G.R. No.

L-19550

June 19, 1967

HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and KARL

BECK, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JOSE LUKBAN, in
his capacity as Acting Director, National Bureau of Investigation; SPECIAL
PROSECUTORS PEDRO D. CENZON, EFREN I. PLANA and MANUEL VILLAREAL, JR. and
ASST. FISCAL MANASES G. REYES; JUDGE AMADO ROAN, Municipal Court of Manila;
JUDGE ROMAN CANSINO, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE HERMOGENES CALUAG,
Court of First Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch, and JUDGE DAMIAN JIMENEZ,
Municipal Court of Quezon City, respondents.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin 1 hereinafter referred
to as Respondents-Prosecutors several judges 2 hereinafter referred to as RespondentsJudges issued, on different dates,3 a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners
herein4 and/or the corporations of which they were officers, 5 directed to the any peace officer, to
search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or
residences, and to seize and take possession of the following personal property to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,
journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers
showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets
and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).
as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or
"used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense," which is described in the
applications adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws,
Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code."
Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening the
Constitution and the Rules of Court because, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with
particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the
warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the
aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and
seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money
seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance
with law on March 20, 1962, said petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this original action
for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and prayed that, pending final disposition of
the present case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining RespondentsProsecutors, their agents and /or representatives from using the effects seized as
aforementioned or any copies thereof, in the deportation cases already adverted to, and that, in
due course, thereafter, decision be rendered quashing the contested search warrants and
declaring the same null and void, and commanding the respondents, their agents or
representatives to return to petitioners herein, in accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of the
Rules of Court, the documents, papers, things and cash moneys seized or confiscated under the
search warrants in question.

In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, 6 (1) that the contested search warrants are
valid and have been issued in accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if any,
were cured by petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible
in evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned
searches and seizures.
On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the petition.
However, by resolution dated June 29, 1962, the writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as
the papers, documents and things seized from the offices of the corporations above mentioned
are concerned; but, the injunction was maintained as regards the papers, documents and things
found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.7
Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in
question may be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the
offices of the aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences of
petitioners herein.
As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the
legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple
reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the
personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of
each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be. 8 Indeed, it
is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have
been impaired thereby,9 and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely
personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. 10 Consequently, petitioners herein may not
validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized
from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to
the admission of said papers in evidence belongsexclusively to the corporations, to whom the
seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against
them in their individual capacity. 11 Indeed, it has been held:
. . . that the Government's action in gaining possession of papers belonging to
the corporation did not relate to nor did it affect the personal defendants. If these
papers were unlawfully seized and thereby the constitutional rights of or any one were
invaded, they were the rights of the corporation and not the rights of the other
defendants. Next, it is clear that a question of the lawfulness of a seizure can be
raised only by one whose rights have been invaded. Certainly, such a seizure, if
unlawful, could not affect the constitutional rights of defendants whose property had
not been seized or the privacy of whose homes had not been disturbed; nor could
they claim for themselves the benefits of the Fourth Amendment, when its violation, if
any, was with reference to the rights of another. Remus vs. United States (C.C.A.)291
F. 501, 511. It follows, therefore, that the question of the admissibility of the evidence
based on an alleged unlawful search and seizure does not extend to the personal
defendants but embraces only the corporation whose property was taken. . . . (A
Guckenheimer & Bros. Co. vs. United States, [1925] 3 F. 2d. 786, 789, Emphasis
supplied.)
With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners herein,
the aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction previously

issued by this Court,12 thereby, in effect, restraining herein Respondents-Prosecutors from using
them in evidence against petitioners herein.
In connection with said documents, papers and things, two (2) important questions need be
settled, namely: (1) whether the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures
made under the authority thereof, are valid or not, and (2) if the answer to the preceding
question is in the negative, whether said documents, papers and things may be used in
evidence against petitioners herein.1wph1.t
Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in the nature of general
warrants and that accordingly, the seizures effected upon the authority there of are null and void.
In this connection, the Constitution13 provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set
forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the
same were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named
had committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue
(Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words, nospecific offense had been alleged in said
applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a
consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the
existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that
the
party
against
whom
it
is
sought
has
performed particular acts,
or
committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact,
the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein
petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of
Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal
Code," as alleged in the aforementioned applications without reference to any determinate
provision of said laws or
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the
most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the
domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims
caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the
constitutional provision above quoted to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not
difficult to imagine what would happen, in times of keen political strife, when the party in power
feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even though by legal means.

Court 14 by providing in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules of Court 15 that "a search
warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense." Not
satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that "no search
warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense."
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants
was compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized,
to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts,
ledgers, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers
showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets
and related profit and loss statements.
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business
transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal.
The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned
corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of
Rights that the things to be seized be particularly described as well as tending to defeat its
major objective: the elimination of general warrants.
Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1), Respondents-Prosecutors maintain that,
even if the searches and seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents,
papers and things thus seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners herein. Upon
mature deliberation, however, we are unanimously of the opinion that the position taken in the
Moncado case must be abandoned. Said position was in line with the American common law
rule, that the criminal should not be allowed to go free merely "because the constable has
blundered," 16 upon the theory that the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches
and seizures is protected by means other than the exclusion of evidence unlawfully
obtained, 17 such as the common-law action for damages against the searching officer, against
the party who procured the issuance of the search warrant and against those assisting in the
execution of an illegal search, their criminal punishment, resistance, without liability to an
unlawful seizure, and such other legal remedies as may be provided by other laws.
However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and eventually
adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. In the language of Judge
Learned Hand:
As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such,
which has been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of
enforcing the constitutional privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against the
offending official may have been protection enough; but that is true no longer. Only in
case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot
profit by their wrong will that wrong be repressed.18
In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court had already declared:

Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search
warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of

If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence
against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment,
declaring his rights to be secure against such searches and seizures, is of no value,
and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the
Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to
punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those
great principles established by years of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in
their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.19
This view was, not only reiterated, but, also, broadened in subsequent decisions on the same
Federal Court. 20After reviewing previous decisions thereon, said Court held, in Mapp vs.
Ohio (supra.):
. . . Today we once again examine the Wolf's constitutional documentation of the right
of privacy free from unreasonable state intrusion, and after its dozen years on our
books, are led by it to close the only courtroom door remaining open to evidence
secured by official lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic right, reserved to all
persons as a specific guarantee against that very same unlawful conduct. We hold
that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is,
by that same authority, inadmissible in a State.
Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against
the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against
them by the same sanction of exclusion as it used against the Federal Government.
Were it otherwise, then just as without the Weeks rule the assurance against
unreasonable federal searches and seizures would be "a form of words," valueless
and underserving of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties, so
too, without that rule the freedom from state invasions of privacy would be so
ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all
brutish means of coercing evidence as not to permit this Court's high regard as a
freedom "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." At the time that the Court held in
Wolf that the amendment was applicable to the States through the Due Process
Clause, the cases of this Court as we have seen, had steadfastly held that as to
federal officers the Fourth Amendment included the exclusion of the evidence seized
in violation of its provisions. Even Wolf "stoutly adhered" to that proposition. The right
to when conceded operatively enforceable against the States, was not susceptible of
destruction by avulsion of the sanction upon which its protection and enjoyment had
always been deemed dependent under the Boyd, Weeks and Silverthorne Cases.
Therefore, in extending the substantive protections of due process to all
constitutionally unreasonable searches state or federal it was logically and
constitutionally necessarily that the exclusion doctrine an essential part of the right
to privacy be also insisted upon as an essential ingredient of the right newly
recognized by the Wolf Case. In short, the admission of the new constitutional Right
by Wolf could not tolerate denial of its most important constitutional privilege, namely,
the exclusion of the evidence which an accused had been forced to give by reason of
the unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise is to grant the right but in reality to withhold its
privilege and enjoyment. Only last year the Court itself recognized that the purpose of
the exclusionary rule to "is to deter to compel respect for the constitutional
guaranty in the only effectively available way by removing the incentive to
disregard it" . . . .

The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the entire
system of constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people rest. Having
once recognized that the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is
enforceable against the States, and that the right to be secure against rude invasions
of privacy by state officers is, therefore constitutional in origin, we can no longer
permit that right to remain an empty promise. Because it is enforceable in the same
manner and to like effect as other basic rights secured by its Due Process Clause, we
can no longer permit it to be revocable at the whim of any police officer who, in the
name of law enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment. Our decision,
founded on reason and truth, gives to the individual no more than that which the
Constitution guarantees him to the police officer no less than that to which honest law
enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in the
true administration of justice. (emphasis ours.)
Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit of the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant
for a search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of
a given crime by the party against whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why
the applicant should not comply with the requirements of the fundamental law. Upon the other
hand, if he has no such competent evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to find that
there is probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only
possible explanation (not justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the
commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence
to establish a probable cause.
Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure an illegal search warrant
and/or make unreasonable searches or seizures would suffice to protect the constitutional
guarantee under consideration, overlooks the fact that violations thereof are, in general,
committed By agents of the party in power, for, certainly, those belonging to the minority could
not possibly abuse a power they do not have. Regardless of the handicap under which the
minority usually but, understandably finds itself in prosecuting agents of the majority, one
must not lose sight of the fact that the psychological and moral effect of the possibility 21 of
securing their conviction, is watered down by the pardoning power of the party for whose benefit
the illegality had been committed.
In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of this Court dated June
29, 1962, petitioners allege that Rooms Nos. 81 and 91 of Carmen Apartments, House No.
2008, Dewey Boulevard, House No. 1436, Colorado Street, and Room No. 304 of the ArmyNavy Club, should be included among the premises considered in said Resolution as residences
of herein petitioners, Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brook, John J. Brooks and Karl Beck,
respectively, and that, furthermore, the records, papers and other effects seized in the offices of
the corporations above referred to include personal belongings of said petitioners and other
effects under their exclusive possession and control, for the exclusion of which they have a
standing under the latest rulings of the federal courts of federal courts of the United States. 22
We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding their alleged possession of and control over
the aforementioned records, papers and effects, and the alleged "personal" nature thereof, has
Been Advanced, notin their petition or amended petition herein, but in the Motion for
Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of June 29, 1962. In other words, said theory
would appear to be readjustment of that followed in said petitions, to suit the approach intimated

in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered and amended. Then, too, some of the affidavits or
copies of alleged affidavits attached to said motion for reconsideration, or submitted in support
thereof, contain either inconsistent allegations, or allegations inconsistent with the theory now
advanced by petitioners herein.
Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the allegations of said petitions said motion for
reconsideration, and the contents of the aforementioned affidavits and other papers submitted in
support of said motion, have sufficiently established the facts or conditions contemplated in the
cases relied upon by the petitioners; to warrant application of the views therein expressed,
should we agree thereto. At any rate, we do not deem it necessary to express our opinion
thereon, it being best to leave the matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the
future.
We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby,
abandoned; that the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as
specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void; that the searches and seizures
therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in connection
with the documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said residences of herein petitioners
is hereby made permanent; that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents,
papers and other effects so seized in the aforementioned residences are concerned; that the
aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it is hereby, denied;
and that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as regards the
documents, papers and other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and other
premises enumerated in the same Resolution, without special pronouncement as to costs.
It is so ordered.

G.R. Nos. 114263-64 March 29, 1996

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOHN JENN PORRAS and SERGIO EMELO, accused-appellants.
FRANCISCO, J.:p
The separate indictments are for MURDER and for FRUSTRATED MURDER respectively. The
appealed judgment went for the People, found appellants John Jenn Porras and Sergio Emelo
guilty of MURDER (Criminal Case No. 245-91) and sentenced them to "imprisonment

of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify, the heirs of Rosendo Mortel in the amount of P50,000.00
plus actual damages, funeral expenses in the amount of P67,000.00 and moral damages in the
amount of P100,000.00," 1 and appellant Sergio Emelo guilty of FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE
(Criminal Case No. 246-91) and sentenced him to imprisonment of Four (4) years, two (2)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum to Eight (8) years of prision mayor,
as maximum, John Jenn Porras is hereby acquitted. With costs in both instances. 2
Appellants impute fourteen alleged errors committed by the trial court which can be substantially
reduced as follows: (1) misappreciation of facts, (2) giving credence to the inconsistent
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, i.e., Jose Malumay and Maribel German; (3) ignoring
the defense of alibi; (4) not considering as fatal the prosecution's inability to present as witness
Cpl. Crisanto de la Cruz; (5) admitting in evidence Sgt. Alvarez's hearsay testimony; and (6) in
convicting
appellants
who
were
not
positively
identified
in
open
court. 3
Hereunder is the recital of facts of the case as summarized by the trial court and duly
substantiated by the evidence on record:
Piecing together the testimonial and material evidence submitted in these
cases, the Court cannot but conceive the following resume: that on the night
of June 20, 1990, (sic) accused John Jenn Porras and Sergio Emelo went
to the police Station looking for Pfc. Roldan Emelo of the Cavite City PNP, a
cousin of the latter and was directed by Sgt. Pilapil to where he was; that
they had some food and drinks at the Banaue Restaurant and Emelo asked
for his black ammo pouch and some .38 caliber ammunition; that thereafter,
perhaps in connivance with Marcelo Real of the Philippine Coast Guard who
was then moonlighting in his tricycle, flagged him down along M. Gregorio
St. and in which Marcos Luciano was a passenger at the time and was told
to alight as they were already overloaded and whereat Luciano identified
John Jenn Porras, who was then wearing a maong jacket and maong pants
when he was focused by the headlights of the incoming vehicle; that they
proceeded to the Aroma Beer House where the victim. Rosendo Mortel was
tabled (sic) and wherein some misunderstanding happened and Ronnie
Mortel went out and was shot at close range by either Porras or Emelo as
seen by a waitress, Maribel Herman who pointed to Porras as the assailant
and who after seeing Rosendo Mortel sprawled on the ground and bloodied,
fled into an alley and thereafter returned and shot the prostrate victim twice
and sped away and who hailed Sgt. Catalino Bermas (sic) was then
monitoring the situation as an Intelligence Operative on his motorcycle to
give chase; that during the shooting Jose Malumay who was on a bicycle on
his way home after going to a house near Sangley Point also heard a gun
shot which he mistook for a blow-out and when he offered to assist, he saw
two men, one in dark attire and the other in white T-shirt who from the
information of the witnesses fixed their identities as the two accused John
Jenn Porras and Sergio Emelo who fired the initial shot and ran away and
later on returned to finish the job with Porras allegedly having fired the last
two shots killing the victim instantaneously as he was brought to the hospital
dead on arrival.

During the chase given by Catalino Bermas he was shot by Emelo along the
way after having told them (Emelo and Real) to go to the Police Station and
Bermas, feeling the effects of his wounds chanced upon Cpl. Dela Cruz in
front of the 501 Beer House and asked for his assistance and they rode in
tandem and pursued the tricycle at the Saulog Terminal Compound where
only the tricycle was left together with the driver Marcelo Real who pointed
to the two accused as the assailants.
Sgt. Amorico Alvarez who was then following up unsolved cases in the
Station was apprised of the shooting and went to the place and was
informed about the identity (sic) of the tricycle which they traced to the
house of Real whereat they found the black ammo pouch. and the
camouflage holster with the name of Emelo inscribed and with live and
spent bullets on the back seat and putting together the evidence thus far
gathered, he was able to apprehend the three, namely: Porras, Emelo and
Real. 4

A Yes, ma'am because the suspects were identified by the witnesses. One involved is
a small man, dark, wearing white T-shirt, maong pants and carrying a black shoulder
bag. The other one is chubby, and he is wearing a sleeveless cream T-shirt, carrying a
maong jacket and wearing maong pants.
Q If you will be able to see these persons again, can you recall them?
A Yes, ma'am..
Q Kindly took around the Court room and point them out.
A (Witness pointing to Emelo as the one carrying a shoulder bag and the other one
who is chubby identified himself as John Jenn Porras.)
Q You said these two persons came to you asking for Roldan Emelo, what did you
do?

Now, to dispose of the issues raised:

A I pointed to the traffic division.
Appellants claim that some of the trial court's factual findings 5 are product of imagination and
gross misrepresentation allegedly due to lack of. evidentiary support. While our examination of
the record shows that the assailed factual findings are in some respects inaccurate they,
however, did not debilitate the prosecution's case and neither did they affect the appellant's
finding of guilt. SPO3 Rolando Villegas, one of the prosecution's witnesses, indeed, positively
identified the appellants as the persons who showed up at the Cavite City police station at
around 9:00 o'clock in the evening of June 19, 1990, looking for Pfc. Roldan Emelo persons
who, the record reveals, were responsible for the dastardly crimes. Thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Q While doing it, Mr. Witness, while waiting for this report you have just mentioned,
can you tell the Court if there was an incident which transpired in your office?
A Because I have read my statement, I remember that two men arrived at the police
station asking for the whereabouts of Pat. Roldan Emelo.

Q And that is where Roldan Emelo was?

A Yes, ma'am.
Q When the two men got your answer, what did they do?
A They proceeded to the Traffic Division and a few moments later they went
out. 6 (Emphasis supplied).
Next, appellants impugn the credibility of the prosecution witnesses by citing the seeming
inconsistency between the testimonies of Maribel German, who apparently saw one assailant,
and Jose Malumay, who, on the other hand, claimed to have seen two assailants. The following
are excerpts of the questioned testimonies:
JOSE MALUMAY:

Q And this Pat. Roldan Emelo is connected with your office?

xxx xxx xxx
A Yes, ma'am.
Q What was this incident, kindly relate to the Honorable Court?
Q Do you know this person who asked for Roldan Emelo?
A I came to know those persons when they were involved in a shooting incident in San
Antonio.
Q At the time they came to you asking for Roldan Emelo, could you still recall how
they look like?

A On that night, from Sangley going to Rafael Palma St. and M. Gregorio St., I passed
by a tricycle upon reaching the corner of Calpo, I heard a shot which I presumed it
(sic) was a tire which exploded so, I stopped my bicycle because I thought they would
need help. When I stopped and look towards the tricycle, I saw the man riding at the
back seat of the driver alighted (sic), mam.
xxx xxx xxx

Q What happened to the man who used to sit at the back of the driver?
A When the man went to the side of the sidecar, another man alighted from the
sidecar, mam.
Q And then, what happened when that man alighted from the sidecar.

Q When you saw that fire coming from the hands of the third man, at this point in time,
where was the third man?
A Beside the fallen man, mam.
Q And his hands was (sic), how would you describe, how was the position as the fire
was coming from his hand?

A When the man went to the side of the sidecar, another man alighted and (sic) jerked
by the man coming from inside the sidecar?

A His hand was positioned as if, he was going to help the fallen man.

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

Q But, Mr. Witness since you saw the incident would you be able to tell the Honorable
Court the attire of the third man who shot the second man?

FISCAL DIESMOS:
Let us just say the man who alighted from the driver (sic) seat, let us call him the
second man and the man who alighted inside (sic) the tricycle as the first man.
COURT:
What did you see?

A As far as I can remember, the man who shot the second man was wearing a dark
attire, mam.
Q What about the first man, the man who alighted from the back of the driver of the
tricycle, did you see how he was attired?
A It seems, he was wearing a white shirt because the upper portion of his attire was
light, mam.

A When the first man jerked himself, (sic) the second man went to the front of the
tricycle, sir.
MARIBEL GERMAN:
FISCAL DIESMOS:
Q In what direction was the second man headed when he ran?
A He crossed the street going to Capt. Jose St., mam.
Q What else happened when the second man ran towards Capt. Jose St.?
A I hear (sic) another shot, then that second man fell on the ground, mam..
Q And then, what else happened when that second man fell on the ground?
A The third man alighted from the sidecar. When he alighted from the sidecar, he is
going (sic) towards the back going to the fallen man, (referring to the second man).
The third man went to the body of the fallen man which I thought he would help him
but as I was about to go away, I heard another shot, then I saw a fire from the hands
of that third man.

Q While you were at work at Cathy's Refreshment, do you recall of (sic) any unusual
incident that happened?
A Yes, Ma'am, there was.
Q What was this, will you please tell the Honorable Court?
A I heard two gunshots.
Q When you heard two gunshots, what did you do?
A I looked where the gunshots came from.
Q And you saw what? Did you see anything?
A There was.

Q What did you see, Madam Witness?

Q But were you able to notice how he was dressed, his attire?

A A fallen man crawling on the ground.

A He was wearing a T-shirt and maong pants and rubber shoes. 8

Q What else did you see, if you saw anything else?

We find that the purported inconsistency is more fancied than real. A closer scrutiny of
Maribel German's testimony reveals that she merely saw an assailant shoot the victim
(Mortel) while sprawled on the ground, but nowhere in her testimony did she state that
there is only one assailant. In fact, Maribel German never testified witnessing the
crime from its inception which Jose Malumay witnessed to have been authored by two
assailants. This explains the apparent inconsistency between the witnesses'
testimonies.

A And a man standing about to enter an alley.

Q Was that man able to enter the alley?
A Yes, Ma'am..
Q And what happened next after he enter (sic) the alley?
A And who again emerged therefrom.
Q After emerging from the alley, what did he do, if he did anything?
A Again he shot the crawling man two times.
Q After shooting the man twice, what did that man do next?
A He poked (sic) his gun in our direction, so we went inside the Cathy's Refreshment.
xxx xxx xxx
Q You said you went inside the restaurant when that man poked a gun at you, is that
right?

At any rate, the alleged inconsistency just discussed, which was shown to be otherwise, is
neither substantial nor of such nature to cast a serious doubt on the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses. The established rule of evidence is that inconsistencies in the testimony of
prosecution witnesses with respect to minor details and collateral matters do not affect either the
substance of their declaration, their veracity or the weight of their testimony. 9 Inconsistencies in
the testimonies of witnesses, if only in minor details, reinforce rather than weaken their
credibility, for it is usual that witnesses to a stirring event should see differently some details of a
startling occurrence.'" Discrepancies on minor details, which do not destroy the substance of the
witness' testimony show that the witness was not rehearsed. 11
Appellants' defense of alibi must likewise fail. Against their positive identification, alibi cannot
prevail. 12Prosecution witness, Marcos Luciano positively identified appellant John Jenn Porras
as one of the persons who were on board the tricycle which was used as get away vehicle by
Mortel's assailants just before midnight on June 19 1990; 13 SPO3 Rolando Villegas identified
Sergio Emelo and John Jenn Porras as the persons who arrived at the PNP station looking for
Pfc. Roldan Emelo at around 9:00 o'clock on that evening of June 19, 1990; 14 Maribel German
described
one
of
the
assailants
as
wearing
a
T-shirt, maong pants and rubber shoes, and was riding in a tricycle; 15 and Sgt. Catalino Bermas
confirmed the person described by Maribel German to be Sergio Emelo, 16 the same person he
identified as his assailant on that same night. 17

A Yes, Ma'am.
Q Inside the restaurant, what did you do?
A I peeped.
Q Where did you peep, through the window?
A I peeped at the door.
Q What did you see?
A I saw the man boarded (sic) a bicycle.
xxx xxx xxx

Furthermore, proof that they were somewhere else when the crime was committed is not
enough. Appellants must likewise demonstrate that they could not have been physically present
at the place of the crime, or in its vicinity, at the time of its commission. 18 In this connection, we
quote with approval, the trial court's observation:
The alibi set up by the two accused that they were in their barracks
sleeping, all the time up to early morning, is of no moment, as alibi is the
weakest of all defenses, specially (sic) so when the place where they
alleged to have been at the time of the commission of the offense and the
situs where the incident happened is (sic) not so far (sic) distant from each
other and maybe (sic) reached within a reasonable time which, in the instant
cases are no more than 100 or 200 meters apart. 19
Appellants also contend that the non-presentation of Cpl. Crisanto de la Cruz, one of the police
officers who first investigated the crime, and Pfc. Roldan Emelo, the police officer who gave
appellant Sergio Emelo the black ammo pouch bag and .38 caliber bullets, is fatal to the

prosecution's case. We find this contention devoid of merit. The matter of deciding whom to
present as witness for the prosecution is not for the accused or, for the trial court to decide, as it
is the prerogative of the prosecutor." Moreover, if the appellants believed that the testimony of
the said police officers would bolster their theory, then they could have availed of the compulsory
process to have the latter produced as their witnesses, 21 which they failed to do so.
Appellants likewise characterize as hearsay the testimony of Sgt. Amorico Alvarez on Pfc.
Roldan Emelo's statements to the police investigator implicating them to the crime. This
contention is bereft of legal basis for it is a settled rule that when a testimony is presented to
establish not the truth but the tenor of a statement or the fact that such statement was made, as
in this case, the same is not hearsay. 22 Furthermore, appellants' conviction did not hinge solely
on the assailed testimony as there were other evidence extant in the records establishing their
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Finally, appellants argue that they were not positively identified in open court by the two
prosecution's witnesses (German and Malumay) to be the culprits, hence they may not be
convicted of the crime charged. The argument is specious and erroneously assumes that there
was no identification made. While witnesses German and Malumay did not point out the
appellants in open court they, nonetheless, described the perpetrators' attire at the time of the
commission of the crime, with one assailant wearing a T-shirt, maong pants and rubber shoes,
and the other assailant wearing a dark attire. These descriptions conform with the other
witnesses' testimony identifying the appellants to be wearing the same attire during the
commission of the crimes. In any event, it is a settled rule that there can be a conviction based
on circumstantial evidence when the circumstances proved form an unbroken chain which leads
to a fair and reasonable conclusion pinpointing the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the
perpetrator of the crime, 23 as in this case. In order that circumstantial evidence may be sufficient
to convict, the same must comply with these essential requisites, viz: (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; (c) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt. 24 The record reveals that there were at least eleven circumstances correctly considered
by the trial court in arriving at its judgment of conviction, viz: moments before the incident of
June 20, 1990, appellants were seen inside the Cavite City PNP Station looking for Pfc. Roldan
Emelo; 25 (2) appellant Sergio Emelo was then wearing a white T-shirt, maong pants and rubber
shoes while appellant John Jenn Porras was wearing a sleeveless cream T-shirt, maong pants
and was carrying a maong jacket, 26 (3) on the same evening just before the incident, appellant
John Jenn Porras, then wearing a maong jacket, was seen on board the tricycle of Marcelo
Real,
together
with
a
man
wearing
a
white
T-shirt; 27 (4) the two assailants were described by Jose Malumay as respectively wearing a dark
attire and white T-shirt, 28 (5) one of the persons who shot Rosendo Mortel was described by
Maribel
German
as
wearing
a
T-shirt, maong pants and rubber shoes; 29 (6) the assailants of Rosendo Mortel bearded a
tricycle to flee from the scene of the crime, 30 (7) Sergio Emelo was identified by Sgt. Catalino
Bermas as the person on board the tricycle that fled from the scene of the crime; 31 (8) Sergio
Emelo was identified by Sgt. Catalino Bermas as the person who shot him during the
chase; 32 (9) a magazine pouch, camouflaged holster with the name Emelo, .38 caliber empty
shells and live bullets were found immediately after the shooting on the floor of the tricycle used
by the appellants; 33 (10) Rosendo Mortel and Sgt. Catalino Bermas both sustained gunshot
wounds from a .38 caliber handgun; 34 and (11) the flight of the appellants which was not
sufficiently explained. There is no reason for us to disagree with the trial court on these matters.
These findings are fully supported by the evidence on record and constitute an unbroken chain

of events which by their concordant combination and cumulative effect, more than satisfy the
requirements for the conviction of the appellants. 35
The trial court, however, erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery in
Criminal Case No. 245-91. Treachery must be proved by clear and convincing evidence, or as
conclusively
as
the
killing
itself. 36 And to appreciate it, two conditions must concur, viz: (a) the employment of means of
execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate, and (b)
that said means of execution be deliberately and consciously adopted. 37 In this regard, the
prosecution failed to definitively establish the manner in which the initial assault against the
deceased victim was committed to justify the appreciation of treachery. This hiatus in the
prosecution's evidence cannot be substituted by mere suppositions as what the trial court
apparently did. It is a well settled rule that in order to appreciate treachery as a modifying
circumstance in a continuous aggression, as in this case, the same must be shown present at
the inception of the attack. 38 Absent any showing therefor, treachery as a qualifying
circumstance may not be considered.
With respect to Criminal Case No. 246-91, we find that the trial court properly discarded the
qualifying circumstance of treachery and correctly ruled that the crime committed is Frustrated
Homicide and not Frustrated Murder as alleged in the information. The shooting of Sgt. Catalino
Bermas who was fully aware of the risks in pursuing appellants was, at best, done in a spur of
the moment, an act which can hardly be characterized as treacherous for it was no where
proved that the same was deliberately adopted to deny Sgt. Bermas the opportunity to defend
himself.
The actual participation of the appellants in the killing of Rosendo Mortel having been
established by the prosecution, they are therefore equally liable pursuant to the rule on
conspiracy "that the act of one is the act of all". 39 Conspiracy was duly proven by the positive
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses pointing to acts done in concert by the appellants to
carry out their unlawful design, but only with respect to the killing of Rosendo Mortel. When an
act done is beyond the contemplation of the co-conspirators and is not a necessary or logical
consequence of the intended crime then only the actual perpetrators are to be held liable." And
in this case, the conspiracy proved corcerns solely the killing of Mortel and is not the shooting of
Sgt. Catalino Bermas. Thus, appellant Sergio Emelo alone should be held liable for the crime of
Frustrated Homicide in Criminal Case No. 246-91.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in Criminal Case No. 24591, finding the appellants JOHN JENN PORRAS and SERGIO EMELO guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide, defined and penalized under Article 249 of the
Revised Penal Code. Considering the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance
and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, appellants are hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty ranging from Eight (8) years and One (1) day of Prision Mayor, as
minimum, to Fourteen (14) years, Eight (8) months and One (1) day of Reclusion Temporal, as
maximum, respectively, and to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of the deceased
Rosendo Mortel the amount of P50,000.00, plus actual damages and funeral expenses in the
amount of P67,000.00. The award for moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00 which we
find to be excessive is hereby reduced to P50,000.00. However, in Criminal Case No. 246-91,
the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed in toto.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 123072 October 14, 1998

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CADIZ LAPAY, ANECITO LAPAY, MARIO LAPAY, PANCHITO
VILLANUEVA, SEGUNDO OLBES, ROGELIO RETEZA, EMILIANO
CRISOSTOMO, BASILIO GENEROSA, RUDY CONSTANTINO and
PAYLITO TORRECAMPO, accused, CADIZ LAPAY, appellant.

During trial and upon motion 8 of Second Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Diosdado A. Yamas,
the lower court, in an Order 9 dated July 3, 1990, dismissed the charges against Basilio
Generosa. On the motion of the defense counsel and without objection from Fiscal Yamas, the
court a quo likewise ordered on January 4, 1985 the provisional dismissal of the case against
Paylito Torrecampo on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. 10
After trial on the merits, the court a quo rendered the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this Court finds the accused Cadiz
Lapay guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder under Article
248, Revised Penal Code, and sentences him [thus]:

PANGANIBAN, J.:

a) In Criminal Case No. 6255, to reclusion perpetua, to pay the heirs of Nelson
Dumasis the sum of P30,000.00, to suffer the accessory penaltiesprovided for by law
and to pay the costs;

In rejecting this appeal, the Court relies on two basic rules: (1) the trial court's assessment of the
credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is generally entitled to the highest degree of respect
and will not be disturbed on appeal, and (2) positive identification prevails over denial and alibi.

b) In Criminal Case No. 6256, to reclusion perpetua, to pay the heirs of Rosario
Sellado the sum of P30,000.00, to suffer all accessory penalties provided for by law
and to pay the costs;

The Case
Appellant Cadiz Lapay appeals from the October 24, 1990 Decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court
of Tagum, Davao, 2 convicting him of murder and sentencing him to three counts of reclusion
perpetua.
On November 28, 1984, Second Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Pedro T. Casia filed three
separate Informations 3for murder against herein appellant and the other accused, namely,
Anecito Lapay, Mario Lapay, Panchito Villanueva, Segundo Olbes, Rogelio Reteza, Emiliano
Crisostomo, Basilio Generosa, Rudy Constantino and Paylito Torrecampo. Except for the names
of the victims, 4 the three Informations were similarly worded as follows:
That on or about August 13, 1984, in the Municipality of San Vicente, Province of
Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with
treachery and evident pr[e]m[e]ditation, with intent to kill, armed with .30 Carbine rifles
and short firearms, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and shoot one [Nelson Dumasis], thereby inflicting upon him wounds which
caused his death, and further causing actual, moral and compensatory damages to
the heirs of the victim. 5
When arraigned on December 28, 1984, the appellant and his co-accused, with the assistance
of their counsel, entered a plea of not guilty. 6 However, Accused Mario Lapay, Panchito
Villanueva, Rogelio Reteza, Emiliano Crisostomo and Rudy Constantino escaped from prison
after being arraigned. 7

c) In Criminal Case No. 6257, to reclusion perpetua, to pay the heirs of Juan Sellado
the sum of P30,000.00, to suffer all accessory penalties provided for by law and to pay
the costs;
and accused Mario Lapay, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder
under Article 248, Revised Penal Code, and sentences him [thus]:
a) In Criminal Case No. 6255, to reclusion perpetua, to pay the heirs of Nelson
Dumasis the sum of P30,000.00, to suffer all accessory penalties provided for by law
and to pay the costs;
b) In Criminal Case No. 6256, to reclusion perpetua, to pay the heirs of Rosario
Sellado the sum of P30,000.00, to suffer all accessory penalties provided for by law
and to pay the costs;
c) In Criminal Case No. 6257 to reclusion perpetua; to pay the heirs of Juan Sellado
the sum of P30,000.00, to suffer all accessory penalties provided for by law and to pay
the costs.
For insufficiency of evidence, the cases against the following accused, namely:
a) Anecito Lapay
b) Panchito Villanueva
c) Segundo Olbes

d) Rogelio Reteza
e) Rudy Constantino, and
f) Emiliano Crisostomo
are hereby dismissed. Without costs.
As stated earlier in this Decision, the cases against accused Paylito Torrecampo and
Basilio
Generosa
had
been
dismissed
for
lack
of
evidence. 11
Both Cadiz and Mario Lapay appealed. However, Mario Lapay escaped from detention on July
10, 1986 and has not been arrested. 12 Accordingly, this Court, in its Resolution dated July 21,
1997, dismissed the appeal of Mario Lapay. 13 Thus, only the appeal of Cadiz Lapay will be
resolved. 14
The
Version of the Prosecution

Facts

The prosecution's account hinges on the testimonies of Eyewitnesses Cornelio Valencia and
Catalina Barrun. 15The trial court summarized the testimony of Valencia in this manner:
On August 12, 1984, witness was in Tagum, Davao, together with Juan and Rosario
Sellado. They went home to Logdeck in the afternoon. Logdeck is a barrio in the
[M]unicipality of San Vicente, Davao. At eight o'clock in the evening of August 12,
1984, witness was at Logdeck preparing for supper. Then he went to the house of
Juan Sellado to call for Nelson Dumasis because supper was ready but upon reaching
the house of Juan Sellado, Nelson Dumasis did not go home because he was not yet
hungry and instead went to the store of Poldo. Witness also went to the store of Poldo
because Nelson went there. He sat at the end of a bench while Sito (Anecito Lapay)
was seated at the other end. While witness was still at the store of Poldo, Anecito
Lapay left to the direction of the house of Francisco Dubos. Witness followed Sito,
maintaining a distance of ten (10) meters away from him. When Anecito Lapay was in
front of the house of Francisco Dubos, he turned towards the house of Jaime
Argaoanon. When Anecito Lapay was nearing the house of Jaime Argaoanon, he was
raising both hands "as if he was signalling". Witness hid among the bushes. Several
men appeared. These men proceeded to the house of Juan Sellado. "Incidentally,
Rosario Sellado was right at the door. Upon arriving at the house of Juan Sellado,
they struck Rosario Sellado who was at the time seated by the door." The witness
used the word "tira" and when asked to explain the meaning of the word, the witness
said "they immediately sho[t] Rosario Sellado who was seated by the door." When the
Court asked: "Who shot Rosario Sellado?", witness answered: "Cadiz Lapay and
Mario Lapay." They used a carbine. Anecito Lapay was around. After Rosario Sellado
was already dead, they also shot at Juan Sellado. Nelson Dumasis arrived to help
[his] auntie but they also shot him Cadiz Lapay and Mario Lapay. Both Cadiz Lapay
and Mario Lapay were armed that evening with a carbine. Cadiz Lapay shot Nelson
Dumasis in succession, receiving sixteen (16) wounds. When Rosario Sellado was

shot, Juan Sellado was only one (1) meter away from her. Both Mario Lapay and
Cadiz Lapay fired at Juan Sellado, the latter receiving five (5) wounds. Juan Sellado
was shouting for help because he was still alive. The witness further testified, thus: "At
first, I assisted Nelson and I called his name and I only discovered that he was dead.
Then, I came upon and assisted Juan Sellado who, at that time, was asking for help[.]
I asked him who killed him and he told me it was Mario and Cadiz." Witness left for
Kapatagan and asked assistance from the barangay captain. When asked: "By the
way, that was nighttime. How were you able to identify those persons?" The witness
answered: "There was [a] moon during that night and I already knew those persons."
At the time of the incident, there was light at the Sellado[s"] house. To the question:
"By the way, when Anecito Lapay made a signal, as you said, there appeared several
persons[;] can you identify those persons?" and witness answered: "Cito, Mario,
Cadiz, Crisostomo, Emiliano, Panchito, Generosa, Rudy, Juan I do not remember
his family name." Testifying further, witness said that Anecito Lapay caused many
troubles to the Sellados. They frequently ha[d] altercations. The Sellados filed a case
against Cadiz Lapay for Arson. 16
Barrun's detailed narration of the incident was summarized by the trial court as
follows:
That at about eleven o'clock in the morning of August 13, 1984, Anecito Lapay and
Loling Lapay came to their house to refer to her the summons they ha[d] received in
connection with a case between the Lapays and the spouses Juan and Rosario
Sellado. Witness told them to find out about the summons.
At about three o'clock in the afternoon of the same day, Juan Sellado, Rosario Sellado
and Nelson Dumasis were in her house. Loling Lapay, wife of Anecito Lapay was also
in the house. Between 7:30 to 8:00 o'clock in the evening, witness went to the house
of Rudy Joyo-a which [was] very close to their house because Anecito Lapay was
there. She heard Anecito Lapay asking assistance from Rudy Joyo-a, but Rudy said,
"You answer it all by yourselves because I have no money." After taking supper with
Rudy, Anecito Lapay disappeared. Then witness saw Nelson Dumasis sitting in the
balcony. Nelson told her that there [was] a person [named] Juan Sellado. Witness told
Nelson Dumasis to stay put because she [would] go there herself. She approached
the two (2) persons and she saw that they were Mario and Cadiz Lapay. Witness
pointed to Mario and Cadiz Lapay in the courtroom. Witness heard Cadiz Lapay
saying, "I received a summons coming from the court." Then she also heard Rosario
saying, "Wait a minute". Cadiz and Mario Lapay were already in the house of Juan
Sellado. Witness was not seen because she hid behind a pile of sand of the
Suaybaguio Construction. Then there were gun burst[s] coming from the house of
Juan Sellado. Cadiz and Mario Lapay caused the firing. Cadiz and Mario Lapay were
armed but witness does not know what kind of firearms they had. Then after the gun
burst, witness heard from the house of Juan Sellado, Cadiz Lapay saying: "Poldo is
still around". Hearing these words, Poldo jumped out of the window of their house and
ran away. Cadiz and Mario Lapay chased Poldo, firing two shots at him. Witness did
not know whether or not Cadiz and Mario Lapay had companions because all she saw
were the two. When Poldo saw two (2) men going to the house of Juan Sellado, he
also followed her. Nelson Dumasis was also shot by Cadiz and Mario Lapay. Juan
Sellado and Rosario Sellado were also shot by Cadiz and Mario Lapay. 17

Version of the Defense

. . . [A]t about ten o'clock of August 13, 1984, he was on duty as guard at
Purok IV. Cornelio Valencia approached him and asked him to accompany
Cornelio Valencia to barangay captain Eufracio Almocera. Witness said that
he was going to report the killing of Juan Sellado, Rosario Sellado and
Nelson Dumasis. When asked by the witness who was the assailant,
Cornelio Valencia said, he did not know. Witness accompanied Cornelio
Valencia to the barangay captain[.] Cornelio Valencia also told the barangay
captain that he did not know the assailant of the Sellados. 20

Appellant Cadiz Lapay denied killing the victims, contending that he could not have carried a
carbine rifle and pulled its trigger, because his right hand was swollen. The Appellant's Brief
contained a perfunctory statement of the facts. In fairness to the accused, we hereby reproduce
the trial court's more detailed summary of Lapay's testimony:
On August 5, 1984, witness, accused himself, was at his home lying down because he
was sick; his right hand was swollen. On August 13, 1984, he was still lying down
because his hand was still swollen. He could not carry an object with his right hand.
Witness denied the testimony of prosecution witness Cornelio Valencia that between
7:30 to 8:30 in the evening, accused was in the vicinity of the house of Juan Sellado,
and with a carbine, fired at the house of Sellado, because he said that [was] not true;
the truth being, he (the accused) was in his house lying down at that time. Accused
has a witness to show that on said time and date, he was at his house lying down, in
the person of Crestito Pitaw, the one who brought him to the clinic.
On August 14, 1984, I went to see a quack doctor at the municipality of Asuncion and
on the way I met Segundo Olbes. Upon my request I lay down, waiting for a jeep. At
the house of Segundo Olbes, I learned from him about the death of Juan Sellado,
Rosario Sellado and Nelson Dumasis." Witness denied the testimony of prosecution
witness Catalina Barrun, that he, together with his father and brother were going
towards the house of the victims on August 13, 1984, because he was in his house.
From the house of Segundo Olbes, witness proceeded to the house of the quack
doctor.
xxx xxx xxx
On cross examination, witness affirmed that he was sick and bedridden but qualified
by
saying
that
he
could
go
out
and
manage
to
walk. 18
Corroborating the foregoing, Defense Witness Juanito Naquila took the witness stand. His
testimony was narrated by the trial court thus:
. . . On August 11, 1984, accused Cadiz Lapay went to his house which
[was] about forty meters from the house of Cadiz Lapay[,] for treatment of a
swollen right hand. After treatment, Cadiz Lapay remained in his house. On
August 13, 1984, in the morning, witness met Cadiz Lapay again and on
[the] same date, at six o'clock in the evening, witness served cooked fish to
Cadiz Lapay in the house of Cadiz Lapay. Cadiz Lapay was lying in bed, his
right [hand] still swelling. On August 14 and 15, 1984, in the evening,
witness did not anymore see Cadiz Lapay. 19
To assail the eyewitness account of Prosecution Witness Valencia, the defense also presented
Witness Guillermo Santillan, whose testimony was summarized by the trial court in this wise:

The Trial Court's Ruling

The trial court disbelieved the defenses of denial and alibi, but accorded great weight and
credence to the testimonies of Valencia and Barrun, who had actually seen the appellant and his
brother Mario shoot the victims. It further ruled that treachery qualified the killing to murder,
because the deceased were unarmed and defenseless, and the attack was carried out suddenly
and without warning. The lower court also appreciated the generic aggravating circumstances of
abuse of superior strength and aid of armed men.
Issues
In his Brief, 21 appellant raises the following issues:
I. Whether or not there [was] physical impossibility for the accused-appellant
Cadiz Lapay to have fired a carbine rifle on August 13, 1984 given the fact
that the said accused-appellant could not even hold a pen and/or sign the
receipt of summons on the morning of the same day.
II. Whether or not the testimonies of Cornelio Valencia, who is an
int[e]rested party, and Catalina Barrun, were supported by physical
evidence that indeed Cadiz Lapay shot the victims with a use of a carbine
rifle.
III. Whether o[r] not witnesses Cornelio Valencia and Catalina Barrun ha[d]
accurately identified the gunmen of victims Juan Sellado, Rosario Sellado
and Nelson Dumasis in view of the fact that the said killing oc[c]urred at
nighttime in a place which was notoriously known to be a rebel-infested area
in 1984.
IV. Whether or not an affidavit duly executed by a witness during his lifetime
and which was properly identified by the administering officer, Special
Prosecutor Teodoro Yamas, is inadmissible as evidence. 22
All the above alleged errors point to one core issue: the credibility of the prosecution witnesses
and their testimonies. In addition, we shall discuss the defenses of denial and alibi, and the
characterization of the crime committed.
This Court's Ruling

The appeal is bereft of merit.

Core Issue: Credibility of Witnesses and Their Testimonies
Appellant submits that the testimonies of Valencia and Barrun are not worthy of full faith and
belief. He also points out that Valencia even admitted not knowing who the assailants were when
he reported the incident to Witness Santillan and Barangay Captain Eufracio Almocera.
Appellant further contends that he could not have killed the victims with a carbine rifle, because
he was bedridden with a swollen right hand at the time of the incident.
These arguments do not persuade. It is axiomatic that findings of the trial court with respect to
the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to great respect 23 and will not be
disturbed on appeal, 24 absent any proof that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some
facts or circumstances of weight or substance which could have affected the result of the
case. 25 We find no reason no depart from this rule.

A I followed Cito maintaining a distance of ten (10) meters away from him.
xxx xxx xxx
Q Then what happened?
A When Anecito Lapay was nearing the house of Jaime Argawanon [sic], I saw him
raising [both of his] hands as if he was signaling.
Q Then what happened?
A While witnessing the acts of Anecito, I was hiding along the bushes.
Q Then what happened?

Q You mean to say, from the house of Juan Sellado, you went to the store of Poldo?

A After that several men appeared. After that they left and they proceeded to the
house of Juan Sellado. Incidentally, Rosario Sellado was right at the door. Upon
arriving at the house of Juan Sellado, they struck Rosario Sellado who was at the time
seated by the door.

A Yes, sir.

FISCAL: Your honor please, he used the word "tira".

Q Why?

Q What do you mean by the word "tira"?

A I went there because Nelson went to that store.

WITNESS:

Q Now, aside from Nelson, who else was present in the store of Poldo?

A They immediately shot Rosario Sellado who was seated by the door.

A Cito was there.

COURT:

Q Are you referring to Anecito Lapay?

Q Who shot Rosario Sellado?

A Yes, sir.

A Cadiz Lapay and Mario Lapay.

Q Then what happened after that?

Q What weapon did they use?

A While I was still in the store of Poldo, Cito left.

A They used a carbine.

Q To what direction?

xxx xxx xxx

A He went to the direction of the road leading to the house of Francisco Dubos.

Q Then what happened to Rosario Sellado when they fired at her?

Q Now, what did you do?

A When Rosario Sellado was already dead, they fired at Juan Sellado also.

Both Valencia and Barrun were consistent in positively identifying Cadiz and Mario Lapay as the
malefactors. Valencia testified:

xxx xxx xxx

Q What are those stockpiles you are referring to?

Q By the way, did you see Nelson Dumasis?

A Stockpiles of sand of Suaybaguio Construction.

A Yes, sir.

Q While there what happened after that?

Q What happened to him?

A I heard Cadiz saying, "I received a summons coming from the Corral.

A When Nelson Dumasis arrived to assist his auntie, they also shot him.

Q Then after that what happened?

Q Who shot Nelson Dumasis?

A I heard Rosario Sellado saying, "Wait a minute".

A The same men.

Q Do you mean to say Mario and Cadiz Lapay were already in the house of Juan
Sellado at that time?

Q Who are they?

A Yes, sir.
A Mario and Cadiz Lapay. 26
Q After Rosario Sellado answered, "Wait a minute", what happened?
Witness Barrun gave this more detailed account of the incident:
A There were already gun bursts.
Q Then what did you observe after that?
Q Do you know where did those gun bursts come from?
A Nelson told me that there [was] a person going to the direction of the house of
Mama Adyong.

A Yes, sir, I know.

Q So what did you do?

Q Where?

A I told Nelson to stay put and I'[d] go there myself.

A From the house of Juan Sellado.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Who caused the firing?

Q Then what happened after that?

A Cadiz and Mario caused the firing.

A I approached the two persons, then I saw that it was Cadiz and Mario.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Do you refer to the person named Cadiz Lapay?

Q Did you hear anything from inside the house?

A Yes, sir.

A After the gun bursts coming from the house of Juan Sellado, I heard something.

xxx xxx xxx

Q What [was] that which you heard?

Q Did Mario and Cadiz Lapay see you in that evening?

A I heard Cadiz saying, "Poldo is still around".

A They [did not see] me because I hid among the stockpiles.

Q By the way, were Mario and Cadiz Lapay bringing something?

A They were bringing weapons but could not recognize what kind of weapons were
those.
Q Then what did you do after that?
A After hearing the words from Cadiz saying, "Poldo is still around", Poldo immediately
jumped out.

faith and credit. 29 Indeed, the trial court accorded these testimonies credence and weight. In
light of these considerations, we find no reason to reverse or modify the ruling of the trial court.
Delay in Revealing the Identities of the Malefactors
Appellant argues that Valencia did not really know who the assailants were, because the said
witness failed to disclose the names of the culprits when he reported the incident to Santillan
and Almocera.

Q From where did Poldo jump out?

A From our window and he ran away.
Q How about Mario and Cadiz Lapay, what did they do?
A They chased Poldo and fired two shots.

We disagree. The failure of Valencia to immediately report the identities of the malefactors
cannot be taken against him. In People v. Malimit, 30 this Court ruled that "[t]he non-disclosure by
the witness to the police officers of appellant's identity immediately after the occurrence of the
crime is not entirely against human experience. In fact, the natural reticence of most people to
get involved in criminal prosecutions against immediate neighbors, as in this case, is of judicial
notice." 31 Delay in revealing the names of the malefactors does not, by itself, impair the
credibility of the prosecution witnesses and their testimonies. 32 We explained in People v.
Beduya: 33

Q Did Mario and Cadiz Lapay have companions at that time?

A I did not know if they had companions but all I [saw] were the two Mario and
Cadiz.
Q By the way, who were inside the house of Juan Sellado at the time when there was
firing?
A Only the two of them, the husband and wife.
Q How about Nelson Dumasis, where was he?
A He was in our house.
Q What happened to Nelson Dumasis in that incident?
A When Nelson Dumasis saw the two men, he followed me.
Q Then what happened after he followed you?
A He was also shot.
Q Who shot him?
A Cadiz and Mario shot him. 27
These testimonies were straightforward, consistent and replete with details. 28 Moreover, nothing
in the record shows that the witnesses were moved by any improper motive; hence, the
presumption is that the witnesses were not so actuated and their testimonies are entitled to full

Fear for one's life explains the failure on the part of witness to a crime to
immediately notify the authorities of what exactly transpired. Once such fear
is overcome by a more compelling need to narrate the truth, then the
witness must be welcomed by the courts to help dispense justice.
In fact, when confronted with his omission, Valencia admitted that he was afraid that the
assailants would kill him also. 34 In any event, he was able to identify Appellant and Mario Lapay
in open court.
Counter-Affidavit
Inadmissible in Evidence
Appellant posits that the trial court erred in not admitting the counter-affidavit executed by
Eufracio Almocera, who died before the trial. He argues that the counter-affidavit should have
been admitted under the doctrine of independently relevant statement; that is, "not to prove the
truth of the facts therein but only to prove that such writings were executed." 35 He further argues
that the counter-affidavit "will corroborate . . . a very material fact that indeed Cornelio Valencia
[did] not know who the assailants really were as he did not see them."
We do not agree. Courts should consider a piece of evidence only for the purpose for which it
was offered. 36 In this case, appellant argues that the said document should have been admitted
for the sole purpose of proving that such counter-affidavit was executed. The counter-affidavit,
therefore, should not have been used for the purpose specified by the defense counsel during
the trial: to "disprove the testimony of Cornelio Valencia" 37 or, as he subsequently declared in
the Appellant's Brief, to corroborate the testimony of Defense Witness Santillan. 38 For the court
to consider the substance of the counter-affidavit is to give probative value to the statements of
an affiant who could no longer be subjected to cross-examination, in violation of the hearsay
rule. 39

In any event, even if the counter-affidavit were admitted to disprove the eyewitness account of
Valencia, the prosecution's case would still prosper. The guilt of appellant rests not only on the
testimony of Valencia, but also on the more detailed account of Barrun.
Alleged Injury of Appellant

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED and the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED, but the amount
of P30,000 as civil indemnity for the heirs of each victim is INCREASED to P50,000, or a total of
P150,000.
SO ORDERED.

While it may be true that the right hand of Cadiz was still swollen when the crime was
committed, appellant failed to show that Cadiz could not have possibly perpetrated the killing.
Appellant himself admitted in court that he could walk, 40 and this was corroborated by Defense
Witness Naquila. 41 More important, no conclusive proof was presented to show that Cadiz could
not, at the time, use his right hand to hold a gun and pull its trigger. Added to these facts was
appellant's failure to present even a medical certificate to substantiate his claim.
Besides, the prosecution eyewitnesses were categorical and consistent in saying that Cadiz and
his brother Mario were the ones who had shot the victims. The eyewitnesses cannot be
mistaken as to the identity of the felons, because the place was sufficiently illuminated by the
moon and the light coming from the house of the Sabellas. 42Their positive declarations prevail
over the negative assertions of the appellant and his witnesses. 43
Denial and Alibi
The defenses of denial and alibi deserve scant consideration when the prosecution has strong,
clear and convincing evidence identifying appellant as the perpetrator. Appellant failed to show
that it was physically impossible for him to be present at the time and the place of commission of
the crime. 44 Thus, this Court has ruled that "alibi is one of the weakest defenses an accused can
invoke and courts have always looked upon it with caution, if not suspicion, not only because it
is inherently unreliable but likewise because it is rather easy to fabricate." 45

G.R. No. 121439

January 25, 2000

AKLAN ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE INCORPORATED

(AKELCO), petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (Fourth Division),
RODOLFO M. RETISO and 165 OTHERS,1respondents.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

The court a quo correctly ruled that treachery qualified the killing. Present in this case indeed, is
the essence of treachery, which is defined as a sudden and unexpected attack without the
slightest provocation on the part of the person attacked. 46 The appellant, with his brother Mario,
shot the victims who were unarmed and defenseless.

In his petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for writ of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order, petitioner assails (a) the decision dated April 20, 1995, of public
respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Fourth (4th) Division, Cebu City, in
NLRC Case No. V-0143-94 reversing the February 25, 1994 decision of Labor Arbiter Dennis D.
Juanon and ordering petitioner to pay wages in the aggregate amount of P6,485,767.90 to
private respondents, and (b) the resolution dated July 28, 1995 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration, for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.

However we do not agree with the trial court that two generic aggravating circumstances, abuse
of superior strength and aid of armed men, also attended the killing. In People v. Torrefiel, 47 the
Court held that treachery absorbs these two circumstances.

A temporary restraining order was issued by this Court on October 9, 1995 enjoining public
respondent from executing the questioned decision upon a surety bond posted by petitioner in
the amount of P6,400,000.00.2

The Crime

Civil Indemnity
The trial court ordered the appellant to pay the heirs of each victim the amount of P30,000, or a
total of P90,000, without stating the reason for the award. We shall treat the award as civil
indemnity to the heirs of the three victims, 48 but increase it to P50,000, or a total of P150,000,
consistent with prevailing jurisprudence. 49

The facts as found by the Labor Arbiter are as follows:3

These are consolidated cases/claims for non-payment of salaries and wages, 13th
month pay, ECOLA and other fringe benefits as rice, medical and clothing allowances,
submitted by complainant Rodolfo M. Retiso and 163 others, Lyn E. Banilla and
Wilson B. Sallador against respondents Aklan Electric Cooperative, Inc. (AKELCO),
Atty. Leovigildo Mationg in his capacity as General Manager; Manuel Calizo, in his
capacity as Acting Board President, Board of Directors, AKELCO.

Complainants alleged that prior to the temporary transfer of the office of AKELCO from
Lezo Aklan to Amon Theater, Kalibo, Aklan, complainants were continuously
performing their task and were duly paid of their salaries at their main office located at
Lezo, Aklan.
That on January 22, 1992, by way of resolution of the Board of Directors of AKELCO
allowed the temporary transfer holding of office at Amon Theater, Kalibo, Aklan per
information by their Project Supervisor, Atty. Leovigildo Mationg, that their head office
is closed and that it is dangerous to hold office thereat;
Nevertheless, majority of the employees including herein complainants continued to
report for work at Lezo Aklan and were paid of their salaries.
That on February 6, 1992, the administrator of NEA, Rodrigo Cabrera, wrote a letter
addressed to the Board of AKELCO, that he is not interposing any objections to the
action taken by respondent Mationg. . .
That on February 11, 1992, unnumbered resolution was passed by the Board of
AKELCO withdrawing the temporary designation of office at Kalibo, Aklan, and that the
daily operations must be held again at the main office of Lezo, Aklan; 4
That complainants who were then reporting at the Lezo office from January 1992 up to
May 1992 were duly paid of their salaries, while in the meantime some of the
employees through the instigation of respondent Mationg continued to remain and
work at Kalibo, Aklan;
That from June 1992 up to March 18, 1993, complainants who continuously reported
for work at Lezo, Aklan in compliance with the aforementioned resolution were not
paid their salaries;
That on March 19, 1993 up to the present, complainants were again allowed to draw
their salaries; with the exception of a few complainants who were not paid their
salaries for the months of April and May 1993;

under the principle of "no work no pay" which is legally justified; That these
complainants have "mass leave" from their customary work on June 1992
up to March 18, 1993 and had a "sit-down" stance for these periods of time
in their alleged protest of the appointment of respondent Atty. Leovigildo
Mationg as the new General Manager of the Aklan Electric Cooperative, Inc.
(AKELCO) by the Board of Directors and confirmed by the Administrator of
the National Electrification Administration (NEA), Quezon City; That they
engaged in ". . . slowdown mass leaves, sit downs, attempts to damage,
destroy or sabotage plant equipment and facilities of the Aklan Electric
Cooperative, Inc. (AKELCO).
On February 25, 1994, a decision was rendered by Labor Arbiter Dennis D. Juanon dismissing
the complaints.5
Dissatisfied with the decision, private respondents appealed to the respondent Commission.
On appeal, the NLRC's Fourth Division, Cebu City,6 reversed and set aside the Labor Arbiter's
decision and held that private respondents are entitled to unpaid wages from June 16, 1992 to
March 18, 1993, thus:7
The evidence on records, more specifically the evidence submitted by the
complainants, which are: the letter dated April 7, 1993 of Pedrito L. Leyson, Office
Manager of AKELCO (Annex "C"; complainants' position paper; Rollo, p. 102)
addressed to respondent Atty. Leovigildo T. Mationg; respondent AKELCO General
Manager; the memorandum of said Atty. Mationg dated 14 April 1993, in answer to the
letter of Pedrito Leyson (Annex "D" complainants' position paper); as well as the
computation of the unpaid wages due to complainants (Annexes "E" to "E-3";
complainants' position paper, Rollo, pages 1024 to 1027) clearly show that
complainants had rendered services during the period-June 16, 1992 to March 18,
1993. The record is bereft of any showing that the respondents had submitted any
evidence, documentary or otherwise, to controvert this asseveration of the
complainants that services were rendered during this period. "Subjecting these
evidences submitted by the complainants to the crucible of scrutiny, We find that
respondent Atty. Mationg responded to the request of the Office Manager, Mr. Leyson,
which We quote, to wit:

Per allegations of the respondents, the following are the facts:

1. That these complainants voluntarily abandoned their respective work/job
assignments, without any justifiable reason and without notifying the
management of the Aklan Electric Cooperative, Inc. (AKELCO), hence the
cooperative suffered damages and systems loss;
2. That the complainants herein defied the lawful orders and other
issuances by the General Manager and the Board of Directors of the
AKELCO. These complainants were requested to report to work at the
Kalibo office . . . but despite these lawful orders of the General Manager, the
complainants did not follow and wilfully and maliciously defied said orders
and issuance of the General Manager; that the Board of Directors passed a
Resolution resisting and denying the claims of these complainants, . . .

Rest assured that We shall recommend your aforesaid request to our Board
of Directors for their consideration and appropriate action. This payment,
however, shall be subject, among others, to the availability of funds.
This assurance is an admission that complainants are entitled to payment for services
rendered from June 16, 1992 to March 18, 1993, specially so that the
recommendation and request comes from the office manager himself who has direct
knowledge regarding the services and performance of employees under him. For how
could one office manager recommend payment of wages, if no services were
rendered by employees under him. An office manager is the most qualified person to
know the performance of personnel under him. And therefore, any request coming
from him for payment of wages addressed to his superior as in the instant case shall
be given weight.

Furthermore, the record is clear that complainants were paid of their wages and other
fringe benefits from January, 1992 to May, 1992 and from March 19, 1993 up to the
time complainants filed the instant cases. In the interegnum, from June 16, 1992 to
March 18, 1993, complainants were not paid of their salaries, hence these claims. We
could see no rhyme nor reason in respondents' refusal to pay complainants salaries
during this period when complainants had worked and actually rendered service to
AKELCO.
While the respondents maintain that complainants were not paid during
this interim period under the principle of "no work, no pay", however, no proof was
submitted by the respondents to substantiate this allegation. The labor arbiter,
therefore, erred in dismissing the claims of the complainants, when he adopted the
"no work, no pay" principle advanced by the respondents.1wphi1.nt
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed decision dated February 25,
1994 is hereby Reversed and Set Aside and a new one entered ordering respondent
AKELCO to pay complainants their claims amounting to P6,485,767.90 as shown in
the computation (Annexes "E" to "E-3").
A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner but the same was denied by public
respondent in a resolution dated July 28, 1995.8
Petitioner brought the case to this Court alleging that respondent NLRC committed grave abuse
of discretion citing the following grounds:9
1. PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE DISCRETION IN REVERSING THE
FACTUAL FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS OF THE LABOR ARBITER, AND
DISREGARDING THE EXPRESS ADMISSION OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS THAT
THEY DEFIED PETITIONER'S ORDER TRANSFERRING THE PETITIONER'S
OFFICIAL BUSINESS OFFICE FROM LEZO TO KALIBO AND FOR THEM TO
REPORT THEREAT.
2. PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
CONCLUDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WERE REALLY WORKING OR
RENDERING SERVICE ON THE BASIS OF THE COMPUTATION OF WAGES AND
THE BIASED RECOMMENDATION SUBMITTED BY LEYSON WHO IS ONE OF THE
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WHO DEFIED THE LAWFUL ORDERS OF PETITIONER.
3. PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
CONSIDERING THE ASSURANCE BY PETITIONER'S GENERAL MANAGER
MATIONG TO RECOMMEND THE PAYMENT OF THE CLAIMS OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS AS AN ADMISSION OF LIABILITY OR A RECOGNITION THAT
COMPENSABLE SERVICES WERE ACTUALLY RENDERED.
4. GRANTING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS CONTINUED TO REPORT AT THE
LEZO OFFICE, IT IS STILL GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR PUBLIC
RESPONDENT TO CONSIDER THAT PETITIONER IS LEGALLY OBLIGATED TO
RECOGNIZE SAID CIRCUMSTANCE AS COMPENSABLE SERVICE AND PAY

WAGES TO PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FOR DEFYING THE ORDER FOR THEM TO

REPORT FOR WORK AT THE KALIBO OFFICE WHERE THE OFFICIAL BUSINESS
AND OPERATIONS WERE CONDUCTED.
5. PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND
SERIOUS, PATENT AND PALPABLE ERROR IN RULING THAT THE "NO WORK, NO
PAY" PRINCIPLE DOES NOT APPLY FOR LACK OF EVIDENTIARY SUPPORT
WHEN PRIVATE RESPONDENTS ALREADY ADMITTED THAT THEY DID NOT
REPORT FOR WORK AT THE KALIBO OFFICE.
6. PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN
ACCORDING WEIGHT AND CREDIBILITY TO THE SELF-SERVING AND BIASED
ALLEGATIONS OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS, AND ACCEPTING THEM AS PROOF,
DESPITE THE ESTABLISHED FACT AND ADMISSION THAT PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS DID NOT REPORT FOR WORK AT THE KALIBO OFFICE, OR
THAT THEY WERE NEVER PAID FOR ANY WAGES FROM THE TIME THEY
DEFIED PETITIONER'S ORDERS.
Petitioner contends that public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in finding that
private respondents are entitled to their wages from June 16, 1992 to March 18, 1993, thus
disregarding the principle of "no work, no pay". It alleges that private respondents stated in their
pleadings that they not only objected to the transfer of petitioner's business office to Kalibo but
they also defied the directive to report thereat because they considered the transfer illegal. It
further claims that private respondents refused to recognize the authority of petitioner's lawful
officers and agents resulting in the disruption of petitioner's business operations in its official
business office in Lezo, Aklan, forcing petitioner to transfer its office from Lezo to Kalibo
transferring all its equipments, records and facilities; that private respondents cannot choose
where to work, thus, when they defied the lawful orders of petitioner to report at Kalibo, private
respondents were considered dismissed as far as petitioner was concerned. Petitioner also
disputes private respondents' allegation that they were paid their salaries from January to May
1992 and again from March 19, 1993 up to the present but not for the period from June 1992 to
March 18, 1993 saying that private respondents illegally collected fees and charges due
petitioner and appropriated the collections among themselves for which reason they are claiming
salaries only for the period from June 1992 to March 1993 and that private respondents were
paid their salaries starting only in April 1993 when petitioner's Board agreed to accept private
respondents back to work at Kalibo office out of compassion and not for the reason that they
rendered service at the Lezo office. Petitioner also adds that compensable service is best shown
by timecards, payslips and other similar documents and it was an error for public respondent to
consider the computation of the claims for wages and benefits submitted merely by private
respondents as substantial evidence.
The Solicitor General filed its Manifestation in lieu of Comment praying that the decision of
respondent NLRC be set aside and payment of wages claimed by private respondents be
denied for lack of merit alleging that private respondents could not have worked for petitioner's
office in Lezo during the stated period since petitioner transferred its business operation in
Kalibo where all its records and equipments were brought; that computations of the claims for
wages and benefits submitted by private respondents to petitioner is not proof of rendition of
work. Filing its own Comment, public respondent NLRC claims that the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of this Court to review decisions or resolutions of respondent NLRC does not include
a correction of its evaluation of evidence as factual issues are not fit subject for certiorari.

Private respondents, in their Comment, allege that review of a decision of NLRC in a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 does not include the correctness of its evaluation of the evidence but
is confined to issues of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion and that factual findings of
administrative bodies are entitled great weight, and accorded not only respect but even finality
when supported by substantial evidence. They claim that petitioner's Board of Directors passed
an unnumbered resolution on February 11, 1992 returning back the office to Lezo from Kalibo
Aklan with a directive for all employees to immediately report at Lezo; that the letter-reply of Atty.
Mationg to the letter of office manager Leyson that he will recommend the payment of the private
respondents' salary from June 16, 1992 to March 18, 1993 to the Board of Directors was an
admission that private respondent are entitled to such payment for services rendered. Private
respondents state that in appreciating the evidence in their favor, public respondent NLRC at
most may be liable for errors of judgment which, as differentiated from errors of jurisdiction, are
not within the province of the special civil action of certiorari.
Petitioner filed its Reply alleging that review of the decision of public respondent is proper if
there is a conflict in the factual findings of the labor arbiter and the NLRC and when the
evidence is insufficient and insubstantial to support NLRC's factual findings; that public
respondent's findings that private respondent rendered compensable services were merely
based on private respondents' computation of claims which is self-serving; that the alleged
unnumbered board resolution dated February 11, 1992, directing all employees to report to Lezo
Officer was never implemented because it was not a valid action of AKELCO's legitimate board.
The sole issue for determination is whether or not public respondent NLRC committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or want of jurisdiction when it reversed the finding of
the Labor Arbiter that private respondent refused to work under the lawful orders of the petitioner
AKELCO management; hence they are covered by the "no work, no pay" principle and are thus
not entitled to the claim for unpaid wages from June 16, 1992 to March 18, 1993.
We find merit in the petition.
At the outset, we reiterate the rule that in certiorari proceedings under Rule 65, this Court does
not assess and weigh the sufficiency of evidence upon which the labor arbiter and public
respondent NLRC based their resolutions. Our query is limited to the determination of whether
or not public respondent NLRC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion in rendering the assailed resolutions.10 While administrative findings of fact are
accorded great respect, and even finality when supported by substantial evidence, nevertheless,
when it can be shown that administrative bodies grossly misappreciated evidence of such nature
as to compel a contrary conclusion, this court had not hesitated to reverse their factual
findings.11 Factual findings of administrative agencies are not infallible and will be set aside when
they fail the test of arbitrariness. 12Moreover, where the findings of NLRC contradict those of the
labor arbiter, this Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, may look into the records of the
case and reexamine the questioned findings.13
We find cogent reason, as shown by the petitioner and the Solicitor General, not to affirm the
factual findings of public respondent NLRC.
We do not agree with the finding that private respondents had rendered services from June 16,
1992 to March 18, 1993 so as to entitle them to payment of wages. Public respondent based its
conclusion on the following: (a) the letter dated April 7, 1993 of Pedrito L. Leyson, Office

Manager of AKELCO addressed to AKELCO's General Manager, Atty. Leovigildo T. Mationg,

requesting for the payment of private respondents' unpaid wages from June 16, 1992 to March
18, 1993; (b) the memorandum of said Atty. Mationg dated 14 April 1993, in answer to the letter
request of Pedrito Leyson where Atty. Mationg made an assurance that he will recommend such
request; (c) the private respondents' own computation of their unpaid wages. We find that the
foregoing does not constitute substantial evidence to support the conclusion that private
respondents are entitled to the payment of wages from June 16, 1992 to March 18, 1993.
Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to justify a conclusion.14 These evidences relied upon by public respondent did not
establish the fact that private respondents actually rendered services in the Kalibo office during
the stated period.
The letter of Pedrito Leyson to Atty. Mationg was considered by public respondent as evidence
that services were rendered by private respondents during the stated period, as the
recommendation and request came from the office manager who has direct knowledge
regarding the services and performance of employees under him. We are not convinced. Pedrito
Leyson is one of the herein private respondents who are claiming for unpaid wages and we find
his actuation of requesting in behalf of the other private respondents for the payment of their
backwages to be biased and self-serving, thus not credible.
On the other hand, petitioner was able to show that private respondents did not render services
during the stated period. Petitioner's evidences show that on January 22, 1992, petitioner's
Board of Directors passed a resolution temporarily transferring the Office from Lezo, Aklan to
Amon Theater, Kalibo, Aklan upon the recommendation of Atty. Leovigildo Mationg, then project
supervisor, on the ground that the office at Lezo was dangerous and unsafe. Such transfer was
approved by then NEA Administrator, Rodrigo E. Cabrera, in a letter dated February 6, 1992
addressed to petitioner's Board of Directors.15 Thus, the NEA Administrator, in the exercise of
supervision and control over all electric cooperatives, including petitioner, wrote a letter dated
February 6, 1992 addressed to the Provincial Director PC/INP Kalibo Aklan requesting for
military assistance for the petitioner's team in retrieving the electric cooperative's equipments
and other removable facilities and/or fixtures consequential to the transfer of its principal
business address from Lezo to Kalibo and in maintaining peace and order in the cooperative's
coverage area.16 The foregoing establishes the fact that the continuous operation of the
petitioner's business office in Lezo Aklan would pose a serious and imminent threat to
petitioner's officials and other employees, hence the necessity of temporarily transferring the
operation of its business office from Lezo to Kalibo. Such transfer was done in the exercise of a
management prerogative and in the absence of contrary evidence is not unjustified. With the
transfer of petitioner's business office from its former office, Lezo, to Kalibo, Aklan, its
equipments, records and facilities were also removed from Lezo and brought to the Kalibo office
where petitioner's official business was being conducted; thus private respondents' allegations
that they continued to report for work at Lezo to support their claim for wages has no basis.
Moreover, private respondents in their position paper admitted that they did not report at the
Kalibo office, as Lezo remained to be their office where they continuously reported, to wit: 17
On January 22, 1991 by way of a resolution of the Board of Directors of AKELCO it
allowed the temporary holding of office at Amon Theater, Kalibo, Aklan, per
information by their project supervisor, Atty. Leovigildo Mationg that their head office is
closed and that it is dangerous to hold office thereat.

Nevertheless, majority of the employees including the herein complainants, continued

to report for work at Lezo, Aklan and were paid of their salaries.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The transfer of office from Lezo, Aklan to Kalibo, Aklan being illegal for failure to
comply with the legal requirements under P.D. 269, the complainants remained and
continued to work at the Lezo Office until they were illegally locked out therefrom by
the respondents. Despite the illegal lock out however, complainants continued to
report daily to the location of the Lezo Office, prepared to continue in the performance
of their regular duties.
Complainants thus could not be considered to have abandoned their work as Lezo
remained to be their office and not Kalibo despite the temporary transfer thereto.
Further the fact that they were allowed to draw their salaries up to May, 1992 is an
acknowledgment by the management that they are working during the period.
xxx

xxx

rules and regulations and to modify, amend or revoke the same; to

designate the work as well as the employee or employees to perform it; to
transfer or promote employees; to schedule, direct, curtail or control
company operations; to introduce or install new or improved labor or money
savings methods, facilities or devices; to create, merge, divide, reclassify
and abolish departments or positions in the company and to sell or close the
business.

xxx

It must be pointed out that complainants worked and continuously reported at Lezo
office despite the management holding office at Kalibo. In fact, they were paid their
wages before it was withheld and then were allowed to draw their salaries again on
March 1993 while reporting at Lezo up to the present.
Respondents' acts and payment of complainants' salaries and again from March 1993
is an unequivocal recognition on the part of respondents that the work of complainants
is continuing and uninterrupted and they are therefore entitled to their unpaid wages
for the period from June 1992 to March 1993.
The admission is detrimental to private respondents' cause. Their excuse is that the transfer to
Kalibo was illegal but we agree with the Labor Arbiter that it was not for private respondents to
declare the management's act of temporarily transferring the AKELCO office to Kalibo as an
illegal act. There is no allegation nor proof that the transfer was made in bad faith or with malice.
The Labor Arbiter correctly rationalized in its decision as follows: 18
We do not subscribe to complainants theory and assertions. They, by their own
allegations,
have
unilaterally
committed
acts
in
violation
of
management's/respondents' directives purely classified as management prerogative.
They have taken amongst themselves declaring management's acts
oftemporarily transferring the holding of the AKELCO office from Lezo to Kalibo, Aklan
as illegal. It is never incumbent upon themselves to declare the same as such. It is
lodged in another forum or body legally mantled to do the same. What they should
have done was first to follow management's orders temporarilytransferring office for it
has the first presumption of legality. Further, the transfer was only temporary. For:
The employer as owner of the business, also has inherent rights, among
which are the right to select the persons to be hired and discharge them for
just and valid cause; to promulgate and enforce reasonable employment

xxx

xxx

xxx

Even as the law is solicitous of the welfare of the employees it must also
protect the right of an employer to exercise what are clearly management
prerogatives. The free will of management to conduct its own business
affairs to achieve its purpose can not be denied. The transfer of assignment
of a medical representative from Manila to the province has therefore been
held lawful where this was demanded by the requirements of the drug
company's marketing operations and the former had at the time of his
employment undertaken to accept assignment anywhere in the Philippines.
(Abbot Laboratories (Phils.), Inc., et al. vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. L-76959,
Oct. 12, 1987).
It is the employer's prerogative to abolish a position which it deems no longer
necessary, and the courts, absent any findings of malice on the part of the
management, cannot erase that initiative simply to protect the person holding office
(Great Pacific Life Assurance Corporation vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. No. 88011, July 30,
1990).
Private respondents claim that petitioner's Board of Directors passed an unnumbered resolution
dated February 11, 1992 returning back the office from its temporary office in Kalibo to Lezo.
Thus, they did not defy any lawful order of petitioner and were justified in continuing to remain at
Lezo office. This allegation was controverted by petitioner in its Reply saying that such
unnumbered resolution was never implemented as it was not a valid act of petitioner's Board.
We are convinced by petitioner's argument that such unnumbered resolution was not a valid act
of petitioners legitimate Board considering the subsequent actions taken by the petitioner's
Board of Directors decrying private respondents inimical act and defiance, to wit (1) Resolution
No. 411, s. of 1992 on September 9, 1992, dismissing all AKELCO employees who were on
illegal strike and who refused to return to work effective January 31, 1992 despite the directive of
the NEA project supervisor and petitioner's acting general manager; 19(2) Resolution No. 477, s.
of 1993 dated March 10, 1993 accepting back private respondents who staged illegal strike,
defied legal orders and issuances, out of compassion, reconciliation, Christian values and
humanitarian reason subject to the condition of "no work, no pay" 20 (3) Resolution No. 496, s. of
1993 dated June 4, 1993, rejecting the demands of private respondents for backwages from
June 16, 1992 to March 1993 adopting the policy of "no work, no pay" as such demand has no
basis, and directing the COOP Legal Counsel to file criminal cases against employees who
misappropriated collections and officers who authorized disbursements of funds without legal
authority from the NEA and the AKELCO Board.21 If indeed there was a valid board resolution
transferring back petitioner's office to Lezo from its temporary office in Kalibo, there was no need
for the Board to pass the above-cited resolutions.

We are also unable to agree with public respondent NLRC when it held that the assurance made
by Atty. Mationg to the letter-request of office manager Leyson for the payment of private
respondents' wages from June 1992 to March 1993 was an admission on the part of general
manager Mationg that private respondents are indeed entitled to the same. The letter reply of
Atty. Mationg to Leyson merely stated that he will recommend the request for payment of
backwages to the Board of Directors for their consideration and appropriate action and nothing
else, thus, the ultimate approval will come from the Board of Directors. We find well-taken the
argument advanced by the Solicitor General as follows:22
The allegation of private respondents that petitioner had already approved payment of
their wages is without basis. Mationg's offer to recommend the payment of private
respondents' wages is hardly approval of their claim for wages. It is just an
undertaking to recommend payment. Moreover, the offer is conditional. It is subject to
the condition that petitioner's Board of Directors will give its approval and that funds
were available. Mationg's reply to Leyson's letter for payment of wages did not
constitute approval or assurance of payment. The fact is that, the Board of Directors of
petitioner rejected private respondents demand for payment (Board Resolution No.
496, s. 1993).
We are accordingly constrained to overturn public respondent's findings that petitioner is not
justified in its refusal to pay private respondents' wages and other fringe benefits from June 16,
1992 to March 18, 1993; public respondents stated that private respondents were paid their
salaries from January to May 1992 and again from March 19, 1993 up to the present. As cited
earlier, petitioner's Board in a Resolution No. 411 dated September 9, 1992 dismissed private
respondents who were on illegal strike and who refused to report for work at Kalibo office
effective January 31, 1992; since no services were rendered by private respondents they were
not paid their salaries. Private respondents never questioned nor controverted the Resolution
dismissing them and nowhere in their Comment is it stated that they questioned such dismissal.
Private respondents also have not rebutted petitioner's claim that private respondents illegally
collected fees and charges due petitioner and appropriated the collections among themselves to
satisfy their salaries from January to May 1992, for which reason, private respondents are
merely claiming salaries only for the period from June 16, 1992 to March 1993.
Private respondents were dismissed by petitioner effective January 31, 1992 and were accepted
back by petitioner, as an act of compassion, subject to the condition of "no work, no pay"
effective March 1993 which explains why private respondents were allowed to draw their
salaries again. Notably, the letter-request of Mr. Leyson for the payment of backwages and other
fringe benefits in behalf of private respondents was made only in April 1993, after a Board
Resolution accepting them back to work out of compassion and humanitarian reason. It took
private respondents about ten months before they requested for the payment of their
backwages, and the long inaction of private respondents to file their claim for unpaid wages cast
doubts as to the veracity of their claim.

respondents to recover something they have not earned and could not have earned because
they did not render services at the Kalibo office during the stated period.
Finally, we hold that public respondent erred in merely relying on the computations of
compensable services submitted by private respondents. There must be competent proof such
as time cards or office records to show that they actually rendered compensable service during
the stated period to entitle them to wages. It has been established that the petitioner's business
office was .transferred to Kalibo and all its equipments, records and facilities were transferred
thereat and that it conducted its official business in Kalibo during the period in question. It was
incumbent upon private respondents to prove that they indeed rendered services for petitioner,
which they failed to do. It is a basic rule in evidence that each party must prove his affirmative
allegation. Since the burden of evidence lies with the party who asserts the affirmative
allegation, the plaintiff or complainant has to prove his affirmative allegations in the complaint
and the defendant or the respondent has to prove the affirmative allegation in his affirmative
defenses and counterclaim.25
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for CERTIORARI is GRANTED.
Consequently the decision of public respondent NLRC dated April 20, 1995 and the Resolution
dated July 28, 1995 in NLRC Case No. V-0143-94 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE for
having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Private respondents complaint for payment of unpaid wages before the Labor Arbiter is
DISMISSED.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 133477

January 21, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
BENJAMIN RAFALES, accused-appellant.
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
Accused-appellant Benjamin Rafales (hereafter BENJAMIN) appeals from the 16 May 1997
judgment1 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, of Balanga, Bataan, in Criminal Case No. 6115,
which convicted him of statutory rape and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua with the accessory penalties, to pay the victim the amount of P40,000 as civil
indemnity and to pay the costs.
The information that charged BENJAMIN with rape reads as follows:

The age-old rule governing the relation between labor and capital, or management and
employee of a "fair day's wage for a fair day's labor" remains as the basic factor in determining
employees' wages. If there is no work performed by the employee there can be no wage or pay
unless, of course, the laborer was able, willing and ready to work but was illegally locked out,
suspended or dismissed,23 or otherwise illegally prevented from working, 24 a situation which we
find is not present in the instant case. It would neither be fair nor just to allow private

That in or about the month of November 1993 at Brgy. Gen. Lim, Orion, Bataan,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused thru
force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie and
succeed to have sexual intercourse with the offended party, Rochelle Gabriel y
Abanador, 11 year old minor girl, against the will and consent of the latter, to her
damage and prejudice.2

BENJAMIN pleaded not guilty upon his arraignment. Trial on the merits followed.
The prosecution first presented as witness the victim Rochelle Gabriel y Abanador (hereafter
ROCHELLE). ROCHELLE testified that in 1993, her neighbor BENJAMIN thrice raped her. The
first rape took place sometime in November. ROCHELLE was then at her home with her siblings
while her parents were at the farm. BENJAMIN arrived, unceremoniously removed ROCHELLE's
dress, laid her on the floor, undressed himself, placed himself on top of her and inserted his
penis in her vagina. ROCHELLE felt pain. After the act was over, she saw a whitish substance
on her vagina.3
The second incident of rape occurred three days after. It was mid-afternoon. ROCHELLE and
playmate Gemma Benaro were playing in the latter's house. BENJAMIN appeared, ordered
Gemma to leave, undressed ROCHELLE, laid her on the floor, undressed himself, placed
himself on top of her and inserted his penis in her vagina. As before, ROCHELLE felt pain and
noticed a white substance on her vagina.4
The third rape took place a few days after this incident. ROCHELLE and playmate Marissa
Rafales were playing cards at the latter's house when BENJAMIN arrived and asked Marissa to
leave. BENJAMIN removed ROCHELLE's dress and short. He laid her down, undressed himself,
stayed on top of her and inserted his penis in her vagina. ROCHELLE again felt pain and saw a
white substance on her vagina. 5 Testifying that she was born on 30 August 1983, ROCHELLE
was ten (10) years old when these incidents took place.
ROCHELLE did not report or reveal to her parents or anyone else the sexual
molestations.6 BENJAMIN's threats to kill her and her family proved too much of a deterrence.
Claiming that she had frequent quarrels with her siblings, ROCHELLE ran away from home. She
took refuge in the streets and sought the company of streetchildren. 7 The police finally found her
and brought her to one Vicky Santos, an employee of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development.8 ROCHELLE stayed with Vicky for four (4) months before she was turned over to
the orphanage. Hence, it was only after two (2) years or in 1995 when ROCHELLE finally
disclosed her sexual ignominy from BENJAMIN's lecherous arms.
Despite her fears that BENJAMIN would carry out his threats to kill her, ROCHELLE confessed
the sexual molestations to Vicky when she confronted her (ROCHELLE) with stories of a childrace victim. ROCHELLE learned that Vicky heard these stories from Gemma, Marissa, and
BENJAMIN's two sisters. Thus, Vicky accompanied ROCHELLE to the police station where she
executed a sworn statement9 attesting to the incidents of the rape.
After ROCHELLE's testimony, the other witnesses of the prosecution took the witness stand.
Pacita Abanador, ROCHELLE's mother, testified that ROCHELLE was born on 30 August 1983.
She also identified BENJAMIN as their neighbor.10
SPO Rolando Bernabe claimed that he was the investigating police officer who took ROCHELLE
and Pacita Abanador's sworn statements.
Dr. Jose Bernardo Gochoco, Jr. who physically examined ROCHELLE two years after the rape
incidents affirmed his findings contained in a medico legal report 11 that ROCHELLE's hymenal

ring and posterior fourchette were intact. He concluded that there was no physical penetration of
ROCHELLE's labia majora.12
For its part, the defense presented its lone witness, accused BENJAMIN. His defense consisted
mainly of denial. He denied having raped ROCHELLE at any time. He denied the rape charge
when he was interrogated at the police precinct. He denied his lechery when a representative of
the Department of Social Welfare and Development visited and allegedly urged him while in
prison to confess to the crime. Yet, he knew of no reason why ROCHELLE would falsely accuse
him of rape.13
In weighing the evidence thus proffered, the trial court found that the prosecution proved beyond
reasonable doubt BENJAMIN's culpability. Affording full credence to ROCHELLE's positive
testimony, the trial court disposed:
It could be seen that there is direct testimony by the young victim that the accused laid
on top of her and raped her. While there seems to be a variance on how she was
raped in her statement before the police, she was violated four (4) times and she
was not sure whether there was penetration or not, but in her declaration in Court she
said that she was raped three (3) times and that there was penetration and that she
saw whitish substance in her genitali genitalia the stubborn fact is that the victim
declared that she felt pain when the penis of the accused was directed at her private
parts. The Court holds that the variance between the out of Court statement and the
declaration in Court does not serve to discredit the testimony of the complainant that
the accused raped her. Affidavits are generally incomplete and discrepancies between
the statements of the affiant and those made on the witness stand do not necessarily
discredit the witness. (People vs. Soan, 243 SCRA 627)
Neither could the fact that the victim only revealed her ordeal some four (4) months
after she was taken custody by the DSWD sufficient reason to discredit totally her
testimony. A young firl [sic] below twelve (12) years could not be expected to be as
prompt and punctilious in denouncing those who violate her chastity as a woman of
age would. She ran away from home after she was molested by the accused and was
found by the police roaming at the town plaza of sufficient excuse for her delayed
revelation of the dastardly act committed against her. Delay in the prosecuting. [sic]
the rape is not an indication of fabricated charges. (People vs. Cabresos, 244 SCRA
362).
That the hymenal ring and fourchette of the victim were intact per the medico-legal
certificate do not belie the testimony of the victim that she was raped. In the case
of People vs. Castro, 196 SCRA 679, it was held that if the victim is of tender age, the
penetration of the male organ could go only as deep as the labia. The visible effect
had there been an immediate examination would have been swelling of the parts
which suffered traumatic contact of the penis seeking entry. For rape to be committed
entrance of the male organ within the labia or pudendum of the female organ is
sufficient. Rupture of the hymen or laceration of the vagina ar not essential. Entry, to
the least extent of the labia or lips of the female organ is sufficient. The victim
remaining a virgin does not negate rape.

The fact that the whitish substance was found at the pedendum [sic] is proof enough
that the penis of the accused at least knocked at the door of the vagina. This is
already considered rape.14
But while the prosecution proved that BENJAMIN thrice raped ROCHELLE, the information
charged him with only one count of rape, thus the trial court held that BENJAMIN could only be
convicted of one crime of rape. And since the rape was committed against a victim below twelve
(12) years old without any attendant modifying circumstances, the trial court imposed the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. The dispositive portion reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the guilt of the accused having been proved beyond reasonable doubt
for statutory rape, the accused is sentenced to reclusion perpetua with the accessory
penalties provided by law. The accused is also ordered to indemnify the victim the
sum of P40,000.00 and to pay the costs.15
In his appeal, BENJAMIN contends that the prosecution failed to establish his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. He emphasizes that certain facts, ignored by the trial court, underscore his
innocence and ROCHELLE's lack of credibility, viz.: (1) the delay in the reporting of the rape
charge coupled by the probability that ROCHELLE's wanderings and constant company of
streetchildren might have undermined the stability of her mind at the time of her testimony; (2)
the ponente's admission that he did not personally observe the deportment of the witnesses; (3)
ROCHELLE's observation that she found a whitish substance on her vagina, where if she was
indeed raped, she should have discharged blood; and (4) the failure of ROCHELLE's mother to
notice any change in her daughter's behavior, for ROCHELLE should have exhibited the
consequent physical and emotional trauma evident in a rape victim.
Antithetic to BENJAMIN's disavowal is the Office of the Solicitor General's prayer (as contained
in the Brief for the Appellee) for the affirmance of the challenged decision. Said Office maintains
that there is moral certainty that BENJAMIN committed the crime charged. ROCHELLE
positively identified BENJAMIN as her rapist. Her straightforward, candid and spontaneous
testimony should dispel any doubt on her credibility or of the fact that the crime was actually
perpetrated. Her sole testimony established BENJAMIN's conviction. Further, the
inconsistencies between ROCHELLE's oral testimony and her affidavit were accurately noted
and explained by the trial court. Significantly, BENJAMIN also failed to impute to ROCHELLE
any ulterior motive why she would falsely testify against him. The only conclusion is that no such
motive existed and that her testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.
The Office of the Solicitor General additionally asserts that BENJAMIN's denunciation of
ROCHELLE's conduct after the rape is purely speculative. There is no proof of ROCHELLE's
mental imbalance. Her mother's failure to observe any change in her behavior and the absence
of a bloody discharge did not militate against the fact that she was ravished. Also
inconsequential is ROCHELLE's unlacerated hymenal ring and fourchette, for they do not
disprove rape. "A mere knocking at the doors of the pudenda" by the accused's penis suffices to
constitute rape. What is important is that there be penetration, no matter how slight, of the male
organ within the labia or the pudendum of the female organ.
Finally, the Office of the Solicitor General seeks to increase the civil indemnity from P40,000 to
P75,000.

BENJAMIN chose not to file a Reply Brief.

We affirm the conviction of BENJAMIN.
In the review of rape cases, we are always guided by the following principles:(1) an accusation
of rape can be made with facility since it is difficult to prove but more difficult for the person
accused, though innocent, to disprove it; (2) by reason of the intrinsic nature of rape, the
testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for
the prosecution must stand or fall on its merits and it cannot draw strength from the weakness of
the evidence for the defense.16
We have meticulously reviewed the records of the case, particularly the transcripts of the
stenographic notes of the witnesses and found that the trial court did not err in convicting
accused BENJAMIN.
ROCHELLE's sincere, forthright and spontaneous declarations that she was raped by one whom
she respectfully deferred to as "kuya"17 proved with moral certainty BENJAMIN's guilt, thus:
Q Why do you know Benjamin Rafales?
A Because he is our neighbor.
Q Beside that can you tell us why you know him?
A He raped me three times.
Q Now, will you go to the first time that according to you he raped you. Do you
remember what month was that when according to you he first raped you?
A November, 1993, sir.
Q Where?
A In our house.
Q Where was your house at the time?
A At Gen. Lim, Orion, Bataan.
Q You stated that he raped you for the first time in your house in 1993, what time was
it?
A 1:00 P.M.
Q How did he rape you in your house?

A He came to our house and he removed my dress, sir.

xxx

Q And what happened next?

Q And yet when the accused went on top of you you did not cry for help?

A He lay me down on the floor, and he went on top of me, sir.

xxx

Q And when the accused on top of you, what did he do?

A I shouted.

A He inserted his penis in my vagina, sir.

Q And the attentions of your brother and sister were called?

Q What did you feel when he inserted his penis in your vagina?

A No, sir, because he immediately covered my mouth.

A I was hurt. I felt pain.

Q But nonetheless you already shouted?

xxx

xxx

xxx

Q Did you notice something in your vagina after Benjamin Rafales stayed on top of
you?

xxx

xxx

xxx

xxx

A Yes, sir.
xxx

xxx

x x x.

Q Let us do [sic] in detail about this rape allegedly committed. Will you tell the court
how the rape was committed by the accused, he approached you, what did he do to
you and what did he tell you?

A Yes, sir.
Q What was the color?

A He immediately removed my dress, sir.

A White, sir.
COURT

Q You mean to say that Benjamin Rafales approached you and without much ado he
undressed you?

Q Why do you know that it is colored white?

A Yes, sir.

A I saw it on my vagina, sir.

Q And of course for you this is not ordinary for another person to undress you?

PROS. BERNARDO

A Yes, sir.

Q For how long did the accused stayed [sic] on top of you?

Q And you did not tell Benjamin Rafales not to undress you?

A Less than an hour.

A I told him.

xxx

xxx

xxx

Q Now, let us go to that time when according to you you were allegedly raped for the
first time by Benjamin Rafales. You said that at the time your brother and sister were
at your house, is that it?

Q And what was the reaction of Benjamin Rafales when you told him not to undress
you?
A He continued to remove my dress, sir.
COURT

A Yes, sir.

Q Was Benjamin Rafales at that time holding anything?

A None, sir.
ATTY. AGUANTA
Q And when you were already undressed, what happened?
A He immediately lay me down on our papag.
COURT
Q And when you were already lying down what happened?
A He immediately went on top of me sir.
Q Were you at that time wearing any panty?
A Yes, Your Honor.
COURT
Q What happened to your panty when according to you he lay you down?
A He removed it.
Q In other words he not only removed your dress but also your panty and you were
totally naked?
A Yes, sir.
Q How about the accused did he also removed [sic] his clothing?
A Yes, sir.
Q All his clothings?
A Yes, Your Honor, even his brief.18
The other two incidents of rape occurred some days after and in a similar manner.
ROCHELLE's credibility is therefore beyond dispute. Her candor in responding to queries
relating to shameful details of that episode in her childhood is palpable. Her responses were
clear and categorical, all earmarks of truth.

For the unassailable credence we grant to ROCHELLE's testimony, we reject BENJAMIN'S

proposition that certain facts evince his innocence and the improbability of the crime having
been committed.
BENJAMIN assails ROCHELLE's failure to immediately disclose her alleged sexual molestations
as a possible telltale mark of falsity or fabrication. But delay in the disclosure of a crime is not
always an indication of prevarication. In rape cases, young girls usually conceal for sometime
their ordeals due to the threats made by their assailants. 19 In this case, ROCHELLE dared not
tell anyone her ordeal because she actually feared BENJAMIN who threatened to kill her and
her parents should she reveal his misdeed. Further, ROCHELLE had for quite sometime been
deprived of the counsel of parents or other adults. She ran away from home, and explained this
behavior as a consequence of her frequent quarrels and misunderstanding. with her siblings. It
was only during her stay at the orphanage when Vicky confronted her [ROCHELLE] with tales of
a child-rape victim. ROCHELLE confessed to Vicky that she was the child-race victim alluded to
by her playmates Marissa, Gemma and the sisters of BENJAMIN. She revealed the details of
the sexual violations quite hesitantly for she still feared BENJAMIN and his threats to kill her.
These circumstances perforce satisfactorily explained and justified the two (2)-year delay in the
disclosure of the crime. Besides, the prescriptive period for the filing of a rape charge is twenty
years.20
BENJAMIN then posits that having roamed the streets and "having been in association with
streetchildren, ROCHELLE may not have a stable mind when she testified in court." But as the
Office of the Solicitor remarks, this is pure speculation. The defense failed to provide proof to
support this hypothesis. Besides, this hypothesis is a ridiculous non-sequitur if not downright
illogical; as if mere association with streetchildren necessarily undermines the stability of one's
mind.1wphi1.nt
BENJAMIN also deems as material the admission by the ponente of the assailed decision that
he "did not hear the testimony of witnesses but only read their testimonies in cold print." The
obvious import is the ponente could not have properly appreciated ROCHELLE's testimony in
view of its incongruity with first, the affidavit she executed before the police and second, the
doctor's medical certificate. BENJAMIN thus discloses another fallacy in his logic, for truth be
told, he failed to produce evidence to buttress this allegation of unjust judgment. Besides, a
judge who pens a decision is not immediately disqualified to render such judgment simply
because another magistrate heard the case. Such fact does not necessarily render
a ponente's decision void, unjust21 or reversible22 considering that the full record of the case was
available for his perusal.23 Anyway, in such a case, the respect ordinarily accorded to the trial
court's findings of fact does not apply, hence (as already adverted to) our careful and thorough
scrutiny of the records particularly the transcript of stenographic notes. 24 Having thus complied
with this injunction, we are now more than convinced that the records bolster the judgment of the
trial court. To be specific, the inconsistencies in the details of ROCHELLE's testimony, on the
one hand, and her affidavit and the medical certificate, on the other hand, were satisfactorily
analyzed and explained by the ponente.
At any rate the first inconsistencies refer only to the manner of the commission of the rape, i.e.,
ROCHELLE in her testimony was certain that the rape was committed three times, there was
penile penetration and that she noticed a whitish substance on her vagina; in her affidavit,
ROCHELLE was not certain if there was indeed penetration, she did not mention the white
substance but specified that she was raped four times with the second rape being witnessed by
her playmates. But ROCHELLE's steadfast claim of rape and that she felt pain during the time

BENJAMIN was unleashing his lust on her trivialized these inconsistencies. It may even be
reasonable to assume that at the time of the execution of her affidavit she had no idea that
penile penetration in the vagina could be slight or full. It is also well settled that when a woman
claims that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that she has
been raped.25 As to ROCHELLE's failure to mention in her affidavit the presence of the white
substance on her vagina, suffice it is to say that nothing in said affidavit indicated that SPO
Bernabe ever addressed ROCHELLE any question on the topic. On BENJAMIN's assertion that
the medical findings did not prove the rape charge, we have already ruled that proof of injury is
not an element of rape.26 Even a medical examination is not required in the prosecution of rape
cases.27 Moreover, as the trial court noted, the physical examination took place two (2) years
after the rape occurrences. Naturally, whatever injuries ROCHELLE might have sustained must
have healed, leaving no traces thereof. Anyway, even the absence of hymenal lacerations does
not negate rape.28 We also deem the matter of Marissa and Gemma's witnessing of the second
rape as trifling for the lone testimony of the rape victim is indeed sufficient for a verdict of
conviction.29
Attempting to additionally assail ROCHELLE's credibility or cast doubt on the fact of rape,
BENJAMIN theorizes that she should have noticed blood "oozing" from her vagina rather than
the "white substance." We reiterate the rule that rape is consummated with the slightest penile
penetration of the labia or pudendum of a female. 30 Hence, blood or a whitish discharge of or on
the vagina after the sexual act is not necessary to prove rape. In the words of the ponente of the
challenged decision "the fact that the whitish substance was found at the pedendum [ sic] is
proof enough that the penis of the accused at least knocked at the door of the vagina. That is
already considered rape."
Finally, we reject for being absolutely frivolous, BENJAMIN's accusation that ROCHELLE's
failure to exhibit the emotional and physical trauma evident in a rape victim assayed to the falsity
of her tale of rape. At any rate, BENJAMIN's sole defense of denial, already considered as
inherently weak, appears flimsy, feeble and self-serving. It cannot therefore prevail over the
positive and credible testimony of the complainant.31
To recapitulate, the prosecution has satisfactorily discharged its onus of proving that BENJAMIN
thrice raped ROCHELLE when she was only ten years old. No birth certificate was presented to
establish her age but ROCHELLE and her mother testified that she was born on 30 August
1983. The defense made no objection.32Thus, carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve (12)
years of age is sufficient for conviction.33 However, BENJAMIN can only be convicted of one
count of rape since the information charged only one offense. 34 This is in compliance with the
constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against
him.
We cannot, however, approve the recommendation of the Office of the Solicitor General to
increase the award of civil indemnity to P75,000. Said amount could only be awarded if the
crime of rape was committed or effectively qualified by any of the circumstances under which the
death penalty is authorized by the applicable amendatory laws. 35 But the trial court erred in
awarding the amount of P40,000 as civil indemnity. We hereby increase the amount to P50,000
in accordance with current jurisprudence.36 Also in order is an award of moral damages in the
amount of P50,000 even without proof thereof. It is automatically awarded in rape cases, for it is
assumed that the complainant has suffered moral injuries entitling her to such an award.37

WHEREFORE, the 16 May 1997 decision of the Regional Trial Court, Balanga, Bataan, Branch
2, in Criminal Case No. 6115 finding accused-appellant BENJAMIN RAFALES guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua is
hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that the indemnity awarded is increased from P40,000
to P50,000 and accused-appellant is further ordered to pay Rochelle Gabriel y Abanador the
sum of P50,000 as moral damages.
No costs.

SO ORDERED.

1wphi1.nt

G.R. No. 122739

January 19, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JOSE M. PANTORILLA and BARTOLOME DAHAN, accused,
JOSE M. PANTORILLA, accused-appellant.
PARDO, J.:
The case before the Court is an appeal taken by Jose M. Pantorilla from the decision 1 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Kidapawan, Cotabato convicting him of murder and sentencing
him to the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the victim Franklin Bello in
the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00). The trial court acquitted co-accused Bartolome
Dahan of the crime charged.
On March 27, 1990, Acting Second Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Alfonso B. Dizon, Jr. of
Cotabato filed with the Regional Trial Court, Cotabato, Branch 17, Kidapawan an information
charging Jose M. Pantorilla, Bartolome Dahan, Peter Doe, and John Doe with murder,
committed as follows:
That in the evening of December 24, 1989, at Poblacion, Municipality of Makilala,
Province of Cotabato, Philippines, the above-named accused, in company with Peter
Doe and John Doe, whose identity and true names still unknown, conspiring and
confederating and mutually helping one another, with treachery and evident
premeditation and availing the darkness of the night, with intent to kill, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drag FRANKLIN BELLO inside the house of
Jose Pantorilla and once inside, with the use of a bolo, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hack and stab FRANKLIN BELLO, hitting
and inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds in the different parts of his body which
caused his instant death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.2
At the arraignment on July 4, 1990, accused Jose M. Pantorilla and Bartolome Dahan pleaded
not guilty. Trial on the merits ensued.

The facts are as follows:

On December 24, 1989, at around 7:00 in the evening, Allan Cablayan, Franklin Bello,
Cezar Santos and Nelson Sanchez were having a drinking spree inside the store of
Mrs. Lina Asibal in Poblacion, Makilala, Cotabato.
Afterwards, Cablayan, Santos and Sanchez left Bello in the store and proceeded to the house of
Danny Atienza to continue their drinking session. However, Atienza was not at home, so they
returned to the store. They found Franklin Bello no longer inside the store but standing in front of
it, so they asked him where he was going. Bello replied that he would go
somewhere.3 Cablayan, Santos and Sanchez turned to go to the back of the store to continue
drinking. While walking, Allan Cablayan looked back and saw Franklin Bello being dragged by
three persons. Allan Cablayan identified them as accused-appellant Jose Pantorilla, accused
Bartolome Dahan and a third person he did not know.4 The three persons dragged Bello inside
the house of Jose Pantorilla and locked it. Allan Cablayan then heard Bello from the inside
crying, "Tabang! Tabang! Tabang!," meaning "Help! Help! Help!" Cablayan sought assistance
from neighbors Ferdinand Ela, Norman Ela, Nelson Sanchez and Bobet Ela. They attempted to
enter the house of Pantorilla, but the door was locked. They called for police
assistance.1wphi1.nt
Sgt. Benito Enot responded, followed by Sgt. Marba and other members of the police force. The
door was locked, so they commanded the occupants to open the door and come out. When the
occupants of the house refused, policemen fired warning shots in the air.5 A few seconds passed
before a woman's voice yelled, "Tama na, sir." Then, the front door opened; the wife and
daughter of accused-appellant Jose Pantorilla, together with the wife and a one-year old son of
accused Bartolome Dahan emerged. Accused-appellant Jose Pantorilla came out last, dressed
in his underwear.
Policemen then entered the house and found the body of Franklin Bello sprawled on the
concrete floor of the kitchen, with blood and intestines protruding from his slashed
stomach.6 They took photographs of the deceased lying on the floor and also recovered a
bladed instrument from the scene.7
Dr. Hervacio Albano, municipal health doctor, conducted a post-mortem examination on
deceased Franklin Bello and concluded that the cause of death was multiple stab wounds. 8
According to accused-appellant Jose Pantorilla, in the early evening of December 24, 1989, he
was at his residence located in Tejada Subdivision, Poblacion, Makilala, Cotabato, with his wife
and daughter, and the wife and one-year-old son of accused Bartolome Dahan. At around 8:30
in the evening, Pantorilla came out of his house to investigate the noise created by his chickens.
He approached his chickens and gave them water. While returning to his house from the poultry,
Franklin Bello, carrying a bolo, embraced Pantorilla from the side and said to him, "Hain ang
imong kwarta?" ("Where is your money?"). They then entered Pantorilla's house through the
kitchen. Pantorilla saw Francisco Cablayan and Allan Cablayan with Franklin Bello but they were
not able to enter the house, since Pantorilla managed to kick the self-locking door against them.
While in the kitchen, Bello started hacking Pantorilla with the bolo. Pantorilla fell to the ground.
He suffered a scar on his upper breast with a wide line around three inches, and scars on the
skin surface in different parts of his body. Then, Franklin Bello fell on his stomach, hitting the
bolo. Pantorilla stood up, got the knife on the floor and used it to stab Bello. 9 Thereafter,

policemen arrived. Pantorilla refused to come out of his house as commanded by the policemen,
saying that there was no warrant for his arrest. When policeman strafed his house with bullets,
his wife shouted "Tabang," meaning "help". Pantorilla decided to come out with his family,
together with the family of accused Bartolome Dahan, who had paid a visit. 10 Bartolome Dahan
was not with them. 11 Policemen took accused-appellant Pantorilla to the municipal building and
placed him in jail.
On February 23, 1995, after due trial, the Regional Trial Court, Kidapawan, Cotabato rendered
decision, the dispositive portion of which reads, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused JOSE PANTORILLA guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of MURDER as charged in the information and hereby sentences
him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. He is hereby ordered to indemnify the
heirs of Franklin Bello, the sum of P50,000.00.
On reasonable doubt, the Court finds the accused, BARTOLOME DAHAN, not guilty
of the crime charged and hereby ACQUITS him. Consequently, the Provincial Warden
is hereby ordered to release accused Bartolome Dahan from his preventive custody,
unless held for some other offense/s.
SO ORDERED.
Given this 23rd day of February, 1995, at Kidapawan, Cotabato, Philippines.
RODOLFO M. SERRANO
Judge12
Hence, this appeal.
In his first assigned error, accused-appellant Jose Pantorilla alleges that the trial court erred in
not believing his plea of self-defense. He claims that it was Franklin Bello who, under the
influence of liquor, entered his house and started hacking him with a bolo. 13 He stabbed Bello out
of fear for his own life and in order to protect his house from being robbed.
To buttress his claim of unlawful aggression, accused-appellant presented a medical
certificate14 which showed that he had contusions and hematoma, with an incised wound on his
left foot and on the second toe of his right foot. He claimed that he sustained the injuries when
Franklin Bello hacked him.
The rule is well-settled that when an accused invokes self-defense, the burden of evidence to
prove his claim shifts to him.15 It is incumbent upon him to show the concurrent presence of all
the elements of self-defense, namely, (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2)
reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; (3) and lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself. 16 Unlawful aggression is an
indispensable element, whether in complete or incomplete self-defense. 17 He must rely on the
strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution, for even if
weak, it could not be disbelieved after the accused admitted to the killing. 18

In this case, the fact that accused-appellant sustained injuries did not signify that he was a victim
of unlawful aggression. His examining doctor testified that the wounds he incurred were merely
superficial, perhaps caused by a small bladed instrument, 19 not a bolo. Furthermore, the medical
certificate issued by Dr. Carlota Sandique of Sto. Nio Hospital, Makilala, Cotabato failed to
indicate the purported injury of Pantorilla on his upper breast and on his hand, 20 rendering the
testimony of accused-appellant Pantorilla doubtful.
Moreover, his testimony was not corroborated by any witness. Neither his wife nor the wife of
Bartolome Dahan, who were allegedly inside the house when the stabbing incident occurred,
testified in court.
Furthermore, prosecution witness Allan Cablayan identified accused-appellant as the aggressor,
together with two other persons. Accused-appellant attempted to discredit the testimony of
prosecution witness Allan Cablayan by alleging that he had been evicted from the house he was
renting and had a grudge against accused-appellant for having initiated ejectment proceedings
on behalf of the owner of the house. However, Allan Cablayan, in his testimony, denied bearing
any grudge against accused-appellant.21 His testimony was given credence by the trial court,
which was in a better position to determine the issue of credibility of witnesses, having heard the
witness and observed his deportment and manner of testifying. We find no cogent reason to rule
otherwise, absent certain facts of substance and value which may have been overlooked that
might affect the result of the case.22
Further negating the claim of self-defense is the manner in which the victim had been stabbed to
death, which does not show reasonable means to repel an aggression. Evidence shows that the
victim Franklin Bello died from multiple stab wounds. Pictures taken at the scene of the crime
reveal that the stomach of the deceased had been slashed and the intestines protruded. There
were also several bloodied marks on the head and other parts of the body of the deceased. The
nature, location and number of wounds inflicted on the victim indicate a determined effort to kill
him.23
Therefore, the plea of self-defense cannot prosper.
In his second assigned error, accused-appellant contends that the trial court convicted him on
the basis of circumstantial evidence but failed to enumerate the circumstances supporting his
conviction. He points out that prosecution witness Allan Cablayan only testified that he saw the
victim being dragged and locked inside his house then heard a voice inside crying for help, and
merely presumed that accused-appellant killed Franklin Bello.
The second assigned error is inconsistent with the first one. Accused-appellant, in his testimony
in court, admitted that he took a knife from the floor and used it to stab Franklin Bello. 24 In
invoking self-defense, accused-appellant admitted killing Bello. Thus, he can not now assert lack
of proof to convict him.
Therefore, we find no error of the trial court in placing responsibility on accused-appellant Jose
M. Pantorilla for the death of Franklin Bello.
We note, though, that the trial court failed to indicate any qualifying circumstance which would
qualify the killing to murder. Without any qualifying circumstance, which will determine the

degree of culpability and penalty to be imposed, accused-appellant Jose M. Pantorilla may be

held liable only for homicide, not murder.25
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED. The Court finds accusedappellant Jose M. Pantorilla guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide, defined and penalized
under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. In the absence of any aggravating or mitigating
circumstances, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court hereby sentences him
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen
(17) years, and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, with all its accessory
penalties, and to pay the heirs of Franklin Bello in the amount of fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00), as civil indemnity, and costs.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 127572

January 19, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
SALVADOR VILLAR, accused-appellant.
MELO, J.:
This Court is once again called upon to discharge the most awesome power in the criminal
justice system, where, by way of automatic review, it is mandated to determine whether or not
the Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659, more commonly referred to as the Death Penalty Law,
was correctly imposed by the trial court, in this case by Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court of
the Fourth Judicial Region, stationed at Puerto Princesa City, Palawan for the heinous crime of
statutory rape committed by a de facto guardian against his l0-year old ward.
Accused-appellant was charged in two separate Informations pertinently reading as follows:
Criminal Case No. 11874
That on or about the 19th of January, 1994, at Barangay Bucana, Municipality of El Nido,
Province of Palawan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused with lewd design and by means of force, intimidation, did then and there willfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge with one Mary Ann Ramos, a child below 12 years old,
against her will and consent to her damage and prejudice.
(p. 8, Rollo.)
Criminal Case No. 11875

That sometime in the month of January, 1993 at Barangay Bucana, Municipality of El Nido,
Province of Palawan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused with lewd design and by means of force, intimidation, did then and there willfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge with one Mary Ann Ramos, a child below 12 years old,
against her will and consent to her damage and prejudice.
(p. 10, Rollo.)
The narration of facts by the trial court, supported as it is by the evidentiary record, is hereby
adopted, to wit:
Mary Ann Ramos is the eldest child of the spouses Danilo Ramos and Josefina
Recasa who were joined in wedlock in Masbate, on January 15, 1982. Shortly
thereafter, the spouses transferred residence to El Nido, Palawan, where in barangay
Bucana of the same town, Mary Ann was born to said spouses on April 7, 1983.
From Masbate, Danilo Ramos and Josefina Recasa-Ramos came to Palawan with
several others, among whom were the accused Salvador Villar and his nephew
identified only by his surname Ranilo. On getting to El Nido, Palawan, the group all
stayed in one house. After a while, however, Salvador Villar built a house of his own in
the island sitio of Lalutaya, barangay Bucana, El Nido, Palawan, and the spouses
Danilo and Josefina Ramos lived with him in the same house. Being more advanced
in age than them, and though still a bachelor, Salvador Villar had been regarded by
the spouses as elder member of their family.
Mary Ann Ramos became of school age in 1989. The island-sitio of Lalutaya where
the Ramoses and other migrants from Masbate settled some years back, however,
was yet without a school. The school nearest to the island-sitio is located in barangay
Bucana, El Nido, Palawan. It was that school were Mary Ann Ramos and other
children of school ages from sitio Lalutaya go to.
To provide the school children from sitio Lalutaya with a place to stay in during school
days, the Ramoses and Salvador Villa built a house where they were to live in
barangay Bucana, El Nido, Palawan. Recognizing the need for someone to look after
the welfare of the children and attend to their meals and all household needs, their
parents engaged the services of Salvador Villar to act as their caretaker and some
kind of a guardian.
In that capacity Salvador Villar conducts the school children on a banca from sitio
Lalutaya to barangay Bucana late in the afternoon of every Sunday. He stays with the
children in barangay Bucana attending to the preparation of their meals and other
household chores during school days. He conducts them back to sitio Lalutaya after
dismissal from classes in the afternoon of every Friday.1wphi1.nt
The accused consistently acted as caretaker and guardian of Mary Ann Ramos from
the time she was enrolled in Grade I. By the start of school year 1993-1994, though,
he had under his care in barangay Bucana, not only Mary Ann but four (4) others,
namely; Mae Ramos, a younger sister of Mary Ann; Liezl Ranilo, and the brothers

Ernie and Rene Maltos, all cousins of the Ramos sisters. For some time all went well
in the manner Salvador performed his duties as guardian of the school children, until
the happening of the incident which provided the basis for the institution of the instant
twin indictments.
The building serving some kind of a dormitory for Mary Ann and the four (4) other
school children with her is a structure of light materials with a floor area measuring
about 18 feet long and 16 feet wide. The walls are made of sawali, or wooden buho
(reed), and with roof of nipa shingles. Its floor, built about three (3) feet above the
ground, is made of bamboo slats.
The house they were living is so structured that it could be said to have two (2) rooms.
One room serves as bedroom while on one side of the other is the place for the
kitchen, and section for the dining room. Mary Ann and the two other girls sleep side
by side on mats spread on the floor in the bedroom while the boys, Ernie and Rene
Maltos, also sleep beside each other on another side of the room close to the kitchen.
Salvador Villar, on the other hand, sleeps on a bed close to the two boys.
Roughly 10:00 o'clock, one evening about the middle of January, 1993, and while all
the four (4) other children with her were already asleep, Mary Ann noticed Salvador
Villar approached her and with a knife poked at her chest, undressed her. Even as she
struggled to prevent him from undressing her he also took off her panty and made her
lie down. She attempted to shout but he covered her mouth with his hand. Then he
laid on top of her and thereupon forcibly inserted his male organ in her female
genitalia. With his penis inside her private organ he executed repeated pumping
motions. The entry of his male organ in to her reproductive organ, and his execution of
the pumping motions, caused her intense pain which made her momentary loss of
consciousness.
When shortly after she regained consciousness, she felt pain in her female organ.
Realizing that her organ had been bleeding she became frightened. Just then,
Salvador Villar warned her not to tell anyone what happened or he will kill her. (TSN,
Roselyn N. Teologo, February 9, 1995, pp. 9-14.) Because of fear instilled in her by
that threat she refrained from telling anyone about what the accused did to her.
That was not to be the last time the accused forcibly imposed his sexual gratification
on the complainant.
For a period of about a year thereafter the accused repeatedly had forcible carnal
knowledge of the complainant at intervals of more or less three days, or about ten (10)
times a month. He raped her so many times, about a hundred (100) times, that she
was unable to recall the precise dates of each assault on her. Aside from the first
occasion which she recalled to have taken place one evening about the middle of
January, 1993, the only other occasion which took place also in the house they were
staying in barangay Bucana, El Nido, Palawan, was in the evening of January 19,
1994. (TSN, Roselyn N. Teologo, June 9, 1995, pp. 14-23)
In the evening of January 19, 1994, the accused again forcibly had carnal knowledge
of the complainant. About 10:00 o'clock that evening, and after all the other school

children with Mary Ann have already been asleep, the accused approached her and
for the nth time forcibly undressed her. Thereafter, he laid on top of her and inserted
his male organ into hers. With his penis inside her female organ he executed pumping
motions even as she struggled to free herself from him. With his weight over her body
and with a knife poked on her she was unable to extricate herself.
Occasioned by the fear instilled in her by the threat to her life by the accused, the
repeated sexual assaults on the complainant by the said accused would not have
been disclosed to her parents were it not for another unusual incident which may have
some bearing to the successive commission of the offenses herein charged.
As usual, on January 20, 1994, a Thursday, Salvador Villar cooked their supper, and
at dinnertime set the table for their meals. They ate their supper at about 6:30 o'clock
in the evening, as usual. Salvador Villar partook of the meal with them and the
children noticed that he was already drunk at the time. After having been through
eating, the children, as usual, cleared the table and washed the dishes. Thereafter,
Salvador Villar left and some time later the children went to bed, without Salvador
Villar having been back.

spanked her. But the following morning they proceeded to the town hall of El Nido and
filed a complaint for rape against Salvador Villar. (TSN, Roselyn N. Teologo, 9
February, 1995, pp. 16-17).
Aside from filing a complaint, Mary Ann, accompanied by her mother, also submitted
for physical/medical examination by a physician on January 27, 1994. Dr. Nestor A.
Reyes of the District hospital of Taytay, Palawan, conducted that examination and
issued Medico Legal Certificate, marked Exhibit "C", the full text of which follows:
Patient: Mary Ann Ramos, 10 years old residing at barangay Bucana, El Nido, Palawan
Place of incident: Inside the room (Residential)
Date of incident: From January 1993 to January 19, 1994
Time of incident: Nighttime
Place of treatment: Taytay District Hospital, Taytay, Palawan

After the children have been asleep for some time they were awakened when
Salvador Villar came. On getting up the house, Salvador Villar drank water first then
threw the water container out on the window. Afterwards, he went inside the room
where the children have been sleeping and in a drunken mode shouted: "Nasan na
Kayo, mga putang ina kayo!" On seeing him with a drawn bolo on hand the children,
overcame with fright, rose from bed, jumped out through the window and proceeded
together to, and took refuge in, the house of one Minda Mentos. Ms. Mentos
welcomed them and made them get up her house. After a while Salvador Villar came,
fetching them, but they did not go back with him. Instead, they spent the night in the
house of Minda Mentos to whom they related why they jumped out through the
window.

Date of treatment:

Time of treatment: 3:30 PM

FINDINGS:
1. Breast undeveloped
2. Absence of pubic hair

The children returned to their place of abode the following morning of January 21,
1994. Salvador Villar prepared their breakfast that morning which they partook with
him. When asked while eating why he chased them the night before, the accused told
them that he was drunk and did not know what he was doing.
Soon after Mary Ann Ramos was sexually abused by Salvador Villar, she related to
her 9-year old cousin, Liezl Ranilo, what the accused did to her. But Liezl likewise
refrained from disclosing it to their parents because she was likewise afraid of the
threat by the accused. It was that incident which made the children jump out of the
window which led to the disclosure by Mary Ann of the sexual abuse on her by the
accused.
As was the habit, after dismissal from their classes late in the afternoon of Friday,
January 21, 1994, the children proceeded home on a banca to their parents in sitio
Lalutaya, barangay El Nido, Palawan. Thru Liezl Ranilo, the mother of Mary Ann
Ramos learned about the incident which made them jump out through the window.
Thereupon, her mother asked Mary Ann why they jumped out through the window and
she related why, including what Salvador Villar had been doing to her. Her mother

January 27, 1994

3. Hymen with old healed lacerations at 6,8,9 and 12 o'clock

4. Vagina admits 1 finger easily.
REMARKS:
had possible
sexual intercourse
(pp. 18-24, Rollo.)
Accused-appellant imputes two errors upon the trial court for convicting him of two counts of
rape, to wit:
I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY

BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF TWO COUNTS OF RAPE (IN JANUARY 1993
AND ON JANUARY 19, 1994) DESPITE THE IMPROBABLE AND INCONSISTENT
TESTIMONY OF THE COMPLAINING WITNESS.

abuse that had been going which may be noticed from any unusual behavior on her part and in
spite of the fact that there were five individuals sleeping side by side on the floor.

II

We find no competent evidence showing that the victim exhibited no unusual behavior during the
one-year period that she was being sexually abused by accused-appellant. The lack of concrete
evidence of any unusual behavior on record does not prove that there was in fact no such
unusual behavior. If accused-appellant wanted the court to consider such an allegation, it was
incumbent upon him to prove the same with competent evidence. The fundamental rule is that
upon him who alleges rests the burden of proof. He cannot simply rely on the lack of evidence
showing the contrary.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT IN

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 11874 AND SENTENCING HIM TO DEATH PURSUANT TO
SECTION 11 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7659 AMENDING ARTICLE 336 OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE.
In his brief, accused-appellant resolutely questions the factual findings of the trial court
concerning the credibility of the victim. For instance, accused-appellant cites the inconsistency
between the victim's declaration in her sworn statement and her direct testimony in court as to
the exact time when she was first raped by accused-appellant in 1993.

The argument does not have much weight.

We likewise find no merit in accused-appellant's contention that it was improbable that nobody
witnessed the rapes despite the fact that there were five of them sleeping inside the some room
where the offenses were allegedly committed. This argument is not new in this jurisdiction. In
fact, People vs. Sangil (276 SCRA 532 [1997]), we noted that:

The argument fails to persuade us.

. . . the commission of rape was concededly "improbable but not impossible. . .
It may well be pointed out that not all kinds of inconsistency of a witness render the witness'
testimony unworthy of credence. Verily, inconsistencies in minor details reinforce rather than
weaken credibility (People vs. Del Prado, 110 Phil. 1034 [1960]), and such inconsistencies do
not materially impair the credibility of the witness (People vs. Modelo, 35 SCRA 639 [1970]).
Under the circumstances of the case at bar, the Court finds the materiality of the exact time the
crime was committed as a minor detail and not of great significance. The more important
consideration is that the declarations of the victim both in her sworn statement before the
investigating police officer and in her testimony in court, are consistent on the basic matters
constituting the elements of the crime charged. Besides, this Court has already ruled that
discrepancy between the witnesses' testimony in court and the affidavits they had previously
signed, as to minor details regarding the commission of the crime, do not constitute sufficient
ground to impeach the credibility of said witnesses, where on material and important points their
declarations are consistent (People vs. Valera, 5 SCRA 910 [1962]).
Furthermore, the Court cannot impose the burden of exactness in the victim's recollection of her
harrowing experience more so in the present case where the victim was an innocent and tender
9-year old lass when she was first raped. It is all the more understandable that the victim in the
present case may have been confused as to the exact details of each and every rape incident,
considering that she claimed she had been sexually ravished for more than 100 times in a span
of one whole year. It is in fact expected that such a victim would rather wish and even purposely
forget the abhorrent memories of every single occasion. This being the case, it would be
exacting too much should the Court demand a very accurate, detailed, and flawless account of
the two occasions now subject of her charges out of the 100 occasions of forcible intercourse.
In People vs. Sagucio (277 SCRA 183 [1997]), where this Court faced the same issue of alleged
inconsistencies in the victim's narration, we held that errorless testimony cannot be expected
especially when a witness is recounting details of a harrowing experience. A court cannot expect
a rape victim to remember every detail of the appalling outrage.
Accused-appellant also contends that the victim's testimony is unworthy of credence because of
the inherent improbability of her testimony that nobody in their house learned of the repeated

In People vs. Ignacio we took judicial notice of the interesting fact that among poor
couples with big families living in small quarters, copulation does not seem a problem
despite the presence of other persons around them. Considering the cramped space
and meager room for privacy, couples perhaps have gotten used to quick and less
disturbing modes of sexual congresses which elude the attention of family members;
otherwise, under the circumstances, it would be almost impossible to copulate with
them around even when asleep. It is also not impossible nor incredible for the family
members to be in deep slumber and not be awakened while the sexual assault is
being committed. One may also suppose that growing children sleep more soundly
than grown-ups and are not easily awakened by adult exertions and suspirations in
the night. There is no merit in appellant's contention that there can be no rape in a
room where other people are present. There is no rule that rape can be committed
only in seclusion. We have repeatedly declared that "lust is no respecter of time and
place," and rape can be committed in even the unlikeliest of places.
(pp. 539-540)
Finally, accused-appellant claims that the death penalty cannot be imposed upon him under the
provisions of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659 which pertinently provides:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of
the following attendant circumstances:
1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law-spouse of the parent
of the victim.

He posits that he was not a guardian of the victim. He argues that he was a mere employee of
the victim's parents, spouses Danilo and Josefina Ramos, charged with the duty of looking after
the needs of their children Mary Ann and May Ramos, and likewise given the task of conducting
them by banca from Barangay Bucana to Sitio Lalutaya and vice-versa to attend school. He
further contends that he cannot be said to have the power, control or authority over the person of
Mary Ann Ramos which a guardian should have, because it is still her parents who exercise the
same over her. He insists that he served as a mere companion of the children while they
attended their classes.
There may be ample evidence on record to show that accused-appellant qualified as a guardian
of the victim the way the lawmakers intended the word to be understood, but the Court reserves
its ruling on the issue considering that this special qualifying circumstance of being a guardian
was not duly alleged in the information.
The Court cannot affirm the death sentence imposed by the trial court anchored upon the abovecited provision of the Death Penalty Law.
In People vs. Dela Cuesta (G.R. No. 126134, March 2, 1999), we held:
The seven modes of committing rape introduced under R.A. 7659 and R.A. 4111
which warrant the automatic imposition of death penalty partake of the nature of a
qualifying circumstance under the Revised Penal Code since it increases the penalty
or rape to one degree. As such, this qualifying circumstance, that the child is under
eighteen (18) and the offender is a guardian, should be alleged in the information to
be appreciated as such.
(pp. 10-11)
Although the circumstances to qualify simple rape to the heinous crime of rape, namely: (a)
victim under 18 years old (the certificate of live birth exhibit "A" was admitted by the defense),
and (b) the offender being a guardian, were duly proven in the present case, these circumstance
cannot considered for purposes of imposing the extreme penalty of death unless these were
alleged in the information. An examination of the two informations in the present case reveals
that only the qualifying circumstance that the child is under 12 was alleged. There was no
allegation that the offender was a guardian of the victim. To consider said circumstance as
qualifying, would constitute denial of the right of accused-appellant to due process and to be
informed of the charges against him. At best, such circumstance may only be treated as a
generic aggravating circumstance, which, in the case of simple statutory rape, however, is
inconsequential because the imposable penalty is the singular indivisible penalty of reclusion
perpetua.

sentencing accused-appellant to reclusion perpetua, with civil indemnity of P50,000.00 in favor

of the victim, with an ADDITIONAL P50,000.00 as moral damages; and (b) in Criminal Case No.
11875 MODIFYING the sentence to reclusion perpetua, also with civil indemnity of P50,000.00,
and P50,000.00 as moral damages in favor of the victim. Costs de officio.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 117487 December 12, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ARNEL ALICANDO y BRIONES, accused-appellant.
PUNO, J.:
The case at bar involves the imposition of the death penalty. With all our frailties, we are asked
to play the role of an infallible God by exercising the divine right to give or take away life. We
cannot err in the exercise of our judgment for our error will be irrevocable. Worse, our error can
result in the worst of crimes murder by the judiciary.
The records reveal that appellant Arnel Alicando was charged with the crime of rape with
homicide 1 in an Information which reads:
That on or about the 12th day of June 1994 in the City of Iloilo, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Court, said accused, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and by means of force, violence and
intimidation to wit: by then and there pinning down one KHAZIE MAE
PENECILLA, a minor, four years of age, choking her with his right hand,
succeeded in having carnal knowledge with her and as a result thereof she
suffered asphyxia by strangulation fractured cervical vertebra and
lacerations of the vaginal and rectal openings causing profuse hemorrhages
and other injuries which are necessarily fatal and which were the direct
cause of her death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On June 29, 1994, appellant was arraigned with the assistance of Atty. Rogelio Antiquiera of the
PAO, Department of Justice. Appellant pleaded guilty.

For each the two counts of simple statutory rape, accused-appellant may be held civilly liable for
the amount of P50,000.00 by way of indemnity and an additional P50,000.00 as moral
damages.1wphi1.nt

After appellant's plea of guilt, the trial court ordered the prosecution to present its evidence. It
also set the case for reception of evidence for the appellant, if he so desired. 2

WHEREFORE, finding the conviction of accused-appellant for two counts of rape justified by the
evidence on record, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the decision of Branch 52 of the Regional Trial
Court, Fourth Judicial Region, stationed at Puerto Princesa City (a) in Criminal Case No. 11875

The prosecution evidence shows that in the afternoon of June 12, 1994, Romeo Penecilla, father
of the four year old victim Khazie Mae, was drinking liquor with Ramil Rodriguez and Remus
Gaddi in his (Penecilla's) house at Barangay Rizal, Zone 1, Pulo Bala, Iloilo. Appellant joined
them but every now and then would take leave and return. Appellant was living in his uncle's

house some five (5) arm's length from Penecilla's house. At about 4:30 p.m., Penecilla's group
stopped drinking and left.

ON OPENING THE SKULL 7 THORACO-ABDOMINAL CAVITIES:

a) Fractured, 2nd cervical vertebra.

Luisa Rebada also lives in the Penecilla neighborhood, about one and a half (1-1/2) arm's length
from the house of appellant. At about 5:30 p.m. of that day, she saw the victim at the window of
appellant's house. She offered to buy her "yemas" but appellant closed the window. Soon she
heard the victim crying. She approached appellant's house and peeped through an opening
between its floor and door. The sight shocked her appellant was naked, on top of the victim, his
left hand choking her neck. She retreated to her house in fright. She gathered her children
together and informed her compadre, Ricardo Lagrana, then in her house, about what she saw.
Lagrana was also overcome with fear and hastily left.
Romeo Penecilla returned to his house at 8 o'clock in the evening. He did not find Khazie Mae.
He and his wife searched for her until 1 o'clock in the morning. Their effort was fruitless. Rebada
was aware that the Penecillas were looking for their daughter but did not tell them what she
knew. Instead, Relada called out appellant from her window and asked him the time Khazie Mae
left his house. Appellant replied he was drunk and did not know.
As the sun started to rise, another neighbor, Leopoldo Santiago went down from his house to
answer the call of nature. He discovered the lifeless body of Khazie Mae under his house. Her
parents were informed and so was the police. At 9:00 a.m., Rebada suffered a change of heart.
She informed Romeo Penecilla and his wife Julie Ann, that appellant committed the crime.
Forthwith, appellant was arrested and interrogated by PO3 Danilo Tan. He verbally confessed
his guilt without the assistance of counsel. On the basis of his uncounselled verbal confession
and follow up interrogations, the police came to know and recovered from appellant's house,
Khazie Mae's green slippers, a pair of gold earrings, a buri mat, a stained pillow and a stained Tshirt all of which were presented as evidence for the prosecution.

b) Fractured, crecoid cartilage.

c) Both lungs, expanded with multiple petechial hemorrhages.
d) Other internal organs, congested.

EXTREMITIES:
1) Confluent abrasion, 3 x 2.6 cm., in dia., posterior aspect, lower 3rd, left forearm.
2) Old wound, 2 x 1.5 cm., in dia., posterior middle 3rd, left forearm.
3) Old wound, 1.5 x 1 cm., in dia., antero-lateral aspect, middle 3rd, right forearm.

VAGINAL FINDINGS/ANAL FINDINGS:

a) Lacerated wound, from the fourchette up to the dome of the rectum..

The body of Khazie Mae was autopsied by Dr. Tito Doromal, a medico-legal officer. His autopsy
report reveals the following injuries sustained by the victim:
HEAD & NECK/THORACO-ABDOMINAL REGIONS:
1) Contusion , purple in color, 11 x 11.3 cm., in dia., from left and right anterior neck,
down to the medial portion of the left and right infraclavicular area.

b) Hematoma, from the fourchette up to the rectum.

c) Lacerated wound, lateral wall of the vagina up to the level of the promontory of the
sacrum with a length of 8 centimeters.
d) A cylinder with a diameter of 2 cms., easily passes the vaginal and anal openings.

2) Contusion, bluish purple, 5.5 x 6.3 cm., in dia., antero-lateral left chest wall.
3) Contusion, bluish in color, 3 in nos., 1, 0.5 & 1.1 cm., in dia., right antero- inferior
chest wall.

CAUSE OF DEATH:
A) ASPHYXIA BY STRANGULATION.

4) Contusion, purple in color, 4 x 3.2 cm., in dia., left sub-costal arch.

B) FRACTURED, 2nd CERVICAL VERTEBRA.
5) Contusion, purple in color, 4.5 x 5 cm., in dia., supero-lateral, left iliac crest.
C) HEMORRHAGE, 2nd DEGREE TO LACERATED VAGINAL & RECTAL
OPENINGS.

Appellant adopted the autopsy report of Dr. Doromal as his documentary evidence to prove that
the proximate cause of Khazie Mae's death was asphyxia by strangulation.
On July 20, 1994, the trial court found appellant guilty and sentenced him to death, viz:
WHEREFORE, the court hereby finds the accused, Arnel Alicando,
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for (sic) the Crime of Rape with Homicide
penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by
paragraphs 6 and 7 (No. 4) Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659. Arnel
Alicando is hereby sentenced to suffer a (sic) penalty of death and to
indemnify the heirs of the offended party, Khazie Mae D. Penecilla, the sum
of P50,000.00.
The death sentence shall be executed by putting the person under sentence
to death by electrocution (electric chair). As soon as facilities are provided
by the Bureau of Prisons, the method of carrying out his sentence shall be
changed by gas poisoning (sic).
Here ends Khazie Mae's quest for justice. Her tormentor must suffer for the
grievous offense he had committed. He deserves no mercy.
Cost against the accused.
SO ORDERED.
The case is before us on automatic review considering the death penalty imposed by the trial
court. A new counsel, Atty. Joel Tiongco, took the cudgel for appellant. In his Brief, appellant
assails the decision of the trial court as a travesty of justice.
We find that the Decision of the trial court sentencing the appellant to death is shot full of errors,
both substantive and procedural. The conviction is on an amalgam of inadmissible and
incredible evidence and supported by scoliotic logic.
First. The arraignment of the appellant is null and void. The trial judge failed to follow section (1)
(a) of Rule 116 on arraignment. Said section provides:

The reading of the complaint or information to the appellant in the language or dialect
known to him is a new requirement imposed by the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure. It implements the constitutional right of an appellant ". . . to be informed of
the nature and cause of the accusation against him." 3 The new rule also responds to
the reality that the Philippines is a country divided by dialects and Pilipino as a
national language is still in the process of evolution. 4 Judicial notice can be taken of
the fact that many Filipinos have limited understanding either of the Pilipino or English
language, our official languages for purposes of communication and instruction. 5 The
importance of reading the complaint or information to the appellant in the language or
dialect known to him cannot thus be understated.
In the case at bar, the records do not reveal that the Information against the appellant was read
in the language or dialect known to him. The Information against the appellant is written in the
English language. It is unbeknown whether the appellant knows the English language. Neither is
it known what dialect is understood by the appellant. Nor is there any showing that the
Information couched in English was translated to the appellant in his own dialect before his plea
of guilt. The scanty transcript during his arraignment, reads: 6
xxx xxx xxx
Prosecutor Edwin Fama Appearing as public prosecutor
Atty. Rogelio Antiquiera For the accused, Your Honor. Ready for
arraignment.
Interpreter (Reading the information to the accused for arraignment and
pre-trial.)
Note: (After reading the information to the accused, accused pleads guilty)
One need not draw a picture to show that the arraignment of the appellant is a nullity.
It violated section 1(a) of Rule 116, the rule implementing the constitutional right of the
appellant to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. It also
denied appellant his constitutional right to due process of law. 7It is urged that we must
presume that the arraignment of the appellant was regularly conducted. When life is at
stake, we cannot lean on this rebuttable presumption. We cannot assume. We must
be sure.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 1. Arraignment and plea; how made.
(a) The accused must be arraigned before the court where the complaint or
information has been filed or assigned for trial. The arraignment must be
made in open court by the judge or clerk by furnishing the accused a copy
of the complaint or information with the list of witnesses, reading the same
in the language or dialect known to him and asking him whether he pleads
guilty or not guilty. The prosecutor may, however, call at the trial witnesses
other than those named in the complaint or information.

Second. The plea of guilt made by the appellant is likewise null and void. The trial court violated
section 3 of Rule 116 when it accepted the plea of guilt of the appellant. Said section provides:
Sec. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence.
When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct
a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the
consequences of his plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and
the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also present evidence in
his behalf.

The records reveal how the trial judge inadequately discharged this duty of
conducting a "searching inquiry." In the hearing of June 28, 1994, the
transcripts reveal the following: 8

Court If you will plead guilty, that plea of guilty has no use because there will
be a mandatory death penalty, do you still insist on your plea of guilty?
Accused Yes, Your Honor.

Note (After reading the information to the accused, accused pleads guilty.)
Court Question (sic) of the court to the accused.
Q Considering that this is a crime and under the amended law is a heinous
crime, because of your plea of guilty without the consent or even against the
discretion of the court, the court will give you a mandatory death penalty
because of the crime charged, do you understand?
Accused Yes, Your Honor.

Court If you plead guilty to the crime charged there will be some effects on
your civil rights hut not until the decision will be affirmed by the Supreme
Court.
Accused Yes, Your Honor.
Note (See Order dated June 28, 1994 attached to the records of this case.)
In the next hearing on July 11, 1994, the following verbal exchange
transpired, viz: 9

Q Did you enter a plea of guilty on your own voluntary will or without any
force or intimidation from any one or whatever?

xxx xxx xxx

Accused None, Your Honor.

Fiscal Fama: Appearing as the public prosecutor, ready, Your Honor.

Q Are you sure?

Our first witness is Dr. Tito Doromal, Your Honor.

Accused Yes, Your Honor.

Atty. Antiquiera: For the accused, Your Honor.

Q Or maybe because you were manhandled or maltreated by anyone and

that will just be the consideration for you to plead guilty?

Court Before the court will proceed with the reception of evidence by the
prosecution Arnel Alicando, please come here. (at this juncture, Arnel
Alicando, come near to the court)

Accused No, Your Honor.

Court Were you not manhandled, please let us see your body?

The court is warning you again that this is reception of evidence by the
prosecution after you plead guilty to the crime charged at, do you
understand?

Note (Accused raised his prison uniform or shirt and showed to the court his
body from waist up.)

A Yes.

Accused No, Your Honor.

Q Do you still affirm and confirm to your plea of guilty of rape with homicide?

Court You were not maltreated in the jail?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Accused No, Your Honor.

Q Do you still insist that your plea of guilty is voluntary without force,
intimidation or whatsoever?

Court Please let us see whether you have bruises so that you will be
examined by a physician to the order of the court?
Accused No, Your Honor.

A Yes.
Q The court is warning you that after reception of evidence, the imposable
penalty is mandatory death?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q Despite of that, you still insist on your plea of guilty?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Court Okey, proceed.
Section 3 of Rule 116 which the trial court violated is not a new rule for it merely incorporated the
decision of this Court in People vs. Apduhan, Jr., 10 and reiterated in an unbroken line of
cases. 11 The bottom line of the rule is that the plea of guilt must be based on a free and
informed judgment. Thus, the searching inquiry of the trial court must be focused on: (1) the
voluntariness of the plea, and (2) the full comprehension of the consequences of the plea. The
questions of the trial court failed to show the voluntariness of the plea of guilt of the appellant nor
did the questions demonstrate appellant's full comprehension of the consequences of his plea.
The records do not reveal any information about the personality profile of the appellant which
can serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilt. The
age, socio-economic status, and educational background of the appellant were not plumbed by
the trial court. The questions were framed in English yet there is no inkling that appellant has a
nodding acquaintance of English. It will be noted too that the trial court did not bother to explain
to the appellant the essential elements of the crime of rape with homicide.
A cursory examination of the questions of the trial court to establish the voluntariness of
appellant's plea of guilt will show their utter insufficiency. The trial court simply inquired if
appellant had physical marks of maltreatment. It did not ask the appellant when he was arrested,
who arrested him, how and where he was interrogated, whether he was medically examined
before and after his interrogation, etc. It limited its efforts trying to discover late body marks of
maltreatment as if involuntariness is caused by physical abuse alone. Regretfully, it even turned
a blind eye on the following damning entry on the June 13, 1994 Record of Events of the Iloilo
PNP (Exh. "M") showing that after his arrest, the appellant was mobbed by inmates while in jail
and had suffered hematoma, viz:
c-0262-94
INFORMATION
2:50 PM, P02 Salvador Pastoloro, Jr., PNP assigned at 327th PNP MFC,
informed this office thru SPO1 W. Garcera alleging that at about 9:00 AM
this date when the suspect ARNEL ALICANDO Y BRIONES, 24 yrs. old,
residence of Rizal, Palapala Zone I, CP, been arrested and mobbed by the
irrate residents of Zone II Rizal, Palapala, GP, in connection of the Rape
with Homicide case wherein the victim KHAZIE MAE PENECILLA Y
DRILON, 4 yrs, old, residence of same place who was discovered dead
under the house thereat. Suspect when turned over to this office and put on
lock up cell was also mobbed by the angry inmates thus causing upon him
hematoma contusion on different parts of his body.

Likewise, the trial court's effort to determine whether appellant had full comprehension of the
consequences of his plea is fatally flawed. It warned the appellant he would get the mandatory
death penalty without explaining the meaning of "mandatory" It did not inform the appellant of
the indemnity he has to pay for the death of the victim. It cautioned appellant there " . . . will be
some effects on your civil rights" without telling the appellant what those "effects" are and what
"civil rights" of his are involved.
Appellant's plea of guilt is void and the trial court erred in using it to sentence him to death. We
stress that under the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, a conviction in capital offenses cannot
rest alone on a plea of guilt. Section 3 of Rule 116 requires that after a free and intelligent plea of
guilt, the trial court must require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the appellant and the
precise degree of his culpability beyond reasonable doubt. This rule modifies prior jurisprudence
that a plea of guilt even in capital offenses is sufficient to sustain a conviction charged in the
information without need of further proof. The change is salutary for it enhances one of the goals
of the criminal process which is to minimize erroneous conviction. We share the stance that "it is
a fundamental value determination of our system that it is far worse to convict an innocent
person than let a guilty man go free. 12
Third. Some prosecution evidence, offered independently of the plea of guilt of the appellant,
were inadmissible, yet, were considered by the trial court in convicting the appellant.
Thus, the trial court gave full faith and credit to the physical evidence presented by the
prosecution. To quote its Decision, 13 viz:
xxx xxx xxx
Further, there are physical evidence to prove Khazie was raped. These
consists of a pillow with bloodstains in its center 14 and the T-shirt 15 of the
accused colored white with bloodstains on its bottom. These physical
evidence are evidence of the highest order. They strongly corroborate the
testimony of Luisa Rebada that the victim was raped.
These are inadmissible evidence for they were gathered by PO3 Danilo Tan of the
Iloilo
City
PNP
as
a
result
of
custodial
interrogation
where appellant verbally confessed to the crime without the benefit of counsel. PO3
Tan admitted under cross-examination, viz: 16
xxx xxx xxx
CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY ATTY. ANTIQUIERA:
Q Mr. Witness, when for the first time did you see Arnel Alicando?
A June 13, 1994, when I arrested him.
Q Previous to that you have never seen him?

A Yes, sir.

Q And when did you stop, finally, investigating and interrogating Arnel Alicando?

Q When for the first time did you start investigating Arnel Alicando?

A After I finished recovering all the exhibits in relation to this case.

A After I finished investigating the body of the victim, Khazie Mae Penecilla.

Q What date did you stop your investigation?

Q And that was also after you were informed that Arnel Alicando was a suspect in
the raping of Khazie Mae Penecilla?

A June 14, 1994, when I finished recovering the white T-shirt and pair of earring.
Atty. Antiquiera:

A Yes, sir
Atty. Antiquiera:

Q You testified in this case, Mr. Witness, you never informed the court that you
apprised the accused of his constitutional rights, is that correct?

Q And who was that person who informed you of the suspect?

A I apprised him.

A Luisa Rebada.
Q Mrs. Rebada who is the witness in this case?

Q My question is, during your testimony before this court under the direct
examination of the prosecution you never informed the court that you apprised
the accused of his constitutional rights?

A Yes, sir.

Pros. Fama:

Q And you started investigating Arnel Alicando in the morning of June 13, 1994?

I did not ask him that question. How will he answer?

A Yes, sir.

Court:

Q How long did you interrogate Arnel Alicando in the morning of June 13, 1994?

Sustained.

A I cannot remember the length of time I investigated him.

Atty. Antiquiera:

Q Did it take you the whole morning of June 13, 1994 in interrogating and
investigating Arnel Alicando?

Q When did you inform, the date when you informed Alicando of his
Constitutional rights?

A Yes, sir.

A On June 13.

Q And the investigation you conducted continued in the afternoon of the same
date?

Q On what hour did you inform him?

A After the witness identified him.

A Yes, sir.
Q What constitutional rights did you inform Alicando of?
Q The following day, June 14, 1994, you still investigated and interrogated Arnel
Alicando.

A The right to remain silent, and right to get his lawyer and I have interpreted in
Visayan language.

A Yes, sir.
Q And during your investigation for almost two (2) days the accused was never
represented by counsel, is that correct?

A Yes, sir.

Q When you arrived at the place of the incident what did you do?

Atty. Antiquiera:

A He pointed to the fish basin.

Q Are you aware of the law that enjoins a public officer to inform the person of his
constitutional rights?

Q Can you identify this fish basin which you said pointed to you by Arnel Alicando?
A Yes, sir.

A Yes, sir.
Q Please point?
That is all, Your Honor.
A (Witness pointing to the fish basin already marked as Exhibit "H".)
It is now familiar learning that the Constitution has stigmatized
as inadmissible evidence uncounselledconfession
or
admission.
Section
12
paragraphs (1) and (3) of Article III of the Constitution provides:
xxx xxx xxx

Q Did you ask the accused what he did with this fish basin?
A I asked the accused what he did with the fish basin and he answered that he
used the fish basin to cover Khazie Mae Penecilla when she was already dead.

Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to
have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If
the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with
one.These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.

Pros. Fama:

xxx xxx xxx

Q What else aside from this fish basin, what else did you recover?

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or the

preceding section shall be inadmissible against him.

A At around 7 o'clock in the evening he further pointed to us the old mat and
the pillowwherein he layed the victim Khazie Mae Penecilla

In the case at bar, PO3 Tan did not even have the simple sense to reduce the all important
confession of the appellant in writing. Neither did he present any writing showing that appellant
waived his right to silence and to have competent and independent counsel despite the blatant
violation of appellant's constitutional right, the trial court allowed his uncounselled confession to
flow into the records and illicitly used it in sentencing him to death.
It is not only the uncounselled confession that is condemned as inadmissible, but also evidence
derived therefrom. The pillow and the T-shirt with the alleged bloodstains were evidence derived
from the uncounselled confession illegally extracted by the police from the appellant. Again, the
testimony of PO3 Tan makes this all clear, viz: 17

Q You mean to say to conceal the crime?

A Yes, sir.

Q You mean to say that you returned back to the scene of the incident that time?
A It was already night time and it was only Kagawad Rodolfo Ignacio, my
companion, who went to the place of the incident.
Q You mean to say you were verbally instructed by the accused?
A Yes, sir.
Q In what particular place did you recover those things?

xxx xxx xxx

A Inside the room where he raped the child.
Q Did the accused Arnel Alicando accompany you to the place of the incident?
Q Whose house is that?
A Yes, sir.
A The house of Imelda Alicando.

Q The wife of Romeo Alicando?

A Around the fence of Imelda Alicando situated at the from gate on the right side.

A Yes, sir.

Pros. Fama:

Q In what particular place is that situated?

Q You mean to say you returned back on June 14, you recovered the items
accompanied by the accused?

A Inside the room where the accused was sleeping at Rizal-Palapala.

A No more, I only followed his direction.
Pros. Fama:
Q He made verbal direction to you?
Q You mean to say inside that room the victim was raped by the accused?
A Yes, sir.
A Yes, sir.
Q Can you please show us the white t-shirt?
Q Can you point that pillow which you said you recovered inside the room of
Imelda Alicando?

A (Witness taking out a white t-shirt from the fish basin.)

A Yes, sir.

Q Please examine that white t-shirt?

Q And the mat?

A (Witness taking out from the fish basin the mat and pillow.)
Q Did you find something on the pillow?
A The pillow have bloodstain in the middle.
. . This was already marked as Exhibit "J", Your Honor and the mat as Exhibit "I".
Q Aside from this what did you recover from the place of incident?
A On June 14, 1994, at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning the accused Arnel
Alicando further informed me that he kept the gold earring of the victim and her
clothes inside the room of the house of Imelda Alicando.
Q Where?
A I saw the clothes of Khazie Mae Penecilla inside the room where the rape took
place hanged on the clothes line. And I found the pair of earring at the bamboo
post of the fence.
Court:
Q Where is that bamboo post of the fence situated?

A The t-shirt have a bloodstain.

We have not only constitutionalized the Miranda warnings in our jurisdiction. We have
also adopted the libertarian exclusionary rule known as the "fruit of the poisonous
tree," a phrase minted by Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter in the celebrated case
of Nardone v. United States. 18 According to this rule, once the primary source (the
"tree") is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative
evidence (the " fruit " ) derived from it is also inadmissible. 19 Stated otherwise, illegally
seized evidence is obtained as a direct result of the illegal act, whereas the "fruit of
the poisonous tree" is the indirect result of the same illegal act. The "fruit of the
poisonous tree" is at least once removed from the illegally seized evidence, but it is
equally inadmissible. The rule is based on the principle that evidence illegally obtained
by the State should not be used to gain other evidence because the originally illegally
obtained evidence taints all evidence subsequently obtained. 20 We applied this
exclusionary rule in the recent case of People vs.Salanga, et al., 21 a ponencia of Mr.
Justice Regalado. Salanga was the appellant in the rape and killing of a 15-year old
barrio lass. He was, however, illegally arrested. Soldiers took him into custody. They
gave him a body search which yielded a lady's underwear. The underwear was later
identified as that of the victim. We acquitted Salanga. Among other reasons , we ruled
that "the underwear allegedly taken from the appellant is inadmissible in evidence,
being a so-called "fruit of the poisonous tree." 22
But even assuming arguendo that the pillow and the t-shirt were admissible evidence, still, the
trial court erred in holding that they "strongly corroborated the testimony of Luisa Rebada that
the victim was raped." For one, there was no basis for the trial court to conclude that the stains
on the pillow and t-shirt were human bloodstains. The pillow and the t-shirt were not examined
by any expert. To hold that they were human bloodstains is guesswork. For another, there was
no testimony that the stains were caused by either the blood of the appellant or the victim. In

addition, there was no testimony that the t-shirt was the one worn by the appellant when he
allegedly committed the crime. It must also be noted that it is not unnatural for appellant to have
bloodstains on his shirt. He is a butcher by occupation. Romeo Penecilla himself, the father of
the victim, testified he knows the appellant "becausehe used to accompany me during
butchering of animals." 23
The burden to prove that an accused waived his right to remain silent and the right to counsel
before making a confession under custodial interrogation rests with the prosecution. It is also the
burden of the prosecution to show that the evidence derived from confession is not tainted
as "fruit of the poisonous tree." The burden has to be discharged by clear and convincing
evidence. Indeed, par. 1 of Section 12 of Article III of the Constitution provides only one mode of
waiver the waiver must be in writing and in the presence of counsel. In the case at bar, the
records show that the prosecution utterly failed to discharge this burden. It matters not that in the
course of the hearing, the appellant failed to make a timely objection to the introduction of these
constitutionally proscribed evidence. The lack of objection did not satisfy the heavy burden of
proof that rested on the prosecution.
There is no and there ought not to be any disagreement on basic principles. The Court should
be concerned with the heinousness of the crime at bar and its despicable perpetration against a
4-year old girl, an impersonation of innocence itself. The Court should also be concerned with
the multiplication of malevolence in our midst for there is no right to be evil, and there are no ifs
and buts about the imposition of the death penalty as long as it remains unchallenged as part of
the laws of our land. These concerns are permanent, norms hewn in stone, and they transcend
the transitoriness of time.
Be that as it may, our commitment to the criminal justice system is not only to convict and punish
violators of our laws. We are equally committed to the ideal that the process of detection,
apprehension, conviction and incarceration of criminals should be accomplished with fairness,
and without impinging on the dignity of the individual. In a death penalty case, the Court cannot
rush to judgment even when a lowlife is involved for an erroneous conviction will leave a lasting
stain in our escutcheon of justice.
In sum, the Court cannot send the appellant to die in the electric chair on the basis of the
procedural irregularities committed by, and the inadmissible evidence considered by the trial
court. In Binabay vs. People, et al., 24ponencia of Mr. Chief Justice R. Concepcion, this Court
held that no valid judgment can be rendered upon an invalid arraignment. Since in the case at
bar, the arraignment of the appellant is void, his judgment of conviction is also void. In fairness
to the appellant, and in justice to the victim, the case has to be remanded to the trial court. for
further proceedings. There is no philosophy of punishment that allows the State to kill without
any semblance of fairness and justice.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision in Criminal Case No. 43663, convicting accused Arnel
Alicando of the crime of Rape with Homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death is
annulled and set aside and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 84905

February 1, 2000

REGINO CLEOFAS and LUCIA DELA CRUZ, petitioners,

vs.
ST. PETER MEMORIAL PARK INC., BASILISA ROQUE, FRANCISCO
BAUTISTA, ARACELI WIJANGCO, DEL ROSARIO, BANCO FILIPINO,
and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF RIZAL and REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
QUEZON CITY, respondents.
BUENA, J.:
This case dates back to 1973. It has dragged on for 26 years and has reached this Court three
times. We now write finis to this controversy.
The property subject of the present controversy is Lot No. 719 of the Piedad Estate situated in
the Municipality of Caloocan, Rizal, containing an area of 215,264 square meters. It forms part
of the land covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 614 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal, in
the name of the Government of the Philippines.
On March 20, 1909, the Director of Lands, as administrator of the Piedad Estate, executed a
contract in favor of Antonio Cleofas, (predecessor-in-interest of herein petitioners) known as
Sales Certificate No. 923. Antonio Cleofas took possession of the lot and occupied the same
until his death sometime in 1945. Antonio's title was burned in a fire sometime in 1933.
Subsequently, when petitioners tried to reconstitute the lost certificate, they discovered that the
lot was already registered in the name of herein respondent Memorial Park. Hence, they filed on
October 31, 1970 a suit against respondents for annulment of certificate of title and recovery of
possession before then Court of First Instance of Rizal which was docketed as Civil Case No. Q15001. In their complaint, petitioners prayed, among others, that they be declared the rightful
owners of Lot No. 719, that the title of their predecessor, Antonio Cleofas, be reconstituted and
that all certificates of title over said lot issued in the names of the respondents be declared null
and void. 1
Respondent Memorial Park, filed its answer alleging inter alia: that while Lot No. 719 was
originally sold to Antonio Cleofas by the government, Cleofas subsequently assigned his rights
to a certain Aniceto Martin and Trino Narciso, in whose favor Transfer Certificate of Title No.
21893 was issued on June 17, 1932; that Martin and Narciso in turn conveyed the property to
Nazario Roque on May 11, 1937 resulting in the issuance of TCT No. 32258; and that Nazario's
transfer certificate of title was cancelled and the property was passed on to his heirs, Carmen
and Basilisa Roque from whom respondent St. Peter Memorial Park purchased the lot. 2
After trial, the lower court, on May 2, 1973, rendered judgment in favor of herein petitioners and
against respondents, the decretal portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, it is hereby declared that the plaintiffs are the
rightful owners of Lot 719 of the Piedad Estate and are entitled to possession of the
same; that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 21893 issued by the defendant Register of

Deeds of Rizal is declared null and void, and the following Transfer Certificates of Title
Nos. 32258 issued by defendant Register of Deeds of Rizal cancelling TCT No.
21893; 12360 issued by defendants Register of Deeds of Quezon City, cancelling TCT
No. 32258; 74978 in the name of defendant Araceli Wijangco del Rosario issued by
defendant Register of Deeds of Quezon City and a transfer from TCT No. 12360;
98115, 130328 and 131768 in the name of defendant Basilisa Roque-Bautista and in
the name of defendant corporation which are all mortgaged to the defendant Bank,
and all issued by defendant Register of Deeds of Quezon City; are hereby declared
null and void and are deemed cancelled and of no effect. The plaintiffs' petition for
reconstitution of their lost title having been consolidated with this case, the same is
hereby granted, and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City is directed to reconstitute
plaintiffs' title on Lot 719. Piedad Estate, based on all available records and other data
appearing in said registry of property.

and all issued by defendant Register of Deeds of Quezon City; are hereby declared
null and void and are deemed cancelled and of no effect. The plaintiffs petition for
reconstitution of their lost title having been consolidated with this case, the same is
hereby granted and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City is directed to reconstitute
plaintiffs' title on Lot 719, Piedad Estate, based on all available records and other data
appearing in said registry of property.

It is further ordered that as prayed for the defendant corporation St. Peter Memorial
Park, Inc., and the defendants Francisco M. Bautista and Basilisa Roque pay jointly
and severally to the plaintiffs the amount of P40,000.00 as damages and the amount
of P10,000.00 as Attorney's fees; plus costs.

The trial court found the Deed of Assignment in favor of Martin and Narciso, predecessors of
herein respondent St. Peter Memorial Park, spurious. The trial court dwelled on the fact that the
Assignment of Certificate of Sale No. 923 6 executed by Antonio Cleofas in favor of Martin and
Narciso, Deed No. 25874 7 executed by the Director of Lands in favor or Martin and Narciso
conveying lot 719 to the latter and the deed of sale executed by Martin and Narciso in favor
Nazario Roque were all in the possession of respondent St. Peters and not with the proper
custodians or repositories thereof and that the alleged assignment bears only a thumbmark of
Antonio Cleofas although there is proof of his competence to sign the same. 8

SO ORDERED. 3
On June 30, 1973, respondents Memorial Park and Banco Filipino filed a joint motion for new
trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence consisting of documents to show that the title
issued to Antonio Cleofas refers to lot 640 and not lot 719 of the Piedad Estate. The motion for
new trial was denied by the trial court on February 5, 1974. Aggrieved, respondents filed with
this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition to set aside the trial court's order denying their
motion. The petition was docketed as G.R. No. L-38280. 4
On March 21, 1975, this Court granted respondents' motion and remanded the case to the Court
of First Instance for new trial. At the new trial, respondents introduced new evidence to show
that Antonio Cleofas is the awardee of Lot 640 of the Piedad Estate as evidenced by Deed No.
18562 dated August 10, 1929, as well as TCT No. 15694 covering the same lot. It is their theory
that Sheet 15 of Original Certificate of Title No. 614 which is the basis of petitioners' title over the
subject lot, referred to Lot No. 640 and not to Lot 719.
On March 19, 1977, the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch IV, Quezon City, then presided
by Judge Ricardo P. Tensuan, rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads 5:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision dated May 2, 1973 is hereby
revived and reinstated, and it is hereby declared that the (1) plaintiffs are the rightful
owners of Lot 719 of the Piedad Estate and are entitled to possession of the same;
that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 21893 issued by the defendant Register of Deeds
of Rizal is declared null and void, and the following Transfer Certificate of Title Nos.
32258 issued by defendant Register of Deeds of Rizal cancelling TCT Nos. 21893;
12360 issued by defendant Register of Deeds of Quezon City, cancelling TCT Nos.
32258; 74978 in the name of the defendant Araceli Wijangco del Rosario issued by
defendant Register of Deeds of Quezon City and a transfer from T.C.T Nos. 12360,
98115, 130328 and 131768 in the name of defendant Basilisa Roque-Bautista and in
the name of defendant corporation which are all mortgaged to the defendant Bank,

(2) It is further ordered that as prayed for, the defendant corporation St. Peter
Memorial Park, Inc., pay to the plaintiffs the amount of P40,000.00 as damages and
the amount of P10,000.00 as attorney's fees; plus costs.
SO ORDERED.

Again, respondents elevated the case to this Court and on July 30, 1979, we rendered a
decision affirming the trial court's decision, portions of which is hereunder quoted:
The deed of assignment in question of Lot No. 719, although more than thirty years
old, was not produced from a custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine. It
was found in the custody of the St. Peter Memorial Park, Inc., not in the folder of
Bureau of Lands for Lot No. 719. If, as contended by the petitioners the said deed of
assignment was the basis of the sale of Lot No. 719 by the Bureau of Lands in favor of
Aniceto Martin and Trino Narciso, the deed of assignment should have been placed in
the folder of the Bureau of Lands for Lot No. 719. No reason was given why the deed
of assignment of Lot No. 719 in favor of Aniceto Martin and Trino Narciso was
produced from the possession of St. Peter Memorial Park, Inc.
Moreover, the deed of assignment was principally signed by one Ruperto Cleofas who
was not a co-owner of Lot No. 719. Antonio Cleofas, who was the sole owner of said
lot, was only a co-assignor. Although he could write his name, Antonio Cleofas did not
sign the deed of assignment. There appears only a thumb mark over the typewritten
name of Antonio Cleofas. These suspicious circumstances were not explained by the
petitioners. The deed of assignment cannot be presumed genuine and authentic under
Sec. 22, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court. It was not produced from a custody
in which it would naturally be found if genuine and it is blemished by circumstances of
suspicion.
The fact that petitioner, St. Peter Memorial Park, Inc., was in possession of the deed
of assignment of Lot No. 719 which the trial court found to be spurious is a badge of
bad faith. 9

Again, respondents St. Peter Memorial Park and Banco Filipino moved to reconsider the
aforesaid decision. During the pendency of the motion, respondent filed a Supplemental Motion
for Reconsideration praying alternatively, (1) that the motion be considered in the light of the
additional documentary evidence which they ask the Court to take judicial notice of; or (2) if this
Court is not inclined to do so on procedural or technical grounds, that the case be remanded to
the trial court for new trial in order to afford them the opportunity to present newly discovered
evidence. In their prayer for another new trial, respondents have manifested that in view of the
adverse finding as to the genuineness of the deed of assignment, they continued their search for
evidence to bolster their contention that the deed of assignment of Sale Certificate No. 923 was
a genuine document properly filed in a government office and confirmed by entries in the records
of the same. 10
On March 28, 1983, this Court set aside its decision of July 30, 1979 and remanded the case to
the trial court of Quezon City for new trial. In granting the second motion for new trial, this Court
ratiocinated: 11
It is neither a valid objection that the petitioners had previously been afforded the
opportunity to present evidence which they failed to do during the trial. A second new
trial is expressly authorized by the Rules if "based on a ground not existing nor
avoidable when the first motion was made" (Sec. 4, Rule 37, Rules of Court). As
pointed out above, the circumstances surrounding the discovery of the evidence which
the petitioners desire to present are adequate justification for the failure to make them
available during the original trial, or in the new trial previously allowed.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The evidentiary worth of the evidence proffered by the petitioners may not be brushed
aside by a simplistic and sweeping appraisal that "they do not promise to change the
results." Undeniably, if it is true that copies of Exhibits "1" and "2" had actually been
filed in the proper government office, but were only misplaced or misfiled therein, there
would be little doubt as to the authenticity of the copies in the possession of the
petitioners which had been presented in court as Exhibits "1" and "2". Such a finding
would meet squarely the pronouncement that Exhibits "1" and "2" are spurious. It
would also serve to dissipate the doubts as to their genuineness arising from the fact
that Exhibit "1" was executed not by Antonio Cleofas alone, and that it was
thumbmarked and not signed by him.

no. 719 of the Piedad Estate and the Notarial Register of Notary Public Jose Ma. Delgado,
showing entries of the deed of sale executed by the Director of Lands in favor of Trino Narciso
and Aniceto Martin over 719. 12
On the basis of the new evidence presented by respondent, the trial court on November 20,
1985 rendered judgment dismissing petitioners' complaint. 13 The trial court opined that the deed
of assignment was not found in the possession of the person in which it would naturally be found
because the deed of conveyance was misrecorded in a memorandum sheet of OCT No. 543 of
the Tala Estate.
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals which was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 12901. On
September 2, 1988, the court rendered judgment 14 affirming in toto the trial court's decision. The
Court of Appeals anchored its ruling on the doctrine that a title which emanated from a spurious
source may be the root of a valid title.
Petitioners now challenge the court's decision before this Court arguing that the Court of
Appeals gravely abused its discretion when it disregarded pertinent and material facts of the
case and went beyond the issues raised. They assert that the doctrine relied upon by the Court
of Appeals is not applicable to the case at bar because in the three trials held, the only point
raised is the spurious character of the alleged deed of assignment.
While we have in many cases recognized and applied the aforementioned doctrine, we cannot,
given the facts of the case, apply the said doctrine. Rather, we will delve on the determination of
the authenticity of the deed of assignment in relation to the additional evidence presented by
respondents during the second new trial.
We have scrutinized the evidence presented and we are convinced that the deed of assignment
executed by Antonio Cleofas in favor of Narciso and Trino, is authentic. Thus, we are
reconsidering our ruling in St. Peter Memorial Park, Inc. vs. Cleofas, (92 SCRA 407) where we
held that the deed of assignment is a spurious document which may not be accorded any
evidentiary value.

The peculiar circumstances surrounding the discovery of the evidence that the
petitioners seek to present; their significance and materiality in arriving at a true
appraisal of the matters involved in this case which, as had been previously observed
by Us, is one that "involves public interest" affecting as it does many memorial lot
buyers and the integrity of the torrens systems (63 SCRA 190); and the considerable
value of the property herein litigated, behooves Us to proceed cautiously and with
circumspection in the determination of the true merits of the controversy, regardless of
technicalities and procedural niceties, with the primordial end in view of rendering
justice to whomsoever it may be due.

It must be recalled that the decision of then Court of First Instance in May 1977 finding the
Assignment of Sales Certificate No. 923 spurious, relied on the fact that said assignment and
Deed of Conveyance No. 25874 were in the possession of respondent St. Peter Memorial Park,
and were not in the custody of the government offices where they should ordinarily be. 15 This
was sufficiently refuted by herein respondents during the second new trial where they presented
evidence showing that the said assignment and Deed No. 25874 were properly filed in the
Bureau of Land and confirmed by Risalina Concepcion, Chief of the Archives Division, Bureau of
Records Management, and Norberto Vasquez, Jr., Deputy Register of Deeds, District III,
Caloocan City. Respondents' failure to present evidence to show that the said documents were
properly recorded in the books of the Register of Deeds can be attributed to the fact that there
was a misrecording of the transactions on OCT No. 543 of the Tala Estate instead of OCT No.
614. When Aniceto Martin, who was also a grantee of two lots of the Tala Estate, presented the
deed of assignment of lot 719, this was recorded in a sheet pertaining to OCT No. 543 instead of
being inscribed in a sheet pertaining to OCT 614 covering the Piedad Estate.

In the second new trial, respondents presented photocopies of OCT No. 543 of the Tala Estate
which contain an entry of the sale by Antonio Cleofas in favor of Narciso and Martin covering lot

Moreover, we believe that respondent St. Peter Memorial's possession of the documents is
reasonable considering that it is the vendee of the subject lot. In other words, it is reasonably

expected that respondent, as successor-in-interest of the assignees Trino and Narciso, and the
purchaser of the subject lot, be found in the possession of the documents.1wphi1.nt
The custody to be shown for the purpose of making a document evidence without proof of
execution is not necessarily that of the person strictly entitled to the possession of the said
document. It is enough that if the person in whose custody the document is found is so
connected with the document that he may reasonably be supposed to be in possession of it
without fraud. 16 Thus, documents are said to be in proper custody where they are in the place in
which, and under the care of the person with whom, they would naturally be, as, for instance,
where they are found among the family papers of the persons entitled thereto, or where they are
found in the hands of an agent of the parties beneficially interested. 17

G.R. No. 123541

February 8, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
DIOLO BARITA y SACPA, DENVER GOLSING y DELFIN, DIONISIO
CUISON y FONTANILLA, accused-appellants.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

Additionally, the fact that the deed of assignment contain only a thumb mark of Antonio Cleofas
is not indicative of the document's spuriousness. Petitioners failed to present evidence to prove
that the thumb mark appearing in the deed of assignment is not that of Antonio Cleofas.
Petitioners merely relied on the fact that in the Sales Certificate No. 923, Antonio Cleofas signed
his name. Thus, we agree with the trial court's observation that:
. . ., absent any evidence that the thumbmark purporting to be Antonio Cleofas' in the
Assignment of Certificate of Sale (Exh. "1") is not really his, the presumption of law
that the transfer transaction evidenced thereby was fair and regular must stand, more
so when the document was acknowledged before a notary public and was,
furthermore, the basis of several acts of public officers.18
It is important to stress too that the deed of assignment was duly notarized by Notary Public
Vicente Garcia on July 15, 1921. 19 Also, Deed No. 25874 issued and executed by the Director
of Lands on behalf of the government, granting and conveying lot no. 719 to Trino and Martin
was notarized by Notary Public Jose Ma. Delgado. 20Having been notarized, the documents
have in their favor the presumption of regularity, and to contradict the same, there must be
evidence that is clear, convincing and more than merely preponderant. 21 Petitioners failed to
rebut said presumption, hence the presumption stands.
Finally, petitioners' failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to
assert their right over the property warrants a presumption that they have abandoned their right
or declined to assert it. 22

Before us is an appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City,
Branch 6, finding accused-appellants Diolo Barita, Denver Golsing and Dionisio Cuison guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act 6425 otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act as amended by Section 13 of Republic Act 7659.2
Diolo Barita (BARITA), Denver Golsing (GOLSING) and Dionisio Cuison (CUISON) were
charged with violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act 6425 in an information that reads:
That on or about the 9th day of June 1994, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually aiding one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously sell and deliver more or less 2,800 grams of dried marijuana leaves
with flowering tops knowing fully well that said leaves of marijuana is a prohibited
drug, in violation of the above mentioned provision of law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
On October 25, 1984, all three accused were arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged.4
The lower court summarized the facts as follows:

Petitioners admit that they were in possession of the land only until 1945. From that time until
the filing of the complaint, petitioners never questioned respondents' possession. They have
waited more than 25 years before questioning respondents' title. Their long inaction and
passivity in asserting their rights over the disputed property precludes them from recovering the
same by laches. 23

The evidence shows that on June 9, 1994 at about 12:00 o'clock noon Police Supt.
Felix Cadalli of the 14th Narcotics Regional Field Unit, Camp Bado Dangwa, La
Trinidad, Benguet received a report from a civilian informer that one alias Jun, a taxi
driver, who usually waits for passengers at Nelbusco Terminal, Otek St., Baguio City is
the middleman of those selling marijuana at Justice Village, Baguio City.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 12901 is AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioners.

After evaluating the information, P/Supt. Cadalli organized a buy-bust team composed
of P/Insp. Virgilio Pelaez as team leader, PO3 Teofilo Juanata as poseur-buyer, SPO1
Edelfonso Sison driver and PO3 Rolando Gamit as back-up. A briefing ensued
wherein Insp. Pelaez, PO3 Gamit and SPO1 Sison were instructed to proceed to
Justice Village, and wait and position themselves strategically thereat so that they
could witness the transaction between their poseur-buyer and the drug pushers. Supt.

SO ORDERED.

Cadalli gave PO3 Juanata two pieces of P100.00 bills together with machine copies
thereof and pieces of paper cut into the size of money bills such that if put together
with one of the two P100.00 bills on top and the other at the bottom, the whole bunch
will have the appearance of a bundle of money to be used in the purchase of
marijuana for entrapment purposes. The two P100.00 bills were previous the subject
of an Authentication (Exh. E) dated June 3, 1994 before Prosecutor Octavio Banta.
Juanata was instructed by Cadalli to proceed with the civilian informer to Nelbusco
Terminal at Otek St., Baguio City to contact alias Jun, the middleman.
In accordance with instructions, Pelaez, Gamit and Sison left for Justice Village at
about 3:00 p.m. on board the red car owned and driven by Sison. In turn, Juanata and
the civilian informer boarded a passenger jeepney and proceeded to the Nelbusco
Terminal. There, they were able to see alias Jun waiting for passengers inside his taxi.
Juanata was introduced by the civilian informer to alias Jun, later identified as Dionisio
Cuison, as a buyer of marijuana. And the latter told then that the stocks of marijuana
were available at Justice Village. The three proceeded to Justice Village on boards
Jun's taxicab.
Meanwhile, the Narcom team of Pelaez waited at the road junction of Justice Village
and Marcos Highway. Not long after, they spotted the taxi driven by accused Cuison
carrying Juanata and the civilian informer and followed it unnoticed. The taxi stopped
by the side of the road at Justice Village. The red car of Sison following passed by the
taxi and then took a U-turn at the dead end of the road such that when the red car was
parked, those inside it were facing the taxi parked around 20 meters away.
Soon after he parked his taxi, accused Cuison alighted and talked to some persons.
When he returned, he informed Juanata that they have to wait because the sellers of
marijuana were not around yet. After about five minutes, two persons walked towards
the taxi. Accused Cuison went out of the taxi to meet them. And they talked. After
which Juanata was introduced by Cuison to the two as a marijuana buyer. Juanata
introduced himself as Jojo while the two introduced themselves as Diolo, later
identified as Diolo Barita and Denver, later identified as Denver Golsing. Juanata
ordered three kilos of marijuana and was told by accused Golsing that a kilo costs
P800.00. Then accused Barita and Golsing told them to wait as they will get the
marijuana.
After about 5 minutes, accused Golsing and Barita returned. Accused Barita was
carrying a transparent plastic bag which he handed to Juanata. After examining the
contents of the plastic bag (Exh. G), consisting of three bundles (Exhs. H, I, J), two
wrapped in a brown paper (Exhs. H and I) and the third wrapped in a newspaper page
(Exh. J), and determining the contents thereof as marijuana, Juanata handed the
boodle money to accused Golsing and immediately gave the pre-arranged signal by
removing his cap.
Forthwith, the group of Insp. Pelaez rushed to where the transaction took place,
identified themselves as Narcom agents, and arrested accused Barita, Golsing and
Cuison. The accused together with the marijuana confiscated and the boodle money
recovered were brought to the 14th Narcotics Regional Field Unit at Camp Dangwa.
The accused were turned over for investigation while the marijuana was turned over to

the evidence custodian after Juanata, Gamit and Sison inscribed and signed their
initials on the transparent plastic bag (Exh. G) as well as on the wrappers of the three
bundles (Exhs. H, I, J) contained therein to identify the confiscated items and avoid
tampering. The Booking Sheet and Arrest Reports (Exhs. B, C, D) of the accused
were made.5
On November 6, 1995, the RTC rendered its decision finding all the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt for violating Section 4, Article II of Republic Act 6425 as amended, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE the Court finds the accused Diolo Barita y Sacpa, Denver Golsing y
Delfin and Dionisio Cuison y Fontanilla Guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals
by direct participation and/or by indispensable cooperation of the offense of Violation
of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act 6425 as amended by Section 13 of Republic Act
7659 (Sale of 2.8 kilos of marijuana, a prohibited drug) as charged in the Information
and hereby sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to
pay a fine of P500,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and
to pay the proportionate costs.
The marijuana confiscated from the accuses (Exhs. G, H, I, J) being the subject and
instrument of the crime is declared confiscated and forfeited in favor of the state and
referred to the Dangerous Drugs Board for immediate destruction.
The accused Diolo Barita, Denver Folsing and Dionisio Cuison, being detention
prisoners are entitled to be credited in the service of their sentence 4/5 of their
preventive imprisonment in accordance with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED.6
Hence, this appeal where each of the accused-appellants filed their respective appellant's briefs.
In support of his appeal, BARITA denies any participation in the alleged sale of marijuana. He
claims that no buy-bust operation was conducted and that the accusation against him was all
part of a frame-up. To prove this, BARITA alleges that the prosecution evidence is replete with
numerous flaws and glaring inconsistencies considering that:
1.) Records (requests for physical examination made by P/Supt. Felix G. Caddali, Jr.)
reveal that the buy bust team allegedly arrested five (5) persons 7 yet the prosecution
witnesses insist that only three (3), herein accused-appellants, were arrested.
Considering that the prosecution witnesses made no explanation concerning this, their
testimonies should not be given credence. Moreover, the prosecution witnesses
attempted to hide the fact of the arrest of the other two who were arrested, SIBAYAN
and BINDADAN. According to them, since the prosecution witnesses were not able to
give a sufficient explanation why only three accused were charged, they concocted
the buy-bust operation.
2.) None of the accused-appellants reside or are from Justice Village, the place where
the alleged sale took place and could not have committed the crime.

3.) There is a reasonable doubt as to the existence of the civilian informer for if there
really was one, the NARCOM agents would not have taken his report without
question.
4.) The events leading to the buy-bust are contrary to human experience and opposed
to common sense inasmuch as the alleged sale of marijuana was not definite to
happen and that Jun supposedly knew the sellers of marijuana yet upon arrival at
Justice Village, he had to inquire about them thereat.

chemist admitted that she only tested small quantities of the specimens given to her and that
she could not determine whether the whole specimen was marijuana.8
Accused-appellants GOLSING and CUISON raise substantially identical arguments for the
reversal of the decision of the RTC in their briefs. Thus, for the purpose of this appeal, we
resolve to discuss their arguments jointly.
We find no merit in the appeal.

5.) The prosecution witnesses' accounts differ with respect to whether or not Jun
alighted from the taxicab at the time when the alleged pushers neared the taxicab.

Accused-appellants' defenses consist of questioning the credibility of the witnesses for the
prosecution and "frame-up".

6.) PO3 Juanata's testimony is doubtful since he could not testify as to where his
companions were at the time of the sale, which negates the existence of a buy-bust
plan.

It is well established in this jurisdiction that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies are accorded great respect unless the court a quo overlooked
substantial facts and circumstances which, if considered, would materially affect the result of he
case.9 We find no reason to depart from this rule in the present case.

7.) There is a divergence of testimony as to where the sale took place.

8.) The prosecution witnesses gave different versions as to where the alleged sellers
proceeded after they went to get the marijuana.
9.) The testimonies given with respect to the buy-bust money is shrouded with
contradictions.
10.) There is a divergence of testimony as to the ownership of the red car used in the
buy-bust operation.
11.) There is a divergence of testimony as to the existence of a safehouse.
12.) There is a divergence of testimony as to the participation of PO3 Gamit in the
arrest of the accused-appellants.
13.) The taxicab was released without an order from the trial court and such release
was never exlained.
14.) The joint affidavit of arrest does not contain the name of P/Insp. Virgilio Pelaez,
the team leader, as one of the affiants.
It is contended that the foregoing inconsistencies and unexplained facts in the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses cast doubt on their credibility. BARITA also claims that the trial court
convicted the accused-appellants based on the weakness of their defense and not on the
strength of the prosecution's evidence. Moreover, BARITA questions the identity of the marijuana
presented in court considering that the description of the marijuana in the joint affidavit of arrest
and the written request for laboratory examination differ and that the chain of custody of the
confiscated marijuana leaves was not clearly established. Finally, BARITA alleges that the
weight of the alleged marijuana leaves was not duly proved in light of the fact that the forensic

Accused-appellants were arrested by virtue of a buy-bust operation conducted by the 14th

Narcotics Regional Command Field Unit. The buy-bust operation was established by
prosecution witnesses PO3 Teofilo S. Juanata, Jr. (JUANATA), Rolando Gamit (GAMIT) and
Idelfonso Sison (SISON), the apprehending officers, who positively identified BARITA and
GOLSING as the two men who sold the marijuana and CUISON (the taxi driver) as the
middleman in the sale. JUANATA, who acted as poseur buyer, testified that:
PROS: CENTENO:
Q:
Who was your companion in going to the Nel Bosco Terminal after the
briefing was conducted by Felix Cadalig?
A:

Our Civilian Informer, sir.

Q:

Do you know the name of this Civilian Informer?

A:

No, sir.

Q:

Until now?

A:

No, sir, it was my first time to see him.

Q:

Were you able to reach the Nel Bosco Terminal?

A:

Yes, sir.

Q:
went?

How about the group of Pelaes, Gamit and Sison, do you know where they

A:

They proceeded, to Justice Village, Marcos Highway, Baguio City, sir.

Q:
How many times lapsed when you noticed that alias June just returned to the
place after he left you?

Q:
Now, what time did you reach the Nel Bosco terminal located at Otek St.,
Baguio City on June 9, 1994?

A:

About five minutes, sir.

A:

4 p.m., sir.

Q:

Was he alone when he returned to your place?

Q:

And what was your purpose in going to the Nel Bosco Terminal on that day?

A:

Yes, sir, he was not able to see the person selling marijuana.

A:

To look for alias Jun, sir.

Q:
So what happened when you saw alias Jun returned alone because he was
not able to locate the person selling marijuana?

Q:

Were you able to locate alias Jun at Nel Bosco Terminal?

A:

A:

Yes, sir, he was there because he is a taxi driver.

Q:
What happened when you saw alias Jun at the Nel Bosco Terminal which
happened to be a taxi driver?

Q:
At that time when you were already at Justice Village waiting for a while as
you said, did you know the other members of the buy bust team?
A:

A:
sir.

I was not able to see them but I know they were their positioned, sir.

I was introduced by the civilian informer as a prospective marijuana buyer,

Q:
How long did you wait at Justice Village after alias Jun returned without
having located the seller of marijuana as you said?

Q:
And what happened after this civilian informer introduced to you to alias Jun
to be a prospective buyer of marijuana?
A:
Jun answered that he knows somebody who sells marijuana at Justice Vil.,
Marcos Highway, sir.
Q:

If this alias Jun will be seen again by you, will you be able to identify him?

A:

Yes, sir.

Q:

Will you please look inside the courtroom and tell us if this alias Jun present?

A:
(Witness pointing to a person in blue t-shirt who identified himself as Dionisio
Cuison)
xxx

We waited for a while, sir.

xxx

xxx

A:

About 5 minutes, sir.

Q:

And what happened after the lapse of five minutes?

A:

Two male persons arrived, sir.

Q:

Will you tell us the appearance of these two male persons walking?

A:

They look like bachelors, sir.

Q:

Aside from walking toward your place, what else did you observe if any?

A:

Alias Jun alighted from the taxi cab and met the two male persons sir.

Q:
How about you, what did you do when you saw that alias Jun alighted from
the taxi cab and met these two persons?

PROS: CENTENO:
A:

I remained inside the taxi, sir.

Q:
Now, after alias Jun left you and the civilian informer inside the taxi cab, what
happened next Mr. Juanata?

Q:

Was alias Jun able to meet these two persons?

A:

A:

Yes, sir, they talked, sir.

He returned, sir.

Q:
How far was that place where you saw alias Jun and the two male persons
talking from the place where you were seated inside the taxi cab?

A:
(Witness pointed to a person inside the courtroom who identified himself as
Diolo Barita).

A:

Q:
You said a while ago that after you were introduced to these two male
persons by this Jun, Denver told you that a price of a kilo of marijuana is P800.00, so
what did you tell Denver when he told you that a price of a kilo of marijuana is P800?

More or less five minutes, sir.

Q:
After you saw alias Jun and the two male persons talking as you said, what
happened next?

A:
A:

Q:
How far were you from these two male persons when alias June introduced
you to them?

Q:
At the time Denver was telling you that the cost of a kilo of marijuana is
P800, where was Diolo?
A:

A:

Q:
What was he doing at the time Denver was telling you that the cost of a kilo
of marijuana was P800.00?
A:

Q:
After you told Denver that you wanted to buy 3 kilos of marijuana after you
were told that the cost of a kilo is P800, what happened next?
A:

The two of them left, sir.

Q:

How about alias Jun, where did he go?

A:

He was left there, sir.

Q:

So the person who left were Denver and Diolo?

A:

Yes sir.

I introduced myself as Jojo, sir.

Q:

And how did the two male persons introduced themselves to you?

A:

Diolo and Denver, sir.

Q:
him?

He was there listening, sir.

Denver said that a kilo of marijuana cost P800.00, sir.

Q:
By the way, what was the name you gave to these two male persons when
you were introduced by alias Jun to them?
A:

At this side, sir.

They approached the taxi, sir and I was introduced as a marijuana buyer.

Q:
After you were introduced by alias Jun to these two male persons that you
were a marijuana buyer, what happened next?
A:

I told them that I will buy three kilos, sir.

Alias Jun introduced me to that two male persons, sir.

If this Denver would be seen again by you, would you be able to identify

A:

Yes, sir.

Q:

If Denver is in the courtroom, will you please point to him?

Q:
How about your civilian informer, where was he during all the time that you
were ordering 3 kilos of marijuana?
A:

A:
(Witness pointed to a person inside the courtroom who identified himself as
Denver Golsing)
Q:
How about this other person who introduced himself to you as Diolo, if you
will see him again, will you be able to identify him?
A:

Yes, sir.

Q:

Will you please point to him?

He was near inside the taxi cab, sir.

Q:
do you know where Denver and Diolo went after they left the place where
you were told that a cost of a kilo of marijuana is P800?
A:

I don't know, sir.

Q:
What happened after Denver and Diolo left the place where you were with
Jun and the civilian informer?

A:

They returned after five minutes, sir.

Q:
I am just curious Mr. Juanata, everytime you answer a question regarding
the time element, you have been uniformed in saying that the interval is always five
minutes. After the lapse of five minutes, you said they returned to the place, who
returned to the place?
A:

Denver and Diolo, sir.

A:

I alighted from the taxi cab and then Diolo handed to me the plastic bag, sir.

Q:

After Diolo handed to you the plastic bag, what did you do?

A:

I opened the contents of the object wrapped in a newspaper, sir.

COURT:
You are saying therefore that inside the plastic bag was an object wrapped
in a newspaper?

Q:
Did you see these two persons approach the place where you were with Jun
at that time?
A:
Q:
place?
A:
Q:
time?

I saw them, sir.

Will you tell us the appearance at that time they were returning to your

A:

Yes, sir.

COURT:
Continue, counsel.

Diolo was carrying a plastic bag, sir.

Could you tell us the size of this plastic bag being carried by Diolo at that

PROS. CENTENO:
Q:

Now, this plastic bag, is it transparent or not?

Yes, sir, transparent.

A:

(Witness demonstrating a with the size of about 2 feet in height).

A:

Q:

How about the bulk?

Q:
What happened after you opened these items wrapped in a newspaper page
found inside the transparent bag?

A:

Two feet by 1/2 feed in width.

Q:

How about Denver, what was the appearance at that time?

A:
sir.

He was not carrying anything, it was only Diolo who was carrying something,

Q:
If you see that plastic bag again which was carried by Diolo on June 9, 1994
at Justice Village, Baguio City, will you be able to identify the same?
A:

Yes, sir.

Q:
Were these two persons, Diolo and Denver able to reach the place where
you were on June 9, 1994?

A:
I saw a marijuana wrapped inside the newspaper and then I gave the money
to Denver and also, I gave my pre-arrange signal to the back up team, sir.
Q:
By the way, what was supposed to be the pre-arrange signal to be given to
the back up team?
A:

by removing my yellow cap, sir.

Q:
And after you have delivered the money to Denver at the same time giving
your signal by removing your yellow cap as you said, what happened?
A:
I introduced myself as a Narcom Agent and gave my name as PO3 Teofilo
Juanata, Jr.

A:

Yes, sir.

Q:
What happened after you gave your pre-arrange signal and at the same time
you introduced yourself as a Narcom Agent to the persons?

Q:

What happened when they reached the place where you were?

A:

The back up team arrived and we apprehended them, sir.

Q:
team?

Who were the persons whom you apprehended upon arrival of the back up

A:

Jun, Denver and Diolo, sir.

Q:

The persons you earlier identified in Court?

A:

Yes, sir.10

JUANATA's testimony is corroborated by the testimonies of GAMIT 11 and SISON12 who gave
similar accounts of the events that transpired. The alleged inconsistencies and/or flaws in the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses pointed out by accused-appellants are insufficient to
overturn the judgment of conviction against them inasmuch as the testimonies of these
witnesses are consistent with each other on material points. Their testimonies sufficiently
establish all the facts necessary for the conviction of the accused for what is material and
indispensable is the submission of proof that the sale of the illicit drug took place between the
seller and the poseur-buyer.13 At any rate, the inconsistencies pointed out by the accusedappellants are trivial in nature and do not prove that they did not commit the crime charged.
Furthermore, the testimonies of the three police officers carry with it the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official functions. 14 Accused-appellants failed to convincingly
prove that in testifying against them, these witnesses were motivated by reasons other than their
duty to curb the sale of prohibited drugs. In the absence of such ill motive, it is presumed that
none exists.
Aside from proving the fact of the sale, the prosecution also successfully established the identity
of the packages taken from the accused-appellants in court through the testimonies of
JUANATA,15 GAMIT,16 SISON17 and Forensic Chemist P/Ins. Alma Margarita Villaseor
(VILLASEOR).18 In addition, JUANATA's testimony traces the chain of custody of the packages
to the effect that after arresting the accused-appellants, they were brought to Camp Dangwa
together with the confiscated marijuana. The marijuana was turned over to the Investigation
Division after the apprehending officers properly initiated the bags. Thereafter, a request for
laboratory exam was prepared and SPO1 Modesto Carrera delivered the three packages to the
PNP Crime Laboratory Service assigned to Camp Dangwa. 19 The said office received the three
packages, which were properly identified in court by VILLASEOR. 20
It was also proved that the substance sold by the accused-appellants was approximately 2,800
grams of marijuana. On the witness stand, VILLASEOR, who was qualified as an expert
witness,21 testified that she subjected samples taken from the three packages to three
examinations all of which resulted in a positive finding that the samples she tested were
marijuana. She also weighed the packages and established that their total weight came out to
2,810.5 grams.22 Her findings were placed in the chemistry report 23, which states that
"Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimen gave POSITIVE result to the
test for the presence of Marijuana, a prohibited drug."
We are not persuaded by the claim of accused-appellants that in order for them to be convicted
of selling 2,800 grams of marijuana, the whole specimen must be tested considering that
Republic Act 7659 imposes a penalty dependent on the amount or the quantity of drugs seized

or taken. This Court has ruled that a sample taken from one of the packages is logically
presumed to be representative of the entire contents of the package unless proven otherwise by
accused-appellant.24
Likewise, accused-appellants' defense of "frame-up" does not convince us of their innocence.
Such defense has been invariably viewed by this Court with disfavor for it can easily be
concocted but difficult to prove and is a common and standard line of defense in most
prosecutions arising from violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. 25BARITA's26 and
GOLSING's27 attempt to prove the "frame-up" by claiming that they were abused by the police
officers28 in order to confess to the crime is belied by the testimony of defense witness, Dr.
Vladlmir Villaseor. (DR. VILLASEOR). DR. VILLASEOR testified that BARITA, GOLSING
and CUISON did not exhibit any signs that they were maltreated after he examined them and
that none of them sustained any physical injuries. 29 Similarly, BARITA's claim that he was
arrested by the police in order to extort P200,000.00 from him is not worthy of belief. No
evidence, aside from his bare assertions was presented to establish such as fact. Neither of his
co-accused, GOLSING or CUISON substantiated this allegation. In the absence of clear and,
convincing evidence to prove the alleged "frame-up" or extortion, such defenses must fail.
Finally, the fact that the requests for physical examination show that five persons were examined
does not discredit the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that only three persons were
arrested at Justice Village. As aptly observed by the trial court:
Apparently, only Barita, Golsing and Cuison were caught in the actual act of the
selling the marijuana along the road in Justice Village, Sibayan and Bindadan were
not caught on the road as they were in their houses. Sibayan and Bindadan
were invited and taken into custody afterwards when implicated by Barita when the
latter was asked to point to the house of his companions where they got the
marijuana.
This explains why Dr. Villaseor examined five persons instead of only the three
accused. This also explains why Juanata, Sison and Gamit insisted only three
accused as they really arrested only the three accused in the actual act of selling
marijuana.
This is supported by the fact that only Barita, Gosling and Cuison have booking sheet
and arrest reports (Exh. B, C and D). There were no booking sheet and arrest reports
of Sibayan and Bindadan presented by both the prosecution and the defense.
If there were any booking sheet and arrest reports of Sibayan and Bindadan, the
defense would have demanded their production in court by Subpoena duces tecum.
Why did not defendants do so?
Further, the two requests for physical examination (Exhs. 1 and 2) would show that
Barita, Golsing and Cuison were arrested together as they were lumped together in
one request for physical examination (Exh. 1 for defense). And that Sibayan and
Bindadan were not taken together with the aforesaid 3 accused as the request for
their physical examination was in a separate paper (Exh. 2 for defense).

In any event, a close scrutiny of the physical examination papers signed by Barita,
Cuison, Golsing, Sibayan and Bindadan (Exh. 8 to 12) would show that the alleged
case against them is "suspected drug pushers" or "Violation of Section 4 Article II RA
6425."
Hence, even assuming 5 persons were arrested for drug pushing, the 3 accused
herein, Barita, Golsing and Cuison were definitely among those arrested. So, instead
of contradicting or destroying the truth and veracity of the drug pushing charge against
the 3 accused, the physical examination papers actually confirm and strengthen the
case against them because the same would show that they were really arrested for
drug pushing.30
Any person who sells or acts as a broker in the sale of marijuana shall be punished
with reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten
million pesos31 if 750 grams or more of marijuana is sold. 32 In the Present case, BARITA,
GOLSING and CUISON (as broker) were correctly meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua and
a fine of five hundred thousand pesos (P500.000.00) by the RTC considering that the
prosecution has clearly established that they delivered and sold 2,800 grams of marijuana to
JUANATA, the poseur-buyer. Moreover, the RTC also correctly ordered the confiscation and
forfeiture of the marijuana in favor of the state for its immediate destruction as this is in
accordance with law.33
WHEREFORE, the appealed
AFFIRMED.1wphi1.nt

decision

of

the

Regional

Trial

Court

is

hereby

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 123860

In an amended information, dated January 9, 1991, accused-appellant Edwin Naag y

Roque was charged, together with Joselito Alcantara, with two counts of murder
allegedly committed as follows:2
That on or about the fifteenth (15th) day of November, 1990, in the City of
Olongapo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, conspiring, confederatingtogether and mutually
helping one another armed with a knife and with intent to kill, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and stab therewith
spouses Atty. Rodrigo Fontelera, Sr. and Rosita Fontelera, with treachery
and evident premeditation, and as a result thereof, said spouses Rodrigo
and Rosita Fontelera suffered multiple stab wounds, which directly caused
their death shortly thereafter, to the damage and prejudice of the members
of the family and relatives of said spouses.
All contrary to law and with the qualifying circumstance of evident
premeditation.
Only accused-appellant was arrested and tried. The other accused, Joselito Alcantara,
remained at large.
The evidence for the prosecution consisted of the autopsy reports and testimony of Dr.
Richard Patilano, medico-legal officer of Olongapo City, the dying declarations of
Rosita Fontelera, and accused-appellant's extrajudicial confession.
Dr. Patilano conducted autopsies on the victims in the evening of November 15, 1990
and prepared reports. His autopsy report (Exh. F) 3 on Rodrigo Fontelera, Sr. is as
follows:

January 20, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
EDWIN NAAG y ROQUE and JOSELITO ALCANTARA, accused,
EDWIN NAAG y ROQUE, accused-appellant.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision,1 dated November 15, 1995, of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 72, Olongapo City, finding accused-appellant Edwin Naag y Roque guilty on two counts
of murder aggravated by abuse of superior strength and sentencing him to suffer two terms
of reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant was ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased
P38,000.00 for the funeral expenses, P100,000.00 for moral damages, and the costs.
The antecedent facts are as follows:

This is a body of a 60 year old male, Filipino, Sthenic in body built, measuring about 5
feet and 2 inches in length, not yet rigid post mortem.
FINDINGS
Lips and nailbeds: pale
Stab Wounds: 13 Stab wounds over the face and neck areas. Most of the scab
wounds were 1.5 cm in length with one extremity being sharp, mostly oriented at
vertical position. The ones at the right lateral side of the neck severed the right
jugular blood vessels. 8 stab wounds were located at the back of the head and at
the nuchal area of the neck. The ones at the head were at horizontal orientation
while those at the nuchal area were vertically oriented. STWs ranged from 1 cm to
3.5 cm in length, only one extremity was sharp. 6 STWs were located at the right
side of the chest and abdominal areas, ranging from 0.5 cm to 3 cm in length,
vertical or left oblique in orientation, only one extremity was sharp. 6 STWs were
located at the back, most of the STWs were oriented at horizontal direction, mostly
1.5 cm long, one extremity sharp. 4 STWs were located at the posterior aspect of
the left upper extremity, ranging from 0.5 cm to 1.5 cm long, mostly at vertical

orientation, only one sharp extremity, 3 STWs were located at the antero-lateral
aspect of the left arm, mostly were at vertical orientation, one extremity was sharp.
6 STWs were located at the right arm and forearm, posterior aspect, mostly were at
vertical orientation with an average length of 1.5 cm. (Total STWs-46)
Incised wounds: 1.5 cm over the distal phalanx, 2nd finger, right hand, posterior
aspect; 1.5 cm over the distal phalanx, posterior aspect, 3rd finger, right hand, all
were at horizontal orientation.
Lungs: Left lower lobe 1 STW, 1 cm. right lobe with adhesions.
Liver 1 cm STW at the right lobe.
Stomach: Full of undigested food, no alcoholic odor.

Stomach: Full of undigested food, no alcoholic odor.

Cause of Death: Hypovolemic Shock Due to Multiple Stab Wounds
Dr. Patilano testified5 that most of the 46 stab wounds inflicted on Rodrigo Fontelera, Sr. were
fatal; that he was of the opinion that only one person frontally stabbed Fontelera, Sr., but "as [the
stab wounds at the back] have different orientations," he could not tell how many stabbed
Fontelera, Sr.
With regard to Rosita Fontelera, Dr. Patilano testified that she suffered fewer stab wounds than
her husband and that, from the nature of her wounds, she (Rosita Fontelera) did not die
immediately.
Dr. Patilano said that both victims were stabbed by means of a pointed, but not double bladed,
instrument. However, he could not tell if only one instrument was used in stabbing the victims.

Cause of Death: Hypovolemic Shock due to Multiple Stab Wounds

The autopsy report (Exh. G)4 on Rosita Fontelera, on the other hand, reads:
This is a body of a 54 year old female, Filipino, Hypersthenic in body built, measuring
about 4 feet and 11 inches in length, not yet rigid post mortem.

FINDINGS
Lips and nailbeds: pale
Stab Wounds: 3 cm in length, sharp extremity directed towards the left, oriented at
horizontal position, located at the right upper chest, 4th interspace, mid-clavicular
line, directed backward and to the left, making a 1.5 cm STW at the right side of the
heart which progressed into the right auricle causing massive bleeding with the left
thoracic cavity; 2 cm. oriented horizontally, located at the right lower chest wall,
arrested by the 6th right rib, sharp extremity directed leftward; 1.5 cm sharp
extremity directed upward and to the left, oblique orientation, located at the right
hypochondriac area resulting to 0.5 cm STW of the right lobe of the liver; 2.5 cm left
oblique in orientation with sharp extremity directed upward and to the left, located at
the left side of the abdomen; 1.5 cm horizontally oriented, located at the right upper
back, bone-deep; 1.5 cm horizontally oriented, located at the right back, over the
right scapula, bone-deep; 3.5 cm horizontally oriented, sharp extremity directed
towards the left, progressed beneath the right scapula, inferior margin, making a 2
cm STW at the inferior margin of the right lung.
Incised wound: 6 cm, skin-deep over the upper third, posterior aspect, right arm; 2.5
cm left oblique in orientation located over the distal third, artero-medical aspect, left
forearm.

The second prosecution witness was Eufracio Banal, a member of the Scriptures Baptist
Church. He testified6 that on November 15, 1990, at around 5 p.m., while he was checking the
sound system in his church, one of his churchmates, Angie Dizon, came rushing in and told him
that Rosita Fontelera was at the "Siesta Pizza," which Angie owned, in need of urgent help.
Banal said he followed Angie Dizon, and he found Rosita Fontelera lying on the pizza parlor's
floor, seriously wounded. While they were lifting her up in order to take her to the hospital, she
said, "Si Edwin, si Edwin," twice. Rosita Fontelera died on arrival at the hospital. According to
Banal, he did not know accused-appellant and only came to know him as the "Edwin" whom
Rosita Fontelera referred to when he saw accused-appellant in court. Earlier, on November 16,
1990, Banal gave a sworn statement (Exh. Q)7 about the final words of Rosita Fontelera. PO3
Ramon Fernandez testified8 that he was the one who took down the statement of Eufracio
Banal.
Pfc. Leo Batinga, another police investigator at the Olongapo Police Station, also testified. 9 He
said that he received a telephone report of the incident at 6:20 in the evening of November 15,
1990. Together with other police officers, he proceeded to the victims' residence at No. 21 21st
Street, East Bajac-Bajac, where they found the body of Rodrigo Fontelera, Sr. with multiple
wounds. They also found on the top of the lavatory a kitchen knife with a brown handle. A worker
at the "Siesta Pizza," Mercy Salapanti Seballa, told them that Rosita Fontelera four times said
"Edwin, taga-Novaliches" as she stumbled into "Siesta Pizza," seriously wounded.1wphi1.nt
Pfc. Batinga said he had asked the son of the victims, Rodrigo Fontelera, Jr., if he knew "a
certain Edwin from Novaliches," and was told that Edwin is accused-appellant who was their
former caretaker; that on orders of their station commander and then Olongapo City Mayor
Richard Gordon, he and his fellow police officers went to accused-appellant's house in
Aguardiente, Novaliches, but accused-appellant was not there; that they later learned that
accused-appellant had been arrested by the barangay tanod of Aguardiente, Novaliches; that
accused-appellant was taken to Olongapo City; that there accused-appellant admitted to them
that he was one of the assailants of the Fonteleras. Accused-appellant executed a waiver (Exh.
A)10 relative to his warrantless arrest and subsequent detention.

Atty. Norberto de la Cruz was the lawyer who signed accused-appellant's confession (Exh.
O)11 as assisting counsel. He testified 12 that on November 16, 1990, he was at the La Paz
Batchoy Restaurant in front of the police station, when Pfc. Leo Batinga and Lt. Esteban showed
him a "ready-made sworn statement, a sort of confession" of accused-appellant which they
asked him to sign, as assisting counsel. According to Atty. De la Cruz, while accused-appellant
said he had voluntarily executed the same, he (Atty. De la Cruz) nevertheless insisted that
another investigation be conducted in his presence. According to Atty. De la Cruz, prior to the
questioning by the police, he asked accused-appellant in the latter's native Bicol dialect whether
he had been forced or intimidated to confess and the latter answered in the negative, and said
"never mind" when Atty. De la Cruz told him he could be imprisoned as a result of his
confession. The investigation was then conducted by Pfc. Batinga who typed accusedappellant's answers to the questions of the investigator. Aside from him, the other one present at
the investigation was Lt. Esteban. Atty. De la Cruz said that, before signing, he read the
confession (Exh. O). As the opening statement did not state that the confession was taken in his
presence, he called the attention of the police investigators to the omission, but he was told
"Never mind, anyway your name is at the bottom." He therefore signed the confession (Exh. O),
which he later identified as the following:13
SALAYSAY NI EDWIN NAAG NAIBINIGAY KAY PFC LEO BATINGA SA TANGGAPAN
NG TAGAPAGSIYAT NG KAGAWARAN NG PULISYA LUNGSOD NG OLONGAPO
NITONG IKA-16 NG NOBYEMBRE 1990 SA GANAP NA ALAS 4:30 NG HAPON SA
HARAP NI P/LT ESTEBAN:
xxx

xxx

TANONG: Nais mo pa rin bang pagpatuloy natin ito?

SAGOT: Opo.
01. T: Ang buo mong pangalan at mga bagay hingil sa tunay mong pagkatao?
S: EDWIN NAAG Y ROQUE, 21 anyos, binata, laborer at nakatira sa Agua Fiente
Forest Hill Subd. Novaliches, Quezon City.

02. T: Kung ikaw ay nakapagaral, anong grado ang inabot mo at eskwelahan?

S: High School Graduate, Novaliches High School.

03. T: Nakakaintindi ka at nakakabasa ng wikang tagalog?

S: Opo.

xxx

LAYUNIN: Ang inbistigasyon ito ay may kaugnayan sa pagpatay sa magasawang

ATTY. RODRIGO FONTELERA at Gng. Rosita Fontelera na naganap kahapon ika-15
ng Nobyembre 1990 mga alas 5:20 ng hapon sa kanilang bahay na nasa 21-21st.
EBB, Olongapo City, naiintindihan mo?

04. T: Marunong kang sumulat ar bumasa?

S: Marunong po.

SAGOT: Opo.
PAALALA: Bago tayo magsimula, nais kong ipagbigay alam sa iyo na sa Ilalim ng
ating Saligang Batas, ikaw Edwin ay may mga KARAPATAN ng mga sumusunod:

05. T: Kailan ka dumating ng Olongapo City?

S: Kahapon mga alas 5:00 ng hapon ika-15 ng Nob. 1990.

(1) KARAPATAN mong manahimik, magbigay o huwag magbigay ng ano

man salaysay. Ihinto ng ano mang oras ang imbistigasyon ito;
(2) KARAPATAN mong kumuha ng abogado na tutulong sa iyo at kung hindi
mo kaya, magbibigay kami at ito ay walang bayad;
(3) Ang sasabihin mo ay maaaring gamitin ng PANIG o LABAN sa iyo sa
alin mang hukuman dito sa Pilipinas;
TANONG: Ngayon masabi namin sa iyo ang LAYUNIN pati na ang iyong mga
KARAPATAN, ito ba ay iyong nauunawan o naiintindihan?
SAGOT: Opo.

06. T: Saan ka naman galing?

S: Sa Novaliches po.

07. T: Anong oras kang umalis sa Novaliches?

S: Mga alas 2:00 ng hapon.

08. T: Sino naman ang kasama mong dumating sa Olongapo kahapon ika-15 ng
Nobyembre 1990 ng hapon?

SAGOT: Dalawa lang kami ni Joselito Alcantara ang nagkita, si Joel po ay hindi ko
alam kung saan nagtungo. Parehong Balintawak ang binabaan namin dalawa at doon
kami nagkahiwalay.

S: Sina Joel at Joselito Alcantara.

14. T: Anong patalim ang ginamit mo, ni Joel at Joselito?

S: Si Joselito po ay taga Cavite City hindi ko po alam doon. Si Joel na hindi ko naman
alam din ang apelyido ay taga-Pangasinan alam po ito ng aking tatay.

S: Itong nasa ibabaw ng lamesa po sa ngayon ay si Joselito Alcantara. (Affiant was

referring and pointing to a kitchen knife HIGH CARBON STAINLESS with a brown
handle whose blade measure about 6 inches more or less). Ako po ay beinte nueve
na naagaw kay Atty. Fontelera. Naagaw po nito ang Beinte Nueve balisong kay
Joselito at ito naman ay naagaw ko kay Atty. Fontelera. Beinte Nueve rin ang ginamit
ni Joel.

10. T: Saan naman kayo nagtuloy ng dumating kayo sa Olongapo?

15. T: Sino ang unang sinaksak sa magasawa?

S: Ako muna ang nagtuloy sa bahay ni Uncle Fontelera at Auntie Rosing (Reffering to
Rosita and Fontelera) at sumunod na lang sila.

S: Unang sinaksak si Atty. Fontelera nina Joel at Joselito at ako ay sumaksak din
tatlong beses kay Atty. habang nasa dirty kitchen sa labas ng kainan. Ang sumunod ay
si Auntie Rosing naman ang sinaksak ni Joel.

09. T: Taga saan naman itong sina Joel at Joselito Alcantara?

11. T: Ano naman ang sadya mo dito kay Atty. Fontelera at kanyang asawa?
S: Nais ko sanang makausap si Atty. Fontelera na turing sana kaming kamaganak
dahil naghirap kami sa pangangalaga sa kanilang lote sa Novaliches at kung ibebenta
niya ang lupa, sana naman may bigyan kami ng kaunti. Pinalayas pa kami. E. N.

16. T: Anong dahilan at pati sina Joselito at Joel ay nakisali sa pagsaksak dito sa
magasawa?
S: Kasi ang balak nilang dalawa ay makakuha ng mga gamit doon sa bahay.

12. T: Ano naman ang nangyari, nakausap mo ba si Atty. Fontelera?

17. T: Saan naman nila balak ito, sa Novaliches o dito na sa Olongapo?

S: Hindi ko po nakausap. Pumasok po itong si Joel at Joselito na bigla na lang

sinaksak si Atty. at si Auntie Rosing. Nasaksak ko nang tatlong beses si Uncle
Fontelera (Reffering to Atty. Fontelera) at ng sasaksakin naman si Auntie Rosing,
inawat si Joel ngunit sinabi ni Joel na testigo pa sa atin ito kayat ipinagpatuloy nito
ang pagsaksak. Nakita ko po na nakatakbo pa si Auntie Rosing patungong Pizza at
nagsisigaw ng Edwin Novaliches kayat natakot ako at lumabas kaagad ako kasama
na sina Joel at Joselito at nagkita kami sa Victory Liner Terminal.

S: Sa Novaliches pa po.

18. T: May nakuha naman sila sa bahay ng magasawa?

S: Wala po.

13. TANONG: Magkakasama kayong umalis, saan naman kayo sumakay ng nasa
Victory Liner Terminal na kayong tatlo?

19. T: Kailan naman binalak ang pagnanakaw?

S: Noon ika-14 ng Nobyembre 1990 mga alas 4:00 ng hapon.

27. T: Anong nangyari ngayon?
20. T: Bakit naman binalak nila ito?

S: Nanghiram ako ng P200.00 at ito po ay nag-check-out ng alas 10:00 ng gabi, sa

trabaho at sumama sa akin.

S: Dahil alam nila na abogado ito at maraming gamit. Naikwento ko sa kanila.

28. T: Saan kayo nagtuloy ni Susie?

21. T: Kailan mo pa nakilala itong si Joselito at Joel?
S: Sa kanilang bahay po.
S: Si Joselito mula ng Elementary at si Joel ay nitong 1990 lang.

29. T: Habang naroroon kayo, may nangyari ba.

22. T: Nang makarating ka sa Balintawak, saan ka nagtuloy?
S: Opo.
S: Dumiretso ako sa NUTRI SNACK sa 58 Gen Luis Bo. Capri Novaliches.

30. T: Ano ito?

23. T: Mga anong oras kang nakarating doon?
S: Mga 9:30 ng gabi po.

S: Nakita ko po na dumating kayo. (affiant was reffering to Lt. Esteban and Pfc.
Batinga) may iba pa na may armalite kayat nagtago ako.

24. T: Bakit ka naman nagtungo doon?

31. T: Ano ngayon ang nangyari?

S: Kakausapin ko si SUSIE PANGILINAN 20 anyos na aking girlfriend.

S: Nagbantay po ang mga pulis doon at pinagpapasok nila ang ibang bahay at ako
naman po ay pinanonood lang sila. Nais ko sanang sumurender ngunit natakot ako na
baka barilin ako ng naka-armalite. Ng madaling araw na. Nakita ako at nagkahabulan
po ngunit hindi ako nahuli ng mga pulis. Ang mga Barangay na tumulong sa mga pulis
ang siyang nakahuli sa akin at ibinigay ako sa Novaliches Police Substation at doon
pinaguusapan ng mga pulis ang tungkol sa mga Pulis Olongapo City na nagreport rin
doon na naghahanap sa akin.

25 T: Nakausap mo naman?
S: Opo.

32. T: Paano ka ngayon dinala dito sa Olongapo.

26. T: Anong oras naman ang trabaho nitong si Susie Pangilinan?
S: Alas 6:00 ng gabi hangang alas 6:00 ng umaga po.

S: Kinuha na lang ako ng mga pulis Olongapo sa Novaliches Police Sub Station at
dinala dito sa inyong tanggapan.

[Sgd.]
33. T: Lalagdaan at panunumpaan mo ito?

ASSISTED BY: ATTY. NORBERTO DE LA CRUZ

S: Opo.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 17th day of Nov. 90 of Olongapo City. I
hereby certify that I personally examined the affiant and I am satisfied that he
voluntary executed and understood the foregoing statement.

34. T: Ang suot mo damit at sapatos ng saksakin ang magasawang Fontelera?

[Sgd.]
ASS'T CITY PROSECUTOR

S: Itong suot kong pantalon ngayon (Affiant was referring and pointing to his\stripped
pants a blue and black stripe pants believe to be with blood stain)

35. TANONG: (Karugtong)

SAGOT: Puting ordinaryong T-shirt po. Naiwan ko po ito sa Novaliches) at ang
sapatos po ay iyan. (Affiant was pointing to low cut white rubber shoes
ROBERTSON).

36. T: May nais ka pa bang sabihin sa amin?

S: Laging galit kasi si Uncle Fontelera.

37. T: Itong Auntie Rosing Fontelera mo may galit ka rin ba sa kanya?

S: Wala naman po.

38. T: Lalagdaan mo ito?

S: Opo.
[Sgd.]
EDWIN
-Nagsalaysay-

NAAG

The last witness for the prosecution was the victims' son, Rodrigo Fontelera, Jr. He
testified14 that he used to meet accused-appellant whenever he went to Novaliches to spend
vacations which his cousin Salvador Jordan. On the other hand, accused-appellant used to go
three to four times a year to the Fontelera house in Olongapo City to do odd jobs. Fontelera, Jr.
said that accused-appellant once told him that he (accused-appellant) felt bad because the
senior Fontelera was ejecting accused-appellant's family from the lot they were occupying in
Novaliches.
Fontelera, Jr. testified that his father earned from P100,000.00 to P150,000.00 a year from his
law practice. He also said that he suffered shock and anxiety because of the circumstances
under which his parents died. He submitted receipts (Exhs. L to L-7; 15 M to M-116) as proof of the
expenses for his parents' funeral services.
Accused-appellant testified in his behalf.17 He knew the victims because accused-appellant's
father was the adopted son of Rosita Fontelera's parents. They all hailed from Bicol. Moreover,
his father was caretaker of the Fontelera lot in Novaliches. He said that at around four 4 o'clock
in the afternoon of November 15, 1990, he went to Olongapo City with Joselito Alcantara and a
certain Joel to do some repairs on the Fontelera house; that while outside the house talking to
Rosita Fontelera, he heard a commotion inside; that when he went inside, he saw Joel and
Joselito stabbing Atty. Fontelera, Sr.; that he managed to pacify Joel and take him outside the
house; that when he returned inside the house, however, he saw Joselito attacking Atty.
Fontelera, Sr.; that when he went outside to look for Rosita Fontelera so that they could take
Atty. Fontelera, Sr. to the hospital, he found Rosita Fontelera herself being stabbed; that he saw
her run to the house while shouting "Edwin, Edwin, Novaliches"; that due to confusion, accusedappellant immediately left and took a bus home to Novaliches, arriving there between 9 and 10
p.m.; that when he saw many policemen arrive at their house, he became afraid and went to his
girlfriend's house and from there, called up his father; that upon the advice of his father, he
surrendered to their barangay captain who turned him over to the custody of the police in
Novaliches; that he was fetched from Novaliches by the Olongapo police on November 16, 1990
at around 9 a.m. and brought to their station in Olongapo City; that he was subjected to torture
and electric shock and doused several times with water taken from the urinal; that at one point
he was even taken outside the police station and told to run which he, however, refused to do
knowing that he would be shot on the pretext that he was escaping; that Lt. Batinga asked him
to sign a piece of paper (which turned out to be a confession) in exchange for his release; that
he only signed one page out of the three pages; and that Atty. De la Cruz did not sign the
document in his presence.

On cross-examination, accused-appellant testified18 that he had known Joselito Alcantara for

about five years because they were neighbors in Novaliches and that Joel, whose surname he
did not know, was actually Joselito's friend; that they had been working at the Fontelera house
for two days already prior to the incident; that Atty. Fontelera shouted "bad words" at him and his
companions because he was drunk; that he signed the document purporting to be his
confession inside the detention cell and never affirmed his signature thereon before the
prosecutor.
Jose Naag, accused-appellant's uncle, also testified. 19 He said that on November 15, 1990, he
accompanied accused-appellant to the barangay authorities. Two days before, on November 13,
1990, at around 7 a.m., he saw accused-appellant at the bus terminal and was told by him that
he (accused-appellant) was going to Olongapo City.
On rebuttal, Rodrigo Fontelera, Jr. testified 20 that, although for a time accused-appellant stayed
on his parents' lot in Novaliches, the actual caretaker of the lot was his aunt Mely Roque who is
his mother's sister, and that accused-appellant was a relative of the husband of Mely Roque. He
denied that accused-appellant did some repairs on the Fontelera house in November 1990.
On November 15, 1995, the trial court rendered its decision. It dismissed accused-appellant's
claim that he had no hand in the killing of the Fonteleras. It held that he bore them a grudge
because the Fonteleras drove accused-appellant from the Fontelera lot in Novaliches. The court
noted that accused-appellant's name was mentioned several times by Rosita Fontelera as she
was dying and that accused-appellant fled. The court considered the killings of the couple
qualified by evident premeditation and aggravated by abuse of superior strength. However, it did
not appreciate the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender because accused-appellant
did not surrender immediately to the police who went looking for him in his house in Novaliches.
The dispositive portion of its decision21 reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the guilt of the
accused has been proved beyond reasonable doubt and hereby sentences accused
Edwin Naag y Roque guilty of the crime of Double Murder with the aggravating
circumstance of abuse of superior strength and is hereby sentenced to suffer two (2)
terms of reclusion perpetua; to indemnify the family of the victims in the sum of
THIRTY-EIGHT THOUSAND PESOS (P38,000.00) funeral expenses, ONE
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) moral damages and to pay the costs.
Hence, this appeal. Accused-appellant contends:22
I. WITH THE TOTALITY OF FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES PROFFERED IN THE
COURSE OF TRIAL ON THE MERITS, THE TRIAL COURT LIKEWISE ERRED IN
"PRESUMING" CONSPIRACY.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS MISPLACED RELIANCE ON
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, INTERTWINED WITH OTHER DOCTRINES OF
LAW ON EVIDENCE IN SECURING A CONVICTION.
III. THE TRIAL COURT MADE A WRONG AND SWEEPING VERDICT THAT
"FLIGHT" IS PER SE ALWAYS TRANSLATED AS ONE OF GUILT.

IV. THE TRIAL COURT'S FAVORABLE PRONOUNCEMENT ON DYING

DECLARATION, ABSENT ITS PRE-REQUISITE ELEMENTS IS ERRONEOUS.
V. WITH THE DEARTH AND PAUCITY OF FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES
INDUBITABLE AND ESTABLISHED IN THE COURSE OF TRIAL, THE COURT A
QUO ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE MIRANDA SAFEGUARDS ARE
OBSERVED.
I.
The prosecution's case is anchored on accused-appellant's extrajudicial confession (Exh. O) and
on Rosita Fontelera's dying declarations.
A. Anent the extrajudicial confession, accused-appellant claims that there was really no
investigation made in the presence of counsel because after he had been interrogated by the
police, he was simply made to sign the confession. Accused-appellant makes capital of the
testimony of Atty. Norberto De la Cruz that he had been asked to sign a prepared confession of
accused-appellant.
To be sure, what Atty. De la Cruz said was that he refused the request and demanded another
investigation to be conducted in his presence and that the confession which he signed, which is
marked Exhibit O, was the result of accused-appellant's interrogation during which he was
present.
However, we are inclined to believe accused-appellant's claim that he was interrogated without
the assistance of counsel. In the first place, the opening statement of the confession (Exh. O)
says that the confession was taken in the presence of P/Lt. Esteban, but not in the presence of
Atty. De la Cruz as well. Atty. De la Cruz's explanation, that when he noticed the omission and
asked that his presence be mentioned he was assured that it was not necessary because
anyway his name appeared at the bottom of the confession, is too pat to be believed. The
opening statement is intended to indicate the circumstances under which the confession was
taken, including the persons present, and, therefore, there was no reason why the name of Atty.
De la Cruz was omitted. The reason seems to be that Atty. De la Cruz was not really present at
the investigation allegedly conducted on November 16, 1990.
In the second place, an examination of Exhibit O shows that Atty. De la Cruz's name was simply
added at the end of the confession after it had been prepared. The confession appears to have
been prepared on a typewriter different from that used to type the name of the accusedappellant, Atty. De la Cruz, and the acknowledgment clause and the name of the Assistant City
Prosecutor before whom the confession was sworn to. The text of the confession is darker
suggesting that their ribbon used was new, whereas the names of accused-appellant, Atty.
Norberto de la Cruz, and the Assistant City Prosecutor, as well as the acknowledgment clause
are lighter, suggesting that the ribbon used was almost faded. It is not quite probable that the
typist simply changed the ribbon of his machine, otherwise the first portion should be lighter and
the latter part darker. For these reasons, we hold that accused-appellant was interrogated
without the assistance of counsel, in violation of Art. III, 12(1).

Nor does it appear that accused-appellant effectively waived effectuation of the rights in Art. III,
12(1) of the Constitution, which provides:
Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to
be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent
counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in
writing and in the presence of counsel.
The following appears in accused-appellant's confession:
PAALALA: Bago tayo magsimula, nais kong ipagbigay alam sa iyo na sa Ilalim ng
ating Saligang Batas, ikaw Edwin ay may mga KARAPATAN ng mga sumusunod:
(1) KARAPATAN mong manahimik, magbigay o huwag magbigay ng ano man
salaysay. Ihinto ng ano mang oras ang imbistigasyon ito;
(2) KARAPATAN mong kumuha ng abogado na tutulong sa iyo at kung hindi mo kaya,
magbibigay kami at ito ay walang bayad;
(3) Ang sasabihin mo ay maaring gamitin ng PANIG o LABAN sa iyo sa alin mang
hukuman dito sa Pilipinas;
TANONG: Ngayon masabi namin sa iyo ang LAYUNIN pati na ang iyong mga
KARAPATAN, ito ba ay iyong nauunawaan o naiintindihan?
SAGOT: Opo.
TANONG: Nais mo pa rin bang ipagpatuloy natin ito?
SAGOT: Opo.
Authoritative interpretations of the Miranda rule 23 as embodied in Art. III, 12(1) require,
however, that the suspect in custodial interrogations be warned: (1) that he has a right to remain
silent; (2) that he has a right to the assistance of counsel; (3) that if he cannot afford counsel one
will be provided to him; and (4) that anything he will say can and will be used against
him.24 While accused-appellant was told what his rights were and answered in the affirmative
when asked whether he understood what he had been told, the crucial question is whether he
effectively waived the effectuation of these rights. We find that he did not and, therefore, his
confession (Exh. O) is inadmissible in evidence. Accused-appellant was not asked whether he
was willing to testify even without the assistance of counsel. If he was willing to testify only with
the assistance of counsel, he should have been asked if he had one. If he said he wanted to
have counsel but could not afford one, he should have been asked if he wanted one to be
appointed for him.25 As a result of the investigator's failure to ask these questions before taking
down accused-appellant's statement, there was no effective waiver of his rights to remain silent
and to counsel.

B. The trial court likewise relied on Rosita Fontelera's dying declarations for its conclusion that
accused-appellant was one of those who killed the Fonteleras. As already stated, as Rosita
Fontelera lay dying, she was heard repeatedly saying. "Si Edwin, si Edwin." Two witnesses,
Eufracio Banal and Pfc. Leo Batinga, testified to this fact. Accused-appellant also admitted that,
as he was coming out of the Fontelera house to tell Rosita Fontelera that her husband had been
stabbed, the latter shouted, "Edwin, Novaliches, Edwin, Novaliches," as she was running from
him. It is contended, however, that the declaration is incomplete and cannot be taken to mean
that Rosita Fontelera was pointing to accused-appellant as an assailant. Accused-appellant cites
the case of People v. De Joya,26 in which it was held:
. . . It is not disputed that "Paqui" is the nickname of appellant Pioquinto de Joya. It
must be noted at once, however, that the words "Si Paqui" do not constitute by
themselves a sensible sentence. Those two words could have been intended to
designate either (a) the subject of a sentence or (b) the object of a verb. If they had
been intended to designate the subject, we must note that no predicate was uttered by
the deceased. If they were designated to designate the subject of a verb, we must
note once more that no verb was used by the deceased. The phrase "Si Paqui" must,
moreover, be related to the question asked by Alvin: "Apo, Apo, what happened?"
Alvin's question was not: "Apo, Apo, who did this to you?
It has been held that a dying declaration to be admissible must be complete in itself. . .
. The doctrine of completeness has also been expressed in the following terms in Prof.
Wigmore's classic work:
The application of the doctrine of completeness is here peculiar. The
statement as offered must not be merely a part of the whole as it was
expressed by the declarant; it must be complete as far it goes. But it is
immaterial how much of the whole affair of the death is related, provided the
statement includes all that the declarant wished or intended to include in it.
Thus, if an interruption (by death or by an intruder) cuts short a statement
which thus remains clearly less than that which the dying person wished to
make, the fragmentary statement is not receivable, because the intended
whole is not there, and the whole might be of a very different effect from
that of the fragment; yet if the dying person finishes the statement he
wishes to make, it is no objection that he has told only portion of what he
might have been able to tell." (Emphasis supplied)
The reason upon which incomplete declarations are generally excluded, or if admitted,
accorded little or no weight, is that since the declarant was prevented (by death or
other circumstance) from saying all that he wished to say, what he did say might have
been qualified by the statements which he was prevented from making. That
incomplete declaration is not therefore entitled to the presumption of truthfulness
which constitutes the basis upon which dying declarations are received.
This case is, however, different from People v. De Joya. In this case, the deceased was saying
"Si Edwin, si Edwin" not only when found inside the pizza parlor by Banal and Seballa but also
as she was running away wounded. The circumstances in which she was saying "Si Edwin, si
Edwin" make it clear that she was referring to accused-appellant as her assailant or at least one
of her assailants.

Indeed, accused-appellant himself testified that he heard Rosita Fontelera shouting, "Edwin,
Edwin, Novaliches" as she was running away from him. Contrary to accused-appellant's claim
that he was approaching Rosita Fontelera to inform her that her husband, Atty. Fontelera, had
been stabbed, it is clear that Rosita Fontelera was fleeing from him and running inside the pizza
parlor beside her house to seek refuge from her attacker. She was running away from accusedappellant because the latter was after her.
Rule 130, 42 provides that "[s]tatements made by a person while a startling occurrence is
taking place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto, with respect to the circumstances
thereof, may be considered as part ofres gestae."27 It was in the context of a startling event that
Rosita Fontelera was shouting "Edwin, Edwin, Novaliches." In that context, her words can only
mean that accused-appellant was her attacker. After all, she did not just name accusedappellant when she staggered into the pizza parlor seriously wounded but also as she was
fleeing from her assailant. Rosita Fontelera became hysterical and shouted accused-appellant's
name and place of residence. That is why, in panic, accused-appellant fled.
Indeed, there is circumstantial evidence strongly pointing to accused-appellant's guilt, to wit: (1)
accused-appellant's admitted he was present at the time of the killing of the Fonteleras; (2) he
later fled from the place and went into hiding; and (3) accused-appellant had a motive for killing
the Fonteleras.
Accused-appellant admitted being at the Fontelera residence in Olongapo City at the time of the
killing. He was from Novaliches. Why he went to Olongapo City, to the residence of the
Fonteleras, has not been satisfactorily explained. His claim that he went to the Fontelera
residence to do some repair jobs was belied by Rodrigo Fontelera, Jr. who denied that there
were repairs done on their house in November 1990. 28 Now, Joselito Alcantara and Joey were
total strangers to the Fonteleras. It was accused-appellant who was known to the Fonteleras. It
is hard to believe accused-appellant's claim that it was his companions alone who killed the
couple and that he had no part in the commission of the crime.
Accused-appellant himself testified 29 that while he was outside the house talking with Rosita
Fontelera, he heard a commotion from inside. Upon entering the house, he allegedly saw "My
two companions . . . stabbing Atty. Fontelera, [Sr.];" that after stopping Joel and bringing him
outside the house, accused-appellant went back inside the house for his other companion,
Joselito Alcantara, but by then Atty. Fontelera, Sr. had already suffered many stab wounds; that
when he went outside to call Rosita Fontelera, "[he] saw that Mrs. Fontelera was likewise
stabbed," presumably by Joel whom accused-appellant had earlier brought outside the house;
that when accused-appellant approached Rosita Fontelera, the latter, "suddenly stood up and
ran to the house"; that Rosita then started shouting his name, as a consequence of which he
became so "confused . . . that I . . . went straight to the terminal."
Now, why should Rosita Fontelera run towards the house shouting "Edwin, Edwin, Novaliches" if
she was not running away from accused-appellant because the latter was attacking her? And
why should accused-appellant panic and flee from the scene of the killing and go into hiding in
Novaliches if he was not guilty? Flight is evidence of guilt. 30 For as the proverb says, "the wicked
flee when no man pursueth; but the righteous are as bold as a lion." 31 Accused-appellant's
excuse that he went home to "tell my parents about what happened" 32 is puerile and is not
worthy of credence. The explanation in his brief 33 that it was because he feared for his safety
and that he wanted "to surrender in a safer place like his hometown" is an admission that he is

guilty of the killing of the couple. He feared for his safety because of possible revenge by
relatives and friends of the victims.
Finally, accused-appellant had the motive to kill the couple. He went to Olongapo City and
brought along his two companions because he resented his family's eviction from the land of the
Fonteleras in Novaliches. In his own words, Atty. Fontelera, Sr. "fired" his father as caretaker of
the land.34 He thus had a motive to think ill of them.
This concatenation of details constitute circumstantial evidence which, under Rule 133, 4 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence, is sufficient to convict accused-appellant if: (a) there is more than
one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.
II.
Judging from the number and severity of the stab wounds inflicted on the victims, the crime
committed was murder qualified by treachery. Apparently, accused-appellant and his
companions made sure they succeeded in killing their victims without risk to
themselves.35 Treachery absorbs she circumstance of abuse of superior strength,36 so there was
no need for the trial court to take it into account as an aggravating circumstance. On the other
hand, there is no basis for appreciating evident premeditation as there is no evidence of the
planning and preparation to kill or when the plan was conceived.37
Since the killing of the couple was committed inside their house, the aggravating circumstance
of dwelling should be appreciated. Considering the presence of one aggravating circumstance
and the absence of any mitigating circumstance, the penalty for the crimes committed in this
case would have been death. However, as the crimes were committed after the effectivity of the
1987 Constitution and prior to the reimposition of the death penalty by R.A. No. 7659, the trial
court properly imposed on accused-appellant two terms of reclusion perpetua for the killing of
both Rodrigo Fontelera, Sr. and Rosita Fontelera.
III.
With regard to the question of damages, Rodrigo Fontelera, Jr. presented receipts showing that
the victims' family spent P18,000.00 for, "funeral coach chandeliers, (First Class) embalming"
(Exh. L);38 P4,000.00 for the vault (Exh. L-3); 39 P1,100.00 for two tombstones (Exhs. L-7 and L5);40 P1,0000.00 for "exc. fee" (Exhs. L-2 and L-6);41 and P950.00 for "Prep." fees for Rosita
Fontelera (Exh. L-4);42 or the total amount of P25,050.00. Accordingly, the amount of P38,000.00
awarded as funeral expenses to the heirs of Rodrigo Fontelera, Sr. and Rosita Fontelera should
be reduced to P25,050.00.
The award of P100,000.00 as indemnity for the death of Rodrigo Fontelera, Sr. and Rosita
Fontelera is in accord with our current rulings 43 and should be affirmed. The award of
P100,000.00 as moral damages for each death is likewise appropriate.44
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 72, Olongapo City, is
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION as above indicated.

SO ORDERED.1wphi1.nt

That on or about the 26th day of September, 1987, at about 8:00 P.M., in the
City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused, conniving and confederating together and mutually
helping each other, to wit: while the two accused hold (sic) her body by the
use of force, violence and intimidation, accused Reynaldo Mabini hold (sic)
her hands and pointing a knife at her, pressing her to the ground, accused
Eduardo Caballes did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have carnal knowledge of the complainant against her will, and inflicting
upon her the following physical injuries:

G.R. No. 102723-24 June 19, 1997

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EDUARDO CABALLES and REYNALDO MABINI, accused,
EDUARDO CABALLES, appellant.

CONTUSSION (sic) 1 x 1 CM (R) INFRAORBITAL;

CONTUSSION (sic) 1 x l CM (R) ARM P/3 ANTERIOR;
LINEAR ERUTHEMA (sic) 1 CM CLAVICULAR (L)
MEDIAL 3rd-LINEAR ERYTEMA (sic) (L) CM (R)
SUBMANDIBULAR, LINEAR ABRASION 0.5 CM (L)
UPPER LIP MUCOSA. 2

PANGANIBAN, J.:
This Court is appalled at the unabated commission of heinous crimes in our country. Particularly
disheartening is the high incidence of rape perpetrated day by day in urban and rural areas
alike.
In this ponencia, the Court finds occasion to clarify existing jurisprudence on the grant of
damages in the crime of rape, which is likewise applicable to the crimes of murder, homicide and
parricide. Civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 (consistent with prevailing jurisprudence)
is automatically granted to the offended party, or his/her heirs in case of the former's death,
without need of further evidence other than the fact of the commission of any of the
aforementioned crimes. Moral and exemplary damages may be separately granted in addition to
indemnity. Moral damages can be awarded only upon sufficient proof that the complainant is
entitled thereto in accordance with Article 2217 of the Civil Code, while exemplary damages can
be imposed if the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances duly
proven. The amounts thereof shall be at the discretion of the courts.
In the case before us, Appellant Eduardo Caballes is charged with two (2) counts of rape
allegedly committed in concert with Co-accused Reynaldo Mabini against Miguela Baculi in the
evening of September 26, 1987. The two Amended Complaints, both dated October 26, 1987,
sworn to by the victim and certified by 4th Asst. Fiscal Rodulfo G. Ugsad, indicted the accused
as follows:

The accused, with the assistance of their counsel de parte, 3 both entered a plea of not guilty
during their arraignment on January 13, 1988. 4 Trial ensued in due course in the consolidated
cases. 5 Thereafter, on July 16, 1991, Judge Priscila S. Agana of the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu, Branch 24, rendered judgment 6 convicting both accused of two counts of rape. The
dispositive portion of the assailed Decision is quoted hereinbelow:
THEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING PREMISES, accused
Eduardo Caballes is hereby sentenced twice to suffer the penalty
of RECLUSION PERPETUA. With respect to accused Reynaldo Mabini, he
is hereby sentenced twice to suffer an imprisonment ranging from twelve
(12) years of prision mayor as minimum to eighteen (18) years of reclusion
temporal as maximum, after appreciating minority in his favor. Moral and
exemplary damages to be paid jointly and severally by the accused, in the
sums of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) and FIFTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P50,000.00) respectively, are hereby awarded to the private
complainant Miguela Baculi. 7
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution

That on or about the 26th day of September, 1987, at about 8:00 P.M., in the
City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused, conniving and confederating together and mutually
helping each other, took turns in having sexual intercourse with the
complainant by the use of force and intimidation, that is, while accused
Eduardo Caballes was having sexual intercourse with the complainant,
accused Reynaldo Mabini who at that time was pointing a knife at the
complainant pulled Eduardo on top of the complainant, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the
complainant against her will. 1
And,

The prosecution relied heavily on the testimony of the private complainant, Miguela Baculi,
twenty-five (25) years of age and married. According to Miguela, on Septembers 8 26, 1987,
while on her way home from work about 7:30 p.m., she was accosted by Accused Eduardo
Caballes and Reynaldo Mabini. She recognized both because they had been her neighbors at
Sambag 4, Guadalupe, Cebu City for the past eight years. Upon confronting her, Mabini covered
her mouth and pointed a knife at her while Caballes held her hands. They led her to a secluded
area where they initially molested her. She was able to wriggle herself free and run for a short
distance but her abductors caught up with her. She was slapped, punched and strangled before
she was brought to another secluded and dark area farther away. While Mabini held her hands
and pointed a knife at her, Caballes raised her skirt and removed her underwear. She was
forced to lie down. Caballes next took off his own trousers and underwear, mounted Miguela and

inserted his erect penis into her vagina. After satisfying his lust, Caballes exchanged positions
with Mabini who likewise violated her chastity against her will. Thereafter, Miguela was escorted
towards her home by the accused. Mabini threatened to kill her if she reported the incident to the
police. After parting from her attackers, the rape victim went home but, not finding her husband,
proceeded to the house of his relatives, the spouses Bernardo and Juanita Jumaoas, to whom
she related her shameful experience. It was the spouses Jumaoas who reported the rape to the
police which led to the arrest of the accused that same evening. 9
Miguela was thereafter examined at the Cebu City Medical Center. The medical doctor who
examined her genitalia found her cervix "hyperemic, with edema of the anterior lip" which might
have been caused by trauma or forced contact resulting in the rupture of the capillaries,
hyperemia and edema. Sperm analysis yielded negative result, but the doctor explained that
there might have been no ejaculation or it might have happened outside the vagina. 10 The victim
was further observed to have suffered contusions below her right eye and on her right arm just
below the shoulder, possibly caused by a blunt object applied with force or a fistic blow, and
linear erythema (redness) on the clavicle (collarbone), possibly caused by force applied to
induce choking. 11
Version of the Defense
In their respective testimonies, both accused admitted having had sexual intercourse with
Miguela successively in the same evening of September 26, 1987. But they gave contradicting
versions. According to Accused Eduardo Caballes, he and Co-accused Reynaldo Mabini
attended a dance-affair in the neighboring barrio that evening. They had consumed about nine
or ten bottles of Red Horse beer when they saw Miguela Baculi a few meters away. Reynaldo
approached her. From where he was sitting, Eduardo saw his co-accused pulling the arm of
Miguela who in turn appeared to be resisting. He approached both and asked what the
commotion was about. Miguela expressed her surprise why Reynaldo was pulling her; the latter
said that he wanted to tell her something. Eduardo convinced Miguela to walk along with them
so they could talk. Miguela allegedly went voluntarily with them. After a distance of about twenty
(20) meters, Eduardo told Miguela that he liked her and asked if he could touch her. Miguela
replied that she already had a husband. Eduardo assured her that nobody would know. She did
not resist when he kissed and embraced her. He then went to gather some banana leaves which
they used as a mat. Then they undressed themselves and had sex, while Reynaldo waited about
five (5) meters away. Thereafter, at the suggestion of Eduardo, Miguela allegedly agreed to have
sex with Reynaldo also. Both accused later walked Miguela to the corner of the road leading to
her house. Before parting ways, she allegedly even agreed to meet with them again if nobody
would learn about their tryst. Eduardo further testified that he did not know why Miguela filed
rape charges against them. 12
The testimony in court of the other accused, Reynaldo Mabini, was delayed for sometime
because he was observed to be suffering from mental disorder. The Psychiatric Evaluation
Report of Dr. Renato D. Obra of the Southern Islands Medical Center, Cebu City, however,
indicated that he was capable of facing trial. 13 Mabini scantly declared that in the evening of
September 26, 1987, he drank beer and Aejo rum with Eduardo Caballes. At around 8:00 p.m.,
they saw Miguela pass by. The accused admitted that he made a "quick intimidation" of Miguela
with the use of a knife, and thus succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her against her
will. 14

The Trial Court's Decision

In weighing the credibility of the witnesses, the court a quo declared:
. . . the Court is inclined to believe the testimony of the victim Miguela Baculi
to be credible and convincing. No Filipino woman would herself (sic) and be
exposed to public ridicule by concocting and inventing a story that she was
raped. It would be a great shame on her part if what she has told the court
is not true. And it must be noted that in this case Miguela Baculi was crying
when she narrated in court her sad story. She told the court how she was
accosted by the two accused, Mabini pointing a knife at her and gagging her
mouth with his hands and Caballes holding her hands. And then the
accused dragged her to a secluded place but on the way she was able to
free herself. Unfortunately though, she was caught by the accused only a
few faces (sic) and through force and intimidation she was brought to a
secluded place where she was raped one at a time by the two accused. 15
With respect to the defense witnesses, the trial court characterized their testimonies this wise:
. . . the testimony of accused Caballes cannot be given any importance at
all for it runs counter to the normal course of human nature. For the court
cannot believe him when he testified that Miguela Baculi consented to his
having sexual intercourse with her. Considering that Miguela is a decent,
virtuous and a happily married woman, it would be hard to imagine, nay
impossible for her to give her consent to have sexual intercourse with a man
who conveyed to her his love for the first time and who was drunk at the
time. Moreso (sic), to have carnal knowledge with men one after another
voluntarily in the presence of each other accused (sic). The court is inclined
to believe that accused Caballes did not tell the truth.
And to top it all, the other accused Reynaldo Mabini admitted that he raped
Miguela Baculi. Although a medical certificate (Exhibit 2-Mabini) was
presented and submitted in court regarding the mental capacity of the
accused to stand trial, nevertheless the attneding (sic) physicial (sic)
recommended that accused is (sic) ready to stand trial. 16
The court a quo further ruled that both accused had conspired in the commission of the offense,
observing that "the two accused planned to commit the crime of rape before complainant
showed up and they both executed the heinous act exactly as planned." It thus held that two
counts of rape were committed by each of the accused.
In addition, the trial court held that the crime was "aggravated by the fact that both accused are
relatives of the victim's husband . . . , the commission was planned and premiditated ( sic) after
the accused finished drinking liquor, with abuse of superior strength and use of a knife, in an
uninhabited place and during nighttime." 17
From the above decision, only Eduardo Caballes appealed. 18

Issues
In his appeal brief, 19 Appellant Caballes attributes the following alleged errors upon
the trial court:

The Court's Ruling

The appeal has no merit.
First Issue: Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence

I
The trial court erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of rape.
II
The trial court erred in finding that the accused had pre-planned the alleged act of
rape before the complainant showed up and they both executed the heinous act
exactly as planned.
III
The trial court erred in finding that the crime of rape was more aggravated by the fact
that both accused are relatives of the victim's husband and their neighbor.
IV
The trial court erred in awarding moral and exemplary damages to be paid jointly and
severally by the accused in the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) AND
FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) respectively. 20
In questioning the sufficiency of the prosecution evidence, Accused- appellant Caballes points to
the absence of laceration and sperm in the victim's vagina, negating forced penetration. Neither
could he and his co-accused have preplanned their advances on Miguela considering that they
only chanced upon her and were under the influence of liquor. With the above circumstances,
appellant avers that at most he could be held guilty only of attempted rape with physical injuries.
Furthermore, appellant contends that for relationship to be appreciated as aggravating, it is the
victim who should be related by consanguinity to the perpetrator of the act. Finally, citing this
Court's 1990 decision in People vs. Timbang, 21 indemnity due the rape victim should not exceed
P20,000.00. 22
The Solicitor General, on the other hand, asserts that the private complainant's testimony
alleging she was raped is sufficient to convict appellant and his co-accused of the offense
charged. A married woman will not publicly admit that she had been sexually abused by two men
unless that is the truth. Moreover, the contusions on different parts of the complainant's body
support her allegation that force was applied on her by her offenders to make her submit to their
abject sexual desires. Besides, the absence of spermatozoa in the complainant's sexual organ
does not negate the commission of rape since it is penetration, however slight, that
consummates rape. 23In addition, the Solicitor General opines that there was conspiracy
between the two accused since, while one was ravishing the victim, the other was holding her
hands and vice versa, thereby facilitating the commission of rape.24

The law provides that carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following instances
constitutes rape: (1) when force or intimidation is used; (2) when the woman is deprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3) when she is under twelve (12) years of age. 25
It is important to note that both accused admitted having had sexual congress with the private
complainant. Appellant claims though that said complainant copulated with him voluntarily.
However, the medical findings on the victim, which included contusions on various parts of her
body, belie appellant's claim. Rather, they support Miguela's declarations that she was
manhandled by the accused before and during her molestation.
It is well-settled that the absence of spermatozoa in the victim's vagina does not necessarily
negate the commission of rape. 26 Neither is the existence of laceration indispensable. What is
essential is that there be penetration of the sexual organ no matter how slight. 27 In the instant
case, the victim gave a spontaneous, positive and unclouded picture of how appellant, with the
help of his co-accused, disgustingly consummated the rape:
Q Now, considering that after you were molested the accused forced (you) to stand up
and brought you to a far secluded place, what happened next when you arrived (at)
that place?
A Mabini grabbed my hands and pointed a knife at me while Caballes raised my skirt
and took off my pantie (sic).
Q Considering that you were being held by the accused Mabini and (he was) pointing
a knife at you while this accused Caballes was removing your pantie (sic), what
happened next?
A They forced me to lie down on the ground.
Q Now, after you were forced to lie down on the ground, what happened next?
A Mabini lay at my side and pointed a knife at my neck while he was grabbing my
hands and Caballes took off his trouser and his brief and expose(d) his organ.
Q After Caballes exposed his organ, what did he do with that?
xxx xxx xxx
A He penetrated me with his organ forcefully without my consent.

28

Q Now, what was accused Caballes doing while he was inserting his sex organ to your
sex organ?
A He made a (sic) push and pull movements. 29
On the basis of the above testimony, there was penetration of the victim's sexual organ. Forced
coitus is further corroborated by the findings of the physician who examined Miguela on the very
evening after the sexual abuse was consummated. In his examination of the victim's genitalia,
Dr. Gilberto Magallon of the Cebu City Medical Center said that the cervix was "hyperemic with
edema of the anterior lip." 30 He added that such condition of the cervical layer was not normal
for a woman, and explained that the probable cause thereof was trauma resulting from forced
contact applied on the affected part. 31 Gathering from the testimony of the victim, the forceful
"push and pull movements" of appellant could well have been the cause of hyperemia in her
sexual organ. Clearly then, appellant committed the felony under the first circumstance, i.e., with
the use of force and intimidation.
Indeed, no young woman of decent repute would publicly expose herself to the shame and
embarrassment of admitting having been sexually abused by two men successively within each
other's full view if such were not the truth. 32 No ulterior motive was offered by the appellant to
explain why Miguela would falsely charge him with the serious offense. Neither did appellant
attempt to explain the disparity between his testimony and that of his co-accused, a disparity
which supported the victim's contentions. The only logical conclusion is that no other reason
impelled the complaining witness to come to court than to seek justice for the dastardly crime
committed against her virtue. 33 Even her sole testimony which is credible suffices to make a
conviction, 34 for when a woman says that she has been raped, she almost always says it all. 35
Finally, it is doctrinal that the evaluation by the trial court of the testimony of a witness is
generally accorded great respect because of its direct opportunity to observe the witness'
demeanor on the stand and to determine whether she is telling the truth. Such assessment is
generally binding on this Court except when the same was reached arbitrarily or when the trial
court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and
substance which could have affected the disposition of the case. 36 None of these exceptions is
found in the instant case.
Second Issue: Attendance of Aggravating Circumstances
No Evident Premeditation
We find merit in the contention of accused-appellant that the trial court wrongly concluded that
the sexual assault was planned and premeditated. For evident premeditation to be appreciated,
it is necessary that the prosecution prove the following elements: (1) the time when the accused
decided to commit the crime; (2) an overt act showing that the accused clung to their
determination to commit the crime; and (3) the lapse of a period of time between the decision
and the execution of the crime sufficient to allow the accused to reflect upon the consequences
of the act. 37 The prosecution, however, failed to establish with clear and convincing evidence the
attendance of any of these elements which cannot be inferred merely from conjectures and
suppositions.

Degree of Relationship Between

the Parties Not Aggravating
In order that the alternative circumstance of relationship may be taken into consideration in the
imposition of the proper penalty, the offended party must either be the (a) spouse, (b) ascendant,
(c) descendant, (d) legitimate, natural or adopted brother or sister, or (e) relative by affinity in the
same degree, of the offender. 38 The complaining witness simply stated that accused-appellant
was related to her husband through their grandparents. 39 And although appellant admitted being
related with the private complainant's husband, he said that he was a third-degree cousin of the
former's grandmother. 40 Neither the prosecution nor defense counsel attempted to clarify the
witnesses' statements. We cannot positively conclude from such bare declarations that appellant
is an ascendant or descendant by affinity of the complainant. It seems rather doubtful that the
relationship between the offended party and the offender falls within the statutorily defined
concept of relationship determinative of the penalty to be imposed. Since the degree of
relationship was not clearly established to be one of those provided for by law, we cannot use
such circumstance against the accused.
Abuse of Superior Strength, Nighttime,
and Uninhabited Place
The trial court further said that the crime was also aggravated by "abuse of superior strength and
use of a knife, in an uninhabited place and during nighttime." 41 Scouring the evidence on record,
we do not find any evidence by the prosecution to support the unexplained conclusion of the trial
court.
The prosecution merely showed that the crime was committed at nighttime and in an
uninhabited place. These circumstances, by themselves, do not aggravate the offense.
Nighttime 42 and uninhabited place, 43 to be appreciated, must have been purposely sought and
taken advantage of in order to facilitate the commission of the offense. There is nothing in the
records, however, to show that appellants had deliberately chosen or used these circumstances
to their advantage.
Furthermore, the trial court erred in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of abuse of
superior strength. Although the trial court did not elaborate on the basis of its conclusion, it relied
apparently on the finding that the crime was committed by two persons who also used a knife to
terrorize the victim into submission. We cannot sustain this view. The use of a knife or the
commission of the crime by two persons cannot be considered as generic aggravating
circumstances in rape, for they are included as an integral part of the crime. Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code provides that "[w]henever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a
deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death."
(Emphasis supplied.)
Third Issue: Damages
The trial court ordered the two accused separately to pay P50,000.00 as moral and exemplary
damages to the victim. In effect, the trial court imposed the amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages and another P25,000.00 as moral damages for each count of rape.

The trial court correctly awarded moral damages to the victim, pursuant to Articles 2217 and
2219 of the Civil Code. Miguela testified in court that as a consequence of the vicious and
detestable act perpetrated upon her by the accused, she suffered from depression, shock and
sleepless nights. 44 The award of exemplary damages is not justified, however, in view of the
failure of the prosecution to prove one or more aggravating circumstances. 45
In view of the above discussion, the amount of moral damages should be increased to
P50,000.00 for each count of rape, but the award of exemplary damages should be deleted.
The trial court further erred in not granting civil indemnity to the private complainant which, as
we explained at the outset, is automatically imposed upon the accused without need of proof
other than the fact of the commission of the offense. Indemnity of P50,000.00 should, therefore,
be reckoned for each count of rape committed by the accused.
In the exercise of our discretion, and since an appeal in a criminal case throws the whole case
open for review, it is proper for this Court to impose additional damages upon appellant.
Appellant is therefore liable for the increased amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages for each
count of rape. He is additionally liable to Miguela Baculi in the amount of P100,000.00 as
indemnity for the two counts of rape committed against her.
The same cannot apply, however, in the case of Reynaldo Mabini who did not appeal his
conviction. Additional penalties cannot prejudice him, but modifications to the judgment
beneficial to him are considered in his favor. 46Because of the deletion of the award of exemplary
damages, he is only liable, jointly and severally with Appellant Caballes, for the sum of
P50,000.00 as moral damages for the two counts of rape as adjudged by the trial court.
Moreover, he is not affected by the increase in the amount of the said award. In the same vein
that the additional moral damages can no longer be imposed upon Reynaldo Mabini, so we
cannot order him to pay civil indemnity.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code provides that whenever the crime of rape is committed by
two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. Considering that
appellant is answerable for two counts of rape, we find no error in the imposition by the trial
court of the double penalty of reclusion perpetua upon him.47
WHEREFORE, all premises considered, the assailed Decision of the trial court convicting
Appellant Eduardo Caballes of the crime of rape on two counts and sentencing him to reclusion
perpetua for each count is hereby AFFIRMED subject to the modification that, in addition to his
joint and several liability with Accused Eduardo Mabini for P50,000.00 as moral damages
imposed by the trial court, appellant shall further pay the following amounts to Miguela Baculi:
1. Additional amount of P25,000.00 as moral damages for each count of rape, or a total of
P50,000.00; and
2. Civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 for each count of rape or a total of P100,000.00.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 95386 May 29, 1997

MIGUELA CAMPOS ONG, Surviving Spouse of MANUEL
ONG, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ALFREDO ONG and ROBERT
ONG respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 26, 1990,
affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Cebu City, which declared Alfredo
Ong, Jr. and Robert Ong the illegitimate children of Manuel Ong and thus, entitled to support.
Also assailed herein is the resolution issued on August 16, 1990, denying the motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner.
Petitioner Miguela Campos Ong is the surviving spouse of Manuel Ong. The latter died on May
21, 1990, while the case was pending appeal in the Court of Appeals. On the other hand, private
respondents Alfredo Ong, Jr. and Robert Ong are children of Saturnina Caballes allegedly by
Manuel Ong. They brought this case to compel Manuel Ong to recognize them as his illegitimate
children and to give them support.
They presented evidence showing the following:
On December 20, 1953, Manuel Ong, representing himself as Alfredo Go, was introduced to
Saturnina Caballes at the Yarrow Beach Resort, a night club in Talisay, Cebu, by Constancia Lim
and Vicente Sy. In no time, the two had a relationship. Since October 1954, Manuel started
spending the night with Saturnina. Saturnina testified that she and Manuel Ong lived together for
four months, first on A. Lopez Street and later in Talamban. In addition, Manuel Ong gave her
money, a sack of rice each month, and other supplies. On June 28, 1955, Alfredo Ong, Jr. was
born in Talamban. He was registered in the Local Civil Registry as Alfredo Go, Jr. On August 17,
1956, Robert Ong was born. Because the midwife told Saturnina that the child should carry her
surname as she was not married to Manuel Ong, "alias" Alfredo Go, the child was therefore
registered as Robert Caballes.
Thereafter, the financial support from Manuel Ong started to dwindle, until seven months later
when Manuel Ong stopped seeing her. This prompted Saturnina to look for him. She discovered
his identity as Manuel Ong. Saturnina asked Manuel Ong for financial support of their children,
but he refused her request.
In the latter part of 1961, Saturnina and private respondents again asked Manuel Ong for
monetary assistance because of financial difficulties. But Ong denied them assistance. The
records disclose that on December 25, 1976, Alfredo and Robert Ong visited Manuel Ong in his
house on M.J. Cuenco Avenue where they were entertained and presented to Manuel Ong by
Dolores Dy, Manuel's Chinese commonlaw wife. Alfredo Ong, Jr. testified that on March 29,
1979, he was given a China Banking Corp. check for P100.00 by Manuel Ong as his gift on his

graduation from high school. Later, when Alfredo Ong was in his senior year in college, he saw
Manuel in the latter's office and asked him for money to defray his educational expenses.
Manuel Ong gave him P100.00 cash and told him to make a list of his school needs. After
getting the list which Alfredo had prepared, Manuel Ong told him to come back. Alfredo returned
with some friends in September 1982, but Manuel Ong turned down his request and ordered him
to leave and threatened to call the police if he did not leave.
On September 30, 1982, Alfredo filed a complaint for recognition and support against Manuel
Ong. The complaint was amended on November 25, 1982 to include Robert as co-plaintiff. After
trial, private respondents were found to be the illegitimate children of Manuel Ong in accordance
with Art. 283, pars. 2 and 4 of the Civil Code. Accordingly, the trial court ordered:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs:
1. declaring the plaintiffs as the illegitimate children of Manuel Ong,
begotten by him with Saturnina Caballes;
2. ordering Manuel Ong to pay the said plaintiffs the monthly support of
P600, effective from the date of this decision. 1
On appeal, this decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 2 Petitioner moved for
reconsideration, but his motion was denied on August 16, 1990 for lack of merit. The appellate
court cited Art. 283, par. 3 as an additional ground for ordering the recognition of private
respondents as illegitimate children of Manuel Ong. Hence, this petition.
The pertinent provisions of Art. 283 of the Civil Code state:
Art. 283. In any of the following cases, the father is obliged to recognize the
child as his natural child:

of 1957, during which they had repeated sexual intercourses; (4) that during this period, Manuel
Ong gave support to Saturnina and private respondents; (5) that Dolores Dy, Manuel's
commonlaw wife, treated private respondents like close relatives of Manuel Ong by giving them
on November 2, 1979 and January 6, 1977 tokens of affection, such as family pictures of
Dolores Dy and Manuel Ong, 3 and by visiting them in their house on A. Lopez Street in 1980; (6)
that on two occasions Manuel Ong gave money to Alfredo, first, as the latter's high school
graduation gift and second, for the latter's educational support.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals dismissed Manuel Ong's claim that Alfredo tried to extort
money from him. They noted that Alfredo had written his name on the piece of paper and that if
this was a case of extortion, the amount demanded would have been in round figures and not
P4,974.28. On this basis they concluded that the amount written on the list was the total of the
itemized expenses which Alfredo Ong, Jr. was asking his father to defray as his school
expenses.
Petitioner questions the morality and credibility of Saturnina Caballes. She refers to Saturnina's
admission that before she had relation with Manuel she was cohabiting with a paralytic from San
Fernando, in order to distinguish this case from that of Navarro v. Bacalla 4 in which the
compulsory recognition of a natural child was ordered on the basis of the testimony of the
mother of the child that the putative father had impregnated her. Petitioner points out that, in that
case, there was also evidence presented that at no time before and during the child's conception
did the mother have any relation with any other man. Thus:
Specifically, as the records shows, the paternity of defendant herein was
proved by the testimony of plaintiff's mother that "he (defendant)
impregnated me" and that at the time, before, and during plaintiff's
conception she had no affair with any other man aside from the
defendant. . .
We agree with appellant that the foregoing evidence is included in the broad
scope of paragraph 4, Article 283, New Civil Code. 5

xxx xxx xxx

2. When the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the
alleged father by the direct acts of the latter or his family;
3. When the child was conceived during the time when the mother
cohabited with the supposed father;
4. When the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant
is his father.
Art. 289 allows the investigation of paternity of spurious children on the same grounds
specified in this article and in Art. 284.
The records of this case bear out the following findings of both the Court of Appeals and the trial
court: (1) that Manuel Ong introduced himself to Saturnina Caballes as Alfredo Go; (2) that
Saturnina Caballes and Manuel Ong had an illicit relationship from 1954 until sometime in March

To begin with, factual questions as determined by the trial court, especially rulings on the
credibility of witnesses, 6when affirmed by the appellate court, are binding on this Court and are
accorded utmost respect. It is only when it is shown that the trial court ignored or overlooked or
did not appreciate correctly matters of substance which affect the results of the controversy that
this Court will depart from this rule. 7 In the case at bar, no sufficient reason has been shown for
this Court not to adhere to the general rule.
Inconsistencies there are in the testimony of Saturnina Caballes, but they are not of such a
nature as to put in doubt the testimony of Saturnina that Manuel Ong was the father of private
respondents Alfredo Ong, Jr. and Robert Caballes. The discrepancies concern minor details and,
if at all, only show that Saturnina Caballes was an uncoached witness. 8 Saturnina testified that
shortly after getting acquainted with each other, she and Manuel Ong had relation and in fact
lived together at A. Lopez Street in Cebu City for four months, and that Manuel Ong gave her
support consisting of money and the necessities of life, like rice.
Saturnina's testimony was corroborated by Constancia Lim Monteclaros. Constancia was the
person who introduced Saturnina to Manuel Ong. Constancia and Vicente Sy, Manuel Ong's

close friend, lived together in a room in the house of Ong. She knew Manuel very well. No
reason has been given why she should testify falsely against Manuel Ong.
Two circumstances are mentioned which allegedly make it improbable that Manuel Ong was the
father of private respondents. The first is that Saturnina Caballes admitted having cohabited with
another man before meeting Manuel Ong. The records show, however, that the man, who was a
paralytic, was taken by his mother in 1953, before Saturnina started having an affair with Manuel
Ong in 1954. Private respondent Alfredo Ong, Jr. was born on June 28, 1955, more than a year
after the paralytic had left Saturnina. The other private respondent, Robert Caballes, was born
on August 17, 1956. Hence, private respondents could not have been conceived during the
period of cohabitation of their mother with the unidentified paralytic.
The other circumstance mentioned is that Manuel Ong was allegedly sterile. Ong claimed that,
in addition to petitioner Miguela Campos Ong, he lived with a commonlaw wife, Dolores Dy, and
with another woman named Anatolia Veloria but he had no child with anyone of them. He said
that during World war II he got sick and was treated by a certain Dr. Deiparine who allegedly told
him that as a result of his illness he would not be able to beget any child. Ong further claimed
that he cohabited with Dolores Dy before and during his marriage with petitioner Miguela
Campos Ong. His inability to procreate is said to be the reason why petitioner and Manuel Ong
raised six children not related to them by blood.
We think both the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed claims that Manuel
Ong was sterile and therefore could not have been the father of private respondents. No
competent medical testimony was presented to prove this claim. His testimony that he had been
told by a certain Dr. Deiparine that because of an illness he contracted during the war he would
no longer be able to procreate is plain hearsay.
On the other hand, the claim that although he lived with three women (including petitioner) no
one bore him a child is belied by the fact that he acknowledged a certain Lourdes Balili as his
natural child. The record shows that on May 24, 1948, the Court of Instance of Cebu rendered a
decision which in part stated: 9
This is a case of acknowledgment of a natural child and support. When this
case was called for trial today, the parties entered into the following
agreement:
That the defendant is agreeable to acknowledge
Lourdes Ong as his natural child and the mother,
Victoria Balili, acknowledges the right of the said
defendant to the custody of the child.
Plaintiff Lourdes Ong, therefore, is hereby declared acknowledged natural
child of Manuel Ong, with the right to bear the name of natural father, who
shall have the custody upon her, without prejudice for the mother to see and
visit her from time to time.
In the complaint for support filed in that case, it was alleged:

4. That in the month of January, 1938, to the day when the last war broke
out, the guardian-ad-litem, Victoria Balili, and the herein defendant Manuel
Ong with repeated promises by the latter to marry the former, they lived
together as husband and wife;
5. That while they lived as such, the plaintiff Lourdes Ong was begotten or
born on March 31, 1939, at the City of Cebu; 10
These allegations contradict the claim of Manuel Ong 11 that during the war he lived with Victoria
Balili (not Victoria Veloria, which is apparently a typographical error) but because of his sterility
they did not beget any child.
Petitioner contends that the decision in that case cannot be presented as evidence of his virility
because it was based on a compromise agreement relating to the civil status of persons, which
is prohibited under Art. 2035, par. 1 of the Civil Code. This contention is untenable. The evidence
was not presented to establish in chief a fact but to impeach the credibility of Manuel Ong as a
witness. Moreover, as is clear from the quoted portion of the judgment, the parties did not really
enter into a compromise in the sense in which the term is used in Art. 2028 as "a contract
whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or put an end to one
already commenced." Rather what Manuel Ong did was actually to make a voluntary recognition
of the child pursuant to Art. 278, which provides that recognition shall be made in the record of
birth, a will, a statement before the court of record, or in any authentic writing. What he agreed to
do was to acknowledge the child as his, rather than to agree to consider the child to be his
natural child.
Indeed, the evidence for petitioner does not show that Manuel Ong was sterile and could not
have begotten private respondents or that even if he was so during the war that he could not
have been cured ten years later of that condition when Alfredo Ong, Jr. was conceived. On the
other
hand,
as
this
Court
has
ruled 12 an adult male is presumed to have normal powers of virility and the burden of evidence
to prove the contrary rests upon him who claims otherwise. Petitioner has not overcome this
presumption.
The Court of Appeals declared private respondents the illegitimate children of Manuel Ong
pursuant to Art. 283, pars. 2, 3 and 4. In regard to the finding that private respondents had been
in the continuous possession of status as children of Manuel Ong, petitioner cites the ruling
in De Jesus v. Syquia, 13 wherein it was stated:
The word "continuous" in subsection 2 of article 135 of the Civil Code does
not mean that the concession of status shall continue forever, but only that it
shall not be of an intermittent character while it continues.
Petitioner contends that Manuel Ong's acts of recognition were intermittent and
isolated and not continuous, as Alfredo Ong, Jr. claims to have encountered his
putative father only four times, in 1961, on December 25, 1976, March 29, 1979 and
sometime in September 1982, whereas Robert had only two such encounters, which
were in 1961 and on December 25, 1976.

Petitioner also contends that the refusal of Manuel Ong to recognize and give support to private
respondents is proof that he never recognized them as his children because, as held
in Mendoza v. Ibaez: 14

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated January 26 1990, and its resolution,
dated August 16, 1990, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

. . . the enjoyment of the status of a natural child referred to in the said

article must necessarily be proven by acts showing an express desire on the
part of the father, or of his family, as the case may be, to recognize the
claimant as his natural child, such as the keeping of the child, or by other
analogous acts, of equal weight and efficacy, showing that such relationship
exists between the child and the alleged father or his family.
With regard to the Court of Appeals' finding that there was cohabitation between Manuel Ong
and Saturnina, thus justifying the application of par. 3 of Art. 283, petitioner points out that the
Court of Appeals simply referred to its main decision and that of the trial court in holding that
there was cohabitation when the fact is that neither in the appellate court's decision nor in that of
the trial court was it found that there was cohabitation. On the contrary, the trial court held that
there was no cohabitation because Manuel Ong and Saturnina Caballes did not openly live
together as husband and wife, for a period of time, under the same roof, but did so
clandestinely. 15
We agree that this case does not fall under pars. 2 and 3 of Art. 283 of the Civil Code. As
petitioner well states, the four times during which Manuel Ong met Alfredo and gave the latter
money cannot be considered proof of continuous possession of the status of a child. The father's
conduct toward his son must be spontaneous and uninterrupted for this ground to exist. Here
there are no acts shown of Manuel Ong treating Alfredo Ong, Jr. as his son except on the four
occasions during which they met. In the case of Robert Caballes, there is no proof at all that
Manuel Ong treated him as his son.
Nor can it be said that there was proof of cohabitation in this case. While Saturnina Caballes
testified that she and Manuel Ong lived together for four months as husband and wife in order to
justify a finding of cohabitation, the relationship was not open and public so as to constitute
cohabitation. 16 While the parties are not required to hold themselves out as husband and wife,
neither must they act clandestinely or secretly, otherwise they will be considered to have merely
engaged in illicit sexual intercourse. 17
Nonetheless, we hold that the evidence in this case sufficiently makes this case fall under the
last paragraph of Art. 283, i.e., any other evidence showing that Manuel Ong was the father of
private respondents. In Ilano v. Court of Appeals, 18 this Court held that the phrase "any
evidence or proof" in the last paragraph of Art. 283 operates as a blanket provision covering all
cases in the preceding ones, so that evidence, even though insufficient to constitute proof under
the other paragraphs, may nonetheless be enough to qualify the case under par. 4. In this case,
the testimony of Saturnina Caballes that she had illicit sexual relation with Manuel Ong over a
long period (1954-1957) which, had it been openly done, would have constituted cohabitation
under par. 3 is proof that private respondents were conceived and born during such relationship
and constitutes evidence of Ong's paternity. This relationship was further established through the
testimony of Constancia Lim. The evidence for private respondents is not negated by the
admission of Saturnina Caballes that she had relation with another man before, because the
relationship terminated at least a year before the birth of Alfredo Ong, Jr. and two years before
the birth of the second child Robert Caballes.

G.R. Nos. 80437-38 July 11, 1996

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ROBERTO B. ABORDO, accused-appellant.
MENDOZA, J.:p
Roberto Abordo was the houseboy of Antonio Tan. He was accused of the rape and
attempted rape of his employer's 10-year old daughter, Arlene Tan, in two separate
complaints filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 100, at Quezon City.
In criminal Case No. 80437, the complaint alleged:
That on or about the 7th day of August, 1982, in Quezon City, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused, by means
of force and intimidation, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of the undersigned complainant, a minor,
10 years of age, against her will and in her own house.
In criminal Case No. 80438 it was alleged:
That on or about the 15th day of August, 1982, in Quezon City, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, said accused did then
and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and by means of force and
intimidation, commence the commission of rape directly by overt acts, to wit:
while the undersigned complaint, a minor, 10 years of age, was inside their
bedroom, the said accused, without the permission of any one, entered the
said room, lay on top of the undersigned, embraced, kissed and touched
her private parts and with intent of having carnal knowledge of her by
means of force and threats to kill her, and if the accused did not accomplish

his purpose, that is, to have carnal knowledge of the undersigned, it was not
because of his voluntary desistance but because of the opportune
intervention of her brother and another relative who responded to her cries
for help.

When accused-appellant stood up, Aris said he saw accused-appellant's penis

because his pants was unzipped. 8 Accused-appellant ran down the stairs and went
away. In her sworn statement, 9 Arlene said that at about 11:00 in the morning, she
told her cousin Tadeo de Lara about what accused-appellant had done to her.

Accused-appellant was found guilty of the charges. For the crime of rape, he was
sentenced to a prison term of reclusion perpetua and ordered to indemnify Arlene Tan
in the sum of P10,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. For
attempted rape, he was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of 4 years, 2
months, and 1 day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years and 1 day of prision
mayor, as maximum, and to indemnify Arlene Tan in the sum of P2,000.00, also
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

On the same day, at 1:00 o'clock p.m., Antonio Tan, who was in San Juan, Metro
Manila attending a conference of real estate brokers, was fetched by his brother-inlaw, Benjamin Henerala, and told about what happened to Arlene. The two proceeded
to complainant's house and arrived at 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon. Antonio Tan
confronted accused-appellant and asked him, "What have you done?" Accusedappellant at first did not answer, but when Tan demanded an answer accused
appellant said, "None, sir, I just went on top of her." 10

The facts are as follows:

Aris testified that when he told his father that accused-appellant had gone on top of
Arlene, Antonio Tan hit accused-appellant. 11 Antonio Tan said that he was shocked
and because he did not know what to do in such situation, he waited for his compadre
and neighbor, Co. Manuel S.J. Pea. At 7:00 in the evening a certain Eddie Cruz
arrived and, after an hour, they went to the police station at the Araneta Coliseum in
Quezon City, together with Arlene, Aris, Tadeo de Lara, bringing with them accusedappellant. 12 When asked during his cross-examination why he decided to take
accused-appellant to the police station, Tan said it was because he believed what
Arlene had told him about the incident and Arlene would never lie about such a
serious matter.

Arlene Tan was ten (10) years old at the time of the commission of the crimes. She
and her brothers Aris Tan and Arthur Tan lived in Quezon City with their father. Her
mother worked abroad. The complainant's father, Antonio Tan, ran a store on the
ground floor of their house, selling snacks (merienda) and car spare parts. The store
usually closed between 9:00 o'clock and 10:00 o'clock in the evening. Antonio Tan and
his son Arthur occupied the room on the second floor of the house, while Arlene and
her four-year old brother Aris occupied the room at the mezzanine.
Accused-appellant had been employed as a houseboy on August 1 or 2, 1982, 1 less
than a week before the commission of rape charged in Criminal Case No. 80437. He
cooked the food, washed the clothes and cleaned the house. He was also in charge of
opening the store in the morning and closing it at 9:00 in the evening. He slept in the
sala located at the mezzanine, near the room of Arlene. 2
On August 7, 1982, at around 10:30 in the evening, Arlene was awakened by the
weight of accused-appellant on top of her. She found she had been undressed.
Accused-appellant kissed her and with his two hands pinned down her shoulders.
Then with the use of his right hand, accused-appellant inserted his penis into her
vagina. Arlene said she suffered pain but she could not shout because accusedappellant placed his mouth on her mouth all the while that he was doing the sexual
act. He threatened Arlene with harm if she shouted. Arlene testified that when the
incident happened, her brother, Aris, was outside the room playing near the door.
Although Aris saw that accused-appellant was doing to her, because of his tender age,
being then only four years old, Aris did not do anything. 3
The next day, August 8, 1982, accused-appellant warned Arlene not to tell anybody
about the incident, otherwise she and her brother Aris would get hurt. 4
On August 15, 1982, at around 10:00 in the morning, while Arlene was in her room
playing hide-and-seek with Aris, accused-appellant entered their room, undressed her
and from behind inserted his penis. 5 Aris testified 6 that he saw accused-appellant on
top of his sister and both lay straight on the floor. Aris said he saw Arlene's skirt raised
up to her waist and her panty removed. 7 Arlene pushed accused-appellant as she
asked Aris to help her. Aris hit accused-appellant on the head with a piece of wood.

On August 17, 1982, Arlene was taken to the medico-legal branch of the Philippine
Constabulary headquarters at Camp Crame where she was examined by Dr. Gregorio
C. Blanco. Dr. Blanco's findings are contained in the medico-legal report (Exh. E) he
issued. The report states:
GENERAL AND EXTRAGENITAL:
Fairly developed, fairly nourished and coherent female child. Breasts
undeveloped. Abdomen is flat and tight. There is a contusion at the left
mandibular region, measuring 1.5 by 1 cm, 4.5 cm from the anterior midline.
GENITAL:
There is absence of public hair. Labia majora are full, convex and coaptated
with the pinkish-brown labia minora presenting in between. On separating
the same are disclosed a congested vulvar mucosa and an elastic, fleshytype hymen with a deep, healing laceration at 3 and shallow, healing
lacerations at 7 and 9 o'clock. External vaginal orifice offers strong
resistance to the introduction of the examining index finger and the virginsized vaginal speculum. Vaginal canal is narrow with prominent rugosities.
Cervix is normal in size, color and consistency with scanty amount of whitish
secretion.

Vaginal and peri-urethral smears are positive for gram-negative diplococci

but negative for spermatozoa.

In giving credence to the testimony of the examining physician, the physical

examination of whom was of doubtful veracity as may be viewed from the
testimony of the victim.

REMARKS:
IV
Subject is in non-virgin state physically.
In addition Dr. Blanco testified. After identifying his report, 13 he testified that based on
his examination Arlene had been sexually abused and the hymenal lacerations could
have been caused by sexual intercourse. Dr. Blanco explained that he observed
"healing lacerations," not "healed lacerations" nor "fresh lacerations," which indicated
that the sexual intercourse took place from 6 to 12 days before the examination was
made, i.e., between August 5 and August 12, 1982.
Accused-appellant's defense was basically denial. Accused-appellant testified that on
August 7, 1982, at about 10:00 in the evening, the stayed in the sala on the second
floor. Complainant's father was then in the store on the ground floor. 14 He said he
could not have committed the rape "because Mr. Tan was there." 15He could not have
attempted to rape Arlene on August 15, 1982 either "because Mr. Tan was [also] there
[in the house at the time]." On the other hand he was doing household chores from
6:00 o'clock in the morning to 9:00 o'clock in the evening. 16
The trial court sustained the prosecution version and convicted accused-appellant of
rape committed on August 7, 1982. The trial court declared that it could have found
accused-appellant guilty of consummated rape for the August 15, 1982 incident were
it not for the fact that the Information in the second case charged only attempted rape.
Hence the appeals from the decisions in the two cases which were consolidated. In
Criminal Case No. 80437 (Rape) it is alleged that the trial court erred:
I
In believing the testimony of the offended party Arlene Tan and witness Aris
Tan taking into account the improbability and impracticability of the
commission of the crime charged considering the presence of all the
members of the household during its alleged commission on August 7, 1982
in the very house of the victim.
II
In not considering the absence of the possible physical effects of the crime
charged, upon the body of the alleged victim.
III

In not believing and not giving significance and importance to the fact that
accused has all the time stayed in the alleged victim's home from the day
the crime complained of was allegedly committed to that day the complaint
was filed.
On the other hand, in Criminal Case No. 80438 (Attempted Rape), it is alleged that the
trial court erred:
V
In convicting the accused based on the uncorroborated testimony of the
alleged victim.
First. Accused-appellant argues that he could not have raped Arlene on August 7,
1982 since the members of her family were in the house and were within a hearing
distance from Arlene's room. He contends that much less could he have performed
the sexual act "in the actual presence of another person" (Arlene's brother Aris).
The contention has no merit. We have had cases 17 showing that fear of discovery or
the possible appearance of other people does not necessarily deter the commission of
rape. In People v. Opea, 102 SCRA 755 (1981), we said that it is not impossible to
commit rape in a small room even if there are several other persons in it. Lust does
not respect either time or place. 18 Besides, accused-appellant admitted that at 10:00
in the evening of August 7, 1982, Arlene's father was in the store on the ground floor
of the house. Knowing that Arlene's father usually went to bed between 11:00 o'clock
and 12:00 o'clock midnight 19accused-appellant must have thought it safe to enter the
room where Arlene was sleeping. Because of accused-appellant's threats, Arlene was
forced to keep quite and yield to accused-appellant's desire.
Accused-appellant makes much of the fact that the prosecution failed to present
evidence to show the "possible physical effects" of rape. It is argued that if there was
rape the lacerations of the hymen, noted by the medico-legal officer, would have
caused profuse bleeding even the day after the rape and Arlene would have
complained of persistent severe pains.
What Dr. Blanco testified he found were "healing lacerations," not fresh ones. After all,
when he examined Arlene Tan, it had been ten days after the rape. There was still
some bleeding but not too much because the lacerations were already
drying. 20 Anyway, since Arlene was less than twelve (12) years old at the time of the
rape, it is not necessary to prove that force had been used against her since the gist
of the offense of statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a woman below 12 years of
age. 21

Arlene may not have related the details of the rape but her simple answers to
questions asked her on the witness stand leave no doubt that she was telling the
truth. As she told her story:

A He kissed me.
Q Beside kissing you, what else happened? Tell the court so that we will finish
this.

ATTY. MENDOZA.
A "Pinatungan, hinalikan, inilabas iyong kanya, tapos ipinasok."
Q What happened at 10:30 in the evening of August 7, 1982?
Q What else did he do?
WITNESS:
A That is all.
A "Hinubaran po niya ako, tapos pinatungan."
Q Did you feel anything when the penis of accused was inside your vagina?
COURT
A Yes, sir. "Masakit." 22
Q What else happened?
A "Inilagay niya iyong kanya sa akin."
Q What do you mean by "he inserted his into mine"?
A "Iyong dito niya."
ATTY. MENDOZA
Witness pointing to the front.

Arlenes's testimony was supported by the medico-legal report of Dr. Gregorio C.

Blanco who found that she was in "non-virgin state physically," meaning to say she
had sexual intercourse. He also explained that the deep, healing laceration at 3:00
o'clock and shallow, healing lacerations at 7:00 o'clock and 9:00 o'clock in the hymen
could have been caused by the forcible insertion of the male organ into Arlene's
genital tract.
Accused-appellant contends that complainant's failure to recall the name of the doctor
who examined her casts doubt on the testimony of Dr. Blanco that a physical
examination had in fact been conducted on her. This is not correct. It only means
Arlene did not know Dr. Blanco very well or did not remember his name or never knew
his name in the first place.

COURT
Q "Iyong titi"?
WITNESS
A Yes, sir.
Q Into your "pekpek"?
A Yes, sir.
COURT
Q After that, when the accused . . . no. When the accused placed his penis inside
your vagina, what happened or what else did the accused do?
WITNESS

Accused-appellant also argues that the fact that he never escaped shows he was
innocent of the charges. The proverb "the wicked flee even when no man pursueth,
but the innocent are as bold as a lion" (Prov. 28:1) has been adopted as rule of
evidence, 23 but there is no rule holding the converse. Accused-appellant probably did
not think his offense would be discovered, especially since it appeared he had
succeeded in silencing his very young victim. As already stated Arlene did not
complain because she had been threatened with harm by accused-appellant.
Accused-appellant assails his conviction for the crime of attempted rape on the
ground that the testimony of the complainant was uncorroborated. The rule is clear
that the lone testimony of the victim in the crime of rape, if credible, is sufficient to
sustain a conviction. By the nature of rape the only evidence that oftentimes is
available is the victim's own declaration. 24 Testimonies of rape victims who are young
and immature are credible. This is especially true where the victim has no motive to
testify against the accused. 25 As we said in People v. Manzana, 26 no woman,
especially one of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an
examination of her private parts and expose herself to humiliation as a result of a
public trial if she is not motivated solely by a desire to vindicate her honor.

Besides, Arlene's narration of the incident on August 15, 1982 was corroborated by
her younger brother. Aris testified that he saw accused-appellant on top of his sister;
that Arlene's skirt was raised up to her waist and her panty removed; and that he saw
accused-appellant's penis when accused-appellant stood up. Aris' testimony may be
nebulous in some portions, but this could be due to lack of clarity in the questions
themselves. Aris was only five (5) years old at the time he testified. Rather than
exhibiting untruthfulness his testimony shows candor and lack of guile or
prevarication. Thus the lack of definiteness in his statement as to the time he played
hide-and-seek with his sister, whether it was daytime or nighttime, whether the fact
that accused-appellant went on top of her sister was not part of their game or whether
he actually saw his father hit accused-appellant does not detract from the substance
of his testimony.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION
that the indemnification to the victim, Arlene Tan, is increased to P50,000.00 for the
crime of rape and P10,000.00 for the crime of attempted rape.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 117684 January 30, 1997

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CLODUALDO CABILLAN, accused-appellant.
VITUG, J.:
An information, dated 21 October 1992, filed with the court a quo charged Clodualdo Cabillan
with rape, to wit:
That on or about August 7, 1992, in the Municipality of Sto. Tomas, Province
of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, by means of force and intimidation, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of Alienaven
Aida Devaras, against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 1
The plight and traumatic experience in the early life of private complainant Alienaven Aida
Devaras was recounted in the decision 2 of the trial court.
Alienaven, born in Manila on 29 April 1977, was an illegitimate child of Bienvenida Devaras.
Some time in 1980, she and her mother moved to the Davao Penal Colony ("DAPECOL") where
the latter met and later married Clodualdo Cabillan, an inmate. The marriage, contracted in 1983
between Clodualdo and Bienvenida, saw the birth of the couple's children, namely, Agronoemi,
Clodualdo, Jr. and Rommel. Following Clodualdo's release from prison in 1988, the family
started to reside in Sto. Tomas, Davao.
Upon attaining the age of eleven years, Alienaven began to be subjected to sexual abuse by her
stepfather. The attack on her virtue kept on for about two or three times a week. The threat on
her life had gagged her for years but the incident on 07 August 1992, the subject matter of the
information, was to be the last straw. On that day of 07 August 1992, while Bienvenida, then a
laundry woman, was doing her daily washing at the house of a neighbor, Clodualdo returned
home from a billiard game. He found Alienaven, by then already fifteen years of age and a HighSchool sophomore, going through her school work. He told Agronoemi, Clodualdo, Jr., and
Rommel to leave the house and to play at the creek. Once the children had left, Clodualdo
started to make his sexual advances on Alienaven. Alienaven resisted but, frightened by the
double-bladed knife wielded by her stepfather, she, once again, was unable to fend the bestial
act.
This time, however, Alienaven had enough courage to seek the assistance of Ella Caballero, an
employee of the Department of Social Welfare and Development ("DSWD"). She also had
herself medically examined. The results disclosed these findings:

1. Old healed lacerated wounds at the 7:00 o'clock and 10:00 o'clock of the
hymen;
2. Admits three (3) fingers of the examinee into the vagina with ease. 3
Clodualdo denied the charges. He cited various reasons, reiterated in this appeal and
hereinafter discussed, why he could not have committed the offense charged.
On 12 July 1994, the trial court convicted the accused. The dispositive portion of the decision
read:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Clodualdo Cabillan guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE, punishable under Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, the court hereby sentences said accused to suffer a
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, together with the accessory penalties
provided by law, to pay the costs, and is hereby further ordered to indemnify
the victim by the way of moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00, in
accordance with the current case doctrine of the Supreme Court.
SO ORDERED. 4
The Court, in this appeal, sees no sound reason to overturn the conviction. Certainly, looking at
the records, the trial court cannot be faulted for giving credence to the testimony of private
complainant. Alienaven's account of the incident, delivered straightforwardly, was narrated in a
manner that is typical of young victims of rape. Thus
Q You said you were in your house at Menzi, Sto. Tomas, what were you doing at that
time, at 10:00 o'clock in the morning?
A I was studying my lesson.
Q You were then in what year?
A Second year.
Q And where were you studying at that time?
A In Sto. Tomas Barangay High School.
Q While you were studying, where was your mother?
A My mother was out. She went to the house of Warny Bolences?
Q And what was your mother doing at the house of Warny Bolences?

A She went there to wash clothes.

A He just stood there.

Q How far was the house of Warny Bolences from your house?

Q How long did he stay near the creek?

A Maybe, one (1) kilometer.

A He did not stay long. He went back to the house.

Q How about your stepfather, the accused, where was he at that time?

Q And upon returning to your house, what did he do?

A He was in the Billiard Hall.

A When he went back to the house, he looked for my stepbrothers and sister and told
them to go to the creek because Danny and Noli were there.

Q Where was that Billiard Hall located?

Q And after the young children left the house, what did your stepfather say and do?
A In Menzi, near the basketball court.
Q How far is that basketball court from your house?

A He told me, while your brothers and sister are away, let us have sexual intercourse
immediately.

A It's about 25 meters.

Q And what was your answer?

Q What time did your mother leave in your house?

A I said, I don't and because I was studying.

A At around 9:00 o'clock in the morning.

Q And how did your stepfather react to that?

Q And while you were studying, who was with you in your house?

A He went down and came back and got angry.

A I was with my stepbrothers and a stepsister.

Q You said, came back, got angry, what did he do to you?

Q After your mother left, what time did your stepfather return to your house?

A He pulled me to the division.

A At around 10:00 o'clock in the morning.

Q What kind of division was that?

Q And upon returning to your house, what did he do?

A A division which he put a stick and a blanket.

A He went to the creek.

Q And while inside that division, what did he do to you?

Q Where is this creek located in relation to your house?

A He covered my mouth and told me "don't shout or else I will kill you.

A In the lower part of our house.

Q And what happened next?

Q Your house stands near a creek?

A He removed my panty.

A Yes, Sir.

Q What were you wearing at that time?

Q And what was your stepfather doing, standing by the creek?

A A skirt.

Q Did he remove all your dress?

Q And while he was having intercourse with you, where did he place this knife?

A No, only my panty.

A On my side.

Q And after getting your panty, what did he do to you?

A He undressed himself.

Q You said a while ago that when your younger brothers and sister left the house,
your stepfather said let us make a quick fuck, was there a time that you were fucked
by your stepfather?

Q And then what did he do?

A Yes, Sir.

A He placed on top of me.

Q At what age or in what year that your stepfather first had intercourse with you?

Q And after that, what did he do to you?

A When I was 11 years old.

A He fucked me. He made me lie down and try to pull my legs apart.

Court:

Q Pulling your legs apart, what did he do to you?

Q You describe it.

A He continued fucking me.

A When I was 11 years old, he did it to me standing and afterwards, he ordered me to

lie down. That was the first time he raped me.

Q When you said he fucked you, using the word "kayat," what did he do?
A He inserted his penis into my vagina and pushed and pulled it.
Q How long?
A Less than three (3) minutes.
Q After three minutes, what happened?
A After he fucked me, I told him "watch out I will tell my Mom" and he told me, "are you
not ashamed," and I told him, "Why? What I be ashamed? She is my mother."

Pros. Tirol:
Q How often when you were still 11 years old that your stepfather have intercourse
with you?
A Two or three times a week.
Q And you are saying this was the frequency between 1988 up to August of 1992?
A Yes, Sir.
Court:

Q You said you were forced by your stepfather in having sexual intercourse, does he
have weapon?

Q Did you not get pregnant?

A Yes, Sir, a double bladed knife.

A No.

Court Interpreter:

Q Why?

Witness demonstrating how long, which is 6 inches in length.

A I do not know.

Pros. Tirol:

Pros. Tirol:

Q Now, this matter, did you not report this to your mother?
A I revealed it once to my mother, but my mother forgive him.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

Q You said you were forcibly fucked on August 7, 1992, what made you to report this
incident to the authorities after four years of frequent intercourse?

Rape is horrible and nauseating. The crime is even more disgusting and infuriating when the
victim is a mental retardate who is incapable of giving intelligent consent to the sexual act.

A I can not swallow it anymore and if I will not give him, he will maltreat me. 5

This is an appeal from the Decision 1 dated September 2, 1991 of the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 171, 2 in Criminal Case No. 9370-V-89 convicting Accused
Rodolfo San Juan of the crime of rape, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, and ordering him to indemnify the offended party in the amount of P20,000.00 and to
pay the costs. 3

A young girl's revelation that she has been raped, coupled with her voluntary submission to
medical examination and her willingness to undergo public trial where she could be compelled to
give out the details of an assault on her dignity, cannot be so easily dismissed as mere
concoction. 6 Here, particularly, the person she has accused is her own stepfather. 7 It would be
highly improbable for a girl of her age to fabricate a charge so humiliating to herself and her
family as well had she not been truly subjected to the pain and the harrowing experience of
sexual abuse. 8

The Criminal Complaint, which was treated as the Information 4 after a preliminary investigation
had been conducted by Asst. Provincial Prosecutor Calixtro O. Adriatico, reads as follows:
The undersigned complainant, assisted by her father, accuses Rodolfo San
Juan of the crime of rape, penalized under the provisions of Art. 335 of the
Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:

The Court rejects the argument of accused-appellant that the rape could not have been
committed without thereby courting the curiosity of neighbors who live nearby. Lust is no
respecter of time and precinct; 9 it can be committed in most unlikely places 10 such as in a park,
along a roadside, within school premises, or even in an occupied room. 11

That on or about the 30th day of September, 1988, in the municipality of

Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused Rodolfo San Juan did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force, threats and
intimidation, have carnal knowledge of the offended party Vivian Enriquez, a
mentally retarded, (sic) against her will and consent.

Neither can the Court accept the averment that at an age of 62 years, accused-appellant would
be unable to indulge in the sexual act. Except for his self-serving testimony, there is utterly no
proof to support the claim. Accused-appellant has admitted that he suffers from no
ailment, 12 and that, in fact, he still does heavy work. 13
Appellant would, regrettably, even sullen the reputation of Alienaven by pointing to her supposed
sexual experience in the past not only with him but also with others. This attempt will not detract
the Court from the established fact that in the particular instance complained of, the sexual
congress has taken place against the will of the victim. 14
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against accusedappellant.

Contrary to law.
When arraigned, the accused, assisted by Counsel de Oficio Ricardo Neri, pleaded not
guilty. 5 After trial, the trial court found the accused guilty as charged. Hence, this appeal.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 105556 April 4, 1997

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RODOLFO SAN JUAN, accused-appellant.

The prosecution presented four witnesses: (1) the offended party and complainant Vivian
Enriquez, who gave an account of the rape; (2) the victim's father Vicente Enriquez, an
eyewitness to the crime; (3) Dr. Erlinda Ramos-Marfil, who testified on the mental condition of
the victim; and (4) Dr. Maximo Reyes, who testified on the results of his medical examination of
the victim.
Their testimonies were summarized by the trial court as follows:
VICENTE ENRIQUEZ, father of victim Vivian Enriquez, substantially
testified that his daughter Vivian who is 26 years old is mentally retarded.
That on September 30, 1988 between the hours of 6:00 and 6:30 in the

evening while he was by the window of his house tending to his grandchild
in the cradle, he was watching his daughter Vivian fetching water from a
communal water system located in front of his house. That he has been
keeping watch of his daughter Vivian because he received news that the
accused often called her. That after a while, he noticed that Vivian was no
longer in (sic) the faucet so he started to look for her. That he went to the
residence of his nephew about 10 meters away from the faucet but failed to
find Vivian there. That he returned home and accompanied by his son
Junior, they proceeded to a vacant house owned by the sister of the
accused about 3 to 4 meters away from his house and saw the accused on
top of the body of his daughter Vivian with the accused's penis inserted
inside the sex organ of his daughter Vivian. That Vivian's dress was raised
up to the shoulder and the hands of the accused were on the breast (sic) of
Vivian. That when the accused noticed them, the accused rose up, put on
his brief and short pants and jumped out of the window. That he and his son
Junior chased the accused but the accused jumped over the fence and they
failed to overtake him. That he returned to the house where he found Vivian
and the accused and asked Vivian to go home. That because of his anger,
he slapped Vivian and the latter revealed to him that she was often
threatened by the accused, placed his arms around her neck and
admonished not to shout. (sic) That Vivian informed him that the accused
had sexually abused him (sic) about five (5) times. That he went to the
house of the eldest sister of the accused where the accused was but the
latter did not come out so he went home. That after a while, accused called
him and invited him to the store. That he followed and while they were
walking, he told the accused, "Traidor kang kapitbahay" and the accused
boxed him twice. That he fell down to the ground and the accused's brotherin-law approached and kicked him. That his children came to his assistance
but the accused threw stones to (sic) his children. That he brought his
daughter Vivian to the Valenzuela District Hospital and then to the
Valenzuela Police Station. That Vivian was examined by the NBI.
xxx xxx xxx
VIVIAN ENRIQUEZ, substantially testified that in the afternoon of
September 30, 1988, she saw the accused in front of his house. That the
accused approached her and asked her to go with him to an empty house.
That the accused told her that if she will not go with him, her parents,
brothers and sisters will die. That inside the empty house, the accused
embraced her and asked her to lay (sic) down. That the accused removed
her panty and inserted his penis inside her organ. That she felt painful (sic).
That accused raised her upper clothes and embraced her tightly and had
sexual act with her. That her father saw them through the window of the
accused and the accused ran away. That her father slapped her and
brought her home. That the empty house is near the house of the accused
and near the public faucet. That she told the accused not to remove her
panty but the accused continued removing her panty. That she could not
resist because the accused was on top of her and her hands were not free
to move. That the accused touched her breasts and her sex organ and she
resisted because it was painful and told the accused she don't like (sic).

That the accused raped her several times before the incident at bar. That
while the accused was performing sexual act with her, she resisted and told
the accused "Wag na ho" and she slapped his arms. That she did not
continue to struggle while the accused was doing the sexual act because
she felt weak and her arms were painful and the accused held her hands.
On redirect, she said that she affixed her thumbmark on the complaint.
On Court's clarificatory question, she said that she attended school and
reached up to Grade V. That she cannot write her name without sample
from where she could copy. That she do (sic) not know her age and do (sic)
not know when she was born.
DRA. ERLINDA RAMOS-MARFIL, Psychiatrist and Officer-in-Charge of the
Neuro-Psychiatric Service of the NBI, testified that she examine (sic) and
evaluate (sic) mentally sick people referred to their section by the Medico
Legal Section of the NBI. That she conducted examination and made
evaluation on the mental condition of the victim Vivian Enriquez when she
was referred to their department by their Medico Legal Section. That victim
Vivian Enriquez is premature or childish in her ways and her mental age is
only of a five (5) years and ten (10) months old child. That her speech is
delayed and she is playful. That she can also be taught to do something and
relay things that she has experienced or happened (sic) to her. That victim
is suffering from mental retardation. That she prepared a Neuro-Psychiatric
Evaluation Report. That psychological test was conducted by Ma. Cynthia A.
Alcuaz who concluded that Vivian Enriquez is within the mentally retarded
group with a mental age of five years and ten months.
DR. MAXIMO REYES, Medico Legal Officer of the NBI, substantially
testified that he conducted examination on the person of the victim. That he
did not find physical injuries on the body of the victim on account of lapse of
time. That he found old healed hymenal laceration which under the normal
course could be caused by fully erected (sic) male organ. That the old
hymenal laceration was inflicted for a long time. That he prepared the Living
Case Report.
On cross-examination, he said that the old healed hymenal laceration could
have been inflicted more than three months ago. That hymenal laceration
could also be caused by instrumentation, horse or bicycle riding and
masturbation. 6
Version of the Defense
Against the prosecution's theory that Vivian was raped by Accused-appellant Rodolfo San Juan
in the empty house of his elder sister, the defense relies on denial, claiming that the accusedappellant spent almost half the day drinking tuba with his brothers-in-law and that, when he went
to his sister's house that afternoon, he slept on the floor because he was already very tipsy. He
claims not to have seen anybody else there.

The defense presented three witnesses, to wit: the accused himself, his brother-in-law Domingo
Jubilla, and Purificacion Roldan. Their testimonies were summarized by the trial court as follows:
Accused (herein appellant San Juan) substantially testified that on
September 30, 1988 from 9:00 in the morning, he was in his house and had
a drinking spree with his brothers-in-law Domingo Jubilla, Jaime Jubilla, Jr.
and Boy Jubilla up to 4:00 in the afternoon. That at about 4:00 in the
afternoon, he left his companions and went to a nearby fence and answered
to the call of nature. That the fence where he urinated is about 1 1/2 arms
length to the place where his companions where (sic). That because he was
drunk, he was not able to return to his companions and he went to the
house of his sister which is about two arms length from where his
companions were. That he was drunk that he could not stand without
support or hold on solid thing and cannot recognize the things before him
(sic). That upon entering the house of his sister, he almost stumbled down.
That the house of his sister has no partition and the windows are made of
glass and visible to the place where they had a drinking spree. That the
house is also visible to the house of Vivian Enriquez which is about two
arms length away. That he had not seen Vivian Enriquez. That the
communal water system is near the house of his sister and about 1 1/2
arms length from the place he urinated. (sic) That while urinating, he heard
voices of people coming from the communal water system. That he fell
asleep at about 4:00 in the afternoon and woke up between 5:00 and 6:00
in the same afternoon. That when he woke up, he went home and noticed
Vicente Enriquez and Junior Enriquez in their (Enriquez) yard. That when he
reached home, he took a bath and changed his clothes to go to his stall at
the "talipapa" in Dalandanan. That it is not true that he raped Vivian
Enriquez. That it is not also true that he was on top of Vivian and inserted
his sex organ inside her private part. That he was then sleeping. That there
was no occasion that (sic) Vicente Enriquez confronted him on that day.
That there was a misunderstanding that existed between him and Vicente
Enriquez and/or his children in the past because they envy (sic) him since
their (accused) financial standing improved. That there are (sic) times that
they fought with each other that resulted to (sic) bodily harm/physical
injuries.
PURIFICACION ROLDAN substantially testified that on September 30,
1988 between 5:00 and 6:00 in the afternoon she was at the artesian well
located along the roadside fetching water. That there were many people
fetching water at that time. That she the accused sleeping in the house of
his (accused) sister located about two meters away from the faucet with the
door and windows opened. (sic) That the accused was sleeping because he
was drunk. That she saw Vivian Enriquez entered (sic) the house and stood
(sic) inside the house and after about 30 seconds, her (Vivian) father and
Junior Enriquez arrived and took her. That the house of the sister of the
accused and the house of Vivian Enriquez is around four to five meters
away. That after Vivian was brought home, there was altercation between
Vivian's father Vicente and the accused. That they had a long time grudge
and she saw them having heated argument on the New Year of 1988.

DOMINGO JUBILLA substantially testified that on September 30, 1988 at

9:00 in the morning he was in the house of the accused at Isla, Valenzuela,
Metro Manila on occasion of the baptismal party of the child of his (witness)
elder brother Renato alias Boy held in the house of the accused because
his brother do (sic) not own yet a house. That upon arriving in the house of
the accused, he, his elder brother, the accused and the latter's elder brother
had a drinking spree at the terrace of the house of the accused that lasted
up to 5:00 in the afternoon. That at 5:00 in the afternoon, they left the
accused sleeping in the house of his sister about one house away to (sic)
the house of the accused. That he know (sic) that the accused was sleeping
because they located him upon his (accused) wife (sic) request and found
him sleeping inside his sister's house. That upon seeing the accused
sleeping, they prepared to leave and go home. That they left the house of
the accused at about 5:30 in the afternoon. That while in the house of the
accused, he saw Vicente Enriquez and Vivian in their house looking out
their window. 7
The Trial Court's Ruling
Granting full credence and probative weight to the prosecution witnesses' testimonies, the trial
court, on September 2, 1991, rendered its Decision convicting the appellant, viz.:
In sum, the Court is convinced beyond doubt of the existence and
commission of the offense. Vivian's mental deficiency, her lack of sufficient
discretion, judgment and moral courage to seriously resist was taken
advantage of by the accused who is experienced in the ways of life.
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Rodolfo San Juan guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense charged in the complaint, he is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with the
accessory penalties prescribed by law and to pay the costs.
Accused is hereby ordered to indemnify the offended party the sum of
P20,000.00. 8
SO ORDERED. 9
The Issues
In his appeal brief, appellant through Counsel Manuel A. Dalucapas
assignment of errors: 11

10

submitted the following

I
The lower court erred in giving full faith and credit to the testimonies of
complainant and her witnesses, while rejecting altogether the truthful and
credible testimony of accused-appellant which was corroborated by his
witnesses.

II
The lower court erred in convicting the accused-appellant despite the
prosecution's failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Ultimately, the errors assigned by the appellant may be reduced to the single issue of credibility
of witnesses.
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is unmeritorious.
Credibility of Witnesses
In deciding this appeal, the Court is guided by three well-entrenched principles in reviewing rape
cases, to wit:
(a) an accusation of rape can be made with facility and while the accusation
is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for the person accused, though
innocent, to disprove the charge;
(b) considering that, in the nature of things, only two (2) persons are usually
involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant should be
scrutinized with great caution; and
(c) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merit, and
cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence of
the defense. 12
The foregoing principles involve questions of fact and credibility of witnesses particularly that
of the offended party.
In a long line of cases, it has been held that "the assessment of the credibility of witnesses and
their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique opportunity
to observe the witnesses firsthand and note their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling
examination. These are the most significant factors in evaluating the sincerity of witnesses and
in unearthing the truth, especially in the face of conflicting testimonies. Through its observations
during the entire proceedings, the trial court can be expected to determine, with reasonable
discretion, whose testimony to accept and which witness to disbelieve. Verily, findings of the trial
court on such matters will not be disturbed on appeal unless some facts or circumstances of
weight have been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted so as to materially affect the
disposition of the case." 13 After a thorough scrutiny of the records of the case at bench, the
Court finds that the trial court did not err in giving full faith and credence to the testimonies of
Vivian and the other prosecution witnesses which it characterized as "clear, positive and
convincing." 14
Complaining Witness Credible

The mere fact that 26-year old Vivian had the mental development of a child 5 years and 10
months old does not lessen her credibility, since she has shown her ability to communicate her
ordeal clearly and consistently. Her steadfast account of the rape both on direct and crossexamination are replete with details that jibe on material points. Moreover, her testimony, taken
together with her father's, paints a convincing picture of the whole sordid incident. Her positive
identification of Rodolfo San Juan as the one who raped her is credible because she knew and
recognized Appellant San Juan, her neighbor.
Furthermore, Vivian's mental age lends credence to her testimony. Considering her childlike
naivete and innocence, it is indeed highly unlikely for her to testify so tenaciously and
convincingly on the details of the rape if she has not in fact suffered such crime at the hands of
appellant. It has been held that "no woman especially one who is of tender age would concoct a
story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts and thereafter permit herself to be
subjected to a public trial, if she is not motivated solely by the desire to have the culprit
apprehended and punished." 15
No Fixed Reaction to a Shocking Crime
The defense assails the credibility of Vicente and Vivian's testimonies by asserting that some
portions thereof are "at odd (sic) with natural human experience." 16 Vicente allegedly saw the
appellant raping his daughter for one or two minutes, yet he and his son 17 who was then with
him did not stop the alleged rape or utter a word of outrage. 18 Appellant argues further that "[i]f it
were true that she was raped and shouted for help, then the people present in the artesian well
fetching water should have heard her considering that the well is only 3 or 4 meters away from
the place of the incident. Experience has proved beyond cavil that when a lady is being abused,
she will shout on the top of her voice to attract the attention of the persons around the vicinity to
lend a helping hand. This is specially true in the present case considering that Vivian never
testified that the appellant covered her mouth during the incident." 19
After a thorough study of the records in this case, the Court is convinced that the reaction of
Vicente and his son, Junior, when they witnessed the rape of Vivian, is not contrary to human
experience as to be unbelievable. We have repeatedly ruled that "the workings of the human
mind placed under a great deal of emotional and psychological stress (such as during rape) are
unpredictable, and different people react differently. There is no standard form of human
behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling, frightful or traumatic
experience some may shout, some may faint, and some may be shocked into insensibility." 20
In People vs. Villaruel, 21 Appellant Villaruel assailed Eyewitness Rosaleo Cagado's "supposed
unusual behavior in just watching appellant assault his victim instead of putting a stop to it, or at
least calling for help." The Court ruled there that "(w)hile it may be true that Rosaleo Cagado
acted in a rather odd manner, he could not be faulted for being indecisive. There is no standard
rule by which witnesses to a crime may react thereto." (Emphasis supplied.) In the present case,
that Eyewitnesses Vicente and Junior had probably been shocked into inaction at the sight of
Appellant San Juan raping Vivian should not detract from the credibility of their testimonies.
Nonetheless, it should be observed that Vicente and his son subsequently recovered from their
shock and sprang in pursuit of the appellant. This may be gleaned from the testimonies of both
father and daughter. Vivian testified to the following:

FISCAL VICENTE:
That is very fair to the witness, I am only asking if (she) had seen her father.
COURT:
Witness may answer.
WITNESS:
A I saw him through the window.
xxx xxx xxx
Q How about Mang Rudy, what did he do when he saw your father through the
window?

Corollarily, in stating that he watched the rape for one or two minutes, Vicente did not
necessarily determine the duration on the basis of a timepiece. He merely gave an estimate of
what then felt to him to be one or two minutes. His subjective sense of time under such
distressful circumstances cannot be deemed exactly accurate.
Equally bereft of merit is the argument of the defense that Vivian's testimony is incredible.
Appellant contended that her alleged cries for help would have been heard by the people
fetching water from the artesian well just three or four meters from the nearby house. But as the
Solicitor General astutely and correctly states, "(b)eing a mentally retarded woman, and in a
state of shock and surprise, Vivian may have mistaken her plea for help as loud outcries albeit in
truth, her voice was muffled." 24 Her voice could have been silenced by shock. This was
supported by the fact that at no instance did Vivian testify that her mouth had been covered by
appellant.
Parenthetically, that the rape took place in a house with people nearby does not diminish the
credibility of Vivian's rape charge. "In a long line of rape cases, the Court has held that rape can
be committed even in places where people congregate, in parks, along the roadside, within
school premises and even inside a house where there are other occupants or where other
members of the family are also sleeping. Lust is no respecter of time and place."25

A When Mang Rudy saw my father, he ran away. 22

Hymenal Laceration Not Vital to Proving Rape
This confirms the following testimony of Vicente:
Q What happened when you arrived at that house finding your daughter and the
accused in that position and appearance?
A Then he rose up and put on his pair of short pants his brief and short pants and
jumped out of the window.
Q What did you do when you saw the accused jumped out of the window?
A We chased him.
Q When you said "we", who was your companion in chasing the accused?
A My son Junior.
Q Where did the accused go?
A He jumped over the fence, I did not follow him anymore and he proceeded to his
house.
Q What did you do when you desisted from chasing the accused up to his house?
A I returned to the place where my daughter was. 23 (Emphasis supplied.)

The defense submits that "Dr. Maximo Reyes, the Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI who
conducted the medical examination on the victim, . . . ruled out the commission of rape on the
date complained of and alleged in the Information instituted by the Fiscal. The victim was
examined on October 1, 1988 whereas, the alleged commission of the rape took place on
September 30, 1988. And Dr. Reyes found out that the injury in the hymen of the victime ( sic)
was inflicted more than three (3) months before the medical examination." 26
This argument does not defeat Vivian's assertion that Appellant San Juan raped her that fateful
afternoon. We reiterate the well-settled doctrine that ". . . lack of lacerated wounds does not
negate sexual intercourse. Moreover, the fact that hymenal lacerations were found to be 'healed
round edge' and that no spermatozoa was found does not necessarily negate rape. A freshly
broken hymen is not an essential element of rape. For that matter, in crimes against chastity, the
medical examination of the victim is not an indispensable element for the successful prosecution
of the crime, as her testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict the accused thereof," 27 as
in this case. The fact that Vivian had an old, healed hymenal laceration only gives credence to
her testimony that she was raped several times before by the appellant. 28
Mental Retardate Incapable of Giving Consent
The mere fact that Vivian was mentally retarded, the defense argues, "should not work
against the appellant as the former is a normal person after
all." 29 In support of this contention, the defense cites the testimony of prosecution
witness and psychiatrist, Dr. Erlinda Martin:
Fiscal Vicente: (To the witness)

Q We would like to solicit your opinion on this matter whether a person although 26
years old but with a mental state of 5 years and 10 months child, can resist seriously a
sexual abuse on her person?

otherwise unconscious are absent. The victim has the mentality of a child
below seven years old. If sexual intercourse with a victim under twelve
years of age is rape, then it should follow that carnal knowledge with a
seventeen-year old girl whose mental age is that of a seven year old child
would constitute rape. 30 (Emphasis supplied.)

A She has a mental age of 5 years old, but she can be placed in equal footing to a
normal person. (TSN, December 17, 1990, p. 13).
The defense then quotes from her cross-examination as follows:
Q Now if your actual age is 26 but your mental age is 5 years old only, is there still
coherency (of) action or intelligence in the answer that you can extract from the
subject?
A Yes, that would be equivalent to her mental age (TSN, December 17, 1990, p. 24).
xxx xxx xxx
Q Now, in layman's language, please explain to us your findings on the subject that
she is coherent.

In any case, Dr. Martin's assertions support the earlier conclusion regarding the admissibility of
Vivian's testimony in view of the quality of her perceptions and her ability to communicate these
to the court.
No False Accusation of Rape
The contention of the defense that "the complaint was initiated merely because of the long time
grudge by Vicente Enriquez on (sic) the appellant," 31 deserves scant consideration. We reiterate
that "it is unnatural for a parent to use her offspring as an engine of malice, especially if it will
subject a daughter to embarrasment and even stigma." It is plainly inconceivable that Vicente
would expose his mentally retarded daughter Vivian, whom he had loved and cared for through
the years, to the travails and indignities accompanying a rape trial out of mere spite for his
neighbor Rodolfo San Juan over some petty spats. Indeed, it is improbable that a father would
prejudice his own daughter if he "was not motivated by an honest desire to have the culprit
punished." 32

A Coherent is tama ang sinasabi (TSN, December 17, 1990, pp. 25-26).
Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence
Dr. Martin's testimony that Vivian was coherent and able to communicate her perceptions on the
stand cannot in any way support the submission that she was a "normal person" capable of
giving lawful consent to a sexual intercourse. The defense overlooked well-entrenched doctrines
laid down by this Court, to wit:
The issue . . . that a mentally retarded woman could not have given valid
and legal consent to the sexual act is not new. In the case of People
vs. Manlapaz, 88 SCRA 704, We held that the victim, 13 years old at the
time of the commission of the act but with the mentality of a 5-year old child,
"is incapable of giving rational consent to the carnal intercourse." And in the
case of People vs. Gallano, 108 SCRA 405, the judgment of conviction by
the trial court was affirmed by Us because complainant Victoria Micaller,
who was then 31 years old at the commission of the act but had the
mentality of a 7-year old child, "is a retardate or one mentally ill, such that
she was incapable of offering any effective or real resistance to appellant's
sexual assault (p. 407, Id.). . . Her mental condition was such that she
would not resist sexual advances because she was so deprived of reason to
make any effective resistance. Hence, by being so deprived, the act is made
possible in the same way when there is active resistance but same is
overcome by force and threat, which is the essence of the crime of rape (p.
413, Id.).
Assuming that complainant . . . voluntarily submitted herself to the bestial
desire of appellant still the crime committed is rape under paragraph 3 of
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code. This is so even if the circumstances
of force and intimidation, or of the victim being deprived of reason or

In sum, the Court finds Vivian's testimony, together with the testimonies of the other witnesses of
the prosecution, overwhelmingly straightforward, logical and convincing as to be worthy of belief
and impervious to a mere denial by Appellant San Juan. "It is a well-settled rule that an
affirmative testimony is far stronger than a negative testimony, especially so when it comes from
the mouth of a credible witness . . ." 33
Therefore, we agree with the trial court that the evidence for the prosecution has proved beyond
reasonable doubt that Appellant Rodolfo San Juan is guilty of the crime of rape. This conclusion
is reached pleno jure. However, the indemnity of P20,000.00 awarded by the trial court to Vivian
must be increased to P50,000.00 pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence. 34
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED and the questioned Decision of the trial court, finding
Appellant Rodolfo San Juan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and imposing
on him the penalty of reclusion perpetua is hereby AFFIRMED. The indemnity in favor of
Complainant Vivian Enriquez is hereby INCREASED to fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00).
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 126367 June 17, 1999

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
DIONISIO MONFERO y SOLTE, accussed-appellant.

In all these three (3) cases to pay the sum of P20,000.00 as Attorney's fee
and to pay the cost.
SO ORDERED. 2

ROMERO, J.:

The facts, as established by the prosecution, are as follows:

Hell hath no fury like a woman scorned." On this adage, the accused-appellant erects the
foundation of his defense. By presenting his victim, the complainant herein, as a spurned lover
driven by blind rage and jealousy to concoct rape charges against him, accused-appellant
attempts to impress upon this Court that whatever sexual relations he and the complainant had
were purely consensual and voluntary. We are not persuaded.

In January 1992, private complainant Mary Jane Calinagan, a thirteen-year old barrio lass living
with her mother and sister in Siniloan, Laguna, was a Grade V student at the Siniloan
Elementary School. At that time, accused-appellant Dionisio Monfero alias Harold Monfero was
also residing with Mary Jane's family together with his live-in partner Vangie Vargas, a friend of
Mary Jane's mother.

Dionisio Monfero alias Harold Monfero was indicted before Branch 33 of the Regional Trial Court
of Siniloan, Laguna for three (3) counts of rape committed on January 6, 23, and 30, 1992
respectively. Except for the time and date, the three informations filed against Monfero and
docketed as Crim. Cases Nos. S-1456, S-1457, and S-1458, were identically worded as follows:

On January 6, 1992, Mary Jane was alone in their house resting as she was then afflicted with
smallpox. 3 At around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, accused-appellant Monfero arrived and
asked about the whereabouts of her mother and Vangie Vargas. Mary Jane replied that her
mother was at the house of Atty. Salvador Reyes watching "betamax" while Vangie was in
Balian, Pangil, Laguna making paper mache. After learning that Mary Jane was alone in the
house, accused-appellant suddenly embraced her and forcibly removed her pair of shorts and
panty. He covered her mouth with his arm and pushed her near the stairs. Being sick, she could
not resist his advances successfully. As he held her down, he removed his pants and brief and
laid on top of her, causing her pain as he inserted his penis into her vagina. When he was done,
accused-appellant got up and used a T-shirt to wipe his penis and her vagina. It was then that
Mary Jane saw that she was bleeding. Before he left, Monfero threatened to kill her, her mother,
and her sister if she reported the incident. Her mother returned home at 4:00 o'clock in the
afternoon while Monfero's live-in partner, Vangie, arrived at 7:00 o'clock that evening. Afraid that
the accused would carry out his threat, Mary Jane kept silent about her ordeal. 4

That on or about . . . o'clock in the afternoon of January . . ., 1992 at

Barangay G. Redor, Municipality of Siniloan, Province of Laguna and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with lewd
design and by means of force and violence, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with one MaryJane P.
Calinagan, a 14 year old girl against her will and consent to her damage
and prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 1
On arraignment, accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty to each of the informations.
Hence, the cases were consolidated for trial. In a decision dated January 27, 1995, the trial court
convicted and sentenced accused-appellant as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding
accused DIONISIO MONFERO y SOLTE alias HAROLD MONFERO Guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the three (3) crime (sic) of rape as charged.
In Criminal Case No. S-1456 to undergo imprisonment of RECLUSION
PERPETUA and to pay the victim the amount of P30,000.00 as moral
damages.
In Criminal Case No. S-1457 to undergo imprisonment of RECLUSION
PERPETUA and to pay the victim the amount of P30,000.00 as moral
damages.
In Criminal Case No. S-1458 to undergo imprisonment of RECLUSION
PERPETUA and to pay tile victim the amount of P30,000.00 as moral
damages.

On January 23, 1992, Mary Jane was again violated by Monfero. At around 2:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, accused-appellant arrived at her house and finding her alone, he again forced himself
on her. In her attempt to free herself from the accused, her shorts and T-shirt were torn. After
removing her shorts and panty, Monfero pushed Mary Jane near the stairs and placed himself
on top of her while at the same time kissing her and touching her breasts. She continued to fight
him but as before, she did not succeed for he was too strong for her. Mary Jane testified that,
unlike the first sexual assault, the second rape caused her less pain and she did not bleed as
much. In both instances, however, accused-appellant was able to penetrate her. 5 After satisfying
his lust, Monfero left but not without warning her not to report the incident to anyone.
The third rape happened on January 30, 1992 at around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon. Being
alone in their house, as before, Mary Jane was once again abused by Monfero. In a standing
position, accused-appellant tried to insert his penis into her vagina but did not succeed in
penetrating her. Before he left, he threatened her again.
It was only in June 1992 that Mary Jane told her mother about her ordeal in the hands of
Monfero. Eugenia Paguinto, noticing that her daughter was gaunt and pale, compelled the latter
to reveal the dastardly acts of the accused. No formal complaint was immediately filed as
Eugenia got sick and had to be hospitalized. Upon learning of the rapes, however, Eugenia
drove Monfero and Vangie out of their house. 6

On July 13, 1992, Mary Jane's uncle, Federico and her grandfather accompanied her to the
General Cailles Memorial Hospital where she was examined by Dr. Aurora Cantara. The
physical examination revealed that Mary Jane's hymen had healed lacerations at 3 o'clock and 9
o'clock and her vagina admits a finger with minimum resistance.

Jane vividly narrated how accused-appellant raped her on three occasions. Thus, on direct
examination, she testified:

Thereafter, on July 17, 1992, Mary Jane assisted by her mother filed the three complaints for
rape. While the case was pending trial, relatives of the accused-appellant offered to settle the
cases filed against Monfero and even proposed that the latter and Mary Jane get married. Mary
Jane refused even as her mother was open to the proposition at first. Later, however, Eugenia
decided to support her daughter in her decision to pursue the rape charges.

Q And when this accused Harold Monfero arrived at your residence in Brgy. G. Redor
Street, Siniloan, Laguna, what did he ask you if any?

Accused Dionisio Monfero alias Harold Monfero, 31 years old at the time of the trial and single,
was making a living as a tricycle driver when he committed the alleged rapes. For his part,
Monfero claims as his defense that he and Mary Jane were sweethearts and that whatever
sexual relations they had were purely voluntary and consensual. He testified that he first met
Mary Jane on October 10, 1991 when she happened to board his tricycle on her way home with
her sister Annabelle. Upon reaching their house, Mary Jane told accused-appellant that she
wanted to introduce him to her mother. Since then, he became a regular visitor of Mary Jane,
courting her for about three months until they became sweethearts. Monfero further claimed that
during said courtship, he became close to Mary Jane's mother, even calling her "biyenan." In
fact, he contended, it was with Eugenia's consent that he and Mary Jane lived together as
husband and wife from January to July 1992. He likewise maintained that he was the one who
paid for Mary Jane's tuition fee at Laguna State Polytechnic College where she was enrolled as
a first year high school student.
According to Monfero, during the time they lived together, he and Mary Jane had sexual
intercourse almost every day. He claimed that many people knew about their cohabitation his
fellow tricycle drivers, his neighbors in Bgy. Isla, even Mary Jane's family, including her mother
who often visited them at Bgy. Isla to bring food.
As to why Mary Jane filed the complaints for rape against him, Monfero explained that she was
driven by jealousy because she had suspected that he was having an affair with Vangie Vargas.
Moreover, he added, Mary Jane's mother got mad at him when she learned that the wedding
plans could not push through as he did not have enough money to pay for the expenses.
To corroborate accused-appellant's claims, the defense presented a signed resolution signed by
the members of the Tricycle Drivers Association of Pangil, Laguna attesting to the fact that
Monfero and Mary Jane indeed cohabited from January to July 1992. The defense also
presented Monfero's mother, the president of the tricycle drivers association, Vangie Vargas, and
some of his neighbors as witnesses to support Monfero's version of the facts.
At the outset, worth recalling are the three guiding principles in rape prosecutions. First, an
accusation for rape is easy to make, difficult to prove and even more difficult to
disprove. Second, in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime, the testimony of the complainant
must be scrutinized with utmost caution. And third, the evidence of the prosecution must stand
on its own merits and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the evidence of the defense. 7

Atty. Fadul

A He asked me about my mother's whereabouts and I informed him that my mother

was in the house of Atty. Reyes watching betamax.
Q And how about the live in partner of Harold Monfero, where was she on that time?
A She was in Balian making pap(i)er mache.
Q What did Harold Monfero do after asking those questions and you answered him?
A He suddenly embraced me.
Q Aside from embracing you, what else did he do to you?
A He removed my short(s) and panty Afterwards, he covered my mouth with his arm.
Q And did you exert effort to evade him?
Atty. Bellosillo
Leading, Your Honor.
Court: May answer.
A Yes, sir.
Atty. Reyes
Q What did you do when you said you resisted him?
A I tried to evade him by removing his hands. But he pushed me near the stairs.
Q Were you able to put aside his hands?
A Because during that time I was very weak because of my small pox.

With these principles in mind, this Court finds no cogent reason to reverse accused-appellant's
conviction. As shown in the transcripts of her testimony, on direct and cross examination, Mary

Q And afterwards, what happened next when you were pushed according to you?

A I went near our stairs and the accused placed himself on top of me while I was
resisting but I was not able to evade him because he was very strong.

A After he removed my short and panty, he put off his pants and brief.
Q Aside from lying on top of you, what else did he do to you?
Q And after removing his pants and brief, what did he do?
A He kissed my neck and at the same time touching my bust.
A He laid on top of me.
Q How long (did) Harold Monfero laid (sic) on top of you?
Q And after lying on top of you, what did he do?
A Around five to seven minutes sir.
A He inserted his penis inside my vagina and it was very painful. There was blood. I
do not know if he was already finished with his desire when he rose and got a Tshirt and used it in wiping his penis and my vagina and threatened me that if I will
report the matter, he will kill me, my mother and my sister.

Q Do you know whether the sexual intercourse have been committed (sic) by the
accused and you?
A I do not know.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Was there blood after the sexual intercourse?
Q How about on January 23, 1992 at about 2:00 in the afternoon, where were you?
A Also in our house.

A During the first time that he abused me, there was blood, plenty, but the second time
he abused me, only few drops of blood.

Q And did you have any visitor on that date and hour?

Q Did the accused (leave) after the sexual intercourse (with) you?

A None sir.

A Before he left, he threatened to kill me, my mother, my brother and in addition

thereto, he threatened to kill my uncle as well as Atty. Reyes.

Q How about accused Harold Monfero?

xxx xxx xxx
A He was there.
Q What happened if there was anything?

Q How about on January 30, 1992, more or less 3:00 in the afternoon, did you have
occasion to see Harold Monfero alias Dionisio (sic)?

A He again abused me.

A Yes, sir.

Q When you said he again abused you, what did he do specifically?

Q What transpired there, when Harold Monfero arrived?

A He removed my short(s), panty, lady sando and he removed his pants and brief.

A He went inside our house while looking outside (sic) and I told him not to go inside
anymore but he approached me and touched my shoulder.

Q How did he remove your short(s) and panty, will you inform the Court?

Q Did you consent with (sic) the touching of your shoulder?

A He forcibly removed my short(s) while I was resisting, in the process, the automatic
was cut off and he was able to remove my T-shirt which was torn.

A No, sir because it was very painful.

Q After removing your short(s) and panty, what did the accused do next?

Q What else did he do with you aside from touching your shoulder?

A While he was holding my shoulder, he opened the (zipper) of my pants and removed
my pants and panty and he removed his pants.

A Yes, Your Honor.

Court: More or less on the first incident, what time did it (take) place?

Q Aside from his pants, what did he remove?

A Around 3:00 in the afternoon Your Honor.
A No more.
Q (What) (a)bout the second time?
Q You mean to say he has no brief?
A More or less 2:00 in the afternoon Your Honor.
A I have said already that he removed his pants as well as his brief.
Court: The third time?
Q After removing his pants and brief, what did he do to you?
A 3:00 in the afternoon.
A He embraced me and while we were standing by the door, he inserted his penis
inside my vagina.
Q You mean to say you were in the standing position?
A Yes, sir.
Q Was he able to have his penis penetrate your private part?
A No, sir.
Q And how long did he have this thing done to you?
A For a short time only sir.
Court: After that, what else happened?
A He did not threatened (sic) me anymore because I did not report the first and
second threat but he said that he will push through with his threat if I will report the
matter.

xxx xxx xxx 8

From the evidence adduced at the trial, there is no dispute that Mary Jane is no longer a virgin.
A medical examination of her genitalia revealed healed hymenal lacerations. In fact, the accused
himself admitted having had carnal knowledge of Mary Jane but he denied having raped her,
claiming that she consented to have sex with him as they were living together as husband and
wife from January to July 1992.
Well settled is the rule that when an alleged victim of rape says she was violated, she says, in
effect, all that is necessary to show that rape has been inflicted on her and so long as her
testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis
thereof. 9 Certainly, no woman, especially one who is of tender age, would concoct a story of
defloration, allow an examination of her private parts and thereafter permit herself to be
subjected to a public trial if she is not motivated solely by the desire to have the culprit
apprehended and punished. 10
With respect to the first and second sexual assaults, Mary Jane was certain that Monfero was
able to penetrate her. In fact, she testified that she bled after each of the two rapes. As for the
third rape, however, Mary Jane was unsure whether there was penetration or not, but she said
she felt his penis touch her vagina. Thus, on cross examination, Mary Jane narrated:

A No, Your Honor.

Q On the 3rd occasion, January 30, 1992, you said that

was around 3:00 in the afternoon, you said that the
accused allegedly was not able to insert his penis at
(sic) your vagina, is it not correct?

Court: (What) (a)bout in the first incident?

A I felt that his penis touched my vagina.

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q That was only what you felt Miss witness, can you
say that the penis was not able to go inside your
vagina?

Court: In that incident, was he able to insert his penis to your private part?

Court: (What) (a)bout in the second incident?

A I do not know whether he was able to insert it or not, I

just felt that it was touching my vagina.

the trial court is bereft of any finding that Mary Jane is a girl of loose morals as the accusedappellant holds her out to be.

Q So, you were changing your answer that the accused

was not able to insert his penis in your vagina because
you felt that it only touched your vagina?

On the other hand, the "sweetheart theory" propounded by the defense hardly convinces the
Court that accused-appellant is entitled to an acquittal. In the first place, Monfero's version of the
facts is simply incredible. As Monfero would have us believe, Mary Jane introduced him to her
mother the same day they first met and three months later, agreed to live and have sex with him.
That a thirteen-year old barrio lass would voluntarily have a relationship with a man more than
twice her age is already hard enough to conceive. Even harder to accept is the claim that the
girls mother consented to it. Certainly, these circumstances do not conform to reality. As the
Solicitor General put it, evidence to be believed, must not only come from a credible source but
must also be credible in itself. It must be natural and in conformity with human experience.

A He was able to insert it sir. 11

Considering that Mary Jane is obviously an ingenue barely out of puberty and considering also
their relative positions at that time, it is understandable that she was unable to categorically state
whether or not accused-appellant was able to penetrate her fully. One thing she was sure about
though was that Monfero's penis touched her vagina as he attempted to insert it into her genital.
Well settled is the rule that full penetration of the vaginal canal is not an essential element of
rape. The slightest introduction of the male organ into the labia of the victim already constitutes
rape. 12
As for accused-appellant's claim that Mary Jane failed to show that she exerted sufficient
resistance to Monfero's sexual advances, it is enough to point out that, in rape cases, it is not
necessary that the victim should have resisted unto death. 13 Physical resistance need not be
established in rape when intimidation is exercised upon the victim and the latter submits herself,
against her will, to the rapist's embrace because of fear for life and personal safety. 14 Actual
resistance on the part of the victim is not an essential element of rape. What the victim should
adequately prove is the use of force or intimidation by the alleged rapist. In any case, from Mary
Jane's testimony during trial, it is clear that she tried to stop Monfero's advances during each of
the three assaults but her efforts proved futile as her strength was no match to his.
Furthermore, as held by this Court, the failure of the complainant to immediately report the rapes
to her family or to the police authorities does not detract from her credibility, her hesitation being
attributable to her age, the moral ascendancy of the accused-appellant and his threats against
the former. 15
Regarding the alleged inconsistencies in the statements made by Mary Jane before and during
trial, the same refer only to minor details that are not at all related to the incidents complained of.
The Court has held that the credibility of a witness is not impaired where there is consistency in
relating the principal occurrence and positive identification of the accused. Inconsistency on
minor details is insignificant. Rather than eroding the credibility of the witness, such difference in
fact constitutes a sign of veracity. 16
From the records, there is also nothing that would reveal that Mary Jane had a motive other than
to bring her rapist to justice and vindicate her honor. Worth noting is the fact that when Mary
Jane testified that her mother at first acquiesced to settle the case, she cried on the witness
stand. 17 Her tears clearly evinced her frustration over her mother's willingness to come to a
settlement. Besides, Mary Jane's sincere, straightforward and candid statements regarding the
details of her rape by the accused-appellant hardly indicate that she was just weaving a tall tale
to secure a conviction. It is doctrinal that the evaluation by the trial court of the testimony of a
witness is accorded the highest respect because it has the direct opportunity to observe the
witness' demeanor on the stand and determine if she is telling the truth or not. 18 The decision of

As to Monfero's claim that Mary Jane and her mother fabricated the rape charges because they
suspected that he was having an affair with Vangie Vargas and because he did not have enough
money to finance his wedding to Mary Jane, the same strains one's credibility. Even when
consumed with hate and revenge, it would take a certain degree of moral depravity for a girl to
concoct a story, publicize occurrences that cast a stain on her honor, and drag her entire family
to shame just to sate her need for vengeance. As for Mary Jane's mother, it is unnatural for a
parent to use her offspring as an engine of malice if it will subject her to embarrassment and
even stigma. 19Moreover, as the Court ruled in a similar case,"(n)o mother would stoop so low as
to subject her daughter to the hardships and shame concomitant to a rape prosecution just to
assuage her own hurt feelings. It is unthinkable that a mother would sacrifice her daughter's
honor to satisfy a grudge, knowing fully well that such an experience would certainly damage her
daughter's psyche and mar her entire life. A mother would not subject her daughter to a public
trial with its accompanying stigma on her as the victim of rape, if said charge is not true." 20
Regarding the document signed by Monfero's fellow tricycle drivers attesting to the fact that he
and Mary Jane lived together as husband and wife from January to July 1992, the same has no
probative value because, as the Solicitor General correctly observed, it was not subscribed to
before a person authorized by law to take sworn statements. Neither was the attestation affirmed
by the signatories on the witness stand.
Although the president of the "tricycle drivers" association, Rene Gabatan, was presented as
defense witness to identify the said certification and to testify about Monfero and Mary Jane's
alleged relationship, his testimony hardly helped in exculpating the accused-appellant. In the first
place, according to Gabatan, the said certification was prepared and signed at the request of
accused-appellant's mother. Second, the transcripts of Gabatan's testimony clearly show the
inconsistencies in his statements. For instance, Gabatan earlier testified that he knew that
Monfero and Mary Jane were living together as husband and wife in accused-appellant's house
in Brgy. Isla. However, on further questioning, he admitted that he had never been to Monfero's
house and that he only saw the latter and Mary Jane riding the tricycle together and on another
occasion, when Mary Jane allegedly accompanied Monfero to one of the association's
meetings. 21 Furthermore, on cross-examination, he completely changed his answers to the
questions propounded to him after being reminded that he could be held liable for perjury if he
lied. Thus,
Court: And you know for a fact that if you are telling a lie before this Court, you will be
punished for perjury?

A I know that, sir.

Q You are very sure that you saw Harold Monfero and Mary Jane Calinagan in the
month of January 1992?
A I saw them sir.

Q How come you testified before this Court that they are living together as husband
and wife?
A I just said that they were together on a tricycle.
Court: But you have not informed this Court that they were living together as husband
and wife?

Q You will not change your answer?

A I did not said (sic) that, your Honor.
A I cannot tell whether it was in January 1992.
xxx xxx xxx

Q But you always see them from the period of January up to July that the accused
and the victim were together?

Court: How about on February, 1992?

A Sometimes. 22

A Not always, sir.

The defense presented other witnesses and evidence to support accused-appellant's

"sweetheart theory," but the trial court did not give credence to the same and we find no reason
to hold otherwise. All told, it appears that the alleged love affair between Monfero and Mary Jane
is but a mere fabrication by the former to exculpate himself from the rape charges filed against
him. In a similar case where the "sweetheart theory" was also used as a defense, the Court
ruled that the absence of love notes, mementoes or pictures casts doubt on the accused's claim
that he and the victim were sweethearts. 23 Being an affirmative defense, the allegation of a love
affair must be supported by convincing proof. This accused-appellant failed to do. In any case,
being sweethearts does not prove consent by the complainant to the sexual act. 24 A love
relationship, even if true, will not necessarily rule out force. 25

Q But you used to see Harold Monfero and the victim Mary Jane Calinagan together
in a tricycle?

In view of the circumstances of this case, we find that the accused-appellant is guilty of all the
charges under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code:

A I am not sure. I think it was in the month of May because I called for a meeting
during that month, your Honor.
(On Redirect)
Q Mr. witness, you stated that you used to see Harold Monfero and the victim Mary
Jane Calinagan always together in a tricycle, is that correct?

A Not very often, sir.

Art. 335. When and how rape is committed Rape is committed by having
carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

Q Can you still recall Mr. witness, how often did you see the accused and Mary Jane
Calinagan together?

1. By using force or intimidation;

A I do not remember because the incident does not call my attention. I do not mind
them together.

xxx xxx xxx

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

Court: How about in the house of Harold Monfero, have you seen them together?
xxx xxx xxx
A No, your Honor.
Atty. Gatdula: But you know that the victim resides also in the house of Harold
Monfero?
A I know nothing about that.

As regards the civil liability of the accused-appellant, the award of P30,000 in moral damages
should be increased to P50,000 for each count of rape in line with current
jurisprudence. 26 In People vs. Prades, 27 we held that "the fact that complainant suffered the
trauma of mental, physical and psychological sufferings which constitute the bases for moral
damage are too obvious to still require the recital thereof at the trial by the victim, since the
Court itself even assumes and acknowledges such agony on her part as a gauge of her

credibility. What exists by necessary implication as being ineludibly present in the case need not
go through the superfluity of still being proved through a testimonial charade.
Moreover, accused-appellant is likewise liable to pay his victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for
each rape committed.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby DENIED and the judgment of the
lower court is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that for each of the three counts of rape,
accused-appellant is ordered to pay the victim P50,000 as civil indemnity and P50,000 as moral
damages. Costs against the appellant.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 118441-42

January 18, 2000

ARMANDO JOSE y PAZ and MANILA CENTRAL BUS LINES (MCL),

represented by its General Manager MR. DANILO T. DE
DIOS, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ROMMEL ABRAHAM, represented by his
father FELIXBERTO ABRAHAM, JOSE MACARUBO and MERCEDES
MACARUBO, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision1 of the Court of Appeals, reversing the
decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 172, Valenzuela, Metro Manila and ordering
petitioners to pay damages for injuries to persons and damage to property as a result of a
vehicular accident.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Manila Central Bus Lines Corporation (MCL) is the operator-lessee of a
public utility bus (hereafter referred to as Bus 203) with plate number NVR-III-TB-PIL
and body number 203. Bus 203 is owned by the Metro Manila Transit Corporation and
is insured with the Government Service Insurance System.1wphi1.nt
On February 22, 1985, at around six o'clock in the morning, Bus 203, then driven by petitioner
Armando Jose, collided with a red Ford Escort driven by John Macarubo on MacArthur Highway,
in Marulas, Valenzuela, Metro Manila. Bus 203 was bound for Muntinlupa, Rizal, while the Ford
Escort was headed towards Malanday, Valenzuela on the opposite lane. As a result of the
collision, the left side of the Ford Escort's hood was severely damaged while its driver, John
Macarubo, and its lone passenger, private respondent Rommel Abraham, were seriously injured.
The driver and conductress of Bus 203 rushed Macarubo and Abraham to the nearby Fatima
Hospital where Macarubo lapsed into a coma. Despite surgery, Macarubo failed to recover and

died five days later. Abraham survived, but he became blind on the left eye which had to be
removed. In addition, he sustained a fracture on the forehead and multiple lacerations on the
face, which caused him to be hospitalized for a week.
On March 26, 1985, Rommel Abraham, represented by his father, Felixberto, instituted Civil
Case No. 2206-V-85 for damages against petitioners MCL and Armando Jose in the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 172, Valenzuela.
On July 17, 1986, the spouses Jose and Mercedes Macarubo, parents of the deceased John
Macarubo, filed their own suit for damages in the same trial court, where it was docketed as Civil
Case No. 2428-V-86, against MCL alone. On the other hand, MCL filed a third-party complaint
against Juanita Macarubo, registered owner of the Ford Escort on the theory that John
Macarubo was negligent and that he was the "authorized driver" of Juanita Macarubo. The latter,
in turn, filed a counterclaim for damages against MCL for the damage to her car. Civil Case No.
2206-V-85 and Civil Case No. 2428-V-86 were consolidated and later tried jointly. The facts, as
found by the trial court, are as follows:
In Civil Case No. 2206-V-85, the Court heard the testimonies that during the night
previous to the accident of February 22, 1985 at 6:15 a.m., Rommel Abraham and
John Macarubo were at a party. There was therefore, no sleep for them,
notwithstanding testimony to the contrary and the service of drinks cannot be totally
discounted. After the party at 11 p.m., while both Rommel and John were enroute
home to Valenzuela from La Loma, the car encountered mechanical trouble and had
to be repaired as its cross-joint was detached. The defect of a cross-joint is not minor
and repair thereof would as testified to by Rommel lasted up to early dawn and the car
started to run only after five o'clock in the morning. With lack of sleep, the strains of a
party still on their bodies, and the attention to the repair coupled with the wait until the
car was ready to run, are potentials in a driver for possible accident. The accident
happened at 6:15 a.m. when the physical and mental condition of the driver John
Macarubo was as expected not too fit for the driving as he could not anymore control
the car. The desire to be home quick for the much needed sleep could have prompted
him to overtake the preceding vehicle.
Indeed the pictures taken of the two vehicles (Exh. 1, 2 and 3) will clearly show that
the MCL bus was at its proper lane and not in an overtaking position while the car
driven by John Macarubo was positioned in a diagonal manner and crossed the line of
the MCL, which is an indication of an overtaking act. If it were the bus that was
overtaking at the time, the car would have been thrown farther away from the point of
the impact.
The court is convinced of the close supervision and control of MCL over their drivers,
and its exercise of due diligence in seeing to it that no recklessness is committed by
its employees, drivers especially, from the unrebutted testimonies of Cesar Cainglet.
The Court noted the respective damages of the two vehicles especially the point of the
impact. From these damages as shown by the picture, it can be clearly deduced which
vehicle did the bumping. It was the car driven by John Macarubo that hit the MCL
which was on its right and correct lane.2

Based on the foregoing facts, the trial court rendered judgment on September 28, 1989,
dismissing both civil cases against MCL and ruling favorably on its third-party complaint against
Juanita Macarubo, ordering the latter to pay MCL P54,232.12 as actual damages, P24,000.00
for lost income, and P10,000.00 as attorney's fees.
Rommel Abraham, the Macarubo spouses, and third-party defendant Juanita Macarubo then
appealed to the Court of Appeals which, on December 21, 1994, rendered a decision reversing
the decision of the trial court. It held (1) that the trial court erred in disregarding Rommel
Abraham's uncontroverted testimony that the collision was due to the fault of the driver of Bus
203; (2) that the trial court erred in relying on photographs (Exhs. 1-3) which had been taken an
hour after the collision as within that span of time, the positions of the vehicles could have been
changed; (3) that the photographs do not show that the Ford Escort was overtaking another
vehicle when the accident happened and that John Macarubo, its driver, was negligent; and (4)
that MCL failed to make a satisfactory showing that it exercised due diligence in the selection
and supervision of its driver Armando Jose. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and the defendants-appellees MCL
and Armando Jose are adjudged to pay jointly and severally:
1. Rommel Abraham, represented by his father Felixberto Abraham:
(a) P37,576.47 as actual damages;
(b) P50,000.00 as compensatory damages;
(c) P15,000.00 as moral damages;
(d) P5,000.00 as exemplary damages; and
(e) P10,000.00 as attorney's fees.
2. The heirs of John Macarubo:
(a) P50,000.00 as indemnity for his death;
(b) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
(c) P10,000.00 as exemplary damages; and

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioners MCL and Armando Jose raise four issues
which boil down to the question whether it was the driver of Bus 203 or that of the Ford Escort
who was at fault for the collision of the two vehicles.
It is well-settled that a question of fact is to be determined by the evidence offered to support the
particular contention.3 In the proceedings below, petitioners relied mainly on photographs,
identified in evidence as Exhibits 1 to 3, showing the position of the two vehicles after the
collision. On the other hand, private respondents offered the testimony of Rommel Abraham to
the effect that the collision took place because Bus 203 invaded their lane.4
The trial court was justified in relying on the photographs rather than on Rommel Abraham's
testimony which was obviously biased and unsupported by any other evidence. Physical
evidence is a mute but an eloquent manifestation of truth, and it ranks high in our hierarchy of
trustworthy evidence.5 In criminal cases such as murder or rape where the accused stands to
lose his liberty if found guilty, this Court has, in many occasions, relied principally upon physical
evidence in ascertaining the truth. In People v. Vasquez,6 where the physical evidence on record
ran counter to the testimonial evidence of the prosecution witnesses, we ruled that the physical
evidence should prevail.7
In this case, the positions of the two vehicles, as shown in the photographs (Exhs. 1 to 3) taken
by MCL line inspector Jesus Custodio about an hour and fifteen minutes after the collision,
disputes Abraham's self-serving testimony that the two vehicles collided because Bus 203
invaded the lane of the Ford Escort and clearly shows that the case is exactly the opposite of
what he claimed happened. Contrary to Abraham's testimony, the photographs show quite
clearly that Bus 203 was in its proper lane and that it was the Ford Escort which usurped a
portion of the opposite lane. The three photographs show the Ford Escort positioned diagonally
on the highway, with its two front wheels occupying Bus 203's lane. As shown by the photograph
marked Exhibit 3, the portion of MacArthur Highway where the collision took place is marked by
a groove which serves as the center line separating the right from the left lanes. The photograph
shows that the left side of Bus 203 is about a few feet from the center line and that the bus is
positioned parallel thereto. This negates the claim that Bus 203 was overtaking another vehicle
and, in so doing, encroached on the opposite lane occupied by the Ford Escort.
Indeed, Bus 203 could not have been overtaking another vehicle when the collision happened. It
was filled with passengers,8 and it was considerably heavier and larger than the Ford Escort. If it
was overtaking another vehicle, it necessarily had to accelerate. The acceleration of its speed
and its heavy load would have greatly increased its momentum so that the impact of the collision
would have thrown the smaller and lighter Ford Escort to a considerable distance from the point
of impact. Exhibit 1, however, shows that the Ford Escort's smashed hood was only about one
or two meters from Bus 203's damaged left front. If there had been a great impact, such as
would be the case if Bus 203 had been running at a high speed, the two vehicles should have
ended up far from each other.

(d) P10,000.00 as attorney's fees.

In discrediting the physical evidence, the appellate court made following observations:
Costs against the appellees.
SO ORDERED.

We cannot believe that it the car which overtook another vehicle and proceeded to the
lane occupied by the bus. There was a traffic jam on the "bus lane" while traffic was
light on the "car lane." Indeed, we find it inconceivable that the car, occupying the lane

without any traffic, would overtake and traverse a heavy traffic lane.9 (Emphasis
supplied.)
This is correct. However, the fact remains that when the Ford Escort finally came to a stop, it
encroached on the opposite lane occupied by Bus 203.

A: It was cut, ma'am.

Q: You were able to repair that cross-joint 12:00 o'clock and you were able to run and
reached this place of accident at 6:00 o'clock?
A: No, we we're not able to get spare parts, ma'am.

Significantly, Rommel Abraham testified that on February 21, 1985, the night before the
accident, he and John Macarubo went to a friend's house in La Loma where they stayed until 11
p.m.10 Abraham's explanation as to why they did not reach Valenzuela until six o'clock in the
morning of the next day when the accident happened indicates that the Ford Escort careened
and slammed against Bus 203 because of a mechanical defect. Abraham told the court. 11

Q: Why were you able to reach this place at 6:00 o'clock?

A: We went home and look for the spare parts in their house, ma'am.

ATTY. RESPICIO:

Q: House of Macarubo?

Q: I am sorry, Your honor. After leaving Arnel's place where did you go?

A: Yes, ma'am.

ROMMEL ABRAHAM

Q: So you were able to repair the car?

A: We proceeded in going home, sir.

A: Yes, ma'am.

Q: You were on your way home?

Q: What time were you able to repair the car?

A: Yes, sir.

A: Around 5:00 o'clock in the morning, sir.

Q: What time did you . . . I will reform the question. You met the accident at about 6:00
o'clock the next day, 6:00 o'clock in the morning the next day, did it take you long to
reach BBB?

Q: You were able to replace the cross-joint or what?

A: Our car had a mechanical trouble somewhere at 2nd Avenue, sir.

Q: How?

Q: What kind of trouble?

A: The cross-joint were welded in order to enable us to go home, ma'am.

A: The cross-joint were detached, sir.

Q: No spare parts was replaced?

Q: Are you familiar with cars?

A: No, ma'am.

A: A little, sir.
COURT:
Q: What time was that when you have this cross-joint problem?
A: About 12:00 o'clock perhaps, sir.
Q: What happened to the cross joint?

A: Ginawaan ng paraan, ma'am.

Thus, as Rommel Abraham himself admitted, the Ford Escort's rear cross-joint was
cut/detached. This mechanism controls the movement of the rear tires. Since trouble in the
cross-joint affects a car's maneuverability, the matter should have been treated as a serious
mechanical problem. In this case, when asked if they were able to repair the cross-joint,
Abraham said "Ginawaan ng paraan, ma'am," by simply welding them just so they could reach
home. His testimony indicates that the rear cross-joint was hastily repaired and that, at most, the
kind of repairs made thereon were merely temporary; just enough to enable Abraham and
Macarubo to reach home. Given such fact, the likelihood is that while the Ford Escort might not
have been overtaking another vehicle, it actually strayed into the bus' lane because of the
defective cross-joint, causing its driver to lose control of the vehicle.

The appellate court refused to give credence to the physical evidence on the ground that the
photographs were taken an hour after the collision and that within such span of time the bus
could have been moved because there was no showing that the driver left the scene of the
accident. This is not correct. Constancia Gerolada, Bus 203's conductress, testified that,
immediately after the collision, she and bus driver, petitioner Armando Jose, took the injured
driver and passenger of the Ford Escort to the Fatima Hospital. 12 This fact is not disputed by
private respondents.
Rommel Abraham mentioned in his appellant's brief in the appellate court a sketch of the scene
of the accident allegedly prepared by one Patrolman Kalale, which shows Bus 203 to be
occupying the Ford Escort's lane. However, the records of this case do not show that such a
sketch was ever presented in evidence in the trial court or that Patrolman Kalale was ever
presented as a witness to testify on the sketch allegedly prepared by him. Under Rule 132, 3 of
the Rules on Evidence, courts cannot consider any evidence unless formally offered by a party.
Finally, the appellate court also ruled that MCL failed to make a satisfactory showing that it
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its bus
driver, Armando Jose.13 Under the circumstances of this case, we hold that proof of due
diligence in the selection and supervision of employees is not required.
The Civil Code provides in pertinent parts:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is
no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this chapter.
Art. 2180 The obligation imposed in Art. 2176 is demandable not only for one's own
acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not
engaged in any business or industry.
xxx

xxx

xxx

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage.
Thus, the responsibility of employers is premised upon the presumption of negligence of their
employees. As held in Poblete v. Fabros:14

on the part of the employer. This is the presumed negligence in the selection and
supervision of the employee. The theory of presumed negligence, in contrast with the
American doctrine of respondent superior, where the negligence of the employee is
conclusively presumed to be the negligence of the employer, is clearly deducible from
the last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code which provides that the
responsibility therein mentioned shall cease if the employers prove that they observed
all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damages (12 Manresa, 657;
Balica vs. Litonjua and Leynes, 30 Phil. 624; Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co., 30 Phil.
768), as observed in the same cases just cited.
Therefore, before the presumption of the employer's negligence in the selection and supervision
of its employees can arise, the negligence of the employee must first be established. While the
allegations of negligence against the employee and that of an employer-employee relation in the
complaint are enough to make out a case of quasi-delict under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, the
failure to prove the employee's negligence during the trial is fatal to proving the employer's
vicarious liability. In this case, private respondents failed to prove their allegation of negligence
against driver Armando Jose who, in fact, was acquitted in the case for criminal negligence
arising from the same incident.15
For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the appellate court erred in holding petitioners liable to
private respondents. The next question then is whether, as the trial court held, private
respondent Juanita Macarubo is liable to petitioners.
Art. 2180 of the Civil Code makes the persons specified therein responsible for the quasidelicts of others. The burden is upon MCL to prove that Juanita Macarubo is one of those
specified persons who are vicariously liable for the negligence of the deceased John Macarubo.
In its third-party complaint, MCL alleged that Juanita Macarubo was the registered owner of the
Ford Escort car and that John Macarubo was the "authorized driver" of the car. 16 Nowhere was it
alleged that John Macarubo was the son, ward, employee or pupil of private respondent Juanita
Macarubo so as to make the latter vicariously liable for the negligence of John Macarubo. The
allegation that John Macarubo was "the authorized driver" of the Ford Escort is not equivalent to
an allegation that he was an employee of Juanita Macarubo. That John Macarubo was the
"authorized driver" of the car simply means that he drove the Ford Escort with the permission of
Juanita Macarubo.
Nor did MCL present any evidence to prove that Juanita Macarubo was the employer of John
Macarubo or that she is in any way liable for John Macarubo's negligence under Art. 2180 of the
Civil Code. For failure to discharge its burden, MCL's third-party complaint should be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and the complaints filed in
Civil Cases Nos. 2206-V-85 and 24428-V-86 against Manila Central Bus Lines and Armando
Jose, as well as the third-party complaint filed in Civil Case No. 2206-V-85 against Juanita
Macarubo, are hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.1wphi1.nt

[I]t is such a firmly established principle, as to have virtually formed part of the law
itself, that the negligence of the employee gives rise to the presumption of negligence

G.R. No. 118828 & 119371

February 29, 2000

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
HENRY LUGARTO Y PETILLA and ERNESTO CORDERO y
MARISTELA @ "Booster," accused-appellants.

Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Medico-Legal Office to autopsy Angels body.3 Said office also
issued a Certificate of Identification of Dead Body,4 which was signed by Romezen. The autopsy
was conducted by NBI Medico-Legal Officer Ludivino J. Lagat, who concluded that Angel Alquiza
died due to multiple stab wounds and traumatic injuries. The severity of her injuries were vividly
described in Autopsy No. N-94-1553,5 thus:

PER CURIAM:

POSTMORTEM FINDINGS

On 31 January 1995, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 47, per Judge Lorenzo B.
Veneracion, handed down a judgment in Criminal Case No. 94-138071 and Criminal Case No.
94-138138, finding accused-appellants Henry Lagarto y Petilla (hereaffer LAGARTO) and
Ernesto Cordero y Maristela (hereafter CORDERO) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of raping
and slaying seven-year old Alquiza y Lagman (hereafter Angel) in the early hours of 2 August
1994. They were initially sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in each with
damages. In our Decision of 12 October 1995 in G.R. Nos. 119987-88 (319 Phil. 364), a special
civil action forcertiorari filed by the Office of the Solicitor (OSG) questioning the propriety of the
sentence imposed, we ordered the court to impose the correct penalty prescribed by law in light
of its findings of and conclusions, i.e., the death penalty, subject to automatic review by us at
proper time.

Pallor, generalized.

Conformably with the decision in G.R. Nos. 119987-88, Judge Veneracion on 22 May 1996 an
Order correcting the sentence in Criminal Case No. 94-138071 and Criminal Case No. 94138138 and imposing the penalty of death. The Order was read in open court at the National
Penitentiary.

Incised wounds: 14.0 cms, left pre-auricular area up to the temple; 21.0 cms, vagina,
to the anus then to the sacral area with evisceration of the intestines, 2:0 cm. Knee.

Thereafter, the records of these cases were forwarded to us far automatic review, in accordance
with Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and Section 10, Rule 122 of the Rules
of Court.
The pertinent facts follow:
At 5:10 p.m. on 2 August 1994, PO3 Edgardo E. Ko of the Western Police District Command,
Directorate for Investigation, Crimes Against Persons Division, Philippine National Police,
Manila, received an information from PO3 Mabilisan of Station 11 that a dead body in a sack
was found at around 4:30 p.m. floating in the flooded street of Del Pan near the corner of
Lavizares St., Binondo, Manila. Residents discovered the corpse wrapped in a round yellow
tablecloth tied with a nylon cord inside a sack. The responding policemen PO3 Ko, SPO1
Edgardo Manuel, and PO3 Rosalie Fernandez noticed the victim's feet and left hand
protruding from the sack and round yellow tablecloth. They untied the sack and nylon cord and
saw the victim, a young girl, wearing nothing but her duster, with gaping wounds on the left ear
and chin, her genitals lacerated, her eyes missing, and her head bashed in. They immediately
brought the body to the police morgue at Tres Amigos Memorial Chapel.1

Both eyes, missing.

Hematoma: 5.0 x 9.0 cms., and 5.0 x 17.0 cms., right and left inguinal area.
Abrasion: 4.0 x 5.0 cms., and 4.0 x 4.0 cms., periorbital area, right and left
respectively; 12.0 x 4.0 cms., left thigh; 19.0 x 20.0 cms., posterior chest wall.
Contused hematoma: 10.0 x 9.0 cms., left side of the neck to the clavicular area.

Fractures: Axial fractures of the skull, open, compound; mandibular bone; right femur,
upper third; 1st to the 10th ribs, anteriorly right and left.
Dislocation, left hip joint.
Liver multiple lacerations.
Stab wounds: all elliptical, clean-cut edges, with a sharp and a blunt extremities in
different orientations.
1) 2.5 cms., forehead, right side; directed backwards, involving the soft,
tissues; fracturing the temporal bone; then to the right-cerebral hemisphere;
with a depth of 7.0 cm.
2) 2.0 cms., temple, left side; directed medially; involving the soft tissues;
fracturing the temporal bone; then to the left cerebral hemisphere; with a
depth of 5:0 cm
3) 3.0 cms.; mandibular area, left side; fracturing the mandibular bone

A. certain Romezen Alquiza called the police station, inquiring about the body recovered from
Del Pan, Tondo, Manila, whose description matched his sister Angel who, had been missing
since the night of 1 August 1994. He was advised to proceed to the Tres Amigos Memorial
Chapel. Together with his mother Zenaida and some family members, Romezen went to said
mortuary to look at the body. Indeed, it was Angel Alquiza. 2 He then requested the National

Hemothorax, 500 c.c.

Hemoperitoneum, 1,100 c.c.

Brain Hemorrhagic with minor portion missing.

Visceral organs, pale.
Stomach, empty.

by SPO2 Enrico Miranda, a neighbor and occasional laundry client. She allegedly saw three
men molest and kill a little girl inside the warehouse of Mang Gorio during a downpour in the
early hours of 2 August 1994. When asked if she could recognize these men from a police lineup, she positively identified Lagunday and LAGARTO as two of the men who raped and killed
the girl.13 Her sworn statement, taken by PO3 Ko with the aid of SPO2 Miranda, who acted as
interpreter between the investigator and the hearing impaired, is hereunder substantially
reproduced:

CAUSE OF DEATH:
03. T.: Noong isang araw, petsa 2 ng Agosto 1994 . . . ano and nakita mo?
MULTIPLE STAB WOUNDS, TRAUMATIC INJURIES.
S.: Nakita kong bata saksak . . . takip ilong at wala panty.
REMARKS: Vaginal swab submitted to Chemistry Division for examination.
04. T.: Sino ito bata iyo kita?
PO3 Ko's Advance Information,6 which was based on his investigation of Zenaida Alquiza,
Rosalina Puno, Alicia de la Vega, Ligaya Cordero, Mario Blorecia, and Eliseo Sendiego,
disclosed that at around 9:30 on the night of 1 August 1994, Angel, a seven-year old Grade 2
student of the Rosario Almario Elementary School and a resident of 1200 Sunflower St., Tondo,
Manila, went out to buy champorado from a store at nearby Kagitingan St. When she did not
return after some time, the members of her family searched for her in the neighborhood, but they
did not find her. At around 1:25 p.m. of 2 August 1994, they reported her missing to the police.
Rosalina Puno, the owner of he store at 1144 Kagitingan St., said that Angel did drop by her
store at around 9:30 p.m. to buy,champorado and ate it there before heading home via
Bougainvillea7 St. Said street is adjacent to Sunflower St. and leads to Tagumpay St., a dimly lit
area used by CORDERO and his wife Ligaya as a parking space for their pedicabs.8
One of said pedicabs, "No. 14," was driven by a certain Abundio Lagunday on 1 August 1994 but
was found the following day abandoned and covered with cartons and plastics at the comet of
Kagitingan and Salvacion Sts., near the junk shop of the late Mang Gorio (Mauro Gregorio).
Because of this, Ligaya Cordero was invited by the police on 3 August 1994 to answer some
questions.9 Mario Blorecia, a scavenger and a friend of Lagunday, said the latter, who appeared
nervous (balisa), came to him at around 6:30 p.m. on 3 August 1994, left the pedicab to his care
(kasi nagkahulihan), and immediately departed after covering the pedicab with scraps of carton
and plastic. They both used to work at the junk shop of Mang Gorio, which was later converted
into a warehouse.10

S.: Hindi kilala pero liit lang. . .

05. T.: Saan mo kita bata saksak at takip bibig at ilong?
S.: Doon marami lata at saka plastic.
06. T.: Kanino ito lugar o sino may ari?
S.: Gorio.
07. T.: Saan ito lugar?
S.: Kagitingan.
08. T.: Ano pa iyo kita o dinig?
S.: Kita ko bata takip ilong, at tali bibig, sigaw siya, saksak sa leeg.

Follow-up investigation disclosed that around 9:30 p.m. on 1 August 1994, a certain Jose
Soriano of 1155 Kagitingan St. was buying a cigarette at Rosalina Puno's store when he saw
Angel with Lagunday (akay ni Lagunday) at the corner of Bougainvillea and Kagitingan Sts. He
did not think she was in any trouble because he knew Lagunday sometimes picked up Angel
from school.11

09. T.: Kita mo ba kung sino ang gawa nito sa bata?

Based on these pieces of information, Lagunday was arrested on 4 August 1994 as the primary
suspect in the case. During custodial investigation, and after he was apprised of his
constitutional rights, Lagunday admitted his culpability and pointed to two other men as his
cohorts, namely, @ "Boboy" and @ "Boyet." In the ensuing investigation, Lagunday also
positively identified LAGARTO as one of companions on that fateful night. 12

S.: Oo.

A major breakthrough in the case was provided by a 50-year old widow and laundry woman by
the name of Herminia Barlam, who was accompanied to the Homicide Section on 4 August 1994

S.: Tatlo.
10. T.: Kilala mo sila?

11. T.: Asan sila nayon?

S.: Declarant was pointing to and positively identifying . . . ABUNDIO LAGUNDAY . . .
and HENRY LAGORTE . . . . .

12. T.: Ano gawa nitong si Abundio sa batang babae?

S.: Sigaw ako lakas at palo nila ako kahoy.

S.: (declarant was demonstrating her fingers in a pumping motion and covering her
mouth).

23. T.: Sino palo sa iyo kahoy?

S.: Siya (declarant was pointing to and positively identified HENRY LAGARTO)

13. T.: Ito isang turo mo, ano gawa sa batang babae?
24. T.: Ano yari ng ikaw sigaw lakas?
S.: Saksak leeg batang babae (declarant was demonstrating with her right index finger
pointing to her neck.)

S.: Wala pansin akin, at ako iyak.

14. T.: Kilala mo ba ito dalawang turo mo?

25. T.: Ano pa iyo kita sa loob bodega?

S.: hindi kilala, pero isa Lando * takas, wale ipen.

S.: Iyak iyak bata tapos tigil na, patay na.

15. T.: Ano gawa Lando sa bata babae?

26. T.: Ikaw ba ay may asawa?

S.: Palo ulo bata kahoy kapal.

S.: Patay na.

16. T.: Ano gawa mo bago ikaw kita sila?

27. T.: Ano pangalan asawa mo?

S.: Ihi ako sa tabi bodega, kita ko sila butas.

S.: Tony.

17. T.: Asan na batang babae?

28. T.: Ilan anak mo?

S.: Patay na suot puti damit ganda.

S.: Dalawa.

18. T.: Ikaw silip sa butas, ano iyo kita?

29. T.: Anong pangalan anak mo?

S.: Bata babae saksak at kantot tatlo lalaki, at iyak iyak sigaw pa.

S.: Junior at Totoy.

19. T.: Sino kita mo kantot bata babae?

30. T.: Totoo ba sabi mo?

S.: Iyon sampal ko kanina (declarant was referring to ABUNDIO LAGUNDAY who was
slapped by the declarant during the line up)

S.: Totoo, hindi ako nanloloko.

20. T.: Ano oras mo kita ito?

S.: Alas 2 umaga, lakas ulan.
21. T.: Ano pa iyo kita?
S.: Bata patay at tali nila sako.
22. T.: Ano iyo gawa?

31. T.: Susumpaan mo ba ito?

S.: Oo.14
As the inquest continued, more suspects were brought in for questioning, namely, the following
persons implicated by Lagunday: Rolando Manlangit y Mamerta @ "Lando," Richard Baltazar y
Alino @ "Curimao," and Catalino Yaon y Aberin @ "Joel." Accused-appellant CORDERO @
"Booster" was not initially implicated by Lagunday; hence, he was not indicted under the first
Information dated 8 August 1994. When they were in detention together, however, Lagunday
CORDERO as the mastermind 15 and pointed to Manlangit, Baltazar, and Yaon as their lookout.
CORDERO was further linked to the crime by a certain laundry woman named Ofelia Lagman,

who, having washed laundry for Corderos several times; allegedly remembered seeing on top of
their washing machine a round yellow tablecloth matching the one in which Angels body was
wrapped. She also confirmed that the Corderos had a round table with a glass top. 16 If further
appeared that CORDERO had previously raped his two daughters although no case was filed
against him.17
On the basis of these findings, criminal charges for rape with homicide were filed against the
suspects by the City Prosecutor's Office of Manila. The first information, dated 8 August 1994,
was filed on 10 August 1994 and was docketed Criminal Case No. 94-138071, entitled People of
the Philippines v. Abundio Lagunday, a.k.a. "Jr. Jeofrey," and Henry Lagarto y Petilla. It stated
thus:

CONTRARY TO LAW.19
Prior to arraignment, however, the court was informed by the prosecution that Lagunday had
been shot and killed while trying to grab the gun of one of his police escorts on 12 August
1994.20 Upon motion of the private prosecutor, Lagunday's name was dropped from the
information. His co-accused in Criminal Case No. 138071, LAGARTO, and other accused in
Criminal Case No. 138138, all pleaded "not guilty" to the charges. Thereafter, upon motion of the
prosecution,21 the two cases were consolidated.22
The prosecution relied mainly on the statements and testimonies of PO3 Ko, Dr. Lagat, Herminia
Barlam, Ofelia Lagman, and Rolando Javar.

That on or about August 2, 1994, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused,
conspiring and confederating together with one alias "LANDO", and other persons
whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and helping
one another, with treachery, taking advantage of their superior strength and nocturnity,
and Ignominy, and with the use of force and violence, that is, by taking ANGEL
ALQUIZA Y LAGMAN into a pedicab, and once helpless, forcibly bringing her to a
nearby warehouse, covering her mouth, slashing her vagina, hitting her head with a
thick piece of wood and stabbing her neck, did then and there wiifully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledged the person of said ANGEL ALQUIZA Y LAGMAN,
a minor, seven (7) years of age, against the latter's will and consent and on said
occasion the said ABUNDIO LAGUNDAY, a.k.a. "Jr. Jeofrey", HENRY LAGARTO Y
PETILLA, and one a.k.a. "LANDO" and others, caused her fatal injuries which were
the direct cause of her death immediately thereafter.

The testimony of PO3 Edgardo Ko merely replicated the contents of his Advance Information
dated 3 August 1994 (Exh. "K"), Progress Report 1 dated 5 August 1994 (Exh. "L"), and
Progress Report 2 dated 9 August 1994 (Exh. "M") on which the criminal informations were
based. He presented to the court some of the items recovered with the body of Angel, which
were marked as evidence for the prosecution, namely, a yellow tablecloth (Exh. "F"), a sack
(Exh. "I"), nylon cord, exh. "H"); a piece of embroidered cloth or crocheted curtain (Exh. "J"), and
a girl's (Exh. "G").23

CONTRARY TO LAW.18

Dr. Ludivino Lagat, NBI Medico-Legal Officer; autopsied the body of Angel on 2 August 1994,
after receiving a request for autopsy (Exh. "A") and examining certificate of identification (Exh.
"B"), both signed by Angel's brother Romezen. 26 His findings disclosed that Angel died due to
multiple stab wounds and traumatic injuries. Both of her eyes were missing. Dr. Lagat found,
among other injuries, two stab wounds on the head and one at the neck; a head fracture which
part of her brain was leaking out 27; severe head deformity due to force; an incised wound 21
centimeters long from the vagina to her anus up to the "sacral area with evisceration of the
intestines" caused by a "sharp bladed weapon."28

The other information, dated 11 August 1994 and filed on 12 August 1994, and docketed as
Criminal Case No. 94-138138, is entitled of the People of the Philippines v. Ernesto Cordero y
Maristela @ "Booster," Rolando Manlangit y Mamerta @ "Lando," Richard Baltazar y Alino
@ "Curimao," and Catalino Yaon y Aberin @ "Joel." Its accusatory portion reads:
That on or about the 2nd day of August, 1994, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the
said accused conspiring and confederating with ABUNDIO LAGUNDAY Alias "JR.
JEOFREY" and HENRY LAGARTO y PETILLA who have already been charged in the
Regional Trial Court of Manila of the same offense under Criminal Case No. 94138071, and helping one another, with treachery, taking advantage of their superior
strength and nocturnity and ignominy, and with the use of force and violence, that is,
by taking ANGEL ALQUIZA y LAGMAN into a pedicab, and once helpless, forcibly
bringing her to a nearby warehouse, covering her mouth, slashing her vagina, hitting
her head with a thick piece of wood and stabbing her neck, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the person of said ANGEL
ALQUIZA y LAGMAN, a minor, seven (7) years of age, against the latter's will and
consent and on said occasion the said accused together with their confederates
ABUNDIO LAGUNDAY Alias "JR. JEOFREY" and HENRY LAGARTO y PETILLA
caused her fatal injuries which were the direct cause of her death immediately
thereafter.

Even as the trial judge deplored the sloppy handling of evidence by the police and their lack of
control over the crime scene, 24 it was revealed during PO3 Ko's cross-examination that
CORDERO was investigated and attested on 8 August 1994 on the basis of Lagman's sworn
statements before the NBI and the police, not on Lagunday's verbal confession. 25

On cross-examination, the defense, banking on a "possibility" that some of injuries of Angel

might have been caused by other factors, suggested that Angel was ran over by a motor vehicle
before she was stabbed.29 When confronted about the absence of spermatozoa, Dr. Lagat said it
"could be due to soaking (of the body in floodwater). It could be washed out." And the body was,
indeed, washed at the Tres Amigos Memorial Chapel. Moreover, no spermatozoa was found
because "the area was expose(d) and there were some other things that were present in the
area like the intestine,"30 which spilled out of vagina.31
Ofelia Lagman, on whose statement CORDERO was initially arrested and investigated, testified
that when she heard the news about a child found dead in neighborhood, she inquired and
learned that it was Angel, her husband's niece. Angel had been missing since the night of 1
August 1994. She learned that the body had been taken to the Tres Amigos Memorial Chapel so
she immediately went there. The sight that greeted her shivers down her spine because the
round yellow tablecloth where Angels body was wrapped was familiar to her. She had seen one
just like it in the house of CORDERO, a neighbor whom she had known for four years so that

she was able to positively identify him in court, 32 and for whom she had done three-days' laundry
work in the last week of July 1994. She saw it on top of their washing machine, folded the way
round materials are folded. It was about a meter in diameter, made of a material like
linoleum.33 On 3 August 1994, she decided to share this information with NBI. Five days later, on
8 August 1994, she made a similar statement to the police.

and laundry woman to help support her family consisting of two sons. She has been
noted to function well in areas of self care and daily living. No assaultiveness (sic),
irritability nor destructiveness were reported. There was no history of previous
psychiatric consultation and treatment, nor history of alcohorism and prohibited drug
use.

Another key witness, Rolando Javar, a mason and resident of 1190 Tagumpay St., said that
between 9:30 and 10:00 in the evening of 1 August 1994, as he was going home in a pedicab,
he saw CORDERO and LAGARTO standing in front of the warehouse at Kagitingan St., as if
waiting for somebody. When he alighted in front of his house at Tagumpay St., he saw Lagunday
driving "Ernie Sidecar No. 14," with Angels as passenger.34 LAGARTO was one of the pedicab
drivers of CORDERO.35

MENTAL STATUS EXAMINATIONS:

On cross-examination, Javar said that he first told his story to Angel's mother Zenaida on 12
September 1994. She is his neighbor, while Ernesto CORDERO is his neighbor and balae, the
latter being the father of his son's wife. He was at first reluctant to tell Zenaida about what he
knew because of his relationship with the Corderos.36

Initial examination revealed an adult female, sthenic (sic), fairly kempt in a dress.
Behaved and cooperative, but severe deafness was obvious and questions had to be
repeated several times in a loud manner before she answered. She was able to state
her personal data accurately. She was oriented to time; place and person. She related
"kita bata babae" and indicated the height of the child with her hand. "Sinaksaksak"
and made a stabbing action with the forefinger at the throat of her companion, then
she made slashing motions on each of her arms and groin. She pointed at her right
eye, "tangal mata." She indicated that there were three men, one of them (she
indicated eye glasses) stabbed the victim, and that another took the victim's earrings.

Prosecution witness Herminia37 Barlam categorically pointed to CORDERO and LAGARTO as

among the three men (the other one being deceased Lagunday) she saw in the warehouse at
Kagitingan St. at around 2:00 a.m. on 2 August 1994. She witnessed how they stabbed the face
and genitals of Angel, hit her with a piece of wood, raped her as she bled, and eventually killed
her. She saw how they tied her hands and feet, wrapped her lifeless form in a yellow tablecloth,
and put her inside a sack. Because of her hearing impairment, however, the defense sought to
disqualify her on the basis of incompetence and repeatedly requested that she be taken to the
National Center for Mental Health (NCMH) to determine if she was competent to testify. 38 The
court initially denied 39 said motion but eventually granted40 it. Nevertheless, on 26 August 1994,
prior to her psychiatric evaluation, the court heard the testimony of Barlam. In essence, she said
she was Kagitingin St. at around 2:00 a.m. on 2 August 1994. She saw three men and a child
whose name, she later learned, was "Jingjing." One of the men saw her and asked her to be
quiet. This man hit her. Another man, who wore glasses, 41 stabbed the child and tied the sack
where the child's body was placed. She positively (and angrily) identified these two men as
LAGARTO and CORDERO. The third man was already dead.42

She explained that this happened at 3:00 A.M. ("alas tres, umuulan") and then
demonstrated that she was urinating at a bodega. She further demonstrated that one
of the men hit her with a piece of wood on her left elbow and knee , and showed her
scars. She was able to identify familiar objects, and was able to identify the 2 peso
coins, 10, 20, and 100 peso bills. She was able to do simple mathematic(al)
operations. She related that she is no longer staying at their house "baka ako patayin."
Mood was euthymic (sic), affect adequate.

On 27 September 1994, the NCMH submitted to the court its Report 43 on the phychiatric
evaluation of Herminia (Marina) Barlam. . . . signed by Dr. Benjamin D. Vista and Dr. Isagani S.
Gonzales. The following is a verbatim reproduction of its contents:

Patient was recommended to an ear specialist for assessment and fitting of a hearing
aid, after which psychological examinations were repeated and the patient reinterviewed.

She was next examined on August 29 and 31, 1994 when she was given a battery of
psychological tests. On interview, she gave the same account of what she saw
consistently, and expressed her irritation "paulit-ulit tanong." Attention span is short
and patient tends to confabulate when she unable to hear the question properly,
hence gives inconsistent answer at times. She is friendly and tends toward familiarity
with the interviewer, at times slapping the desk with her hand especially when
embarrassed. She tends to be anxious when many people are around.

GENERAL DATA:

PHYSICAL AND NEUROLOGICAL EXAMINATIONS:

MARINA DELOS SANTOS, 53 years old, female, single, Filipino, Roman Catholic,
unschooled, from 1267 Kagitingan St. Tondo, Manila brought for the first time to the
National Center for Mental Health on August 26, 1994 for examination.

(B)ilateral deafness, all other findings with normal limits.

BACKGROUND HISTORY:
From collateral interviews with relatives and friends, the patient has been deaf since
birth and has not been given any formal education. She has worked as a balut vendor

PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION RESULTS:

Evaluation shows that patient is classified as having moderate mental retardation
associated with deafness, which is characterized by a subaverage intelligence
quotient (between 35-55), but may achieve self-maintenance in unskilled or semi-

skilled work under sheltered conditions, but needs supervision and guidance when
under social or economic stress.
At present, she may be deemed competent based on the following finding: no
evidence of insanity of psychosis, a consistency in relating her story, she appreciates
the meaning of the oath she takes as a witness before the court, and is capable of
cooperating with counsel.
REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:
Because of her deafness and associated mental retardation, this patient is prone to
anxiety, panic and inconsistency when threatened by intimidation or a large crowd of
people.
The accuracy of her testimony will depend much on the cooperation of the people who
would examine her in court. Gubjonsson and Gunn (1982), as quoted in the Principles
and Practice of Forensic Psychiatry, state that "even a severely mentally handicapped
person may be capable of giving reliable testimony on items of basic fact," but "may
demonstrate a high degree of suggestibility when an individual was unsure of the
facts." For example, such patients may agree that the color of a green leaf is pink
when unsure of its real color, however, suggesting false perceptions that a pencil
being held is getting increasingly hot may not be successful.
An accurate testimony, therefore will depend much on an environment free distraction
and intimidations. (Emphasis ours)
On the basis of the NCMH report, Barlam was fitted with a hearing aid and testified anew on 3
October 1994. Her examination was marked by countless objections, comments, and arguments
of counsels. She began by saying that on the night of 1 August 1994, after drinking coffee, she
went near the warehouse at Kagitingan St. to relieve herself. While there, she sensed some
commotion inside so she peeped through a hole in the wall. She saw three men and a child. Two
of these men were in the courtroom and she identified them as LAGARTO and CORDERO. The
other one was already dead.44
Barlam was then shown six pictures of seven different girls (Exhibits "BB," "BB-1" to "BB-6").
She positively identified Angel Alquiza in one picture where angel was seated beside another
girl, both of them clad in "flower girl" attire.45 She added that one of the men hit her knee and left
elbow. They ordered her to leave, but she did not, so one of them hit her with a piece of wood.
Another man gouged out the child's eyes, cut off her ear, removed her earring, slashed her
vagina, then raped her. She said this man wore eyeglasses, all the while pointing at
CORDERO.46 After the child was raped, a man hit her head while another stayed by the door.
They tied her feet, wrapped her in some yellow material, then put her in sack. She pointed to
CORDERO as the man who wrapped the child in the yellow material. She even saw tears in the
child's eyes when she lit a small candle.47
On cross-examination Barlam declared that she already knew Angel before the incident of 2
August 1994 because, at one time when she was washing some laundry, she had seen Angel
eating porridge (lugaw). She noticed how pretty the girl was. On the other hand, she first saw

CORDERO on that fateful day.48 Barlam proceed to narrate that she saw Angel on her knees,
with CORDERO standing beside her while LAGARTO stood by the door. The man who was
already dead, Lagunday, saw her, told her to leave, and when she refused, went outside and hit
her with a piece of wood on the left knee and right elbow. CORDERO slashed the left side of
Angel's face twice, then her vagina, gouged out her eyes, and took off her earrings. Both
LAGARTO and Lagunday hit Angel's head with a piece of wood.49
On re-direct examination, Barlam maintained that CORDERO was the one who slashed Angel's
vagina then raped her. ("Hiwa dito hiwa dito, anunta, anunta, hiwa kiki, tanda na hiwa pa
kiki.")50 When she was asked to identify the man who hit Angel with a thick piece of wood, she
went straight to LAGARTO whom she slapped and boxed. 51 As the defense tried to derail this
witness by confronting her with her sworn statement where she described the man who hit Angel
with a piece of wood as a certain "Lando walang ipen," the prosecution clarified that while it is
true that one of the accused, Rolando Manlangit @ "Lando," in fact had no front teeth (bungal),
the sworn statement was prepared by PO3 Ko during the investigation conducted when she was
not yet wearing a hearing aid a statement she never read because she was illiterate. In any
case, the prosecution insisted that on the witness stand, Barlam was more than consistent in
specifying the participation of Lagunday, CORDERO, and LAGARTO. 52 The court also observed
that from a distance, LAGARTO looked as if his front teeth were missing. 53
After the prosecution had rested its case, the court, upon motion of PAO lawyer Atty. Jesse
Tiburan, and without opposition from the prosecution, discharged accused Manlangit, Yaon, and
Baltazar in Criminal Case No. 94-138138 for insufficiency of evidence. LAGARTO and
CORDERO, however, objected to the discharge of Manlangit on the ground that he was
allegedly identified by Barlam. In view of such objection, the court reconsidered its order with
regard to Manlangit, who, by counsel, waived the right to present evidence and prayed that the
case against him be deemed submitted for resolution.54
The defense of CORDERO and LAGARTO consisted mainly of denial and alibi. LAGARTO even
posed insanity as an alternative defense, but this failed to convince the trial court.55
CORDERO denied that he had anything to do with the rape-slay of Angel Alquiza. He
maintained that around 7:30 p.m. on 1 August 1994, he was at home talking to a certain Gerardo
Eriste, who was asking his help in borrowing money from an Indian moneylender. After Eriste left
around 9:30 p.m., he ate, rested, a video on television with his children for about an hour before
going to bed at about 11:00 p.m. He woke up at 7:00 a.m. the following day and began counting
the pedicab boundary money which he would remit to the Indian moneylender. On 3 August
1994, around 11:00 a.m., police arrived at his house, saying he was being invited by Maj.
Gacutan to the station. He denied any of knowledge of the incident in question, but he was
nevertheless instructed to stay in the office. In the afternoon, he accompanied Maj. Gacutan to
his house to see their dining table which had a glass top instead of a tablecloth. Then, they went
back to Station 2, where he stayed for about 12 hours, leaving around 1:00 or 2:00 in the
morning of 4 August 1994. He was allowed to leave because, apparently, he did not know
anything about the killing of Angel. On 7 August 1994, he was again invited to the police station.
There, Maj. Gacutan said he would be brought to the Homicide Section at UN Avenue because
they were being pestered by some members of the press. Maj. Gacutan even allegedly asked
some money in exchange for his liberty. While in detention with Lagunday, Manlangit, Yaon, and
Curimao, he learned that Lagunday implicated him upon the instance of two corpulent women
who had visited the latter and banged his banged his head on the wall. He was detained for
about 12 hours and left the station around 1:00 or 2:00 p.m. on 8 August. On cross-examination,

CORDERO said he was unaware of the warehouse at Kagitingan St., which is about ten blocks
from his house at Sunflower St. 56He also said that he did not know Lagunday prior to 8 August
1994, even if the latter was one of their pedicab drivers, because his wife was the one who dealt
with them.57
CORDERO's alibi was corroborated by his daughter Emily58 and Gerardo Eriste.59
Rebuttal witness Maj. Franklin A. Gacutan, however, claimed that on 4 August 1994, while
CORDERO was being questioned in relation to the case of Angel Alquiza, he told CORDERO he
could leave because they have not yet found any evidence against him. He also denied the
allegation that CORDERO was arrested because of media pressure and that the latter offered
him a bribe.60
On cross-examination, Maj. Gacutan said Lagunday did not implicate CORDERO or
LAGARTO,61 and it was Barlam who pointed to CORDERO when the latter was already in
detention.62 And in the early hours of 4 August 1994, he and his men, accompanied by
Lagunday, inspected the warehouse where the alleged crime took place. It was surrounded by
houses and some street lights were on. They entered the dark warehouse but found no
evidence. Peeping inside, nothing could be seen because of the darkness. 63
SPO2 Enrico Miranda was summoned to testify on the veracity of the sworn statement of
Barlam. Since they were neighbors and she laundered their clothes, they supposedly
understood each other using crude sign language. In the investigation conducted by PO3 Ko on
4 August 1994, he acted as interpreter between the latter and Barlam. The defense sought to
capitalize on said sworn statement, where Barlam did not mention either the name of LAGARTO
or CORDERO.64 Moreover, during the hearing of 17 August 1994, he allegedly saw Barlam
outside the courtroom talking to another woman who was showing to her a newspaper and
pointing to a picture of CORDERO, but he did not hear what they were talking about. 65 Another
witness, Gloria Sigua, corroborated this point and added that she had an argument with the
woman who was apparently coaching Barlam to point to CORDERO. The woman was a
companion of Angel's mother Zenaida.66
To show further that Lagunday did not implicate either CORDERO or LAGARTO, the defense
presented Vivencio Singalawa, who testified that on 5 August 1994, when he visited his friend Jr.
Jeofrey (Lagunday's alias) shortly after lunch at Precinct 2, the latter allegedly confessed that he
was the sole author of crime under investigation. Lagunday also mentioned the names "Lando,"
"Joel" and "Curimao" (the aliases of CORDERO's co-accused in Criminal Case No. 94-138138),
who served as lookout. Lando was a worker of Mang Gorio, while Joel and Curimao were
scavengers (nagtutulak ng kariton). Singalawa, a barangay tanod, knew the warehouse at
Kagitingan St. where the crime was committed because he grew up in that place; yet, he
claimed he did not know CORDERO, who lived in the same barangay.67
LAGARTO denied any involvement in the crime and claimed he was also at home at the time of
its commission. At the hearing of 4 August 1994, his attorney moved that he be taken to the
NCMH for examination. The Court granted said motion, but as of the time LAGARTO was called
to testify on 5 December 1994, the result of such assessment had not yet been submitted to the
court.68

Under oath, LAGARTO said he was a garbage collector. On the night of 1 August 1994, he
collected Rosita Besonia's trash, then asked rice from her as his customary "fee." He went home
with a plate of rice, ate dinner, then slept on the floor by the door from 7:00 p.m. to 5:00 a.m. the
following day. On 4 August 1994, while on his way to his cousin at Don Bosco, policemen in two
vehicles a car and an owner-type jeep suddenly forced him into the jeep. A man in the car
(Lagunday) was allegedly being compelled by the other policemen to point him. In the evening,
after spending some time at the Luneta detachment of the WPDC, he went home with the police
because they were looking for a certain "Buboy Bungal." Although his brother's nickname was
Buboy, the latter was not "bungal." In any event, they also brought Buboy to the Luneta
detachment only to be released when it was confirmed that Buboy's front teeth were indeed
intact. He denied the charges against him, as well as the allegation that he drove a pedicab for
CORDERO.69
LAGARTO's neighbors; Rosita Besonia70 and Janet Badilla,71 and his mother Noriana
Lagarto72 confirmed his alibi. When cross-examined, however, LAGARTO admitted he was alone
at home at 7:00 p.m. on 1 August 1994.73
In its Decision74 of 31 January 1995, the trial court, per Judge Lorenzo B. Veneracion, gave full
credit to the version of the prosecution and convicted CORDERO and LAGARTO for the crime of
rape with homicide, but exonerated as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered, dismissing the
Information as against ROLANDO MANLANGlT for lack of evidence, and finding both
accused HENRY LAGARTO Y PETILLA and ERNESTO CORDERO Y MARISTELA
"guilty" beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE WITH HOMICIDE charged in
the Information of these cases, and sentencing both accused (with) the penalty
ofreclusion perpetua with all the accessories provided for by law.
Said accused are further ordered to indemnify, jointly and severally, the private
complainant the sum of P100,000 for the death of the victim, ANGEL ALQUIZA; the
sum of P500,000 for moral damages; and the amount of P52,000 for actual damages
representing expenses incurred for the wake and funeral of the victim. They are
further ordered to pay the cost of these suits.
SO ORDERED.
Disagreeing with the penalty imposed, the City Prosecutor of Manila filed on 8 February 1995 a
motion for reconsideration75 of the Decision, and asked that it be modified by imposing the
proper penalty of death instead of reclusion perpetua. In its Order dated 10 February 1995, 76 the
trial court did not take cognizance of the motion on the belief that "the accused Lagarto and
Cordero have complied with the legal requirements for the perfection of an appeal." This
prompted the Office of the Solicitor General to elevate the matter to this Court by certiorari. The
petition, docketed as G.R. Nos. 119987-88, was unanimously granted by the Court en banc on
12 October 1995, thus:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is GRANTED. The
case is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court for the imposition of the
penalty of death upon private respondents in consonance with respondent's judge's
finding that the private respondents in the instant case had committed the crime of

Rape with Homicide under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659, subject to automatic review by this Court of the
decision imposing the death penalty.

4. In not finding as a fact that the testimony of prosecution's (sic) witness Major
Franklin Gacutan is adverse against the prosecution and points to the fact that the
accused-appellant Ernesto M. Cordero is innocent of the offense charged.

SO ORDERED.77

5. In failing to hold that prosecution's (sic) witness Herminia Barlam is not qualified to
become a witness.

Accordingly, on 22 May 1996, Judge Veneracion promulgated an Order in open court at the
National Penitentiary, imposing the proper penalty of death upon the accused.78
In his Appellant's Brief filed on 9 September 1997, LAGARTO pointed out that the trial court
seriously erred:
1. In rendering a judgment of conviction on accused Henry Lagarto apparently by
conclusions or assumptions without considering the fact that there is no conclusive
evidence to show that Angel Alquiza was really raped and killed by somebody;
2. In failing to consider that there was no credible and acceptable identification which
is free from doubt that anyone of the accused and more particularly Lagarto
committed of participated in the commission of the crime charged. The prosecution
witnesses were coached and (this) was very apparent constraining even the court to
warn to (sic) private prosecutor regarding his coaching of the witnesses. Witness
Barlam had changed her testimony several times and her general appearance would
not merit belief against the constitutional presumption of innocence of the accused.
3. In failing to consider that by physical evidence, the bodega could not have been the
situs of the crime disproving thereby the claim that the victim was raped and killed
inside is not also because no evidence or traces was found inside it but also because
the bodega which is not big simply an uninhabited house, is within the heart of the
community and surrounded by houses and an unusual commotion or noise would
certainly invite attention.

6. In taking into account of, and according evidentiary value to the finding and
recommendation of (the) psychiatrist from (the) National Center for Mental Health.
7. In not finding as a fact that it is highly impossible and improbable for witness
Herminia Barlam to have seen what had (sic) supposedly happened in the subject
warehouse on August 2, 1994.
8. In not finding as a fact that the testimony of prosecution's (sic) witness Heminia
Barlam is full of discrepancies and self contradictions.
9. In not finding as a fact that the testimony of prosecution witness Herminia Barlam is
highly improbable and contrary to human experience.
10 In not finding as a fact that prosecution witness Herninia Barlam is a perjured,
biased and rehearsed witness.
11. In failing to hold that the adverse result against the prosecution of the ocular
inspection is a proof that the accused-appellant Ernesto M. Cordero is innocent of the
offense charged.
12. In not finding as a fact that the testimonies of the other witnesses for the
prosecution are unworthy of belief.

4. In failing to consider that Henry Lagarto demonstrated his innocence before the
court and was supported by witnesses.

13. In failing to hold that conspiracy is (sic) not proven beyond reasonable doubt by
the prosecution and that therefore criminal liability is individual, not collective, and thus
exempts the herein accused-appellant from the offense charged.

For his part, after several extensions, CORDERO filed on 29 September 1997, through counsel,
his Appellant's Brief. He claims therein that the trial court committed grave and reversible error in
the following:

14. In not finding as a fact that the late Abundio Lagunday was the sole author of the
offense charged,

1. In rendering the order dated May 22, 1996 and in considering the same as the
promulgation of the penalty of death against accused-appellant Ernesto M. Cordero.

15. In failing to hold that the defense of alibi assumes importance where the evidence
for the prosecution is weak and came (sic) from (a) source that cannot be
characterized as fully unbiased and disinterested.

2. In failing to hold that the prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti.
3. In failing to hold that the evidence of the prosecution and defense both points (sic)
to the fact that accused-appellant Ernesto M. Cordero is completely innocent of the
offense charged.

16. In falling to hold that accused-appellant Ernesto M. Cordero was illegally arrested
and not accorded the right to preliminary investigation.
17. In holding (that) the accused-appellant Ernesto M. Cordero is liable to private
complainant for damages.

As the issues raised by LAGARTO are covered by CORDERO's assignment of errors, we will
concurrently dispose of them.
CORDERO claims that the trial court never amended or modified its Decision of 31 January
1995, as mandated by us in People v. Veneracion (G.R. Nos. 119987-88). He argues that the
trial court merely "ordered that its Order pursuant to the Decision of this Honorable Court be
promulgated by reading to both accused the same Order in the language known and understood
by both of them" and did not state that the penalty being imposed was death.
CORDERO's apprehension is unwarranted because the trial court issued two orders in open
court at the National Penitentiary on 22 May 1996. The first was made in compliance with our
ruling in People v. Veneracion:
Pursuant to the Decision of the Honorable Supreme Court in G.R. No. 119987-88
directing the imposition of the penalty of death upon the herein accused in
consonance to (sic) the findings that they had committed the crime of Rape with
Homicide under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 11 of
Republic Act No. 7659, the penalty imposed to (sic) the herein accused, HENRY
LAGARTO Y PETILLA and ERNESTO CORDERO Y MARISTELA shall, as it is hereby
imposed, be the penalty of death.
Pursuant further to the aforesaid Decision, after this Order is duly promulgated, let the
entire record of these cases be returned to the Honorable Supreme Court for
automatic review.
SO ORDERED.79
while the other dealt with its promulgation:
When these cases were called, both accused appeared assisted by counsel de oficio,
Atty. Jovito Salvador, PAO lawyer of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, who, was
appointed counsel de oficio.
In view of the failure of counsel on record Atty. Miguel Badando for accused Henry
Lagarto and Atty. Paterno Esmaquel for accused Ernesto Cordero to appear despite
notice. (sic) Private Prosecutor Pete Prinsipe interposed no objection to the
promulgation of the Order in the absence of counsel on record.
Thereafter, the Court ordered that the Order of this Court pursuant to the Decision of
the Honorable Supreme Court be promulgated by reading to both accused the same
Order in the language known and understood by both of them.
Thereafter, the order for the transmittal of the entire records of these cases to the
Honorable Supreme Court for automatic review is hereby reiterated.
SO ORDERED.80

Both LAGARTO and CORDERO claim that the prosecution failed to prove the act of death of
Angel Alquiza because her death certificate was not proffered in evidence. Instead, the
prosecution presented the Autopsy Report (Exh. "C"), which allegedly cannot be considered as
proof of the fact of death of Angel "because there was no proper and sufficient identification of
the victim that was mentioned in said autopsy Report."81
This issue, however, is answered in CORDERO's Brief itself: "The said Autopsy Report states
that the body of the supposed victim, Angel Alquiza, was identified by a certain Romezen
Alquiza, a brother of the victim." 82 The records show that Romezen submitted to the NBI a
request for autopsy and the NBI issued a Certificate of Identification of Dead Body which he also
signed.83 These were essential for the autopsy which was eventually made by Dr. Lagat. In any
case, there is no rule that specifies who may identify a victim. It is enough that such
persons knows the one being identified. Certainly, a brother of the victim can recognize his own
sister even with her manifest physical injuries. The prosecution cannot be faulted for not
presenting other witnesses to verify Romezen's identification, the choice of witnesses being a
matter of legal strategy and prerogative. Neither was CORDERO denied any opportunity to
cross-examine him regarding such fact because the Autopsy Report is an official document the
authenticity of which is presumed. Its validly, therefore, cannot be collaterally attacked by putting
Romezen on the witness stand.1wphi1.nt
As to the legal failure of the prosecution to prove the cause of Angel's death, LAGARTO and
CORDERO maintain that the fact of stabbing which, according to the post-mortem findings of
Dr. Lagat, was the cause of death of the victim was not adequately established. Dr. Lagat
said that there might be other causes of death, such as Angel being hit by a motor vehicle. But
then, this is a mere probability. If we were to stretch this line of reasoning further, other
possibilities may be apparent: Angel could have still been alive when she was ran over by the
motor vehicle, as suggested by the defense; on the other hand, she could have already been
dead at the time. Preliminary police findings showed the that sack wherein Angel's body was
placed was found along a truck route. In the flooded street, it could have easily been hit by a
truck, thus, producing the cranial injury which the defense suggests might be the true cause of
Angel's death. Or, it is also likely that she could have been severely hit on the head by a hard
object. This last scenario, being supported by the testimony of prosecution witness Barlam,
seems more plausible. It is worth mentioning that Angel suffered numerous injuries which could
not all have been caused by a motor vehicle. Neither could the defense explain why or how the
body could be wrapped in a round yellow tablecloth, then put inside a sack, if Angel was still
alive at the time. CORDERO even stresses that his table has a glass top, instead of a mantle.
He fails to consider the implication of this fact: The round yellow tablecloth seen in his house by
Ofelia Lagman in July 1994 was the one used in wrapping Angel's body because said tablecloth
was no longer there after the incident in question. The prosecution, for its part, offered
convincing and logical answers to these questions, based on the testimonies of its witnesses.
It is further argued that the prosecution failed to prove the fact of rape because the Autopsy
Report did not categorically state that Angel was, in fact, raped. Dr. Lagat's examination
revealed that Angel's genital injury was caused by a sharp-bladed weapon. Ultimately,
CORDERO concludes, "the testimony of witness Barlam regarding the rape in question cannot
prevail over the aforesaid finding and autopsy report of Dr. Lagat." This is non sequitur. The
finding that the incised wound on Angel's genitals was caused by a sharp-bladed instrument
does not necessarily mean that she was not raped. Barlam, whose competence and credibility
as a witness was upheld by Judge Veneracion based on the NCMH report and on his own

observation of her deportment during the three days she testified in court, swore that she saw
Angel being raped in the early hours of 2 August 1994.
CORDERO also claims he was never properly identified as one of the perpetrators of the crime
charged. Jose Soriano said he saw Angel with Lagunday on the night of 1 August 1994 and they
"appeared normal." Barlam's sworn statement of 4 August 1994 mentioned Lagunday,
LAGARTO, and a certain Lando, but not CORDERO, a fact confirmed by PO3 Ko and SPO2
Miranda. Maj. Gacutan said they had no evidence against CORDERO, so they allowed him to
go home after he was initially invited to the police station. Vivencio Singalawa claimed Lagunday
admitted sole authorship of the crime. And because he was not properly identified by the State's
prime witness, CORDERO suggests that Barlam was merely coached by the family of Angel to
implicate him.
We are not convinced. Jose Soriano could not have seen CORDERO with Angel that night
because CORDERO was somewhere else at the time. Prosecution witness Rolando Javar saw
CORDERO and LAGARTO between 9:30 and 10:00 p.m. on 1 August 1994 standing by the
warehouse at Kagitingin; as if they were waiting for someone (palinga-linga). Javar is even
related to CORDERO by affinity; his son being married to CORDERO's daughter, so there
appears no plausible reason for him to lie, especially in this case where his balae is faced with
death sentence. On the other hand, whatever Lagunday revealed to Singalawa is purely
hearsay, since Lagunday died even before arraignment.
As stated earlier, Barlam's sworn statement of 4 August 1994 was taken by PO3 Ko with the
assistance of SPO2 Miranda. Since she is illiterate and at the time had not yet been equipped
with a hearing aid, it is highly probable that the essence of her narration was not captured in the
translation and transcription. In any event, even if she did not name CORDERO in her sworn
statement, she undoubtedly and consistently pointed to him and LAGARTO in open court, even
slapping and boxing them at times to demonstrate her indignation. We agree with the trial court
that by her words and actions, Barlam had sufficiently and convincingly identified CORDERO
and LAGARTO as two of the men who raped and killed on 2 august 1994.
The manner in which Barlam testified in court betray not a single hint that anyone had coached
or coaxed her to implicate CORDERO. Defense witnesses Gloria Sigua and SPO2 Miranda
supposedly witnessed how a companion of Zenaida Alquiza showed Barlam a newspaper with
CORDERO's picture in it. Sigua allegedly argued with this woman after hearing her say, "ito ba,
isama mo na ito sa pagturo." 84 Yet, SPO2 Miranda, who was standing besideBarlam at the time,
heard nothing.85 What is even more telling is he believed there was nothing wrong with Barlam,
save for her hearing impairment, and that she was telling the truth.86

deemed competent," the defense attacked instead the damaging contents of the NCMH
psychiatric evaluation report anchored on the following grounds: (1) said report is hearsay
because the doctors who prepared and issued the same were not presented in court; and (2) it
was not offered in evidence by the prosecution.
This argument fails to consider the very nature of the NCMH report. Having made upon order of
the trial court, such report is in the nature of an official document in aid of judicial determination.
It is not evidence for the prosecution or against the defense but a document a scientific report
prepared and issued by an entity totally removed from the criminal proceedings, hence,
indifferent, objective, and impartial. To be utilized by the trial court, it need not be offered in
evidence by the prosecution because the court may take judicial notice of its existence and
composition. It is also for this reason that its contents cannot be rejected on account of being
hearsay.
The fate of accused-appellants LAGARTO and CORDERO depends greatly on the credibility of
Barlam as a witness. The trial court also recognized this, such that it propounded numerous
classificatory questions throughout the hearings of 3 and 4 October 1994, when Barlam was
testifying on the witness stand after her psychiatric examination, just to elucidate her responses
amid the sea of queries unleased by the lawyers. It is in cases like this where we find ourselves
adhering more to the principle that factual findings of the trial court must be accorded respect
and even finality on appeal because the trial judge had every opportunity to question the
witness, hear her testify, and observe her demeanor and deportment. 87 Exceptions to this rule
exist, such as when the trial court's evaluation was arbitrarily made, or when some substantial
fact or circumstance which might affect the result of the case has been overlooked,
misunderstood, or misapplied, but no such peculiarity is apparent in the case at bar. 88 The trial
court has "keenly observed (Barlam) during her testimony and . . . is convinced that she is
speaking the truth."89 After poring over the voluminous records of this case and scrutinizing the
assailed Decision of 31 January 1995, we see no reason to depart from this conclusion.
We agree with the observation of the trial court that Barlam was referred to the NCMH precisely
upon the repeated motion of defense counsels. Because of her damaging testimony, her
disqualification was the best ploy for the defense. Barlam, however, adequately met the
minimum requirements for qualifying as a witness under Sections 20 and 21, Rule 130 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence, thus:
Sec. 20. Witnesses; their, qualifications. Except as provided in the next succeeding
section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving, can make known their
perception to others, may be witnesses.

For his part, Maj. Gacutan supposedly did not arrest CORDERO because had no evidence
against him. The information supplied by prosecution Lagman and Javar, linking CORDERO to
the crime, was sufficient to give the police a reason to arrest him. Ultimately, CORDERO's role in
the crime charged was duly established when he was positively identified in court by Barlam as
the cohort of Lagunday and LAGARTO.

Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or conviction of a

crime, unless otherwise provided by law, shall not be a ground for disqualification.

From the moment Barlam surfaced as an eyewitness to the crime, accused-appellants

LAGARTO and CORDERO, through counsel, have desperately tried to disqualify her on ground
of incompetence. Obviously aware of the futility of any to objection to Barlam's testimony on
account of the psychiatric finding by the NCMH, after the three examinations, that "she may be

(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for
examination, is such that they are incapable of intelligently making known
their perception to others;

Sec. 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. The following

persons cannot be witnesses:

(b) . . .
Barlam could certainly perceive and make known her perception to others. Even if she is deaf,
she saw what happened on 2 August 1994. She related what she saw to the police on 4 August
1994; to the psychiatrists who examined her at NCMH on 26, 29, and 31 August 1994; and to
the trial court on 26 August, 3 and 4 October 1994. Did she "intelligently" make known her
perception to others, especially when she testified in court? Certainly, she did. Everybody
understood her even if some of her statements on minor points were inconsistent. A perusal of
the transcript of stenographic notes would readily reveal that counsels for the defense attempted
in vain to confuse her on relevant facts, even confronting her with her sworn statement a
clear indication that she connected with them "intelligently."
Because of Barlam's "deafness and associated mental retardation," the defense harped that she
should be disqualified from testifying. The disquisition above, notwithstanding, we have ruled
that even a mental retardate or a feeble-minded person could qualify as a competent witness. 90
Instead of finding Barlam, unfit to be a witness, the NCMH even bolstered her credibility by
declaring her to be competent and consistent in her recollection and narration of the events she
witnessed on 2 August 1994. Barlam was ordered by the court to undergo psychiatric tests
because she exhibited some aberrant behavior. Her speech was fragmented, at times
unintelligible or incongruous, but this was due in most part to her congenital deafness and
anxieties. The fact remains that the thrust of her testimony regarding the circumstances
surrounding the events that transpired on 2 August 1994 never varied. Against the
recommendation of the NCMH that her examination in court should be free from distraction and
intimidation, defense counsels literally tried every trick in the book to badger and confuse her,
derail her testimony by confronting her with her sworn statement, and otherwise cast doubt on
her capacity to testify. Yet, her testimony held.
When Barlam testified on 26 August 1994, prior to her psychiatric examination, she declared
thus:
ATTY. PRINSIPE (Private Prosecutor):

COURT:
She answered "kalsada"
ATTY. PRINSIPE:
Q

Where is that street you mentioned?

Kagitingan.

Q
And will you kindly tell the Honorable Court whether there was an unusual
incident that happened on that date and time?
A

It's Monday - - - (cut short)

ATTY. ESMAQUEL:
May we manifest that the answer is not responsive to the question. The
question is whether there was an unusual incident that happened on that
date and time.
A

Oh, hindi ako nanloloko peksman.

ATTY. PRINSIPE:
Please related (sic) it to the Court.
A

Mama na naka salamin - - -

ATTY. ESMAQUEL:

Q
On August 2, 1994 at around 2:00 in the morning, will you tell the Court
where were you?
Will you (the interpreter) please whisper to the right ear (of the witness) because this
is a vital witness and we (the prosecution) will request repeatedly.

May we request that the answer be stricken out of the record for not being
responsive.
ATTY. BADANDO (Counsel de parte for Lagarto):
Your honor, I would like to make an observation on record that I could not
see any man wearing an eye glasses.

WITNESS:
Kalsada.
ATTY. ESMAQUEL (Counsel de parte for Cordero):
At this juncture, may we manifest that the answer of the witness is not
responsive. The only question is - - - (cut short)

COURT:
Sige.
WITNESS:

The man wearing eye glasses - - sinaksak ang bata.

You were stating that you saw Cordero tying the sack, were there any other person
present during that tying of the sack?

COURT:
Go down from where you, were and go to the person whom you said - - (cut
short)

A
isa.

Wala ngang tao. Lima kami, iyan, iyan, isa patay na. Anim iyon, patay na ang

ATTY. BADANDO:
ATTY. PRINSIPE:
The first thing she said was "siya, ako at siya."
Before that your honor, I just want to make an important observation that
immediately after the witness pointed, that man Cordero, he removed his
eye glasses, your honor.

ATTY. ESMAQUEL:
Yes, let it be on record.

INTERPRETER:
ATTY. BADANDO:
Please make it of record that the witness step(ped) down from the witness
stand and she is now going to the place - - - (cut short)
COURT:

Which means three including herself.

ATTY. PRINSIPE:

Point to the man.

You said three?

INTERPRETER:

- - - and she is now pointing to a man, and when asked to identify himself,
he claims that he is Ernesto Cordero and the other one is Henry Lagarto.

ATTY. PRINSIPE:
Will you please look around and see whether the two whom you are
referring to are inside the courtroom?

ATTY. PRINSIPE:
The witness is very angry your honor, in pointing to the accused.91
xxx

Iyong isa patay na.

xxx

Will you please step down from the witness stand and approach the two, tap
them on the shoulder.

xxx
INTERPRETER:

You pinpointed Cordero a while ago, why did you pinpoint him?
A

Iyan ang nakita ko. Iyan tali sako tapos tapon Moriones.

Q
You stated that somebody was hogtied or tying a sack, do you know whatever
there was (anyone ) inside, that sack.
A
xxx

Marami sako, maraming tali, damit ng bata sira-sira na.

xxx

The witness step(ped) down from the witness stand and she is now going to
the two men, who, when asked to identify themselves claim(ed) that they
are (sic) Ernesto Cordero and Henry Lagarto.
ATTY. PRINSIPE:
Q You said that you saw Cordero tying the sack, why do you know, do you know the
reason why he was tying that sack?

xxx
ATTY. ESMAQUEL:

ATTY. PRINSIPE:

Incompetent to answer. The only thing is because the witness - - - he is

asking about Cordero.

ATTY. PRINSIPE:
Q

Do you know the name of the child who was stabbed?

Oh oh.

COURT:
Sustain.
ATTY. ESMAQUEL:
ATTY. PRINSIPE:
May we manifest that the witness failed to answer.
Q
time?

Why were you in that place you mentioned a while ago on that date and
COURT:

A
Iinom ako kape. Iiyak iyak bata. Nagugutom ako. Dinig sabi nang mama,
huwag ka ingay. - - tapos pinalo ako, sabi ko bakit iyak bata, tapos sabi ko wala na
patay na, ah ah ah.
FISCAL (Should be either Atty.; Esmaquel or Atty. Badando):
Do not allow her to be relating a story.

In the interest of justice, repeat the question.

(Interpreter repeating)
A.

Oho.

ATTY. PRINSIPE:

ATTY. PRINSIPE:
Who was the child you saw and you heard crying? What is the name?
ATTY. BADANDO:
Your honor, I object because she was (not) able to identify any child. What
she stated (earlier) is a certain Tetchie, a mother of that woman. There is no
basis.

What is the name?

A

Jingjing.

Why do you know that the name of the child is Jingjing?

Dinig ko sa kalsada.

If I will show you the picture of Jingjing, would you be able to recognize her?

Oho.92

COURT:
Answer.
ATTY. ESMAQUEL:
May I join the objection on the ground that earlier, she was asked - - - (cut
short)
COURT:

On 3 October 1994, Barlam went back to court after being cleared by the NCMH to testify and
after being fitted with a hearing aid. Excerpts from that day's hearing are hereunder quoted
minus the objections, comments, and oral arguments of counsels. The questions were translated
into Tagalog and her responses quoted verbatim by the court interpreter. The pages where they
appear in the TSN are in parentheses. Fiscal Narciso J. Rosero, Jr. began the examination by
asking what Barlam was doing in the morning of 1 August 1994 (or evening of 2 August 1994).
A

Iinom ako kape. Lalaba. Iihi ako. (24)

Let the witness answer. Objection overruled.

A

Batang sinaksak.

Iihi ako sa dulo. May tubig sa dulo. Doon ako huhugas. (25)
FISCAL:

Were you able to finish washing?

Oh.

After you were able to finish washing, what did you observe, if any?

WITNESS:
Sabi nila, alis na, alis na sabi. Sabi ko ayoko, patayin na ninyo ako, hindi
ako aalis.
FISCAL:

ATTY. BADANDO:
Very vague.

COURT:
Answer.
A

Kita ko tatlo lalake, isa bata apat tao, tatlo lalake isa bata. Totoo sinasabi ko.

FISCAL:
Q
These three male persons who you saw that morning these three male
persons whom you saw together with the female child, would you be able to recognize
these three male persons if you see them again? (27)
A

INTERPRETER:
The witness step(ped) down from the witness stand and the witness now is
slapping the face of one male person two male persons, and when asked
to identify themselves, they claimed that they are (sic) Ernesto Cordero and
Henry Lagarto.
Isa patay na.

FISCAL:
Q
How about the female child whom you saw in the company of these three
male persons, if you see her again; would you be able to recognize her?
A

Malayo ako doon, binato ako ng kahoy. Hindi ako loloko. Totoo yon.

Q
After you said one of these male persons hit you with a piece of wood on your
left knee and on your left elbow, what did you do next after that?
A
Aalis mata, aalis tenga, aalis hikaw, hiwa dito, hiwa kiki niya." Pag hindi totoo,
ikukulong ako tapos. (32)
ATTY. BADANDO:
Let it be made of record that. the witness is mentioning or motioning that
after slashing the child including the private part, she motion(ed) "anunta,
anunta". The witness is touching her index finger into her palm, and then
pointing to her private part. That was aside from slashing.

Oho.

Q
Will you please look around inside the courtroom and find out whether they
are all here?

Q
So what happened when you answered them that you will not leave, maski
na patayin ka.

Oho. (28)

At this point, Barlam was shown six pictures of seven different girls from she correctly picked out
the picture of Angel Alquiza.93

FISCAL:
Q

Who, of these three male persons, who among them "anunta, anunta"?

ATTY. BADANDO:
Your honor, let it be reflected also on record that the witness said that there
was a person who has an eyeglasses, but when we look(ed) around, there
was no such person wearing an eyeglasses.
INTERPRETER:
The witness is pointing to the two accused, (33) which, when asked
answered by the name of Ernesto Cordero.
ATTY. ESMAQUEL:
I would like to request, your honor, that the witness be admonished not to
slap the accused.

FISCAL:

And now, the one pointed to was the accused Lagarto. (42)
The actuation of the witness is merely a sign of her sincerity in conveying
the truth to the Honorable Court. (34)

COURT:
Who was the one who wrapped her with the yellow tablecloth?

xxx

xxx

xxx
Q

Iyan.

FISCAL:
COURT:
Q
if any?

Alright, aside from this "anunta, anunta", what did these two persons do next,
You go down again and point to the one who wrapped the child with the
yellow material?

A
Isa palo ulo, isa alis diyan, isa pinto, diyan ka, sabi, diyan ka muna, isa palo
ako tapos hikaw alis.

(A)fter all those things, what next did these three persons do?

COURT:

Isa tali paa, pula, tapos isa dilaw, balot sako, kurtina, wala na, tapos na.

COURT:

Iyan tali. Iyan na nga ho.

The witness pointed to the accused Cordero.

Q

Who was the one of the two accused who tie(d) the sack?

You said that the eye was taken out, who remove(d) the eye?

ATTY. BADANDO:

INTERPRETER:
The witness step(ped) down from the witness stand and (s)he is now going
to the accused (cut short) (41)

And the witness was shouting yanyanyan.

COURT:
Ayan, ayan.

ATTY. ESMAQUEL:
May I manifest, your honor, that what has been pointed out by the witness is
the accused Lagarto, your honor.
ATTY. BADANDO:

You said that the face, was slash(ed), who slash(ed) the face? (43).

Kalbo.

INTERPRETER:

Let it be recorded that what has been stated earlier, the one pointed was
Cordero. It is clear from the transcript of stenographic notes dated August
26, 1994 that when asked by (sic) the same question, the witness pointed to
the accused Cordero as the one who tie(d) the sack.

The witness step(ped) down again to (sic) the witness stand and she is now
pointing to the accused Lagarto.
COURT:

FISCAL:
Who was the one who slashed the private part of the child?
That is already on record.
A
ATTY. ESMAQUEL:

Iyan nga dalawa. Kulit mo kausap. Iihi ako, saan ako iihi ako.

FISCAL:

Sa gilid. Dito kahoy, tapos tali sako, tapos balot dilaw, tali pula, tali paa.

Q
You stated a while ago that you heard a child somewhere crying, when you
heard somewhere a child crying, what did you do, if any?

INTERPRETER:
Witness is motioning to her feet.

A
Sabi ko, kawawang bata, tapos hiwa dito, tangal mata. Totoo iyon, hindi ako
nagsisinungaling. (44)

WITNESS:

ATTY. BADANDO:
The witness, a while ago, is motioning that tears (were) flowing down from
the eye of the child.
FISCAL:
Q

How did you come to know that tears were flowing from the eye of the child?

Sindi ako kandila, kita ko tulo

INTERPRETER:

Totoo ho, hindi ako nanloloko.

FISCAL:
Q

What was the attire of the child, if any, when you saw her crying, if any?

Dilaw daster may manggas.

FISCAL:
Q
At the time the portion of her body was slashed, and the private part of the
body was slashed (46) by the accused, what was her attire, was she still wearing that
attire?

Witness referring to her two eyes.

A

Hindi na.

What do you mean?

Patay na siya. Wala nang damit. (47)

WITNESS:
Hina lang.
FISCAL:
Q

At the time you lighted the candle, how far were you from the child?

Dito ako ihi, sa dulo, butas dito, dito bata.

The following day, 4 October 1994, Barlam was cross-examined. Her testimony, as that on
direct, are similarly quoted and paginated:
Q
Before the incident that you saw on August 2, 1994, did you already know
Angel Alquiza?

ATTY. BADANDO:
A
We would like to stipulate as to the distance that that is only one arm(s)
length. (45)

Oo. Kakain ng lugaw.

Q
When for the first time did you meet Angel Alquiza before that incident on
August 2, 1994?

FISCAL:
A

Lima taon siya. Ito bahay, ito kalsada, ako lalaba. Ang ganda bata. (11)

About one arm(s)length or one a half arm(s)length.

xxx
Q

xxx

Where was (sic) these three persons at the time you saw the child crying?
ATTY. ESMAQUEL:

xxx

Q
Before the incident which you saw on August 2, 1994, have you already met
or saw (sic) the accused Cordero? (15)
A

Hindi pa.

So when for the first time did you see the man with an eye glasses?

Noon nga, noong una doon. Tatlo iyan. Patay na isa.

When you said "noon nag, what are you referring to?

Isa bata tatlo lalaki.

And where did you see those three male(s) and one child?

Iihi ako dulo. Sindi ako kandila. Doon tubig huhugas ako, "uulan-ulan.

INTERPRETER:
Witness is motioning the size of the candle.
A

Tapos ligo na ako. Ihi ako tapos dito rinig ko bata aray. Nihiwa na.

INTERPRETER:
Witness is motioning to the eye, the ears, (16) the throat, the private organ.
A

Ako nga palo kahoy. (17)

Barlam's erratic behavior became manifest as the hearing droned on, but so did the clarity and
consistency of her narration. She pretended picking lice off the interpreter's head; she said her
father's cousin was a tin can; she even allegedly exposed her private part to the defense
counsels. There is no denying, however, that she saw Angel surrounded by these three men
one a pedicab operator with a history of abusing even his own daughters; the other two,
scavengers and occasional pedicab drivers. CORDERO stood before her as she knelt on the
floor. LAGARTO stayed by the door. Lagunday saw Barlam, shooed her away, then went after
her and hit her with a piece of wood when she would not leave. The left side of Angel's face was
slashed twice by CORDERO, who also gouged out her eyes and cut her vagina all the way to
and beyond her anus. He took her earrings. Angel's head was bashed in when she was hit with
a piece of wood by LAGARTO and Lagunday.94
Even on re-direct examination, Barlam was certain that it was CORDERO who slashed Angel's
vagina and raped her. ("Hiwa dito hiwa dito, anunta, anunta, hiwa kiki, tanda na hiwa pa
kiki.")95 The one who hit Angel with a thick piece of wood was LAGARTO, and Barlam identified
him in dramatic fashion by slapping and boxing him. 96 When confronted with her sworn
statement where she said that the man who hit Angel with a piece of wood was "Lando walang

ipen," it was made clear by the prosecution that such sworn statement was made in connection
with an investigation conducted by PO3 Ko when Barlam had not yet been fitted with a hearing
aid. In fact, she did not and could not read such statement so it had to be "read" to her by SPO2
Miranda without her hearing aid. Barlam never deviated in relating to the court the complicity of
Lagunday, CORDERO, and LAGARTO in the rape-slay of Angel. In the assailed decision, the
trial court even observed that from afar, LAGARTO looked as if his front teeth were missing. 97
Barlam's testimony, in our opinion, adequately established the liability of Lagunday, LAGARTO,
and CORDERO for raping and killing Angel Alquiza. She not only proved to be competent but
also truthful in her narration of what transpired on 2 August 1994. Her sworn statement might not
entirely jibe with her oral testimony, but we have ruled that in case of conflict between the
contents of a sworn statement and testimony in open court, the latter generally prevails since ex
parte affidavits are often incomplete and inaccurate because by their nature, they are ordinarily
prepared by a person other than the affiant.98 Barlam may have strangely at times, but such
idiosyncrasy has no bearing on the consistency and veracity of her testimony. She repeatedly
pointed to accused-appellants LAGARTO and CORDERO as she spoke, and slapped, boxed,
and glowered at them when she was asked by the court to identify the malefactors. Neither can
we discount the psychiatric report which gave Barlam a clean bill of mental health. For three
days, she was examined by professional psychiatrists, but her story remained the same. It was
the same story she narrated in court, albeit with some minor inconsistencies.
It must also be noted that Barlam absolutely has no motive to falsely testify against LAGARTO
and CORDERO. The absence of evidence of any improper motive actuating her as the principal
witness of the prosecution strongly tends to sustain the conclusion that no such improper motive
existed at the time she testified and her testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.99
LAGARTO and CORDERO deny the allegations against them and said they were sleeping in
their respective homes at the time the crime was supposedly committed. By itself, alibi is a
relatively weak defense; it is further emasculated in the absence of any showing that it was
physically impossible for the accused to have been at the crime scene or its immediate vicinity at
the moment it was being perpetrated.100 CORDERO's home is merely ten blocks from the
warehouse at Kagitingan St. He denied any knowledge of its existence, which is highly dubious
considering that it is a roadside structure. His daughter Emily and Eriste supported his alibi, but
only up to the time that he supposedly slept at around 11:00 p.m. on 1 August 1994. LAGARTO,
on the other hand, lived with his family at Parola Area D, Tondo, Manila, which is a jeepney and
tricycle ride from the warehouse at Kagitingan St. His neighbors, Besonia and Badilla, and
mother Noriana corroborated his story that he slept at around 7:00 p.m. on 1 August 1994 until
5:00 a.m. the following day. But on cross-examination, he admitted he was all alone in their
house when he slept.
The fact that LAGARTO and CORDERO were at home in the evening of 1 August and in the
morning of 2 August is no indication that they were there the whole time. They were both placed
at the crime by two witnesses. Javar saw them in front of the warehouse between 9:30 and
10:00 on 1 August 1994, as if waiting for someone. Barlam saw them inside the warehouse
around 2:00 a.m. on 2 August 1994. CORDERO was the one who stabbed Angel in the face,
slashed her organ, raped her, and tied her feet. LAGARTO hit angel on the head. Together with
Lagunday, the three wrapped her in yellow tablecloth identical with the one Lagman saw
CORDERO's house, put her in a sack which they tied with a nylon cord, then, under a mantle of
heavy rain, set her adrift in murky floodwater. Incidentally, CORDERO raises in issue the delay
in which Javar reported to the authorities what he knew about Angel Alquiza's case. This was

properly addressed by Javar when he said that he did not initially want to report the matter to
anyone because CORDERO was his balae.101 In the end, his conscience convinced him to shun
family ties in order to help bring justice to Angel.
Besides, LAGARTO and CORDERO were positively identified by prosecution witness Barlam as
the authors of the crime charged. Their denial and alibi cannot prevail over the positive
identification and assertions of Barlam.102
LAGARTO and CORDERO make much of the perceived impossibility of committing the crime in
the warehouse of Mang Gorio. Maj. Gacutan visited the place on 4 August 1994 and found its
perimeter adequately lit and surrounded by residential houses, but its interior was so dark that
anyone who peeped from the outside would not have seen anything inside. He did not even find
any evidence in the dark bodega.
This argument is untenable. It is established that rape is no respecter of time or place. It can be
committed in small, confined places, like a one-room shack and in the presence of other family
members,103 or a small hut on a raft (alang).104 The same can be said of any other crime that
accompanies and compounds the rape. In the case at bar, even if there were houses around the
warehouse and there was a lamppost nearby, there is no dispute that Angel was assaulted
therein at 2:00 in the morning during a heavy downpour. Under the condition then prevailing, the
desolation of the warehouse and its immediate vicinity provided a perfect cover for the atrocities
perpetrated against Angel. On the other hand, when the court conducted an ocular inspection of
the warehouse on 22 November 1992, it was noted that the holes through one or more of which
Barlam had witnessed the crime have been patched up. The protestation of CORDERO and
LAGARTO cannot be given serious consideration because the trial court gathered "from the
Barangay Captain and other residents that there have been alterations in the warehouse; that
the opening had been covered, so much so that the actual conditions of the warehouse at the
time of the commission of the offense are no longer obtaining during the ocular
inspection."105 LAGARTO and CORDERO likewise question the wisdom of this observation
because there is allegedly no evidence, testimonial or otherwise, which would support it. The
ocular inspection was, however, conducted with the assistance of the Barangay Captain and
some residents. The conclusions of the court, therefore, is not conjectural but based on
information supplied by the escorts who were more familiar with the physical condition of the
warehouse.
As regard Maj. Gacutan's investigation, which allegedly yielded no evidence against LAGARTO
and CORDERO, the trial court correctly observed that this is to be expected because Maj.
Gacutan "did not take with him any (forensics) expert to any instrument to recover any physical
evidence."106 Nonetheless, his failure to obtain any evidence from the crime scene does not ipso
facto eliminate the fact that a crime was committed therein, especially in view of the damning
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
The next crucial question to be resolved is whether LAGARTO and CORDERO, together with
deceased Lagunday, conspired to rape and kill Angel.
The following undisputed facts must be taken into consideration and read in connection with
Barlam's testimony:

1. On the night in question, Angel was last seen being led by the hand of Lagunday. Javar saw
Angel riding "Ernie Sidecar No. 14" which was driven by Lagunday. Ligaya, wife of CORDERO,
confirmed that on 1 August 1994, Lagunday drove "sidecar No. 14" which was part of their fleet
of pedicabs.
2. LAGARTO was arrested by the police after Lagunday implicated him along with accused
Manlangit, Baltazar, and Yaon.
3. Eyewitness Barlam positively identified Lagunday and LAGARTO from a police line-up as two
of the tree men she saw raping and killing a girl in the abandoned warehouse of Mang Gorio at
Kagitingan St.
4. Lagunday and his co-accused Manlangit both used to work for Mang Gorio at the latter's junk
shop, which is the abandoned warehouse where the crime took place.
5 Lagman told the NBI and the police that the yellow tablecloth where Angel's body was
wrapped was the one she saw at the CORDERO residence.
6. Javar saw CORDERO and LAGARTO in front of the warehouse on the night in question as if
they were waiting for somebody.
7. During detention, Lagunday pointed to CORDERO as the alleged mastermind.
8 Barlam saw CORDERO slash Angel's face and genitals before raping her, while LAGARTO
stood by the door. Lagunday and LAGARTO both hit Angel's head with a piece of wood. When
angel was dead, they tied her feet, wrapped her in a round yellow tablecloth possibility owned by
CORDERO, placed her in sack, then set adrift in the floodwater of Del Pan.
All these demonstrate that the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt that
LAGARTO, CORDERO, and Lagunday shared a common design to rape and kill Angel Alquiza.
Although there is no direct proof of such unity of purpose, conspiracy was properly appreciated
in these premises by the trial court because their individual acts, taken as a whole, showed that
they were acting in unison and cooperation to achieve the same unlawful objective. 107 Under
these premises. it is not even necessary to pinpoint the precise participation of each of the
accused, the act of one being the act of all. 108 Thus, the trial court correctly observed that
"conspiracy is established by the concerted action of the accused in the commission of the crime
as well as in their concerted efforts after the commission of the crime as well as in their
concerted efforts after the commission of the crime,"109as when they attempt to dispose of the
body of the victim to hide their misdeed. In the case at bar, the trial court found that CORDERO,
LAGARTO, and Lagunday acted in concert to slay the victim and thereafter conceal her body by
wrapping it in a round yellow tablecloth, putting it in a sack, and leaving it in flooded street in Del
Pan. Jurisprudence constantly points out that the conduct of the accused before, during, and
after the commission of the crime may be considered to show an extant conspiracy. 110 Even if by
Barlam's testimony it would appear that only CORDERO raped Angel, LAGARTO is still liable for
the crime of rape with homicide because where conspiracy is adequately shown, the precise
modality or extent of participation of each individual conspirator becomes secondary. The
applicable rule, instead, is that the act of one conspirator is the act of all of them.111

CORDERO insists that the trial court erred in failing to hold that he was illegally arrested and
was not accorded the right to a preliminary investigation.
This argument has no merit. CORDERO voluntarily entered a plea of "not guilty" when he was
arraigned on 22 August 1994.112 By so pleading, he submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court,
thereby curing any defect in his arrest, for the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of
the court over his persons.113 Besides, his act of entering a plea when arraigned amounted to a
waiver of the right to question any irregularity in his arrest. 114 It is too late for CORDERO to
protest his arrest because a valid information had been filed against him, he was properly
arraigned, trial commenced and was terminated, and a judgment of conviction had been
rendered against him.115 Besides, his illegal arrest, if such was the fact, did not have any bearing
on his liability since an allegation of an invalid warrantless arrest cannot deprive the State of his
right to prosecute the guilty when all the facts on record point to his culpability.116 Any irregularity
in his arrest will not negate the validity of his conviction duly proven beyond reasonable doubt by
the prosecution.117
LAGARTO and CORDERO were charged with and convicted and the special complex
felony118 of rape with homicide, defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, viz.:
Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by having carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. . . .;
2. . . .;
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
xxx

xxx

shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that
may have attended the commission of the deed. However, for determining the civil liability, an
appreciation of one aggravating circumstance the cruelty that attended the rape and killing of
Angel may be in order. Angel was a seven-year old child. Her captors and tormentors were
grown-up men. The Autopsy Report (Exh. "C") listed her injuries: numerous hematomas,
abrasions, contused-hematomas, incised wounds, fractures, lacerations, and stab wounds. Both
of her eyes were missing. Her vagina was sliced, producing an incised wound 14 centimeters
long that went beyond her anus and causing disembowelment. This was done presumably so
that her underdeveloped organ could accommodate the organs of the assailants. She was
bleeding to death, her intestines spilling out, when CORDERO raped her in the presence of
LAGARTO and Lagunday. Her head was hit so hard that part of her brain began to leak through
the fracture. Angel Alquiza suffered through all these. She did not die instantaneously. The
cruelty inflicted was too much and could only come from persons turned beast.
The presence of the aggravating circumstance of cruelty119 warrants the award of exemplary
damages,120 which we hereby fix at P100,000.
The award of P500,000 as moral damages, which no longer requires proof per current case
law,121 has to be reduced to P100,000.
Current jurisprudence122 has fixed at 100,000 the indemnity in cases of rape with homicide.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 47, as modified in the
Order of 22 May 1996, in Criminal Case Nos. 94-138071 and 94-138138 dated 31 January
1995, imposing the death penalty on accused-appellants HENRY LAGARTO y PETILLA. and
ERNESTO CORDERO y MARISTELA is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that said
accused-appellants are hereby ordered, jointly and severally, to pay the heirs of the victim, Angel
L. Alquiza, the amounts of P100,000 as indemnity, P100,000 as moral damages, and P100,000
as exemplary damages, in addition to the P52,000 awarded by the trial court as actual
damages.1wphi1.nt

xxx

When by reason or on occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall
be death.

In accordance with Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic
Act No. 7659, upon finality of this decision, let the records of these cases be forwarded to the
Office of the President for possible exercise of executive clemency.

xxx

Costs against accused-appellants.

xxx

xxx

It having been established beyond any shadow of a doubt that LAGARTO and CORDERO raped
and killed her on the occasion of the rape, the mandatory penalty of death is inescapable. Four
Justices have continued to maintain their stand that R.A. No. 7659 is unconstitutional insofar as
it prescribes the death penalty; nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the majority to the
effect that the law is constitutional and the death penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at
bar.
In view of foregoing, it may no longer be necessary to consider if any of the qualifying and
generic aggravating circumstances alleged in the informations had been proven or if any
mitigating circumstance had been established. Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, provides that in all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 71523-25

December 8, 2000

ROLANDO SANTOS y RAMIREZ, petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 72420-22

December 8, 2000

JESUS E. ESTACIO, petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, respondent.

"2. In Criminal Case No. 5950, there being no modifying circumstance in attendance,
sentences each of said accused to suffer the indeterminate penalty ranging from
FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional as the
minimum, to TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as the maximum, to
pay a fine of P5,000.00 each, to indemnify, jointly and severally, the Bank of the
Philippine Islands and/or the Central Bank of the Philippines, in the amount of P3
million representing the amount defrauded, and to pay their proportionate share of the
costs of said action;

x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 72384-86

December 8, 2000

ALFREDO R. FAJARDO, JR., petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 72387-89

December 8, 2000

MARCELO S. DESIDERIO, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents.

"3. In Criminal Case No. 5951, there being no modifying circumstance in attendance,
sentences each of them to suffer the indeterminate penalty ranging from FOUR (4)
YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional as the minimum,
to TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as the maximum, to pay a fine
of P5,000.00 each, to indemnify, jointly and severally, the Bank of the Philippine
Islands in the amount of P5 million representing the amount defrauded, and to pay
their proportionate share of the costs of said action.
"Accused Estacio, Fajardo, Jr., Santos and Desiderio appear to have been detained at the NBI
as of February 16, 1982 by virtue of a Presidential Commitment Order, although all of them were
later bonded and released on different dates, except Santos who has remained in custody up to
the present. Accordingly, they should be granted the benefits of such preventive imprisonment
under Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, as follows: Santos from February 16,
1982 up to the date of the promulgation of this decision; Estacio up to April 29, 1985; Fajardo, Jr.
up to April 26, 1982 and Desiderio up to April 19, 1982.
"Let copies of this decision be furnished the Hon. Governor, Central Bank; the Citibank; the Bank
of the Philippine Islands and the Bankers Association of the Philippines for their information and
guidance.

DECISION
"SO ORDERED."
BUENA, J.:
Challenged in these four separate petitions for review on certiorari is the Decision dated July 19,
19851 of the Sandiganbayan disposing of Criminal Case Nos. 5949 to 5951 as follows:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, finding accused Alfredo Fajardo, Jr. alias Boy
Fajardo, Marcelo Desiderio y Silvestre, Jesus Estacio y Estrella and Rolando Santos y Ramirez
alias Mickey Mouse, GUILTY as co-principals in the three (3) separate complex crimes of Estafa
Thru Falsification of Public Documents and hereby sentences them as follows:
"1. In Criminal Case No. 5949, there being no modifying circumstance in attendance,
each of said accused to suffer the indeterminate penalty ranging from FOUR (4)
YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY ofprision correccional as the minimum,
to TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as the maximum; to pay a fine
of P5,000.00 each, to indemnify, jointly and severally, the Bank of the Philippine
Islands and/or the Central Bank of the Philippines in the amount of P1 million
representing the amount defrauded, and to pay their proportionate costs of said
action;

On April 15, 1982, the Tanodbayan filed with the Sandiganbayan three (3) informations for estafa
thru falsification of public documents against Felipe Salamanca, Mariano Bustamante, Basilio
Tan, Alfredo Fajardo, Jr., Jesus Estacio, Rolando San Pedro, Manuel Valentino, Rolando Santos,
Marcelo Desiderio, Jaime Tan and Emilio Reyes. 2 The informations filed were similarly worded
except for the dates of commission of the crime charged, the number of the checks involved,
and the amounts allegedly misappropriated. Thus:
"That on or about (October 19, 1981 in Crim. Case No. 5949, November 20, 1981 in Crim. Case
No. 5950, and October 30, 1981 in Crim. Case No. 5951), in the City of Manila and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Manuel Valentino, employed as Bookkeeper
detailed at the Clearing Office, Central Bank of the Philippines and accused Jesus Estacio y
Estrella, employed as Janitor-Messenger of the Central Bank of the Philippines, and as such are
public employees, with abuse of confidence and taking advantage of their official position, in
order to implement a plan or scheme to defraud the Bank of the Philippine Islands, Laoag City
Branch, which plan or scheme was previously formulated and agreed upon by all the herein
accused immediately prior to (October 19, 1981 in Crim. Case No. 5949, November 20, 1981 in
Crim. Case No. 5950, and October 30, 1981 in Crim. Case No. 5951), accused Manuel
Valentino pursuant to said plan or scheme, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously

and taking advantage of his official position and with intent to gain and to defraud, falsify the
Clearing Statement prepared by the Central Clearing office of the Bank of the Philippine Islands
and submitted to the Clearing Section of the Central Bank of the Philippines as well as the
Manifest prepared by the Central Bank Clearing Office in connection thereto by crossing out the
entry in the duplicate copies of the aforesaid Clearing Statement and Manifest which entries
refer to Check No. (27101 in Crim. Case No. 5949, 27111 in Crim. Case No. 5950, and 27108 in
Crim. Case No. 5951) and Check No. (27105 in Crim. Case No. 5949, 27118 in Crim. Case No.
5950 and 27121 in Crim. Case No. 5951) issued by accused Bustamante against his checking
account at the Bank of Philippine Islands, Laoag City Branch, which has only an outstanding
balance of P1,000.00 and which checks were deposited in the current account of Magna
Management Consultant with the Citibank Greenhills Branch by accused Rolando San Pedro
and as a result of the aforesaid falsification which made it appear that no such checks were
submitted by the Bank of Philippine Islands to the Central Bank of the Philippines for clearing,
the Bank of the Philippine Islands, Laoag City Branch has not issued any notice of dishonor or
stop payment to the Citibank Greenhills Branch, and as a consequence thereof accused
Rolando San Pedro was able to withdraw from the Citibank the full amount of the two checks
amounting to (P1,000,000.00 in Crim. Case No. 5949,P3,000,000.00 in Crim. Case No. 5950,
and P5,000,000.00 in Crim. Case No. 5951) and thereafter all the accused appropriated among
themselves the proceeds thereof to their own personal use and benefit and to the damage and
prejudice of the Central Bank of the Philippines or the Bank of the Philippine Islands, Laoag City
Branch in the aforementioned amount of (P1,000,000.00 in Crim. Case No. 5949, P3,000,000.00
in Crim. Case No. 5950, andP5,000,000.00 in Crim. Case No. 5951)."
Upon arraignment, accused Fajardo, Jr. @ Boy Fajardo, Desiderio, Estacio, Valentino and
Santos, assisted by their respective counsel, pleaded not guilty to the crimes
charged.3 Salamanca, Basilio Tan, Jaime Tan, Reyes and Bustamante have remained at-large
while San Pedro died. Upon agreement of the prosecution and the defense, a joint trial of the
three cases was ordered conducted.4
Estacio was first discharged as an accused to be utilized as a state witness. 5 Later, he filed a
motion for his re-inclusion in the information as an accused allegedly for the sake of the safety of
his family. The Sandiganbayan granted his motion and thus he was re-included as an accused in
Crim. Case Nos. 5949-5951.6 The prosecution also moved for the discharge of Valentino as an
accused but the Sandiganbayan denied that motion. Exercising its discretion, the
Sandiganbayan eventually discharged Valentino from the three informations to be a state
witness.7

Upon the lapse of the clearing period, the depositor would withdraw the amount of the checks.
However, the scheme faltered as the huge amounts covered by the checks caused suspicion on
the part of the PVB. It called up the BA to inquire about those checks and hence, the former
bank discovered that the checks were insufficiently funded.
In the pilferage scheme, current accounts would be opened with a provincial bank, such as the
Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI), Laoag branch, and a city bank such as the CitibankGreenhills, Manila. A BPI check deposited with Citibank would then be forwarded to the Central
Bank clearing house where members of the syndicate, who were employed there, would pilfer
the check and alter the Central Bank manifest and the entries in the clearing bank statements.
The pilferage was intended to provide opportunity for the syndicate to blot out entries referring to
the pilfered check. Consequently, BPI-Laoag would not know that a check drawn on it had been
deposited with Citibank. After the lapse of the five-day clearing period, the syndicate would
withdraw the amount deposited from Citibank simply because said bank would have considered
the check cleared and funded, as no protest or notice of dishonor could be received from BPILaoag. In utilizing this scheme in the commission of the crimes charged in Criminal Case Nos.
5949 to 5951, the syndicate netted Nine Million Pesos (P9,000,000.00).
EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION
The prosecution offered the testimonies of sixteen (16) witnesses, 8 and documentary evidence
marked Exhibits "A" to "DD", and Annexes "B" to "QQ", with sub-markings, to prove the
following:
On October 14, 1981, one Mariano Bustamante 9 opened a savings account with BPI-Laoag with
an initial deposit of P3,000.00: P2,000.00 of which was in check, and P1,000.00 in cash.10 That
same day, he opened a current account with P1,000.00 as initial deposit in the same bank. Upon
his request, a checkbook was issued to him.11
That same month, Marcelo Desiderio, allegedly a representative of Magna Management
Consultant, approached Maria Nieves Garrido, personal banker of Citibank-Greenhills, and
requested signature cards and other requirements for the purpose of opening a current account.
Thereafter, Desiderio returned to the bank, submitted the required documents and duly
accomplished forms, and made an initial deposit of P10,000.00. Thus, a checking account in the
name of Magna Management Consultant was opened in Citibank-Greenhills with Rolando San
Pedro as its representative. A checkbook was given to Desiderio.12

The antecedent facts that gave rise to the instant petitions are as follows:
Sometime in 1981, a syndicate masterminded by Felipe Salamanca infiltrated the Clearing
Center of the Central Bank of the Philippines (Central Bank, for brevity). In its operation, the
syndicate employed two schemes: the switching scheme, and the pilferage scheme.
In the switching scheme, a syndicate would open a current account with such banks as the Bank
of America (BA) and the Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB) in Iloilo. As a matter of procedure,
checks drawn on the BA were forwarded to the Central Bank for clearing. Upon receipt of those
checks by the clearing clerk of the Central Bank, who was a member of the syndicate, he would
substitute those checks with ones bearing the stamp of another bank. Thus, instead of
forwarding the checks to the BA, these were misrouted to cause delay in the clearing procedure.

On October 15, 1981, at the Ramada Hotel, Felipe Salamanca informed Manuel Valentino that
two (2) checks were to be deposited with Citibank the following day. Salamanca instructed
Valentino to watch out for those checks in the clearing house at the Central Bank. On October
16, 1981, two (2) checks in the amounts of Four Hundred Ninety-Eight Thousand Seven
Hundred Nineteen Pesos (P498,719.00), and Five Hundred One Thousand Two Hundred Sixty
Pesos and Thirty Centavos (P501,260.30) were indeed deposited with the Citibank-Greenhills
under the current account of Magna Management Consultant, represented by Rolando San
Pedro. On October 30, 1981, two (2) more checks were deposited at the same bank in the total
amount of P3,000,000.00. Another deposit of checks was made on November 20, 1981 in the
total amount of P5,000,000.00. All these checks were brought to the Central Bank Clearing
Center.

The checks deposited on October 16, 1981 did not reach the Central Bank on that day, which
was a Friday, but on Monday, October 19, 1981. Manuel Valentino, a bookkeeper at the Clearing
Operations Division of the Central Bank, received from Jesus Estacio, a Central Bank janitormessenger, the demand envelope containing the two (2) BPI-Laoag checks in the total amount
of P1,000,000.00 in the comfort room on the fourth floor of the Central Bank administration
building. Therein Valentino altered the amount of P1,076,416.95 by crossing out the amount of
One Million Pesos. Thus, under the column "Total amount received", only the amount
of P76,416.95 was reflected in order that BPI-Laoag would not look for the P1 million
check.13 Valentino then brought the altered clearing statement back to the Clearing Center and
prepared a Central Bank Manifest where he changed the figure in the original copy to tally with
those in the altered clearing statement.
On October 30, 1981, the syndicate employed the same scheme. As soon as the demand
envelope containing the BPI-Laoag checks arrived, Valentino took it and gave it to Jesus Estacio
who then brought the same to the comfort room at the fourth floor. Valentino followed him there
and took the two BPI checks amounting to P3,000,000.00, and altered the figures in the BPI
Clearing Statement. Valentino thereafter brought said envelopes to the clearing house, and
prepared the Central Bank Manifest, likewise altering the figures in the original to tally with the
figures in the altered clearing statement.
At the last operation on November 20, 1981, the group followed the same procedure Valentino
asked Estacio to give him the demand envelope and the former then went to the comfort room.
Valentino took the two BPI-Laoag checks in the total amount of P5,000,000.00 which he later
gave to Salamanca. Again, he altered the figures in the clearing statement and those in the
Central Bank Manifest so that these would conform with each other.14
As a matter of procedure, the demand envelopes containing the checks intended for BPI-Laoag,
the altered Central Bank Manifests, and the clearing statements were forwarded to the Regional
Clearing Center. The pilfered checks deposited in the account of Magna Management
Consultant were not included in those envelopes. Because BPI-Laoag did not receive the
checks with a total value of P9,000,000.00, these were not processed. Consequently, as no
objection or protest regarding the checks were registered and no notice of dishonor of the
checks for insufficient funds was made by the BPI-Laoag, and since the reglementary period for
making such protest or notice of dishonor had elapsed, Citibank-Greenhills considered the
checks as good and funded.
Hence, on different dates covering the period from October 26 to December 6, 1981, CitibankGreenhills allowed withdrawals in the aggregate amount of P9,000,000.00 from the account of
Magna Management Consultant. Withdrawals were made through checks endorsed by Rolando
San Pedro and encashed by Jaime R. Tan.15 The proceeds of the anomalous transactions were
divided among the members of the syndicate. Salamanca gave Estacio P10,000.00 after the
October 19, 1981 operation, P4,900.00 after the October 30, 1981 operation andP5,000.00 after
the November 20, 1981 operation. Valentino received P20,000.00, P10,000.00 and P20,000.00
after the October 16 and 30, and November 20, 1981 operations.
On January 28, 1982, Segundo Gonzaga, then Administrative Assistant for Transit Center
(Clearing Center of BPI), was informed through a long distance telephone call by the manager of
BPI-Laoag that their clearing transactions on October 19, 1981, October 30, 1981 and
November 20, 1981 registered an outstanding discrepancy of P9,000,000.00 as reflected in their

inter-office reconciliation statement. The manager of BPI-Laoag and the BPI Regional Manager
for Northern Luzon who went to the office at BPI-Ayala showed the clearing statements to
Gonzaga. Upon comparing the xerox copies of the BPI Clearing Statements (Laoag copies) and
xerox copies of the clearing envelope sent to Citibank Manila, Gonzaga noticed the alterations.
Thus, he went to the Accounting Department of BPI-Ayala and found out that the Central Bank
debited their bank in the amount ofP9,000,000.00.16
Gonzaga went to Citibank-Greenhills and talked to Jake Ocampo, its assistant manager, about
the clearing items. After checking their outgoing clearing checks for October 19, 1981, October
30, 1981 and November 20, 1981, Ocampo told Gonzaga that they did not recall said clearing
checks. He gave Gonzaga reproduced microfilm copies of those checks. Gonzaga submitted the
checks to his superiors with an accompanying report.17 The BPI and the Central Bank jointly
referred the matter for investigation to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which assigned
the case to Head Agent Salvador Ranin of the Special Investigation Division.18
On February 12, 1982, the Chief of the Anti-Bank Fraud Unit of the Central Bank, Atty. Agapito
Fajardo, the banks Chief Security Officer, and the BPI Vice-President and Comptroller brought
Manuel Valentino to the NBI. The following day, Agent Ranin took Valentinos statement.
Valentino waived his rights to remain silent and to counsel. He signed the waiver on the first
page of his statement. On March 22, 1982, Agent Ranin took Valentinos supplementary sworn
statement. The same NBI agent took Jesus Estacios statement on February 17, 1982 and
supplementary statement on March 22, 1982. Like Valentino, Estacio waived his right to counsel.
In their respective statements, Valentino and Estacio admitted their participation in the
commission of the crime, narrated how they carried out the plan to defraud the banks, and
identified those who participated in the criminal acts. After the investigation, Agent Ranin came
out with a Memorandum Report dated April 26, 1982.19
EVIDENCE FOR THE DEFENSE
On December 2, 1969, the Central Bank of the Philippines employed Jesus Estacio as janitormessenger. In 1978, a certain Rico Javier introduced Estacio to Felipe Salamanca. When
Salamanca learned that Estacio was connected with the Central Bank, he asked Estacio if he
knew any bookkeeper thereat as his compadre needed one. Estacio replied that he would look
for one. A week later, Salamanca called up Estacio and asked him if he had found a bookkeeper.
Estacio mentioned Manuel Valentino. Salamanca instructed Estacio to bring Valentino to Jacks
Restaurant in Quezon City after office hours. In that restaurant, Estacio introduced Valentino to
Salamanca. Valentino was in turn introduced to Basilio Tan. During their conversation, Valentino
told Salamanca about his work as a bookkeeper at the Central Bank.20
Sometime in October 1981, Valentino requested Estacio to accompany him to the EDCOR
office. There they met Salamanca, Marcelo Desiderio, Rolando Santos and Basilio Tan.
Salamanca told Estacio to stay outside the office because the group was going to discuss
something. Half an hour later, the group dispersed. That same month, Estacio saw Romeo
Villasanta, another accused, at the clearing office of the Central Bank. When Estacio asked why
Villasanta was there, the latter answered that he was "just expediting something." Estacio saw
Villasanta for the second time that same month talking with Valentino at the clearing office.
Valentino asked Estacio to point out the office of the Department of Economic Research to
Villasanta because Villasanta would be doing some research. Estacio went with Villasanta to the

fourth floor and showed him the said office. Villasanta then inquired where the comfort room in
that floor was. Estacio thereafter went back to his work and did not see Villasanta anymore.21 1
On November 20, 1981, Valentino asked Estacio to bring an envelope to the fourth floor and to
wait for him at its lobby. Estacio acceded and later, Valentino arrived. Valentino took the
envelope from Estacio and went to the comfort room. Thereafter, Estacio went to the Clearing
Office.22
Sometime in February 1982, upon learning that somebody from the NBI was looking for him,
Estacio went to the NBI. There he told Agent Ranin that he wanted to call a lawyer but Agent
Ranin did not allow him to do so. Agent Ranin investigated him from 5:30 p.m. until 7:30 p.m. on
February 17, 1982. This continued the following day and lasted a week. In the course of the
investigation, Agent Ranin promised Estacio that he would not be harmed should he cooperate
and admit the charges against him, and that he would be freed once he becomes a state
witness. However, Agent Ranin hit him with a newspaper and poked his gun at him. Estacio was
allowed to read the statement before he signed it.23
On cross-examination, Estacio admitted that during his stay at the NBI for about two months, his
wife and children would visit him every week and he could talk to them freely. 24 He was
transferred to Muntinlupa and detained at the Death Row for two years. On March 22, 1982,
Agent Ranin took his second statement that was a continuation of his first statement. He was
unable to read his supplementary statement because of fear of Agent Ranin, who was scaring
him. He stressed that the statements he made before the NBI were not true and that he only
signed those documents25 because he was afraid of Agent Ranin.26
Rolando Santos came to know Felipe Salamanca when he sold his car to him (Salamanca) on
installment withP15,000.00 as down payment with the balance of P20,000.00 to be paid in two
or three months. He accepted partial payment for the car. After a time, Salamanca fully paid the
balance. In July 1981, Salamanca gave himP3,000.00. Twice or thrice, Salamanca tried to
convince him to join a scheme to defraud a bank. After Salamanca had paid him the full price of
the car, Salamanca asked him again to join his group. All he had to do was to open a checking
account. He could have easily facilitated this, being the Vice-President for Finance of American
Steamship Agencies. In those meetings with Salamanca where he was persuaded to open a
checking account with a bank, Basilio Tan, the son of a general and his classmate at San Beda
College, Valentino, and Desiderio were present. When he told Salamanca that he was not
interested in the scheme to defraud a bank, as he was busy with his job, Salamanca got mad.
On October 20, 1981, an unidentified assailant shot him in his house. He sustained three (3)
gunshot wounds and was confined at the Paraaque Medical Center.27
Marcelo Desiderio came to know Felipe Salamanca sometime in July 1981 when Salamanca
went to his office28because he wanted to open an account with Citibank-Greenhills. Desiderio
went to Citibank-New York to inquire about the requirements for opening an account. Two days
later, he gave Salamanca the bank forms and signature cards to be accomplished. He learned
from Salamanca that the forms would be filled up by Rolando San Pedro. For the initial deposit,
Salamanca gave him P10,000.00 in cash and check. He also received P2,500.00 as
consultancy fee. He went to Citibank-Greenhills to make the deposit and the bank issued him a
checkbook.29

Desiderio denied that he was present in any meeting where Salamanca and his group discussed
a plan to defraud a bank. He acceded in opening the bank account at Citibank-Greenhills
because Salamanca assured him that the account would be opened in connection with a loan
application with the Citibank of New York. He denied that Salamancas group tasked him and
Rolando Santos with opening accounts in Metro Manila banks, particularly with CitibankGreenhills. He denied knowing Santos and Estacio personally although he admitted that Estacio,
with Manuel Valentino, came to his office to deliver a tailored suit for a certain Atty. Martin. He
further denied knowing Jaime Tan but admitted knowing Alfredo Fajardo, who was his client
when he was still connected with BPI.30
Alfredo Fajardo opted to waive his right to testify and said that he has no documentary
evidence to present before the Sandiganbayan.31 Another accused, Emilio Reyes, voluntarily
surrendered to the Sandiganbayan and was detained at the Security and Sheriff Services
office.32 He filed a motion for reinvestigation on June 16, 1987 but it was resolved against
him.33 He pleaded not guilty to the charges against him. 34 However, since July 17, 1989, Reyes
failed to appear for trial. On February 16, 1990, the Sandiganbayan acquitted him in these cases
on account of the prosecutions failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 35 Because the
cases against Reyes were tried in absentia, the Sandiganbayan ordered that these be archived
without prejudice to revival "for purposes of contempt citation in the event that he shall have
been apprehended and brought within the jurisdiction" of the court.36
Rolando San Pedro was arrested on March 22, 1988 at the vicinity of the Sandiganbayan. 37 He
entered a plea of not guilty to the charges against him. 38 On June 11, 1989, he died. 39 Thus, the
Sandiganbayan dismissed the cases against him. In the Resolution of February 23, 1990, which
was promulgated on March 12, 1990, the Sandiganbayan resolved that the cases against Felipe
Salamanca, Basilio Tan, Jaime Tan and Mariano Bustamante be archived.40
As stated earlier, the Sandiganbayan convicted Estacio, Desiderio, Santos, and Fajardo of the
complex crimes of estafa thru falsification of public documents. Estacio, Desiderio and Fajardo
filed separate motions for reconsideration,41 while Santos filed with the Supreme Court a motion
for extension of time to file a petition forcertiorari.42 On September 26, 1985, the Sandiganbayan
denied those motions for reconsideration.43 Hence, the instant petitions for review
on certiorari that they individually filed with this Court, but which were consolidated in the
Resolution of December 10, 1985.44
In its consolidated comment on the petitions, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) questions
the propriety of raising factual issues in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of a
Decision of the Sandiganbayan.45The OSG asserts that in such a petition, this Courts
jurisdiction is "confined to questions of law" and hence, this Court "is not supposed to reweigh
evidence but only to determine its substantiality." On this matter, in Filoteo, Jr. vs.
Sandiganbayan,46 this Court, after citing Jariol, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan,47 said:
"As amended by Republic Act No. 7975, Section 7 of P.D. No. 1606 expressly provides that
`(d)ecisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be appealable to the Supreme Court by
petition for review on certiorari raising pure questions of law in accordance with Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. However, in exceptional cases, this Court has taken cognizance of questions of
fact in order to resolve legal issues, as where there was palpable error or grave
misapprehension of facts by the lower court. Criminal cases elevated by convicted public
officials from the Sandiganbayan deserve the same thorough treatment by this Court as criminal

cases involving ordinary citizens simply because the constitutional presumption of innocence
must be overcome by proof beyond reasonable doubt. In all criminal cases, a persons life and
liberty are at stake."
While only petitioner Estacio is a government employee in these cases, as the three others are
private individuals, it is in the light of this pronouncement that the instant petitions shall be
considered and resolved. Moreover, in the recent case of Armed Forces of the Philippines
Mutual Benefit Association, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals,48 the Court, citing Supreme Court
Circular No. 2-90 dated March 9, 1990, held that a petition for review on certiorariquestioning the
final judgment, order, or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional
Trial Courts or other courts, may raise factual issues. In the exercise of its sound discretion,
taking into account the attendant circumstances, this Court retains the option of either taking
cognizance of, and deciding such issues, or referring the case to the proper court for
determination. In these criminal cases, this Court chooses to take cognizance of factual
questions raised in the interest of proper administration of justice.
In their separate petitions, petitioners assert that there was no proof beyond reasonable doubt
that they committed the crimes charged principally because:
(a) the extrajudicial confessions of petitioner Estacio and Valentino are inadmissible in
evidence as their right to counsel was violated when said confessions were executed;
(b) the discharge of Valentino from the informations to be a state witness was
improper; and
(c) conspiracy, which made all petitioners equally guilty, was not adequately proven.
Notably, petitioners Santos and Estacio aver that, should they be convicted as charged, they
should be held individually liable only as an accomplice.49
Relevant to petitioners contention on the admissibility of the extrajudicial confessions of
petitioner Estacio and Valentino is Article IV, Section 20 of the 1973 Constitution providing for the
rights of an accused during custodial investigation. It reads:
"No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under investigation
for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be
informed of such rights. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which
vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this
section shall be inadmissible in evidence."
On the other hand, the first paragraph of Article III, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution states:
"(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably
of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with
one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel."

A comparison of these provisions would readily show that the 1973 Constitution does not specify
the right against uncounselled waiver of the right to counsel, which is found in paragraph 1,
Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. However, the latter constitutional provision cannot
be applied to extrajudicial confessions made prior to its date of effectivity. In Filoteo, Jr. vs.
Sandiganbayan, this Court held that:
"x x x the specific provision of the 1987 Constitution requiring that a waiver by an accused of his
right to counsel during custodial investigation must be made with the assistance of counsel may
not be applied retroactively or in cases where the extrajudicial confession was made prior to the
effectivity of said Constitution. Accordingly, waivers of the right to counsel during custodial
investigation without the benefit of counsel during the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution should,
by such argumentation, be admissible. Although a number of cases held that extrajudicial
confessions made while the 1973 Constitution was in force and effect, should have been made
with the assistance of counsel, the definitive ruling was enunciated only on April 26, 1983 when
this Court, through Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile, issued the guidelines to be observed by law enforcers
during custodial investigation. The Court specifically ruled that `(t)he right to counsel may be
waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Thereafter,
in People vs. Luvendino, the Court through Mr. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano vigorously taught:
`x x x. The doctrine that an uncounselled waiver of the right to counsel is not to be given legal
effect was initially a judge-made one and was first announced on 26 April 1983 in Morales vs.
Enrile and reiterated on 20 March 1985 in People vs. Galit. x x x.
While the Morales-Galit doctrine eventually became part of Section 12 (1) of the 1987
Constitution, that doctrine affords no comfort to appellant Luvendino for the requirements and
restrictions outlined in Morales and Galit have no retroactive effect and do not reach waivers
made prior to 26 April 1983 the date of promulgation of Morales."50
Clearly then, the Morales-Galit rulings are inapplicable in these cases as the extrajudicial
confessions in question here, were taken on February 13, February 17 and March 22, 1982,
long before the date of promulgation of theMorales Decision on April 26, 1983. Prior to this date,
the guidelines requiring that waiver of the right to counsel by an accused can be properly made
only with the presence and assistance of counsel, had yet to be formulated and pronounced by
this Court.51
The rule on prospective application of "judge-made laws" was stressed in Co vs. Court of
Appeals.52 In that case, the Court, through then Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa, ruled that in
accordance with Article 8 of the Civil Code providing that "(j)udicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines,"
and Article 4 of the same Code stating that "(l)aws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the
contrary is provided," the principle of prospectivity of statutes, original or amendatory, shall apply
to judicial decisions, which, although in themselves are not laws, are nevertheless evidences of
what the law means.
As to the admissibility of the uncounselled waivers of Valentino and petitioner Estacio of their
right to counsel during custodial investigation, the intelligent and voluntary execution thereof
should be determined. The pre-interrogation advisories to the extrajudicial confessants uniformly
state:

"01. QUESTION: Mr. MANUEL VALENTINO, we are informing you that you are under
investigation in connection with the alleged Estafa thru Falsification of Commercial/Official
Documents committed at the Central Bank of the Philippines. But before we ask you any
question, you must understand your legal rights. You have the right to remain silent. You have
the right not to give any statement if you do not wish to. Anything you say may be used as
evidence against you in any proceeding. You are entitled to the assistance of counsel of your
own choice. If you cannot afford a lawyer and you want one, a lawyer will be appointed for you
before we ask you any question. Now, after having been so informed, are you still willing to give
a free and voluntary statement and swear to tell the truth and nothing but the truth in this
investigation?
ANSWER: Yes, sir.
"02. Q: Are you willing to sign a Waiver of your rights?
"A: Yes, sir.
"WAIVER
"I have been advised of my right to remain silent; that anything that I say may be used as
evidence against me and that I have the right to a lawyer to be present with me while I am being
questioned.
"I understand these rights and I am willing to make a statement and answer questions. I do not
want the assistance of counsel and I understand and know whag (sic) I am doing. No promises
or threats have been made to me and no force or pressure of any kind has been used against
me.
(Sgd.
MANUEL VALENTINO y SOCAN

with

thumbmark)

13 February 1982, NBI, Manila"53

It is settled that once the prosecution has shown that there was compliance with the
constitutional requirement on pre-interrogation advisories, a confession is presumed to be
voluntary and the declarant bears the burden of proving that his confession is involuntary and
untrue.54 The defense attempted to prove that Valentino and petitioner Estacio were subjected to
threats and intimidation at the NBI to obtain their confessions. Other than their bare assertions,
Valentino and petitioner Estacio miserably failed to present any convincing evidence to prove the
NBIs use of force or intimidation on their persons. Before signing their statements, they never
protested against any form of intimidation, much more, of maltreatment that they could have
relayed to relatives visiting them at the NBI. In People vs. Pia,55 the Court said:
"x x x It has been held that where the defendants did not present evidence of compulsion or
duress or violence on their persons; where they failed to complain to the officers who
administered the oaths; where they did not institute any criminal or administrative action against
their alleged intimidators for maltreatment; where there appeared to be no marks of violence on
their bodies and where they did not have themselves examined by a reputable physician to

buttress their claim, all these should be considered as factors indicating voluntariness of
confessions."
That the statements were intelligently executed is borne out by the fact that both confessants
have reached the tertiary level of education: Valentino holds the degree of Bachelor of Science
in Commerce56 while petitioner Estacio reached the first year of college education in banking and
finance.57 Possessed with sufficient education and not proven to be mentally unfit, they could
have protested the forced extraction of culpability from themselves if indeed that was true.
Moreover, the extrajudicial confessions in question are replete with details on the manner in
which the crimes were committed, thereby ruling out the probability that these were involuntarily
made.58 Voluntariness of a confession may be inferred from its language such that, if upon its
face the confession exhibits no sign of suspicious circumstances tending to cast doubt upon its
integrity, it being replete with details which could possibly be supplied only by the accused
reflecting spontaneity and coherence which, psychologically, cannot be associated with a mind
to which violence and torture have been applied, it may be considered voluntary. 59 In U.S. vs.
De los Santos,60 the Court said:
"If a confession be free and voluntary the deliberate act of the accused with a full
comprehension of its significance, there is no impediment to its admission as evidence, and it
then becomes evidence of a high order; since it is supported by the presumption a very strong
one that no person of normal mind will deliberately and knowingly confess himself to be the
perpetrator of a crime, especially if it be a serious crime, unless prompted by truth and
conscience."
In these cases, the NBI investigator would not have known the members of the syndicate and
the sophisticated manner by which the crimes in question were perpetrated if Valentino and
Estacio, who were directly involved therein, did not reveal these.
With respect to the admissibility of the extrajudicial confessions of Valentino and petitioner
Estacio against their co-accused, once again, this Court declares that although an extrajudicial
confession is admissible only against the confessant, jurisprudence makes it admissible as
corroborative evidence of other facts that tend to establish the guilt of his coaccused.61 In People vs. Alvarez,62 this Court ruled that where the confession is used as
circumstantial evidence to show the probability of participation by the co-conspirator, that
confession is receivable as evidence against a co-accused. The Court elucidated further
in People vs. Encipido63 as follows:
"It is also to be noted that APPELLANTS extrajudicial confessions were independently made
without collusion, are identical with each other in their material respects and confirmatory of the
other. They are, therefore, also admissible as circumstantial evidence against their co-accused
implicated therein to show the probability of the latters actual participation in the commission of
the crime. They are also admissible as corroborative evidence against the others, it being clear
from other facts and circumstances presented that persons other than the declarants
themselves participated in the commission of the crime charged and proved. They are what is
commonly known as interlocking confession and constitute an exception to the general rule that
extrajudicial confessions/admissions are admissible in evidence only against the declarants
thereof."

Petitioner Estacio claimed that, to his surprise, he found Valentino at the NBI. They talked for a
while and Valentino told him to say whatever he (Valentino) would say. 64 That allegation alone
cannot be considered as indicative of collusion between them as their sworn statements both
contain facts showing their deep involvement in the scheme to defraud a bank. Human
experience dictates that no one would volunteer to demonstrate ones culpability unless it was
the truth. It may thus be safely presumed that in telling petitioner Estacio to say whatever he
would say, Valentino was merely cautioning petitioner Estacio to tell the truth. Nevertheless,
even without the extrajudicial confessions of petitioner Estacio and Valentino, evidence on
record is sufficient to sustain a finding of culpability.65
On the validity of the discharge of Valentino from the information to be a state witness, the
determination of who should be used as a state witness to bolster the successful prosecution of
criminal offenses is part of prosecutorial discretion. 66 However, it is the courts that finally
determine whether the requirements of the Rules of Court 67 have been satisfied to justify the
discharge of an accused to become a state witness.
It should be recalled that petitioner Estacio was originally discharged to be a state witness. Upon
his manifestation that he would rather remain an accused in these cases for the protection of his
family, the court re-included him in the information. Apparently considering the nature of the
crimes and the secrecy by which these were perpetrated, the prosecution was left with no
recourse but to side with Valentinos motion for his discharge to be a state witness. The absolute
necessity for the testimony of someone who was a participant in the criminal scheme is
buttressed by the ruling that where a crime is contrived in secret then the discharge of one of the
conspirators is essential so he can testify against the other conspirators. 68 In a conspiracy which
was done in secret, there is a necessity to discharge one of the accused to provide direct
evidence of the commission of the crime.69
Worth noting, however, is that Valentinos testimony and his sworn statements differ with regard
to petitioner Estacios participation in the commission of the October 19, 1981 criminal act, and
the participation of petitioner Fajardo in the three crimes. Valentino stated in his sworn statement
that on October 19, 1981, when he noticed that the BPI representative had placed the demand
envelope containing the BPI-Laoag checks for clearing at the Laoag counter behind him,
petitioner Estacio, who was the syndicates messenger, immediately came with a push cart.
Petitioner Estacio placed the demand envelope in the pushcart and proceeded to the comfort
room in the fourth floor where Valentino followed him to alter the documents to suit the
syndicates purposes. On the other hand, when he testified, Valentino asserted that he did not
see petitioner Estacio at the meeting when they hatched the first operation on October 16, 1981.
When the alterations were made on October 19, 1981, Valentino claimed that petitioner Estacio
was not with them70 for it was he himself who brought the bundle of checks to the fourth floor
comfort room where Villasanta took the checks and altered the bank statements.
With respect to petitioner Fajardo, Valentino averred in his supplementary sworn statement that
petitioner Fajardo was present in three or four conferences where he participated in the
discussion to defraud a bank.71 However, on the witness stand, Valentino swore that petitioner
Fajardo had "no participation in these cases" 72 or in the three operations subjects of these
cases.

These discrepancies in Valentinos sworn statements and testimony are material ones as far as
petitioners Estacio and Fajardo are concerned. On this issue, the Court has consistently held
that:
"x x x discrepancies between the statement of the affiant in his affidavit and those made by him
on the witness stand do not necessarily discredit him since ex-parte affidavits are generally
incomplete. Affidavits are generally subordinate in importance to open court declarations
because they are oftentimes not in such a state as to afford him a fair opportunity of narrating in
full the incident which has transpired in his affidavit and those made by him. This is so because
affidavits are frequently prepared by the administering officer and cast in the latters language or
the latters understanding of what the affiant had said, while the affiant frequently simply signs
the affidavit after the same has been read to him." 73
In People vs. Fabro, the Court ruled that repudiation and recantation of confessions which have
been obtained in accordance with the Constitution are looked upon with disfavor as
unreliable.74 However, that ruling may not find application under the circumstances of these
cases. In Fabro, it was the accused himself who recanted his confession when, on the witness
stand, he denied he committed the crime. No other witness testified for the defense. On the
other hand, in these cases, Valentino, a co-conspirator who appeared as a state witness before
the court, adhered to his confession as regards the participation of the accused, except that he
testified that petitioner Estacio was absent when the first crime was planned and committed, and
that petitioner Fajardo was not involved in the three cases. It has been held that where a witness
who testified for the prosecution subsequently testifies for the defense by retracting his previous
testimony, the test to decide which testimony to believe is a comparison coupled with the
application of the general rules of evidence. 75 Although these cases do not involve the conflicting
testimonies of a witness, that rule may be applied in a conflict between a sworn statement and
the testimony while recognizing the inferiority of a sworn statement to a testimony. In these
cases, the narration of facts in Valentinos sworn statements were in substance reproduced in
his testimony which, in turn, was supported by other testimonial evidence and the voluminous
documentary evidence.
In the absence of any reason to question the credibility of Valentino and that of his testimony,
that portion of his testimony on the nonparticipation of petitioner Estacio in Crim. Case No. 5949
and petitioner Fajardo in all three cases shall be controlling. We deem the variance in
Valentinos testimony as endeavors to rectify his sworn statements to conform to the truth. To
reiterate, such variance, does not make him a less credible witness or affect the merit of his
testimony, as the other pieces of prosecution evidence support it and do not prove that it is
untruthful or contrived.
The value of Valentinos testimony in the prosecution of these cases cannot be underestimated.
It fills in the gaps in the prosecution evidence that the other prosecution witnesses failed to
cover. Without it, conspiracy to defraud the BPI-Laoag of P9,000,000.00 through falsification of
the clearing statement and manifest would not have been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. 76 As creditably shown by the prosecution, the
crimes were committed not solely by the person who altered the clearing statement and
manifest. That all-important act, the conception of which could have been hatched only by one

familiar with banking procedures, would not have been possible if not for the indispensable
cooperation of others. Thus, Valentino testified:

demand envelopes to the Central Banks fourth floor comfort room where alterations were made.
By the nature of his work, he had access to these demand envelopes containing BPI checks. His
participation in the conspiracy was therefore vital to the realization of the syndicates objectives.

"Q Will you please describe in detail what was agreed upon during the meeting?
A It was agreed upon that Salamanca and Villasanta will open an account at Laoag Branch of
the Bank of the Philippine Islands and Desiderio also and Santos are also in charge in opening
accounts in Metro Manila, particularly Citibank, Greenhills. Basilio Tan, he is stationary in the
office. Jaime Tan and Rolando San Pedro are the ones in charge in withdrawals at the
Citibank."77
However, the liability of each of the petitioners must be considered within the purview of the
following pronouncement in the celebrated case of People vs. Berroya78 where the Court said
that:
"x x x to hold an accused liable as co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to
have performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the conspiracy. That overt act may
consist of active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself, or it may consist of
moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being present at the time of the commission of the
crime, or by exerting moral ascendancy over the other co-conspirators by moving them to
execute or implement the conspiracy. Hence, the mere presence of an accused at the
discussion of a conspiracy, even approval of it without any active participation in the
same, is not enough for purposes of conviction. Thus, assuming Vienes was a participant in
the planning to abduct a Taiwanese national, in the absence of eyewitnesses to the actual
abduction, there is a paucity of evidence as to whether or not Vienes carried out his part of the
plan." (emphasis supplied)
In these cases, even if Valentinos supplementary sworn statement stating that
petitioner Fajardo participated in the discussion of the scheme to milk money from a bank
should be given evidentiary weight, still, that evidence is not enough to convict him. There is no
evidence showing that he participated in opening a bank account in the procedure to alter the
clearing manifests and statements, or in the withdrawal of substantial amounts resulting from
such alteration of documents. There is thus insufficient evidence against petitioner Fajardo to
find him culpable for the crimes charged in these cases and hence, he should be acquitted.
Similarly situated as petitioner Fajardo, is petitioner Santos. His admission to having attended
several meetings of Salamancas group did not satisfactorily define his liability as a conspirator
considering the absence of any proof that he committed an overt act in pursuance of the
syndicates scheme. His pretext of having entered into a "car sale" with Salamanca may ring
hollow in truth but the weakness of his defense cannot be taken against him considering the
insufficiency of prosecution evidence on his participation in the actual commission of the crime.
His acquittal is, therefore, likewise in order.
With respect to petitioner Estacio, Valentinos testimony on the first syndicate operation on
October 16, 1981 should be counted in his favor. There is insufficient evidence that he
participated in the alteration of documents at the Central Bank Clearing Office on October 19,
1981 much more in the prior discussion to perpetrate the crime. Hence, his acquittal in Criminal
Case No. 5949 should follow. However, as regards the syndicate operations on October 30,
1981 and November 20, 1981, there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of his role in carrying the

Parenthetically, the Court notes with dismay the Sandiganbayans pronouncement that petitioner
Estacios "wishy-washy" attitude in offering himself as a state witness "confirmed his knowledge
of the intimate details of the conspiracy and the mode or manner by which its operations and
schemes would be initiated and consummated."79Such conclusion is in consonance with the
presumption of guilt, not with that of innocence. An accused may have some reasons for his
irresolute action as far as testifying for the prosecution is concerned. Petitioner Estacio had such
reason he feared for the safety of his family considering that he would be up against a
syndicate that, because of the success of its evil scheme, had the money to harm their
perceived "enemies." That petitioner Estacio was deeply enmeshed in the syndicates activities
to bleed money from banks is shown by the fact that in Crim. Case No. 6603 involving the
syndicates operation in the Solidbank, his conviction for the crime of estafa thru falsification of
public/commercial documents was affirmed by this Court in G.R. No. 75362. 80 But such
conviction for another crime must not be the basis for a conclusion that the accused is guilty of
another crime charged, although basically, the same criminal acts were committed. We therefore
find the Sandiganbayans pronouncement totally unexpected of a court that must determine the
culpability of an accused based on the prosecution evidence and not on the weakness of the
defense or the reputation of an accused.
Petitioner Desiderio, on the other hand, has been proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt for
having participated both in the discussion and mapping out of the malevolent scheme and in its
actual execution. Desiderios knowledge of banking procedures provided the rationale for his
giving "birth", or having "authored" the scheme along with Salamanca and Villasanta. 81 He had
served as branch manager in the BPI where he was employed for twenty-seven years, or until
he was charged with estafa for accommodating a clients loan against an uncollected
deposit.82 Nieves Garrido, a personal banker at Citibank-Greenhills, who entertained him when
he made queries about opening a current account, confirmed his having opened said account
for Magna Management Consultant, thereby lending credence to and corroborating Valentinos
testimony on his role in the implementation of the criminal scheme.
Petitioner Desiderios claim that he opened that account in accordance with his legitimate role
as consultant in Mardes Management Consultant is a lame excuse. Anyone, especially a
businessman such as San Pedro or Salamanca, could have opened a current account without
hiring the services of a management consultant. That lame excuse sounds even lamer
considering the evidence showing that his alleged client was also engaged in management
consultancy. Desiderio thus relied on denial as a mode of defense. A denial, like other defenses,
remains subject to the strength of the prosecution evidence which is independently assessed.
When the evidence for the prosecution convincingly connects the crime and the culprit, the
probative value of the denial is negligible. 83 Desiderios denial of complicity in the scheme
cannot, therefore, prevail over the positive testimonies of Nieves Garrido and Valentino that he
played the important role of opening the current account that paved the way to the "inside jobs"
of petitioner Estacio, Valentino and, probably, Villasanta. His sole overt act under the syndicates
scheme facilitated the commission of all three counts of estafa thru falsification of public
documents.
Notably, in these cases, the Sandiganbayan observed that none of the accused refuted the
documentary exhibits offered in evidence by the prosecution. 84 The pieces of documentary

evidence consist of bank records including deposit slips, ledger cards, specimen cards, checks
for deposit and withdrawal, clearing statements and clearing manifests. All of these clearly and
positively buttress the prosecutions theory as to how the pilferage scheme was successfully
implemented. The defense obviously could not demolish the evidentiary weight of the
prosecutions documentary evidence and hence, it focused on the prosecution evidence on the
membership of the accused in the syndicate, and on the probative value of the interlocking
confessions of Valentino and petitioner Estacio. There is thus no alternative to giving full
credence and merit to the prosecutions documentary evidence, and to declaring them to be in
complete accord with the prosecution theory on the commission of the offenses and the nature
and extent of participation of the accused.
The informations filed in these cases individually charge an offense "defined and penalized
under Article 315, par. 2 (a) in relation to Article 171, par. 2" of the Revised Penal Code. The
elements of estafa are as follows: (1) the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence, or
by means of deceit; and (2) the offended party or a third party suffered damage or prejudice
capable of pecuniary estimation.85 It is indubitable that estafa was committed by abuse of
confidence in these cases. The conspirators that enlisted and utilized the assistance of Central
Bank employees abused the confidence that the banking system reposed upon such
employees. As a result of such abuse of confidence, the BPI sustained damage in the aggregate
of Nine Million Pesos (P9,000,000.00). Verily, the perpetrators of the crimes breached even the
confidence that people reposed on the Central Bank and the whole banking system.
By falsifying clearing documents, the offenders committed the complex crime of estafa thru
falsification of public documents. Under Article 171 (4) of the Revised Penal Code, any public
officer or employee who, taking advantage of his official position, makes untruthful statements in
a narration of facts, commits the crime of falsification of public documents. This kind of
falsification requires the concurrence of the following requisites: (a) the offender makes in a
document untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (b) he has a legal obligation to disclose
the truth of the facts narrated by him; and (c) the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely
false.86
The prosecution has duly proven these requisites. Valentino occupies a public position as
bookkeeper at the Clearing Office of the Central Bank. He intercepted and pilfered BPI-Laoag
checks with the assistance of petitioner Estacio, a janitor-messenger at the Central Bank. In the
comfort room, Valentino and/or Villasanta, who has so far avoided the clutches of the law,
tampered with the clearing statements and clearing manifests which Estacio had taken from
Valentinos desk. The tampered documents, along with the pilfered demand envelopes, were
then sent to the Central Bank Regional Clearing Center in Laoag. These "inside jobs" were
perpetrated as part of the decadent scheme that private individuals had hatched to gain
monetary gratification.
Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) under which the defendants were charged in these cases, states
that any person who shall defraud another by means of "using fictitious name, or falsely
pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or
imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits"shall be held liable for the crime of
swindling (estafa). Under the peculiar circumstances proven in these cases, the crime actually
committed by the offenders is that defined in Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code on other
deceits. The first paragraph of this article states that "(t)he penalty of arresto mayor and a fine of
not less than the amount of the damage caused and not more than twice such amount shall be
imposed upon any person who shall defraud or damage another by any other deceit not

mentioned in the preceding articles of this chapter." Although the information charged the
accused with violation of paragraph 2 of Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code defining the
crime of falsification by public officer of employee, the Sandiganbayan correctly found that the
accused violated paragraph 4 of the same Article which states as follows:
"The penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed P5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any
public officer, employee, or notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a
document by committing any of the following acts:
xxx

xxx

xxx

"4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts."

Inasmuch as the crime committed in these cases is the complex crime of estafa thru falsification
of public documents and Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code states that when an offense is a
necessary means for committing another offense, "the penalty for the most serious crime shall
be imposed" in its maximum period, the penalty for the crimes committed in these cases is that
imposed for falsification of public documents or prision mayor in its maximum period and a fine
of P5,000.00.
While it appears that the Sandiganbayan correctly held that the basis for imposition of penalty
should be that imposed by law for falsification of public documents, it erred in imposing the
maximum penalty of the indeterminate sentence it meted upon the accused. Finding no
modifying circumstances, the Sandiganbayan imposed for each complex crime of estafa thru
falsification of public document, the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and
one (1) day of prision correccional to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor.
Under the procedural guidelines for imposing penalties for complex crimes enunciated
in Nizurtado vs. Sandiganbayan,87 the first step in determining the proper penalty is to consider
whether or not aggravating and/or mitigating circumstances attended the commission of the
crimes.
Only petitioner Estacio claimed that he voluntarily surrendered.1wphi1 For said mitigating
circumstance to be appreciated, surrender must be made spontaneously or in such a manner
that it shows the intent of the accused to surrender unconditionally to the authorities, either
because he acknowledges his guilt, or because he wishes to save them the trouble and expense
of finding and capturing him. 88 According to NBI Agent Ranin, petitioner Estacio went to the NBI
bearing a referral note from Atty. Agapito Fajardo, Chief of Anti-Fraud Unit of the Central
Bank.89 However, it was proven by the prosecution beyond peradventure of doubt that petitioner
Estacios alleged surrender was anything but spontaneous. He went to the NBI on February 17,
1982,90 five days after Atty. Fajardo had brought Valentino to that office for questioning, and a
day after a Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) had been issued against him and
Valentino.91 Moreover, the booking sheet and arrest report states that petitioner Estacio was
"arrested" on February 16, 1982.92 Voluntary surrender having been insufficiently proven, as far
as penalty is concerned, petitioner Estacio in Crim. Cases Nos. 5950-51 shall suffer the same
penalty as petitioner Desiderio who did not present proof that could mitigate the penalty that he
should suffer for the crimes.

Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code states that when the penalty prescribed by law is a single
divisible penalty, the accused shall be imposed the medium period of such penalty when there
are neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances. The propriety of imposing the medium
period of the more serious penalty for a complex crime after considering the modifying
circumstances notwithstanding that Article 48 requires the imposition of the penalty in its
maximum period has been settled. 93 It is supported by the doctrine that penal provisions shall be
interpreted in favor of the accused.

of the crimes charged for lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt. The Decision of the
Sandiganbayan as far as petitioner Marcelo S. Desiderio in G. R. No. 72387-89 and petitioner
Jesus E. Estacio, with respect to Criminal Case Nos. 5950 and 5951 are concerned, is herby
AFFIRMED subject to the modification that, for each crime, they shall suffer the indeterminate
sentence of four (4) years, two (2) months, and one (1) day of prision correccional maximum to
ten (10) years of prision mayormedium.
SO ORDERED.

The medium period of prision mayor is eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years. In the
absence of impediments to the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, for each crime
committed, the penalty that should be imposed upon petitioner Estacio in Crim. Case Nos. 5950
and 5951, and upon petitioner Desiderio in Crim. Case Nos. 5949, 5950 and 5951, shall be the
indeterminate sentence comprising of the minimum penalty within the range of prision
correccional, to the maximum penalty of prision mayor medium plus a fine of P5,000.00. It will
be observed that the maximum penalty erroneously imposed by the Sandiganbayan is ten (10)
years andone (1) day which is already within the period of prision mayor maximum.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, petitioner Rolando Santos y Ramirez in G.R.
Nos. 71523-25, petitioner Alfredo R. Fajardo, Jr. in G.R. No. 72384-86 and petitioner Jesus E.
Estacio in G.R. No. 72420-22 with respect to Criminal Case No. 5949 are hereby ACQUITTED