MOVABLE AND IMMOVABLE PROPERTY

1. Ladera vs Hodges
2. Mindanao Bus Co., vs City Assessor and treasurer
Doctrine:
PROPERTY;
IMMOVABLE
PROPERTY
BY
DESTINATION;
TWO
REQUISITES
BEFORE
MOVABLES MAY BE DEEMED TO HAVE BEEN
IMMOBILIZED; TOOLS AND EQUIPMENTS MERELY
INCIDENTAL TO BUSINESS NOT SUBJECT TO REAL
ESTATE TAX. Movable equipments, to be
immobilized in contemplation of Article 415 of the Civil
Code, must be the essential and principal elements of
an industry or works which are carried on in a building
or on a piece of land. Thus, where the business is one
of transportation, which is carried on without a repair or
service shop, and its rolling equipment is repaired or
serviced in a shop belonging to another, the tools and
equipments in its repair shop which appear movable
are merely incidentals and may not be considered
immovables, and, hence, not subject to assessment as
real estate for purposes of the real estate tax.
3. Makati Leasing & Finance vs Weaver Textiles
Doctrine:
CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY; MACHINERY THOUGH
IMMOBILIZED BY DESTINATION IF TREATED BY
THE PARTIES AS A PERSONALTY FOR PURPOSES
OF A CHATTEL MORTGAGE LEGAL, WHERE NO
THIRD PARTY IS PREJUDICED. The next and the
more crucial question to be resolved in this petition is
whether the machinery in suit is real or personal
property from the point of view of the parties.

Examining the records of the instance case, the

Supreme Court found no logical justification to exclude
and rule out, as the appellate court did, the present
case from the application of the pronouncement in the
TUMALAD v. VICENCIO CASE (41 SCRA 143) where
a similar, if not identical issue was raised. If a house of
strong materials, like what was involved in the Tumalad
case may be considered as personal property for
purposes of executing a chattel mortgage thereon as
long as the parties to the contract so agree and no
innocent third party will be prejudiced thereby, there is
absolutely no reason why a machinery, which is
movable in its nature and becomes immobilized only by
destination or purpose, may not be likewise treated as
such. This is really because one who has so agreed is
estopped from denying the existence of the chattel
mortgage.
4. Santos Evangelista vs Alto Surety & Insurance Corp.
Doctrine:
PROPERTY; HOUSE IS NOT PERSONAL BUT REAL
PROPERTY FOR PURPOSES OF ATTACHMENT. A
house is not personal property, much less a debt, credit
or other personal property capable of manual delivery,
but immovable property "A true building (not merely
superimposed on the soil), is immovable or real
property, whether it is erected by the owner of the land
or by a usufructuary or lessee" (Laddera vs. Hodges,
48 Off. Gaz., 5374.) and the attachment of such
building is subject to the provisions of subsection (a) of
section 7, Rule 59 of the Rules of Court.
5. Tsai Vs CA
Doctrine:

6. Sergs Products vs PCI

Doctrine:
CIVIL LAW; CONTRACTS; CONTRACTING PARTIES
MAY VALIDLY STIPULATE THAT REAL PROPERTY
BE CONSIDERED AS PERSONAL. The Court has
held that contracting parties may validly stipulate that a
real property be considered as personal. After agreeing
to such stipulation, they are consequently estopped
from claiming otherwise. Under the principle of
estoppel, a party to a contract is ordinarily precluded
from denying the truth of any material fact found
therein. Hence, in Tumalad v. Vicencio, the Court
upheld the intention of the parties to treat a house as a
personal property because it had been made the
subject of a chattel mortgage. The Court ruled: ". . . .
Although there is no specific statement referring to the
subject house as personal property, yet by ceding,
selling or transferring a property by way of chattel
mortgage defendants-appellants could only have
meant to convey the house as chattel, or at least,
intended to treat the same as such, so that they should
not now be allowed to make an inconsistent stand by
claiming otherwise." Applying Tumalad, the Court in
Makati Leasing and Finance Corp. v. Wearever Textile
Mills also held that the machinery used in a factory and
essential to the industry, as in the present case, was a
proper subject of a writ of replevin because it was
treated as personal property in a contract. Cc||| (Serg's
Products, Inc. v. PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc., G.R.
No. 137705, August 22, 2000)
7. Burgos vs Chief of Staff
Doctrine:

CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY; MACHINERIES INTENDED

FOR AN INDUSTRY WHICH MAY BE CARRIED ON IN
A BUILDING WHEN PLACED BY A TENANT REMAIN
MOVABLE PROPERTY SUSCEPTIBLE TO SEIZURE;
CASE AT BAR. Under Article 415 [5] of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, "machinery, receptacles.
instruments or implements intended by the owner of
the tenement for an industry or works which may be
carried on in a building or on a piece of land and which
tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or
works" are considered immovable property . In Davao
Sawmill Co. vs. Castillo (61 Phil. 709) where this legal
provision was invoked, this Court ruled that machinery
which is movable by nature becomes immobilized
when placed by the owner of the tenement, property or
plant, but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary,
or any other person having only a temporary right,
unless such person acted as the agent of the owner. In
the case at bar, petitioners do not claim to be the
owners of the land and/or building on which the
machineries were placed. This being the case, the
machineries in question, while in fact bolted to the
ground remain movable property susceptible to seizure
under a search warrant.||| (Burgos, Sr. v. Chief of Staff,
G.R. No. 64261, December 26, 1984)
8. Lopez vs Orosa
Doctrine:
PROPERTY; REAL ESTATE; MATERIALMAN'S
LIEN; DOES NOT EXTEND TO THE LAND;
BUILDING SEPARATE AND DISTINCT FROM
LAND. Appellant's contention that the lien
executed in favor of the furnisher of the materials
used for the construction, repair or refection of a

building is also extended to land on which the

construction was made is without merit, because
while it is true that generally, real estate connotes
the land and the building constructed thereon, it is
obvious that the inclusion of the building, separate
and distinct from the land, in the enumeration of
what constitute real properties (Art. 415 of the New
Civil Code [Art. 334 of the old]) could mean only one
thing, that a building is by itself an immovable
property. (Leung Yee vs. Strong Machinery Co., 37
Phil. 644.)
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; BUILDING AS IMMOVABLE
PROPERTY; IRRESPECTIVE OF OWNERSHIP OF
LAND AND BUILDING. A building is an
immovable property irrespective of whether or not
said structure and the land on which it is adhered to
belong to the same owner.
9. Yap vs Tanada
Doctrine:
CIVIL LAW; PROPERTY; IMMOVABLE PROPERTY;
WATER PUMP INSTALLED IN RESIDENCE BUT
REMOVABLE WITHOUT DETERIORATION, NOT
IMMOVABLE PROPERTY The Civil Code considers
as immovable property, among others, anything
"attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, in such a
way that it cannot be separated therefrom without
breaking the material or deterioration of the object."
The pump does not fit this description. It could be, and
was in fact separated from Yap's premises without
being broken or suffering deterioration. Obviously the
separation or removal of the pump involved nothing
more complicated than the loosening of bolts or

dismantling of other fasteners.

10. Machinery & Engineering Supplies Inc., vs CA

Doctrine:
APPLICABLE
ONLY
TO
RECOVER
PERSONAL PROPERTY. Ordinarily replevin may
be brought to recover any specific personal property
unlawfully taken or detained from the owner thereof,
provided such property is capable of identification
and delivery; but replevin will not lie for the recovery
of real property or incorporeal personal property.
4.ID.; MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT, WHEN
IMMOVABLE. The machinery and equipment in
question appeared to be attached to the land,
particularly to the concrete foundation of a building,
in a fixed manner, in such a way that the former
could not be separated from the latter without
breaking the material or deterioration of the object.
Hence, in order to remove said outfit, it became
necessary not only to unbolt the same, but to also
cut some of its wooden supports. Said machinery
and equipment were "intended by the owner of the
tenement for an industry" carried on said immovable
and tended "directly to meet the needs of said
industry." For these reasons, they were already
immovable pursuant to paragraph 3 and 5 of Article
415 of Civil Code of the Philippines.
5.ID.; RESTITUTION; REINSTALLATION OF
DISMANTLED AND REMOVED PROPERTY IN ITS
ORIGINAL CONDITION. When the restitution of
what has been taken by way of replevin has been

ordered, the goods in question shall be returned in

substantially the same condition as when taken (54
C. J., 599-600, 640-641). Inasmuch as the
machinery and equipment involved in this case were
duly installed and affixed in the premises of
respondent
company
when
petitioner's
representative caused said property to be
dismantled and then removed, it follows that
petitioner must also do everything necessary to the
reinstallation of said property in conformity with its
original condition.
PUBLIC DOMINION AND PRIVATE OWENRSHIP
1. LAUREL VS GARCIA
Doctrine:
2. Rabuco vs Villegas
Doctrine
3. Macasiano vs Diokno
Doctrine:
PROPERTY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT DEVOTED
TO PUBLIC SERVICE; DEEMED PUBLIC; UNDER
THE ABSOLUTE CONTROL OF CONGRESS; LOCAL
GOVERNMENTS HAVE NO AUTHORITY TO
CONTROL OR REGULATE THEM UNLESS SPECIFIC
AUTHORITY IS VESTED UPON THEM BY
CONGRESS; AUTHORITY TO BE INTERPRETED
ACCORDING TO BASIC PRINCIPLES OF LAW; ART.
424 OF THE CIVIL CODE. Properties of the local
government which are devoted to public service are
deemed public and are under the absolute control of
Congress (Province of Zamboanga del Norte v. City of
Zamboanga, L-24440, March 28, 1968, 22 SCRA

1334). Hence, local governments have no authority

whatsoever to control or regulate the use of public
properties unless specific authority is vested upon them
by Congress. One such example of this authority given
by Congress to the local governments is the power to
close roads as provided in Section 10, Chapter II of the
Local Government Code, which states: "SEC. 10.
Closure of roads. A local government unit may
likewise, through its head acting pursuant to a
resolution of its sangguniang and in accordance with
existing law and the provisions of this Code, close any
barangay, municipal, city or provincial road, street,
alley, park or square. No such way or place or any part
thereof shall be closed without indemnifying any
person prejudiced thereby. A property thus withdrawn
from public use may be used or conveyed for any
purpose for which other real property belonging to the
local unit concerned might be lawfully used or
conveyed." However, the aforestated legal provision
which gives authority to local government units to close
roads and other similar public places should be read
and interpreted in accordance with basic principles
already established by law. These basic principles have
the effect of limiting such authority of the province, city
or municipality to close a public street or thoroughfare.
Article 424 of the Civil Code lays down the basic
principle that properties of public dominion devoted to
public use and made available to the public in general
are outside the commerce of man and cannot be
disposed of or leased by the local government unit to
private persons.
4.ROADS AND STREETS ORDINARILY USED FOR
VEHICULAR TRAFFIC CONSIDERED PUBLIC

PROPERTY; LOCAL GOVERNMENT HAS NO

POWER TO USE IT FOR ANOTHER PURPOSE OR
TO DISPOSE OF OR LEASE IT TO PRIVATE
PERSONS. However, those roads and streets which
are available to the public in general and ordinarily
used for vehicular traffic are still considered public
property devoted to public use. In such case, the local
government has no power to use it for another purpose
or to dispose of or lease it to private persons.
5.PROPERTY WITHDRAWN FROM PUBLIC USE;
BECOMES PATRIMONIAL PROPERTY OF THE
LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNIT; CAN BE OBJECT OF
ORDINARY CONTRACT. When it is already
withdrawn from public use, the property then becomes
patrimonial property of the local government unit
concerned (Article 422, Civil Code; Cebu Oxygen, etc.
et al. v. Bercilles, et al., G.R. No. L-40474, August 29,
1975, 66 SCRA 481). It is only then that the respondent
municipality can "use or convey them for any purpose
for which other real property belonging to the local unit
concerned might be lawfully used or conveyed" in
accordance with the last sentence of Section 10,
Chapter II of Blg. 333, known as Local Government
Code. Such withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial
property which can be the object of an ordinary
contract (Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co., Inc. v.
Bercilles, et al., G.R. No. L-40474, August 29, 1975, 66
SCRA 481).
4. Republic vs Ca
Doctrine:
CIVIL
LAW;
LAND
TITLES
AND
DEEDS;
COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 141 (PUBLIC LAND

ACT); LAND ACQUIRED UNDER A FREE PATENT;

PRESCRIPTION AGAINST ENCUMBRANCE. The
provisions under Secs. 118, 121, 122 and 124 of the
Commonwealth Act No. 141 (Public Land Act) clearly
proscribe the encumbrance of a parcel of land acquired
under a free patent or homestead within five years from
the grant of such patent. Furthermore, such
encumbrance results in the cancellation of the grant
and the reversion of the land to the public domain. The
prohibition against any alienation or encumbrance of
the land grant is a proviso attached to the approval of
every application. Prior to the fulfillment of the
requirements of law, Respondent Morato had only an
inchoate right to the property; such property remained
part of the public domain and, therefore, not
susceptible to alienation or encumbrance. Conversely,
when a "homesteader has complied with all the terms
and conditions which entitled him to a patent for [a]
particular tract of public land, he acquires a vested
interest therein and has to be regarded an equitable
owner. thereof." However, for Respondent Morato's title
of ownership over the patented land to be perfected,
she should have complied with the requirements of the
law, one of which was to keep the property for herself
and her family within the prescribed period of five (5)
years. Prior to the fulfillment of all requirements of the
law, Respondent Morato's title over the property was
incomplete. Accordingly. if the requirements are not
complied with, the State as the grantor could petition
for the annulment of the patent and the cancellation of
the title.

5. Province of Zamboanga Del Norte vs City of

Zamboanga
Doctrine:
POLITICAL LAW; MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS;
PROVINCES;
PATRIMONIAL
AND
PUBLIC
PROPERTIES THEREOF, DISPUTE AS TO PROPER
CLASSIFICATION OF PROPERTY INVOLVED IN
INSTANT CASE; CASE REMANDED TO LOWER
COURT FOR DETERMINATION THEREOF. Where
in its motion for reconsideration of the main decision of
this Court declaring that Republic Act 3039 is
unconstitutional and void in so far as the same seeks to
deprive the Province of Zamboanga del Norte of its
share in the 26 lots situated within the City of
Zamboanga, without just compensation, for the reason
that said 26 lots are patrimonial property of the old
Province of Zamboanga, the movant City of
Zamboanga contends that the said lots are not
patrimonial property of the former Province of
Zamboanga, said 26 lots having been always used for
public purposes, such as school sites, playgrounds and
athletic fields for schools, while the appellee Province
of Zamboanga contends that the evidence sought to be
filed by movant relative to its contention is not newly
discovered evidence and is therefore inadmissible at
this stage of the proceedings and in the alternative, that
it has additional evidence to show that most of these
lots are not actually devoted to public use, in the
interest of justice and equity, the main decision of this
Court should be reconsidered and set aside, in so far
as the 26 lots and the monetary indemnities involved
are concerned. Instead, the records of the case should
be remanded to the court of origin for new trial, in order
to determine whether or not the 26 lots were or were

not actually devoted to public use or governmental

purposes prior to the enactment of Republic Act 3039.
6. Chaves v Public Estates
Doctrine:
PATRIMONIAL PROPERTY CAN BE SOLD TO
PRIVATE PARTIES. Government owned lands, as
long they are patrimonial property, can be sold to
private parties, whether Filipino citizens or qualified
private corporations. Thus, the so-called Friar Lands
acquired by the government under Act No. 1120 are
patrimonial property which even private corporations
can acquire by purchase. Likewise, reclaimed alienable
lands of the public domain if sold or transferred to a
public or municipal corporation for a monetary
consideration become patrimonial property in the
hands of the public or municipal corporation. Once
converted to patrimonial property, the land may be sold
by the public or municipal corporation to private parties,
whether Filipino citizens or qualified private
corporations.
7. Villarico vs Sarmiento
Doctrine:
It is not disputed that the lot on which petitioner's
alleged "right of way" exists belongs to the state or
property of public dominion. Property of public
dominion is defined by Article 420 of the Civil Code as
follows:
"ART. 420.The following things are
property of public dominion:
(1)Those intended for public use such

as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports

and bridges constructed by the State,
banks, shores, roadsteads, and other of
similar character.
(2)Those which belong to the State,
without being for public use, and are
intended for some public service or for
the development of the national wealth."
Public use is "use that is not confined to privileged
individuals, but is open to the indefinite public." 6
Records show that the lot on which the stairways were
built is for the use of the people as passageway to the
highway. Consequently, it is a property of public
dominion.
Property of public dominion is outside the commerce of
man and hence it: (1) cannot be alienated or leased or
otherwise be the subject matter of contracts; (2) cannot
be acquired by prescription against the State; (3) is not

subject to attachment and execution; and (4) cannot be

burdened by any voluntary easement. 7
Considering that the lot on which the stairways were
constructed is a property of public dominion, it can not
be burdened by a voluntary easement of right of way in
favor of herein petitioner. In fact, its use by the public is
by mere tolerance of the government through the
DPWH. Petitioner cannot appropriate it for himself.
Verily, he cannot claim any right of possession over it.

OWNERSHIP
1. Javier vs Veridiano
Doctrine: