"thecreation
ofthefederal
SeniorExecutive our society.Inevitably
it reflects
thevalues,conflicts,
Service,and structural
changessuchas theestablish- and competingforcesto be foundin a pluralistic
mentoftheOfficeofManagement
andBudget,theOf- society.The idealof a neatlysymmetrical,
frictionless
ficeof PersonnelManagement,
and theCongressional organization
structure
is a dangerous
illusion."34
NorBudgetOffice."Sunshine"provisions
suchas theFree- tonLongmakesa similar
point:"Agenciesandbureaus
domofInformation
Actand "sunset"requirements
are moreor less perforce
are in thebusinessof building,
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PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW

222

is
and increasingtheirpoliticalsupport. lithic.Any'dulyelected'spokesman
foranyinterest
maintaining,
groups takenas speakingin closeapproximation
foreachand
Theyleadandinlargepartareledbythediverse
theyleadand everymember."39
them.Frequently
then,
sustains
whoseinfluence
In thisviewof theindividual,
Roger personality
directions.""3
led in conflicting
in collective
are themselves
exists,butit is conceptualized
Davidsonfindsa politicalvirtuewherethoseimbued terms.
approachmightsee disorder:"In
withthemanagerial
theAmerican
thecivilservicerepresents
manyrespects,
to PublicAdministration
The LegalApproach
thandoes Congress."36
peoplemorecomprehensively
publicad- Origin
within
The basicconceptbehindpluralism
andValues
is a
branch
administrative
the
since
is
that
ministration
it mustbe struccenterof government,
policy-making
In theUnitedStates,thelegalapproachto publicadfactionby pro- ministration
turedto enablefactionto counteract
beeneclipsedbytheother
has historically
to a comprehensive approaches,especially
vidingpoliticalrepresentation
it
Nevertheless,
themanagerial.
political,economic,and social has a venerable
of theorganized
variety
as a
emerged
and has recently
tradition
at large.To theex- full-fledged
thatarefoundinthesociety
interests
publicadministration.
vehiclefordefining
scheme It is derivedprimarily
tentthatthepoliticalapproach'sorganizational
sources.
fromthreeinter-related
a political Firstis administrative
comesto resemble
is achieved,thestructure
law. As earlyas 1905,Frank
partyplatformthat promisessomethingto almost Goodnow,a leadingcontributor
of
to thedevelopment
forresolv- public administrative
clearpriorities
establishing
without
everyone
theorygenerally,publisheda
of bookentitled
becomesadversary
amongthem.Agency
ingconflicts
Law
of theAdministrative
ThePrinciples
is shiftedto the of theUnitedStates.40 Therehe definedadministrative
of conflict
agencyand theresolution
the officeof the chiefexecutive,inter- lawas "thatpartofthelawwhichfixestheorganization
legislature,
or the courts. Moreover,the anddetermines
which
oftheauthorities
agencycommittees,
thecompetence
remedies
numberof bureausand agenciestendsto growover executethelaw,andindicates
totheindividual
Othershavefoundthis
time,partlyin responseto the politicaldemandsof fortheviolation
ofhisrights.""41
Thisapproachto broad conceptionof administrative
forrepresentation.
interests
organized
law adequatefor
has beenwidelydenounced defining
organization
and
administrative
muchoftheworkofpublicadministrators
"costly,"and thenatureof publicagencies.For instance,Marshall
"unmanageable,"
government
as making
"inefficient,"37but, as Seidmanargues,it persists Dimockwrites:
organizationis frequently
because administrative
law is somethingverypositiveand conviewedas a politicalquestionthatheavilyemphasizes To thepublicadministrator,
uses to describeit is
he customarily
term
The
his
It
is
authority.
crete.
politicalvalues.
ViewoftheIndividual
tends
Thepoliticalapproachto publicadministration
group.It
as partof an aggregate
to viewtheindividual
himor
theindividual
byturning
doesnotdepersonalize
approach,but
herintoa "case," as doesthemanagerial
ratheridentifiesthe individual'sinterestsas being
to be
similaror identicalto thoseof othersconsidered
withinthe same groupor category.For example,afserviceis aimed
thegovernment
actionwithin
firmative
at specificsocial groupssuch as blacksand women
of
circumstances
withoutinquiryas to theparticular
any individualmemberof thesebroad and diverse
groups.Similarly,farmersgrowingthe same crops
suband/orlocatedin thesame nationalgeopolitical
divisionsare consideredalike,despiteindividualdifamongthem.The sameis truein anynumber
ferences
wherepublicpolicies
of areasof publicadministration
This is a tendealingwithpeople are implemented.
dency,of course,thatfitsthepoliticalculturewelltendto thinkin termsof groups,e.g., the
politicians
"black" vote,the"farm"vote,labor,andso forth.Indeed, thisapproachis so strongthatsome,such as
ofgovernitthemainfeature
consider
DavidTruman,38
mentintheUnitedStates.TheodoreLowiarguesthata
American"public
centraltenetof the contemporary
philosophy" is that "organized interests are
monoand easy to define,sometimes
homogeneous

in"my mandate." It is "his" law, somethinghe feelsa proprietary

terestin. It does threethings:tellshimwhatthelegislatureexpectshim
and setsforththesubstanto accomplish,fixeslimitsto his authority,
tive and proceduralrightsof the individualand group. Having a
considershimselfboth
positiveviewof his mandate,theadministrator
and a builder.He is a builderbecause everytimehe apan interpreter
plies old law to new situationshe builds the law. Thereforelaw, like
in action.'
is government
administration,

Davisarguesthatpublic
Takinga relatedview,Kenneth
agenciesare bestdefinedin termsof law: "An adminotherthan
authority,
agencyis a governmental
istrative
body,whichaffects
a courtand otherthana legislative
either
adjudication,
ofprivate
partiesthrough
therights
negotiating,
prosecuting,
investigating,
rule-making,
acting."43
or informally
settling,
A secondsourceof thelegalapproachhas beenthe
of publicadtowardthe"judicialization"44
movement
of
thepurview
fallswithin
Judicialization
ministration.
of administrative
law,buttends
Goodnow'sdefinition
of proheavilyupontheestablishment
to concentrate
Dimock
rights.
individual
to
safeguard
designed
cedtjres
capturestheessenceofjudicialization:
succinctly
Procedure Act [19461 came into exisBefore the Administrative
staff,with
tence,decisionswere made by the regularadministrative
the ultimatedecision being entrustedto the head of the agency.
it was a collectiveor institutionaldecision, each
Characteristically,
makinghis contributionand all checkingeach other. The decisions
were made on the basis of statutorylaw, plus agencysublegislation,
plus decided court cases. The systemworked, and in most cases

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PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIVE THEORY AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS

workedwell. Then theidea arose of using"hearingexaminers"in certain cases wherehearingswerelong and technical,as in railroadcases
comingunderthe InterstateCommerceCommission....
ProcedureAct . .. was enacted,however,
WhentheAdministrative
judicializationwas speeded up, and now, like a spreadingfog, it has
become well-nighuniversal.It began withhearingofficerswho were
recruitedby the U.S. Civil Service Commissionand put in a pool,
fromwhichtheywereassignedto variousagencies.... [TIhe idea of
courtroomprocedurewas stillfurther
enlargedwhenCongresscreated
theofficeof "Administrative
Judge,"thisbeingone who operatesinside theagencyinsteadof outsideit,as in thecase of theEuropean administrative
courts.
. . .In actual practice. . . the longerthe systemhas been in existhehearingexaminer'srecommendeddecitence,themorefrequently
sion becomes the finaldecision.'5

223

theconstitutionality
orlegality
tion,insuitschallenging
ofpublicinstitutions
suchas schools,prisons,
andmenthecourtshavefrequently
decreed
tal healthfacilities,
reliefrequiring
institutional
reforms
thatplace
on-going
thejudgesin therole of "partner"5withpublicadministrators.
Indeed,in someinstances
judgesclearly
underbecome supervisorsof vast administrative
takings."2

Thelegalapproachtopublicadministration
embodies
due process.It
threecentralvalues.One is procedural
thatthisvaluecannotbe conhas longbeenrecognized
or standards.53
finedto anysinglesetof requirements
Rather,thetermstandsforthevalueof fundamental
fairness
and is viewedas requiring
procedures
designed
to
frommalicious,arbitrary,
protect
individuals
capriThus,judicialization
bringsnotonlylaw butlegalproor
unconstitutional
harm
at
the
hands
of
cious,
the
cedureas well to bear upon administrative
decision
A
concerns
individual
subgovernment.
second
value
to
more
like
function
courts
making.Agenciesbegin
rightsas embodiedin evolvinginterpretations
and consequently
legal valuescometo playa greater stantive
of
the
Bill
ofRightsandtheFourteenth
Amendment.
In
rolein theiractivities.
the
the
of
views
maximization
ingeneral,
judiciary
lawprovides
Constitutional
a thirdsourceofthecontemporary
legal approachto public administration.dividualrightsand libertiesas a positivegood and
of theUnitedStatespoliticalsystem.
feature
Sincethe 1950s,thefederaljudiciaryhas virtually
re- necessary
of
these
Breaches
rights
maybe tolerated
bythecourts
definedtheprocedural,
and substanequal protection,
on
when,
some
essential
balance,
governmental
functiverightsand liberties
of thecitizenry
vis-a-vispublic
theirabridgment.
However,theusualpreadministrators."
Theold distinction
between
and tionrequires
rights
in such circumprivileges,
whichhad largelymadetheConstitution
ir- sumptionis againstthe government
stances
and,
doctrines
consequently,
judicial
place a
to individuals'
claimswithregardto thereceipt
relevant
actionthatinofgovernmental
metitsdemise.Concomitant- heavyburdenon officialadministrative
benefits,
uponthesubstantive
constitutional
ofinrights
ly,therewas a vastexpansionin therequirement
that fringes
Third,thejudiciary
valuesequity,a concept
affordconstitutional
publicadministrators
procedural dividuals.5'
interpretation.
due process to the individualsupon whom they thatlikedueprocessis subjecttovarying
in general,
acted.A newstringency
specifically
was readintothe However,in termsof publicadministration
in theresultof
EighthAmendment's
of crueland unusual equitystandsforthevalueof fairness
prohibition
between
private
partiesandthegovernment.
It
punishment.
Whollynew rights,such as the rightto conflicts
againstarbitrary
or invidious
treatment
of intreatment
and habilitation,
werecreated,if not fully militates
muchof theconstitutional
reratified
by the SupremeCourt,forthoseconfinedto dividuals,encompasses
ofequalprotection,
andenablesthecourtsto
publicmentalhealthfacilities.
Theright
toequalprotec- quirement
whoseconstitutional
rights
tionwas vastlystrengthened
and appliedina variety
of fashionreliefforindividuals
action.
administrative
mattersrangingfrompublicpersonnel havebeenviolatedbyadministrative
One of themajorfeatures
of thevaluesof thelegal
meritexaminations
to theoperationof publicschools
approachto publicadministration
is thedowngrading
and prisons.
reasoning
associatedwiththemanaThe expansionof the constitutional
rightsof in- ofthecost/benefit
dividualsvis-a-vispublicadministrators
has been en- gerialapproach.The judiciaryis not obliviousto the
butitscentralfocustendsto be on
forcedprimarily
intwoways,bothofwhichenhancethe costsofitsdecisions,
rights,
rather
thanon the
relevance
of thelegalapproachto contemporary
public thenatureof theindividual's
ofsecuring
thoserights.
Thisis especialadministration.
The courtshavesoughtto forcepublic coststo society
incasesinvolving
thereform
ofpublicinstituadministrators
scrupulouslyto avoid violatingin- lyevident
dividuals'constitutional
rightsby reducingpublicof- tions.As one courtsaid, "inadequateresourcescan
forthestate'sdeprivficials'once absoluteimmunity
fromcivil suitsfor neverbe an adequatejustification
rights."5
damagesto a qualifiedimmunity.'7
Withsomeexcep- inganypersonof hisconstitutional
tions,publicadministrators
arenowliablefordamages
ifthey"knewor reasonably
shouldhaveknown"that Organizational
Structure
an action taken abridgedsomeone'sconstitutional
rights.'8
In theSupreme
Court'sview,thisapproach"in
As suggested
in thediscussion
ofjudicialization,
the
additionto compensating
victims,servesa deterrent preferred
structure
of thelegalapproachto publicadpurpose""that"shouldcreatean incentive
forofficials ministration
is onethatwillmaximize
theuse of adverwhomayharbordoubtsaboutthelawfulness
oftheirin- saryprocedure.The full-fledged
judicial trialis the
tendedactionsto erron thesideof protecting
citizens' archetypical
modelof thisstructure.
In termsof public
constitutional
rights."50
Consequently,
theconceptof administration,
however,it is generally
modifiedto
administrative
competenceis expanded to include allowgreater
flexibility
in thediscovery
of facts.Juries
reasonableknowledgeof constitutional
law. In addi- are notusedand hearingexaminers
oftenplaya more
MAY/JUNE
1983
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224

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW

to an inactive role in bringingout relevantinformation. nantpublicschoolteacher,she was entitled

is oftenassociatedwithregula- dividualizedmedicaldetermination
of her fitnessto
thisstructure
Although
publicad- continueon thejob. In Wyattv. Stickney
within
itsgeneralpresence
(1971),"?a
torycommissions,
treatFor exam- federaldistrict
courtrequiredthatan individual
shouldnotbe underestimated.
ministration
publicper- mentplan be developedforeach personinvoluntarily
relieduponincontemporary
ple,itis heavily
in theareasof adverse confinedto Alabama'spublicmentalhealthfacilities.
especially
sonnelmanagement,
doesnot,of
qua individual
andlaborrela- Emphasison theindividual
opportunity,
actions,equalemployment
of individualsinto
tions."'It is also commonin instanceswheregovern- course,precludethe aggregation
orpublicschooleduca- broadergroups,as in the case of class actionsuits.
suchas welfare
mentalbenefits,
tion, are being withheld or withdrawnfrom However,whilesucha suitmaybe desirableto obtain
thelegalapchange,it does not diminish
variesfromcontext widespread
The precisestructure
individuals."7
individuals.
specific
of
it
rights
the
with
concern
through
running
proach's
butthecommonelement
to context,
of the hearing
and impartiality
is the independence
As Dimockpointsout,to a largeextentthis
examiner.
ofPowers
The Separation
the managerialapproach's
undermines
independence
standoutside
Hearingexaminers
relianceon hierarchy.
to public
upontheseopposingapproaches
Reflection
hierarchiesin an importantsense. administration
administrative
thattheycannotbe synthesized
suggests
Althoughtheycan be toldwhatto do, thatis, which forthesimplereasonthattheyarean integral
partofa
casesto hear,theycannotbe toldhowto ruleordecide. politicalculturethat emphasizesthe separationof
Moreover,forall intentsand purposes,theirrulings powersrather
politicalaction.Thus,itis
thanintegrated
may be bindingupon publicagencies.This may in- largely
truethateachof theseapproachesis associated
coordina- withthevaluesembodiedin a different
on administrative
branchof govtroduceseriouslimitations
oflawand ernment.The managerialapproachis most closely
interpretation
examiner's
tionas thehearing
hastaken
agencyrules may differfromthat of the agency's associatedwiththeexecutive.
Thepresidency
theimpact on a vastnumberof rolesand functions,
Dimocksummarizes
hierarchy.
buta major
managerial
as follows:
structure
of theadjudicatory
poweris to makesurethat
of itsconstitutional
feature
therole
executed.Thisis largely
thelawsare faithfully
judgesare on a different ofimplementation,
and administrative
The hearingofficers
whichis thefocusofthemanagerial
oragency,
inhisdepartment
unlikeotherofficials
payroll.Moreover,
The
of public administration.
definition
or evencom- approach's
to fire,discipline,
forbidden
is expressly
theexecutive
closely
more
is
contrast,
by
approach,
political
judgeexceptunderveryspecialcirwiththeadministrative
municate
It viewspublicadconcerns.
whichusuallymeanswhenthejudgesubmitshis pro- associatedwithlegislative
cumstances,
law makersand policy
as supplementary
thejudgeis isolatedinthesame ministrators
posedorder.Underthenewsystem,
on representativeHenceitsemphasis
makersgenerally.
willbe
influence
as a judicialjudge,forfearthatimproper
manner
The legalapand accountability.
ness,responsiveness,
to bearuponhim.5'
brought
initsconproachis verycloselyrelatedto thejudiciary
thismodelis at cernwithindividualrights,adversary
extent,therefore,
and
To a considerable
procedure,
oddswithall thevaluesembodiedin theothertwoap- equity.
economy,
proaches:It militatesagainst efficiency,
Brandeispointedout,thefounders'purAs Justice
respon- pose in creatingthe constitutional
representativeness,
effectiveness,
brancheswas not
managerial
It is intended, simplyto facilitateefficiency,
and a
siveness,and politicalaccountability.
coordination,
of therightsof smoothfunctioning
protection
The purrather,to affordmaximum
of government
generally.
or in- pose was also to createa system
privatepartiesagainstillegal,unconstitutional,
thatwouldgiveeach
action.
vidiousadministrative
abusesor
brancha motiveand a meansforpreventing
actionby another.This wouldpreventthe
misguided
and
executive,
ofall powers,legislative,
"accumulation
ViewoftheIndividual
inthesamehands,"which,as Madisonwrote
judiciary,
to be "the
considered
The legal approach'semphasison proceduraldue in Federalist#47,thefounders
of
the
But
separation
of
tyranny."
definition
very
conit
to
and equityleads
rights,
process,substantive
inaction.
toward
a
create
tendency
would
also
powers
of
set
a
in
unique
as
a
person
individual
unique
the
sider
The notionthateverypersonis entitled Not onlywouldeach branchcheckthe others,but a
circumstances.
here.The adversary systemof checksand balanceswouldalso serveas a
to a "day in court"is appropriate
to explain checkon popularpoliticalpassions.Thus,thetermsof
individual
an
to enable
is designed
procedure
of theHouse
of members
think- officeand theconstituencies
circumstances,
his or heruniqueand particular
and the Senate differfromeach
deci- of Representatives
tothegovernmental
andso forth
ing,motivations,
The judiciary,
sion maker.Moreover,a decisionmayturnprecisely otherand fromthoseof thepresident.
se and serves
no
has
constituency
per
appointive,
the
being
of
become
which
part
upon such considerations,
exam- at good behavior,subjectto removalbyimpeachment.
"merits"ofthecase.Therearesomeoutstanding
as a whole,
of thegovernment
Forin- Changingthe staffing
plesofthisintherealmofpublicadministration.
be
can
only
that
accomplished
is
something
therefore,
v.
LaFleur
Education
Board
of
stance, in Cleveland
and directions
itspolicyinitiatives
Altering
gradually.
(1974)59 the Supreme Court ruled that before a manrequireswidespreadconsensusamongthe
leavecouldbe imposedupona preg- drastically
datorymaternity
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PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIVE THEORY AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS

someactionsof thelegislature,
citizenry.
Importantly,
suchas approving
treaties,
over-riding
vetoes,and proposingconstitutional
amendments,
requireextraordinarymajorities.
Thiscan enablea politicalminority
to
protectitselffroma majoritypassion." Overall,the
government
was designedto be responsive
slowlyto
relatively
long-term
publicdemandsand to requirethe
of relatively
development
broadagreement
amongthe
electorate
priorto takingaction.

225

developa distinctive
theoretical
core suitableto the
politicalcultureby buildingaroundtheneedto maintainvalues,organizational
and perspectives
structures,
on theindividual
thattendto checkand balanceeach
other.
Preciselyhow such theorymay be derivedis, of
evidentor predictable.
course,not immediately
However,a fewideascometomind.First,publicadministrativetheorists
mustrecognize
thevalidity
of
and utility
each of theapproachesdiscussedhere.Perhapsothers
canbe addedinthefuture,
butthelegitimacy
ofeachof
. . attentionmust be paid to the public adthese
is
beyond
question.
definition
of
a
Consequently,
ministrativepractitioners whose action is thefieldof publicadministration
mustincludea concircumscribedby internalconsiderations of siderationof managerial,political,and legal apchecks, balances, and administrativeand proaches.Second,itis necessary
to recognize
thateach
approachmaybe moreorlessrelevant
political pressures....
todifferent
agencies, administrative
functions,
and policyareas. For
stressesadjudicationand, conseThismodelofgovernment
hasnotseemedwell-suited example,regulation
quently,
should
notbe organized
probably
acprimarily
to publicpolicyaimedat widespread
ofthe
penetration
to
cording
the
or
managerial
political
approaches.
Likeeconomicandsociallifeofthepolitical
It is
community.
mostclearlyfallwithinthe
in favorof inertiaand inflexibility.
weighted
In answer wise,overheadoperations
purview
of
the
managerial
approach.
Distributive
policy
to thisproblem,duringthe past centuryor so, the
may
be
best
organized
according
to
the
political
apUnited States developeda large administrative
approach.
Much
more
thought
and
research
must
be
paratusto facilitate
specialized,positive,and flexible
devoted
to
these
matters
before
firm
any
conclusions
governmental
action."2
Thisphenomenon
is commonly
itis an administrative
fallacy
referred
to as the"riseoftheadministrative
state"and canbe reached.Butclearly
to
to
try
treat
all
agencies
and
programs
under
a
univeris hardlyconfinedto theUnitedStates.'3However,in
thiscountry
itrepresents
an effort
to reducetheinertial sal standard.Thisis one reasonwhythemuchvaunted
techniquesof PPBS and ZBB
qualitiesof the systemof separationof powers.In "rational" budgeting
failed."
Third,
as
heretical
as it willsoundto some,
essence,all threegovernmental
functions
havebeencolpublic
administrative
theory
mustmakegreater
use of
lapsedintotheadministrative
branch.Thus,publicadministrators
makerules(legislation),
implement
these politicaltheory.As is arguedhere,theseparationof
delegarules(an executive
function),
and adjudicatequestions powersgoeswellbeyondtheissuesoflegislative
tion
and
agency
subdelegation-it
reaches
to
the
coreof
theirapplicationand execution(a judicial
concerning
Finally,
The collapsingof theseparationof powers theleadingtheoriesof publicadministration.
function).
mustbe paid to thepracticalwisdomof the
has been well recognized.As JusticeWhitewrotein attention
public
administrative
practitioners
whoseactionis cirBuckleyv. Valeo(1976), "Thereis no doubtthatthe
cumscribed
by
internal
considerations
of checks,
oftheadministrative
development
agencyinresponse
to
and politicalpressures
modernlegislative
and administrative
needhas placed balances,and administrative
are often
severestrainon theseparation-of-powers
inits generally.Individualpublicadministrators
principle
called
to
upon
integrate
the
three
approaches
to public
pristine
formulation.""
Thisstrainhasalsocontributed
and muchcan be learnedfromtheir
to a "crisisof legitimacy"'5
in publicadministration administration
becauseof the accumulation
of legislative,
executive, experience.
and judicialfunctions
in administrative
agenciesruns
counterto the deeplyingraineddesire withinthe
Notes
politicalculturefora system
of checksand balances.
In a veryreal fashion,however,
a system
of checks 1. Robert Parker, "The End of
Public Administration,"Public
and balanceshas devolvedto theadministrative
branch
AdministrationReview, Vol. 34 (June 1965), p. 99; quoted in
with
thethreegovernmental
along
functions.
Thus,as
Richard Stillman,Public Administration:Concepts and Cases
hasbeenarguedinthisessay,thevaluesassociatedwith
(Boston: Houghton,Mifflin,1976), p. 3.
each functionhave been transmuted
into distinctive 2. FrederickC. Mosher, "Research in Public Administration,"
theoretical
approachestowardpublicadministration.
Public Administration
Review, Vol. 16 (Summer1956), p. 177;
Theseapproaches
Stillman,Public Administration,
havedifferent
origins,
p. 3.
stressdifferent
values and structuralarrangements,
and view in- 3. Herbert Kaufman, "Emerging Conflictsin the Doctrines of
Public Administration,"American Political Science Review,
dividualsinremarkably
different
ways.Thisis precisely
Vol.
50 (December 1956), pp. 1057-1073.
becauseeachstresses
a different
function
of publicad4. JamesQ. Wilson, "The BureaucracyProblem," The Public Inministration.
Consequently,
althoughtheremay be
terest,Vol. 6 (Winter
pp. 3-9.
roomforgreater
synthesis
oftheseapproaches,
seeking 5. See Gabriel Almond 1976),
and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture
to unifytheorybyallowingone approachto driveout
(Boston: Little,Brown, 1965), whose findingsprovidea useful
the otherswould promotepublicbureaucracy
in the
outline of the values formingthe core of the U.S. political
mostinvidioussenseof theterm.Rather,thetaskis to
culture.
MAY/JUNE 1983
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226

PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REVIEW

6. Carl Schurz,TheNecessityand Progressof CivilServiceReform

(Washington,D.C.: Good Government,1894), p. 3.
7. Woodrow Wilson, "The Study of Administration,"Political
Science Quarterly, Vol. 56 (December 1941), pp. 481-506
in 1887).
(originallycopyrighted
8. Ibid., p. 481.
9. FrederickTaylor, ThePrinciplesof ScientificManagement(New
York: Harper and Bros., 1917).
10. Leonard D. White,Introductionto theStudyof Public Administration(New York: Macmillan, 1926), pp. vii-viii.See also
HerbertJ. Storing,"Leonard D. Whiteand the Studyof Public
Administration," Public AdministrationReview, Vol. 25
(March 1965), pp. 38-51.
ed. by LutherGulick
11. Papers on the Science of Administration,
and L. Urwick(New York: Instituteof Public Administration,
1937), pp. 192, 10.
12. Robert Simmons and Eugene Dvorin, Public Administration
(Port Washington,N.Y.: AlfredPublishing,1977), p. 217.
13. Max Weber,From Max Weber:Essays in Sociology,translated
and ed. by H. H. Gerthand C. W. Mills (New York: Oxford
UniversityPress, 1958), pp. 196-244.
14. PeterBlau and MarshallMeyer,Bureaucracyin ModernSociety,
seconded. (New York: Random House, 1971),esp. p. 8. See also
Victor Thompson, Modern Organization(New York: Knopf,
1961), pp. 58-80.
15. See Harold Seidman,Politics,Position,and Power (New York:
OxfordUniversityPress, 1970), Chapter 1.
16. See Eugene Lewis, American Politics in a BureaucraticAge:
Clients,and Victims(Cambridge,Mass.:
Citizens,Constituents,
Winthrop,1977).
17. Weber,Essays in Sociology,p. 228.
(New
18. JayShafritz,et al., PersonnelManagementin Government
York: Marcel Dekker, 1978), p. 94.
19. Ralph Hummel, The BureaucraticExperience(New York: St.
Martin's, 1977), pp. 24-25.
20. See ErvingGoffman,Asylums(Garden City,N.Y.: Doubleday,
1961), esp. pp. 1-24;Halderman v. PennhurstState School, 244
F. Supp. 1295 (1977); Holt v. Sarver,304 F. Supp. 362 (1970);
John Hersey, The AlgiersMotel Incident(New York: Knopf,
1968).
21. See Amitai Etzioni, Modern Organizations(Englewood Cliffs,
N.J.: PrenticeHall, 1964), chapter4, fora brief,cogentdescription of the human relations approach. Victor Thompson,
Modern Organization, discusses bureaupathology at pp.
152-177.
22. Wallace Sayre, "Premises of Public Administration:Past and
Emerging,"in Jay Shafritzand AlbertHyde, eds., Classics of
Public Administration(Oak Park, Ill.: Moore, 1978), p. 201.
Dwight Waldo, The AdministrativeState (New York: Ronald
Press, 1948), demonstrateshow the basic value choices of
managerialpublic administrationare ultimatelystatementsof
politicalpreference.
23. Paul Appleby, Policy and Administration(University,Ala.:
Universityof Alabama Press, 1949); see also Theodore Lowi,
The End of Liberalism(New York: W.W. Norton, 1969).
24. Myersv. U.S., 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926).
25. David Nachmias and David H. Rosenbloom, Bureaucratic
Government,U.S.A. (New York: St. Martin's, 1980).
26. The literaturehereis too vast to cite in its entirety.See Samuel
Bureaucracy
Krislovand David H. Rosenbloom,Representative
and theAmericanPolitical System(New York: Praeger, 1981)
fora recentdiscussion.
27. PL 95-454, sect. 3 and sect. 2301 (b) (1). See also Givhan v.
WesternLine ConsolidatedSchool District,99 S. Ct. 693 (1979),
a public
which enunciatesconstitutionalconditionspermitting
employee to act as a "representative"within a public administrative
structure.

28. PL 92-463.
29. See WilliamKeefeand MorrisOgul,The AmericanLegislative
Process, fourthed. (EnglewoodCliffs,N.J.: Prentice-Hall,
1977), p. 407.
30. See Frederick
Mosher,Democracyand thePublic Service(New
York: OxfordUniversity
Press, 1968); Ralph Hummel,The
BureaucraticExperience; MorrisJanowitz,
Deil Wright,
and
WilliamDelany,Public Administrationand the Public (Westport,Conn.: Greenwood,1977); Lowi, End of Liberalism;
WilliamMorrow,Public Administration(NewYork:Random
House,1975);andBruceSmithandJamesD. Carroll,eds.,Improving the Accountabilityand Performanceof Government

(Washington,
D.C.: Brookings,
1982).
31. Thiswasan implicit
assumption
ofthe19th-century
civilservice
reformers,
who arguedthat"as thefunctions
of government
growinextent,
importance
andcomplexity,
thenecessity
grows
oftheirbeingadministered
notonlywithhonesty,
butalso with
trainedabilityand knowledge,"
CarlSchurz,Congressand the
Spoils System(NewYork:GeorgePeck,1895), p. 4. See Harry
Kranz,The ParticipatoryBureaucracy(Lexington,
Mass.: LexingtonBooks, 1976); and Samuel Krislov,Representative
Bureaucracy(Englewood
Cliffs,N.J.: Prentice-Hall,
1974)for
discussions
of socialrepresentativeness
andefficiency.
32. MarverBernstein,
The Job of theFederal Executive(Washington,D.C.: Brookings,
1958),p. 30.
33. Ibid., pp. 26-37. See also Herbert
Kaufman,
TheAdministrative
Behavior of Federal Bureau Chiefs(Washington,
D.C.: Brookings,1981),esp. chapter
2.
34. Seidman,
Politics,Position, and Power, p. 13.
inFrancisRourke,
35. Norton
Long,"PowerandAdministration,"
ed., BureaucraticPower in National Politics (Boston:Little,
Brown, 1965), p. 18.

36. RogerDavidson,"Congressand theExecutive:The Race for

in A. DeGrazia,ed., Congress: The First
Representation,"
Branch of Government(NewYork:Anchor,1967), p. 383.
1.
37. See Seidman,
Politics,Position, and Power, chapter
Process (NewYork:Knopf,
38. DavidTruman,The Governmental
1951); see also ArthurBentley,The Process of Government
of Chicago,1908).
(Chicago:University
39. Lowi, End of Liberalism, p. 71. See also GrantMcConnell,
Private Power and AmericanDemocracy (New York:Knopf,
4 and 5.
1966),chapters
Law of
40. FrankGoodnow,The Principlesof theAdministrative
the UnitedStates (NewYork:G.P. Putnam'sSons,1905).
41. Ibid., p. 17.
42. MarshallDimock,Law and Dynamic Administration(New
York: Praeger,1980), p. 31.
Law and Government(St. Paul:
43. Kenneth
Davis,Administrative
West, 1975), p. 6.
44. Dimock,Law and DynamicAdministration,
chapter10.
ofthe
toCharlesDullea,"Development
45. Ibid., p. 113.According
Law Judges,"AdminPersonnelProgramforAdministrative
istrativeLaw Review,Vol. 25 (Winter
1973), pp. 41-47,thetitle

Law Judge"wascreatedbytheU.S. CivilSer"Administrative

viceCommission.
tocite.SeeDavid
aretoovoluminous
46. Thecaselawandliterature
Public Administrationand Law: Bench v.
H. Rosenbloom,
Bureau in the UnitedStates (NewYork:MarcelDekker,1983).
47. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 322 (1974). See also Rosen6.
and Law, chapter
bloom,Public Administration
Wood v. Strickland,420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 50 Law Week4815 (1982).
49. Carlson v. Green,446 U.S. 14, 21 (1980).
50. Owen v. Cityof Independence,445 U.S. 622, 652 (1980).

48.

51. David Bazelon,"The Impactof theCourtson PublicAdminIndiana Law Journal,Vol. 52 (1976), pp. 101-110.
istration,"
52. AbramChayes,"The Role of theJudgein PublicLaw Litiga-

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PUBLIC ADMINISTRATIVE THEORY AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS

53.
54.

55.
56.

57.
58.
59.
60.

tion," Harvard Law Review, Vol. 89 (1976), pp. 1281-1316;

Roger Cramton,"Judicial Lawmakingin the LeviathanState,"
Public AdministrationReview, Vol. 36 (September/October
1976), pp. 551-555.
Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960).
See for instance,Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518 (1980),
whichrequiresthe public employerto "demonstratethatparty
affiliationis an appropriaterequirement
fortheeffective
performance of the public officeinvolved" whenmakinga patronage
dismissal.
Hamilton v. Love, 328 F. Supp. 1182, 1194 (1971).
See Robert Vaughn, The Spoiled System(New York: Charterhouse, 1975); RichardA. Merrill,"Procedure forAdverseActions Against Federal Employees," VirginiaLaw Review, Vol.
59 (1973), pp. 196-287.
Goldbergv. Kelly,397 U.S. 254 (1970); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S.
565 (1975).
Dimock, Law and DynamicAdministration,
p. 114.
414 U.S. 632 (1974). Arguedand decidedwithCohen v. Chesterfield Co. School Board.
Wyattv. Stickney,325 F. Supp. 781 (1971); 334 F. Supp. 387
(1972).

227

61. See Federalist

#10.
62. See PeterWoll,American
seconded. (NewYork:
Bureaucracy,
Norton,1977).Wollis amongseveralscholarswitha constitutionalfocuswhoarguecogently
thattheadministrative
process
is
farmoreflexible
thangovernment
totheoriginal
according
constitutional
couldbe. Seealso,Davis,Administrative
scheme
Law
and Government.James 0. Freedman,Crisis and Legitimacy

(NewYork:Cambridge
University
Press,1978),chapter
2, providesa briefdescription
oftheriseofthecontemporary
administrative
stateand thetensionbetweenits operationand the
founders'
conceptof theseparation
of powers.

63. HenryJacoby, The Bureaucratizationof the World(Berkeley:

University
of California
Press,1978).
64. Buckleyv. Valeo,424U.S. 1, 280-281(1976).

65. Freedman,Crisisand Legitimacy.

66. AllenSchick,"A Deathin theBureaucracy,"

PublicAdministration
Review,Vol. 33 (March/April
1973),pp. 146-156;
"BudgetingExpertCalls CarterPlan 'Disaster,'" Houston
Post,April8, 1977,p. 14A,quotesPeterPhyrr,
originator
of
zerobasedbudgeting,
as callingthefederaleffort
to institute
ZBB all-at-once
"absolutefolly."

Intergovernmental
Management:
PerspectivesfromHumanServices
ProblemSolvingat the Local Level
Robert Agranoff,IndianaUniversity
Valerie A. Lindsay, IllinoisBureau of the Budget
This paper attemptsto defineintergovernmental
stimulate
future
intotheadministrative
inquiry
dimenmanagement
(IGM). It is based on the findings
sionsof intergovernmental
affairs.
of a
studyof local public officialsas they face interThe questionmayappropriately
be raised,whatis
governmental
issuesandseekto resolveproblems.
IGM IGM and how does it differfromintergovernmental
has been one of the neglecteddimensionsof inter- relations
(IGR)? IGR, whichhas beendescribed
as difgovernmental
relationships,
fromtraditional
whichhasfocusedon struc- fering
withitsemphasis
federalism,
on
tural,fiscal,and legalpatterns.'
The studyreferred
levelsanddividedfunctions,
to independent
focusesonachere,on theotherhand,examinesinter-jurisdictional
tual relationships
as governments
sharein theperforproblem-solving.
As such,it providesan excellent
op- manceof expandedfunctions.2
Wright,
amongothers,
portunity
to begindevelopingoperating
principles
of has explainedtheserelationships
as involving
multiple
management.
unitsof government
and governmental
actorsas they
Althoughtheresearchsettingfocusedon interlocal pursue goals and develop and implementpolicy.3 The
humanservices,
theconceptsand approachesare pre- IGM component
of IGR, then,placesemphasison the
sumedto be moregeneral.Thispaperwill"teaseout" goal achievement
componentof theserelationships,
theimportant
implications
formanagers
as theyattempt
to accomplishtasksintergovernmentally
at all levels. RobertAgranoff
is professor
of publicand environmental
affairs,
Thus,theapproachto management,
as wellas to the IndianaUniversity,
Bloomington,
wherehespecializes
inhumanserinterlocal
modeshighlighted,
intergovernmental
arepresumed
management,
and public
to represent vices adminsitration,
IGM generally.Moreover,the substantive
look at management.
humanservices
issuesis a matter
of focus,albeitan im- ValerieA. Lindsayis an analystintheIllinoisBureauoftheBudget,
portantone, sincea largeproportion
of intergovern- Springfield.
She participated
in thisresearchwhilecompleting
an
mentalprograms
and problems
fallsintothiscategory. MPA at IndianaUniversity's
Schoolof Publicand Environmental
The purposeof thearticleis to generatedialogueand Affairs.
MAY/JUNE1983
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