G.R. No. 193679.July 18, 2012.

*
C.F. SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT, INC., NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINES and NORWEGIAN SUN,
and/or ARTURO ROCHA, petitioners, vs. JOEL D. TAOK, respondent.
Labor Law; Employees Compensation; Seafarers; Disability Benefits; A seafarers right to
disability benefits is a matter governed by law, contract and medical findings.A
seafarers right to disability benefits is a matter governed by law, contract and medical
findings. The relevant legal provisions are Articles 191 to 193 of the Labor Code and
Section 2, Rule X of the Amended Rules on Employee Compensation (AREC). The relevant
contracts are the POEA-SEC, the collective bargaining agreement (CBA), if any, and the
employment agreement between the seafarer and his employer.
Labor Law; Employees Compensation; Seafarers; Disability Benefits; The Supreme Court
discussed the significance of the 120-day period as one when the seafarer is considered
to be totally yet temporarily disabled, thus, entitling him to sickness wages.The
importance of this 120-day period cannot be overemphasized that the CAs failure to
consider and apply it in the disposition of this case strikes this Court as absurd. In Vergara
v. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc., 567 SCRA 610 (2008), this Court discussed the
significance of the 120-day period as one when the seafarer is considered to be totally
yet temporarily disabled, thus, entitling him to sickness wages. This is also the period
given to the employer to determine whether the seafarer is fit for sea duty or
permanently disabled and the degree of such disability.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A seafarer has the right to seek the opinion of other doctors
under Section 20-B(3) of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-Standard
Employment Contract (POEA-SEC) but this is on the presumption that the companydesignated physician had already issued a certification as to his fitness or disability and
he finds this disagreeable.Indeed, a seafarer has the right to seek the opinion of other
doctors under Section 20-B(3) of the POEA-SEC but this is on the presumption that the
company-designated physician had already issued a certification as to his fitness or
disability and he finds this disagreeable. Under the same provision, it is the companydesignated physician who is entrusted with the task of assessing a seafarers disability
and there is a procedure to contest his findings. It is patent from the records that Taok
submitted these medical certificates during the pendency of his appeal before the NLRC.
More importantly, Taok prevented the company-designated physician from determining
his fitness or unfitness for sea duty when he did not return on October 18, 2006 for reevaluation. Thus, Taoks attempt to convince this Court to put weight on the findings of
his doctors-of-choice will not prosper given his failure to comply with the procedure
prescribed by the POEA-SEC.
Same; Same; Same; Same; As provided under Paragraph 3, Section 20-B of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration-Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC), a
seafarer is entitled to sickness wages during the period he is deemed to be temporarily
and totally disabled.As provided under Paragraph 3, Section 20-B of the POEA-SEC, a
seafarer is entitled to sickness wages during the period he is deemed to be temporarily
and totally disabled. Without need for further extrapolation, the objective of the law in

providing for the payment of sickness wages is to aid the seafarer while his disability
prevents him from performing his usual duties.
Same; Same; Same; Same; This condition of temporary and total disability may last for a
period of 120 to 240 days depending on the need for further medical treatment.This
condition of temporary and total disability may last for a period of 120 to 240 days
depending on the need for further medical treatment. It bears emphasis, however, that
the seafarer is not automatically entitled to 120 to 240 days worth of sickness wages. If
the company-designated physician determines that the seafarer is already fit for sea
duty, then, the employers obligation to pay sickness wages ceases and he is entitled to
reinstatement to his former position. On the other hand, if the company-designated
physician declares that the seafarer is already permanently disabled, the employers
obligation to pay sickness wages likewise ceases as the obligation to pay the
corresponding disability benefits.

Auto Bus Transport Systems, Inc. vs. Bautista

G.R. No. 156367. May 16, 2005.*
AUTO BUS TRANSPORT SYSTEMS, INC., petitioner, vs. ANTONIO BAUTISTA, respondent.
Labor Law; Service Incentive Leave; Field Personnel; Words and Phrases; The phrase
other employees whose performance is unsupervised by the employer in Section 1(D),
Rule V, Book III of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code must not be
understood as a separate classification of employees to which service incentive leave
shall not be grantedrather, it serves as an amplification of the interpretation of the
definition of field personnel under the Labor Code as those whose actual hours of work in
the field cannot be determined with reasonable certainty; Employees engaged on task or
contract basis or paid on purely commission basis are not automatically exempted from
the grant of service incentive leave, unless, they fall under the classification of field
personnel.A careful perusal of said provisions of law will result in the conclusion that
the grant of service incentive leave has been delimited by the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the Labor Code to apply only to those employees not explicitly excluded by
Section 1 of Rule V. According to the Implementing Rules, Service Incentive Leave shall
not apply to employees classified as field personnel. The phrase other employees
whose performance is unsupervised by the employer must not be understood as a
separate classification of employees to which service incentive leave shall not be
granted. Rather, it serves as an amplification of the interpretation of the definition of field
personnel under the Labor Code as those whose actual hours of work in the field cannot
be determined with reasonable certainty. The same is true with respect to the phrase
those who are engaged on task or contract basis, purely commission basis. Said phrase
should be related with field personnel, applying the rule on ejusdem generis that
general and unlimited terms are restrained and limited by the particular terms that they
follow. Hence, employees engaged on task or contract basis or paid on purely commission
basis are not automatically exempted from the grant of service incentive leave, unless,
they fall under the classification of field personnel.Same; Same; Same; Same; What must

be ascertained in order to resolve the issue of propriety of the grant of service incentive
leave to a bus driver-conductor is whether or not he is a field personnel; According to the
Labor Code, field personnel shall refer to nonagricultural employees who regularly
perform their duties away from the principal place of business or branch office of the
employer and whose actual hours of work in the field cannot be determined with
reasonable certainty.Petitioners contention that respondent is not entitled to the grant
of service incentive leave just because he was paid on purely commission basis is
misplaced. What must be ascertained in order to resolve the issue of propriety of the
grant of service incentive leave to respondent is whether or not he is a field personnel.
According to Article 82 of the Labor Code, field personnel shall refer to non-agricultural
employees who regularly perform their duties away from the principal place of business
or branch office of the employer and whose actual hours of work in the field cannot be
determined with reasonable certainty. This definition is further elaborated in the Bureau
of Working Conditions (BWC), Advisory Opinion to Philippine Technical-Clerical
Commercial Employees Association which states that: As a general rule, [field personnel]
are those whose performance of their job/service is not supervised by the employer or his
representative, the workplace being away from the principal office and whose hours and
days of work cannot be determined with reasonable certainty; hence, they are paid
specific amount for rendering specific service or performing specific work. If required to
be at specific places at specific times, employees including drivers cannot be said to be
field personnel despite the fact that they are performing work away from the principal
office of the employee.
G.R. No. 195466. July 2, 2014.*
ARIEL L. DAVID, doing business under the name and style YIELS HOG DEALER,
petitioner, vs. JOHN G. MACASIO, respondent.Labor Law; Pakyaw Basis; Engagement on
pakyaw or task basis does not characterize the relationship that may exist between the
parties, i.e., whether one of employment or independent contractorship.Engagement on
pakyaw or task basis does not characterize the relationship that may exist between the
parties, i.e., whether one of employment or independent contractorship. Article 97(6) of
the Labor Code defines wages as x x x the remuneration or earnings, however
designated, capable of being expressed in terms of money, whether fixed or ascertained
on a time, task, piece, or commission basis, or other method of calculating the same,
which is payable by an employer to an employee under a written or unwritten contract of
employment for work done or to be done, or for services rendered or to be rendered[.] In
relation to Article 97(6), Article 101 of the Labor Code speaks of workers paid by results
or those whose pay is calculated in terms of the quantity or quality of their work output
which includes pakyaw work and other non-time work.
Same; Pakyaw Basis; A distinguishing characteristic of pakyaw or task basis
engagement, as opposed to straight-hour wage payment, is the non-consideration of the
time spent in working.A distinguishing characteristic of pakyaw or task basis
engagement, as opposed to straight-hour wage payment, is the non-consideration of the
time spent in working. In a task-basis work, the emphasis is on the task itself, in the
sense that payment is reckoned in terms of completion of the work, not in terms of the
number of time spent in the completion of work. Once the work or task is completed, the

worker receives a fixed amount as wage, without regard to the standard measurements
of time generally used in pay computation.
Same; Holiday Pay; Service Incentive Leave Pay; Field Personnel; Under the Implementing
Rules and Regulations (IRR), exemption from the coverage of holiday and Service
Incentive Leave (SIL) pay refer to field personnel and other employees whose time and
performance is unsupervised by the employer including those who are engaged on task
or contract basis.The general rule is that holiday and SIL pay provisions cover all
employees. To be excluded from their coverage, an employee must be one of those that
these provisions expressly exempt, strictly in accordance with the exemption. Under the
IRR, exemption from the coverage of holiday and SIL pay refer to field personnel and
other employees whose time and performance is unsupervised by the employer including
those who are engaged on task or contract basis[.] Note that unlike Article 82 of the
Labor Code, the IRR on holiday and SIL pay do not exclude employees engaged on task
basis as a separate and distinct category from employees classified as field personnel.
Rather, these employees are altogether merged into one classification of exempted
employees. Because of this difference, it may be argued that the Labor Code may be
interpreted to mean that those who are engaged on task basis, per se, are excluded from
the SIL and holiday payment since this is what the Labor Code provisions, in contrast with
the IRR, strongly suggest. The arguable interpretation of this rule may be conceded to be
within the discretion granted to the LA and NLRC as the quasi-judicial bodies with
expertise on labor matters.
Duterte vs. Kingswood Trading Co., Inc.
Labor Law; Dismissals; The employer, before it can legally dismiss its employee on the
ground of disease, must adduce a certification from a competent public authority that the
disease of which its employee is suffering is of such nature or at such a stage that it
cannot be cured within a period of six months even with proper treatment.The law is
unequivocal: the employer, before it can legally dismiss its employee on the ground of
disease, must adduce a certification from a competent public authority that the disease
of which its employee is suffering is of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be
cured within a period of six months even with proper treatment. Here, the record does not
contain the required certification. And when the respondents asked the petitioner to look
for another job because he was unfit to work, such unilateral declaration, even if backed
up by the findings of its company doctors, did not meet the quantum requirement
mandated by the law, i.e., there must be a certification by a competent public authority.
Same; Nature of Employment; Field Employees; To determine whether an employee is a
field employee, it is also necessary to ascertain if actual hours of work in the field can be
determined with reasonable certainty by the employer.If required to be at specific
places at specific times, employees, including drivers, cannot be said to be field
personnel despite the fact that they are performing work away from the principal office of
the employer. Thus, to determine whether an employee is a field employee, it is also
necessary to ascertain if actual hours of work in the field can be determined with
reasonable certainty by the employer. In so doing, an inquiry must be made as to
whether or not the employees time and performance are constantly supervised by the

employer.
INC Shipmanagement, Inc. vs. Moradas
Labor Law; Seafarers; It is doctrinal that the entitlement of seamen on overseas work to
disability benefits is a matter governed, not only by medical findings, but by law and by
contract.With respect to the applicable rules, it is doctrinal that the entitlement of
seamen on overseas work to disability benefits is a matter governed, not only by
medical findings, but by law and by contract. The material statutory provisions are
Articles 191 to 193 under Chapter VI (Disability Benefits) of the Labor Code, in relation
[to] Rule X of the Rules and Regulations Implementing Book IV of the Labor Code. By
contract, the POEA-SEC, as provided under Department Order No. 4, series of 2000 of the
Department of Labor and Employment, and the parties Collective Bargaining Agreement
bind the seaman and his employer to each other.Same; Disability Benefits; Petitioners
having established through substantial evidence that respondents injury was selfinflicted and, hence, not compensable pursuant to Section 20 (D) of the 1996 Philippine
Overseas Employment Agency-Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC), no grave
abuse of discretion can be imputed against the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) in upholding the dismissal by the Labor Arbiter of his complaint for disability
benefits.All told, petitioners having established through substantial evidence that
respondents injury was self-inflicted and, hence, not compensable pursuant to Section 20
(D) of the 1996 POEA-SEC, no grave abuse of discretion can be imputed against the NLRC
in upholding the dismissal by the LA of his complaint for disability benefits. It is wellsettled that an act of a court or tribunal can only be considered to be tainted with grave
abuse of discretion when such act is done in a capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. For the reasons herein detailed, the Court
finds these qualities of capriciousness or whimsicality wanting in the case at bar and
thus, holds that the CA erred in ruling that grave abuse of discretion exists.
Royal Plant Workers Union vs. Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines, Inc.-Cebu Plant
Labor Law; Management Prerogatives; The Court has held that management is free to
regulate, according to its own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment,
including hiring, work assignments, working methods, time, place, and manner of work,
processes to be followed, supervision of workers, working regulations, transfer of
employees, work supervision, lay-off of workers, and discipline, dismissal and recall of
workers.The Court has held that management is free to regulate, according to its own
discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment, including hiring, work assignments,
working methods, time, place, and manner of work, processes to be followed, supervision
of workers, working regulations, transfer of employees, work supervision, lay-off of
workers, and discipline, dismissal and recall of workers. The exercise of management
prerogative, however, is not absolute as it must be exercised in good faith and with due
regard to the rights of labor.
Same; Labor Standards; There is no law that requires employers to provide chairs for
bottling operators. The Labor Code, specifically Article 132 thereof, only requires
employers to provide seats for women. No similar requirement is mandated for men or

male workers.The rights of the Union under any labor law were not violated. There is no
law that requires employers to provide chairs for bottling operators. The CA correctly
ruled that the Labor Code, specifically Article 132 thereof, only requires employers to
provide seats for women. No similar requirement is mandated for men or male workers. It
must be stressed that all concerned bottling operators in this case are men. There was no
violation either of the Health, Safety and Social Welfare Benefit provisions under Book IV
of the Labor Code of the Philippines. As shown in the foregoing, the removal of the chairs
was compensated by the reduction of the working hours and increase in the rest period.
The directive did not expose the bottling operators to safety and health hazards. The
Union should not complain too much about standing and moving about for one and onehalf (1 ) hours because studies show that sitting in workplaces for a long time is
hazardous to ones health. The report of VicHealth, Australia, disclosed that prolonged
workplace sitting is an emerging public health and occupational health issue with serious
implications for the health of our working population. Importantly, prolonged sitting is a
risk factor for poor health and early death, even among those who meet, or exceed,
national activity guidelines.
SEA POWER SHIPPING ENTERPRISES, INC., and/or BULK CARRIERS LIMITED and SPECIAL
MARITIME ENTERPRISES, and M/V MAGELLAN, petitioners, vs. NENITA P. SALAZAR, on
behalf of deceased ARMANDO L. SALAZAR, respondent.
Labor Law; Seafarers; Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-Standard
Employment Contract (POEA-SEC); In compensation proceedings for seafarers, the
Supreme Court refers to the provisions of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration-Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC) as it memorializes the
minimum rights of a seafarer and the concomitant obligations of an employer.In
compensation proceedings for seafarers, this Court refers to the provisions of the POEA
Contract as it memorializes the minimum rights of a seafarer and the concomitant
obligations of an employer. Section 20(A) thereof pertinently discusses the rules on
granting death benefits. Nevertheless, on account of the liberal interpretation permeating
seafarers agreements, we also consider the possibility of compensation for the death of
the seafarer under Section 32-A of the POEA Contract.
Same; Same; Same; Work-Related Death; Section 20(A) of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC), and a long line
of jurisprudence explaining the provision, require that for a seafarer to be entitled to
death benefits, he must have suffered a work-related death during the term of his
contract.Section 20(A) of the POEA Contract, and a long line of jurisprudence explaining
the provision, require that for respondent to be entitled to death benefits, Armando must
have suffered a work-related death during the term of his contract. The provision reads:
SECTION 20. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS A. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR
DEATH 1. In case of work-related death of the seafarer, during the term of his contract the
employer shall pay his beneficiaries the Philippine Currency equivalent to the amount of
Fifty Thousand US dollars (US$50,000) and an additional amount of Seven Thousand US
dollars (US$7,000) to each child under the age of twenty-one (21) but not exceeding four
(4) children, at the exchange rate prevailing during the time of payment. x x x x 4. The
other liabilities of the employer when the seafarer dies as a result of work-related injury

or illness during the term of employment are as follows: x x x x c. The employer shall pay
the beneficiaries of the seafarer the Philippines currency equivalent to the amount of One
Thousand US dollars (US$1,000) for burial expenses at the exchange rate prevailing
during the time of payment.
Same; Same; Requisites for Death to be Compensable.Unlike Section 20(A), Section 32A of the POEA Contract considers the possibility of compensation for the death of the
seafarer occurring after the termination of the employment contract on account of a
work-related illness. But, for death under this provision to be compensable, the claimant
must fulfill the following: 1. The seafarers work must involve the risks describe herein; 2.
The disease was contracted as a result of the seafarers exposure to the described risks;
3. The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors
necessary to contract it; 4. There was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer.
RODOLFO J. SERRANO, petitioner, vs. SEVERINO SANTOS TRANSIT and/or SEVERINO
SANTOS, respondents.
Labor Law; Retirement; Bus Conductors; Statutes; Republic Act No. 7641; Termination of
Employment; Republic Act No. 7641 which was enacted on December 9, 1992 amended
Article 287 of the Labor Code by providing for retirement pay to qualified private sector
employees in the absence of any retirement plan in the establishment; Bus conductors
paid on commission basis fall within the coverage of Republic Act No. 7641 and its
implementing rules.Republic Act No. 7641 which was enacted on December 9, 1992
amended Article 287 of the Labor Code by providing for retirement pay to qualified
private sector employees in the absence of any retirement plan in the establishment. The
pertinent provision of said law reads: x x x Admittedly, petitioner worked for 14 years for
the bus company which did not adopt any retirement scheme. Even if petitioner as bus
conductor was paid on commission basis then, he falls within the coverage of R.A. 7641
and its implementing rules. As thus correctly ruled by the Labor Arbiter, petitioners
retirement pay should include the cash equivalent of the 5-day SIL and 1/12 of the 13th
month pay.
Same; Same; Same; Taxi Drivers; Service Incentive Leave (SIL); For purposes of applying
the law on Service Incentive Leave (SIL), as well as on retirement, the Court notes that
there is a difference between drivers paid under the boundary system and conductors
who are paid on commission basis; In practice, taxi drivers do not receive fixed wages
they retain only those sums in excess of the boundary or fee they pay to the owners or
operators of the vehicles while conductors are paid a certain percentage of the bus
earnings for the day.The affirmance by the appellate court of the reliance by the NLRC
on R & E Transport, Inc. is erroneous. In said case, the Court held that a taxi driver paid
according to the boundary system is not entitled to the 13th month and the SIL pay,
hence, his retirement pay should be computed on the sole basis of his salary. For
purposes, however, of applying the law on SIL, as well as on retirement, the Court notes
that there is a difference between drivers paid under the boundary system and
conductors who are paid on commission basis. In practice, taxi drivers do not receive
fixed wages. They retain only those sums in excess of the boundary or fee they pay to
the owners or operators of the vehicles. Conductors, on the other hand, are paid a certain

percentage of the bus earnings for the day.

G.R. No. 193628. March 19, 2014.*
SPLASH PHILIPPINES, INC., LORENZO ESTRADA, TAIYO SANGYO TRADING and MARINE
SERVICE, LTD. (TST PANAMA S.A.) and M/V HARUTAMOU, petitioners, vs. RONULFO G.
RUIZO, respondent.
Labor Law; Seafarers; Permanent Total Disability; The true test of whether respondent
suffered from a permanent disability is whether there is evidence that he was unable to
perform his customary work for more than 120 days.As in many other maritime
compensation cases which reached the Court, the CAs award of permanent total
disability benefits to Ruizo is anchored on the 120-day rule often invoked through the
Courts pronouncement in Crystal Shipping. The CA declared: The true test of whether
respondent suffered from a permanent disability is whether there is evidence that he was
unable to perform his customary work as chief cook for more than 120 days. The 120day rule laid down in Crystal Shipping and other cases similarly resolved, however, had
already been clarified or modified. In Vergara v. Hammonia Maritime Services, Inc., 567
SCRA 610 (2008), the Court declared: T]he respondent in the case was unable to
perform his customary work for more than 120 days which constitutes permanent total
disability. This declaration of a permanent total disability after the initial 120 days of
temporary total disability cannot, however, be simply lifted and applied as a general rule
for all cases in all contexts. The specific context of the application should be considered,
as we must do in the application of all rulings and even of the law and of the
implementing regulations.
Same; Same; Disability Benefits; Work-Related Illness; In every maritime disability
compensation claim, it is important to bear in mind that under Section 20(B)3 of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract (POEASEC), in the event a seafarer suffers a work-related injury or illness, the employer is liable
only for the resulting disability that has been assessed or evaluated by the companydesignated physician.In every maritime disability compensation claim, it is important to
bear in mind that under Section 20(B)3 of the POEA-SEC, in the event a seafarer suffers a
work-related injury or illness, the employer is liable only for the resulting disability that
has been assessed or evaluated by the company-designated physician. If a doctor
appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment, a third doctor may be agreed
jointly between the employer and the seafarer whose decision shall be final and binding
on both parties. Further, the parties supposed CBA (the complete copy belatedly
submitted by Ruizo to the CA) contains an almost identical provision (as the POEA-SEC) in
its Article 20.1.4.2.
Same; Same; Permanent Total Disability; A temporary total disability only becomes
permanent when so declared by the company physician within the periods he is allowed
to do so, or upon the expiration of the maximum 240-day medical treatment period
without a declaration of either fitness to work or the existence of a permanent disability.
In any event, as we said in Vergara: a temporary total disability only becomes
permanent when so declared by the company physician within the periods he is allowed

to do so, or upon the expiration of the maximum 240-day medical treatment period
without a declaration of either fitness to work or the existence of a permanent disability.
Although the 240-day maximum treatment period under the rules had already expired,
counted from his repatriation on December 21, 2005, it can be said that Ruizo and the
petitioners agreed to have the treatment period extended as it was obvious that he still
needed treatment. In fact, he agreed, after some trepidation, to be subjected to an
ultrasound procedure (ESWL) in the effort of the petitioners to improve his condition; he
was expected to return after February 5, 2007 to Dr. Cruz for a repeat ESWL, but he failed
to do so. Clearly, under the circumstances, the 120-day rule had lost its relevance.
ANTONIO E. UNICA, petitioner, vs. ANSCOR SWIRE SHIP MANAGEMENT CORPORATION,
respondent.
Labor Law; Seafarers; Termination of Employment; Petitioners stay in the vessel for
another 20 days should not be interpreted as an implied extension of his contract. A
seaman need not physically disembark from a vessel at the expiration of his employment
contract to have such contract considered terminated.In the case at bar, although
petitioners employment contract with respondent ended on October 25, 2000 and he
disembarked only on November 14, 2000 or barely 20 days after the expiration of his
employment contract, such late disembarkation was not without valid reason.
Respondent could not have disembarked petitioner on the date of the termination of his
employment contract, because the vessel was still in the middle of the sea. Clearly, it was
impossible for petitioner to safely disembark immediately upon the expiration of his
contract, since he must disembark at a convenient port. Thus, petitioners stay in the
vessel for another 20 days should not be interpreted as an implied extension of his
contract. A seaman need not physically disembark from a vessel at the expiration of his
employment contract to have such contract considered terminated.
Same; Same; Contractual Employees; It is a settled rule that seafarers are considered
contractual employees. Their employment is governed by the contracts they sign
everytime they are rehired and their employment is terminated when the contract
expires.It is a settled rule that seafarers are considered contractual employees. Their
employment is governed by the contracts they sign everytime they are rehired and their
employment is terminated when the contract expires. Their employment is contractually
fixed for a certain period of time. Thus, when petitioners contract ended on October 25,
2000, his employment is deemed automatically terminated, there being no mutuallyagreed renewal or extension of the expired contract.