Sinyavino Oensive (1942)

The Sinyavino Oensive was an operation planned by

the Soviet Union in the summer of 1942 with the aim
of breaking the Siege of Leningrad, which had begun
the previous summer, and establish a reliable supply line
to Leningrad. At the same time, German forces were
planning Operation Northern Light (German: Nordlicht)
to capture the city and link up with Finnish forces. To
achieve that heavy reinforcements were arriving from
Sevastopol, which the German forces captured in July
1942. Both sides were unaware of the others preparations, and this made the battle unfold in an unanticipated
manner for both sides.

Soviet forces tried to lift the siege, which caused severe

damage to the city and losses in civilian population. The
Road of Life was frequently disabled by regular German
airstrikes. Several smaller oensives were launched in
1942 in the region, but failed. The last oensive near
Lyuban resulted in the encirclement and destruction of
most of the Soviet 2nd Shock Army.[7] Nevertheless, the
opening of a supply route to Leningrad was so important
that preparations for the new operation began almost immediately after the defeat at Lyuban.[8]

The Soviet oensive began rst in two stages. The

Leningrad Front began the oensive on August 19 and
the Volkhov Front launched the main oensive on August 27. From August 28, the German side shifted the
forces which were building up for their own oensive to
gradually halt the Soviet oensive. Initial German counterattacks failed, but the Soviet forces could not advance
either. After a ten day stalemate, the signicantly reinforced Germans launched a counterattack against the Soviet forces on September 21. After ve days of heavy
ghting, the German forces linked up and cut o the bulge
formed by the Soviet oensive.[4] By October 10, the
front line returned to the position before this battle; heavy
ghting continued until October 15, as the last pockets of
Soviet resistance were destroyed or broke out.

2 Preparations
The area south of Ladoga is heavily forested with many
wetlands (notably peat deposits) close to the lake. This
terrain hindered the mobility of artillery and vehicles. In
addition the forest shielded both sides from visual observation. One of the key locations were the Sinyavino
heights, which were approximately 150 metres higher
than the surrounding at terrain. The heights were one of
the few dry and clear areas and provided a good spot for
observation. The front line changed very little after the
blockade was established, allowing the German forces to
build a dense defensive network of strong points in the
area, interconnected by trenches, protected by extensive
obstacles and interlocking artillery and mortar re.[9]

In the end, the Soviet oensive failed, but heavy casualties caused the Germans to order their forces to assume
a defensive stance. In November, the German reinforce- 2.1 German plans
ments and other units were stripped from Army Group
North to deal with the major Soviet oensive at Stalin- The plan to capture Leningrad in summer-autumn 1942
grad and Operation Northern Light was aborted.[5]
was rst outlined in the OKW (German supreme command) directive 41 of April 5, 1942. The directive
stressed that the capture of Leningrad and the drive to
the Caucasus in the east were the main objectives in the
1 Background
summer campaign on the Eastern Front.[10]
The Siege of Leningrad started in early autumn 1941. By
September 8, 1941, German and Finnish forces had surrounded the city, cutting o all supply routes to Leningrad
and its suburbs. However the original drive on the city
failed and the city was subjected to a siege. During the
winter 194142, the city was partially supplied via the
Road of Life over the frozen Lake Ladoga, which allowed
the defenders to continue holding out. However after the
Siege of Sevastopol ended on July 4, 1942, with the German capture of the city, the German 11th Army was free
to be used elsewhere, and Hitler decided that the 11th
Army would be used in the assault on Leningrad.[6]

During discussions with Hitler on June 30, the commander of Army Group North, Field Marshal Georg
von Kchler, presented him with several operations that
would help to carry out this directive. Following these
discussions the OKH (German high command) started redeploying heavy artillery from Sevastopol, including the
siege artillery batteries Gustav, Dora and Karl, to assist
in destroying Soviet defenses and the Kronshtadt fortress.
The redeployment was complete by July 23. On the same
day, Fuehrer Directive No. 45 included orders for an operation by Army Group North to capture Leningrad by
early September. This operation was named Feuerza1

4 BATTLE

uber (Fire Magic). The attack was to be carried out by 3 Order of battle
the forces of the 11th Army, which were free to be used
elsewhere after the capture of Sevastopol.[12] In addition,
the OKH sent the 8th Air Corps to provide air support 4 Battle
for land forces. On July 30, the operation was renamed
Operation Northern Light (German: Nordlicht).[6]
Neither side was aware that the other was building up
The formulated operation required three army corps to forces and planning to launch an oensive in the region.
penetrate the Soviet defenses south of Leningrad. One The Germans only realized that the Soviet action was a
corps would then cut o Leningrad from the troops to major oensive in the following days after the start of
the south and west, while the other two would turn east the attack by the 8th Army on August 27. This resulted
and destroy the Soviet forces between the Neva River in the 11th Army and the 8th Air Corps being reassigned
and Lake Ladoga. Then the three corps could capture to deal with a major Soviet oensive and abandon preparations for the oensive on Leningrad.[21] Likewise the
Leningrad without heavy street ghting.[13]
Soviet forces were unaware of the redeployment of the
This would in turn free up the troops involved in the siege 11th Army to Leningrad and only expected to face ten
for use elsewhere and would make victory on the East- divisions of the 18th Army. The redeployment of forces
ern Front more likely. Meanwhile, the Germans were from the Crimea was not detected. This meant that the
also preparing for the Battle of Stalingrad. The 11th Soviet forces were launching an oensive when at a nuArmy had a total of 12 divisions under command in the merical disadvantage even before the battle started.[8]
Leningrad area.[6]

4.1 Soviet oensive, Leningrad Front, August 1926

2.2

Soviet plans

The Soviet Union had tried throughout 1942 to lift the

siege. While both the winter and Lyuban oensives operation failed to break the siege of the city, there was now
a part of the front where only 16 kilometres (9.9 mi) separated the Leningrad Front in the city and the Volkhov
Front.[14] The oensive was to link up the forces of the
two fronts and establish a supply route to Leningrad.
Because the Leningrad Front was at this time weaker,
the Volkhov was to carry out the oensive, while the
Leningrad Front would only carry out local attacks and
capture bridgeheads across the River Neva. The Volkhov Frontline before Volkhov Fronts attack
Fronts 8th Army was to spearhead the attack, with the
4th Guards Rie Corps in second and the reforming 2nd Ultimately the Soviet operation started before the GerShock Army in third echelon.[15]
man one, on August 19, although German sources give
Taking into account the dicult and heavily fortied ter- later dates.[22] This is because the oensive by the
rain of the upcoming battle, the Soviet troops were, in Volkhov Front did not begin until August 27. The Gercontrast to their earlier operations, very well equipped. man operation was due to begin on September 14.[23]
The 8th army was signicantly reinforced with artillery The Leningrad Front launched its oensive on August 19,
and tanks. On average, each rst echelon division was however due to the limited supplies and manpower, the
reinforced by a tank battalion, a few artillery regiments front was only to capture and expand bridgeheads across
and one or two batteries of Katyusha rocket launchers. the Neva River, that would help it to link up with the
This allowed the Soviets to deploy 60-100 guns and 5-9 Volkhov Front.[16] The German side did not see this as
tanks per kilometer of frontage of their main oensive. a major oensive, because the Leningrad Front had alThe troops were equipped with large numbers of PPD- ready mounted several local oensives in July and early
40 and PPSh-41 sub-machine guns. Engineering units August. On August 19, Franz Halder noted in his diary
were attached to individual artillery batteries, increasing only local attacks as usual in the Region. Therefore, no
additional defensive measures were taken.[24]
the overall mobility of the army.[16][17]

4.3

Stalemate, September 1020

4.2

Soviet main oensive, Volkhov Front, JG 54 and JG 77 were rushed to provide air superiority
operations over the battle front. Despite being opposed
August 27 September 9

Leningrad Front

by the Soviet 14th Air Army and outnumbered two to

one, the Luftwae maintained air superiority. Luftotte
1 destroyed 42 Soviet aircraft in large-scale air battles on
the 1 and 2 September and relieved pressure on German
ground forces. The German aerial activity was so eective, there was evidence some Soviet airmens morale had
broken down and they were not giving their best in combat. This prompted Joseph Stalin to threaten any pilot
refusing to engage with the enemy a court-martial.[19]

Schlisselburg

WS No3
WS No2

Melnitsa

WS No1

Lipka

WS No4

Nev

Neva
Operational
Group

Mar'ino

XXVI Army Corps

WS No5

Gorodok 2
WS No8

Gorodok 1
Nevskaya
Dubrovka

Sinyavino

Moskovskaya
Dubrovka

WS No6

WS No7

Arbuzovo

8th Army

Annenskoye

4th Guards
Rie Corps

Kruglaia Grove

2nd Shock Army

Gaitolovo

Volkhov Front

Tortolovo

18th Army

Mishino

XXX Army Corps

Sinyavino Oensive: situation on September 10

Soviet forces

Porech'e

11th Army
Mga

Voronovo

German forces

The furthest advance achieved by the Soviet forces

The Volkhov Front oensive started on the morning of

August 27. The hidden buildup of forces allowed the Soviet forces to enjoy a signicant superiority on the rst
day of the oensive in manpower, tanks and artillery and
caught the German by surprise. The 8th Army had initial
success advancing and scattering the rst line of German
defenses such as the 223rd Infantry Division, advancing
3 kilometres (1.9 mi) on the rst day at the location of
the main attack. However initial attempts to expand on
the anks failed due to heavy German resistance.[25] The
German command reacted by redeploying the 5th Mountain and 28th Light Infantry (Jager) divisions from staging
areas for Operation Nordlicht to meet the Soviet oensive. Lead elements from the 170th infantry Division,
which had only arrived in Mga, have also joined the offensive. In addition Hitler diverted the 3rd Mountain division, which was being redeployed by sea to Finland, to
Estonia instead.[21]

On September 5 Volkhov Fronts penetration increased

to 9 kilometres (5.6 mi), at the furthest point, thus leaving only 6 kilometres (3.7 mi) to the Neva River. Attempts to capture Sinyavino and the adjacent heights met
very heavy resistance and failed. On the anks, the Soviet forces captured the German strong points at Workers
Settlement 8 and Mishino on September 3, and Voronovo
on September 7. However no more ground was gained
after this day in the penetration sector. To try to break
the stalemate, the third echelon troops (2nd Strike Army)
were used, but German anking counterattacks forced a
halt to the oensive. On September 7, the Volkhov front
pulled back two divisions from the 8th Army and replaced
them with a fresh division and a tank brigade to achieve
further advance.[26]

4.3 Stalemate, September 1020

The battle turned into a stalemate with neither side gaining any ground despite several attempts to renew the offensive. Between September 1019 there was no major
change in the front line. The Soviet side was waiting for
reinforcements and air support, hoping to advance the 7
kilometres (4.3 mi) that separated it from the Leningrad
Front in the next few weeks, but reinforcements took
time.[27]
Having halted the Soviet advance, the German forces
now aimed to defeat it. Manstein, who was appointed
by Hitler to be in charge of all German forces in the
sector, aimed to cut o the bulge formed by the Soviet
advance. However, the initial counterattack on September 10 failed with heavy losses, encountering extensive
mineelds and artillery and mortar re. Manstein decided to build up forces for a two-pronged attack, while
local German counterattacks checked the Soviet attempts
to advance.[28]

On August 29, the breach in the German defenses was up

to 7 kilometres (4.3 mi) deep. To sustain their advance
towards Sinyavino, the Soviet forces started committing
their second echelon divisions into combat. The German
forces were further reinforced by the 12th Panzer and
part of the 96th Infantry Divisions. Notably, this day saw
the rst combat deployment of the Tiger tank, as part of
the 502nd Tank Battalion, which on August 29 had four
Tigers. The attempt to counterattack with them failed as
two of the tanks broke down almost immediately, and the 4.4
third tanks engine overheated.[20][21]
During this rst phase, aerial reinforcements were dispatched to Luftwaenkommando Ost (Air Command
Easts) Luftotte 1 (Air Fleet 1). The Oberkommando der
Luftwae (High Command of the Air Force) sent several Jagdgeschwader (Fighter Wings) to assist German
defences against intense Soviet air attacks. Elements of

German counter-oensive, September

21 October 15

The main German counter oensive began on September

21. Six divisions participated in the attack, with 121st
Infantry Division attacking from the north, 30th Army
Corps 24th, 132nd and 170th Infantry Divisions from
the south and 3rd Mountain and 28th Light Infantry Di-

6 NOTES
Army also suered losses, especially the 223rd Infantry
Division, which was opposing the 8th Army on the rst
day of its oensive.[22] Heavy casualties led to the OKH
Operations Order No. 1, which ordered Army Group
North to defense during the winter. In November, the
German reinforcements and other units were stripped
from Army Group North to deal with a major Soviet offensive at Stalingrad and Operation Northern Light was
aborted.[5]

6 Notes
[1] Glantz p. 226
[2] Isayev p. 142, only between August 28September 30
The German counteroensive

[3] Glantz (1995), p. 295

[4] Glantz p. 224

visions mounting holding attacks. The 5th Mountain Division suered heavy casualties in the last ten days and
did not play a big role in the counteroensive.[28]

[5] Glantz p. 230

The counterattacking German were facing the same problems as the Soviet forces had faced in the previous month.
Advance in dicult terrain overcoming the defensive positions was very slow and casualties were high.[22] Only
on September 25, after ve days of very heavy ghting,
German forces linked up near Gaitolovo, and part of the
Soviet 8th (the 6th Guards Rie Corps)[19] and 2nd Shock
Armies were encircled. After defeating Soviet attempts
to relieve or break out of the pocket, it was bombarded
by heavy artillery and air strikes. At the same time the
28th Light Infantry and the 12th Panzer divisions defeated the attempts of the Leningrad Front to expand their
bridgeheads.[4]

[7] Isayev p. 134

In the heavy ghting from the end of September to October 15, the German forces reduced the encirclement and
recaptured all previously lost strong points, except a small
bridgehead held by forces of the Leningrad Front near
Moskovkaya Dubrovka.[1]

[6] Isayev p. 133

[8] Isayev p.135

[9] Glantz pp.216217
[10] Isayev p. 132
[11] Glantz p. 484
[12] Glantz pp. 212213
[13] Glantz p. 213
[14] Isayev P.135
[15] Glantz p.217
[16] Isayev p. 135
[17] Glantz p. 218
[18] Glantz p. 216
[19] Bergstrm 2003, p. 365.
[20] Isayev p. 139

Aftermath

For the Soviet Union this operation was a costly failure,

although with less eect compared to the Soviet defeat
near Miasnoy Bor in June and July, where the 2nd Shock
Army was almost destroyed and the German forces reported capturing 33,000 prisoners.[29] After only three
months the Soviet forces would launch a new oensive,
Operation Iskra. That oensive would open a corridor to
Leningrad in January 1943.[30]

[21] Glantz p. 221

[22] Haupt W. Army Group North. The Wehrmacht in Russia
19411945
[23] Isayev p. 137
[24] Glantz p. 217
[25] Glantz p. 219
[26] Glantz p. 222
[27] Isayev p.140

For the Germans, the eects were bigger. Although the [28] Glantz p. 223
Soviet threat was eliminated and the position of the 18th
[29] Glantz p. 207
Army re-established, the 11th Army had suered serious losses in men, equipment and ammunition. The 18th [30] Glantz p. 286

References
Bergstrm, Christer (2003). Jagdwae: The War
in Russia, JanuaryOctober 1942. Classic Publications. ISBN 1-903223-23-7.
Glantz, David M. (2002). The Battle for Leningrad
1941-1944. Kansas University Press. ISBN 07006-1208-4.
Glantz and House, David M. and Jonathan M.
(1995). When Titans clashed: how the Red Army
stopped Hitler. Kansas University Press. ISBN 07006-0899-0.
Haupt, Werner (1997). Army Group North. The
Wehrmacht in Russia 19411945. Schier Military
History, Atlegen, PA. ISBN 0-7643-0182-9.
Krivosheev, Grigoriy.
"
XX : :
" [Russia and the
USSR in the wars of the 20th century: Loss
of armed forces: Statistical study] (in Russian).
Google translation
(Isayev), (2006).
. ,
. (in Russian). . ,
. ISBN 5-699-11949-3.

Coordinates: 595427N 310502E / 59.90750N

31.08389E

8 TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

Text and image sources, contributors, and licenses

8.1

Text

Sinyavino Oensive (1942) Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sinyavino_Offensive_(1942)?oldid=670453616 Contributors: JackofOz, Whiskey, Andrew Gray, Hohum, Rjwilmsi, Angusmclellan, Koavf, Ian Lancaster, RussBot, Bleakcomb, M3taphysical, Chanheigeorge,
De Administrando Imperio, SmackBot, Incnis Mrsi, Scepbot, Magioladitis, Dodo19~enwiki, Buckshot06, The Anomebot2, Paracel63,
Dapi89, Mishnayd, MisterBee1966, Xyl 54, Gemini1980, VolkovBot, TXiKiBoT, Robert1947, WereSpielChequers, Jappalang, Sturmvogel 66, MystBot, Yobot, AnomieBOT, LilHelpa, The Banner, Anotherclown, AustralianRupert, StoneProphet, FrescoBot, Diwas, Volga2,
VT1978, EmausBot, John of Reading, D2306, Demiurge1000, Whoop whoop pull up, Mjbmrbot, Snotbot, Ymblanter, CitationCleanerBot,
Hamish59, Nimetapoeg, YiFeiBot and Anonymous: 10

8.2

Images

File:Flag_of_German_Reich_(19351945).svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/99/Flag_of_German_

Reich_%281935%E2%80%931945%29.svg License: Public domain Contributors: Own work Original artist: Fornax
File:Flag_of_the_Soviet_Union_(1923-1955).svg Source:
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/58/Flag_of_the_
Soviet_Union_%281923-1955%29.svg License: CC-BY-SA-3.0 Contributors: ? Original artist: created by rotemliss from Image:Flag of
the Soviet Union.svg.
File:Sinyavin_offensive_25_09.JPG Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/38/Sinyavin_offensive_25_09.JPG
License: CC BY 3.0 Contributors: Own work (Original text: I (D2306 (talk)) created this work entirely by myself.) Original artist: D2306
(talk)
File:Sinyavin_offensive_27_08.JPG Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/63/Sinyavin_offensive_27_08.JPG
License: CC BY 3.0 Contributors: Transferred from en.wikipedia; transferred to Commons by User:Berichard using CommonsHelper.
Original artist: D2306 (talk). Original uploader was D2306 at en.wikipedia
File:Sinyavino_Offensive,_September_10,_1942.svg Source:
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a5/Sinyavino_
Offensive%2C_September_10%2C_1942.svg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 Contributors: This is a retouched picture, which means
that it has been digitally altered from its original version. Modications: English. The original can be viewed here: <a
href='//commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Sinyavin_offensive_10_09-fr.svg' title='File:Sinyavin oensive 10 09-fr.svg'>Sinyavin
oensive 10 09-fr.svg</a>. Modications made by Incnis Mrsi. Original artist: w:User:D2306 (version in JPEG)
Augusta 89 (vectorisation)
Incnis Mrsi (back to English language)

File:Volkhov_Front_Road.JPG Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/ef/Volkhov_Front_Road.JPG License:

Public domain Contributors: Transferred from en.wikipedia; transferred to Commons by User:Berichard using CommonsHelper.
Original artist: ... Original uploader was D2306 at en.wikipedia

8.3

Content license

Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 3.0