1) Pangasinan Trans. Co. vs. Phil.

Farming
Facts:
On November 18, 1946, the petitioner herein, (holder of several certificates
of public convenience with principal office of Dagupan Pangasinan),
presented to the Commission a written complaint for illegal reduction of
rates against herein respondent, alleging in substance, (a) that the latter had
been authorized to operate public service cars on the same lines awarded to
petitioner, subject to the condition that it shall charge five centavos per
passenger per kilometer; and (b) that, without permission, respondent "has
charged and now charging" a reduced passenger rate of two centavos per
passenger per kilometer. When the complaint was heard on January 9, 1947,
respondent orally moved for its dismissal on the ground that it did not
specify the acts constituting the offense. Despite petitioner's objection the
motion was granted, but petitioner was given a period of five days to amend
its complaint. Within the period indicated, an amended complaint was made
on January 14, 1947, naming the specific passengers who had paid two
centavos per kilometer and describing the routes traversed and the dates of
collection, to wit, on October 29, November 9 and November 2 of the year
1946. When this amended complaint was subsequently argued respondent
pleaded that the offense had prescribed, more than two months having
elapsed from the commission of the acts to the day the amended complaint
was filed
Issue:
Whether the amended complaint is to be regarded as a continuation of the
original compliant.
Ruling:
Where the original declaration states the cause of action, but does it
imperfectly, and afterward the amended declaration is filed, correcting the
defect, the plea of the statute of limitations will relate to the time of filing the
original declaration." (37 C.J., p. 1072.).
Under the rules of criminal law (if invoked) the commencement of the action
on November 18 (20 days after October 29) interrupted the running of the
sixty-day period, (People vs. Joson, 46 Phil., 380; Article 91, Revised Penal
Code) which began to run anew on January 9, 1947. Wherefore, on January
14, when the amended pleading was submitted only about twenty-five days
had elapsed from October 29. And this, on the suppositionthat the
prescription began to run on October 29; for it must be observed that the
period of prescription commences from the day on which the crime is

discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their agents (article 91,
Revised Penal Code), as to which date there are no representations.
Therefore, we must hold that the proceedings against herein respondent
were, under the law, commenced within the statutory period.
2) Dela Cruz vs. Ejercito
Facts:
On May 20, 1974 Milagros de la Cruz was charged with bigamy in the Court
of First Instance of Pampanga, Angeles City Branch IV for having married
Sergeant Dominick L. Gaccino on September 15, 1973 while her prior
marriage to Teodoro G. David was undissolved. The information was filed at
the instance of her first husband (Criminal Case No. 3128).
On August 1, 1974 Milagros de la Cruz filed in the same court at its San
Fernando Branch III a complaint for the annulment of her marriage to
Sergeant Gaccino on the ground of duress (Civil Case No. 4188).
Defendant Gaccino did not answer the complaint. Judge Mariano Castaeda,
Jr. ordered the Provincial Fiscal to investigate whether there was a collusion
between the parties. A special counsel of the Fiscal's office reported that
there was no collusion. .
On December 16, 1974 Judge Castaeda rendered a decision annulling the
marriage of Milagros de la Cruz to Gaccino. No appeal was taken from that
decision. It became final. In view of the annulment of her second marriage,
Milagros de la Cruz filed on January 27, 1975 a motion to dismiss the bigamy
charge. The private prosecutor and the prosecuting fiscal opposed the
motion.
Judge Bienvenido Ejercito denied it in his order of May 27, 1975 on the
ground that the decision in the annulment case is not controlling in the
criminal case because the parties and the issues in the two cases are not the
same.
That refusal of Judge Ejercito to dismiss the bigamy case, not withstanding
the judicial pronouncement that her second marriage was a nullity, prompted
Milagros de la Cruz to file the instant special civil action of certiorari and
prohibition.
Issue:
Whether the bigamy case became moot or untenable after the second
marriage.
Ruling:

We hold that the finding in the annulment case that the second marriage
contracted by Milagros de la Cruz with Sergeant Gaccino was a nullity is
determinative of her innocence and precludes the rendition of a verdict that
she committed bigamy. To try the criminal case in the face of such a finding
would be unwarranted.
As noted by Groizard, it is essential "que el segundo matrimonio 'ha de
constituir un acto solemne en que concurran los requisitos exigidos para la
existencia del sacramento o del contrato' " (2 Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal,
12th ed., p. 675, note 2). As pointed out in the Merced case, supra, it is
necessary in a prosecution for bigamy that the second marriage be declared
valid if its validity was questioned in a civil action.
And even supposing arguendo that the decree annulling the second marriage
was questionable or erroneous because it was issued in a judgment by
default, still that would not prevent the decree from having legal effect. "An
erroneous judgment is not a void judgment" (Chereau vs. Fuentebella, 43
Phil. 216).
WHEREFORE, the lower court's order of May 27, 1975, denying the motion to
dismiss of Milagros de la Cruz, is set aside. The writ of prohibition is granted.
No Costs.

3) De Ocampo vs. Republic

Facts:
Alfredo V. de Ocampo filed on June 29, 1960 an application for the
registration of two parcels of land known respectively as Lot No. 817 of the
Cadastral Survey of Sagay and Lot No. 2509 of the Cadastral Survey of
Escalante, both of Negros Occidental, stating in said application that the
Bureau of Public Schools, thru the Division Superintendent of Public Schools,
Bacolod City, is claiming said parcels of land.
On December 28, 1960, the court a quo issued an order of general default
against the whole world with the exception of the Bureau of Public Schools
and one Eugenio Cordero, a mortgagee of the lands. On May 13, 1961, the
court a quo issued an order declaring the Bureau of Public Schools as having
waived its claim to the property for its failure to file an answer in the absence
of any reasonable excuse
On July 27, 1961, the applicant filed a motion to declare the Bureau of Public
Schools as having completely abandoned its right to file an opposition and to
allow him to present his evidence, but on August 5, 1961, the court a quo
issued an order stating in substance as follows: It appearing that the Bureau

of Public Schools represented by the Solicitor General has not yet filed its
opposition to the petition despite the fact that the hearing was set for August
8, 1961, and the provincial fiscal was required to communicate with the
above official to inquire if he is still interested in pressing the claim of the
Bureau of Public Schools, postponing again for this purpose the hearing to
September 16, 1961, the court warned that if on that date the Solicitor
General has not yet filed his opposition, the claim of the Bureau of Public
Schools shall be deemed definitely abandoned and the court shall proceed
with the hearing of the evidence of the applicant.
Issue:
Whether the order by the court is interlocutory in character
An order is deemed final when it finally disposes of the pending action so
that nothing more can be done with it in the lower court (Mejia v. Alimorong,
4 Phil. 572; Insular Government v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Nueva Segovia,
17 Phil. 487; People v. Macaraig, 64 Phil. 904). In other words, a final order is
that which gives an end to the litigation (Olsen & Co v. Olsen, 48 Phil.
238).The test to ascertain whether an order is interlocutory or final is: does it
leave something to be done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the
case? If it does, it is interlocutory; if it does not, it is final (Moran, Comments
on the Rules of Court, Vol. 1, 3rd ed. pp. 806-807). A final order is that which
disposes of the whole subject-matter or terminates the particular
proceedings or action, leaving nothing to be done but to enforce by
execution what has been determined (2 Am. Jur., section 22, pp. 861-862).
(Reyes v. De Leon, G.R. No. L-3720, June 24, 1952).

4) Ortiz vs. Trent

Facts:
This is an original suit of mandamus brought in this court to compel the
allowance of an appeal from an order made by the Court of First Instance of
Albay in special proceedings for settlement of the estate of Doa Josefa
Garcia Pascual. The defendant judge, the administrator of the estate, and
one of the heirs have demurred to the complaint.
That mandamus is the proper remedy in cases of this kind, has been decided
in the case of Alemany vs. Sweeney(2 Phil. Rep., 654). The order from which
the plaintiff sought to appeal was dated on the 24th of October, 1908, and
was an order declaring who the heirs of the deceased were, what
participation each had in the property, and assigning it to them in undivided
interests. The same order also denied a petition presented by the plaintiff

Ortiz, holding that he had no right to intervene in the proceeding. This is the
only part of the order which it is necessary to consider.
Ortiz claims the right to intervene because he had bought and become the
owner of the interest of one of the heirs in the property. The way in which
this interest was acquired appears in the case of the estate of Jose Maria
Ceballos, Angel Ortiz, appellant
Issue:
Whether herein petitioner had the right to intervene as prescribed by law
Ruling:
In the case of The matter of the estate of Josefa Garcia Pascual2 (6 Off. Gaz.,
1242), this court held that the plaintiff Ortiz had no right to intervene in this
proceeding. At that time, however, his standing was only that of a general
creditor of the heirs. Since that time he claims to have acquired and become
the owner of the interest of one of the heirs of the estate. It is apparent that
the resolution of the question that will be presented upon the hearing of the
appeal.

5) Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Primetown Property Group

Facts:
Gilbert Yap, Vice Chair of Primetown applied on March 11, 1999 for a refund
or credit of income tax which Primetown paid in 1997. He claimed that they
are entitled for a refund because they suffered losses that year due to the
increase of cost of labor and materials, etc. However, despite the losses,
they still paid their quarterly income tax and remitted creditable withholding
tax from real estate sales to BIR. Hence, they were claiming for a refund. On
May 13, 1999, revenue officer Elizabeth Santos required Primetown to submit
additional documents to which Primetown complied with. However, its claim
was not acted upon which prompted it to file a petition for review in CTA on
April 14, 2000. CTA dismissed the petition as it was filed beyonf the 2-year
prescriptive period for filing a judicial claim for tax refund according to Sec
229 of NIRC. According to CTA, the two-year period is equivalent to 730 days
pursuant to Art 13 of NCC. Since Primetown filed its final adjustment return
on April 14, 1998 and that year 2000 was a leap year, the petition was filed
731 days after Primetown filed its final adjusted return. Hence, beyond the
reglementary period. Primetown appealed to CA. CA reversed the decision of
CTA. Hence, this appeal.
Issue:

W/N petition was filed within the two-year period

Ruling:
Pursuant to EO 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987, a year shall be
understood to be 12 calendar months. The SC defined a calendar month as a
month designated in the calendar without regard to the number of days it
may contain. The court held that Administrative Code of 1987 impliedly
repealed Art 13 of NCC as the provisions are irreconcilable. Primetown is
entitled for the refund since it is filed within the 2-year reglementary period

6) Briboneria vs. Court of Appeals

Facts:
Petitioner Salvador D. Briboneria, filed a complaint for Annulment
of Document and Damages, with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order against private respondent Gertrudes B. Mag-isa,
with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig. In due time, private respondent
Gertrudes B. Mag-isa, as defendant, filed her answer, after issues in the case
had been joined, petitioner served on the private respondent Mag-isa a
request for admission. Petitioner filed a Motion for summary Judgment,
claiming that the Answer to Request for Admission was filed by private
respondents beyond the ten (10) day period fixed in the
request and that the answer was not under oath.
That, consequently the private respondents are deemed to have admitted
the material facts and documents subject of the request for admission. The
private respondents filed an opposition to the motion for summary judgment,
while the petitioner filed a reply to said opposition. The
petitioner thereupon filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus to annul and set aside the order of the court a
quo, alleging that the said order was issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals dismisses the petition.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration having been likewise denied.
Issue:
Whether the appellate court erred in holding that the matters of fact and the
documents requested to be admitted are mere reiterations and/or
reproductions of those alleged in the complaint.
Ruling:
He claims that the material facts and documents described in the request for
admission are relevant evidentiary matters supportive of his cause of action.
He further argues that the private respondents have impliedly admitted

the material facts and documents subject tof the request for admission on
account of their failure to answer the request for admission within the period
fixed therein, and for said answer not being under oath. The petition cannot
be upheld; the petitioner's contentions are devoid of merit. "The material
matters and documents set forth in the request for admission are the same
as those set forth in the complaint which private respondents either admitted
or denied in their answer." it will be noted that the request for admission was
not served upon the private respondent Mag-isa but upon her counsel, Atty.
Alfredo A. Alto. Private respondent Mag-isa,therefore, cannot be deemed to
have admitted the facts and documents subject of the request for admission
for having failed to file her answer thereto within the period fixed in the
request. The petition should be, as it is hereby, DENIED. The decision of the
Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED

7) Lopez vs. Liboro

Facts:
In the Court of First Instance of Batangas the appellant opposed
unsuccessfully the probate of what purports to be the last will and testament
(Exhibit A) of Don Sixto Lopez, who died at the age of 83 in Balayan,
Batangas, on March 3, 1947, almost six months after the document in
question was executed. In the court below, the present appellant specified
five grounds for his opposition, to wit: (1) that the deceased never executed
the alleged will; (2) that his signature appearing in said will was a forgery; (3)
that at the time of the execution of the will, he was wanting in testamentary
as well as mental capacity due to advanced age; (4) that, if he did ever
execute said will, it was not executed and attested as required by law, and
one of the alleged instrumental witnesses was incapacitated to act as such;
and it was procured by duress, influence of fear and threats and undue and
improper pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiaries instituted
therein, principally the testator's sister, Clemencia Lopez, and the herein
proponent, Jose S. Lopez; and (5) that the signature of the testator was
procured by fraud or trick.
Issue:
Whether the court erred in admitting the questioned piece of evidence
Ruling:
In this jurisdiction this rule has been followed. After the parties have
produced their respective direct proofs, they are allowed to offer rebutting
evidence only, but, it has been held, the court, for good reasons, in the
furtherance of justice, may permit them to offer evidence upon their original

case, and its ruling will not be disturbed in the appellate court where no
abuse of discretion appears. (Siuliong and Co. vs. Ylagan, 43 Phil., 393; U. S.
vs. Alviar, 36 Phil., 804.) So, generally, additional evidence is allowed when it
is newly discovered, or where it has been omitted through inadvertence or
mistake, or where the purpose of the evidence is to the evidence is to correct
evidence previously offered. (I Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 2d
ed., 545; 64 C. J., 160-163.) The omission to present evidence on the
testator's knowledge of Spanish had not been deliberate. It was due to a
misapprehension or oversight.

8) Ortua vs. Rodriguez

Facts:
This suit grew out of an application for the purchase of a tract of public land
filed by the plaintiff-appellee with the Bureau of Lands. The case was
submitted to the court below upon an agreed statement of facts, from which
it appears that the sales application was approved and given entry S. A. No.
4546 by the Bureau of Lands in the same year in which it was filed, that is
1920. It appears also that after the filing of the application, the appellee took
possession of the land and introduced improvements thereon consisting of a
bib concrete warehouse, a house, and 180 coconut trees. It further appears
that eight years after the occupation of the land by the appellee, one
Honesto Obias filed a protest stating, among other things, that the appellee
had no right to purchase public land by reason of his being a citizen of the
Chinese Republic. Acting upon that protest, the Director of Lands ordered the
cancellation of the appellee's sales application, and required him to pay the
sum of P3,000 as rentals for the occupation of the land. This decision of the
Director of the Lands was appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, who affirmed the same but reduced the amount required
to be paid thereunder from P3,000 to P400, which latter amount was paid by
the petitioner under protest.
Issue:
Whether the appellee was entitled to recover the sum of P400 paid by him
under protest.
Ruling:
It has been held that where stipulations have been entered into between
counsel, one of the parties will not be allowed to withdraw from the
agreement thus made without the consent of the other, except by leave of
court upon cause shown. (Aurrecoechea vs. Bangs, 110 U. S., 217; 28 Law.
ed., 125.) We believe that the rule thus laid down should be followed in this

case not only because it is sound, but because it comes within the spirit of
section 333 of the Code of Civil Procedure. (Irlanda vs. Pitargue, 22 Phil.,
383.) Counsel for the appellants made no attempt whatever to obtain leave
of the court below to withdraw from the stipulations entered into in this case,
and we see nothing in the record that might have justified the granting of
such leave.

9) Sideco vs. Paredes

Facts:
The petitioner was sued separately by sixteen tenants of his to recover a
share which each of them claims in the sugar benefit payments. The plaintiff
in each of fourteen cases claims P82.18, and in the remaining two cases
P164.36. A joint trail was had in the justice of the peace court of Santa Ana,
where the defendant prevailed, as well as in the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga, where the plaintiffs prevailed. Petitioner moved to consolidate
the sixteen cases for the purposes of appeal and tendered one record on
appeal and one appeal bond, to minimize the expenses. The respondent
judge denied the motion to consolidate on the ground that it was field too
late and disapproved the consolidated record on appeal. Hence the present
petition for certiorari and mandamus to annul the order denying the motion
to consolidate and to compel the respondent judge to approve the
consolidated record on appeal and appeal bond.
Issue:
Whether the order of consolidation by the court was proper
Ruling:
Section 1 of Rule 32 of the Rules of Court provides as follows:
SECTION 1. Consolidation. When actions involving a common question of
law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial
of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions
consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein
as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay
We find, therefore, that under section 1 of Rule 32, in relation to section 2 of
Rule 1, the petitioner is entitled as a matter of right and justice to have the
sixteen cases in question consolidated for the purpose of appeal.lawphil.net
Wherefore, the orders of the respondent judge dated June 14 and July 14,
1941, respectively, denying the motion for consolidation and the motion for
reconsideration, are set aside, and the Court of First Instance of Pampanga is

hereby directed to approve and certify the consolidated record on appeal and
to approve the appeal bond, tendered by the petitioner in civil cases Nos.
6896-6911 of said court, without any finding as to costs. So ordered.

10)

Roque vs. Encarnacion

Facts:
In Civil case No. 16787 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled
Asuncion Roque Reyes vs. Francisco Reyes, plaintiff, petitioner herein, alleges
that she married defendant in November, 1943, and that out of their
marriage two children were born; that during the marriage plaintiff acquired
certain personal and real properties which produced a monthly income of
P3,530; that defendant committed concubinage with a woman named Elena
Ebarle, and in 1952 he attempted to take away her life, giving her blows and
attempting to strangle her. She, therefore, prays for (a) legal separation, (b)
legal custody of the children, (c) liquidation of the conjugal property, and (d)
alimony and support for the children.
In his answer, the defendant admits their marriage, claiming, however, that
it took place in February, 1944, but he denies the alleged concubinage by
him and the alleged income of the properties, or the squandering of the
same. He presented a counterclaim, alleging that plaintiff was already a
married woman when she contracted the marriage with him, having been
married with one Policarpio Bayore since February 19, 1930; that she
fraudulently represented herself as single, without impediment to contract
marriage; that she has been squandering money obtained from him, trying to
acquire property in her own name, etc. He prays for (a) the annulment of his
marriage to plaintiff, (b) custody of the children, and (c) damages in the
amount of P30,000. Her answer to the counterclaim is one mainly of denials.
As to the express allegation contained in the counterclaim that plaintiff is a
married woman at the time of their marriage, plaintiff makes this denial:
6. That the plaintiff denies specifically each and every allegation averred in
paragraph 6 of the counterclaim, the truth being that said Policarpio Bayore
(plaintiff's husband) has been absent for 14 consecutive years.
On October 21, 1952, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment,
opposition to which was filed by plaintiff on the ground that an action for
annulment can not be a ground for summary judgment. In support of the
motion for summary judgment, the deposition of Policarpio Bayore, former
husband of the plaintiff, was submitted. A supposed certified copy of his
marriage to plaintiff was identified by Bayore at the time of the taking of his
deposition. The affidavit of defendant was also submitted in support of the

action. Plaintiff did not present any affidavit, deposition, or document to

support his objection. Without much ado, the trial judge granted the motion
for summary judgment, immediately rendering a decision (a) declaring
plaintiff's marriage to defendant null and voidab initio, (b) declaring that
plaintiff concealed her true status and awarding the custody of the children
to defendant, and (c) declaring plaintiff's rights to the conjugal properties
forfeited in favor of their children, although granting the custody of the
smaller child to plaintiff.
Issue:
Whether the trial court had jurisdiction to render a summary judgment in the
action to annul the marriage.
Ruling:
We find that the trial court committed an error in annulling the marriage of
plaintiff to defendant in a summary judgment proceeding without the
formality of a trial. The trial court's error is not, however, limited to this. In
spite of the fact that a genuine issue of fact was raised by plaintiff's pretense
that she entered the marriage in good faith, this issue was ignored and the
court declared her rights to properties obtained during the marriage
forfeited, and the custody of one of the children denied to her. These
constitute an abuse of judicial discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction,
properly the subject of a proceeding by certiorari.
The judgment entered in the case is hereby annulled, and the lower court is
ordered to proceed in the case according to the Rules.