1. Tumalad v Vicencio; G.R. No.

L-30173; September 30, 1971

Although a building is an immovable; the parties to a contract may by agreement treat as
personal property that which by nature is a real property however they are estopped from
subsequently claiming otherwise.

FACTS:
Alberta Vicencio and Emiliano Simeon received a loan of P4, 800 from Gavino and Generosa
Tumalad. To guaranty said loan, Vicencio executed a chattel mortgage in favor of Tumalad over
their house of strong materials which stood on a land which was rented from the Madrigal &
Company, Inc. When Vicencio defaulted in paying, the house was extrajudicially foreclosed,
pursuant to their contract. It was sold to Tumalad and they instituted a Civil case in the Municipal
Court of Manila to have Vicencio vacate the house and pay rent.

The MTC decided in favor of Tumalad ordering Vicencio to vacate the house and pay rent until
they have completely vacated the house. Vicencio is questioning the legality of the chattel
mortgage on the ground that 1) the signature on it was obtained thru fraud and 2) the mortgage is
a house of strong materials which is an immovable therefore can only be the subject of a REM.
On appeal, the CFI found in favor of Tumalad, and since the Vicencio failed to deposit the rent
ordered, it issued a writ of execution, however the house was already demolished pursuant to an
order of the court in an ejectment suit against Vicencio for non-payment of rentals. Thus the case
at bar.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the chattel mortgage is void since its subject is an immovable

HELD:
NO.
Although a building is by itself an immovable property, parties to a contract may treat as personal
property that which by nature would be real property and it would be valid and good only insofar
as the contracting parties are concerned. By principle of estoppel, the owner declaring his house
to be a chattel may no longer subsequently claim otherwise.

When Vicencio executed the Chattel Mortgage, it specifically provides that the mortgagor cedes,
sells and transfers by way of Chattel mortgage. They intended to treat it as chattel therefore are
now estopped from claiming otherwise. Also the house stood on rented land which was held in
previous jurisprudence to be personalty since it was placed on the land by one who had only
temporary right over the property thus it does not become immobilized by attachment.

[Vicencio though was not made to pay rent since the action was instituted during the period of
redemption therefore Vicencio still had a right to remain in possession of the property]

2. Makati Leasing & Finance Corp. v. Wearever Textiles; G.R. No. L-58469; May 16, 1983
FACTS
Wearever Textile Mills, Inc. executed a chattel mortgage contract in favor of Makati Leasing and
Finance Corporation covering certain raw materials and machinery. Upon default, Makati Leasing
fi led a petition for judicial foreclosure of the properties mortgaged. Acting on Makati Leasings
application for replevin, the lower court issued a writ of seizure. Pursuant thereto, the sheriff
enforcing the seizure order seized the machinery subject matter of the mortgage. In a petition for
certiorari and prohibition, the Court of Appeals ordered the return of the machinery on the ground

that the same can-not be the subject of replevin because it is a real property pursuant to
Article415 of the new Civil Code, the same being attached to the ground by means of bolts and
the only way to remove it from Wearever textiles plant would be to drill out or destroy the
concrete fl oor. When the motion for reconsideration of Makati Leasing was denied by the Court
of Appeals, Makati Leasing elevated the matter to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE
Whether the machinery in suit is real or personal property from the point of view of the parties.
HELD
There is no logical justification to exclude the rule out the present case from the application of the
pronouncement in Tumalad v Vicencio, 41 SCRA 143. If a house of strong materials, like what
was involved in the Tumalad case, may be considered as personal property for purposes of
executing a chattel mortgage thereon as long as theparties to the contract so agree and no
innocent third party will be prejudiced thereby, there is absolutely no reason why a machinery,
which is movable in its nature and becomes immobilized only by destination or purpose, may not
be likewise treated as such. This is really because one who has so agreed is estopped from
the denying the existence of the chattel mortgage.
In rejecting petitioners assertion on the applicability of the Tumalad doctrine, the CA lays stress
on the fact that the house involved therein was built on a land that did not belong to the owner of
such house. But the law makes no distinction with respect to the ownership of the land on
which the house is built and We should not lay down distinctions not contemplated by law.
It must be pointed out that the characterization by the private respondent is indicative of the
intention and impresses upon the property the character determined by the parties. As stated
in Standard Oil Co. of New York v. Jaramillo, 44 Phil. 630, it is undeniable that the parties to a
contract may, by agreement, treat as personal property that which by nature would be a real
property as long as no interest of third parties would be prejudiced thereby.
The status of the subject matter as movable or immovable property was not raised as an issue
before the lower court and the CA, except in a supplemental memorandum in support of the
petition filed in the appellate court. There is no record showing that the mortgage has been
annulled, or that steps were taken to nullify the same. On the other hand, respondent has
benefited from the said contract.
Equity dictates that one should not benefit at the expense of another.
As such, private respondent could no longer be allowed to impugn the efficacy of the chattel
mortgage after it has benefited therefrom.
Therefore, the questioned machinery should be considered as personal property.

3. Santos Evangelista v Alto Surety; G.R. No. L-11139; April 23, 1958
FACTS: Petitioner, Santos Evangelista, instituted Civil Case in the Court of First Instance of
Manila for a sum of money, he obtained a writ of attachment, which levied upon a house, built by
Rivera on a land situated in Manila and leased to him, by filing copy of said writ and the
corresponding notice of attachment with the Office of the Register of Deeds of Manila. In due
course, judgment was rendered in favor of Evangelista, who bought the house at public auction
held in compliance with the writ of execution issued in said case. When Evangelista sought to
take possession of the house, Rivera refused to surrender it, upon the ground that he had leased
the property from the Alto Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. and that the latter is now the true owner of
said property It appears that a definite deed of sale of the same house had been issued to
respondent, as the highest bidder at an auction sale held in compliance with a writ of execution
issued in Civil Case of the same court for the sum of money, had been rendered in favor
respondent herein, as plaintiff therein. Evangelista instituted the present action against
respondent and Ricardo Rivera, for the purpose of establishing his title over said house, securing
possession thereof, apart from recovering damages. After due trial, the CFI Manila rendered
judgment for Evangelista, sentencing Rivera and Alto Surety to deliver the house in question to
Evangelista and to pay him, jointly and severally until said delivery, plus costs. On appeal taken
by respondent, this decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals, which absolved said
respondent from the complaint, upon the ground that, although the writ of attachment in favor of
Evangelista had been filed with the Register of Deeds of Manila prior to the sale in favor of
respondent, Evangelista did not acquire thereby a preferential lien, the attachment having been

levied as if the house in question were immovable property, although in the opinion of the Court of
Appeals, it is "ostensibly a personal property.
ISSUE: Whether or not the house is personal property.
RULING: No, the said house is not a personal property, much less a debt, credit or other personal
property not capable of manual delivery, but immovable property. As explicitly held, in Laddera vs.
Hodges (48 Off. Gaz., 5374), "A true building (not merely superimposed on the soil) is immovable
or real property, whether it is erected by the owner of the land or by usufructuary or lessee. This
is the doctrine of our Supreme Court in Leung Yee vs. Strong Machinery Company, 37 Phil.,
644. It is true that the parties to a deed of chattel mortgage may agree to consider a house as
personal property for purposes of said contract (Luna vs. Encarnacion, * 48 Off. Gaz., 2664;
Standard Oil Co. of New York vs. Jaramillo, 44 Phil., 630; De Jesus vs. Juan Dee Co., Inc., 72
Phil., 464). However, this view is good only insofar as the contracting parties are concerned. It is
based, partly, upon the principle of estoppel. Neither this principle, nor said view, is applicable to
strangers to said contract. Much less is it in point where there has been no contract whatsoever,
with respect to the status of the house involved as in the case at bar. WHEREFORE, the decision
of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed, and another one shall be entered affirming that of
Court of Instance of Manila with the costs of the instance against respondent, the Alto Surety &
Insurance Co. Inc. It is so ordered.
4. Tsai v Court of Appeals; G.R. No. 120098; October 2, 2001

FACTS: On November 26, 1975, respondent Ever Textile Mills, Inc. (EVERTEX)
obtained a three million peso (P3,000,000.00) loan from petitioner Philippine
Bank of Communications (PBCom). As security for the loan, EVERTEX
executed in favor of PBCom, a deed of Real and Chattel Mortgage over the lot
where its factory stands, and the chattels located therein. On April 23, 1979,
PBCom granted a second loan to EVERTEX. The loan was secured by a chattel
mortgage over personal properties enumerated in a list attached thereto.
After April 23, 1979, the date of the execution of the second mortgage
mentioned above, EVERTEX purchased various machines and equipments.
Upon EVERTEX's failure to meet its obligation to PBCom, the latter
commenced extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings against EVERTEX. On
December 15, 1982, the first public auction was held where petitioner PBCom
emerged as the highest bidder and a Certificate of Sale was issued in its favor
on the same date. On March 7, 1984, PBCom consolidated its ownership over
the lot and all the properties in it. In November 1986, it leased the entire
factory premises to petitioner Ruby L. Tsai. On May 3, 1988, PBCom sold the
factory, lock, stock, and barrel to Tsai, including the contested machineries.
On March 16, 1989, EVERTEX filed a complaint for annulment of sale,
reconveyance, and damages with the Regional Trial Court against PBCom.
EVERTEX claimed that no rights having been transmitted to PBCom over the
assets of insolvent EVERTEX, therefore Tsai acquired no rights over such
assets sold to her, and should reconvey the assets.
ISSUE: Whether or not the inclusion of the questioned properties in the
foreclosed properties is proper.
HELD: Yes. While it is true that the questioned properties appear to be
immobile, a perusal of the contract of Real and Chattel Mortgage executed by
the parties gives a contrary indication. In the case at bar, the true intention of
PBCOM and the owner, EVERTEX, is to treat machinery and equipment as
chattels. Assuming that the properties in question are immovable by nature,
nothing detracts the parties from treating it as chattels to secure an
obligation under the principle of estoppel. It has been held that an immovable
may be considered a personal property if there is a stipulation as when it is
used as security in the payment of an obligation where a chattel mortgage is
executed over it, as in the case at bar.

5. Burgos, Sr. v Chief of Staff; G.R. No. L-64261; December 26, 1984

FACTS: On December 7, 1982, two search warrants where issued and the
premises at 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building,
Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business addresses of the "Metropolitan Mail" and

"We Forum" newspapers were searched. Office and printing machines, equipment,
paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and
distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books
and other written literature alleged to be in the possession and control of Jose
Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum" newspaper, were seized.
ISSUE: Whether or not real properties were seized under the disputed warrants.

HELD: No. Under Article 415 (5) of the Civil Code, "machinery,
receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the
tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building
or on a piece of land and which tend directly to meet the needs of the
said industry or works" are considered immovable property. In Davao
Sawmill Co. v. Castillo, it was said that machinery which is movable by
nature becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement,
property or plant, but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or
any other person having only a temporary right, unless such person
acted as the agent of the owner. In the present case, petitioners do not
claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which the
machineries were placed. The machineries, while in fact bolted to the
ground, remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a search
warrant.
6. Lopez v Orosa and Plaza Theater; G.R. Nos. L-10817-18; February 28, 1958

FACTS: Lopez was engaged in business under the name Lopez-Castelo Sawmill.
Orosa approached Lopez and invited the latter to make an investment in the theatre
business he was forming, the Plaza Theatre. Lopez expressed his unwillingness to
invest. Nonetheless, Lopez agreed to supply the lumber for the construction of the
theatre. Lopez further agreed that that the payment therefore would be on demand
and not cash on delivery basis. Lopex delivered the lumber which was used for the
construction of the Plaza Theatre. However, of the total cost of materials amounting
to P62, 255.85, Lopez was paid only P 20, 848.50, thus leaving a balance of P 41,
771.35.
Due to Lopez demands, Orosa issued a deed of assignment over his shares of
stock of the Plaza Theatre, Inc. As there was still an unpaid balance, Lopez filed a
case against Orosa and Plaza Theatre. He asked that Orosa and Plaza theatre be
held liable solidarily for the unpaid balance, and in case defendants failed to pay, the
land and building should be sold in public auction with the proceeds to be applied to
the balance, or that the shares of stock be sold in public auction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lien for the value of the materials used in the construction
of the building attaches to said structure alone and does not extend to the land on
which the building is adhered to.
HELD: No. While it is true that generally, real estate connotes the land and the
building constructed thereon, it is obvious that the inclusion of the building, separate
and distinct from the land, in the enumeration of what may constitute real properties
could only mean one thingthat a building is by itself an immovable property. In
view of the absence of any specific provision to the contrary, a building is an
immovable property irrespective of whether or not said structure and the land on
which it is adhered to belong to the same owner. The lien so created attaches
merely to the immovable property for the construction or repair of which the
obligation was incurred. Therefore, the lien in favor of appellant for the unpaid value
of the lumber used in the construction of the building attaches only to said structure
and to no other property of the obligors.

7. Yap v Tanada; G.R. No. L-32917; July 18, 1988

Yap v. Taada
G.R. No. L-32917, July 18, 1988, 163 SCRA 464
Narvasa, J.
FACTS: Goulds Pumps International (Phil.), Inc. filed a complaint against Yap and his wife seeking
recovery of P1,459.30 representing the balance of the price and installation cost of a water pump in
the latter's premises. Goulds presented evidence ex parte and judgment by default was rendered by
Judge Taada requiring Yap to pay to Goulds the unpaid balance of the pump purchased by him and
interest of 12% per annum.
Thereafter, the water pump in question was levied by the sheriff and by notice dated November 4,
1969, scheduled the execution sale thereof. But in view of the pendency of Yap's motion for
reconsideration, suspension of the sale was directed. It appears however that a copy of the order
suspending the sale was not transmitted to the sheriff Hence, the Deputy Provincial Sheriff went
ahead with the scheduled auction sale and sold the property levied on to Goulds as the highest
bidder.
Yap argues that "the sale was made without the notice required by Sec. 18, Rule 39, of the New
Rules of Court," i.e., notice by publication in case of execution sale of real property, the pump and its
accessories being immovable because attached to the ground with character of permanency (Art.
415, Civil Code).
ISSUE: Whether or not the water pump in question is an immovable property.
HELD: No. Yap's argument is untenable. The Civil Code considers as immovable property, among
others, anything "attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, in such a way that it cannot be
separated therefrom without breaking the material or deterioration of the object." The pump does not
fit this description. It could be, and was in fact separated from Yap's premises without being broken or
suffering deterioration. Obviously, the separation or removal of the pump involved nothing more
complicated than the loosening of bolts or dismantling of other fasteners.
8. Machinery and Engineering Supplies v. Court of Appeals; G.R. No. L-7057; October 29, 1954

FACTS: Petitioner Machinery and Engineering Supplies filed a complaint for replevin
for the recovery of the machinery and equipment sold and delivered to Ipo
Limestone Co. An order was issued to seize and take immediate possession of the
properties specified in the order. Upon carrying out the courts order, Roco, the
companys President, along with a crew of technical men and labourers, proceeded
to the factory. The manager of Ipo Limestone Co. and Torres protested against the
seizure of the properties on the ground that they are not personal properties.
However, since the sheriff contended that his duty is purely ministerial, they all went
to the factory and dismantled the equipment despite the fact that the equipment
could not be dismantled without causing damage or injuries to the wooden frames
attached to them. Consequently, they had to cut some of the supports of the
equipment which rendered its use impracticable.
ISSUE: Whether or not the machinery and equipment in question could be the
subject of replevin.
HELD: No. Replevin is applicable only to personal property. The machinery and
equipment in question appeared to be attached to the land, particularly to the
concrete foundation of said premises, in a fixed manner, in such a way that the
former could not be separated from the latter without breaking the material or
deterioration of the object. Hence, in order to remove the said outfit, it became
necessary not only to unbolt the same, but also to cut some of its wooden supports.
Moreover, said machinery and equipment were intended by the owner of the
tenement for an industry carried on said immovable. For these reasons, they were
already immovable pursuant to paragraphs 3 and 5 of Article 415 of the Civil Code.
3. Arts. 419-426
1. Province of Zamboanga v City of Zamboanga; G.R. No. L-24440; March 28, 1968
FACTS: After Zamboanga Province was divided into two (Zamboanga Del Norte and Zamboanga
Del Sur), Republic Act 3039 was passed providing that--

"All buildings, properties, and assets belonging to the former province of Zamboanga and located
within the City of Zamboanga are hereby transferred free of charge in favor of the City of
Zamboanga."
Suit was brought alleging that this grant without just compensation was unconstitutional because
it deprived the province of property without due process. Included in the properties were the
capital site and capitol building, certain school sites, hospital and leprosarium sites, and high
school playgrounds.
ISSUES:
1. Are the properties mentioned, properties for public use or patrimonial property?
2. Should the city pay for said properties?
HELD:
1.

2.

If we follow the Civil Code classification, only the high school playgrounds are
for public use since it is the only one that is available to the general public,
and all the rest are patrimonial property since they are not devoted to public
use but to public service. But if we follow the law on Municipal Corporations,
as long as the purpose is for a public service, the property should be
considered for PUBLIC USE.
If the Civil Code classification is used, since almost all the properties involved
are patrimonial, the law would be unconstitutional since the province would be
deprived of its own property without just compensation. If the law on
Municipal Corporations would be followed, the properties would be of public
dominion, and therefore NO COMPENSATION would be required. It is the law
on Municipal Corporations that should be followed. Firstly, while the Civil Code
may classify them as patrimonial, they should not be regarded as ordinary
private property. They should fall under the control of the State, otherwise
certain governmental activities would be impaired.Secondly, Art. 424, 2nd
paragraph itself says "without prejudice to the provisions of special laws."

The court held that to resolve the issue it is important to identify the nature of the
properties in dispute. The properties that are devoted for public purpose are owned by
the province in its governmental capacity. Those that are not devoted for public use
remain as patrimonial property of the Province. The RA 3039 is held valid in so far as the
properties that are devoted for public use or owned by the province in its governmental
capacity and thus must retain its public purpose. Hence these governmental properties
need not be paid by the City of Zamboanga.
With respect to the patrimonial properties from the 50 lots in dispute, the RA 3039
cannot be applied in order to deprive the province of its own patrimonial properties that
are not devoted for public use. Hence the City of Zamboanga shall pay just compensation
to the Province of Zamboanga for these patrimonial properties.
2. Salas v Jarencio G.R. No. L-29788; August 30, 1972

Facts:
City of Manila owner in fee simple of a parcel of land known as Lot 1,
Block 557 of Cadastral Survey of City of Manila, containing an area of
9689.80 sqm. On various dates in 1927, City of Manila sold portions of
the parcel of land. When the last sale was effected August 1924,
Transfer Certificate of Title 22547 covering the residue of the land
7490.10 sam was issued in the name of City of Manila.
On September 1960, Municipal Board of Manila adopted a resolution
requesting the President to consider the feasibility of declaring the land
under Transfer Certificate of Title 25545-25547 as patrimonial property
of Manila for the purpose of selling these lots to the actual occupants

thereof. The resolution was then transmitted to the Congress. The bill
was then passed by Congress and approved by President, and became
Republic Act 4118, converting the land from communal property to
disposable and alienable land of State.
To implement RA 4118, Land Authority requested City of Manila to
deliver the Citys TCT 22547 in order to obtain title thereto in the name
of Land Authority. The request was granted with the knowledge and
consent of City mayor, cancelling TCT 22547 and issuing TCT 80876 in
the name of Land Authority.
City of Manila, for some reasons, brought an action to restrain, prohibit,
and enjoin Land Authority and Register of Deeds from implementing RA
4118, and praying for the declaration of RA 4118 as unconstitutional.
Trial court declared RA 4118 to be unconstitutional and invalid on the
ground that it deprived City of its property without due process of law
and payment of just compensation.
Land Authority and Register of Deeds argued that the land is a
communal land, or a portion of public domain owned by State; that the
land has not been used by City of Manila for any public purpose; that it
was originally a communal land not because it was needed in
connection with its organisation as a municipality but rather for the
common use of its inhabitants; that the City mayor merely enjoys the
usufruct over said land and its exercise of acts of ownership by selling
parts thereof did not necessarily convert the land into a patrimonial
property of City of Manila nor divert the State of its paramount title.
Issue:Whether the aforementioned land is a private or patrimonial
property of the City of Manila.
Held:
The land is public property.
As a general rule, regardless of the source or classification of the land in
the possession of municipality, excepting those which it acquired in its
own funds in its private or corporate capacity, such property is held for
the State for the benefit of its inhabitants, whether it be for governmental
or proprietary purposes. The legal situation is the same if the State itself
holds the property and puts it to a different use.
When it comes to property of municipality which it did not acquire in its
private or corporate capacity with its own funds (the land was originally
given to City by Spain), the legislature can transfer its administration and

disposition to an agency of the National Government to be disposed of

according to its discretion. Here it did so in obedience to the
constitutional mandate of promoting social justice to insure the wellbeing and economic security of the people.
The property was not acquired by the City of Manila with its own funds in
its private or proprietary capacity. The land was part of the territory of
City of Manila granted by sovereign in its creation. Furthermore, City
expressly recognised the paramount title of the State over its land when
it requested the President to consider the feasibility of declaring the lot
as patrimonial property for selling.
There could be no more blatant recognition of the fact that said land
belongs to the State and was simply granted in usufruct to the City of
Manila for municipal purposes. But since the City did not actually use
said land for any recognized public purpose and allowed it to remain idle
and unoccupied for a long time until it was overrun by squatters, no
presumption of State grant of ownership in favor of the City of Manila
may be acquiesced in to justify the claim that it is its own private or
patrimonial property.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby reversed, and
petitioners shall proceed with the free and untrammeled implementation
of Republic Act No. 4118 without any obstacle from the respondents.
Without costs.
3. Cebu Oxygen v Bercilles; G.R. No. L40474; August 29, 1975

In 1968, a terminal portion of a street in Cebu was excluded in the citys

development plan hence the council declared it as abandoned and was
subsequently opened for public bidding. Cebu Oxygen & Acetylene Co., Inc.
was the highest bidder at P10,800.00. Cebu Oxygen applied for the lands
registration before CFI Cebu but the provincial fiscal opposed it, so did the
court later through Judge Pascual Bercilles, as it was ruled that the road is
part of the public domain hence beyond the commerce of man.
ISSUE: Whether or not Cebu Oxygen can validly own said land.
HELD: Yes. Under Cebus Charter (RA 3857), the city council may close any
city road, street or alley, boulevard, avenue, park or square. Property thus
withdrawn from public servitude may be used or conveyed for any purpose
for which other real property belonging to the City may be lawfully used or
conveyed. Since that portion of the city street subject of Cebu Oxygens
application for registration of title was withdrawn from public use, it follows
that such withdrawn portion becomes patrimonial property which can be the
object of an ordinary contract.
Article 422 of the Civil Code expressly provides that Property of public
dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public service, shall
form part of the patrimonial property of the State.

4. Chavez v Public Estates Authority; G.R. No. 133250; July 9, 2002

FACTS: In 1973, the Government through the Commissioner of Public Highways

and the Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines (CDCP)
signed a contract to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay. PD
1084 was issued, creating Public Estates Authority (PEA), and PD 1085, transferring
the reclaimed lands under the MCCRRP to PEA.
In 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a private
corporation to develop the Freedom Islands, and the JVA was approved by
President Ramos. However, PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA through
negotiation without public bidding. A Legal Task Force was created to look into the
issue. The said task force upheld the legality of the JVA.
In 1998, Frank I. Chavez, as a taxpayer, filed a petition to compel PEA to disclose all
facts on its negotiations with AMARI, invoking the constitutional right of the people to
information on matters of public concern. He assails the sale to AMARI of lands of
the public domain as a blatant violation of the constitutional prohibiting in the sale of
alienable lands of the public domain to private corporations.
Despite the ongoing court petitions, PEA and AMARI signed an Amended Joint
Venture Agreement (Amended JVA) in 1999, and such was approved by President
Estrada. The Amended JVA seeks to convey to AMARI the ownership of 77.34
hectares of the Freedom Islands.
ISSUE: Whether AMARI has the capacity to acquire the lands held by PEA.
HELD: No. Under the 1987 Constitution, private corporations such as AMARI cannot
acquire alienable land of the public domain. Reclaimed lands comprising the
Freedom Islands, which are covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are
alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private
corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private
corporations. PEA may only sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the
ownership limitations in the 1987 Constitution and existing laws. Thus, the Amended
Joint Venture Agreement between AMARI and PEA was null and void.
5.
Check applicable sections of the Local Govt Code (RA 7160) and Indigenous Peoples Act (RA 8371)
(to be continued)