G.R. No. L-35546 Aquino JR Vs Enrile 1974

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G.R.No.L35546
TodayisSaturday,June20,2015
RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila
ENBANC
G.R.No.L35546September17,1974
INTHEMATTEROFTHEPETITIONFORHABEASCORPUSOFBENIGNOS.AQUINO,JR.,RAMONMITRA,
JR.,FRANCISCORODRIGO,ANDNAPOLEONRAMA,petitioners,
vs.
HONJUANPONCEENRILE,SECRETARYOFNATIONALDEFENSEGEN.ROMEOESPINO,CHIEFOF
STAFF,ARMEDFORCESOFTHEPHILIPPINESANDGEN.FIDELV.RAMOS,CHIEF,PHILIPPINE
CONSTABULARY,respondents.
INTHEMATTEROFTHEPETITIONFORHABEASCORPUSOFJOAQUINP.ROCES,TEODOROM.LOCSIN,
SR.,ROLANDOFADUL,ROSALINAGALANG,GOENGGUAN,MAXIMOV.SOLIVEN,RENATO
CONSTANTINO,ANDLUISR.MAURICIO,petitioners,
vs.
THESECRETARYOFNATIONALDEFENSETHECHIEFOFSTAFF,ARMEDFORCESOFTHEPHILIPPINES
THECHIEF,PHILIPPINECONSTABULARY,etal.,respondents.
INTHEMATTEROFTHEPETITIONFORHABEASCORPUSOFJOSEW.DIOKNO,CARMENI.DIOKNO,*1
petitioner,
vs.
JUANPONCEENRILE,THESECRETARYOFNATIONALDEFENSEROMEOESPINO,THECHIEFOFSTAFF,ARMEDFORCESOFTHEPHILIPPINES.
respondents.
MAXIMOV.SOLIVEN,NAPOLEONG.RAMA,ANDJOSEMARIVELEZ,petitioners,
vs.
HON.JUANPONCEENRILE,SECRETARYOFNATIONALDEFENSEHON.FRANCISCOTATAD,PRESS
SECRETARYANDGEN.FIDELV.RAMOS,CHIEF,PHILIPPINECONSTABULARY,respondents.
G.R.No.L35547September17,1974*2
ENRIQUEVOLTAIREGARCIAII,petitioner,
vs.
BRIG.GEN.FIDELRAMOS,CHIEF,PHILIPPINECONSTABULARYGEN.ROMEOESPINO,CHIEFOFSTAFF,
ARMEDFORCESOFTHEPHILIPPINESANDHON.JUANPONCEENRILE,SECRETARYOFNATIONAL
DEFENSE,respondents.
INTHEMATTEROFTHEPETITIONFORHABEASCORPUSOFVERONICAL.YUYITUNGANDTANCHIN
HIAN,petitioners,
vs.
JUANPONCEENRILE,SECRETARYOFNATIONALDEFENSELIEUT.GEN.ROMEOESPINO,CHIEFOF
STAFF,ARMEDFORCESOFTHEPHILIPPINESANDBRIG.GEN.FIDELV.RAMOS,CHIEFOFTHE
PHILIPPINECONSTABULARY,respondents.
INTHEMATTEROFTHEPETITIONFORHABEASCORPUSOFAMANDODORONILAJUANL.MERCADO,
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1974/sep1974/gr_l_35546_1974.html
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HERNANDOL.ABAYA,ERNESTOGRANADA,LUISD.BELTRAN,TANCHINHIAN,BRENGUIAO,RUBEN
CUSIPAG,ROBERTOORDOEZ,MANUELALMARIOANDWILLIEBAUN,petitioners,
vs.
HON.JUANPONCEENRILE,SECRETARYOFNATIONALDEFENSELIEUT.GEN.ROMEOESPINO,CHIEF
OFSTAFF,ARMEDFORCESOFTHEPHILIPPINESANDBRIG.GEN.FIDELV.RAMOS,CHIEF,PHILIPPINE
CONSTABULARY,respondents.
G.R.No.L35571September17,1974.*3
INTHEMATTEROFTHEPETITIONFORHABEASCORPUSOFBRENZ.GUIAO,TERESITAM.GUIAO,
petitioner,
vs.
JUANPONCEENRILE,THESECRETARYOFNATIONALDEFENSELT.GEN.ROMEOESPINO,CHIEFOF
STAFFOFTHEARMEDFORCESOFTHEPHILIPPINES:ANDBRIG.GEN.FIDELV.RAMOS,CHIEFOFTHE
PHILIPPINECONSTABULARY,respondents.
ERNESTORONDON,petitioner,
vs.
HON.JUANPONCEENRILE,SECRETARYOFNATIONALDEFENSEGEN.FIDELV.RAMOS,CHIEF,
PHILIPPINECONSTABULARYANDMAJORRODULFOMIANA,respondents.
MAKALINTAL,C.J.:p
Thesecasesareallpetitionsforhabeascorpus,thepetitionershavingbeenarrestedanddetainedbythemilitary
byvirtueofthePresident'sProclamationNo.1081,datedSeptember21,1972.
Attheoutsetawordofclarificationisinorder.ThisisnotthedecisionoftheCourtinthesensethatadecision
represents a consensus of the required majority of its members not only on the judgment itself but also on the
rationalizationoftheissuesandtheconclusionsarrivedat.Onthefinalresultthevoteispracticallyunanimous
this is a statement of my individual opinion as well as a summary of the voting on the major issues. Why no
particularJusticehasbeendesignatedtowritejustoneopinionfortheentireCourtwillpresentlybeexplained.
At one point during our deliberations on these cases it was suggested that as Chief Justice I should write that
opinion. The impracticability of the suggestion shortly became apparent for a number of reasons, only two of
whichneedbementioned.First,thediscussions,astheybegantotouchonparticularissues,revealedalackof
agreement among the Justices as to whether some of those issues should be taken up although it was not
necessary to do so, they being merely convenient for the purpose of ventilating vexing questions of public
interest,orwhetherthedecisionshouldbelimitedtothoseissueswhicharereallymaterialanddecisiveinthese
cases. Similarly, there was no agreement as to the manner the issues should be treated and developed. The
samedestinationwouldbereached,sotospeak,butthroughdifferentroutesandbymeansofdifferentvehicles
ofapproach.ThewritingofseparateopinionsbyindividualJusticeswasthusunavoidable,andunderstandablyso
forstillanotherreason,namely,thatalthoughlittleovertreferencetoitwasmadeatthetime,thefutureverdictof
historywasverymuchafactorinthethinkingofthemembers,noothercaseofsuchtranscendentalsignificance
to the life of the nation having before confronted this Court. Second and this to me was the insuperable
obstacleIwasandamoftheopinion,whichwassharedbysixotherJustices1atthetimethequestionwasvoted
upon,thatpetitionerJoseW.Diokno'smotionofDecember28,1973towithdrawhispetition(G.R.No.L35539)shouldbe
granted, and therefore I was in no position to set down the ruling of the Court on each of the arguments raised by him,
exceptindirectly,insofarastheyhadbeenraisedlikewiseintheothercases.
ItshouldbeexplainedatthispointthatwhentheCourtvotedonDiokno'smotiontowithdrawhispetitionhewas
still under detention without charges, and continued to remain so up to the time the separate opinions of the
individualJusticeswereputinfinalformpreparatorytotheirpromulgationonSeptember12,whichwasthelast
day of Justice Zaldivars tenure in the Court. 2 Before they could be promulgated, however, a major development
supervened:petitionerDioknowasreleasedbythePresidentinthemorningofSeptember11,1974.Inviewthereofallthe
members of this Court except Justice Castro agreed to dismiss Diokno's petition on the ground that it had become moot,
with those who originally voted to grant the motion for withdrawal citing said motion as an additional ground for such
dismissal.
Thepetitionersintheothercases,exceptBenignoAquino,Jr.(G.R.No.L35546),eitherhavebeenpermittedto
withdrawtheirpetitionsorhavebeenreleasedfromdetentionsubjecttocertainrestrictions.3InthecaseofAquino,
formalchargesofmurder,subversionandillegalpossessionoffirearmswerelodgedagainsthimwithaMilitaryCommission
on August 11, 1973 and on the following August 23 he challenged the jurisdiction of said Commission as well as his
continueddetentionbyvirtueofthosechargesinapetitionforcertiorariandprohibitionfiledinthisCourt(G.R.No.
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L37364).ThequestioncameupastowhetherornotAquino'spetitionforhabeascorpusshouldbedismissedontheground
that the case as to him should more appropriately be resolved in this new petition. Of the twelve Justices, however, eight
votedagainstsuchdismissalandchosetoconsiderthecaseonthemerits.4
OnDiokno'smotiontowithdrawhispetitionIvotedinfavorofgrantingitfortworeasons.Inthefirstplacesuch
withdrawal would not emasculate the decisive and fundamental issues of public interest that demanded to be
resolved, for they were also raised in the other cases which still remained pending. Secondly, since it was this
petitioner'spersonallibertythatwasatstake,Ibelievedhehadtherighttorenouncetheapplicationforhabeas
corpusheinitiated.EvenifthatrightwerenotabsoluteIstillwouldrespecthischoicetoremovethecasefromthis
Court's cognizance, regardless of the fact that I disagreed with many of his reasons for so doing. I could not
escape a sense of irony in this Court's turning down the plea to withdraw on the ground, so he alleges among
others, that this is no longer the Court to which he originally applied for relief because its members have taken
newoathsofofficeunderthe1973Constitution,andthenrulingadverselytohimonthemeritsofhispetition.
ItistruethatsomeofthestatementsinthemotionareanaffronttothedignityofthisCourtandthereforeshould
notbeallowedtopassunanswered.Anyanswer,however,wouldnotbeforeclosedbyallowingthewithdrawal.
Formypart,sincemostofthosestatementsareofasubjectivecharacter,beingmattersofpersonalbeliefand
opinion,Iseenopointinrefutingtheminthesecases.Indeedmyimpressionisthattheywerebeamedlessat
thisCourtthanattheworldoutsideanddesignedtomakepoliticalcapitalofhispersonalsituation,asthepublicity
given to them by some segments of the foreign press and by local underground propaganda news sheets
subsequently confirmed. It was in fact from that perspective that I deemed it proper to respond in kind, that is,
fromanonjudicialforum,inanaddressIdeliveredonFebruary19,1974beforetheLAWASIA,thePhilippineBar
AssociationandthePhilippineLawyers'Association.JusticeTeehankee,itmaybestated,isoftheopinionthata
simple majority of seven votes out of twelve is legally sufficient to make the withdrawal of Diokno's petition
effective,onthetheorythattherequirementofamajorityofeightvotesappliesonlytoadecisiononthemerits.
In any event, as it turned out, after petitioner Diokno was released by the President on September 11 all the
membersofthisCourtexceptJusticeCastrowereagreedthathispetitionhadbecomemootandthereforeshould
no longer be considered on the merits. This notwithstanding, some of the opinions of the individual members,
particularlyJusticesCastroandTeehankee,shouldbetakeninthetimesettinginwhichtheywereprepared,that
is,beforetheorderforthereleaseofDioknowasissued.
TheCases.
Theeventswhichformthebackgroundoftheseninepetitionsarerelated,eitherbrieflyoringreatdetail,inthe
separate opinions filed by the individual Justices. The petitioners were arrested and held pursuant to General
OrderNo.2ofthePresident(September22,1972),"forbeingparticipantsorforhavinggivenaidandcomfortin
theconspiracytoseizepoliticalandstatepowerinthecountryandtotakeovertheGovernmentbyforce..."
General Order No. 2 was issued by the President in the exercise of the powers he assumed by virtue of
Proclamation No. 1081 (September 21, 1972) placing the entire country under martial law. The portions of the
proclamationimmediatelyinpointreadasfollows:
xxxxxxxxx
NOW,THEREFORE,I,FERDINANDE.MARCOS,PresidentofthePhilippinesbyvirtueofthepowers
vested upon me by Article VII, Section 10, Paragraph (2) of the Constitution, do hereby place the
entire Philippines as defined in Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution under martial law and, in my
capacityastheirCommanderinChief,doherebycommandtheArmedForcesofthePhilippines,to
maintainlawandorderthroughoutthePhilippines,preventorsuppressallformsoflawlessviolence
aswellasanyactofinsurrectionorrebellionandtoenforceobediencetoallthelawsanddecrees,
ordersandregulationspromulgatedbymepersonallyoruponmydirection.
In addition, I do hereby order that all persons presently detained, as well as all others who may
hereafter be similarly detained for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion, and all other crimes and
offenses committed in furtherance or on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection
therewith, for crimes against national security and the law of nations, crimes against public order,
crimesinvolvingusurpationofauthority,rank,titleandimproperuseofnames,uniformsandinsignia,
crimescommittedbypublicofficers,andforsuchothercrimesaswillbeenumeratedinordersthatI
shallsubsequentlypromulgate,aswellascrimesasaconsequenceofanyviolationofanydecree,
order or regulation promulgated by me personally or promulgated upon my direction shall be kept
underdetentionuntilotherwiseorderedreleasedbymeorbymydulydesignatedrepresentative.
Theprovisionofthe1935Constitutionreferredtointheproclamationreads:"thePresidentshallbecommander
inchiefofallarmedforcesofthePhilippinesand,wheneveritbecomesnecessary,hemaycalloutsucharmed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection, or rebellion. In case of invasion,
insurrection, or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof, when the public safety requires it, he may suspend the
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privilegeofthewritofhabeascorpus,orplacethePhilippinesoranypartthereofundermartiallaw."
1.ThefirstmajorissueraisedbythepartiesiswhetherthisCourtmayinquireintothevalidityofProclamationNo.
1081.Statedmoreconcretely,istheexistenceofconditionsclaimedtojustifytheexerciseofthepowertodeclare
martiallawsubjecttojudicialinquiry?Isthequestionpoliticalorjusticiableincharacter?
JusticesMakasiar,Antonio,Esguerra,FernandezandAquinoholdthatthequestionispoliticalandthereforeits
determination is beyond the jurisdiction of this Court. The reasons are given at length in the separate opinions
theyhaverespectivelysigned.JusticeFernandezaddsthatasamemberoftheConventionthatdraftedthe1973
Constitutionhebelievesthat"theConventionputanimprimaturonthepropositionthatthevalidityofamartiallaw
proclamationanditscontinuationispoliticalandnonjusticiableincharacter."
JusticeBarredo,ontheotherhand,believesthatpoliticalquestionsarenotpersebeyondtheCourt'sjurisdiction,
thejudicialpowervestedinitbytheConstitutionbeingplenaryandallembracing,butthatasamatterofpolicy
implicit in the Constitution itself the Court should abstain from interfering with the Executive's Proclamation,
dealingasitdoeswithnationalsecurity,forwhichtheresponsibilityisvestedbythecharterinhimalone.Butthe
Courtshouldact,JusticeBarredoopines,whenitsabstentionfromactingwouldresultinmanifestandpalpable
transgressionoftheConstitutionprovenbyfactsofjudicialnotice,noreceptionofevidencebeingcontemplated
forpurposesofsuchjudicialaction.
Itmaybenotedthatthepostulateofnonjusticiabilityasdiscussedinthoseopinionsinvolvesdisparatemethods
ofapproach.JusticeEsguerramaintainsthatthefindingsofthePresidentontheexistenceofthegroundsforthe
declaration of martial law are final and conclusive upon the Courts. He disagrees vehemently with the ruling in
Lansangvs.Garcia,42SCRA448,December11,1971,andadvocatesareturntoBarcelonvs.Baker,5Phil.87
(1905), and Montenegro vs. Castaeda, 91 Phil. 882 (1952). Justice Barredo, for his part, holds that Lansang
neednotbeoverturned,indeeddoesnotcontrolinthesecases.Hedrawsadistinctionbetweenthepowerofthe
Presidenttosuspendtheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpus,whichwastheissueinLansang,andhispowerto
proclaimmartiallaw,callingattentiontothefactthatwhiletheBillofRightsprohibitssuspensionoftheprivilege
except in the instances specified therein, it places no such prohibition or qualification with respect to the
declarationofmartiallaw.
JusticeAntonio,withwhomJusticesMakasiar,FernandezandAquinoconcur,findsthatthereisnodisputeasto
theexistenceofastateofrebellioninthecountry,andonthatpremiseemphasizesthefactorofnecessityforthe
exercisebythePresidentofhispowerundertheConstitutiontodeclaremartiallaw,holdingthatthedecisionas
towhetherornotthereissuchnecessityiswhollyconfidedtohimandthereforeisnotsubjecttojudicialinquiry,
hisresponsibilitybeingdirectlytothepeople.
ArrayedonthesideofjusticiabilityareJusticesCastro,Fernando,TeehankeeandMuozPalma.Theyholdthat
the constitutional sufficiency of the proclamation may be inquired into by the Court, and would thus apply the
principlelaiddowninLansangalthoughthatcasereferstothepowerofthePresidenttosuspendtheprivilegeof
the writ of habeas corpus. The recognition of justiciability accorded to the question in Lansang, it should be
emphasized,isthereexpresslydistinguishedfromthepowerofjudicialreviewinordinarycivilorcriminalcases,
andislimitedtoascertaining"merelywhetherhe(thePresident)hasgonebeyondtheconstitutionallimitsofhis
jurisdiction,nottoexercisethepowervestedinhimortodeterminethewisdomofhisact."Thetestisnotwhether
the President's decision is correct but whether, in suspending the writ, he did or did not act arbitrarily. Applying
this test, the finding by the Justices just mentioned is that there was no arbitrariness in the President's
proclamationofmartiallawpursuanttothe1935ConstitutionandIconcurwiththeminthatfinding.Thefactual
basesforthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpus,particularlyinregardtotheexistenceofa
state of rebellion in the country, had not disappeared, indeed had been exacerbated, as events shortly before
said proclamation clearly demonstrated. On this Point the Court is practically unanimous Justice Teehankee
merelyrefrainedfromdiscussingit.
InsofarasmyownopinionisconcernedthecleavageintheCourtontheissueofjusticiabilityisofnotmuchmore
thanacademicinterestforpurposesofarrivingatajudgment.IamnotundulyexercisedbyAmericasdecisions
onthesubjectwritteninanotherageandpoliticalclime,orbytheoriesofforeignauthorsinpoliticalscience.The
present state of martial law in the Philippines is peculiarly Filipino and fits into no traditional patterns or judicial
precedents.
InthefirstplaceIamconvinced(asaretheotherJustices),withoutneedofreceivingevidenceasinanordinary
adversary court proceeding, that a state of rebellion existed in the country when Proclamation No. 1081 was
issued.Itwasamatterofcontemporaryhistorywithinthecognizancenotonlyofthecourtsbutofallobservant
peopleresidinghereatthetime.Manyofthefactsandeventsrecitedindetailinthedifferent"Whereases"ofthe
proclamation are of common knowledge. The state of rebellion continues up to the present. The argument that
whilearmedhostilitiesgooninseveralprovincesinMindanaotherearenoneinotherregionsexceptinisolated
pockets in Luzon, and that therefore there is no need to maintain martial law all over the country, ignores the
sophisticatednatureandramificationsofrebellioninamodernsetting.Itdoesnotconsistsimplyofarmedclashes
between organized and identifiable groups on fields of their own choosing. It includes subversion of the most
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subtle kind, necessarily clandestine and operating precisely where there is no actual fighting. Underground
propaganda, through printed news sheets or rumors disseminated in whispers recruitment of armed and
ideological adherents, raising of funds, procurement of arms and material, fifthcolumn activities including
sabotage and intelligence all these are part of the rebellion which by their nature are usually conducted far
fromthebattlefronts.Theycannotbecounteractedeffectivelyunlessrecognizedanddealtwithinthatcontext.
Secondly,myview,whichcoincideswiththatofothermembersoftheCourtasstatedintheiropinions,isthatthe
question of validity of Proclamation No. 1081 has been foreclosed by the transitory provision of the 1973
Constitution [Art. XVII, Sec. 3(2)] that "all proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and acts promulgated,
issued, or done by the incumbent President shall be part of the law of the land and shall remain valid, legal,
bindingandeffectiveevenafter...theratificationofthisConstitution..."Tobesure,thereisanattemptinthese
casestoresuscitatetheissueoftheeffectivityofthenewConstitution.Allthat,however,isbehindusnow.The
questionhasbeenlaidtorestbyourdecisioninJavellanavs.ExecutiveSecretary(L36142,50SCRA30,March
31,1973),andofcoursebytheexistingpoliticalrealitiesbothintheconductofnationalaffairsandinourrelations
withothercountries.
On the effect of the transitory provision Justice Muoz Palma withholds her assent to any sweeping statement
that the same in effect validated, in the constitutional sense, all "such proclamations, decrees, instructions, and
acts promulgated, issued, or done by the incumbent President." All that she concedes is that the transitory
provisionmerelygivesthem"theimprimaturofalawbutnotofaconstitutionalmandate,"andassuchtherefore
"aresubjecttojudicialreviewwhenproperundertheConstitution.
Finally,thepoliticalorjusticiablequestioncontroversyindeed,anyinquirybythisCourtinthepresentcasesinto
the constitutional sufficiency of the factual bases for the proclamation of martial law has become moot and
purposelessasaconsequenceofthegeneralreferendumofJuly2728,1973.Thequestionpropoundedtothe
voterswas:"Underthe(1973)Constitution,thePresident,ifhesodesires,cancontinueinofficebeyond1973.Do
youwantPresidentMarcostocontinuebeyond1973andfinishthereformsheinitiatedunderMartialLaw?"The
overwhelming majority of those who cast their ballots, including citizens between 15 and 18 years, voted
affirmativelyontheproposal.Thequestionwastherebyremovedfromtheareaofpresidentialpowerunderthe
Constitutionandtransferredtotheseatofsovereigntyitself.Whatevermaybethenatureoftheexerciseofthat
power by the President in the beginning whether or not purely political and therefore nonjusticiable this
Courtisprecludedfromapplyingitsjudicialyardsticktotheactofthesovereign.
2.Withrespecttothepetitionerswhohavebeenreleasedfromdetentionbuthavenotwithdrawntheirpetitions
becausetheyarestillsubjecttocertainrestrictions,5the ruling of the Court is that the petitions should be dismissed.
Thepowertodetainpersonsevenwithoutchargesforactsrelatedtothesituationwhichjustifiestheproclamationofmartial
law,suchastheexistenceofastateofrebellion,necessarilyimpliesthepower(subject,intheopinionoftheJusticeswho
consider Lansang applicable, to the same test of arbitrariness laid down therein), to impose upon the released detainees
conditions or restrictions which are germane to and necessary to carry out the purposes of the proclamation. Justice
Fernando, however, "is for easing the restrictions on the right to travel of petitioner Rodrigo" and others similarly situated
andsotothisextentdissentsfromtherulingofthemajoritywhileJusticeTeehankeebelievesthatthoserestrictionsdonot
constitute deprivation of physical liberty within the meaning of the constitutional provision on the privilege of the writ of
habeascorpus.
Itneedonlybeaddedthat,tomymind,implicitinastateofmartiallawisthesuspensionofthesaidprivilegewith
respect to persons arrested or detained for acts related to the basic objective of the proclamation, which is to
suppressinvasion,insurrection,orrebellion,ortosafeguardpublicsafetyagainstimminentdangerthereof.The
preservation of society and national survival take precedence. On this particular point, that is, that the
proclamation of martial law automatically suspends the privilege of the writ as to the persons referred to, the
Court is practically unanimous. Justice Fernando, however, says that to him that is still an open question and
Justice Muoz Palma qualifiedly dissents from the majority in her separate opinion, but for the reasons she
discussesthereinvotesforthedismissalofthepetitions.
INVIEWOFALLTHEFOREGOINGANDFORTHEREASONSSTATEDBYTHEMEMBERSOFTHECOURTIN
THEIR SEPARATE OPINIONS, JUDGMENT IS HEREBY RENDERED DISMISSING ALL THE PETITIONS,
EXCEPTTHOSEWHICHHAVEBEENPREVIOUSLYWITHDRAWNBYTHERESPECTIVEPETITIONERSWITH
THEAPPROVALOFTHISCOURT,ASHEREINABOVEMENTIONED.NOCOSTS.
Makasiar,Esguerra,Fernandez,MuozPalmaandAquino,JJ.,concur.
PrefatoryNote
(writtenonSeptember12,1974)
My separate opinion below in the nine cases at bar was handed to Chief Justice Querube C. Makalintal on
Monday,September9,1974,forpromulgation(togetherwiththeindividualopinionsoftheChiefJusticeandthe
otherJustices)onSeptember12(today)asagreeduponbytheCourt.
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On September 11 the petitioner Jose W. Diokno was released from military custody. The implications of this
supervening event were lengthily discussed by the Court in its deliberations in the afternoon. Eleven members
thereafter voted to dismiss Diokno's petition as being "moot and academic" I cast the lone dissenting vote.
Although perhaps in the strictest technical sense that accords with conventional legal wisdom, the petition has
become"moot"becauseDioknohasbeenfreedfromphysicalconfinement,Iamnonethelesspersuadedthatthe
graveissuesoflawhehasposedandthehighlyinsultingandderogatoryimputationsmadebyhimagainstthe
Courtanditsmembersconstituteaninescapableresidueofquestionsoftranscendentaldimensiontotheentire
nationanditsdestinyandtothefutureoftheCourtquestionsthatcannotandshouldnotbeallowedtoremain
unresolvedandunanswered.
Ihavethusnotfounditneedfulnorevenadvisabletorecastmyseparateopinionorchangeawordofit.
Iinvitethereadertoassessmy38pageseparateopinionwhichimmediatelyfollows,inthelightoftheforegoing
contextandfactualsetting.
FREDRUIZCASTRO
AssociateJustice.
SEPARATEOPINION
(writtenbeforeSept.9,1974)
L35539,L35546,L35538,L35540,L35567,L35556,
L35571,L35573,andL35547
SeparateOpinions
CASTRO,J.:
I
Theseninecasesareapplicationsforwritsofhabeascorpus.ThepetitionsaverinsubstancethatonSeptember
21, 1972 the President of the Philippines placed the country under martial law (Proclamation 1081) that on
various dates from September 22 to September 30, 1972, the petitioners or the persons in whose behalf the
applicationsweremadewerearrestedbythemilitaryauthoritiesanddetained,someatFortBonifacioinMakati,
Rizal, others at Camp Aguinaldo and still others at Camp Crame, both in Quezon City and that the arrest and
detentionofthepetitionerswereillegal,havingbeeneffectedwithoutavalidorderofacompetentcourtofjustice.
WritsofhabeascorpuzwereissuedbytheCourtdirectingtherespondentsSecretaryofNationalDefense,Chief
ofStaffoftheArmedForcesofthePhilippines,andChiefofthePhilippineConstabulary,toproducethebodiesof
the petitioners in Court on designated dates and to make returns to the writs. In due time the respondents,
through the Solicitor General, filed their returns to the writs and answers to the petitions. Admitting that the
petitionershadbeenarrestedanddetained,therespondentsneverthelessjustifiedsucharrestanddetentionas
having been legally ordered by the President of the Philippines pursuant to his proclamation of martial law, the
petitionersbeingregardedasparticipantsorashavinggivenaidandcomfort"intheconspiracytoseizepolitical
andstatepowerandtotakeoverthegovernmentbyforce."Therespondentstraversedthepetitioners'contention
thattheirarrestanddetentionwereunconstitutional.
Hearings were held on September 26 and 29 and October 6, 1972, at which the petitioners were produced in
Court.Thereafterthepartiesfiledmemoranda.
Meanwhile, some of the petitioners, with leave of Court, withdrew their petitions1 others, without doing so, were
subsequentlyreleasedfromcustodyundercertainrestrictiveconditions.2EnriqueVoltaireGarciaII,thesolepetitionerinL
35547andoneofthosereleased,havingdiedshortlyafterhisrelease,theactionwasdeemedabatedastohim.
AsofthisdateonlyJoseW.Diokno,inwhosebehalfthepetitioninL35539wasfiled,andBenignoS.Aquino,Jr.
inL35546,arestillinmilitarycustody.
OnAugust23,1973thepetitionerAquinofiledanactionforcertiorariandprohibitionwiththisCourtallegingthat
onAugust11,1973chargesofmurder,subversionandillegalpossessionoffirearmswerefiledagainsthimwitha
militarycommissionthathistrialbythemilitarycourtwhichwastobeheldonAugust27,29and31,1973was
illegal because the proclamation of martial law was unconstitutional and that he could not expect a fair trial
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becausethePresidentofthePhilippines,havingprejudgedhiscase,couldreverseanyjudgmentofacquittalby
themilitarycourtandsentencehimtodeath.Thataction,docketedasL37364andentitled"BenignoS.Aquino,
Jr.vs.MilitaryCommissionNo.2,"isstillpendingconsiderationanddecision.
On the other hand, Jose W. Diokno, on December 28, 1973, filed a motion to withdraw the petition filed in his
behalf,imputingdelayinthedispositionofhiscase,andasseveratingthatbecauseofthedecisionoftheCourtin
theRatificationCases3andtheactionofthemembersoftheCourtintakinganoathtosupportthenewConstitution,he
cannot "reasonably expect to get justice in this case." The respondents oppose the motion on the grounds that there is a
public interest in the decision of these cases and that the reasons given for the motion to withdraw are untrue, unfair and
contemptuous.
II
Thethresholdquestioniswhethertoallowthewithdrawalofthepetitionin
L35539filedinbehalfofDiokno.Inhislettertohiscounsel,whichisthebasisofthemotiontowithdraw,Diokno
states the following considerations: first, the delay in the disposition of his case second, the dismissal of the
petitionsintheRatificationCases,contrarytotheCourt'srulingthatthe1973Constitutionwasnotvalidlyratified
andthird,theactionofthemembersoftheCourtintakinganoathofallegiancetothenewConstitution.Diokno
assertsthat"aconsciencethatallowsamantorotbehindbarsformorethanoneyearandthreemonthswithout
trialofcourse,withoutanychargesatallisaconsciencethathasbecomestunted,ifnotstultified"andthat
"inswearingtosupportthenew'Constitution,'thefivemembersoftheCourtwhohadheldthatithadnotbeen
validlyratified,havenotfulfilledourexpectations."Hegoesontosay:"Idonotblamethem.IdonotknowwhatI
wouldhavedoneintheirplace.But,atthesametime,IcannotcontinuetoentrustmycasetothemandIhave
becomethoroughlyconvincedthatourquestforjusticeinmycaseisfutile."
Asalreadynoted,theSolicitorGeneral,inbehalfoftherespondents,opposesthewithdrawalofthepetitiononthe
ground of public interest, adding that the motion to withdraw cannot be granted by the Court without in effect
admittingthe"unfair,untrueandcontemptuous"statementscontainedtherein.
Withoutpassingontheliabilityofanypartyinthiscaseforcontemptuousstatementsmade,theCourt(byavote
of5to7)deniedthemotion.
IvotedforthedenialofthemotiontowithdrawforinescapablereasonsthatInowproceedtoexpound.
Thegeneralruleisthatintheabsenceofastatuteexpresslyorimpliedlyprohibitingthewithdrawalofanaction,
thepartybringingsuchactionmaydismissitevenwithouttheconsentofthedefendantorrespondentwherethe
latter will not be prejudiced, although it may be necessary to obtain leave of court. But there are recognized
exceptions:whenthepublicinterestorquestionsofpublicimportanceareinvolved.5 For example, the fact that a
finaldeterminationofaquestioninvolvedinanactionisneededorwillbeusefulasaguidefortheconductofpublicofficers
or tribunals is a sufficient reason for retaining an action which would or should otherwise be dismissed. Likewise, appeals
mayberetainedifthequestionsinvolvedarelikelytoarisefrequentlyinthefutureunlesstheyaresettledbyacourtoflast
resort.
Thus,inGonzalesvs.CommissiononElections,6anactionfordeclaratoryjudgmentimpugningthevalidityofRepublic
ActNo.4880whichprohibitstheearlynominationofcandidatesforelectiveofficesandearlyelectioncampaignsorpartisan
political activities became moot by reason of the holding of the 1967 elections before decision could be rendered.
Nonetheless the Court treated the petition as one for prohibition and rendered judgment in view of "the paramount public
interestandtheundeniablenecessityforaruling,thenationalelections[of1969]beingbarelysixmonthsaway.
InKrivenkovs.RegisterofDeeds,7theCourtdeniedthepetitiontowithdraw,anappealinviewofthepublicimportance
of the questions involved, and lest "the constitutional mandate [proscribing the sale of lands to aliens] ... be ignored or
misconceivedwithalltheharmfulconsequences...uponthenationaleconomy."
The petitioner Diokno has made allegations to the effect that the President has "arrogated" unto himself the
powers of government by "usurping" the powers of Congress and "ousting" the courts of their jurisdiction, thus
establishinginthiscountrya"virtualdictatorship."DioknoandhisCounselhaveinfactstressedthatthepresent
trendofeventsinthiscountrysincetheproclamationofmartiallawbearsaresemblancetothetrendofevents
thatledtotheestablishmentofadictatorshipinGermanyunderHitler.Thereisthusaprofoundpublicinterestin
theresolutionofthequestionsraisedinthecasesatbar,questionsthat,inthephraseofChiefJusticeMarshallin
Marbury vs. Madison,8 are "deeply interesting to the nation." I apprehend that in view of the import of the allegations
made by Diokno and his counsel, incalculable harm or, in the very least, great disservice may be caused to the national
interest if these cases are not decided on the merits. As the Solicitor General has observed," petitioner's [Diokno's] arrest
anddetentionhavebeensoexploitedinthehatecampaignthattheonlywaytoprotecttheintegrityofthegovernmentisto
insist on a decision of this case in the forum in which the petitioner had chosen to bring them. Otherwise, like festering
sores,theissuesstirredupbythislitigationwillcontinuetoagitatethenation."
Prescindingfromthepolicyconsiderationsjustdiscussed,IamgladdenedthattheCourthasnotshuntedaside
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what I regard as the inescapable moral constraints in the petitioner Diokno's motion to withdraw his petition for
habeascorpus.9The Court repudiated the facile recourse of avoiding resolution of the issues on the pretext that Diokno
insists on withdrawing his petition. It is thus not a mere happenstance that, notwithstanding that seven members of the
CourtareoftheviewthatDioknohasanabsoluterighttowithdrawhispetition,theCourthasconfrontedtheissuesposed
by him, and now resolves them squarely, definitively and courageously. No respectable legal historian or responsible
chroniclerofthenation'sdestinywillthereforehaveanyreasontoleveltheindictmentthatonceuponagravenationalcrisis
theCourtabdicateditsconstitutionalprerogativeofadjudicationandforsworethesacredtrustreposedinitasthenation's
ultimatearbiterontranscendental,farreachingjusticiablequestions.
Withrespecttothereasonsgivenforthemotiontowithdraw,theCourtismindfulthatithastakensometimeto
resolvethesecases.Inexplanationletitbesaidthattheissuespresentedforresolutioninthesecasesareofthe
utmost gravity and delicateness. No question of the awesome magnitude of those here presented has ever
confrontedtheCourtinallitshistory.Iamnotawarethatanyothercourt,exceptpossiblytheCircuitCourtinEx
parteMerryman, 10 has decided like questions during the period of the emergency that called for the proclamation of
martiallaw.
But then in Merrymanthe Court there held that under the U.S. Federal Constitution the President did not have
powertosuspendtheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpus. Otherwise, where the question involved not power
butrathertheexerciseofpower,courtshavedeclinedtoruleagainstthedulylasted.AsCourtGlendonSchubert
noted,theU.S.SupremeCourt"wasunwillingto[doso]untilthewarwasoverandLincolnwasdead."
Thus, in Ex parte Milligan, 11 the decision voiding the petitioner's trial by a military court was not announced until
December14,1866,aftertheCivilWarwasover.TheCivilWarbeganonMay3,1861withthecaptureofFortSumterby
Confederate forces. Lambdin Milligan was charged before a military commission with aiding rebels, inciting insurrection,
disloyal practices and violation of the laws of war. His trial ran from September to December 1862 he was convicted on
October21,1864andorderedexecutedonMay19,1865.OnMay10,1865heappliedforawritofhabeascorpusfrom the
Circuit Court of Indianapolis. On May 11, Justice Davis and Judge McDonald certified that they differed in opinion and,
therefore, pursuant to the statute of 1802, elevated their questions to the Supreme Court. On June 3, 1865 the death
sentence was commuted to life imprisonment by President Johnson who had succeeded to the Presidency after the
assassinationofLincoln.TheSupremeCourtheardtheparties'argumentsforeightdays,onMarch5,6,7,8,9,12and13,
andApril3,1866.OnDecember14,1866thedecisionoftheSupremeCourtvoidingMilliganstrialwasannounced.
InInReMoyer,12martialrulewasproclaimedinColoradoonMarch23,1904.Applicationforawritofhabeascorpuswas
filed with the State Supreme Court on April 14, 1904, seeking the release of Moyer who had been detained under the
Colorado governor's proclamation. On June 6, 1904 the complaint was dismissed and the petitioner was remanded to the
custody of the military authorities. The Court held that as an incident to the proclamation of martial law, the petitioner's
arrestanddetentionwerelawful.MoyersubsequentlybroughtanactionfordamagesforhisimprisonmentfromMarch30to
June15,1904.ThecomplaintwasdismissedbytheCircuitCourt.Onwritoferror,theU.S.SupremeCourtaffirmed,holding
that "So long as such arrests are made in good faith and in the honest belief that they are needed in order to head the
insurrectionoff,thegovernoristhefinaljudgeandcannotbesubjectedtoanactionafterheisoutofoffice,ontheground
thathehadnoreasonablegroundforhisbelief."13
Finally,inDuncanvs.Kahanamoku, 14 Hawaii was placed under martial rule on December 7, 1941, after the Japanese
sneak attack on Pearl Harbor. The petitioner Duncan was tried by a provost court on March 2, 1944, and found guilty on
April 13 of assault on two marine sentries. The other petitioner, White, was charged on August 25, 1942, also before a
provostcourt,withembezzlingstocksbelongingtoanothercivilian.WhiteandDuncanquestionedthepowerofthemilitary
tribunalsinpetitionsforhabeascorpusfiledwiththeDistrictCourtofHawaiionMarch14andApril14,1944,respectively.
Writs were granted on May 2, 1944, and after trial the District Court held the military trials void and ordered the release of
Duncan and White. On October 24, 1944 the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was restored and martial law was
terminated in Hawaii. On appeal, the decision of the District Court was reversed. 15 Certiorari was granted by the U.S.
Supreme Court on February 12, 1945. 16 On February 25, 1946 the Court held that the trials of White and Duncan by the
militarytribunalswerevoid.
In truth, as the Court in Milliganrecognized, its decision could not have been made while the Civil War lasted.
JusticeDaviswrote:
DuringtheWickedRebellion,thetemperofthetimesdidnotallowthatcalmnessindeliberationand
discussionsonecessarytoacorrectconclusionofapurelyjudicialquestion.Then,considerationsof
safety were mingled with the exercise of power and feelings and interests prevailed which are
happilyterminated.Nowthatthepublicsafetyisassured,thisquestionaswellasallothers,canbe
discussedanddecidedwithoutpassionortheadmixtureofanclementnotrequiredtoformalegal
judgment.Weapproachedtheinvestigationofthiscasefullysensibleofthemagnitudeoftheinquiry
andtheoffullandcautiousdeliberation.17
No doubt there is a point, although controversial, in the observation that in the instances just examined a
successfulchallengewaspossibleonlyretroactively,afterthecessationofthehostilitieswhichwouldunderany
circumstanceshavejustifiedthejudgmentofthemilitary.18
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Nor did it offend against principle or ethics for the members of this Court to take an oath to support the 1973
Constitution. After this Court declared that, with the dismissal of the petitions questioning the validity of the
ratification of the new Constitution, there was "no longer any judicial obstacle to the new Constitution being
considered in force and effect," 19 it became the duty of the members of the Court, let alone all other government
functionaries,totakeanoathtosupportthenewConstitution.Whileitistruethatamajorityofsixjusticesdeclaredthatthe
1973Constitutionwasnotvalidlyratified,itisequallytruethatamajorityofsixjusticesheldthattheissueofitseffectivity
wasapoliticalquestion,whichtheCourtwasnotequippedtodetermine,dependingasitdidonfactorsforwhichthejudicial
process was not fit to resolve. Resolution of this question was dispositive of all the issues presented in the Ratification
Cases.ItthusbecameuntenableforthemembersoftheCourtwhoheldcontraryopinionstopresstheiroppositionbeyond
thedecisionofthosecases.FundamentalrespectfortheruleoflawdictatedthatthemembersoftheCourttakeanoathto
upholdthenewConstitution.Thereisnothinginthatsolemnoaththatdebasestheirindividualpersonalintegrityorrenders
them unworthy or incapable of doing justice in these cases. Nor did the environmental milieu of their adjuration in any
mannerdemeantheirhighofficesordetractfromthelegitimacyoftheCourtasthehighestjudicialcollegiumoftheland.
III
From its AngloSaxon origin and throughout its slow evolution, the concept, scope and boundaries, application,
limitationsandotherfacetsofmartiallawhavebeenthesubjectofmisunderstanding,controversyanddebate. 20
Tothelegalscholarinterestedinsetlegalprinciplesandprecisedistinctions,martiallawcouldbeafrustratingsubject.On
thematterofitsdefinitionalone,itisknowntohaveasmanydefinitionsastherearenumerousauthorsandcourtdecisions
(nottodiscountthedissentingopinions)onthesubject.Thedoctrinaldevelopmentofmartiallawhasreliedmainlyoncase
law, 21 and there have been relatively few truly distinctive types of occasions where martial law, being the extraordinary
remedythatitis,hasbeenresortedto.
In the Philippines, the only other notable instance when martial law was declared was on September 22, 1944,
perProclamationNo.29promulgatedbyPresidentJoseP.Laurel.Butthiswaspursuanttotheconstitutionofthe
shortlived Japanese Occupation Republic, and the event has not been known to be productive of any
jurisprudentialpronouncementsemanatingfromthehighcourtoftheland.
Notwithstanding the confused state of jurisprudence on the subject of martial law in England and in the United
States,and,consequently,inthePhilippines,ausefulknowledgeofthelawonthesubjectcanfairlybehadfrom
a study of its historical background and its rationale, its doctrinal development, applicable constitutional and
statutoryprovisions,andauthoritativecourtdecisionsandcommentaries.
LegalscholarstracethegenesisofmartiallawtoEnglandstartingfromtheageoftheTudorsandtheStuartsin
the 14th century when it was first utilized for the suppression of rebellions and disorders. It later came to be
employed in the British colonies and dominions where its frequent exercise against British subjects gave rise to
thecriticismthatitwasbeingexploitedasaweapontoenhanceBritishimperialism.22
IntheUnitedStates,martiallawwasdeclaredonnumerousoccasionsfromtherevolutionaryperiodtotheCivil
War, and after the turn of the century. One of the earliest instances in American history was the declaration of
martial law by Gen. Andrew Jackson before the Battle of New Orleans in 1814. Fearing that the New Orleans
legislature might capitulate to the British, he placed the State under "strict martial law" and forbade the State
legislature to convene. Martial law was lifted after the American victory over British arms. The Civil War period
sawthedeclarationofmartiallawonmanyoccasionsbyboththeConfederateandtheUnionauthorities.Ithas
also been resorted to in cases of insurrection and rebellion, as exemplified by the Whiskey rebellion (1794 in
Pennsylvania and Virginia) and the Dorr's rebellion (1842 in Rhode Island). Martial law has also been utilized
during periods of disaster, such as the San Francisco earthquake and fire of 1906, and in industrial disputes
involvingviolenceanddisorder.Ithaslikewisebeenvariouslyinstitutedtopoliceelections,totakechargeofticket
salesatafootballgame,topreventtheforeclosureofmortgagestoclosearacetrack.Inanextremecase,the
governorofGeorgiaproclaimedmartiallawaroundagovernmentbuildingtoexcludefromitspremisesapublic
officialwhomhewasenjoinedfromremoving.23
AtthecloseoftheWorldWarI,theterm"martiallaw"waserroneouslyemployedtorefertothelawadministered
inenemyterritoryoccupiedbythealliedforcespendingthearmistice.21WilliamWinthropstatesthattheearlier
confusionregardingtheconceptofmartiallaw,resultingpartlyfromthewrongdefinitionofthetermbytheDuke
of Wellington who had said that "it is nothing more nor less than the will of the general," had misled even the
SupremeCourtoftheUnitedStates.25IntheleadingcaseofExParteMilligan,26however,ChiefJusticeChase,inhis
dissentingopinion,clarifiedandlaiddowntheclassicdistinctionsbetweenthetypesofmilitaryjurisdictioninrelationtothe
terms"martiallaw,""militarylaw"and"militarygovernment,"whichtoagreatextentclearedtheconfusionintheapplication
oftheseterms.
These distinctions were later incorporated in the Manual for CourtsMartial of the United States Army, 27 after
whichtheManualforCourtsMartialoftheArmedForcesofthePhilippines,promulgatedonDecember17,1938pursuantto
ExecutiveOrderNo.178,waspatterned.Inessence,thesedistinctionsareasfollows:
a. Military jurisdiction in relation to the term military law is that exercised by a government "in the
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executionofthatbranchofitsmunicipallawwhichregulatesitsmilitaryestablishment."(IntheU.S.
and the Philippines, this refers principally to the statutes which embody the rules of conduct and
discipline of members of their respective armed forces. In the Philippines we have for this purpose
CommonwealthActNo.408,asamended,otherwiseknownas"TheArticleofWar").
b.Militaryjurisdictioninrelationtothetermmartiallawisthatexercisedintimeofrebellionandcivil
warbyagovernmenttemporarilygoverningthecivilpopulationofalocalitythroughitsmilitaryforces,
withouttheauthorityofwrittenlaw,asnecessitymayrequire.28
c.Militaryjurisdictioninrelationtothetermmilitarygovernmentisthat"exercisedbyabelligerentoccupying
an enemy's territory." 29 (A familiar example of a military government was, of course, that established and
administeredbytheJapanesearmedforcesinthePhilippinesfrom1942to1945).
What is the universally accepted fundamental justification of martial law? Wiener in A Practical Manual Martial
Law,30venturesthisjustification:"MartialLawisthepubliclawofnecessity.Necessitycallsitforth,necessityjustifiesits
existence,andnecessitymeasurestheextentanddegreetowhichitmaybeemployed."
Martial law is founded upon the principle that the state has a right to protect itself against those who would
destroy it, and has therefore been likened to the right of the individual to selfdefense. 31 It is invoked as an
extrememeasure,andrestsuponthebasicprinciplethateverystatehasthepowerofselfpreservation,apowerinherentin
allstates,becauseneitherthestatenorsocietywouldexistwithoutit.32
IV
Inowproceedtodiscusstheissuesposedinthesecases.
InProclamation1081,datedSeptember21,1972,thePresidentofthePhilippinesdeclaredthatlawlesselements,
supported by a foreign power, were in "armed insurrection and rebellion against the Government of the
Philippines in order to forcibly seize political and state power, overthrow the duly constituted government and
supplantourexistingpolitical,social,economicandlegalorderwithanentirelynewone...basedontheMarxist
LeninistMaoistteachingsandbeliefs."Heenumeratedmanyandvariedactsofviolencecommittedinpursuance
of the insurrection and rebellion. He therefore placed the Philippines under martial law, commanded the armed
forcestosuppresstheinsurrectionandrebellion,enforceobediencetohisdecrees,ordersandregulations,and
arrest and detain those engaged in the insurrection and rebellion or in other crimes "in furtherance or on the
occasionthereof,orincidenttheretoorinconnectiontherewith."ThePresidentinvokedhispowersunderarticle
VIIsection10(2)ofthe1935Constitution"tosavetheRepublicandreformoursociety."33
ByGeneralOrderNo.2thePresidentdirectedtheSecretaryofNationalDefenseto"forthwitharrestorcausethe
arrest...theindividualsnamedintheattachedlistsforbeingparticipantsorforhavinggivenaidandcomfortin
the conspiracy to seize political and state power in the country and to take over the government by force ... in
ordertopreventthemfromfurthercommittingactsthatareinimicalorinjurious..."TheSecretarywasdirectedto
hold in custody the individuals so arrested "until otherwise so ordered by me or by my duly designated
representative."Thearrestanddetentionofthepetitionersinthesecasesappeartohavebeenmadepursuantto
thisorder.
IcannotblinkawaythestarkfactofacontinuingCommunistrebellioninthePhilippines.TheCourthasrepeatedly
taken cognizance of this fact in several eases decided by it. In 1971, in Lansang vs. Garcia, 34 the Court, after
reviewing the history of the Communist movement in the country since the 1930s, concluded: "We entertain, therefore, no
doubts about the existence of a sizeable group of men who have publicly risen in arms to overthrow the government and
havethusbeenandstillareengagedinrebellionagainsttheGovernmentofthePhilippines."Itaffirmedthisfindingin1972
35insustainingthevalidityoftheAntiSubversionAct(RepublicAct1700).TheActisitselfacongressionalrecognitionand
acute awareness of the continuing threat of Communist subversion to democratic institutions in this country. Enacted in
1957,ithasremainedinthestatutebooksdespiteperiodicagitationinmanyquartersforitstotalexcision.
Attimestherebellionrequirednomorethanordinarypoliceaction,coupledwithcriminalprosecutions.Thusthe
1932CommunisttrialsresultedintheconvictionofthewellknownCommunistsoftheday:CrisantoEvangelista,
Jacinto G. Manahan, Dominador J. Ambrosio, Guillermo Capadocia, Ignacio Nabong and Juan Feleo, among
others,forcrimesrangingfromillegalassociationtorebellionandsedition.36
The end of World War II saw the resurgence of the Communist rebellion. Now with an army forged out of the
former Hukbalahaps (the armed resistance against the Japanese) and renamed Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng
BayanorHMB,thethreattothesecurityofthestatebecamesomalevolentthatonOctober22,1950,President
ElpidioQuirinowasimpelledtosuspendtheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpus.ThisenabledtheGovernment
to effect the apprehension of top Communist Party leaders Guillermo Capadocia, Flavio Nava, Amado V.
Hernandez,JesusLava,JoseLava,AngelBakingandSimeonRodriguez,amongothers. 37 When challenged by
oneofthosedetainedunderthePresidentialproclamationthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritofhabeas corpus was
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sustainedbytheCourt.38
The beginning of the 1970s was marked by the rise of student activism. This phenomenon swept around the
globe, and did not spare our own colleges and universities. Soon the campuses became staging grounds for
studentdemonstrationsthatgenerallyendedinbloodyandnotinfrequentlylethalstreetriots.
InNavarrovs.Villegas,39inupholdingthepoweroftheMayorofManilatodeterminetheplaceandtimefortheholdingof
publicassemblies,thisCourtnoted
That experiences in connection with present assemblies and demonstrations do not warrant the
Court'sdisbelievingrespondentMayor'sappraisalthatapublicrallyatPlazaMiranda,ascompared
tooneattheSunkenGardensashesuggested,posesaclearerandmoreimminentdangerofpublic
disorders, breaches of the peace, criminal acts, and even bloodshed as an aftermath of such
assemblies,andpetitionerhasmanifestedthatithasnomeansofpreventingsuchdisorders
That, consequently, every time that such assemblies are announced, the community is placed in
such a state of fear and tension that offices are closed early and employees dismissed storefronts
boardedup,classessuspended,andtransportationdisruptedtothegeneraldetrimentofthepublic.
Ridingonthecrestofstudentunrest,theCommunistrebelliongainedmomentum.AstheCourtnotedinLansang
vs.Garcia,40
[T]he reorganized Communist Party of the Philippines has, moreover, adopted Mao's concept of
protracted people's war, aimed at the paralyzation of the will to resist of the government, of the
political, economic and intellectual leadership, and of the people themselves that conformably to
suchconceptthePartyhasplacedspecialemphasisuponmostextensiveandintensiveprogramof
subversion by the establishment of front organizations in urban centers, the organization of armed
citypartisansandtheinfiltrationinstudentgroups,laborunions,andfarmerandprofessionalgroups
that the CPP has managed to infiltrate or establish and control nine (9) major labor organizations
thatithasexploitedtheyouthmovementandsucceededinmakingCommunistfrontsofeleven(11)
major student or youth organizations that there are, accordingly, about thirty (30) mass
organizations actively advancing the CPP interests, among which are the Malayang Samahan ng
Magsasaka (MASAKA) the Kabataang Makabayan (KM), the Movement for the Advancement of
Nationalism (MAN), the Samahang Demokratiko ng Kabataan (SDK), the Samahang Molave (SM),
andtheMalayangPagkakaisangKabataangPilipino(MPKP)that,asofAugust,1971,theKMhad
twohundredfortyfive(245)operationalchaptersthroughoutthePhilippines,ofwhichseventythree
(73)wereintheGreaterManilaArea,sixty(60)inNorthernLuzon,fortynine(49)inCentralLuzon,
fortytwo(42)intheVisayasandtwentyone(21)inMindanaoandSuluthatin1970,thePartyhad
recordedtwohundredfiftyeight(258)majordemonstrations,ofwhichaboutthirtythreei33)ended
in violence, resulting in fifteen (15) killed and over five hundred (500) injured that most of these
actionswereorganized,coordinatedorledbytheaforementionedfrontorganizationsthattheviolent
demonstrationsweregenerallyinstigatedbyasmall,butwelltrainedgroupofarmedagitatorsthat
thenumberofdemonstrationsheretoforestakedin1971hasalreadyexceededthosein1970and
thattwentyfour(24)ofthesedemonstrationswereviolent,andresultedinthedeathoffifteen(15)
personsandtheinjuryofmanymore.
The mounting level of violence necessitated the suspension, for the second time, of the privilege of the writ of
habeascorpusonAugust21,1971.TheGovernment'sactionwasquestionedinLansangvs.Garcia.ThisCourt
found that the intensification and spread of Communist insurgency imperiled the state. The events after the
suspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritconfirmedthealarmingextentofthedangertopublicsafety:
Subsequenteventsasreportedhavealsoproventhatpetitioner'scounselhaveunderestimated
thethreattopublicsafetyposedbytheNewPeople'sArmy.Indeed,itappearsthat,sinceAugust21,
1971,ithadinNorthernLuzonsix(6)encountersandstagedone(1)raid,inconsequenceofwhich
seven(7)soldierslosttheirlivesandtwo(2)otherswerewounded,whereastheinsurgentssuffered
five(5)casualtiesthatonAugust26,1971,awellarmedgroupofNPA,trainedbydefectorLt.Victor
Corpus,attackedtheverycommandpostofTFLAWINinIsabela,destroyingtwo(2)helicoptersand
one (1) plane, and wounding one (1) soldier that the NPA had in Central Luzon a total of four (4)
encounters, with two (2) killed and three (3) wounded on the side of the Government, one (1) KM
SDK leader, an unidentified dissident, and Commander Panchito, leader of dissident group, were
killed that on August 26, 1971, there was an encounter in the Barrio of San Pedro, Iriga City,
CamarinesSur,betweenthePCandtheNPA,inwhichaPCandtwo(2)KMmemberswerekilled
that the current disturbances in Cotabato and the Lanao provinces have been rendered more
complex by the involvement of the CPP/NPA for, in mid1971, a KM group headed by Jovencio
Esparagoza,contactedtheHigaonantribes,intheirsettlementinMagsaysay,MisamisOriental,and
offeredthembooks,pamphletsandbrochuresofMaoTseTung,aswellasconductedteachinsin
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thereservationthatEsparagozawasreportedlykilledonSeptember22,1971,inanoperationofthe
PCinsaidreservationandthattherearenowtwo(2)NPAcadresinMindanao.
It should, also, be noted that adherents of the CPP and its front organization are accordingly to
intelligence findings, definitely capable of preparing powerful explosives out of locally available
materials that the bomb used in the Constitutional Convention Hall was a 'clay more' mine, a
powerfulexplosivedeviceusedbytheU.S.Armbelievedtohavebeenoneofmanypilferedfromthe
SubicNavalBaseafewdaysbeforethatthePresidenthadreceivedintelligenceinformationtothe
effect that there was a JulyAugust Plan involving a wave of assassinations, kidnappings, terrorism
andmissdestructionofpropertyandthatanextraordinaryoccurrencewouldsignalthebeginningof
saideventthattheratherseriousconditionofpeaceandorderinMindanao,particularlyinCotabato
and Lanao, demanded the presence therein of forces sufficient to cope with the situation that a
sizeable part of our armed forces discharges other functions and that the expansion of the CPP
activities from Central Luzon to other parts of the country particularly Manila and its suburbs the
CagayanValley,Ifugao,Zambales,Laguna,QuezonandBicolRegion,requiredthattherestofour
armedforcesbespreadthinoverawidearea.41
By virtue of these findings, the Court, led by Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, unanimously upheld the
suspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpus.TheCourtsaid:
ConsideringthatthePresidentwasinpossessionoftheabovedataexceptthoserelatedtoevents
thathappenedafterAugust21,1971whenthePlazaMirandaprompting,tookplace,theCourtis
notpreparedtoheldthattheExecutivehadactedarbitrarilyorgravelyabusedhisdiscretionwhenhe
thenconcludedthatpublicsafetyandnationalsecurityrequiredthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthe
writ, particularly if the NPA were to strike simultaneously with violent demonstrations staged by the
two hundred fortyfive (245) KM chapters, all over the Philippines, with the assistance and
cooperationofthedozensofCPPfrontorganizations,andthebombingofwatermainsandconduits,
aswellaselectricpowerplantsandinstallationsapossibilitywhich,nomatterhowremote,hewas
boundtoforestall,andadangerhewasunderobligationtoanticipateandatrest.
Hehadconsultedhisadvisersandsoughttheirviews.Hehadreasontofeelthatthesituationwas
criticalas,indeed,itwasanddemandedimmediateaction.Thishetookbelievingingoodfaith
that public safety required it. And, in the light of the circumstances adverted to above, he had
substantialgroundstoentertainsuchbelief."42
ThesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritwasliftedonJanuary7,1972,butsoonthereafterchaosengulfedthe
nation again. A large area of the country was in open rebellion. The authority of the Government was frontally
challenged by a coalition of forces. It was against this backdrop of violence and anarchy that martial law was
proclaimedonSeptember21,1972.
PersonallyItakenoticeofthiscondition,inadditiontowhattheCourthasfoundincasesthathavecometoitfor
decision,andthereisnocogentreasonformetosayasamatteroflawthatthePresidentexceededhispowers
indeclaringmartiallaw.NordoIbelievethattheSolicitorGeneral'smanifestationofMay13,1974totheeffect
that while on the whole the military challenge to the Republic has been overcome there are still large areas of
conflictwhichwarrantthecontinuedimpositionoflaw,canbesatisfactorilycontrovertedbyorbyanyperceptive
observerofthenationalscene.
AsIwillpointoutinthisopinion,thefactthatcourtsareopenbeacceptedasproofthattherebellionandwhich
compellinglycalledforthedeclarationofmartiallaw,nolongerimperilthepublicsafety.Norarethemanysurface
indicia adverted to by the petitioners (the increase in the number of tourists, the choice of Manila as the
conferencesandofaninternationalbeautycontest)toberegardedasevidencethatthethreattopublicsafehas
abated.Thereisactualarmedcombat,attendedbythesomberpanoplywar,raginginSuluandCotabato,notto
not mention the region and Cagayan Valley. 43 I am hard put to say, therefore, that the Government's claim is
baseless.
Iamnotinsensitivetothepleamadehereinthenameofindividualliberty.ButtoparaphraseExparteMoyer, 44
ifitwerethelibertyaloneofthepetitionerDioknothatis.inissuewewouldprobablyresolvethedoubtinhisfavorandgrant
hisapplication.ButtheSolicitorGeneral,whomustbedeemedtorepresentthePresidentandtheExecutiveDepartmentin
this case, 45 has manifested that in the President's judgment peace and tranquility cannot be speedily restored in the
country unless the petitioners and others like them meantime remain in military custody. For, indeed, the central matter
involvedisnotmerelythelibertyofisolatedindividuals,butthecollectivepeace,tranquilityandsecurityoftheentirenation.
V.
The1935ConstitutioncommittedtothePresidentthedeterminationofthepublicexigencyorexigenciesrequiring
theproclamationofmartiallaw.ItprovidedinarticleVII,section10(2)that
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The President shall be commanderinchief of all armed forces of the Philippines and, whenever it
becomesnecessary,hemaycalloutsucharmedforcestopreventorsuppresslawlessviolence, 46
invasion, insurrection, or rebellion. In case of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or eminent danger thereof,
when the public safety requires it, he may suspend the privileges of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the
Philippinesoranypartthereofundermartiallaw.47
In the 1934 Constitutional Convention it was proposed to vest the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeascorpusintheNationalAssembly.Theproposal,sponsoredbyDelegateAraneta,wouldgivethispowerto
the President only in cases where the Assembly was not in session and then only with the consent of the
SupremeCourt.ButthemajorityofthedelegatesentertainedthefearthattheGovernmentwouldbepowerlessin
thefaceofdanger. 48TheyrejectedtheAranetaproposalandadoptedinsteadtheprovisionsoftheJonesLawof1916.
TheframersoftheConstitutionrealizedtheneedforastrongExecutive,andthereforechosetoretaintheprovisionsofthe
formerorganicacts, 49which,adaptedtotheexigenciesofcolonialadministration,naturallymadetheGovernorGenerala
strongExecutive.
Construing a similar provision of the Philippine Bill of 1902 which authorized the Governor General, with the
approval of the Philippine Commission, to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeascorpus"when in cases of
rebellion, insurrection, or invasion the public safety may require it," this Court held that the Governor General's
findingastothenecessityforsuchactionwas"conclusiveandfinal"onthejudicialdepartment. 50This ruling was
affirmedin1952inMontenegrovs.Castaeda,51thisCourtstatingthat
the authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen requiring, the suspension belongs to the
Presidentand'hisdecisionisfinalandconclusive'uponthecourtsanduponallotherpersons.
It is true that in Lansang vs. Garcia 52 there is language that appears to detract from the uniform course of judicial
constructionoftheCommanderinChiefClause.Butaclosereadingoftheopinioninthatcaseshowsthatinthemainthere
was adherence to precedents. To be sure, the Court there asserted the power to inquire into the "existence of the factual
bases [for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus] in order to determine the sufficiency thereof," But
thisbroadassertionofpowerisqualifiedbytheCourt'sunambiguousstatementthat"thefunctionoftheCourtis,merelyto
check not to supplant the Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond the constitutional limits of
his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act." For this reason this Court
announced that the test was not whether the President acted correctly but whether he acted arbitrarily. In fact this Court
readBarcelonandMontenegroasauthorizingjudicialinquiryinto"whetherornottherereallywasarebellion,asstatedinthe
proclamationthereincontested."
OfcoursethejudicialdepartmentcandeterminetheexistenceoftheconditionsfortheexerciseofthePresident's
powers and is not bound by the recitals of his proclamation. But whether in the circumstances obtaining public
safetyrequiresthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpusortheproclamationofmartiallawis
initially for the President to decide. Considerations of commitment of the power to the executive branch of the
Governmentandthelackofacceptedstandardsfordealingwithincommensurablefactors,suggestthewisdomof
considering the President's finding as to necessitypersuasive upon the courts. This conclusion results from the
natureofthepowervestedinthePresidentandfromtheevidentobjectcontemplated.Forthatpowerisintended
to enable the Government to cope with sudden emergencies and meet great occasions of state under
circumstancesthatmaybecrucialtothelifeofthenation.53
The fact that courts are open and in the unobstructed discharge of their functions is pointed to as proof of the
absenceofanyjustificationformartiallaw.TherulinginMilligan54andDuncan55isinvoked.InbothcasestheU.S.
Supreme Court reversed convictions by military commissions. In Milligan the Court stated that "martial law cannot arise
from a threatened invasion. The necessity must be actual and present, the invasion real, such as effectually closes the
courts and deposes the civil administration." In Duncan a similar expression was made: "The phrase 'martial law' ... while
intendedtoauthorizethemilitarytoactvigorouslyforthemaintenanceofanorderlycivilgovernmentandforthedefenseof
the Islands against actual or threatened rebellion or invasion, was not intended to authorize the supplanting of courts by
militarytribunals."
ButMilliganandDuncanweredecidedonthebasisofawidelydisparateconstitutionalprovision.Whatismore,to
theextentthattheymayberegardedasembodyingwhatthepetitionerscallan"opencourt"theory,theyareof
doubtfulapplicabilityinthecontextofpresentdaysubversion.
Unlike the detailed provision of our Constitution, the U.S. Federal Constitution does not explicitly authorize the
U.S. President to proclaim martial law. It simply states in its article II, section 2 that "the President shall be
CommanderinChief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when
called into the actual Service of the United States. ..." On the other hand, our Constitution authorizes the
proclamation of martial law in cases not only of actual invasion, insurrection or rebellion but also of "imminent
danger"thereof.
ItistruethatinDuncantheU.S.SupremeCourtdealtwithaU.S.statutethatintermswassimilartothePhilippine
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Constitution. Section 67 of the Hawaiian Organic Act provided that "[the Territorial Governor] may, in case of
invasion,orimminentdangerthereof,whenpublicsafetyrequiresit,suspendtheprivilegeofthewritofhabeas
corpus, or place the Territory, or any part thereof under martial law until communication can be had with the
President[oftheUnitedStates]andhisdecisionthereofmadeknown."InfacttheHawaiianOrganicAct,thatof
PuertoRico,andtheJoneslawof1916,fromwhichlatterlaw,asIhaveearliernoted,theCommanderinChief
Clause of our Constitution was adopted, were part of the legislation of the U.S. Congress during the colonial
period. But again, unlike the Jones Law, the Hawaiian Organic Act also provided in its section 5 that the U.S.
FederalConstitution"shallhavethesameforceandeffectintheterritory[ofHawaii]aselsewhereintheUnited
States.ForthisreasonitwasheldinDuncanthat"imminentdanger"ofinvasionorrebellionwasnotagroundfor
authorizingthetrialofciviliansbyamilitarytribunal.HadDuncanbeendecidedsolelyonthebasisofsection67of
the Hawaiian Organic Act and had the petitioners in that case been tried for offenses connected with the
prosecutionofthewar,56theprisonsentencesimposedbythemilitarytribunalswouldinallprobabilityhadbeenupheld.
As a matter of fact those who argued in Duncan that the power of the Hawaiian governor to proclaim martial law
comprehended not only actual rebellion or invasion but also "imminent danger thereof" were faced with the problem of
reconciling,thetwopartsoftheHawaiianOrganicAct.Theycontendedthat"ifanypaintofsection67wouldotherwisebe
unconstitutionalsection5mustbeconstruedasextendingthe[U.S.]ConstitutiontoHawaiisubjecttothequalificationsor
limitationscontainedinsection67."57
Forsooth,ifthepowertoproclaimmartiallawisatallrecognizedinAmericanfederalconstitutionallaw,itisonly
byimplicationfromthenecessityofselfpreservationandthensubjecttothenarrowestpossibleconstruction.
NoristhereanyStateConstitutionintheUnitedStates,astheappendedlistindicates(seeAppendix), which in
scope and explicitness can compare with the CommanderinChief Clause of our Constitution. The Alaska
Constitution, for example, authorizes the governor to proclaim martial law when the public safety requires it in
caseofrebellionoractualorimminentinvasion.Buteventhenitalsoprovidesthatmartiallawshallnotlastlonger
thantwentydaysunlessapprovedbyamajorityofthelegislatureinjointsession.Ontheotherhand,thepresent
ConstitutionofHawaiidoesnotgranttotheStategovernorthepowertosuspendthewritofhabeascorpusorto
proclaimmartiallawasdiditsOrganicActbeforeitsadmissionasaStatetotheAmericanUnion.
An uncritical reading of Milligan and Duncan is likely to overlook these crucial differences in textual concepts
between the Philippine Constitution, on the one hand, and the Federal and State Constitutions of the United
States, on the other. In our case then the inclusion of the "imminent danger" phrase as a ground for the
suspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpusandfortheproclamationofmartiallawwasamatterof
deliberate choice and renders the language of Milligan ("martial law cannot arise from a threatened invasion")
inappositeandthereforeinapplicable.
ThePhilippineBillof1902providedinitssection2,paragraph7
that the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended unless when in cases of
rebellion,insurrection,orinvasionthepublicsafetymayrequireit,ineitherofwhicheventsthesame
maybesuspendedbythePresident,orbytheGovernorGeneralwiththeapprovalofthePhilippine
Commission,whereverduringsuchperiodthenecessityforsuchsuspensionshallexist.
TheJonesLawof1916substantiallyreenactedthisprovision.Thussection3,paragraph7thereofprovided:
That the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of
may be suspended by the President or by the Governor General, wherever during such period the
necessityforsuchsuspensionshallexist.
Inaddition,theJonesLawprovidedinitssection21that
...[TheGovernorGeneral]may,incaseofrebellionorinvasion,orimminentdangerthereof,when
thepublicsafetyrequiresit,suspendtheprivilegesofthewritofhabeascorpusorplacetheIslands,
oranypartthereof,undermartiallaw:ProvidedThatwhenevertheGovernorGeneralshallexercise
this authority, he shall at once notify the President of the United States thereof, together with the
attendingfactsandcircumstances,andthePresidentshallhavepowertomodifyorvacatetheaction
oftheGovernorGeneral.
Note that with respect to the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeascorpus, section 21 mentions, as
ground therefor, "imminent danger" of invasion or rebellion. When the Constitution was drafted in 1934, its
framers, as I have already noted, decided to adopt these provisions of the Jones Law. What was section 3,
paragraph7,intheJonesLawbecamesection1(14)ofarticleIII(BillofRights)oftheConstitutionandwhatwas
section 21 became article VII, section 10(2) (CommanderinChief Clause). Thus, the Bill of Rights provision
reads:
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion,
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insurrection,orrebellion,whenthepublicsafetyrequiresit,inanyof'whicheventsthesamemaybe
suspendedwhereverduringsuchperiodthenecessityforsuchsuspensionshallexist.
Ontheotherhand,theCommanderinChiefClausestates:
becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion,insurrection,orrebellion.Incaseofinvasion,insurrection,orrebellion,orimminentdanger
thereof, when the public safety requires it, he may suspend the privileges of the writ of habeas
corpus,orplacethePhilippinesoranypartthereofundermartiallaw.
The attention of the 1934 Convention was drawn to the apparent inconsistency between the Bill of Rights
provisionandtheCommanderinChiefClause.Somedelegatestriedtoharmonizethetwoprovisionsbyinserting
the phrase "imminent danger thereof" in the Bill of Rights provision, but on reconsideration the Convention
deletedthephrasefromthedraftoftheBillofRightsprovision,atthesametimeretainingitintheCommanderin
ChiefClause.
Whenthisapparentinconsistencywasraisedinasuit58questioningthevalidityofPresidentQuirinosuspensionofthe
privilegeofthewritofhabeascorpus,thisCourtsustainedthePresident'spowertosuspendtheprivilegeofthewritevenon
thegroundofimminentdangerofinvasion,insurrectionorrebellion.ItheldthatastheCommanderinChiefClausewaslast
intheorderoftimeandlocalpositionitshouldbedeemedcontrolling.Thisrationalizationhasevokedthecriticismthatthe
Constitutionwasapprovedasawholeandnotinparts,butinresultthedecisioninthatcaseiscertainlyconsistentwiththe
conceptionofastrongExecutivetowhichthe1934ConstitutionalConventionwascommitted.
The 1973 Constitution likewise authorizes the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus on the
groundofimminentdangerofinvasion,insurrectionandrebellion.
The socalled "open court" theory does not apply to the Philippine situation because our 1935 and 1973
Constitutions expressly authorize the declaration of martial law even where the danger to public safety arises
merely from the imminence of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion. Moreover, the theory is too simplistic for our
day,whatwiththeuniversallyrecognizedinsidiousnatureofCommunistsubversionanditscovertoperations.
IndeedthetheoryhasbeendismissedasunrealisticbyperceptivestudentsofPresidentialpowers.
CharlesFairmansays:
Thesemeasuresareunprecedentedbutsoisthedangerthatcalledthemintobeing.Ofcoursewe
arenotwithoutlaw,evenintimeofcrisis.Yetthecasestowhichoneiscitedinthedigestsdisclose
such confusion of doctrine as to perplex a lawyer who suddenly tries to find his bearings. Hasty
recollectionofEx parte Milligan recalls the dictum that 'Martial rule cannot arise from a threatened
invasion.Thenecessitymustbeactualandpresenttheinvasionreal,suchaseffectuallyclosesthe
courtsanddeposestheciviladministration.'NoteventheaerialattackuponPearlHarborclosedthe
courtsorofitsownforcedeposedtheciviladministrationyetitwouldbethecommonunderstanding
ofmenthatthoseagencieswhicharechargedwiththenationaldefensesurelymusthaveauthority
to take on the spot some measures which in normal times would be ultravires. And whilst college
sophomoresaretaughtthatthecasestandsasaconstitutionallandmark,thehardfactisthatoflate
governorshavefrequentlydeclared'martiallaw'and'war'andhavebeenjudiciallysustainedintheir
measures.Undoubtedly,manyofthesecasesinvolvingthesuspensionofstrikerswentmuchtoofar.
But just as certainly so it will be argued here the doctrine of the majority in Ex parte Milligan
doesnotgofarenoughtomeettheconditionsofmodernwar.59
ClintonRossiterwrites:
Itissimplynottruethat'martiallawcannotarisefromathreatenedinvasion,'orthatmartialrulecan
never exist where the courts are open.' These statements do not present an accurate definition of
theallowablelimitsofthemartialpowersofthePresidentandCongressinthefaceofalienthreatsof
internaldisorder.NorwasDavis'dictumonthespecificpowerofCongressinthismatteranymore
accurate.And,howevereloquentquotablehiswordsontheuntouchabilityoftheConstitutionintime
ofactualcrisis,anddidnotthen,expresstherealitiesofAmericanconstitutionallaw.60
WilliamWinthropmakesthesethoughtfulobservations:
It has been declared by the Supreme Court in Ex parte Milligan that martial law' is confined to the
locality of actual war,' and also that it 'can never exist when the courts are open and in the proper
andunobstructedexerciseoftheirjurisdiction.'Butthisrulingwasmadebyabaremajorityfive
of the court, at a time of great political excitement and the opinion of the four other members, as
deliveredbytheChiefJustice,wastotheeffectthatmartiallawisnotnecessarilylimitedtotimeof
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war, but may be exercised at other periods of 'public danger,' and that the fact that the civil courts
areopenisnotcontrollingagainstsuchexercise,sincethey'mightbeopenandundisturbedinthe
executionoftheirfunctionsandyetwhollyincompetenttoavertthreateneddangerortopunishwith
adequatepromptitudeandcertaintytheguilty.'Itistheopinionoftheauthorthattheofthe view of
theminorityofthecourtisthesounderandmorereasonableone,andthatthedictumofthemajority
wasinfluencedbyaconfusingofmartiallawproperwiththatmilitarygovernmentwhichexistsonlyat
atimeandonthetheaterofwar,andwhichwasclearlydistinguishedfrommartiallawbytheChief
Justice in the dissenting opinion the first complete judicial definition of the subject. 61 (emphasis
supplied)
In Queen vs. Bekker (on the occasion of the Boer War) Justice Maasdorp categorically affirmed that "the
existenceofcivilcourtsisnoproofthatmartiallawhasbecomeunnecessary.62
VI
Giventhenthevalidityoftheproclamationofmartiallaw,thearrestanddetentionofthosereasonablybelievedto
beengagedinthedisorderorinformentingitiswellnighbeyondquestioning.Negatethepowertomakesuch
arrestanddetention,andmartiallawwouldbe"mereparade,andratherencourageattackthanrepelit."63 Thus,
inMoyervs.Peabody,64theCourtsustainedtheauthorityofaStategovernortoholdtemporarilyincustodyonewhomhe
believed to be engaged in formenting trouble, and denied recovery against the governor for the imprisonment. It was said
that,asthegovernor"maykillpersonswhoresist,"hemayusethemildermeasureofseizingthebodiesofthosewhomhe
considers in the way of restoring peace. Such arrests are not necessarily for punishment, but are by way of precaution to
preventtheexerciseofhostilepower.Solongassucharrestsaremadeingoodfaithandinthehonestbeliefthattheyare
neededinordertoheadtheinsurrectionoff,theGovernoristhefinaljudgeandcannotbesubjectedtoanactionafterheis
outofofficeonthegroundthathehadnoreasonablegroundforhisbelief."
ItistruethatinSterlingvs.Contantin65thesameCourtsetasidetheactionofaStategovernortakenundermartiallaw.
But the decision in that case rested on the ground that the action set aside had no direct relation to the quelling of the
uprising.TherethegovernorofTexasissuedaproclamationstatingthatcertaincountieswereinastateofinsurrectionand
declaringmartiallawinthatterritory.Theproclamationrecitedthattherewasanorganizedgroupofoilandgasproducersin
insurrectionagainstconservationlawsoftheStateandthatthisconditionhadbroughtsuchastateofpublicfeelingthatif
theStategovernmentcouldnotprotectthepublic'sinteresttheywouldtakethelawintotheirownhands.Theproclamation
further recited that it was necessary that the Railroad Commission be given time to make orders regarding oil production.
When the Commission issued an order limiting oil production, the complainants brought suit iii the District Court which
issuedrestrainingorders,whereuponGovernorSterlingorderedGeneralWoltersoftheTexasNationalGuardstoenforcea
limitonoilproduction.ItwasthisorderoftheStategovernorthattheDistrictCourtenjoined.OnappealtheU.S.Supreme
Court affirmed. After assuming that the governor had the power to declare martial law, the Court held that the order
restrictingoilproductionwasnotjustifiedbytheexigenciesofthesituation.
... Fundamentally, the question here is not the power of the governor to proclaim that a state of
insurrection, or tumult or riot, or breach of the peace exists, and that it is necessary to call military
forcetotheaidofthecivilpower.Nordoesthequestionrelatetothequellingofdisturbanceandthe
overcomingofunlawfulresistancetocivilauthority.Thequestionbeforeusissimplywithrespectto
the Governor's attempt to regulate by executive order the lawful use of complainants' properties in
theproductionofoil.Insteadofaffordingthemprotectionintheexerciseoftheirrightsasdetermined
bythecourts,hesought,byhisexecutiveorders,tomakethatexerciseimpossible.
On the other hand, what is involved here is the validity of the detention order under which the petitioners were
ordered arrested. Such order is, as I have already stated, a valid incident of martial law. With respect to such
question Constantin held that "measures, conceived in good faith, in the face of the emergency and directly
relatedtothequellingofthedisorderorthepreventionofitscontinuance,fallwithinthediscretionoftheExecutive
intheexerciseofhisauthoritytomaintainpeace."
In the cases at bar, the respondents have justified the arrest and detention of the petitioners on the ground of
reasonablebeliefintheircomplicityintherebellionandinsurrection.ExceptDioknoandAquino,allthepetitioners
have been released from custody, although subject to defined restrictions regarding personal movement and
expressionofviews.Asthedangertopublicsafetyhasnotabated,Icannotsaythatthecontinueddetentionof
DioknoandAquinoandtherestrictionsonthepersonalfreedomsoftheotherpetitionersarearbitrary,justasI
amnotpreparedtosaythatthecontinuedimpositionofmartialruleisunjustified.
AstheColoradoSupremeCourtstatedindenyingthewritofhabeascorpusinMoyer:66
Hisarrestanddetentioninsuchcircumstancesaremerelytopreventhimfromtakingpartoraiding
inacontinuationoftheconditionswhichthegovernor,inthedischargeofhisofficialdutiesandinthe
exerciseoftheauthorityconferredbylaw,isendeavoringtosuppress.
VII
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Whilecourtsmayinquireintoortakejudicialnoticeoftheexistenceofconditionsclaimedtojustifytheexerciseof
the power to declare martial law, 67 the determination of the necessity for the exercise of such power is within the
peripheryoftheconstitutionaldomainofthePresidentandaslongasthemeasureshetakesarereasonablyrelatedtothe
occasioninvolved,interferencebythecourtsisofficious.
IamconfirmedinthisconstructionofPresidentialpowersbytheconsensusofthe1971ConstitutionalConvention
tostrengthentheconceptofastrongExecutiveandbytheconfirmationofthevalidityofactstakenordoneafter
theproclamationofmartiallawinthiscountry.The1973Constitutionexpresslyauthorizesthesuspensionofthe
privilegeofthewritofhabeascorpusaswellastheimpositionofmartiallawnotonlyontheoccasionofactual
invasion,insurrectionorrebellion,butalsowherethedangerthereofisimminent.68Acrimoniousdiscussionon
thismatterhasthusbecomepointlessandshouldthereforecease.
ThenewConstitutionaswellprovidesthat
All proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and acts promulgated, issued, or done by the
incumbent President shall be part of the law of the land, and shall remain valid, legal, binding, and
effective even after lifting of martial law or the ratification of this constitution, unless modified,
revoked,orsupersededbysubsequentproclamations,orders,decrees,instructions,orotheractsof
the incumbent President, or unless expressly aid explicitly modified or repealed by the regular
NationalAssembly.69
TheeffectivityofthenewConstitutionisnowbeyondallmannerofdebateinviewoftheCourt'sdecisioninthe
RatificationCases70aswellasthedemonstratedacquiescencethereinbytheFilipinopeopleinthehistoricJuly
1973nationalreferendum.
VIII
It is thus evident that suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is unavoidable subsumed in a
declaration of martial law, since one basic objective of martial rule is to neutralize effectively by arrest and
continueddetention(andpossiblytrialattheproperandopportunetime)thosewhoarereasonablybelievedto
be in complicity or are particeps criminis in the insurrection or rebellion. That this is so and should be so is
ineluctabletodenythispostulateistonegatetheveryfundamentalofmartiallaw:thepreservationofsocietyand
thesurvivalofthestate.Torecognizetheimperativenessandrealityofmartiallawandatthesametimedissipate
its efficacy by withdrawing from its ambit the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is a
propositionIregardasfatuousandthereforerepudiate.
Invasionandinsurrection,bothofthemconditionsofviolence,arethefactualprerequisitesofmartial
law...Therightsofpersonandpropertypresentnoobstructiontotheauthoritiesactingundersucha
regime, if the acts which encroach upon them are necessary to the preservation or restoration of
public order and safety. Princeps et res publica ex justa causa possunt rem meam auferre. All the
procedureswhicharerecognizedadjunctsofexecutivecrisisgovernment...areopentothepersons
whobearofficialauthorityundermartiallaw.Thegovernmentmaywieldarbitrarypowersofpoliceto
allaydisorder,arrestanddetainwithouttrialallcitizenstakingpartinthisdisorderandevenpunish
them(in other words, suspend the [privilege of the] writ of habeas corpus), institute searches and
seizures without warrant, forbid public assemblies, set curfew hours, suppress all freedom of
expression, institute courts martial for the summary trial of crimes perpetrated in the course of this
regimeandcalculatedtodefeatitspurposes...71(emphasissupplied)
The point here is whether martial law is simply a shorthand expression denoting the suspension of
thewrit,orwhethermartiallawinvolvesnotonlythesuspensionofthewritbutmuchmorebesides.
... The latter view is probably sounder because martial law certainly in the present state of its
development,isnotatalldependentonasuspensionofthewritofhabeascorpus. ... Where there
hasbeenviolenceordisorderinfact,continueddetentionofoffendersbythemilitaryissofarproper
astoresultinadenialbythecourtsofwritsreleasingthosedetained....72
IX.
Althoughtherespondents,intheirreturnstothewritsandintheiranswerstotheseveralpetitions,haveinsisted
onadisclaimerofthejurisdictionofthisCourt,onthebasisofGeneralOrdersNos.3and3A, 73their subsequent
manifestationsurgingdecisionofthesecasesamounttoanabandonmentofthisdefense.InpointoffactPresidentMarco
has written, in unmistakable phrase, that "Our martial law is unique in that it is based on the supremacy of the civilian
authorityoverthemilitaryandoncompletesubmissionofthedecisionoftheSupremeCourt....Forwhoisthedictatorwho
would submit himself to a higher body like the Supreme Court on the question of the constitutionality or validity of his
actions?" 74 Construing this avowal of the President and the repeated urgings of the respondents in the light of the
abovequotedprovisionofthe1973Constitution(Art.XVII,sec.3(2)),itismysubmissionthatGeneralOrdersNos.3and3
A must be deemed revoked in so far as they tended to oust the judiciary of jurisdiction over cases involving the
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constitutionalityofproclamations,decrees,ordersoractsissuedordonebythePresident.
X
Insumandsubstance,Ifirmlyadheretotheseviews:(1)thattheproclamationofmartiallawinSeptember1972
bythePresidentwaswellwithintheaegisofthe1935Constitution(2)thatbecausetheCommunistrebellionhad
not abated and instead the evil ferment of subversion had proliferated throughout the archipelago and in many
places had exploded into the roar of armed and searing conflict with all the sophisticated panoply of war, the
impositionofmartiallawwasan"imperativeofnationalsurvival"(3)thatthearrestanddetentionofpersonswho
were"participantsorgaveaidandcomfortintheconspiracytoseizepoliticalandstatepowerandtotakeoverthe
governmentbyforce,"werenotunconstitutionalnorarbitrary(4)thatsubsumedinthedeclarationofmartiallaw
isthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpus (5) that the fact that the regular courts of justice
are open cannot be accepted as proof that the rebellion. and insurrection, which compellingly called for the
declarationofmartiallaw,nolongerimperilthepublicsafety(6)thatactualarmedcombathasbeenandstillis
raging in Cotabato, Lanao, Sulu and Zamboanga, not to mention the Bicol Region and Cagayan Valley, and
nationwide Communist subversion continues unabated (7) that the host of doubts that had plagued this Court
with respect to the validity of the ratification and consequent effectivity of the 1973 Constitution has been
completely dispelled by every rational evaluation of the national referendum of July 1973, at which the people
conclusivelyalbeitquietly,demonstratednationwideacquiescencein.thenewConstitutionand(8)thattheissue
ofthevalidityandconstitutionalityofthearrestanddetentionofallthepetitionersandoftherestrictionsimposed
uponthosewhoweresubsequentlyfreed,isnowforeclosedbythetransitoryprovisionofthe1973Constitution
(Art,XVII.Sec.3(2))whichefficaciouslyvalidatesallactsmade,doneortakenbythePresident,orbyothersupon
hisinstructions,undertheregimeofmartiallaw,priortotheratificationofthesaidConstitution.
XI
ItisnotameresurrealsuspiciononthepartofthepetitionerDioknothattheincumbentmembersofthishighest
Tribunalofthelandhaveremovedthemselvesfromalevelofconsciencetopassjudgmentuponhispetitionfor
habeascorpusor afford him relief from his predicament. He has actually articulated it as a formal indictment. I
venturetosaythathisobsessionalpreoccupationontheabilityofthisCourttoreachafairjudgmentinrelationto
him has been, in no small measure, engendered by his melancholy and bitter and even perhaps traumatic
detention. And even as he makes this serious indictment, he at the same time would withdraw his petition for
habeascorpushopingtherebytoachievemartyrdom,albeitdubiousandamorphous.Asacommentaryonthis
indictment, I here that for my part and I am persuaded that all the other members of this Court are situated
similarly I avow fealt to the full intendment and meaning of the oath I have taken as a judicial magistrate.
UtilizingthemodestendowmentsthatGodhasgrantedme,Ihaveendeavoredinthepasteighteenyearsofmy
judicialcareerandinthefuturewillalwaysendeavortodischargefaithfullytheresponsibilitiesappurtenant
tomyhighoffice,neverfearing,waveringorhesitatingtoreachjudgmentsthataccordwithmyconscience.
ACCORDINGLY,Ivotetodismissallthepetitions.
APPENDIXtoSeparateOpinionof
JusticeFredRuizCastro
STATECONSTITUTIONALPROVISIONS
REGARDINGMARTIALLAW
ALASKACONST.,art.III,sec.20:
Sec.20.MartialLaw.Thegovernormayproclaimmartiallawwhenthepublicsafetyrequiresitincaseofrebellion
oractualorimminentinvasion.Martiallawshallnotcontinueforlongerthantwentydayswithouttheapprovalofa
majorityofthemembersofthelegislatureinjointsession.
MAINECONST.,art.I,sec.14:
Sec.14.Corporalpunishmentundermilitarylaw.Nopersonshallbesubjecttocorporalpunishmentundermilitary
law,exceptsuchasareemployedinthearmyornavy,orinthemilitiawheninactualserviceintimeofwaror
publicdanger.
MARYLANDCONST.,art.32:
Art.32.MartialLaw.Thatnopersonexceptregularsoldiers,marines,andmarinersintheserviceofthisState,or
militia,wheninactualservice,oughtinanycase,tobesubjectto,orpunishablebyMartialLaw.
MASSACHUSETTSCONST.,art.XXVIII:
Art.XXVIII.Citizensexemptfromlawmartial. No person can in any case be subjected to law martial, or to any
penalties or pains, by virtue of that law, except those employed in the army or navy, and except the militia in
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actualservice,butbyauthorityofthelegislature.
NEWHAMPSHIRE,PtII,arts.34and51:
Art.34th.Martiallawlimited.Nopersoncan,inanycase,besubjectedtolawmartial,ortoanypainsorpenalties
byvirtueofthatlaw,exceptthoseemployedinthearmyornavy,andexceptthemilitiainactualservice,butby
authorityofthelegislature.
Art.51st.Powersanddutiesofgovernorascommanderinchieflimitation.Thegovernorofthisstateforthetime
being.shallbecommanderinchiefofthearmyandnavy,andallthemilitaryforcesofthestatebyseaandland
andshallhavefullpowerbyhimself,orbyanychiefcommander,orotherofficer,orofficers,fromtimetotime,to
train, instruct, exercise and govern the militia and navy and for the special defense and safety of this state, to
assembleinmartialarray,andputinwarlikeposture,theinhabitantsthereof,andtoleadandconductthem,and
withthemtoencounter,repulse,repelresistandpursuebyforceofarms,aswellbyseaasbyland,withinand
withoutthelimitsofthisstate:andalsokill,slay.destroy,ifnecessary,andconquerbyallfittingways,enterprise
andmeans,allandeverysuchpersonandpersonsasshall,atanytimehereafter,inahostilemanner,attemptor
enterprisethedestruction,invasion,detrimentorannoyanceofthisstateandtouseandexerciseoverthearmy
and navy, and over the militia in actual service, the law martial in time of war invasion, and also in rebellion,
declared by the legislature to exist, as occasion shall necessarily require: And surprise, by all ways and means
whatsoever,allandeverysuchpersonorpersons,withtheirships,arms,ammunition,andothergoods,asshall
inahostilemannerinvade,orattempttheinvading,conqueringorannoyingthisstateandinfinethegovernor
hereby is entrusted with all other powers incident to the office of the captaingeneral and commanderinchief,
andadmiral,tobeexercisedagreeablytotherulesandregulationsoftheconstitution,andthelawsoftheland
provided,thattheGovernorshallnot,atanytimehereafter,byvirtueofanypowerbythisconstitutiongranted,or
hereaftertobegrantedtohimbythelegislature,transportanyoftheinhabitantsofthisstate,orobligethemto
marchoutofthelimitsofthesame,withouttheirfreeandvoluntaryconsent,ortheconsentofthegeneralcourt,
nor grant commissions for exercising the law martial in any case, without the advise and the consent of the
council.
RHODEISLANDCONST.,art.I,sec.18:.
Sec.18.Militarysubordinatemartiallaw.Themilitaryshallbeheldinstrictsubordinationtothecivilauthority.And
thelawmartialshallbeusedandexercisedinsuchcasesonlyasoccasionshallnecessarilyrequire.
TENNESSEECONST.,art.1,sec.25:
Sec.25.Punishmentundermartialandmilitarylaw.ThatnocitizenofthisState,exceptsuchasareemployedin
thearmyoftheUnitedStates,ormilitiainactualservice,shallbesubjectedtopunishmentunderthemartialor
militarylaw.Thatmartiallaw,inthesenseoftheunrestrictedpowerofmilitaryofficers,orothers,todisposeofthe
persons, liberties or property of the citizen, is inconsistent with the principles of free government, and is not
confidedtoanydepartmentofthegovernmentofthisState.
VERMONTCONST.,ch.1,art.17:
Art.17th.Martiallawrestricted.Thatnopersoninthisstatecaninanycasebesubjectedtolawmartial,ortoany
penaltiesorpainsbyvirtueofthatlawexceptthoseemployedinthearmyandthemilitiainactualservice.
WESTVIRGINIA,art,III,sec.12:
Art. III, sec. 12. Military subordinate to civil power. Standing armies, in time of peace, should be avoided as
dangerous to liberty. The military shall be subordinate to the civil power and no citizen, unless engaged in the
militaryserviceoftheState,shallbetriedorpunishedbyanymilitarycourt,foranyoffensethatiscognizableby
thecivilcourtsoftheState.Nosoldiershall,intimeofpeace,bequarteredinanyhouse,withouttheconsentof
theowner,norintimeofwar,exceptinthemannertobeprescribedbylaw..
FERNANDO,J.,concurringanddissenting:
Theissueinvolvedinthesehabeascorpuspetitionsisthepreeminentproblemofthetimestheprimacytobe
accordedtheclaimsoflibertyduringperiodsofcrisis.ThereismuchthatisnovelinwhatconfrontstheCourt.A
traditional orientation may not suffice. The approach taken cannot be characterized by rigidity and inflexibility.
Thereisroom,plentyofit,fornoveltyandinnovation.Doctrinesdeeplyrootedinthepast,thathavestoodthetest
oftimeandcircumstance,mustbemadeadaptabletopresentneedsand,hopefully,serviceabletoanunknown
future,theeventsofwhich,torecallStory,arelockedtipintheinscrutabledesignsofamercifulProvidence.Itis
essential then that in the consideration of the petitions before us there be objectivity, calmness, and
understanding. The deeper the disturbance in the atmosphere of security, the more compelling is the need for
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tranquilityofmind,ifreasonistoprevail.NolegalcarrieristobeinterposedtothwarttheeffortsoftheExecutive
torestorenormalcy.Heisnottobedeniedthepowertotakethatforhimmaybenecessarymeasurestomeet
emergencyconditions.Sotherealitiesofthesituationdictate.Thereshouldbeonthepartofthejudiciarythen,
sensitivitytothesocialforcesatwork,creatingconditionsofgraveunrestandturbulenceandthreateningthevery
stability not to say existence, of the political order. It is in that setting that the crucial issue posed by these
petitionsistobeappraised.Itmaybethatthisclashbetweentheprimacyoflibertyandthelegitimatedefenseof
authorityisnotsusceptibleofandefinite,clearcutsolution.Nonetheless,anattempthastobemade.Withalldue
recognition of the merit apparent in the exhaustive, scholarly and eloquent dissertations of Justice Barredo and
myotherbrethrenaswellastheeaseandluciditywithwhichtheChiefJusticeclarifiedthecomplexissuesand
theviewsofmembersoftheCourt,Iwouldliketogiveabriefexpressiontomythoughtstorenderclearthepoints
onwhichIfindmyself,withregret,unabletobeofthesamepersuasion.
IconcurinthedismissalofthehabeascorpuspetitionofBenignoS.Aquino,Jr.solelyonthegroundthatcharges
hadbeenfiledanddissentinpartinthedismissalofthepetitionofFranciscoRodrigoandothers,*whojoinedhiminhis
pleafortheremovaloftheconditionsontheirrelease,ontheviewthatasfarasfreedomoftravelisconcerned,itshouldbe,onprinciple,leftunrestricted.
Asoriginallyprepared,thisopinionlikewiseexplainedhisdissentinthedenialofthemotiontowithdrawinthepetitionfiledonbehalfofJoseW.Diokno,a
matternowmootandacademic.
1.Wehavetopassonhabeascorpuspetitions.Thegreatwritoflibertyisinvolved.Rightfully,itislatitudinarianin
scope.Itiswiderangingandallembracinginitsreach.Itcandigdeepintothefactstoassurethattherebeno
tolerationofillegalrestraint.Detentionmustbeforacauserecognizedbylaw.Thewritimposesonthejudiciary
thegraveresponsibilityofascertainingwhetheradeprivationofphysicalfreedomiswarranted.Thepartywhois
keepingapersonincustodyhastoproducehimincourtassoonaspossible.Whatismore,hemustjustifythe
action taken. Only if it can be demonstrated that there has been no violation of one's right to liberty will he be
absolvedfromresponsibility.Failingthat,theconfinementmusttherebycease.Nordoesitsufficethattherebea
courtprocess,order,ordecisiononwhichitismadetorest.Iftherebeashowingofaviolationofconstitutional
rights, the jurisdiction of the tribunal issuing it is ousted. Moreover, even if there be a valid sentence, it cannot,
evenforamoment,beextendedbeyondtheperiodprovidedforbylaw.Whenthattimecomes,heisentitledto
bereleased.Itisinthatsensethen,assowellputbyHolmes,thatthisgreatwrit"istheusualremedyforunlawful
imprisonment."1It does afford to borrow from the language of Birkenhead "a swift and imperative remedy in all cases of
illegalrestraintorconfinement."2Notthatthereisneedforactualincarceration.Acustodyforwhichthereisnosupportin
law suffices for its invocation. The party proceeded against is usually a public official, the runofthemill petitions often
comingfromindividualswhoforonereasonoranotherhaverunafoulofthepenallaws.Confinementcouldlikewisecome
about because of contempt citations,3 whether from the judiciary or from the legislature. It could also be due to statutory
commands,whetheraddressedtoculturalminorities 4ortopersonsdiseased.5Then,too,thisproceedingcouldbeavailed
of by citizens subjected to military discipline6 as well as aliens seeking entry into or to be deported from the country. 7
Eventhoseoutsidethegovernmentservicemaybemadetoaccountfortheiractionasinthecaseofwivesrestrainedby
theirhusbandsorchildrenwithheldfromtheproperparentorguardian.8Itisthusapparentthatanydeviationfromthelegal
normscallsfortherestorationoffreedom.Itcannotbeotherwise.Itwouldbesheermockeryofallthatsuchalegalorder
stands for, if any person's right to live and work where he is minded to, to move about freely, and to be rid of any
unwarranted fears that he would just be picked up and detained, is not accorded full respect. The significance of the writ
thenforaregimeoflibertycannotbeoveremphasized.9
2. Nor does the fact that, at the time of the filing of these petitions martial law had been declared, call for a
different conclusion. There is of course imparted to the matter a higher degree of complexity. For it cannot be
gainsaid that the reasonable assumption is that the President exercised such an awesome power, one granted
admittedlytocopewithanemergencyorcrisissituation,becauseinhisjudgmentthesituationasthusrevealedto
himlefthimwithnochoice.WhatthePresidentdidattestedtoanexecutivedeterminationoftheexistenceofthe
conditionsthatcalledforsuchamove.Therewas,inhisopinion,aninsurrectionorrebellionofsuchmagnitude
thatpublicsafetydidrequireplacingthecountryundermartiallaw.Thatdecisionwashistomakeititisnotfor
the judiciary. The assessment thus made, for all the sympathetic consideration it is entitled to, is not, however,
impressedwithfinality.ThisCourthasalimitedsphereofauthority.That,forme,istheteachingofLansang. 10
The judicial role is difficult, but it is unavoidable. The writ of liberty has been invoked by petitioners. They must be heard,
andwemustruleontheirpetitions.
3.ThisCourthastoactthen.ThelibertyenshrinedintheConstitution,fortheprotectionofwhichhabeascorpus
istheappropriateremedy,imposesthatobligation.Itstaskisclear.Itmustbeperformed.Thatisatrusttowhich
it cannot be recreant Whenever the grievance complained of is deprivation of liberty, it is its responsibility to
inquire into the matter and to render the decision appropriate under the circumstances. Precisely, a habeas
corpus petition calls for that response. For the significance of liberty in a constitutional regime cannot be
sufficiently stressed. Witness these words from the then Justice, later Chief Justice, Concepcion: "Furthermore,
individual freedom is too basic, to be denied upon mere general principles and abstract consideration of public
safety.Indeed,thepreservationoflibertyissuchamajorpreoccupationofourpoliticalsystemthat,notsatisfied
withguaranteeingitsenjoymentintheveryfirstparagraphofsection(1)oftheBillofRights,theframersofour
Constitution devoted [twelve other] paragraphs [thereof] to the protection of several aspect of freedom." 11 A
similarsentimentwasgivenexpressionbythethenJustice,laterChiefJustice,Bengzon:"Lettherebelshavenoreasonto
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apprehendthattheircomradesnowundercustodyarebeingrailroadedintoMuntinlupawithoutbenefitofthosefundamental
privilegeswhichtheexperienceoftheageshasdeemedessentialfortheprotectionofallpersonsaccusedofcrimebefore
the tribunals of justice. Give them the assurance that the judiciary, ever mindful of its sacred mission will not, thru faulty
cogitation or misplaced devotion, uphold any doubtful claims of Governmental power in diminution of individual rights, but
willalwaysclingtotheprincipleutteredlongagobyChiefJusticeMarshallthatwhenindoubtastotheconstructionofthe
Constitution, 'the Courts will favor personal liberty' ...." 12 The pertinence of the above excerpt becomes quite manifest
when it is recalled that its utterance was in connection with a certiorari proceeding where the precise point at issue was
whetherornottherighttobailcouldbeavailedofwhentheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpuswassuspended.Therewas
no decisive outcome, although there were five votes in favor of an affirmative answer to only four against. 13 Such
pronouncements in cases arising under the 1935 Constitution should occasion. no surprise. They merely underscore what
wassovigorouslyemphasizedbythethenDelegateJoseP.Laurel,ChairmanoftheCommitteeontheBillofRights,inhis
sponsorshipaddressofthedraftprovisions.Thus:"Thehistoryoftheworldisthehistoryofmanandhisardousstrugglefor
liberty....Itisthehistoryofthosebraveandablesoulswho,intheagesthatarepast,havelabored,foughtandbledthat
thegovernmentofthelashthatsymbolofslaveryanddespotismmightendurenomore.Itisthehistoryofthosegreat
selfsacrificingmenwholivedandsufferedinanageofcruelty,painanddesolationsothateverymanmightstand,under
theprotectionofgreatrightsandprivileges,theequalofeveryotherman. 14SoshoulditbeunderthepresentConstitution.
No less a person than President Marcos during the early months of the 1971 Constitutional Convention categorically
affirmedinhisTodaysRevolution: Democracy: "Without freedom, the whole concept of democracy falls apart." 15 Such a
viewhassupportinhistory.AstatementfromDr.Rizalhasacontemporaryring:"Giveliberties,sothatnoonemayhavea
righttoconspire." 16MabinilistedasanaccomplishmentoftheillfatedrevolutionagainsttheAmericansthemanifestation
of "our love of freedom guaranteeing to each citizen the exercise of certain rights which make our communal life less
constricted,...."17
4.Equallyso,thedecisiveissueisoneoflibertynotonlybecauseofthenatureofthepetitionsbutalsobecause
thatisthemandateoftheConstitution.Thatisitsphilosophy.Itisaregimeoflibertytowhichourpeopleareso
deeplyandfirmlycommitted.18Thefateoftheindividualpetitionershangsinthebalance.Thatisofgreatconcern.What
is at stake however, is more than that much more. There is a paramount public interest involved. The momentous
questionishowfarintimesofstressfidelitycanbemanifestedtotheclaimsofliberty.SoitisordainedbytheConstitution,
and it is the highest law. It must be obeyed. Nor does it make a crucial difference, to my mind, that martial law exists. It
may call for a more cautious approach. The simplicity of constitutional fundamentalism may not suffice for the complex
problems of the day. Still the duty remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld. Whether in good
times or bad, it must be accorded the utmost respect and deference. That is what constitutionalism connotes. It is its
distinctivecharacteristic.Greaterrestraintsmayofcoursebeimposed.Detention,tocitetheobviousexample,isnotruled
out under martial law, but even the very proclamation thereof is dependent on public safety making it imperative. The
powers, rather expansive, perhaps at times even latitudinarian, allowable the administration under its aegis, with the
consequentdiminutionofthesphereofliberty,arejustifiedonlyundertheassumptionthattherebythebeleagueredstateis
inabetterpositiontoprotect,defendandpreserveitself.Theyarehardlyimpressedwiththeelementofpermanence.They
cannotendurelongerthantheemergencythatcalledfortheexecutivehavingtomakeuseofthisextraordinaryprerogative.
Whenitisathingofthepast,martiallawmustbeatanend.Ithasnomorereasonforbeing.Ifitsproclamationisopento
objection, or its continuance no longer warranted, there is all the more reason, to follow Laski, to respect the traditional
limitation of legal authority that freedom demands. 19 With these habeas corpus petitions precisely rendering peremptory
actionbythisCourt,thereistheopportunityfortheassessmentoflibertyconsideredinaconcretesocialcontext.Withfull
appreciation then of the complexities of this era of turmoil and disquiet, it can hopefully contribute to the delineation of
constitutionalboundaries.Itmayevenbeabletodemonstratethatlawcanbetimelessandyettimely.
5.Therearerelevantquestionsthatstillremaintobeanswered.Doesnottheproclamationofmartiallawcarry
with it the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus? If so, should not the principle above
enunciated be subjected to further refinement? I am not too certain that the first query. necessarily calls for an
affirmative answer. Preventive detention is of course allowable. Individuals who are linked with invasion or
rebellion may pose a danger to the public be safety. There is nothing inherently unreasonable in their being
confined.Moreover,whereitisthePresidenthimself,asinthecaseofthesepetitioners,whopersonallydirected
thattheybetakenin,itisnoteasytoimputearbitrariness.Itmayhappenthoughthatofficersoflesserstaturenot
impressedwiththehighsenseofresponsibilitywouldutilizethesituationtocausetheapprehensionofpersons
withoutsufficientjustification.Certainlyitwouldbe,tomymind,tosanctionoppressiveactsifthevalidityofsuch
detentioncannotbeinquiredintothroughhabeascorpuspetitions.Itismorethanjustdesirablethereforethatif
such be the intent, there be a specific decree concerning the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. Even then, however, such proclamation could be challenged. If vitiated by constitutional infirmity, the
release may be ordered. Even if it were otherwise, the applicant may not be among those as to whom the
privilege of the writ has been suspended. It is pertinent to note in this connection that Proclamation No. 1081
specifically states "that all persons presently detained as well as all others who may hereafter be similarly
detainedforthecrimesofinsurrectionorrebellion,andallothercrimesandoffensescommittedinfurtheranceor
on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith, for crimes against national security and
thelawofnations,crimeagainstthefundamentallawsoftheState,crimesagainstpublicorder,crimesinvolving
usurpationofauthority,rank,titleandimproperuseofnames,uniformsandinsignia,crimescommittedbypublic
officers,andforsuchothercrimesaswillbeenumeratedinOrdersthatIshallsubsequentlypromulgate,aswell
ascrimesasaconsequenceofanyviolationofanydecree,orderorregulationpromulgatedbymepersonallyor
promulgateduponmydirectionshallbekeptunderdetentionuntilotherwiseorderedreleasedbymeorbyduly
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designated representative." 20 The implication appears at unless the individual detained is included among those to
whomanyoftheabovecrimeoroffensemaybeimputed,heisentitledtojudicialprotection.Lastly,thequestionofwhether
or not there is warrant for the view that martial law is at an end may be deemed proper not only in the light of radically
alteredconditionsbutalsobecauseofcertainexecutiveactsclearlyincompatiblewithitscontinuedexistence.Undersuch
circumstances,anelementofajusticiablecontroversymaybediscerned.
6.Thatbringsmetothepoliticalquestiondoctrine.Itsacceptedsignificationisthatwherethematterinvolvedis
lefttoadecisionbythepeopleactingintheirsovereigncapacityortothesoledeterminationbyeitherorboththe
legislativeorexecutivebranchofthegovernment,itisbeyondjudicialcognizance.21Thusitwasthatinsuitswhere
thepartyproceededagainstwaseitherthePresidentorCongress,oranyofitsbranchesforthatmatter,thecourtsrefused
to act. 22 Unless such be the case, the action taken by any or both the political branches whether in the form of a
legislativeactoranexecutiveordercouldbetestedincourt.Whereprivaterightsareaffected,thejudiciaryhasthedutyto
look into its validity. There is this further implication of the doctrine. A showing that plenary power is granted either
departmentofgovernmentmaynotbeanobstacletojudicialinquiry.Itsimprovidentexerciseortheabusethereofmaygive
rise to a justiciable controversy. 23 What is more, a constitutional grant of authority is not usually unrestricted. 24
Limitations are provided for as to what may be done and how it is to he accomplished. Necessarily then, it becomes the
responsibility of the courts to ascertain whether the two coordinate branches have adhered to the mandate of the
fundamentallaw.Thequestionthusposedisjudicialratherthanpolitical.
7.ReferenceatthispointtotheepochalopinionintheaforecitedLansangv.Garciadecision,wherethevalidityof
thesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpuswassustainedbythisCourt,isnotamiss.Forinboth
inthe1935andinthepresentConstitutions,thepowertodeclaremartiallawisembracedinthesameprovision
with the grant of authority to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, with the same limits to be
observedintheexercisethereof.25Itwouldfollow,therefore,thatasimilarapproachcommendsitselfonthequestionof
whether or not the finding made by the President in Proclamation No. 1081 as to the existence of "rebellion and armed
action undertaken by these lawless elements of the communist and other armed aggrupations organized to overthrow the
Republic of the Philippines by armed violence and force [impressed with the] magnitude of an actual state of war against
[the]peopleandtheRepublic..." 26isopentojudicialinquiry.ReferencetotheopinionofChiefJusticeConcepcionwould
prove illuminating: "Indeed, the grant of power to suspend the privilege is neither absolute nor unqualified. The authority
conferredbytheConstitution,bothundertheBillofRightsandundertheExecutiveDepartment,islimitedandconditional.
ThepreceptintheBillofRightsestablishesageneralrule,aswellasanexceptionthereto.Whatismore,itpostulatesthe
formerinthenegative,evidentlytostressitsimportance,byprovidingthat'(t)heprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpus shall
not be suspended. ....' It is only by way of exception that it permits the suspension of the privilege 'in cases of invasion,
insurrection, or rebellion' or, under Art. VII of the Constitution, "imminent danger thereof" 'when the public safety
requires it, in any of which events the same may be suspended wherever during such period the necessity for such
suspension shall exist.' Far from being full and plenary, the authority to suspend the privilege of the writ is thus
circumscribed, confined and restricted not only by the prescribed setting or the conditions essential to its existence, but
also as regards the time when and the place where it may be exercised. These factors and the aforementioned setting or
conditionsmark,establishanddefinetheextent,theconfinesandthelimitsofsaidpower,beyondwhichitdoesnotexist.
And, like the limitations and restrictions imposed by the Fundamental Law upon the legislative department, adherence
thereto and compliance therewith may, within proper bounds, be inquired into by courts of justice. Otherwise, the explicit
constitutional provisions thereon would be meaningless. Surely, the framers of our Constitution could not have intended to
engageinsuchawastefulexerciseinfutility." 27Suchaviewwasfortifiedbythehighestateaccordedindividualfreedom
asmadeclearinthesucceedingparagraphofhisopinion:"Muchlessmaytheassumptionbeindulgedinwhenwebearin
mindthatourpoliticalsystemisessentiallydemocraticandrepublicanincharacterandthatthesuspensionoftheprivilege
affects the most fundamental element of that system, namely, individual freedom. Indeed, such freedom includes and
connotes,aswellasdemands,therightofeverysinglememberofourcitizenrytofreelydiscussanddissentfrom,aswell
ascriticizeanddenounce,theviews,thepoliciesandthepracticesofthegovernmentandthepartyinpowerthathedeems
unwise,improperorinimicaltothecommonwealth,regardlessofwhetherhisownopinionisobjectivelycorrectornot.The
untrammelled enjoyment and exercise of such right which, under certain conditions, may be a civic duty of the highest
order is vital to the democratic system and essential to its successful operation and wholesome growth and
development."28
Thewriterwroteaconcurringanddissentingopinion.Hewasfullyinagreementwiththerestofhisbrethrenasto
the lack of conclusiveness attached to the presidential determination. Thus: "The doctrine announced in
Montenegrov.Castaedathatsuchaquestionispoliticalhasthusbeenlaidtorest.Itisabouttimetoo.Itowed
itsexistencetothecompulsionexertedbyBarcelonv.Baker,a1905decision.ThisCourtwaspartlymisledbyan
undue reliance in the latter case on what is considered to be authoritative pronouncement from such illustrious
AmericanjuristsasMarshall,Story,andTaney.Thatistomisreadwhatwassaidbythem.Thisismostevidentin
thecaseofChiefJusticeMarshall,whoseepochalMarburyv.Madisonwascited.Whythatwassoisdifficultto
understand.Foritspeakstothecontrary.Itwasbyvirtueofthisdecisionthatthefunctionofjudicialreviewowes
itsoriginnotwithstandingtheabsenceofanyexplicitprovisionintheAmericanConstitutionempoweringthecourts
todoso.Thus:'Itisemphaticallytheprovinceanddutyofthejudicialdepartmenttosaywhatthelawis.Those
whoapplytheruletoparticularcases,mustofnecessityexpoundandinterpretthatrule.Iftwolawsconflictwith
eachother,thecourtsmustdecideontheoperationofeach.Soifalawbeinoppositiontotheconstitutionifboth
thelawandtheconstitutionapplytoaparticularcase,sothatthecourtmusteitherdecidethatcaseconformably
to the law disregarding the constitution or conformably to the constitution, disregarding the law, the court must
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determinewhichoftheseconflictingrulesgovernsthecase.Thisisoftheveryessenceofjudicialduty.If,then,
the courts are to regard the constitution, and the constitution is superior to any ordinary act of legislature, the
constitution,andnotsuchordinaryact,mustgovernthecasetowhichtheybothapply."29
8. To refer to Lansang anew, this Court sustained the presidential proclamation suspending the privilege of the
writofhabeascorpusastherewasnoshowingofarbitrarinessintheexerciseofaprerogativebelongingtothe
executive,thejudiciarymerelyactingasacheckontheexerciseofsuchauthority.SoChiefJusticeConcepcion
madeclearinthisportionofhisopinion:"ArticleVIIoftheConstitutionvestsintheExecutivepowertosuspend
theprivilegeofthewritofhabeascunderspecifiedconditions.Pursuanttotheprincipleofseparationofpowers
underlyingoursystemofgovernment,theExecutiveissupremewithinhisownsphere.However,theseparation
ofpowers,undertheConstitution,isnotabsolute.Whatismore,itgoeshandinhandwiththesystemofchecks
andbalances,underwhichtheExecutiveissupreme,asregardsthesuspensionoftheprivilege,butonlyifand
whenheactswithinthesphereallottedtohimbytheBasicLaw,andtheauthoritytodeterminewhetherornothe
hassoactedisvestedintheJudicialDepartment,which,inthisrespect, is, in turn, constitutionally supreme. In
theexerciseofsuchauthority,thefunctionoftheCourtismerelytochecknottosupplanttheExecutive,orto
ascertainmerelywhetherhehasgonebeyondtheconstitutionallimitsofhisjurisdiction,nottoexercisethepower
vestedinhimortodeterminethewisdomofhisact.Tobesure,thepoweroftheCourttodeterminethevalidityof
thecontestedproclamationisfarfrombeingidenticalto,orevencomparablewith,itspoweroverordinarycivilor
criminalcaseselevatedtheretobyordinaryappealfrominferiorcourts,inwhichcasestheappellatecourthasall
of the powers of the court of origin." 30 The test then to determine whether the presidential action should be nullified
according to the Supreme Court is that of arbitrariness. Absent such a showing, there is no justification for annulling the
presidentialproclamation.
On this point, the writer, in a separate opinion, had this to say: "With such presidential determination of the
existenceoftheconditionsrequiredbytheConstitutiontojustifyasuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritnolonger
conclusiveontheotherbranches,thisCourtmaythuslegitimatelyinquireintoitsvalidity.Thequestionbeforeus,
itbearsrepeating,iswhetherornotProclamationNo.889asitnowstands,notasitwasoriginallyissued,isvalid.
The starting point must be a recognition that the power to suspend the privilege of the writ belongs to the
Executive,subjecttolimitations.SotheConstitutionprovides,anditistoberespected.Therangeofpermissible
inquirytobeconductedbythisTribunalisnecessarilylimitedthentotheascertainmentofwhetherornotsucha
suspension,inthelightofthecredibleinformationfurnishedthePresident,wasarbitrary.Suchatestmetwiththe
approval of the chief counsel for petitioners, Senator Jose W. Diokno. To paraphrase Frankfurter, the question
before the judiciary is not the correctness but the reasonableness of the action taken. One who is not the
Executive but equally knowledgeable may entertain a different view, but the decision rests with the occupant of
theoffice.AswouldbeimmediatelyapparentevenfromacursoryperusalofthedatafurnishedthePresident,so
impressively summarized in the opinion of the Chief Justice, the imputation of arbitrariness would be difficult to
sustain. Moreover, the steps taken by him to limit the area where the suspension operates as well as his
instructions attested to a firm resolve on his part to keep strictly within the bounds of his authority. Under the
circumstances, the decision reached by the Court that no finding of unconstitutionality is warranted commends
itself for approval. The most that can be said is that there was a manifestation of presidential power wellnigh
touchingtheextremebordersofhisconcededcompetence,beyondwhichaforbiddendomainlies.Therequisite
showingofeitherimprovidenceorabusehasnotbeenmade."31
9.TheLansangdoctrineformeisdecisiveonthevariousissuesraisedinthiscase,mydiscussionbeingconfined
topetitionerRodrigo,aswellasotherssimilarlysituated,forundermyviewthatthepetitioninAquinoshouldbe
dismissed because charges had been filed, and the petition in Diokno should be considered withdrawn, there
needbenofurtherinquiryastothemeritsoftheirrespectivecontentions.
Now,firstastothevalidityoftheproclamationitself.Itwouldseemthatitisbeyondquestioninthelightofthis
particular transitory provision in the present Constitution: "All proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and
acts promulgated, issued, or done by the incumbent President shall be part of the law of the land, and shall
remain valid, legal, binding, and effective even after lifting of martial law or the ratification of this Constitution,
unless modified, revoked, or superseded by subsequent proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, or other
acts of the incumbent President, or unless expressly and explicitly modified or repealed by the regular National
Assembly." 32 Independently of such provision, such presidential proclamation could not be characterized as arbitrary
underthestandardsetforthintheLansangdecision.Hedidact"onthebasisofcarefullyevaluatedandverifiedinformation,
[which] definitely established that lawless elements who are moved by a common or similar ideological conviction, design
strategy and goal and enjoying the active moral and material support of a foreign power and being guided and directed by
intensely devoted, welltrained, determined and ruthless groups of men and seeking refuge Linder the protection of our
constitutionallibertiestopromoteandattaintheirends,haveenteredintoaconspiracyandhaveinfactjoinedandbanded
their resources and forces together for the prime purpose of, and in fact they have been and are actually staging,
undertaking and waging an armed insurrection and rebellion against the Government of the Republic of the Philippines in
ordertoforciblyseizepoliticalstatepowerinthecountryoverthrowthedulyconstitutedandsupplantourexistingpolitical,
social, economic, and legal order with an entirely new one whose form of government, whose system of laws, whose
conceptionofGodandreligion,whosenotionofindividualrightsandfamilyrelations,andwhosepolitical,social,economic,
legalandmoralpreceptsarebasedontheMarxistLeninistMaoistteachingsandbeliefs...."33
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Subsequent events did confirm the validity of such appraisal. Even now, from the pleadings of the Solicitor
General, the assumption that the situation has not in certain places radically changed for the better cannot be
stigmatizedasdevoidoffactualfoundation.Asofthepresent,evenontheviewthatthecourtsmaydeclarethat
the crisis conditions have ended and public safety does not require the continuance of martial law, there is not
enough evidence to warrant such a judicial declaration. This is not to deny that in an appropriate case with the
proper parties, and, in the language of Justice Laurel, with such issue being the very lis mota, they may be
compelledtoassumesuchanawesomeresponsibility.Asenseofrealismaswellassoundjuristictheorywould
placesuchdelicatetaskontheshouldersofthisTribunal,theonlyconstitutionalcourt.SoIwouldreadRutterv.
Esteban. 34 There, while the Moratorium Act 35 was at first assumed to be valid, with this Court in such suit being
persuadedthatits"continuedoperationandenforcement"undercircumstancesthatdevelopedlater,became"unreasonable
andoppressive,"andshouldnotbeprolongedaminutelonger,...[itwas]"declarednullandvoidandwithouteffect." 36 It
goes without saying that before it should take such a step, extreme care should be taken lest the maintenance of public
peace and order, the primary duty of the Executive, be attended with extreme difficult . It is likewise essential that the
evidenceofpublicsafetynolongerrequiringmartiallawbeoftheclearestandmostsatisfactorycharacter.Itcannotbetoo
strongly stressed that while liberty is a prime objective and the judiciary is charged with the duty of safeguarding it, on a
matter of such gravity during periods of emergency, the executive appraisal of the situation is deserving of the utmost
credence.ItsufficestorecallthestresslaidbyChiefJusticeConcepcioninLansangthatitsfunction"ismerelytocheck
not to supplant" the latter. The allocation of authority in the Constitution made by the people themselves to the three
departments of government must be respected. There is to be no intrusion by any one into the sphere that belongs to
another.Preciselybecauseofsuchfundamentalpostulateinthosecases,andtheremaybesuch,butperhapsratherrare,
itcouldamounttojudicialabdicationifnoinquiryweredeemedpermissibleandthequestionconsideredpolitical.
The last point is, while the detention of petitioners could have been validly ordered, as dictated by the very
proclamationitself,ifitcontinuedforanunreasonablelengthoftime,thenhisreleasemaybesoughtinahabeas
corpusproceeding.Thiscontentionisnotdevoidofplausibility.Evenintimesofstress,itcannotjustbeassumed
thattheindefiniterestraintofcertainindividualsasapreventivemeasureisunavoidable.Itisnottobedeniedthat
where such a state of affairs could be traced to the wishes of the President himself, it carries with it the
presumptionofvalidity.ThetestisagainarbitrarinessasdefinedinLansang.Itmayhappenthatthecontinued
confinement may be at the instance merely of a military official, in which case there is more leeway for judicial
scrutiny.
10.Awordmoreonthewithdrawalofahabeascorpuspetition.Onthebasicassumptionthatpreciselythegreat
writoflibertyisavailabletoapersonsubjectedtorestraintsothathecouldchallengeitsvalidity,Ifinditdifficult
nottoyieldassenttoapleabytheapplicanthimselfthatheisnolongerdesirousorpursuingsuchremedy.He
hadachoiceofwhetherornottogotocourt.Hewasfreetoacteitherway.Thefactthatatfirsthedidso,but
thatlaterhewasofadifferentmind,doesnot,inmyopinion,alterthesituation.Thematter,forme,isstilloneleft
tohisfreeandunfetteredwill.Theconclusionthenformeatleast,isthatacourtmustaccedetohiswishes.It
couldlikewisebebasedonhisbeliefthattherealitiesofthesituationcompeltheconclusionthatreliefcouldcome
from the Executive. That decision was his to make. It must be respected. Moreover, if only because of
humanitarianconsiderations,consideringtheilleffectsofconfinementonhisstateofhealth,thereisequallylegal
supportfortheviewthathisconditionalreleaseasinthecaseoftheotherdetaineeswouldnotbeinappropriate.
Ifhismotionforwithdrawalcontainedphraseologythatisoffensivetothedignityofthecourt,thenperhapsthe
correspondingdisciplinaryactionmaybetaken.Forthatpurpose,andforthatpurposealone,thepetitionmaybe
considered as still within judicial cognizance. It is true in certain cases that the issues raised may be so
transcendental that there is wisdom in continuing the proceeding. The withdrawal, even then, for me, is not
fraught with pernicious consequences. If the matter were that significant or important, the probability is that the
questionwillsoonbeventilatedinanotherpetition.Thereis,todealbrieflywithanotherpoint,thematterofthe
ratherharshandbitterlanguageinwhichthemotionforwithdrawalwascouched.Thatisamatteroftaste.Evenif
itwentbeyondtheboundsofthepermissible,thewithdrawalshouldbegranted.Thisformeistheprinciplethat
shouldobtain.TheratheruncharitableviewexpressedconcerningtheabilityofcertainmembersoftheCourtto
act justly on the matter should not give rise, in my opinion, to undue concern. That is one's belief, and one is
entitledtoit.Itdoesnotfollowthattherebythepersonthusunjustifiablymalignedshouldsufferanylossofself
esteem.Afterall,itisatruismtosaythatamanonthebenchisaccountableonlytohisconscienceand,inthe
ultimate analysis, to his Maker. There is all the more reason then not to be unduly bothered by the remarks in
question.Moreover,theyemanatedfromasourcesufferingfromthepangsofdesperationbornofhiscontinued
detention.Itcouldverywellbethatthedisappointmentofexpectationsandfrustrationofhopesdidleadtosuch
anintemperateoutburst.Thereis,formeatleast,relevancetothisexcerptfromanopinionbyJusticeFrankfurter:
"Sincecourts,althoughrepresentingthelaw,...arealsosittinginjudgment,asitwere,ontheirownfunctionin
exercising their power to punish for contempt, it should be used only in flagrant cases and with the utmost
forbearance.Itisalwaysbettertoerronthesideoftoleranceandevenofdisdainfulindifference."37
11.ThereisnoveltyinthequestionraisedbypetitionerRodrigo.Noristhattheonlyreasonwhyitmatters.Itis
fraughtwithsignificancenotonlyforhimbutalsoforquiteanumberofothersinalikepredicament.Theybelong
to a group released from confinement. They are no longer detained. Ordinarily that should suffice to preclude
resorttotheremedyofhabeascorpus.Offhand,itmaybeplausiblyassertedthattheneednolongerexists.The
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prison wall, to paraphrase Chafee is no longer there it has on function in exercising their power to punish for
contempt,itshouldbeusedonlyinflagrantcasesandwiththeutmostforbearance.Itisalwaysbettertoerron
thesideoftoleranceandevenofdisdainfulindifference."37
to a group released from confinement. They are no longer detained. Ordinarily that should suffice to preclude
resorttotheremedyofhabeascorpus.Offhand,itmaybeplausiblyassertedthattheneednolongerexists.The
prisonwall,toparaphraseChafeeisnolongerthereithasfallendown.Whatistheretopenetrate?Thatisjust
thepoint,petitionerRodrigocomplains.Thatisnotreallytrue,oronlytruepartially.Therearephysicalaswellas
intellectualrestraintsonhisfreedom.Hisreleaseisconditional.Therearethingshecannotsayplaceshecannot
go.Thatisnotlibertyinameaningfulsense.Thisgreatwritthenhasnotlostitssignificanceforhim,aswellasfor
otherssimilarlysituated.ThewayhedevelopedhisargumentcallstomindCardozo'swarningthatinaworldof
reality, a juridical concept may not always be pressed to the limit of its logic. There are countervailing
considerations.ThefactthathewasamongthosewhosedetentionwasorderedbythePresidentisoneofthem.
There was then an executive determination on the highest level that the state of affairs marked by rebellious
activitiesdidcallforcertainindividualsbeingconfinedasapreventivemeasure.Unlessthereisashowingofthe
arbitrarinessofsuchamove,thejudiciaryhastorespecttheactuation.Itmustbeassumedthatwhatwastobe
donewiththemthereaftermusthavebeengivensomeattention.Atoneextreme,theirpreventivedetentioncould
beterminatedandtheirfullfreedomrestored.Attheother,itcouldbecontinuedifcircumstancesdidsowarrant.
Here, there was a middle way chosen. Petitioner Rodrigo as well as several others were released subject to
conditions. It cannot be dogmatically maintained that such a solution was an affront to reason. Not only for the
personlockedup,butperhapsevenmoresoforhisfamily,theendoftheincarcerationwasaneagerlyawaited
andhighlywelcomeevent.Thatisquiteunderstandable.Itdidjustifypetitioner'sassertionthatinsoagreeingto
theconditionsimposed,hewasnotactingofhisownfreewill.Realistically,behadnochoiceoroneminimalat
most.Nonetheless,itcannotbedeniedthathewasarecipientofwhatattheveryleastwasaclearmanifestation
ofthePhilippinebrandofmartiallawbeingimpressedwithamildcharacter.
Thisbeingahabeascorpuspetition,theappropriatequestionforjudicialinquiryisthevalidityofthelimitssetto
theconditionalreleaseofpetitionerRodrigo.TheguidingprincipleissuppliedbythisringingaffirmationofJustice
Malcolm:"Anyrestraintwhichwillprecludefreedomofactionissufficient."38Theimplicationformeisthattheremay
be instances of the propriety of the invocation of the writ even without actual incarceration. This is one of them. It is
heartening that the Court so view it. It is, to my mind, regrettable though that there appears to be full acceptance of the
powerofthemilitarytoimposerestrictionsonpetitionerRodrigo'sphysicalliberty.Thereisneed,itwouldseemtome,fora
morediscriminatingappraisal,especiallywhereitcouldbeshownthattheordertothateffectproceedsfromasourcelower
than the President. The extremely high respect justifiably accorded to the action taken by the highest official of the land,
who by himself is a separate and independent department, not to mention the one constitutional official authorized to
proclaim martial law, is not indicated. There should be, of course, no casual or unreasoned disregard for what the military
may deem to be the appropriate measure under the circumstances. This reflection, though, gives me pause. Petitioner
Rodrigoandotherssimilarlysituatedwerereleased.Thatstepwouldnothavebeentakenifcircumstancesdidnotjustifyit.
It seems then reasonable to assume that full, rather than restricted, freedom was warranted. The matter may be put forth
more categorically, but I refrain from doing so. The reason is practical. To insist that it should be thus may curb what
appearstobethecommendabletendencytoputanendtothepreventivedetentionofthoseinactualconfinement.Asfor
restraintsonintellectuallibertyembracedinfreedomofspeechandofpress,ofassembly,andofassociation,deferenceto
controllingauthoritiescompelmetosaythatthewritofhabeascorpusisnotthepropercaseforassailingthem.Itdoesnot
mean that judicial inquiry is foreclosed. Far from it. All that is intended to be conveyed is that this remedy does not lend
itselftothatpurpose.Insoadvocatingthisapproach,Iamnotunmindfulthatitmightbelookeduponaslackofawareness
forthemischiefthatmaybecausedbyirresponsibleelements,nottosaytherebelsthemselves.ThewordsofWilloughby,
whoseviewonmartiallawisthemostsympathetictotheprimacyofliberty,furnishtheantidote:"Aslongastheemergency
lasts then, they must upon pain of arrest and subsequent punishment refrain from committing acts that will render more
difficulttherestorationofastateofnormalcyandtheenforcementoflaw.39
12.Reliance,asisquiteevidentfromtheforegoing,iswellnighsolelyplacedonPhilippineauthorities.Whilethe
persuasivecharacterofAmericanConstitutionallawdoctrinesisnotentirelyathingofthepast,still,thenoveltyof
the question before us, compels in my view deference to the trend indicated by our past decisions, read in the
lightnotonlyofspecificholdingsbutalsoofthebroaderprinciplesonwhichtheyarebased.Eveniftheydonot
preciselycontrol,theydofurnishaguide.Moreover,thereseemstobeadearthofUnitedStatesSupremeCourt
pronouncements on the subject of martial law, due no doubt to absence in the American Constitution of any
provisionconcerningit.Itisunderstandablewhynoreferencewasmadetosuchsubjectintheearliestclassicon
AmericanconstitutionallawwrittenbyJusticeStory.40Whenthelandmark1866Milligancase41madeitsappearance,
andmuchmoresoafterSterling 42followedin1932andDuncan 43in1946,adiscussionthereofbecameunavoidable.So
it is evident from subsequent commentaries and case books. 44 Cooley though, in his equally famous work that was first
published in 1868 contented himself with footnote references to Milligan. 45 Watson viewed it in connection with the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. 46 In the nineteen twenties, there was a fuller treatment of the
question of martial law. Burdick anticipated Willoughby with this appraisal: "Socalled martial law, except in occupied
territory of an enemy, is merely the calling in of the aid of military forces by the executive, who is charged with the
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enforcement of the law, with or without special authorization by the legislature. Such declaration of martial law does not
suspend the civil law, though it may interfere with the exercise of one's ordinary rights. The right to call out the military
forcestomaintainorderandenforcethelawissimplypartofthepolicepower.Itisonlyjustifiedwhenitreasonablyappears
necessary, and only justifies such acts as reasonably appear necessary to meet the exigency, including the arrest, or in
extreme cases the killing of those who create the disorder or oppose the authorities. When the exigency is over the
members of the military forces are criminally and civilly liable for acts done beyond the scope of reasonable necessity.
Whenhonestlyandreasonablycopingwithasituationofinsurrectionorriotamemberofthemilitaryforcescannotbemade
liableforhisacts,andpersonsreasonablyarrestedundersuchcircumstanceswillnot,duringtheinsurrectionorriot,befree
bywritofhabeascorpus.47
Willoughby,asalreadynoted,waspartialtotheclaimsofliberty.Thisisquiteevidentinthisexcerptinhisopus:
"Thereis,then,strictlyspeaking,nosuchthinginAmericanlawasadeclarationofmartiallawwherebymilitary
lawissubstitutedforcivillaw.Socalleddeclarationsofmartiallaware,indeed,oftenmadebuttheirlegaleffect
goesnofurtherthantowarncitizensthatthemilitarypowershavebeencalleduponbytheexecutivetoassisthim
in the maintenance of law and order, and that, while the emergency lasts, they must, upon pain of arrest and
punishment not commit any acts which will in any way render more difficult the restoration of order and the
enforcementoflaw.Someoftheauthoritiesstatingsubstantiallythisdoctrinearequotedinthefootnotebelow."
48 Willis spoke similarly: "Martial law proper, that is, military law in case of insurrection, riots, and invasions, is not a
substituteforthecivillaw,butisratheranaidtotheexecutionofcivillaw.Declarationsofmartiallawgonofurtherthanto
warncitizensthattheexecutivehascalleduponthemilitarypowertoassisthiminthemaintenanceoflawandorder.While
martiallawisinforce,nonewpowersaregiventotheexecutiveandnocivilrightsoftheindividual,otherthanthewritof
habeascorpus,aresuspended.Therelationsbetweenthecitizenandhisstateareunchanged."49
It is readily evident that even when Milligan supplied the only authoritative doctrine, Burdick and Willoughby did
notignoretheprimacyofcivilliberties.WilliswroteafterSterling.Itwouldindeedbesurprisingifhisopinionwere
otherwise.AfterDuncan,suchanapproachbecomesevenmorestronglyfortified.Schwartz,whosetreatiseisthe
latest to be published, has this summary of what he considers the present state of American law: "The Milligan
and Duncan cases show plainly that martial law is the public law of necessity. Necessity alone calls it forth
necessityjustifiesitsexerciseandnecessitymeasurestheextentanddegreetowhichitmaybeemployed.Itis,
thehighCourthasaffirmed,anunbendingruleoflawthattheexerciseofmilitarypower,wheretherightsofthe
citizen are concerned, may never be pushed beyond what the exigency requires. If martial rule survives the
necessityonwhichaloneitrests,forevenasingleminute,itbecomesamereexerciseoflawlessviolence." 50
Further:"Sterlingv.Constantinisofbasicimportance.Beforeit,anumberofdecisions,includingonebythehighestCourt,
went on the theory that the executive had a free hand in taking martiallaw measures. Under them, it had been widely
supposed that a martiallaw proclamation was so far conclusive that any action taken under it was immune from judicial
scrutiny.Sterlingv.Constantin,definitelydiscreditstheseearlierdecisionsandthedoctrineofconclusivenessderivedfrom
them. Under Sterling v. Constantin, where martial law measures impinge upon personal or property rights normally
beyondthescopeofmilitarypower,whoseinterventionislawfulonlybecauseanabnormalsituationhasmadeitnecessary
theexecutive'sipsedixitisnotofitselfconclusiveofthenecessity."51
ItisnottobelostsightofthatthebasisforthedeclarationofmartiallawinthePhilippinesisnotmerenecessity
butanexplicitconstitutionalprovision.Ontheotherhand,Milligan,whichfurnishedthefoundationforSterling 52
andDuncan53haditsrootsintheEnglishcommonlaw.Thereispertinencethereforeinascertainingitssignificanceunder
thatsystem.AccordingtothenotedEnglishauthor,Dicey:"'Martiallaw,'inthepropersenseofthatterm,inwhichitmeans
thesuspensionofordinarylawandthetemporarygovernmentofacountryorpartsofitbymilitarytribunals,isunknownto
the law of England. We have nothing equivalent to what is called in France the 'Declaration of the State of Siege,' under
which the authority ordinarily vested in the civil power for the maintenance of order and police passes entirely to the army
(autorite militaire). This is an unmistakable proof of the permanent supremacy of the law under our constitution." 54 There
was this qualification: "Martial law is sometimes employed as a name for the common law right of the Crown and its
servantstorepelforcebyforceinthecaseofinvasion,insurrection,riot,orgenerallyofanyviolentresistancetothelaw.
Thisright,orpower,isessentialtotheveryexistenceoforderlygovernment,andismostassuredlyrecognizedinthemost
amplemannerbythelawofEngland.Itisapowerwhichhasinitselfnospecialconnectionwiththeexistenceofanarmed
force. The Crown has the right to put down breaches of the peace. Every subject, whether a civilian or a soldier, whether
what is called a 'servant of the government,' such for example as a policeman, or a person in no way connected with the
administration, not only has the right, but is, as a matter of legal duty, bound to assist in putting down breaches of the
peace.Nodoubtpolicemenorsoldiersarethepersonswho,asbeingspeciallyemployedinthemaintenanceoforder,are
most generally called upon to suppress a riot, but it is clear that all loyal subjects are bound to take their part in the
suppressionofriots."55
Thepicturewouldbeincomplete,ofcourse,ifnoreferenceweremadetoRossiter.InhisworkonConstitutional
Dictatorship, where he discussed crisis governments in the French Republic, in Great Britain and in the United
Statehespokeofmartialrule.Forhim,it"isanemergencydevicedesignedforuseinthecrisesofinvasionor
rebellion.Itmaybemostpreciselydefinedasanextensionofmilitarygovernmenttothecivilianpopulation,the
substitutionofthewillofamilitarycommanderforthewillofthepeople'selectedgovernment.Intheeventofan
actual or imminent invasion b a hostile power, a constitutional government may declare martial rule in the
menaced area. The result is the transfer of all effective powers of government from the civil authorities to the
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military,oroftenmerelytheassumptionofsuchpowersbythelatterwhentheregulargovernmenthasceasedto
function.Intheeventofarebellionitsinitiationamountstoagovernmentaldeclarationofwaronthosecitizensin
insurrection against the state. In either case it means military dictatorship government by the army, courts
martial, suspension of civil liberties, and the whole range of dictatorial action of an executive nature. In the
moderndemocraciesthemilitaryexercisessuchdictatorshipwhileremainingsubordinateandresponsibletothe
executiveheadofthecivilgovernment.Martialrulehasavarietyofformsandpseudonyms,themostimportantof
whicharemartiallaw,asitisknowninthecivillawcountriesoftheBritishEmpireandtheUnitedStates,andthe
stateofsiege,asitisknowninthecivillawcountriesofcontinentalEuropeandLatinAmerica.Thestateofsiege
andmartiallawaretwoedgestothesamesword,andinactiontheycanhardlybedistinguished.Theinstitution
ofmartialruleisarecognitionthattherearetimesinthelivesofallcommunitieswhencrisishassocompletely
disruptedthenormalworkingsofgovernmentthatthemilitaryistheonlypowerremainingthatcanrestorepublic
orderandsecuretheexecutionofthelaws.56
Happily for the Philippines, the declaration of martial law lends itself to the interpretation that the Burdick,
Willoughby,Willis,Schwartzformulationspayingdueregardtotheprimacyoflibertypossessrelevance.Itcannot
be said that the martial rule concept of Rossiter, latitudinarian in scope, has been adopted, even on the
assumption that it can be reconciled with our Constitution. What is undeniable is that President Marcos has
repeatedlymaintainedthatProclamationNo.1081waspreciselybasedontheConstitutionandthatthevalidityof
actstakenthereundercouldbepasseduponbytheSupremeCourt.Forme,thatisquitereassuring,persuaded
as I am likewise that the view of Rossiter is opposed to the fundamental concept of our polity, which puts a
premiumonfreedom.NoundueconcernneedthenbefeltastothecontinuingrelianceonMoyerv.Peabody, 57
whereJusticeHolmesspeakingfortheCourt,statedthatthetestofthevalidityofexecutivearrestisthattheybemade"in
good faith and in the honest belief that they are needed in order to head the insurrection off ..." 58 He did state likewise:
"Whenitcomestoadecisionbytheheadofthestateuponamatterinvolvingitslife,theordinaryrightsofindividualsmust
yield to what he deems the necessities of the moment. Public danger warrants the substitution of executive process for
judicialprocess.SeeKeelyv.Sanders,99US441,446,25Led.327,328,Thiswasadmittedwithregardtokillingmenin
theactualclashofarmsandwethinkitobvious,althoughitwasdisputed,thatthesameistrueoftemporarydetentionto
preventapprehendedharm." 59Norwasthistomanifestlessthanfullregardforcivilliberties.Hisotheropinionsindicated
the contrary. More specifically, it was from his pen, in Chastleton Corporation v. Sinclair, 60 where the doctrine that the
judiciarymayinquireintowhethertheemergencywasatanend,wasgivenexpression.Thus:"Werepeatwhatwasstated
inBlockv.Hirsh,...,astotherespectduetoadeclarationofthiskindbythelegislaturesofarasitrelatestopresentfacts.
But,evenastothem,acourtisnotalibertytoshutitseyestoanobviousmistake,whenthevalidityofthelawdepends
upon the truth of what is declared. ... And still more obviously, so far as this declaration looks to the future, it can be no
morethanprophecy,andisliabletobecontrolledbyevents.Alawdependingupontheexistenceofanemergencyorother
certain state of facts to uphold it may cease to operate if the emergency ceases or the facts change, even though valid
whenpassed."61
13. It may safely be concluded therefore that the role of American courts concerning the legality of acts taken
duringaperiodofmartiallawisfarfromminimal.WhyitmusthesowasexplainedbyDeanRostowinthiswise:
"Unlessthecourtsrequireashowing,incaseslikethese,ofanintelligiblerelationshipbetweenmeansandends,
society has lost its basic protection against the abuse of military power. The general's good intention must be
irrelevant. There should be evidence in court that his military judgment had a suitable basis in fact. As Colonel
Fairman, a strong proponent of widened military discretion, points out: 'When the executive fails or is unable to
satisfy the court of the evident necessity for the extraordinary measures it has taken, it can hardly expect the
courttoassumeitonfaith." 62 This is the way Lasswell would summarize the matter: "On the whole, we can conclude
that the courts of this country have a body of ancient principles and recent precedents that can be used to keep at a
minimum unnecessary encroachments upon private rights by the executive, civil or military. The vigor and sensitiveness
withwhichthedueprocessclausehasbeenaffirmedinthelasttwodecadesis,inparticular,animportantdevelopment." 63
14. It may be that the approach followed may for some be indicative of lack of full awareness of today's stern
realities. It is my submission that to so view the transcendental issues before us is to adhere as closely as
possibletotheidealenvisionedinExparteMilligan:"TheConstitutionisalawforrulersandforpeopleequallyin
war and peace and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men at all times and under all
circumstances."64Itisevertimelytoreiteratethatatthecoreofconstitutionalismisarobustconcernforindividualrights.
Thisisnottodenythatthejudicialprocessdoesnottakeplaceinasocialvoid.Thequestionsthatcallfordecisionareto
be examined in the total social context with full appreciation of the environmental facts, whether viewed in its temporal or
otherrelevantaspects.Theyhavetoreconciletimetestedprinciplestocontemporaryproblems.Legalnormscannotalways
stand up against the pressure of events. The great unquestioned verities may thus prove to be less than adequate. So
much is conceded. Nonetheless, even with the additional difficulty that the Court today is compelled to enter terrain with
boundariesnotsoclearlydefined,carryingwithittheriskofexceedingthenormallimitsofjudicialimprecision,Ifindmyself
unable to resist the compulsion of constitutional history and traditional doctrines. The facts and issues of the petitions
beforeusandthemandatesofthefundamentallaw,asIviewtheminthelightofacceptedconcepts,blunttheedgeofwhat
otherwisecouldbeconsiderationsofdecisiveimpact.Ifindmyselftroubledbythethoughtthat,wereitotherwise,itwould
amount to freezing the flux of the turbulent present with its grave and critical problems in the icy permanence of juristic
doctrines.Asofnow,suchanuncomfortablethoughtintrudes.Hencethisbriefconcurringanddissentingopinion.
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* The other petitioners are Joaquin P. Roces, Teodoro M. Locsin, Rolando Fadul, Rosalina Galang, Go Eng
Guan,MaximoV.Soliven,RenatoConstantino,LuisR.Mauricio,NapoleonG.Rama,JoseMariVelez,RamonV.
Mitra,JuanL.Mercado,RobertoOrdoez,ManuelAlmario,andErnestoRondon.
TEEHANKEE,J.:
Prefatorystatement:Thisseparateopinionwaspreparedandscheduledtobepromulgatedwiththejudgmentof
theCourt(pennedbytheChiefJustice)onSeptember12,1974.Suchpromulgationwashoweverovertakenby
thewelcomenewsofthereleasefromdetentiononSeptember11,1974ofpetitionerJoseW.Dioknouponthe
order of President Ferdinand E. Marcos, and the Court then resolved to defer promulgation until the following
week.Hence,PartIofthisopiniondealingwiththeDioknopetitionshouldbereadinsuchtimecontext.
The two other parts thereof dealing with the Aquino and Rodrigo cases are to be read as of the actual date of
promulgation,sincetheyreiterateamainthemeoftheopinionthattheCourtshouldadheretothewellgrounded
principleofnotrulingonconstitutionalissuesexceptwhennecessaryinanappropriatecase.Inthewriter'sview,
thegratifyingdevelopmentintheDioknocasewhichrenderedhispetitionmootbyvirtueofhisreleaseoncemore
demonstratesthevalidityofthisprinciple.
I.OntheDioknopetition:IvoteforthegrantingofpetitionerJoseW.Diokno'smotionofDecember29,1973to
withdrawthepetitionforhabeascorpusfiledonSeptember23,1972onhisbehalfandthesupplementalpetition
andmotionsforimmediatereleaseandfororalargumentofJune29,1973andAugust14,1973filedinsupport
thereof,asprayedfor.
1.Thepresentactionisoneofhabeascorpusandthedetainee'sownwithdrawalofhispetitionisdecisive.Ifthe
detaineehimselfwithdrawshispetitionandnolongerwishesthisCourttopassuponthelegalityofhisdetention
andcitestheotherpendinghabeascorpuscaseswhichhavenotbeenwithdrawnandwhereintheCourtcanrule
ontheconstitutionalissuesifsominded,1suchwithdrawalofahabeascorpuspetitionshouldbegrantedpracticallyas
a matter of absolute right (whatever be the motivations therefor) in the same manner that the withdrawal motions of the
petitionersintheothercaseswerepreviouslygrantedbytheCourt.2
Sincetherewereseven(7)membersoftheCourtwhovotedforgrantingthewithdrawalmotionasagainstfive(5)
memberswhovotedfordenyingthesameandrenderingadecision,3submitthatthismajorityofseven(7)outofthe
Court'smembershipoftwelve(12)isasufficientmajorityforgrantingthewithdrawalprayedfor.Asimplemajorityofseven
islegallysufficientforthegrantingofawithdrawalofapetition,sinceitdoesnotinvolvetherenditionofadecision, on the
merits.ItisonlywhereadecisionistoberenderedonthemeritsbytheCourtenbancthat the 1973 Constitution requires
theconcurrenceofatleasteight(8)members.4
I therefore dissent from the majority's adhering to the fivemember minority view that the majority of seven
members is not legally sufficient for granting withdrawal and that a decision on the merits be rendered
notwithstandingthewithdrawalofthepetition.
2. The granting of the withdrawal of the petition is but in consonance with the fundamental principle on the
exerciseofjudicialpowerwhich,inthewordsoftheSolicitorGeneral,"asJusticeLaurelemphasized,isjustifiable
onlyasanecessityfortheresolutionofanactualcaseandcontroversyandthereforeshouldbeconfinedtothe
verylismotapresented."5
Suchwithdrawalisfurthermoreinaccordwiththerespondents'standfromthebeginningurgingtheCourtnotto
take cognizance (for want of jurisdiction or as a matter of judicial restraint citing Brandeis' injunction that "The
most important thing we decide is what not to decide" 6 ) or that "at the very least, this Court should postpone
considerationofthiscaseuntilthepresentemergencyisover."7
Manyoftheotherpetitionersinthehabeascorpus cases at bar were granted leave to withdraw their petitions.

PetitionerDiokno'swithdrawalmotionshouldlikewisebegrantedinlinewiththewellestablisheddoctrinethatthe
Courtwillnotruleonconstitutionalissuesexceptwhennecessaryinanappropriatecase.
3.ButtheSolicitorGeneralnowobjectstothewithdrawalonthegroundofpublicinterestandthat"thisTribunal
...hasbeenusedastheopenforumforundergroundpropagandabythosewhohavepoliticalaxestogrind"with
thecirculationofthewithdrawalmotionandthatthisCourtwouldbe"puttingthesealofapproval"andineffect
admit the "unfair, untrue and contemptuous" statements made in the withdrawal motion should this Court grant
thewithdrawal.8 I see no point in the position taken by the SolicitorGeneral of urging the Court to deny the withdrawal
motion only to render a decision that would after all dismiss the petition and sustain respondents' defense of political
questionandhavetheCourtdeclareitselfwithoutjurisdictiontoadjudicatetheconstitutionalissuespresented9 and asking
the Court to embrace the "pragmatic method" of William James which "rejects ... the a priori assumption that there are
immutableprinciplesofjustice.Ittestsapropositionbyitspracticalconsequences."10Theobjectionsareuntenable.
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Thepublicinterestobjectionismetbythefactthattherearestillpending.othercases(principallytheprohibition
caseofpetitionerBenignoS.Aquino,Jr.inanothercase,L37364questioningthefilingofgravechargesunder
theAntiSubversionAct,etc.againsthimwithamilitarycommission 11 and which is not yet submitted for decision)
wherethesameconstitutionalissuesmayberesolved.
Theotherobjectionsaretenuous:TheSolicitorGeneralrefuteshisownobjectionsinhisclosingstatementinhis
commentthat"fortheirpart,respondentsareconfidentthatintheendtheywouldbeupheldintheirdefense,as
indeedpetitionerandcounselhavepracticallyconfessedjudgmentinthiscase."12
Thepropagandaobjectionisnotavalidgroundfordenyingthewithdrawalofthepetitionandshouldnotbeheld
against petitioner who had nothing whatsoever to do with it. The objection that granting the withdrawal motion
would amount to an admission of the "unfair, untrue and contemptuous statements" made therein is untenable
sinceitispatentthatgrantingthewithdrawalmotionperse(regardlessofpetitioner'sreasons)doesnotamount
to an admission of the truth or validity of such reasons and as conceded by the SolicitorGeneral, neither will
denyingthewithdrawalmotionpersedisprovethereasons. 13Theuntruth,unfairnessorcostumacyofsuchreasons
maybestbedealtwith,clarifiedorexpoundedbytheCourtanditsmembersintheCourt'sresolutiongrantingwithdrawalor
intheseparateopinionsoftheindividualJustices(ashasactuallybeendoneandwhichthewriterwillnowproceedtodo).
4.Petitioner'sfirstreasonforwithdrawalissubjective.Aftermentioningvariousfactors,particularly,thefactthat
fiveofthesixJustices(includingthewriter)whoheldintheRatificationcases 14that the 1973 Constitution had not
been validly ratified had taken on October 29, 1973 an oath to import and defend the new Constitution, he expresses his
feeling that "(I) cannot reasonably expect either right or reason, law or justice, to prevail in my case," that "the unusual
lengthofthestrugglealsoindicatesthatitsconscienceislosingthebattle"andthat"sinceIdonotwishtobeapartyto
an I adverse decision, I must renounce every possibility of favorable judgment." 15 A party's subjective evaluation of the
Court'sactionisactuallyofnomoment,forithasalwaysbeenrecognizedthatthisCourt,possessedofneitherthesword
northepurse,mustultimatelyandobjectivelyrestitsauthorityonsustainedpublicconfidenceinthetruth,justice,integrity
andmoralforceofitsjudgments."16
Petitioner'ssecondreasonforwithdrawalreads:"(S)econd,inviewofthenewoaththatitsmembershavetaken,
thepresentSupremeCourtisanewCourtfunctioningunderanew'Constitution,'differentfromtheCourtandthe
Constitution under which I applied for my release. I was willing to be judged by the old Court under the old
Constitution,butnotbythenewCourtunderthenewConstitution,...."17
PetitionerisinerrorinhisassumptionthatthisCourtis"newCourtfunctioningunderanewConstitutiondifferent
from the Court and the Constitution under which [he] applied for [his] release." The same Supreme Court has
continued save that it now operates under Article X of the 1973 Constitution which inter alia increased its
componentmembershipfromeleventofifteenandtransferredtoitadministrativesupervisionoverallcourtsand
personnel thereof with the power of discipline and dismissal over judges of inferior courts, in the same manner
thatthesameRepublicofthePhilippines(ofwhichtheSupremeCourtisbutapart)hascontinuedinexistence
butnowoperatesunderthe1973Constitution.18
DuringtheperiodofninetydaysthattheRatificationcaseswerependingbeforetheCourtuntilitsdismissalofthe
cases per its resolution of March 31, 1973 became final on April 17, 1973, the Executive Department was
operatingunderthe1973ConstitutioninaccordancewithPresidentFerdinandE.Marcos'ProclamationNo.1102
onJanuary17,1973announcingtheratificationandcorningintoeffectofthe1973ConstitutionwhilethisCourt
as the only other governmental department continued to operate tinder the 1935 Constitution pending its final
resolution on the said cases challenging the validity of Proclamation No. 1102 and enforcement of the new
Constitution. (As per the Court resolution of January 23, 1973, it declined to take over from the Department of
Justice the administrative supervision over all inferior courts expressing its sense that "it is best that the status
quo be maintained until the case aforementioned (Javellana vs. Exec. Secretary) shall have been finally
resolved...")
Suchasituationcouldnotlongendurewhereintheonlytwogreatdepartmentsofgovernment,theExecutiveand
the Judicial, 19 for a period of three months were operating under two different Constitutions (presidential and
parliamentary). When this Court's resolution of dismissal of the Ratification cases by a majority of six to four Justices
becamefinalandwasenteredonApril18,1973"withtheresultthatthere(were)notenoughvotestodeclarethatthenew
Constitutionisnotinforce," 20theCourtandparticularlytheremainingthreedissentingJustices(notwithstandingtheirvote
with three others that the new Constitution had not been validly ratified 21 had to abide under the Rule of Law by the
decision of the majority dismissing the cases brought to enjoin the enforcement by the Executive of the new Constitution
andhadtooperateunderitasthefundamentalcharterofthegovernment,unlesstheyweretoturnfromlegitimatedissent
tointernecinedissidenceforwhichtheyhaveneithertheinclinationnorthecapability.
TheCourtastheheadoftheJudicialDepartmentthenceforthassumedthepowerofadministrativesupervision
overallcourtsandallotherfunctionsandliabilitiesimposedonitunderthenewConstitution.Accordingly,thisand
allotherexistinginferiorcourtscontinuetodischargetheirjudicialfunctionandtohearanddetermineallpending
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casesundertheold(1935)Constitution 22aswellasnewcasesunderthenew(1973)Constitutionwiththefullsupport
ofthemembersoftheIntegratedBarofthePhilippines(noneofwhomhasmadepetitioner'sclaimthatthisisa"newCourt"
differentfromthe"oldCourt").
A major liability imposed upon all members of the Court and all other officials and employees was that under
Article XVII, section 9 of the Transitory Provisions 23 which was destructive of their tenure and called upon them "to
vacatetheirrespectiveofficesupontheappointmentandqualificationoftheirsuccessors."TheirtakingtheoathonOctober
29, 1973 "to preserve and defend the new Constitution" by virtue of their "having been continued in office" 24 on the
occasionoftheoathtakingofthreenewmembersoftheCourt 25pursuanttoArticleXV,section4 26wasmeanttoassure
their"continuityoftenure"bywayofthePresidenthavingexercisedthepowerofreplacementunderthecitedprovisionand
ineffectreplacedthemwiththemselvesasmembersoftheCourtwiththesameorderofseniority.27
5. The withdrawal in effect gives cause for judicial abstention and further opportunity (pending submittal for
decision of the Aquino prohibition case in L37364) to ponder and deliberate upon the host of grave and
fundamental constitutional questions involved which have thereby been rendered unnecessary to resolve here
andnow.
InthebenchmarkcaseofLansang vs. Garcia 28 when the Court declared that the President did not act arbitrarily in
issuing in August, 1971 Proclamation No. 889, as amended, suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus for
persons detained for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion and other overt acts committed by them in furtherance thereof,
the Court held through then Chief Justice Concepcion that "our next step would have been the following: The Court, or a
commissionerdesignatedbyit,wouldhavereceivedevidenceonwhetherasstatedinrespondents''AnswerandReturn'
said petitioners had been apprehended and detained 'on reasonable belief' that they had 'participated in the crime of
insurrectionorrebellion.'
(However,sinceintheintervaloftwomonthsduringthependencyofthecase,criminalcomplaintshadbeenfiled
incourtagainstthepetitionersdetainees(LuzvimindoDavid,GaryOlivar,etal.),theCourtfoundthat"itisbestto
letsaidpreliminaryexaminationand/orinvestigationbecompleted,sothatpetitioners'releasecouldbeordered
by the court of first instance, should it find that there is no probable cause against them, or a warrant for their
arrestcouldbeissuedshouldaprobablecausebeestablishedagainstthem." 29TheCourtaccordinglyorderedthe
trial court "to act with utmost dispatch" in conducting the preliminary investigation for violation of the AntiSubversion Act
and "to issue the corresponding warrants of arrest, if probable cause is found to exist against them, or otherwise, to order
theirrelease.")
Can such a procedure for reception of evidence on the controverted allegations concerning the detention as
indicatedinLansangbe likewise applied to petitioner's case considering his prolonged detention for almost two
yearsnowwithoutcharges? 30Itshouldalsobeconsideredthatitisconcededthateventhoughtheprivilegeofthewrit
ofhabeascorpushasbeensuspended,itissuspendedonlyastocertainspecificcrimesandthe"answerandreturn"ofthe
respondents who hold the petitioner under detention is not conclusive upon the courts which may receive evidence and
determineasheldinLansang(andasalsoprovidedintheAntiSubversionAct[RepublicAct1700])whetherapetitionerhas
been in fact apprehended and detained arbitrarily or "on reasonable belief" that he has "participated in the crime of
insurrectionorrebellion"orotherrelatedoffensesasmaybeenumeratedintheproclamationsuspendingtheprivilegeofthe
writ.
PertinenttothisquestionistheCourt'sadoptioninLansangofthedoctrineofSterlingvs.Constantin31 enunciated
through U.S. Chief Justice Hughes that even when the state has been placed under martial law "... (W)hen there is a
substantialshowingthattheexertionofstatepowerhasoverriddenprivaterightssecuredbythatConstitution,thesubjectis
necessarily one for judicial inquiry in an appropriate proceeding directed against the individuals charged with the
transgression. To such a case the Federal judicial power extends (Art. 3, sec. 2) and, so extending, the court has all the
authorityappropriatetoitsexercise....
EquallypertinentistheCourt'sstatementthereinannouncingthemembers'unanimousconvictionthat"ithasthe
authoritytoinquireintotheexistenceofsaidfactualbases[statedintheproclamationsuspendingtheprivilegeof
thewritofhabeascorpusorplacingthecountryundermartiallawasthecasemaybe,sincetherequirementsfor
theexerciseofthesepowersarethesameandareprovidedintheverysameclause]inordertodeterminethe
constitutionalsufficiencythereof." 32TheCourtstressedthereinthat"indeed,thegrantofpowertosuspendtheprivilege
isneitherabsolutenorunqualified.TheauthorityconferreduponbytheConstitution,bothundertheBillofRightsandunder
theExecutiveDepartment,islimitedandconditional.ThepreceptintheBillofRightsestablishesageneralrule,aswellas
anexceptionthereto.whatismore,itpostulatestheformerinthenegative,evidentlytostressitsimportance,byproviding
that'(t)heprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpusshallnotbesuspended....'Itisonlybywayofexceptionthat it permits the
suspensionoftheprivilege'incasesofinvasion,insurrection,orrebellion'orunderArt.VIIoftheConstitution,'imminent
dangerthereof''whenthepublicsafetyrequiresit,inanyofwhicheventsthesamemaybesuspendedwhereverduring
such period the necessity for such suspension shall exist.' Far from being full and plenary, the authority to suspend the
privilege of the writ is thus circumscribed, confined and restricted, not only by the prescribed setting or the conditions
essentialtoitsexistence,butalso,asregardsthetimewhenandtheplacewhereitmaybeexercised.Thesefactorsand
the aforementioned setting or conditions mark, establish and define the extent, the confines and the limits of said power,
beyond which it does not exist. And, like the limitations and restrictions imposed by the Fundamental Law upon the
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legislative department, adherence thereto and compliance therewith may, within proper bounds, be inquired into by the
courts of justice. Otherwise, the explicit constitutional provisions thereon would be meaningless. Surely, the frames of our
Constitutioncouldnothaveintendedtoengageinsuchawastefulexerciseinfutility."33
Whileastateofmartiallawmaybarsuchjudicialinquiriesunderthewritofhabeascorpusintheactualtheaterof
war,wouldtheproscriptionapplywhenmartiallawismaintainedasaninstrumentofsocialreformandthecivil
courts (as well as military commissions) are open and freely functioning? What is the extent and scope of the
validatingprovisionofArticleXVII,section3(2)oftheTransitoryProvisionsofthe1973Constitution?34
Grantingthevalidationoftheinitialpreventivedetention,wouldthevalidatingprovisioncoverindefinitedetention
thereafterormayinquirybemadeastoitsreasonablerelationtomeetingtheemergencysituation?
What rights under the Bill of Rights, e.g. the rights to due process and to "speedy, impartial and public trial" 35
maybeinvokedunderthepresentstateofmartiallaw?
Is the exercise of martial law powers for the institutionalization of reforms incompatible with recognizing the
fundamentallibertiesgrantedintheBillofRights?
ThePresidentiswellawareofthelayman'sviewofthe"centralproblemofconstitutionalisminourcontemporary
society ... whether or not the Constitution remains an efficient instrument for the moderation of conflict within
society.Therearetwoaspectsofthisproblem.Oneistheregulationoffreedominordertopreventanarchy.The
otheristhelimitationofpowerinordertopreventtyranny."36
Hence, he has declared that "The New Society looks to individual rights as a matter of paramount concern,
removed from the vicissitudes of political controversy and beyond the reach of majorities. We are pledged to
uphold the Bill of Rights and as the exigencies may so allow, we are determined that each provision shall be
executedtothefullest," 37andhasacknowledgedthat"martiallawnecessarilycreatesacommandsociety...[and]isa
temporaryconstitutionalexpedientofsafeguardingtherepublic..."38
Hehasthusdescribedtheproclamationofmartiallawand"thesettingupofacorrespondingcrisisgovernment"
asconstitutionalauthoritarianism,"whichisarecognitionthatwhilehisgovernmentisauthoritarianitisessentially
constitutionalandrecognizesthesupremacyofthenewConstitution.
He has further declared that "martial law should have legally terminated on January 17, 1973 when the new
Constitution was ratified" but that "the Popular clamor manifested in the referendum [was] that the National
Assembly he temporarily suspended" and the reaction in the July, 1973 referendum "was violently against
stopping the use of martial law powers," adding that "I intend to submit this matter at least notice a year to the
people,andwhentheysayweshouldshifttothenormalfunctionsofgovernment,thenwewilldoso."39
Therealizationoftheprospectsforrestorationofnormalcyandfullimplementationofeachandeveryprovisionof
theBillofRightsaspledgedbythePresidentwouldthenhopefullycomesoonerratherthanlaterandprovidesan
additional weighty reason for the exercise of judicial abstention under the environmental circumstances and for
thegrantingofthewithdrawalmotion.
II.In the Aquino case: I maintain my original vote as first unanimously agreed by the Court for dismissal of the
habeascorpuspetitionofBenignoS.Aquino,Jr.onthegroundthatgravechargesagainsthimforviolationofthe
AntiSubversionAct(RepublicAct1700),etc.werefiledinAugust,1973andhencethepresentpetitionhasbeen
superseded by the prohibition case then filed by him questioning the filing of the charges against him with a
militarycommissionratherthanwiththecivilcourts(whichcaseisnotyetsubmittedfordecision).
ThesaidprohibitioncaseinvolvesthesameconstitutionalissuesraisedintheDioknocaseandmore,concerning
the constitutionality of having him tried by a military commission for offenses allegedly committed by him long
before the declaration of martial law. This is evident from the special and affirmative defenses raised in
respondents'answerwhichfiledjustlastAugust21,1974bytheSolicitorwhichreiteratethesamedefensesinhis
answer to the petition at bar. Hence, the same constitutional issues may well be resolved if necessary in the
decisionyettoberenderedbytheCourtinsaidprohibitioncase.
Ithereforedissentfromthesubsequentvoteofthemajoritytoinsteadpassuponandresolveinadvancethesaid
constitutionalissuesunnecessarilyinthepresentcase.
III. In the Rodrigo case: I submit that the habeas corpus petition of Francisco "Soc" Rodrigo as well as the
petitionsofthoseotherssimilarlyreleasedshouldbedismissedforhavingbeenrenderedmootandacademicby
virtue of their release from physical confinement and detention. That their release has been made subject to
certain conditions (e.g. not being allowed to leave the Greater Manila area without specific authorization of the
military authorities) does not mean that their action would survive, since "(T)he restraint of liberty which would
justifytheissuanceofthewritmustbemorethanameremoralrestraintitmustbeactualorphysical." 40 They
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mayhavesomeotherjudicialrecoursefortheremovalofsuchrestraintsbuttheiractionforhabeas corpus cannot survive

since they are no longer deprived of their physical liberty. For these reasons and those already expounded hereinabove, I
dissent from the majority vote to pass upon and resolve in advance the constitutional issues unnecessarily in the present
case.
BARREDO,J.,concurring:
Itistomymindveryunfortunatethat,forreasonsIcannotcomprehendordonotdeemconvincing,themajority
oftheCourthasagreedthatnomainopinionbepreparedforthedecisioninthese,cases.Honestly,Ifeelthatthe
grounds given by the Chief Justice do not justify a deviation from the regular practice of a main opinion being
prepared by one Justice even when the members of the Court are not all agreed as to the grounds of the
judgment as long as at least a substantial number of Justices concur in the basic ones and there are enough
otherJusticesconcurringintheresulttoformtherequiredmajority.Idonotseesuchvaryingsubstantialdisparity
intheviewsofthemembersoftheCourtregardingthedifferentissueshereastocallforasummarizationlikethe
onethatwasdone,withcontroversialconsequences,inJavellana. * Actually, the summarization made by the Chief Justice does
not in my opinion portray accurately the spectrum of our views, if one is to assay the doctrinal value of this decision. The divergence's stated are I think
moreapparentthanreal.
Inanyevent,itismyconsideredviewthatahistoricaldecisionlikethis,onelikelytobesuigeneris,atthesame
time that it is of utmost transcendental importance because it revolves around the proper construction of the
constitutionalprovisionssecuringindividualrightsastheymaybe,affectedbythoseempoweringtheGovernment
todefenditselfagainstthethreatofinternalandexternalaggression,astheseareactuallyoperatinginthesetting
of the Official proclamation of the Executive that rebellion endangering public safety actually exists, deserves
better treatment from the Court. Indeed, I believe that our points of seeming variance respecting the questions
before us could have been threshed out, if only enough effort in that direction had been exerted by all. The
trouble is that from the very beginning many members of the Court, myself included, announced our desire to
haveourviewsrecordedforhistory,hence,individualizationratherthanconsensusbecametheorderoftheday.
In consequence, the convenient solution was forged that as long as there would be enough votes to support a
legallybindingjudgment,thereneednotbeanyopinionoftheCourt,everyonecouldgivehisownviewsandthe
Chief Justice would just try to analyze the opinions of those who would care to prepare one and then make a
certification of the final result of the voting. It was only at the last minute that, at my suggestion, supported by
JusticeCastro,theChief'spreparedcertificationwasmodifiedtoassumetheformofajudgment,therebygiving
thisdecisionabettersemblanceofrespectability.
Aswillbeseen,thisseparateopinionofconcurrenceisnotduetoanyirreconcilableconflictofconvictionbetween
meandanyothermemberoftheCourt.Truthtotell,attheearlystagesofoureffortstodecidethesebutafterthe
Court had more or less already arrived at a consensus as to the result, I was made to understand that I could
prepare the opinion for the Court. Apparently, however, for one reason or another, some of our colleagues felt
thatitisunnecessarytotouchoncertainmatterscontainedinthedraftIhadsubmitted,incompleteandunedited
asitwas,hence,theplanwasabandoned.Myexplanationthatadecisionofthisimportshouldbeaddressedin
parttothefutureandshouldattempttoanswer,asbestwecan,notonlythequestionsraisedbythepartiesbut
alsotherelevantonesthatwearecertainarebotheringmanyofourcountrymen,nottospeakofthosewhoare
interested in the correct juridical implications of the unusual political developments being witnessed in the
Philippines these days, failed to persuade them. I still feel very strongly, however, the need for articulating the
thoughtsthatwillenablethewholeworldtovisualizeandcomprehendtheexactlength,breathanddepthofthe
juridicalfoundationsofthecurrentconstitutionalorderandthusbebetterpositionedtorenderitsverdictthereon.
ThefollowingthenisthedraftoftheopinionIpreparedfortheCourt.IfeelIneednotadjustittogiveitthetenor
ofanindividualopinion.SomethinginsidemedictatesthatIshouldletitstandasIhadoriginallypreparedit.Iam
emboldened to do this by the conviction that actually, when properly analyzed, it will be realized that whatever
differencestheremightbeinthevariousopinionswearesubmittingindividually,suchdifferenceslieonlyinthe
distinctive methods of approach we have each preferred to adopt rather than in any basically substantial and
irreconcilable disagreement. If we had only striven a little more, I am confident, we could have even found a
common mode of approach. I am referring, of course, only to those of us who sincerely feel the urgency of
resolving the fundamental issues herein, regardless of purely technical and strained reasons there might be to
apparently justify an attitude of indifference, if not concealed antagonism, to the need for authoritative judicial
clarificationofthejuridicalaspectsoftheNewSocietyinthePhilippines.
OnSeptember11,1974,petitionerDioknowasreleasedbytheorderofthePresident,"underexistingrulesand
regulations."TheCourthas,therefore,resolvedthathisparticularcasehasbecomemootandacademic,butthis
development has not affected the issues insofar as the other petitioners, particularly Senator Aquino, are
concerned. And inasmuch as the principal arguments of petitioner Diokno, although presented only in the
pleadingsfiledonhisbehalf,applywithmoreorlessequalforcetotheotherpetitioners,Ifeelthatmyreference
to and discussion of said arguments in my draft may well be preserved, if only to maintain the purported
comprehensivenessofmytreatmentofalltheimportantaspectsofthesecases.
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Beforeproceedinganyfurther,IwouldliketoexplainwhyIamsayingwehavenobasicdisagreements.
Except for Justices Makasiar and Esguerra who consider the recitals in the Proclamation to be absolutely
conclusiveuponthecourtsandofJusticeTeehankeewhoconsidersitunnecessarytoexpressanyopiniononthe
matter at this point, the rest or eight of us have actually inquired into the constitutional sufficiency of the
Proclamation. Where we have differed is only as to the extent and basis of the inquiry. Without committing
themselves expressly as to whether the issue is justiciable or otherwise, the Chief Justice and Justice Castro
unmistakablyappeartohaveactuallyconductedaninquirywhichasfarasIcanseeisbasedonfactswhichare
uncontradicted in the record plus additional facts of judicial notice. No independent evidence has been
considered,norisanyreferencemadetotheevidenceonwhichthePresidenthadacted.Ontheirpart,Justices
Antonio,FernandezandAquinoareoftheviewthattheProclamationisnotsubjecttoinquirybythecourts,but
assuming it is, they are of the conviction that the record amply supports the reasonableness, or lack of
arbitrariness,ofthePresident'saction.Again,inarrivingatthislatterconclusion,theyhavereliedexclusivelyon
the same factual bases utilized by the Chief Justice and Justice Castro. Justices Fernando and Muoz Palma
categoricallyholdthattheissueisjusticiableand,onthatpremise,theymadetheirowninquiry,butwithnoother
basisthanthesameundisputedfactsintherecordandfactsofjudicialnoticefromwhichtheothershavedrawn
theirconclusions.Formyself,IamjustmakingitveryclearthattheinquirywhichtheConstitutioncontemplates
forthedeterminationoftheconstitutionalsufficiencyofaproclamationofmartiallawbythePresidentshouldnot
go beyond facts of judicial notice and those that may be stated in the proclamation, if these are by their very
nature capable of unquestionable demonstration. In other words, eight of us virtually hold that the Executive's
Proclamationisnotabsolutelyconclusivebutitisnottobeinterferedwithwheneveritwithfactsundisputedin
the record as well as those of judicial notice or capable of unquest demonstration. Thus, it is obvious that
although we are split between upholding justiciability or nonjusticiability, those who believe in the latter have
nonethelessconductedaninquiry,whilethosewhoadheretotheformertheory,insistingonfollowingLansang,
havelimitedtheirinquirytotheuncontrovertedfactsandfactsofjudicialnotice.Indeed,thetruthisthatnoone
hasaskedforinquiryintotheevidencebeforethePresidentwhichiswhattherealimportofjusticiabilitymeans.In
the final analysis, none of us has gone beyond what in my humble opinion the Constitution permits in the
premises.Inotherwords,whileadeclarationofmartiallawisnotabsolutelyconclusive,theCourt'sinquiryintoits
constitutionalsufficiencymaynot,contrarytowhatisimpliedinLansang,involvethereceptionofevidencetobe
weighedagainstthoseonwhichthePresidenthasacted,normayitextendtotheinvestigationofwhatevidence
the President had before him. Such inquiry must be limited to what is undisputed in the record and to what
accordsordoesnotaccordwithfactsofjudicialnotice.
Following now is my separate concurring opinion which as I have said is the draft I submitted to the Court's
approval:
Thisisaclusterofpetitionsforhabeascorpusseekingthereleaseofpetitionersfromdetention,uponthemain
ground that, allegedly, Proclamation 1081 issued by President Ferdinand E. Marcos on September 21, 1972
placing the whole country under martial law as well as the general orders subsequently issued also by the
Presidentbyvirtueofthesaidproclamation,pursuanttowhichpetitionershavebeenapprehendedanddetained,
two of them until the present, while the rest have been released conditionally, are unconstitutional and null and
void,hencetheirarrestanddetentionhavenolegalbasis.
ThepetitionersinG.R.No.L35538arealljournalists,namely,JoaquinP.Roces,TeodoroM.Locsin,Rolando
Fadul, Rosalind Galang, Go Eng Guan, Maximo M. Soliven, Renato Constantino and Luis R. Mauricio. Their
petitionwasfiledataboutnoonofSeptember23,1972.
Almostthreehourslaterofthesameday,thepetitioninG.R.No.L35539wasfiled,withCarmenI.Diokno,as
petitioner,actingonbehalfofherhusband,JoseW.Diokno,asenator,whoisoneofthosestilldetained.
Two days later, early in the morning of September 25, 1972, the petition of Maximo V. Soliven, Napoleon G.
RamaandJoseMariVelez,allmediamen,wasdocketedasG.R.No.L35540.Thelasttwowerealsodelegates
totheConstitutionalConventionof1971.
Inallthethreeforegoingcases,theproperwritsofhabeascorpuswereissuedreturnablenotlaterthan4:00p.m.
ofSeptember25,1972,andhearingofthepetitionswasheldonSeptember26,1972.1
LateintheafternoonofSeptember25,1972,anotherpetitionwasfiledonbehalfofSenatorsBenignoS.Aquino,
Jr. and Ramon V. Mitra, Jr., and former Senator Francisco "Soc" Rodrigo, also a TV commentator. (Delegate
NapoleonRamaalsoappearsaspetitionerinthiscase.)ItwasdocketedasG.R.No.L35546.
The next day, September 26, 1972, a petition was filed by Voltaire Garcia II, another delegate to the
ConstitutionalConvention,asG.R.No.L35547.2
InthistwocasesthewritsprayedforwerealsoissuedandthepetitionswereheardtogetheronSeptember29,
1972.
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InG.R.No.L35556,thepetitionwasfiledbyTanChinHianandVeronicaL.YuyitungonSeptember27,1972,
butthesamewaswithdrawnbythelatteronOctober6,1972andtheformeronOctober9,1972,sincetheywere
released from custody on September 30, 1972 and October 9, 1972, respectively. The Court allowed the
withdrawalsbyresolutiononOctober11,1972.
OnOctober2,1972,thepetitionofjournalistsAmandoDoronila,JuanL.Mercado,HernandoJ.Abaya,Ernesto
Granada, Luis Beltran, Tan Chin Hian, (already a petitioner in G. R. No. L35556) Bren Guiao, (for whom a
subsequent petition was also filed by his wife in G. R. No. L35571, but both petitions on his behalf were
immediatelywithdrawnwiththeapprovaloftheCourtwhichwasgivenbyresolutiononOctober11,1972)Ruben
Cusipag,RobertoOrdoez,ManuelAlmarioandWillieBaunwasfiledinG.R.No.
L35567. All these petitioners, except Juan L. Mercado, Manuel Almario, and Roberto Ordoez withdrew their
petitionandtheCourtallowedthewithdrawalsbyresolutionofOctober3,1972.
And on October 3, 1972, Ernesto Rondon, also a delegate to the Constitutional Convention and a radio
commentator,filedhispetitioninG.R.No.
L35573.
Again,inalltheselastfourcases,G.R.Nos.,L35556,35567,35571and35573,thecorrespondingwritswere
issued and a joint hearing of the petition was held October 6, 1972, except as to the petitioners who had as of
thenannouncedthewithdrawaloftheirrespectivepetitions.
The returns and answers of the Solicitor General in all these nine cases, filed on behalf of the principal
respondents,thesecretaryofNationalDefense,Hon.JuanPonceEnrile,theChiefofStaffoftheArmedForcesof
the Philippines, General Romeo Espino, and the Chief of the Philippine Constabulary, General Fidel V. Ramos,
werepracticallyidenticalasfollows:
RETURNTOWRIT
and
ANSWERTOTHEPETITION
COME NOW respondents, by the undersigned counsel, and appearing before this Honorable Court only for
purposes of this action, as hereunder set forth, hereby state by way of return to the writ and answer to the
petition,asfollows:
ADMISSIONS/DENIALS
1.TheyADMITtheallegationinparagraphsIandVofthePetition
2. They ADMIT the allegations in paragraph II of the Petition that the petitioners were arrested on
September22,1972andarepresentlydetainedatFortBonifacio,Makati,Rizal,butSPECIFICALLY
DENYtheallegationthattheirdetentionisillegal,thetruthbeingthatstatedinSpecialandAffirmative
DefensesofthisAnswerandReturn
3. They SPECIFICALLY DENY the allegations in paragraphs III, IV, VI and VII, of the Petition, the
truth of the matter being that stated in the Special and Affirmative Defenses of this Answer and
Return.
Respondentsstatebywayof
SPECIALANDAFFIRMATIVEDEFENSES
4.OnSeptember21,1972,thePresidentofthePhilippines,intheexerciseofthepowersvestedin
himbyArticleVII,section10,paragraph2oftheConstitution,issuedProclamationNo.1081placing
theentirePhilippinesundermartiallaw
5.PursuanttosaidProclamation,thePresidentissuedGeneralOrdersNos.1,2,3,3A,4,5,6,and
7andLettersofInstructionNos.1,2and3.Truecopiesofthesedocumentsareheretoattachedand
made integral parts hereof as Annexes 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11. A copy of the President's
statementtothecountryonSeptember23,1972isalsoattachedasAnnex12
6.Finally,thepetitionstatesnocauseofaction.
PRAYER
IN VIEW WHEREOF, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Supreme Court that the petition be
dismissed.
Manila,Philippines,September27,1972.
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At the hearings, the following wellknown and distinguished members of the bar appeared and argued for the
petitioners: Petitioner Diokno argued on his own behalf to supplement the arguments of his counsel of record
Attys.JokerD.ArroyoappearedandarguedforthepetitionersinL35538andL35567FrancisE.Garchitorena,
assisted by Oscar Diokno Perez, appeared and argued for the petitioner in L35539 Ramon A. Gonzales,
assistedbyManuelB.Imbongappearedandarguedforthepetitionersin
L35540SenatorsGerardoRoxasandJovitoR.Salonga,assistedbyAttys.PedroL.Yap,SedfreyA.Ordoez,
Custodio O. Parlade, Leopoldo L. Africa, Francisco Rodrigo Jr., Magdaleno Palacol and Dakila F. Castro,
appearedandarguedforthepetitionersin
L35546Atty.E.VoltaireGarciaSr.appearedandarguedinbehalfofhispetitionersoninL35547Attys.RaulI.
GocoandTeoduloR.Dinoappearedforthepetitionersin
L35556 Atty. Roberto P. Tolentino appeared for the petitioner in L35571 and Atty. Aquilino Pimentel Jr.
assistedbyAtty.ModestoR.GaliasJr.appearedandarguedforthepetitionerinL35578.
OnOctober31,1972,formerSenatorLorenzoM.Taada,togetherwithhislawyersons,AttorneysRenatoand
WigbertoTaada,enteredtheirappearanceascounselforallthepetitionersinG.R.No.L35538,exceptFadul,
GalangandGoEngGuan,forpetitionerDioknoinG.R.No.L35539andforpetitionersAquino,Mitra,Rodrigo
andRamainG.R.No.L35546.
Fortherespondents,SolicitorGeneralEstelitoP.Mendoza,AssistantSolicitorsGeneralBernardoP.Pardoand
RosalioA.deLeon(bothofwhomarejudgesnow),SolicitorReynatoS.Puno(nowAssistantSolicitorGeneral)
and Solicitors Jose A. R. Melo and Jose A. Janolo appeared in all the cases, but only the Solicitor General
argued. Later, Assistant Solicitor General Vicente V. Mendoza also appeared and cosigned all the subsequent
pleadingsandmemorandaforrespondents.
AfterthehearingsofSeptember26and29andOctober6,1972,thepartieswererequiredtofiletheirrespective
memoranda.OnNovember9,1972petitionersinallthefiledtheirconsolidated109pagememorandum,together
withtheanswers,containedin86pages,tosome33questionsposedbytheCourtinitsresolutionofSeptember
29,1972,andlater,onDecember1,1972,an88pagereplytothememorandumofrespondents,withannexes.
In a separate Manifestation of Compliance and Submission filed simultaneously with their reply, petitioners
stressedthat:
4.ThatundersignedcounselforPetitionersdidnotaskforanyextensionoftheperiodwithinwhichto
filetheReplyMemorandumforPetitioners,despiteoverwhelmingpressureofwork,because
a.everydayofdelaywouldmeanonedaymoreofindescribablemiseryandanguishonthepartof
Petitionersandtheirfamilies.
b.anyfurtherdelaywouldonlydiminishwhatevertimeisleftmorethanamonth'stimewithin
which this Court can deliberate on and decide these petitions, having in mind some irreversible
eventswhichmayplungethisnationintoanentirelynewconstitutionalorder,namely,theapprovalof
the draft of the proposed Constitution by the Constitutional Convention and the 'plebiscite' was
scheduledonJanuary15,1973
c. the proposed Constitution, if 'ratified' might prejudice these petitions, in view of the following
transitoryprovision:
All proclamations, orders, decrees , instructions, and acts promulgated, issued, or done by the
incumbent President shall be part of the law of the land, and shall remain valid, legal, binding, and
effective even after the lifting of martial law or the ratification of this Constitution, unless modified,
revoked, or superseded by subsequent proclamations, decrees, instructions, or other acts of the
incumbentPresident,orunlessexpresslyandexplicitlymodifiedorrepealedbytheregularNational
Assembly.(ArticleXVII,sec.3,par.2oftheproposedConstitution).
5. In view of the fact that they were arrested and detained allegedly in keeping with the existing
Constitution,itisonlyhumaneandjustthatthesepetitionstobeaccordedpreferenceunderRule
22,section1oftheRulesofCourtbedisposedofwhilethereisstilltimeleft,inaccordancewith
the present Constitution and not in accordance with a new constitutional order being ushered in,
undertheaegisofamartialrule,theconstitutionalityandvalidityofwhichistheverypointatissuein
theinstantpetitions
6.Since,accordingtotheunanimousviewoftheauthorities,ascitedintheirMemorandum,the
overridingpurposeofmartiallawisandcannotgobeyondthepreservationoftheconstitutional
statusquo, and not to alter it or hasten its alteration, it would be extremely unjust and inhuman, to
saytheleast,toallowthesepetitionsforthegreatwritoflibertytobeimperiled,byvirtueofanew
Constitution 'submission' and 'ratification of which are being pressed under martial law that
wouldpurportedlyratifyallExecutiveedictsissuedandactsdoneundersaidregimesomethingthat
hasneverbeendoneasfarasisknownintheentirehistoryoftheAngloAmericanlegalsystem(pp.
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414416,Rollo,L35539.)
At this juncture, it may be stated that as of October 11, 1972, the following petitioners had already withdrawn:
AmandoDoronila,HernandoJ.Abaya,ErnestoGranada,LuisBeltran,BrenGuiao,RubenCusipag,WillieBaun,
TanChinHianandVeronicaL.Yuyitunghence,oftheoriginalninecaseswithatotalof32petitioners,3 only the
sixaboveentitledcasesremainwith18petitioners.4Theremainingpetitionersare:JoaquinP.Roces,TeodoroM.Locsin,
Sr., Rolando Fadul, Rosalind Galang, Go Eng Guan, Maximo V. Soliven, Renato Constantino, Luis R. Mauricio, Jose W.
Diokno thru Carmen Diokno, Napoleon G. Rama, Jose Mari Velez, Benigno S. Aquino, Ramon V. Mitra, Jr., Francisco S.
Rodrigo,JuanL.Mercado,RobertoOrdoez,ManuelAlmarioandErnestoRondonbutonlySenatorsDioknoandAquinoare
still in confinement, the rest having been released under conditions hereinafter to be discussed. The case of petitioner
GarciainG.R.No.L35547isdeemedabatedonaccountofhisdeath.
Over the opposition of these remaining petitioners, respondents' counsel was given several extensions of their
periodtofiletheirmemorandum,anditwasnotuntilJanuary10,1973thattheywereabletofiletheirreplyof35
pages. Previously, their memorandum of 77 pages was filed on November 17, 1972. Thus, the cases were
declaredsubmittedfordecisiononlyonFebruary26,1973,perresolutionofevendate,onlytobereopenedlater,
aswillbestatedanon.
Inthemeanwhile,practicallythesamecounselforpetitionersinthesecasesengagedthegovernmentlawyersin
anotherandseparatetranscendentaljudicialtussleoftwostagesrelativetotheNewConstitution.OnDecember
7,1972,thefirstofthesocalledPlebisciteCases(G.R.No.L35925,CharitoPlanasvs.Comelec,G.R.No.
L35929, Pablo C. Sanidad vs. Comelec, G. R. No. L35940, Gerardo Roxas et al. vs. Comelec, G. R. No. L
35941, Eddie B. Monteclaro vs. Comelec, G. R. No. L35942, Sedfrey A. Ordoez vs. Treasurer, G. R. No. L
35948, Vidal Tan vs. Comelec, G. R. No. L35953, Jose W. Diokno et als. vs. Comelec, G. R. No. L35961,
JacintoJimenezvs.Comelec,G.R.No.L35965,RaulM.Gonzalesvs.ComelecandG.R.No.L35979,Ernesto
Hidalgovs.Comelec)wasfiled.ThesecasestookmostofthetimeoftheCourtuntilJanuary22,1973,whenthey
weredeclaredmootandacademicbecauseoftheissuanceofProclamation1102onJanuary17,1973,buton
January20,1973,asasequeltothePlebisciteCases,JosueJavellanafiledCaseNo.G.R.No.L36142against
the Executive Secretary and the Secretaries of National Defense, Justice and Finance. This started the second
seriesofcasesknownastheRatificationCases,namely,saidG.R.No.L36142andG.R.No.L36164,VidalTan
vs.TheExecutiveSecretaryetal.,G.R.No.
L36165,GerardoRoxasetal.vs.AlejandroMelchoretc.etal.,G.R.No.L36236,EddieB.Monteclarovs.The
ExecutiveSecretary,andG.R.No.L36283,NapoleonV.Dilagvs.TheHonorableExecutiveSecretary.Themain
thrust of these petitions was that the New Constitution had not been validly ratified, hence the Old Constitution
continuedinforceand,therefore,whateverprovisionstheNewConstitutionmightcontaintendingtovalidatethe
proclamations, orders, decrees, and acts of the incumbent President which are being relied upon for the
apprehension and detention of petitioners, have no legal effect. In any event, the advent of a new constitution
naturallyentailedtheconsequencethatanyquestionastothelegalityofthecontinueddetentionofpetitionersor
of any restraint of their liberties may not be resolved without taking into account in one way or another the
pertinent provisions of the new charter. Accordingly, the resolution of these two series of cases became a
prejudicial matter which the Court had to resolve first. It was not until March 31, 1973 that they were decided
adversely to the petitioners therein and it was only on April 17, 1973 that entry of final judgment was made
therein.
From April 18, 1973, the membership of the Court was depleted to nine, in view of the retirement, effective on
saiddate,ofthenChiefJusticeRobertoConcepcion.Withitsnineremainingmembers,doubtswereexpressedas
to whether or not the Court could act on constitutional matters of the nature and magnitude of those raised in
these cases, the required quorum for the resolution of issues of unconstitutionality under the New Constitution
beingtenmembers.(Section2(2),ArticleIX,ConstitutionofthePhilippinesof1973).Prescindingfromthispoint,
it is a fact that even if it is not required expressly by the Constitution, by the Court's own policy which the
Constitution authorizes it to adopt, all cases involving constitutional questions are beard en banc in which the
quorum and at the same time the binding vote is of eight Justices. With only nine members out of a possible
membership of fifteen, it was not exactly fair for all concerned that the court should act, particularly in a case
which in truth does not involve only those who are actual parties therein but the whole people as well as the
GovernmentofthePhilippines.So,theCourt,evenasitwentoninformallydiscussingthesecasesfromtimeto
time,preferredtowaitfortheappointmentandqualificationofnewmembers,whichtookplaceonlyonOctober
29,1973,whenJusticesEstanislaoFernandez,CeciliaMuozPalmaandRamonAquinojoinedtheCourt.
Meantime,subsequenttotheresolutionofFebruary26,1973,declaringthesecasessubmittedfordecision,or,
more particularly on June 29, 1973, counsel for petitioner Carmen I. Diokno in G. R. No. filed a 99page
Supplemental Petition and Motion for Immediate Release which the Court had to refer to the respondents, on
whosebehalf,theSolicitorGeneralfiledanansweronJuly30,19,73.OnAugust14,1973,counselforpetitioner
Dioknofiledamotionaskingthatthesaidpetitionandmotionbesetforhearing,whichtheCourtcouldnotdo,in
view precisely of the question of quorum. As a matter of fact, in the related case of Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. vs.
MilitaryCommissionNo.2etal.,G.R.No.L37364,furtherreferencetowhichwillbemadelater,apreliminary
hearinghadtobeheldbytheCourtonSunday,August24,1973,onthesolequestionofwhetherornotwithits
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membershipofninethen,theCourtcouldactonissuesofconstitutionalityoftheactsofthePresident.
At this point, it may be mentioned incidentally that thru several repeated manifestations and motions, Counsel
Francis E. Garchitorena of Petitioner Diokno invited the attention of the Court not only to alleged denial to his
client of "the essential access of and freedom to confer and communicate with counsel" but also to alleged
deplorable subhuman conditions surrounding his detention. And in relation to said manifestations and motions,
on February 19,1973, said petitioner, Diokno, together with petitioner Benigno S. Aquino and joined by their
common counsel, Senator Lorenzo M. Taada filed with this Court a petition for mandamus praying that
respondents be commanded "to permit petitioner Taada to visit and confer freely and actively with petitioners
DioknoandAquinoatreasonablehourspursuanttotheprovisionsofRA857andRA1083andinpursuanceof
suchdecision,(todirectsaidrespondents)(1)tocleartheconferenceroomofpetitionersofallrepresentativesof
the Armed Forces and all unwanted third persons, and prohibit their presence (2) to remove or cause the
removal of all listening devices and other similar electronic equipment from the conference room of petitioners,
with the further direction that no such instruments be hereafter installed, and (3) to desist from the practice of
examining (a) the notes taken by petitioner Taada of his conferences with petitioners Diokno and Aquino and
(b)suchotherlegaldocumentsaspetitionerTaadamaybringwithhimfordiscussionwithsaidpetitioners."(G.
R.No.L36315).Forobviousreasons,saidpetitionwillberesolvedinaseparatedecision.Itmaybestatedhere,
however,thatinsaidG.R.No.L36315,inattentiontothecomplaintmadebySenatorTaadainhisReplydated
April2,1973,thatMesdamesDioknoandAquinowerenotbeingallowedtovisittheirhusbands,and,worse,their
very whereabouts were not being made known to them, on April 6, 1973, after hearing the explanations of
counselforthereinrespondents,theCourtissuedthefollowingresolution:
Upon humanitarian considerations the Court RESOLVED unanimously to grant, pending further
action by this Court, that portion of the prayer in petitioners' Supplement and/or Amendment to
Petition'filedonApril6,1973thatthewivesandminorchildrenofpetitionersDioknoandAquinobe
allowedtovisitthem,subjecttosuchprecautionsasrespondentsmaydeemnecessary.
Wehavetakenpainstoreciteallthecircumstancessurroundingtheprogressofthesecasesfromtheirinception
inordertocorrecttheimpressionconveyedbythepleadingsofpetitionerDiokno,thattheirdispositionhasbeen
unnecessarily, it not deliberately, delayed. The Court cannot yield to anyone in being concerned that individual
rightsandlibertiesguaranteedbythefundamentallawofthelandaredulyprotectedandsafeguarded.Itisfully
cognizantofhowimportantnotonlytothepetitionersbutalsotothemaintainanceoftheruleoflawistheissueof
legality of the continued constraints on the freedoms of petitioners. Under ordinary circumstances, it does not
reallytaketheCourtmuchtimetodeterminewhetheradeprivationofpersonallibertyislegalorillegal.But,aside
fromtheunusualproceduralsetbacksrelatedabove,itjusthappensthatthebasicissuestoresolveheredonot
affectonlytheindividualrightsofpetitioners.Indeed,theimportanceofthesecasestranscendstheinterestsof
those who, like petitioners, have come to the Court. Actually, what is directly involved here is the issue of the
legalityoftheexistinggovernmentitself.Accordingly,Wehavetoactwithutmostcare.Besides,inasense,the
legalityoftheCourt'sownexistenceisalsoinvolvedhere,andWedonotwantanyonetoevensuspectWehave
hurriedprecipitatelytoupholdOurselves.
Inadditiontotheseconsiderations,itmustbeborneinmindthattherearethousandsofothercasesintheCourt
needing its continued attention. With its clogged docket. the Court, could ill afford to give petitioners any
preferencethat.wouldentailcorrespondinginjusticetootherlitigantsbeforeit.
Whatismore,undertheNewConstitution,theadministrativejurisdictionoveralllowercourts,includingtheCourt
Appeals, has been transferred from the Department of Justice to the Supreme Court, and because that
Department refrained from attending to any administrative function over the courts since January 17, 1973, on
April 18, 1973, after the Ratification Cases became final, We found in Our hands a vast accumulation of
administrativematterswhichhadtobeacteduponwithoutfurtherdelay,ifthesmoothandorderlyfunctioningof
the courts had to be maintained. And, of course. the Court has to continuously attend to its new administrative
work from day to day, what with all kinds of complaints and charges being filed daily against judges, clerks of
courtandotherofficersandemployeesofthedifferentcourtsalloverthecountry,whichtheCourtenbanchasto
tackle. It should not be surprising at all that a great portion of our sessions enbanc has to be devoted to the
considerationanddispositionofsuchadministrativematters.
Furthermore, in this same connection, account must also be taken of the fact that the transfer of the
administrative functions of the Department to the Court naturally entailed problems and difficulties which
consumed Our time, if only because some of the personnel had to acquaint themselves with the new functions
entrustedtothem,whilecorrespondingadjustmentshadtobemadeinthedutiesandfunctionsofthepersonnel
affectedbythetransfer.
PRELIMINARYISSUES
Now, before proceeding to the discussion and resolution of the issues in the pending petitions, two preliminary
matterscallfordisposition,namely,first,themotionofpetitionerJoseW.Diokno,thrucounselSenatorTaada,to
beallowedtowithdrawhisbasicpetitionandsecond,theobjectionofpetitioner,Francisco"Soc"Rodrigo,tothe
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Court's considering his petition as moot and academic as a consequence of his having been released from his
placeofconfinementinFortBonifacio.Relatedtothelatteristheexpressmanifestationoftheotherpetitioners:
JoaquinP.Roces,TeodoroM.Locsin,Sr.,RolandoFadul,RosalindGalang,GoEngGuan,MaximoV.Soliven,
Renato Constantino, Luis R. Mauricio, Napoleon G. Rama, Jose Mari Velez. Ramon V. Mitra, Jr., Juan L.
Mercado, Roberto Ordoez, Manuel Almario and Ernesto Rondon to the effect that they remain as petitioners,
notwithstandingtheirhavingbeenreleased(underthesameconditionsasthoseimposedonpetitionerRodrigo
therebyimplyingthattheyarenotwithdrawing,as,infact,theyhavenotwithdrawaltheirpetitionsandwouldwish
themresolvedontheirmerits.(ManifestationofcounselforpetitionersdatedMarch15,1974.)
I
AnentpetitionerDiokno'smotiontowithdraw,onlysevenmembersoftheCourt,namely,ChiefJusticeMakalintal
andJusticesZaldivar,Fernando,Teehankee,MuozPalma,Aquinoandthewriterofthisopinion,votedtogrant
thesame.SaidnumberbeingshortoftheeightvotesrequiredforbindingactionoftheCourtenbanceveninan
incident, pursuant to Section 11 of Rule 56, the said motion is denied, without prejudice to the right of each
memberoftheCourttorenderhisindividualopinioninregardtosaidmotion.5
OneofthereasonvigorouslyadvancedbypetitionerDioknoinhismotiontowithdrawisthathecannotsubmithis
casetotheSupremeCourtasitispresentlyconstituted,becauseitisdifferentfromtheoneinwhichhefiledhis
petition, and that, furthermore, he is invoking, not the present or New Constitution of the Philippines the
incumbent Justices have now sworn to protect and defend but the Constitution of 19356 under which they were
servingbefore.Indeed,inthe"ManifestationofComplianceandSubmission"filedbyhiscounselasearlyasDecember1,
1973,asimilarfeelingwasalreadyindicated,asmaybegatheredfromtheportionsthereofquotedearlierinthisopinion.
Had petitioner reiterated and insisted on the position asserted by him in said manifestation shortly after the
ratification of the New Constitution on January 17, 1973 or even later, after the decision of this Court in the
RatificationCasesbecamefinalonApril17,1973,perhaps,therecouldhavebeensomekindofjustificationfor
Our then and there declaring his petition moot and academic, considering his personal attitude of refusing to
recognizethepassingoutofthe1935constitutionandoftheSupremeCourtunderit.Butthefactisthataslate
asJune29,1973,morethansixmonthsaftertheratificationoftheNewConstitutionandmorethantwomonths
afterthisCourthaddeclaredthat"thereisnomorejudicialobstacletotheNewConstitutionbeingconsideredas
in force and effect", petitioner Diokno, thru counsel Taada, riled a "Supplemental Petition and Motion for
Immediate Release" wherein nary a word may be found suggesting the point that both the Constitution he is
invokingandtheCourthehassubmittedhispetitiontohavealreadypassedintoinexistence.Onthecontrary,he
insisted in this last motion that "an order be issued (by this Court) directing respondents to immediately file
chargesagainsthimiftheyhaveevidencesupportingthesame."Beitnoted,inthisconnection,thatbyresolution
oftheCourtofJune1,1973,ithadalreadyimplementedtheprovisionsontheJudiciaryoftheNewConstitution
andhadconstituteditselfwithitsninemembersintotheFirstDivision,therebymakingitunmistakablyclearthatit
wasalreadyoperatingastheSupremeCourtundertheNewConstitution.Thefactnowcapitalizedbypetitioner
thattheJusticestooktheoathonlyonOctober29,1973isofnosigner,thetruthbeingthatneithertheJustices'
continuationinofficeaftertheNewConstitutiontookeffectnorthevalidityorproprietyoftheCourt'sresolutionof
June 1, 1973 just mentioned were questioned by him before. Accordingly, the Motion in his motion to withdraw
relativetotheNewConstitutionandthepresentSupremeCourtappeartobeobviousafterthoughtsintendedonly
totendcolortohisrefusaltohavetheissueofallegedillegalityofhisdetentiondulyresolved,realizingperchance
theuntenabilitythereofandtheinevitabilityofthedenialofhispetition,albeitnoneofthiswilleverbeadmitted,as
maybegatheredfromhismanifestationthathewouldnotwanttohaveanythingtodowithanyrulingoftheCourt
adversetohispretensions.Justthesame,thenewoathsoftheJusticesandtheapplicabilityheretooftheOld
and the New Constitution will be discussed in another part of this opinion, if only to satisfy the curiosity of
petitioner.
Although the other petitioners have not joined the subject withdrawal motion, it might just as well be stated, for
whateverrelevantpurposeitmayserve,that,withparticularreferencetopetitionerRodrigo,aslateasNovember
27,1973,afterthreenewjusticeswereaddedtothemembershipoftheCourtinpartialobediencetothemandate
of the New Constitution increasing its total membership to fifteen, and after the Court had, by resolution of
November 15, 1973, already constituted itself into two divisions of six Justices each, said petitioner filed a
Manifestation "for the purpose of showing that, insofar as (he) herein petitioner is concerned, his petition for
habeas corpus is not moot and academic." Notably, this manifestation deals specifically with the matter of his
"conditional release" as being still a ground for habeas corpus but does not even suggest the fundamental
change of circumstances relied upon in petitioner Diokno's motion to withdraw. On the contrary, said
manifestation indicates unconditional submission of said petitioner to the jurisdiction of this Court as presently
constituted. Of similar tenor is the manifestation of counsel for the remaining petitioners in these cases dated
March15,1974.Inotherwords,itappearsquiteclearlythatpetitionersshouldbedeemedashavingsubmittedto
the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as it is presently constituted in order that it may resolve their petitions for
habeascorpuseveninthelightoftheprovisionsoftheNewConstitution.
II
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ComingnowtotheconditionsattachedtothereleaseofthepetitionersotherthanSenatorsDioknoandAquino,it
istobenotedthattheywereallgivenidenticalreleasepapersreadingasfollows:
HEADQUARTERS
5THMILITARYINTELLIGENCEGROUP,ISAFP
CampGeneralEmilioAguinaldo
QuezonCity
M56P5December1972
SUBJECT:ConditionalRelease
TO:FranciscoSocRodrigo
1.AfterhavingbeenarrestedanddetainedforsubversionpursuanttoProclamationNo.1081ofthe
President of the Philippines in his capacity as CommanderinChief of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines,dated21September1972,youareherebyconditionallyreleased.
2. You are advised to abide strictly with the provisions of Proclamation No. 1081 and the ensuing
L0Is.Anyviolationoftheseprovisionswouldsubjectyoutoimmediatearrestandconfinement.
3.Yourinvestigationwillcontinuefollowingaschedulewhichyouwilllateronbeinformed.Youare
advisedtofollowthisschedulestrictly.
4.YouarenotallowedtoleavetheconfinesofGreaterManilaAreaunlessspecificallyauthorizedby
thisOfficeindicatingtheprovincialaddressandexpecteddurationofstaythereat.ContactthisOffice
throughtelephoneNo.971756whennecessary.
5.Youareprohibitedfromgivingorparticipatinginanyinterviewconductedbyanylocalorforeign
massmediarepresentativeforpurposeofpublicationand/orradio/TVbroadcast.
6.Beguidedaccordingly.
(SGD.)MARIANOG.MIRANDA
Lt.ColonelPA
GroupCommander
PLEDGE
THISISTOCERTIFYthatIhavereadandunderstoodtheforegoingconditionalrelease.
IHEREBYPLEDGEtoconductmyselfaccordinglyandwillnotengageinanysubversiveactivity.Iwillimmediately
reportanysubversiveactivitythatwillcometomyknowledge.
(SGD.)F.RODRIGO
Address:60JuanaRodriguez
QuezonCity
TelNo.702566704920
702755
It is the submission of these petitioners that their release under the foregoing conditions is not absolute, hence
theirpresentcasesbeforetheCourthavenotbecomemootandacademicandshouldnotbedismissedwithout
considerationofthemeritsthereof.Theyclaimthatintruththeyhavenotbeenfreed,becauseactually,whathas
been done to them is only to enlarge or expand the area of their confinement in order to include the whole
GreaterManilaareainsteadofbeinglimitedbytheboundariesofthearmycampswhereintheywerepreviously
detained. They say that although they are allowed to go elsewhere, they can do so only if expressly and
specificallypermittedbythearmyauthorities,andthisisnothingnew,sincetheycouldalsogooutofthecamps
before with proper passes. They maintain that they never accepted the above conditions voluntarily. In other
words,itistheirpositionthattheyareinactualfactbeingstillsodetainedandrestrainedoftheirlibertyagainst
theirwillastoentitletheminlawtotheremedyofhabeascorpus.
We find merit in this particular submittal regarding the reach of habeas corpus. We readily agree that the
fundamentallawofthelanddoesnotcountenancethediminutionorrestrictionoftheindividualfreedomsofany
personinthePhilippineswithoutdueprocessoflaw.Nooneinthiscountrymaysuffer,againsthiswill,anykind
ordegreeofconstraintuponhisrighttogotoanyplacenotprohibitedbylaw,withoutbeingentitledtothisgreat
writ of liberty, for it has not been designed only against illegal and involuntary detention in jails, prisons and
concentration camps, but for all forms and degrees of restraint, without authority of law or the consent of the
personconcerned,uponhisfreedomtomovefreely,irrespectiveofwhethertheareawithinwhichheisconfined
issmallorlarge,aslongasitisnotcoextensivewiththatwhichmaybefreelyreachedbyanybodyelse,given
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the desire and the means. More than half a century ago in 1919, this Court already drew the broad and all
encompassingscopeofhabeascorpusintheseunequivocalwords:"Aprimespecificationofanapplicationfora
writofhabeascorpusis restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to
inquireintoallmannersofinvoluntaryrestraintasdistinguishedfromvoluntary,andtorelieveapersontherefrom
ifsuchrestraintisillegal.Anyrestraintwhichwillprecludefreedomofactionissufficient."6*Thereisnoreasonatall
at this time, hopefully there will never be any in the future, to detract a whit from this noble attitude. Definitely, the
conditions under which petitioners have been released fall short of restoring to them the freedom to which they are
constitutionallyentitled.Onlyashowingthattheimpositionofsaidconditionsisauthorizedbylawcanstandinthewayof
anorderthattheybeimmediatelyandcompletelywithdrawnbytheproperauthoritiessothatthepetitionersmayagainbe
freemenasweare.
Andso,Wecometothebasicquestioninthesecases:Arepetitionersbeingdetainedorotherwiserestrainedof
liberty,evidentlyagainsttheirwill,withoutauthorityoflawanddueprocess?
THEFACTS
Asidefromthosealreadymadereferencetoabove,theotherbackgroundfactsofthesecasesareasfollows:
OnSeptember21,1972,PresidentFerdinandE.Marcos7signedthefollowingproclamation:
PROCLAMATIONNO.1081
PROCLAIMINGASTATEOFMARTIALLAW
INTHEPHILIPPINES
WHEREAS,onthebasisofcarefullyevaluatedandverifiedinformation,itisdefinitelyestablishedthat
lawlesselementswhoaremovedbyacommonorsimilarideologicalconviction,design,strategyand
goal and enjoying the active moral and material support of a foreign power and being guided and
directed by intensely devoted, well trained, determined and ruthless groups of men and seeking
refuge under the protection of our constitutional liberties to promote and attain their ends, have
enteredintoaconspiracyandhaveinfactjoinedandbandedtheirresourcesandforcestogetherfor
theprimepurposeof,andinfacttheyhavebeenandareactuallystaging,undertakingandwaging
an armed insurrection and rebellion against the Government of the Republic of the Philippines in
order to forcibly seize political and state power in this country, overthrow the duly constituted
Government,andsupplantourexistingpolitical,social,economicandlegalorderwithanentirelynew
onewhoseformofgovernment,whosesystemoflaws,whoseconceptionofGodandreligion,whose
notionofindividualrightsandfamilyrelations,andwhosepolitical,social,economic,legalandmoral
preceptsarebasedontheMarxistLeninistMaoistteachingsandbeliefs
WHEREAS, these lawless elements, acting in concert through seemingly innocent and harmless,
although actually destructive, front organizations which have been infiltrated or deliberately formed
by them, have continuously and systematically strengthened and broadened their memberships
throughsustainedandcarefulrecruitingandenlistmentofnewadherentsfromamongourpeasantry,
laborers, professionals, intellectuals, students, and mass media personnel, and through such
sustainedandcarefulrecruitmentandenlistmenthavesucceededinspreadingandexpandingtheir
controlandinfluenceoveralmosteverysegmentandlevelofoursocietythroughoutthelandintheir
ceaselessefforttoerodeandweakenthepolitical,social,economic,legalandmoralfoundationsof
our existing Government, and to influence, manipulate and move peasant, labor, student and
terroristic organizations under their influence or control to commit, as in fact they have committed
and still are committing, acts of violence, depredations, sabotage and injuries against our duly
constituted authorities, against the members of our law enforcement agencies, and worst of all,
againstthepeacefulmembersofoursociety
WHEREAS,inthefanaticalpursuitoftheirconspiracyandwidespreadactsofviolence,depredations,
sabotage and injuries against our people, and in order to provide the essential instrument to direct
and carry out their criminal design and unlawful activities, and to achieve their ultimate sinister
objectives, these lawless elements have in fact organized, established and are now maintaining a
Central Committee, composed of young and dedicated radical students and intellectuals, which is
charged with guiding and directing the armed struggle and propaganda assaults against our duly
constitutedGovernment,andthisCentralCommitteeisnowimposingitswillandassertingitssham
authorityoncertainsegmentsofourpopulation,especiallyintheruralareas,throughvariedmeans
of subterfuge, deceit, coercion, threats, intimidation's, machinations, treachery, violence and other
modesofterror,andhasbeenandisillegallyexactingfinancialandotherformsofcontributesfrom
our people to raise funds and material resources to support its insurrectionary and propaganda
activitiesagainstourdulyconstitutedGovernmentandagainstourpeacelovingpeople
WHEREAS,inordertocarryout,asinfacttheyhavecarriedout,theirpremeditatedplantostage,
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undertake and wage a full scale armed insurrection and rebellion in this country, these lawless
elementshaveorganized,establishedandarenowmaintainingawelltrained,wellarmedandhighly
indoctrinated and greatly expanded insurrectionary force, popularly known as the 'New People's
Army' which has since vigorously pursued and still is vigorously pursuing a relentless and ruthless
armed struggle against our duly constituted Government and whose unmitigated forays, raids,
ambuscadesassaultsandreignofterrorandactsoflawlessnessintheruralareasandinoururban
centersbroughtaboutthetreacherousandcoldbloodedassassinationofinnocentcivilians,military
personnel of the Government and local public officials in many parts of the country, notably in the
CagayanValley,inCentralLuzon,intheSouthernTagalogRegion,intheBicolArea,intheVisayas
and in Mindanao and whose daring and wanton guerrilla activities have generated and fear and
panicamongourpeople,havecreatedaclimateofchaosanddisorder,producedastateofpolitical,
social, psychological and economic instability in our land, and have inflicted great suffering and
irreparableinjurytopersonsandpropertyinoursociety
WHEREAS, these lawless elements, their cadres, fellowmen, friends, sympathizers and supporters
have for many years up to the present time been mounting sustained, massive and destructive
propaganda assaults against our duly constituted Government its intrumentalities, agencies and
officials, and also against our social, political, economic and religious institutions, through the
publications, broadcasts and dissemination's of deliberately slanted and overly exaggerated news
stories and news commentaries as well as false , vile, foul and scurrilous statements, utterances,
writingsandpicturesthroughthepressradiotelevisionmediaandthroughleaflets,collegecampus
newspapers and some newspapers published and still being published by these lawless elements,
notably the 'Ang Bayan,' 'Pulang Bandila' and the 'Ang Komunista,' all of which are clearly well
conceived, intended and calculated to malign and discredit our duly constituted Government, its
instrumentalities,agenciesandofficialsbeforeourpeople,andthusundermineanddestroythefaith
and loyalty and allegiance of our people in and alienate their support for their duly constituted
Government,itsinstrumentalities,agenciesandofficials,andtherebygraduallyerodeandweakenas
in fact they had so eroded and weakened the will of our people to sustain and defend our
Governmentandourdemocraticwayoflife
WHEREAS,theselawlesselementshavingtakenuparmsagainstourdulyconstitutedGovernment
and against our people, and having committed and are still committing acts of armed insurrection
andrebellionconsistingofarmedraids,forays,sorties,ambushes,wantonactsofmurders,spoilage,
plunder,looting,arsons,destructionofpublicandprivatebuildings,andattacksagainstinnocentand
defenselesscivilianlivesandproperty,allofwhichactivitieshaveseriouslyendangeredandcontinue
to endanger public order and safety and the security of the nation, and acting with cunning and
manifest precision and deliberation and without regard to the health, safety and wellbeing of the
people,arenowimplementingtheirplantocausewidespread,massiveandsystematicdestruction
and paralyzation of vital public utilities and service particularly water systems, sources of electrical
power, communication and transportation facilities, to the great detriment, suffering, injury and
prejudiceofourpeopleandthenationandtogenerateadeeppsychologicalfearandpanicamong
ourpeople
WHEREAS,theSupremeCourtinthecasesbroughtbeforeit,docketedasG.R.Nos.L33964,L
33965,L33973,L33982,L34004,L34013,L34039,L34265,andL34339,asaconsequenceof
thesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpusbymeasPresidentofthePhilippinesin
my Proclamation No. 889, dated August 21, 1971, as amended, has found that in truth and in fact
thereexistsanactualinsurrectionandrebellioninthecountrybyasizeablegroupofmenwhohave
publicly risen in arms to overthrow the Government. Here is what the Supreme Court said in its
decisionpromulgatedonDecember11,1971:
... our jurisprudence attests abundantly to the Communist activities in the Philippines, especially in Manila, from
thelatetwentiestotheearlythirties,thenaimedprincipallyatincitementtoseditionorrebellion,astheimmediate
objective. Upon the establishment of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, the movement seemed to have
warnednotablybut,theoutbreakofWorldWarIIinthePacificandthemiseries,thedevastationandhavoc,and
the proliferation of unlicensed firearms concomitant with the military occupation of the Philippines and its
subsequentliberation,broughtabout,inthelateforties,aresurgenceoftheCommunistthreat,withsuchvigoras
tobeabletoorganizeandoperateinCentralLuzonanarmycalledHUKBALAHAP,duringtheoccupation,and
renamedHukbongMapagpalayangBayan(HMB)afterliberationwhichclashedseveraltimeswiththeArmed
ForcesoftheRepublic.ThispromptedthenPresidentQuirinotoissueProclamationNo.210,datedOctober22,
1950, suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus the validity of which was upheld in Montenegro v.
Castaeda. Days before the promulgation of said Proclamation, or on October 18, 1950, members of the
CommunistPolitburointhePhilippineswereapprehendedinManila.Subsequentlyaccusedandconvictedofthe
crimeofrebellion,theyservedtheirrespectivesentences.
The fifties saw a comparative lull in Communist activities, insofar as peace and order were
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concerned.Still,onJune20,1957,RepublicActNo.1700,otherwiseknownastheAntiSubversion
Act,wasapproved,uponthegroundsstatedintheverypreambleofsaidstatutethat
... the Communist Party of the Philippines, although purportedly a political party, is in fact an
organized conspiracy to overthrow the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, not only by
force and violence but also by deceit, subversion and other illegal means, for the purpose of
establishinginthePhilippinesatotalitarianregimesubjecttoaliendominationandcontrol,
...thecontinuedexistenceandactivitiesoftheCommunistPartyofthePhilippinesconstitutesaclear,
presentandgravedangertothesecurityofthePhilippinesand
... in the face of the organized, systematic and persistent subversion, national in scope but
internationalindirection,posedbytheCommunistPartyofthePhilippinesanditsactivities,thereis
urgentneedforspeciallegislationtocopewiththiscontinuingmenacetothefreedomandsecurityof
thecountry....
InthelanguageoftheReportonCentralLuzon,submitted,onSeptember4,1971,bytheSenateAd
HocCommitteeofSevencopyofwhichReportwasfiledinthesecasesbythepetitionersherein
The years following 1963 saw the successive emergence in the country of several mass
organizations,notablytheLapiangManggagawa(nowtheSocialistPartyofthePhilippines)among
the workers, the Malayang Samahan ng mga Magsasaka (MASAKA) among the peasantry the
KabataangMakabayan(KM)amongtheyouth/studentsandtheMovementfortheAdvancementof
Nationalism (MAN) among the intellectuals/professionals, the PKP has exerted allout effort to
infiltrate,influenceandutilizetheseorganizationsinpromotingitsradicalbrandofnationalism.
Meanwhile,theCommunistleadersinthePhilippineshadbeensplitintotwo(2)groups,oneofwhich
composedmainlyofyoungradicals,constitutingtheMaoistfactionreorganizedtheCommunist
PartyofthePhilippinesearlyin1969andestablishedaNewPeople'sArmy.Thisfactionadheresto
the Maoist concept of the 'Protracted People's War' or 'War of National Liberation.' Its 'Programme
foraPeople'sDemocraticRevolutionstates,interalia:
The Communist Party of the Philippines is determined to implement its general programme for a
people'sdemocraticrevolution.AllFilipinocommunistsarereadytosacrificetheirlivesfortheworthy
cause of achieving the new type of democracy, of building a new Philippines that is genuinely and
completelyindependent,democratic,united,justandprosperous...
Thecentraltaskofanyrevolutionarymovementistoseizepoliticalpower.TheCommunistPartyof
the Philippines assumes this task at a time that both the international and national situations are
favorable,totakingtheroadofarmed
revolution...
Intheyear1969,theNPAhadaccordingtotherecordsoftheDepartmentofNationalDefense
conducted raids, resorted to kidnappings and taken part in other violent incidents numbering over
230,inwhichitinflicted404casualties,and,inturn,suffered243losses.In1970,itsrecordofviolent
incidentswasaboutthesame,buttheNPAcasualtiesmorethandoubled.
Atanyrate,two(2)factsareundeniable:(a)allCommunists,whethertheybelongtothetraditional
grouportotheMaoistfaction,believethatforceandviolenceareindispensabletotheattainmentof
theirmainandultimateobjective,andactinaccordancewithsuchbelief,althoughtheydisagreeon
themeanstobeusedatagiventimeandinaparticularplaceand(b)thereisaNewPeople'sArmy,
other,ofcourse,thantheArmedForcesoftheRepublicandantagonisticthereto.SuchNewPeople's
Army is per se proof of the existence of the rebellion, especially considering that its establishment
was announced publicly by the reorganized CPP. Such announcement is in the nature of a public
challengetothedulyconstitutionAuthoritiesandmaybelikenedtoadeclarationofwar,sufficientto
establish a war status or a condition of belligerency even before the actual commencement of
hostilities.
Weentertaintherefore,nodoubtsabouttheexistenceofasizeablegroupofmenwhohavepublicly
risen in arms to overthrow the Government and have thus been and still are engage in rebellion
againsttheGovernmentofthePhilippines.
WHEREAS, these lawless elements have to a considerable extent succeeded in impeding our duly
constituted authorities from performing their functions and discharging their duties and
responsibilitiesinaccordancewithourlawsandourConstitutiontothegreatdamage,prejudiceand
detrimentofthepeopleandthenation
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WHEREAS,itisevidentthatthereisthroughoutthelandastateofanarchyandlawlessness,chaos
anddisorder,turmoilanddestructionofamagnitudeequivalenttoanactualwarbetweentheforces
of our duly constituted Government and the New People's Army and their satellite organizations
becauseoftheunmitigatedforays,raids,ambuscades,assaults,violence,murders,assassinations,
acts of terror, deceits, coercions, threats, intimidation's, treachery, machinations, arsons, plunders
and depredations committed and being committed by the aforesaid lawless elements who have
pledgedtothewholenationthattheywillnotstoptheirdastardlyeffortandschemeuntilandunless
theyhavefullyattainedtheirprimaryandultimatepurposeofforciblyseizingpoliticalandstatepower
in this country by overthrowing our present duly constituted Government, by destroying our
democratic way of life and our established secular and religious institutions and beliefs, and by
supplanting our existing political, social, economic, legal and moral order with an entirely new one
whose form of government, whose motion of individual rights and family relations, and whose
political, social, economic and moral precepts are based on the MarxistLeninistMaoist teachings
andbeliefs
WHEREAS, the Supreme Court in its said decision concluded that the unlawful activities of the
aforesaidlawlesselementsactuallyposeaclear,presentandgravedangertopublicsafetyandthe
securityofthenationandinsupportofthatconclusionfoundthat:
... the Executive had information and reports subsequently confirmed, in many by the above
mentionedReportoftheSenateAdHocCommitteeofSeventotheeffectthattheCommunistParty
ofthePhilippinesdoesnotmerelyadheretoLenin'sideaofaswiftarmeduprisingthatithas,also,
adopted Ho Chi Minh's terrorist tactics and resorted to the assassination of uncooperative local
officials that, in line with this policy, the insurgents have killed 5 mayors, 20 barrio captains and 3
chiefs of police that there were fourteen (14) meaningful bombing incidents in the Greater Manila
Areain1970thattheConstitutionalConventionHallwasbombedonJune12,1971that,soonafter
the Plaza Miranda incident, the NAWASA main pipe at the Quezon CitySan Juan boundary was
bombed that this was followed closely by the bombing of the Manila City Hall, the COMELEC
Building,theCongressBuildingandtheMERALCOsubstationatCubao,QuezonCityandthatthe
respectiveresidencesofSenatorJoseJ.RoyandCongressmanEduardoCojuangcowere,likewise,
bombed, as were the MERALCO main office premises, along Ortigas Avenue, and the Doctor's
Pharmaceuticals,Inc.Building,inCaloocanCity.
... the reorganized Communist Party of the Philippines has, moreover, adopted Mao's concept of
protracted people's war, aimed at the paralyzation of the will to resist of the Government, of the
political, economic and intellectual leadership, and of the people themselves that conformably to
suchconcept,thePartyhasplacedspecialemphasisuponamostextensiveandintensiveprogram
ofsubversionbetheestablishmentoffrontorganizationsinurbancenters,theorganizationofarmed
citypartisansandtheinfiltrationinstudentgroups,laborunions,andfarmerandprofessionalgroups
that the CPP has managed to infiltrate or establish and control nine (9) major labor organizations
organizations actively advancing the CPP interests, among which are the Malayang Samahan ng
Magsasaka(MASAKA), the Kabataang Makabayan (KM), the Movement for the Advancement of
Nationalism (MAN), the Samahang Demokratiko ng Kabataan (SDK), the Samahang Molave (SM)
andtheMalayangPagkakaisangKabataangPilipino(MPKP)that,asofAugust,1971,theKMhad
twohundredfortyfive(245)operationalchaptersthroughoutthePhilippinesofwhichseventythree
(73)wereintheGreaterManilaArea,sixty(60)inNorthernLuzon,fortynine(49)inCentralLuzon,
recordedtwohundredfiftyeight(258)majordemonstrations,ofwhichaboutthirtythree(33)ended
in violence, resulting in fifteen (15) killed and over five hundred (500) injured that most of these
actionswereorganized,coordinatedorledbytheaforementionedfrontorganizationsthattheviolent
thenumberofdemonstrationsheretoforestagedin1971hasalreadyexceededthoseof1970and
personsandtheinjuryofmanymore.
Subsequent events ... have also proven ... the threat to public safety posed by the New People's
Army.Indeed,itappearsthat,sinceAugust21,1971,ithadinNorthernLuzonsix(6)encountersand
stagedone(1)raid,inconsequencesofwhichsevensoldierslosttheirlivesandtwo(2)otherswere
wounded,whereastheinsurgentssufferedfive(5)casualtiesthatonAugust26,1971,awellarmed
groupofNPA,trainedbydefectorLt.VictorCorpus,attackedtheverycommandpostofTFLAWINin
Isabela,destroyingtwo(2)helicoptersandone(1)plane,andwoundingone(1)soldierthattheNPA
hadinCentralLuzonatotaloffour(4)encounters,withtwo(2)killedandthree(3)woundedonthe
sideoftheGovernment,one(1)BSDUkilledandthree(3)KMSDKleader,anunidentifieddissident,
andCommanderPanchito,leaderofthedissidentgroupwerekilledthatonAugust26,1971,there
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was an encounter in the barrio of San Pedro, Iriga City, Camarines Sur, between the PC and the
NPA,inwhichaPCandtwo(2)KMmemberswerekilledthatthecurrentdisturbancesinCotabato
andtheLanaoprovinceshavebeenrenderedmorecomplexbytheinvolvementoftheCPP/NPA,for,
in mid1971, a KM group, headed by Jovencio Esparagoza, contacted the Higaonan tribes, in their
settlement in Magsaysay, Misamis Oriental, and offered them books, pamphlets and brochures of
Mao Tse Tung, as well as conducted teachins in the reservation that Esparagoza was reportedly
killedonSeptember22,1971,inanoperationofthePCinsaidreservationandthattherearenow
two(2)NPAcadresinMindanao.
It should, also be noted that adherents of the CPP and its front organizations are, according to
intelligence findings, definitely capable of preparing powerful explosives out of locally available
materials that the bomb used in the Constitutional Convention Hall was a 'Claymore' mine, a
powerfulexplosivedeviceusedbytheU.S.Army,believedtohavebeenoneofmanypilferedfrom
theSubicNavalBaseafewdaysbeforethatthePresidenthadreceivedintelligenceinformationto
the effect that there was a JulyAugust Plan involving a wave of assassinations, kidnappings,
terrorism and mass destruction of property and that an extraordinary occurrence would signal the
beginningofsaideventthattheratherseriousconditionofpeaceandorderinMindanao,particularly
inCotabatoandLanao,demandedthepresencethereinofforcessufficienttocopewiththesituation
that a sizeable part of our armed forces discharges other functions, and that the expansion of the
CPP activities from Central Luzon to other parts of the country, particularly Manila and its suburbs,
theCagayanValley,Ifugao,Zambales,Laguna,QuezonandtheBicolRegion,requiredthattherest
ofourarmedforcesbespreadthinoverawidearea.
WHEREAS,intheunwaveringprosecutionoftheirrevolutionarywaragainsttheFilipinopeopleand
theirdulyconstitutedGovernment,theaforesaidlawlesselementshave,inthemonthsofMay,June
and July, 1972, succeeded in bringing and introducing into the country at Digoyo Point, Palanan,
IsabelaandatotherundeterminedpointsalongthePacificcoastlineofLuzon,asubstantialquantity
of war material consisting of M14 rifles estimated to be some 3,500 pieces, several dozens of 40
mm rocket launchers which are said to be Chicom copies of a Russian prototype rocket launcher,
largequantitiesof80mmrocketsandammunitions,andothercombatparaphernalia,ofwhichwar
material some had been discovered and captured by government military forces, and the bringing
and introduction of such quantity and type of war material into the country is a mute but eloquent
proofofthesinisterplanoftheaforesaidlawyerselementstohastentheescalationoftheirpresent
revolutionarywaragainsttheFilipinopeopleandtheirlegitimateGovernment
WHEREAS,intheexecutionoftheiroverallrevolutionaryplan,theaforesaidlawlesselementshave
preparedandreleasedtotheirvariousfieldcommandersandPartyworkersadocumentcaptioned
'REGIONALPROGRAMOFACTION1972,'acopyofwhichwascapturedbyelementsofthe116th
and 119th Philippine Constabulary Companies on June 18, 1972 at Barrio Taringsing, Cordon,
Isabela,thetextofwhichreadsasfollows:
REGIONALPROGRAMOFACTION1972
The following Regional Program of Action 1972 is prepared to be carried out as part of the overall plan of the
party to foment discontent and precipitate the tide of nationwide mass revolution. The fascist Marcos and his
reactionaryofCongressisexpectedtopreparethemselvesforthe1973hence:
JanuaryJune:
1.Intensifyrecruitmentofnewpartymembersespeciallyfromtheworkersfarmersclass.Cadresare
beingtrainedinordertoorganizethedifferentregionalbureaus.Thesebureausmustconcentrateon
massactionandorganizationtoadvancementofthemassrevolutionarymovement.Referenceisto
the 'Borador ng Programa sa Pagkilos at Ulat ng Panlipunang Pagsisiyasat' as approved by the
CentralCommittee.
2. Recruit and train armed city partisans and urban guerrillas and organize them into units under
Partycadresandactivitiesofmassorganizations.Theseunitsmustundergospecializedtrainingon
explosivesanddemolitionandotherandotherformsofsabotage.
3. Intensify recruitment and training of new members for the New People's Army in preparation for
limitedoffensiveinselectedareasintheregions.
4. Support a more aggressive program of agitation and proraganda against the reactionary armed
forcesandagainsttheConCon.
JulyAugust:
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During this period the Party expects the puppet Marcos government to allow increase in bus rates
thusaggravatingfurthertheplightofstudents,workersandthefarmers.
1.AllRegionalPartyCommitteesmustplanforageneralstrikemovement.TheRegionalOperational
Commands must plan for armed support if the fascist forces of Marcos will try to intimidate the
oppressedFilipinomasses.
2.Conductsabotageagainstschools,collegesanduniversitieshikingtuitionfees.
3.Conductsabotageandagitationagainstpuppetjudgesandcourtshearingcasesagainsttopparty
leaders.
4.CreateregionalchaosanddisordertodramatizetheinabilityofthefascistMarcosGovernmentto
keepandmaintainpeaceandorderthru:
a) Robbery and holdup of banks controlled by American imperialists and those
belongingtotheenemiesofthepeople.
b)Attackmilitarycamps,USbasesandtowns.
c)Moreviolentstrikesanddemonstrations.
SeptemberOctober:
Increaseintensityofviolence,disorderandconfusion:
1.Intensifysabotageandbombingofgovernmentbuildingsandembassiesandotherutilities:
a)Congress.
b)SupremeCourt.
c)ConCon.
d)CityHall.
e)USEmbassy.
f)FacilitiesofUSBases.
g)ProvincialCapitols.
h)PowerPlants.
i)PLDT.
j)RadioStations.
2.Sporadicattacksoncamps,townsandcities.
3. Assassinate high Government officials of Congress, Judiciary, ConCon and private individuals
sympathetictopuppetMarcos.
4.Establishprovisionalrevolutionarygovernmentintownsandcitieswiththesupportofthemasses.
5. With the sympathetic support of our allies, establish provisional provincial revolutionary
governments.
CENTRALCOMMITTEE
COMMUNISTPARTYOFTHE
PHILIPPINES
WHEREAS, in line with their 'REGIONAL PROGRAM OF ACTION 1972,' the aforesaid lawless
elementshaveoflatebeenconductingintensifiedactsofviolenceandterrorism'sduringthecurrent
yearintheGreaterManilaAreasuchasthebombingoftheArcabuildingatTaftAvenue,PasayCity,
onMarch15oftheFilipinasOrientAirwaysboardroomatDomesticRoad,PasayCityonApril23of
theVietnameseEmbassyonMay30oftheCourtofIndustrialRelationsonJune23ofthePhilippine
TrustCompanybranchofficeinCubao,QuezonCityonJune24ofthePhilamlifebuildingatUnited
Nations Avenue, Manila, on July 3 of the Tabacalera Cigar & Cigarette Factory Compound at
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MarquezdeComillas,ManilaonJuly27ofthePLDTexchangeofficeatEastAvenue,QuezonCity,
andofthePhilippineSugarInstitutebuildingatNorthAvenue,Diliman,QuezonCity,bothonAugust
15oftheDepartmentofSocialWelfarebuildingatSanRafaelStreet,Sampaloc,Manila,onAugust
17 of a water main on Aurora Boulevard and Madison Avenue, Quezon City on August 19 of the
Philamlife building again on August 30 this time causing severe destruction on the Far East Bank
and Trust Company building nearby of the armored car and building of the Philippine Banking
Corporation as well as the buildings of the Investment Development, Inc. and the Daily Star
PublicationswhenanotherexplosiontookplaceonRailroadStreet,PortArea,ManilaalsoonAugust
30ofJoe'sDepartmentStoreonCariedoStreet,Quiapo,Manila,onSeptember5,causingdeathto
onewomanandinjuriestosome38individualsandoftheCityHallofManilaonSeptember8ofthe
water mains in San Juan, Rizal on September 12 of the San Miguel Building in Makati, Rizal on
September 14 and of the Quezon City Hall on September 18, 1972, as well as the attempted
bombingoftheCongressBuildingonJuly18,whenanunexplodedbombwasfoundintheSenate
PublicationDivisionandtheattemptedbombingoftheDepartmentofForeignAffairsonAugust30
WHEREAS, in line with the same 'REGIONAL PROGRAM OF ACTION 1972,' the aforesaid lawless
elements have also fielded in the Greater Manila area several of their 'Sparrow Units' or 'Simbad
Units'toundertakeliquidationmissionsagainstrankinggovernmentofficials,militarypersonneland
prominent citizens and to further heighten the destruction's and depredations already inflicted by
themuponourinnocentpeople,allofwhicharebeingdeliberatelydonetosowterror,fearandchaos
amongst our population and to make the Government look so helpless and incapable of protecting
thelivesandpropertyofourpeople
WHEREAS, in addition to the abovedescribed social disorder, there is also the equally serious
disorderinMindanaoandSuluresultingfromtheunsettledconflictbetweencertainelementsofthe
Christian and Muslim population of Mindanao and Sulu, between the Christian 'Ilagas' and the
Muslim 'Barracudas,' and between our Government troops, and certain lawless organizations such
astheMindanaoIndependenceMovement
WHEREAS,theMindanaoIndependenceMovementwiththeactivematerialandfinancialassistance
of foreign political and economic interests, is engaged in an open and unconcealed attempt to
establish by violence and force a separate and independent political state out of the islands of
MindanaoandSuluwhicharehistorically,politicallyandbylawpartsoftheterritoriesandwithinthe
jurisdictionandsovereigntyoftheRepublicofthePhilippines
WHEREAS, because of the aforesaid disorder resulting from armed clashes, killings, massacres,
arsons, rapes, pillages, destruction of whole villages and towns and the inevitable cessation of
agriculturalandindustrialoperations,allofwhichhavebeenbroughtaboutbytheviolenceinflicted
by the Christians, the Muslims, the 'Ilagas,' the 'Barracudas,' and the Mindanao Independence
Movementagainsteachotherandagainstourgovernmenttroops,agreatmanypartsoftheislands
ofMindanaoandSuluarevirtuallynowinastateofactualwar
WHEREAS,theviolentdisorderinMindanaoandSuluhastodateresultedinthekillingofover1,000
civiliansandabout2,000armedMuslimsandChristians,nottomentionthemorethanfivehundred
thousand of injured displaced and homeless persons as well as the great number of casualties
amongourgovernmenttroops,andtheparalyzationoftheeconomyofMindanaoandSulu
WHEREAS,becauseoftheforegoingactsofarmedinsurrection,wantondestructionofhumanand
livesandproperty,unabatedandunrestrainedpropagandaattacksagainsttheGovernmentandits
institutions,instrumentalities,agenciesandofficials,andtherapidlyexpandingranksoftheaforesaid
lawlesselements,andbecauseofthespreadinglawlessnessandanarchythroughoutthelandallof
which prevented the Government to exercise its authority, extend its citizenry the protection of its
laws and in general exercise its sovereignty overall of its territories, caused serious demoralization
among our people and have made the apprehensive and fearful, and finally because public order
andsafetyandthesecurityofthisnationdemandthatimmediate,swift,decisiveandeffectiveaction
betakentoprotectandinsurethepeace,orderandsecurityofthecountryanditspopulationandto
maintaintheauthorityoftheGovernment
WHEREAS,incasesofinvasion,insurrectionorrebellionorimminentdangerthereof,I,asPresident
of the Philippines, have under the Constitution, three course of action open to me, namely: (a) call
outthearmedforcestosuppressthepresentlawlessviolence(b)suspendtheprivilegeofthewritof
habeas corpus to make the arrest and apprehension of these lawless elements easier and more
effectiveor(c)placethePhilippinesoranypartthereofundermartiallaw
WHEREAS, I have already utilized the first two courses of action, first, by calling upon the armed
forcestosuppresstheaforesaidlawlessviolence,committingtothatspecificjobalmost50%ofthe
entire armed forces of the country and creating several task forces for that purpose such as Task
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Force Saranay, Task Force Palanan, Task Force Isarog, Task Force Pagkakaisa and Task Force
Lancafand,second,bysuspendingtheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpusonAugust21,1971up
to January 11, 1972, but in spite of all that, both courses of action were found inadequate and
ineffectivetocontain,muchlesssolve,thepresentrebellionandlawlessnessinthecountryasshown
bythefactthat:
1.Theradicallefthasincreasedthenumberandareaofoperationofitsfrontorganizationsandhas
intensifiedtherecruitmentandtrainingofnewadherentsintheurbanandruralareasespeciallyfrom
amongtheyouth
2.TheKabataangMakabayan(KM),themostmilitantandoutspokenfrontorganizationoftheradical
left,hasincreasedthenumberofitschaptersfrom200asoftheendof1970to317asofJuly31,
1972anditsmembershipfrom10,000asoftheendof1970to15,000asoftheendofJuly,1972,
showingveryclearlytherapidgrowthofthecommunistmovementinthiscountry
3. The Samahang Demokratiko ng Kabataan (SDK), another militant and outspoken front
organization of the radical left, has also increased the number of its chapters from an insignificant
numberattheendof1970to159asoftheendofJuly,1972andhasnowamembershipofsome
1,495highlyindoctrinated,intenselycommittedandalmostfanaticallydevotedindividuals
4. The New People's Army, the most active and the most violent and ruthless military arm of the
radicalleft,hasincreaseditstotalstrengthfromanestimated6,500composedof560regulars,1,500
combat support and 4,400 service support) as of January 1, 1972 to about 7,900 (composed of
1,028 regulars, 1,800 combat support and 5,025 service support) as of July 31, 1972, showing a
markedincreaseinitsregulartroopsofover100%insuchashortperiodofsixmonths
5. The establishment of sanctuaries for the insurgents in Isabela, in Zambales, in Camarines Sur,
and in some parts of Mindanao, a development heretofore unknown in our campaign against
subversionandinsurgencyinthiscountry
6. The disappearance and dropping out of school of some 3,000 high school and college students
andwhoarereportedtohavejoinedwiththeinsurgentsfortraininginthehandlingoffirearmsand
explosives
7. The bringing and introduction into the country of substantial war material consisting of military
hardware and supplies through the MV Karagatan at Digoyo Point, Palanan, Isabela, and the fact
that many of these military hardware and supplies are now in the hands of the insurgents and are
beingusedagainstourGovernmenttroops
8.Theinfiltrationandcontrolofthemediabypersonswhoaresympathetictotheinsurgentsandthe
consequent intensification of their propaganda assault against the Government and the military
establishmentoftheGovernment
9.Theformationatthegrassrootlevelof'politicalpowerorgans,'heretoforeunknowninthehistory
oftheCommunistmovementinthiscountry,composedofBarrioOrganizingCommittees(BOCs)to
mobilize the barrio people for active involvement in the revolution the Barrio Revolutionary
Committees (BRCs) to act as 'local governments in barrios considered as CPP/NPA bailiwicks the
WorkersOrganizingCommittees(WOCs)toorganizeworkersfromallsectorstheSchoolOrganizing
Committees(SOCs)toconductagitationandpropagandaactivitiesandhelpintheexpansionoffront
groups among the studentry and the Community Organizing Committees (COCs) which operate in
theurbanareasinthesamemannerasthe(BOCs)
WHEREAS,therebellionandarmedactionundertakenbytheselawlesselementsofthecommunist
and other armed aggrupations organized to overthrow the Republic of the Philippines by armed
violenceandforcehaveassumedthemagnitudeofanactualstateofwaragainstourpeopleandthe
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the
powersvesteduponmebyArticleVII,Section10,Paragraph(2)oftheConstitution,doherebyplace
theentirePhilippinesasdefinedinArticleI,Section1oftheConstitutionundermartiallawand,inmy
capacityastheirCommanderinChief,doherebycommandtheArmedForcesofthePhilippines,to
maintainlawandorderthroughoutthePhilippines,preventorsuppressallformsoflawlessviolence
aswellasanyactofinsurrectionorrebellionandtoenforceobediencetoallthelawsanddecrees,
ordersandregulationspromulgatedbymepersonallyoruponmydirection.
In addition, I do hereby order that all persons presently detained, as well as all others who may
hereafter be similarly detained for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion, and all other crimes and
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offenses committed in furtherance or on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection

therewith, for crimes against national security and the law of nations, crimes against public order,
crimesinvolvingusurpationofauthority,rank,titleandimproperuseofnames,uniformsandinsignia,
crimescommittedbypublicofficers,andforsuchothercrimesaswillbeenumeratedinordersthatI
shallsubsequentlypromulgate,aswellascrimesasaconsequenceofanyviolationofanydecree,
order or regulation promulgated by me personally or promulgated upon my direction shall be kept
underdetentionuntilotherwiseorderedreleasedbymeorbymydulydesignatedrepresentative.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the Republic of the
Philippinestobeaffixed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 21st day of September, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred
andseventytwo,
(SGD.)FERDINANDE.MARCOS
President
On September 22, 1972 at 9 o'clock in the evening, clearance for the implementation of the proclamation was
granted,andforwith,thefollowinggeneralorder,amongothers,wasissued:
GENERALORDERNO.2
(ORDERINGTHESECRETARYOFNATIONALDEFENSETOARRESTTHEPERSONSNAMEDIN
THE ATTACHED LIST, AS WELL AS OTHER PERSONS WHO MAY HAVE COMMITTED CRIMES
ANDOFFENSESENUMERATEDINTHEORDER).
Pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081, dated September 21, 1972, in my capacity as Commanderin
Chief of all the Armed Forces of the Philippines and for being active participants in the conspiracy
and state power in the country and to take over the Government by force, the extent of which has
now assumed the proportion of an actual war against our people and their legitimate Government
andinordertopreventthemfromfurthercommittingactsthatareinimicalorinjurioustoourpeople,
theGovernmentandournationalinterest,IherebyorderyouasSecretaryofNationalDefensetofor
witharrestorcausethearrestandtakeintoyourcustodytheindividualsnamedintheattachedlist
andtoholdthemuntilotherwisesoorderedbymeorbymydulydesignatedrepresentative.
Likewise, I do hereby order you to arrest and take into custody and to hold them until otherwise
ordered released by me or by my duly authorized representative, such persons as may have
committed crimes and offenses in furtherance or on the occasion of or incident to or in connection
with the crimes of insurrection or rebellion, as well as persons who have committed crimes against
national security and the law of nations, crimes against the fundamental laws of the state, crimes
against public order, crimes involving usurpation of authority, title, improper use of name, uniform
andinsignia,includingpersonsguiltyofcrimesaspublicofficers,aswellasthosepersonswhomay
haveviolatedanydecreeororderpromulgatedbymepersonallyorpromulgateduponmydirection.
DoneintheCityofManila,this22nddayofSeptember,intheyearofOurLord,nineteenhundred
andseventytwo.
(SGD.)FERDINANDE.MARCOSPRESIDENT
REPUBLICOFTHEPHILIPPINES
Inthelistreferredtointhisorderwerethenames,amongothers,ofallthepetitionersherein.Thus,fromshortly
aftermidnightofSeptember22,1972untiltheywereallapprehended,petitionersweretakenonebyone,either
fromtheirhomesorplacesofwork,byofficersandmenoftheArmedForcesofthePhilippines,withouttheusual
warrant of arrest, and only upon orders of the respondent Secretary of National Defense directed to his co
respondent, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces. They have been since then confined either at Camp
Bonifacio,CampCrameorsomeothermilitarycamp,until,asearlieradvertedto,theywerereleasedsubjectto
certainconditions,withtheexceptionofpetitionersDioknoandAquino,whoarestillincustodyuptothepresent.
Theparticularcaseof
petitioner,Aquino.
As regards petitioner Aquino, it appears from his allegations in his petition and supplemental petition for
prohibitioninG.R.No.L37364,alreadyreferredtoearlier,(1)thatonAugust11,1973,sixcriminalcharges,for
illegalpossessionoffirearms,etc.,murderandviolationofRA1700ortheAntiSubversionAct,werefiledagainst
him with Military Commission No. 2, created under General Orders Nos. 8, 12 and 39, (2) that on August 28,
1973,thePresidentcreated,thruAdministrativeOrderNo.355,aspecialcommitteetoundertakethepreliminary
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investigation or reinvestigation of said charges, and (3) that he questions the legality of his prosecution in a
militarycommissioninsteadofinaregularciviliancourtaswellasthecreationofthespecialcommittee,notonly
because of alleged invalidity of Proclamation 1081 and General Order No. 2 and the orders authorizing the
creationofmilitarycommissionsbutalsobecauseAdministrativeOrderNo.355constitutesallegedlyadenialof
theequalprotectionofthelawstohimandtotheothersaffectedthereby.
From the procedural standpoint, these developments did not warrant the filing of a separate petition. A
supplemental petition in G.R. No. L35546, wherein he is one of the petitioners, would have sufficed. But
inasmuch as petitioner Aquino has chosen to file an independent special civil action for prohibition in said G.R.
No.L37364withoutwithdrawinghispetitionforhabeascorpusinG.R.No.L35546,Wewishtomakeitclearthat
inthisdecision,theCourtisgoingtoresolve,forpurposesofthehabeascorpuspetitionofsaidpetitioner,only
the issues he has raised that are common with those of the rest of the petitioners in all these cases, thereby
leavingforresolutioninG.R.No.L37364alltheissuesthatarepeculiaronlytohim.Inotherwords,insofaras
petitioner Aquino is concerned, the Court will resolve in this decision the question of legality of his detention by
virtueofProclamation1081andGeneralOrderNo.2,suchthatinG.R.No.L37364,whatwillberesolvedwillbe
onlytheconstitutionalissuesrelatedtothefilingofchargesagainsthimwithMilitaryCommissionNo.2,premised
alreadyonwhateverwillbetheCourt'sresolutionintheinstantcasesregardingProclamation1081andGeneral
Order
No.2.
Withrespecttotheotherpetitioners,noneofthemstandschargedwithanyoffensebeforeanycourtormilitary
commission.Infact,theyallcontendthattheyhavenotcommittedanyactforwhichtheycanbeheldcriminally
liable.
Goingbacktothefacts,itmaybementioned,atthisjuncture,thatonthedayProclamation1081wassigned,the
CongressofthePhilippineswasactuallyholdingaspecialsessionscheduledtoendonSeptember22,1972.It
hadbeeninuninterruptedsessionsinceitsregularopeninginJanuary,1972.Itsregularsessionwasadjourned
onMay18,1972,followedbythreespecialsessionofthirtydayseach,8fromMay19toJune22,June23toJuly27
andJuly28toAugust31,andonespecialsessionoftwentydays,fromSeptember1toSeptember22.Asamatteroffact,
petitioner Aquino was in a conference of a joint committee of the Senate and the House of Representatives when he was
arrestedinoneoftheroomsoftheHiltonHotelinManila.
It must also be stated at this point that on November 30, 1972, the Constitutional Convention of 1971, which
convenedonJune1,1971andhadbeenincontinuoussessionsincethen,approvedaNewConstitutionthaton
January17,1973,Proclamation1102wasissuedproclaimingtheratificationthereofandthatintheRatification
Cases aforementioned, the Supreme Court rendered on March 31, 1973, a judgment holding that "there is no
further judicial obstacle to the New Constitution being considered in force and effect." Among the pertinent
provisionsoftheNewConstitutionisSection3(2)ofArticleXVIIwhichreadsthus:
(2) All proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and acts promulgated, issued, or done by the
incumbent President shall be part of the law of the land, and shall remain valid legal, binding, and
effective even after lifting of martial law or the ratification of this Constitution, unless modified,
revoked,orsupersededbysubsequentproclamations,orders,decrees,instructions,orotheractsof
the incumbent President, or unless expressly and explicitly modified or repeated by the regular
NationalAssembly.
Beforeclosingthisnarrationoffacts,itisrelevanttostatethatrelativetopetitionerDiokno'smotiontowithdraw,
respondentfiledunderdateofMay13,1974thefollowingManifestation:
COME NOW respondents, by the undersigned counsel, and to this Honorable Court respectfully submit this
manifestation:
1.InaMotiondatedDecember29,1973petitioner,throughcounsel,prayedforthewithdrawalofthe
aboveentitled case, more particularly the pleadings filed therein, Respondents' Comments dated
January17,1974,petitioners'ReplydatedMarch7,1974,andrespondents'RejoinderdatedMarch
27,1974weresubsequentlysubmittedtothisHonorableCourt:
2. The motion to withdraw has been used for propaganda purposes against the Government,
including the Supreme. Court Lately, the propaganda has been intensified and the detention of
petitionerandthependencyofhiscaseinthisCourthavebeenexploited
3.Weareawarethattheissuesraisedinthiscaseareoftheutmostgravityanddelicacy.Thisisthe
reason we said that the decision in these cases should be postponed until the emergency, which
called for the proclamation of martial law, is over. While this position is amply supported by
precedentsandisbasedonsoundpolicyconsiderations,wenowfeelthattoprotecttheintegrityof
government institutions, including this Court, from scurrilous propaganda now being waged with
relentlessness, it would be in the greater interest of the Nation to have the motion to withdraw
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resolvedandifdenied,tohavethepetitionitselfdecided
4.Thisisnottosaythattheemergencyisover,butonlytoexpressajudgmentthatinviewofrecent
tacticsemployedinthepropagandaagainsttheGovernment,itispreferableinthenationalinterest
to have the issues stirred by this litigation settled in this forum. For, indeed, we must state and
reiteratethat:
a.Pursuant to the President's constitutional powers, functions, and responsibilities in a
stateofmartiallaw,heperiodicallyrequirestobeconductedacontinuingassessmentof
the factual situation which necessitated the promulgation of Proclamation No. 1081 on
September21,1972andthecontinuationofmartiallawthroughProclamationNo.1104,
datedJanuary17,1973
b.TheGovernment'scurrentandlatestassessmentofthesituation,includingevidence
ofthesubversiveactivitiesofvariousgroupsandindividuals,indicatesthattherearestill
pocketsofactualarmedinsurrectionandrebellionincertainpartsofthecountry.While
in the major areas of the active rebellion the military challenge to the Republic and its
dulyconstitutedGovernmenthasbeenovercomeandeffectivestepshavebeenandare
beingtakentoredressthecenturiesoldanddeepseatedcausesuponwhichthefiresof
insurrection and rebellion have fed, the essential process of rehabilitation and
renascenceisaslowanddelicateprocess.Onthebasisofsaidcurrentassessmentand
of consultations with the people, the President believes that the exigencies of the
situation, the continued threat to peace, order, and security, the dangers to stable
government and to democratic processes and institutions, the requirements of public
safety,andtheactualandimminentdangerofinsurrectionandrebellionallrequirethe
continuationoftheexerciseofpowersincidenttomartiallaw
c.Themajorityofpersonswhohadtobedetainedupontheproclamationofmartiallaw
have been released and are now engaged in their normal pursuits. However, the
President has deemed that, considering the overall situation described above and in
viewofadequateevidencewhichcannotnowbedeclassified,thecontinueddetention
ofcertainindividualswithoutthefilingofformalchargesincourtforsubversiveandother
criminalactsisnecessaryintheinterestofnationalsecurityanddefensetoenablethe
Governmenttosuccessfullymeetthegravethreatsofrebellionandinsurrection.Inthis
regard, the Secretary of National Defense and his authorized representatives have
actedinaccordancewithguidelinesrelatingtonationalsecuritywhichthePresidenthas
prescribed.
Respectfullysubmitted.
Manila,Philippines,May13,1974.
(Vol.II,Rollo,L35539.)
and that earlier, in connection with the issue of jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over the instant cases, the
respondentsinvokedGeneralOrdersNos.3and3Areading,asfollows:
GENERALORDERNO.3
WHEREAS, martial law having been declared under Proclamation No. 1081, dated September 21,
1972andisnowineffectthroughouttheland
WHEREAS,martiallaw,havingbeendeclaredbecauseofwantondestructionoflivesandproperty,
widespreadlawlessnessandanarchyandchaosanddisordernowprevailingthroughoutthecountry,
which condition has been brought about by groups of men who are actively engaged in a criminal
conspiracytoseizepoliticalandstatepowerinthePhilippinesinordertotakeovertheGovernment
byforceandviolence,theyextentofwhichhasnowassumedtheproportionofanactualwaragainst
ourpeopleandtheirlegitimateGovernmentand
WHEREAS, in order to make more effective the implementation of the aforesaid Proclamation No.
1081 without unduly affecting the operations of the Government, and in order to end the present
nationalemergencywithintheshortestpossibletime
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, CommanderinChief of all the Armed Forces of
thePhilippines,andpursuanttoProclamationNo.1081,datedSeptember21,1972,doherebyorder
that henceforth all executive departments, bureaus, offices, agencies and instrumentalities of the
NationalGovernment,governmentowedorcontrolledcorporations,aswellasallgovernmentsofall
theprovinces,cities,municipalitiesandbarriosthroughoutthelandshallcontinuetofunctionunder
theirpresentofficersandemployeesandinaccordancewithexistinglaws,untilotherwiseorderedby
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meorbymydulydesignatedrepresentative.
IdoherebyfurtherorderthattheJudiciaryshallcontinuetofunctioninaccordancewithitspresent
organizationandpersonnel,andshalltryanddecideinaccordancewithexistinglawsallcriminaland
civilcases,exceptthefollowingcases:
1. Those involving the validity, legality or constitutionality of any decree, order or acts issued,
promulgatedorperformedbymeorbymydulydesignatedrepresentativepursuanttoProclamation
No.1081,datedSeptember21,1972.
2.Thoseinvolvingthevalidityorconstitutionalityofanyrules,orders,oractsissued,promulgatedor
performed by public servants pursuant to decrees, orders, rules and regulations issued and
promulgated by me or by my duly designated representative pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081,
datedSeptember21,1972.
3.Thoseinvolvingcrimesagainstnationalsecurityandthelawofnations.
4.ThoseinvolvingcrimesagainstthefundamentallawsoftheState.
5.Thoseinvolvingcrimesagainstpublicorder.
6.Thosecrimesinvolvingusurpationofauthority,rank,title,andimproperuseofnames,uniforms,
andinsignia.
7.Thoseinvolvingcrimescommittedbypublicofficers.
DoneintheCityofManila,this22nddayofSeptember,intheyearofOurLord,nineteenhundredandseventy
two.
(SGD.)FERDINANDE.MARCOSPresidentRepublicofthePhilippines
GENERALORDERNO.3A.
Subparagraph 1 of the second paragraph of the dispositive portion of General Order No. 3, dated
September22,1972,isherebyamendedtoreadasfollows:
xxxxxxxxx
1. Those involving the validity, legality, or constitutionality of Proclamation No. 1081, dated
September21,1972,orofanydecree,orderoractsissued,promulgatedorperformedbymeorby
mydulydesignatedrepresentativepursuantthereto.
xxxxxxxxx
Done in the City of Manila, this 24th day of September, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred
andseventytwo.
(SGD.)FERDINANDE.MARCOSPresident
LikewiserelevantaretheissuancebythePresidentonJanuary17,1973ofProclamation1104readingthus:
PROCLAMATIONNO.1104
DECLARINGTHECONTINUATIONOFMARTIALLAW.
WHEREAS, Barangays (Citizens Assemblies) were created in barrios in municipalities and in
districts/wardsincharteredcitiespursuanttoPresidentialDecreeNo.86,datedDecember31,1972,
composed of all persons who are residents of the barrio, district or ward for at least six months,
fifteen years of age or over, citizens of the Philippines and who are registered in the list of Citizen
Assemblymemberskeptbythebarrio,districtorwardsecretary
WHEREAS, the said Barangays were established precisely to broaden the base of citizen
participationinthedemocraticprocessandtoaffordampleopportunitiesforthecitizenrytoexpress
theirviewsonimportantnationalissues
WHEREAS, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 86A, dated January 5, 1973 and Presidential
Decree No. 86B, dated January 7, 1973, the question was posed before the Barangays: Do you
wantmartiallawtocontinue?
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WHEREAS, fifteen million two hundred twentyfour thousand five hundred eighteen (15,224,518)
votedforthecontinuationofmartiallawasagainstonlyeighthundredfortythreethousandfiftyone
(843,051)whovotedagainstit
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the
powers in me vested by the Constitution, do hereby declare that martial law shall continue in
accordancewiththeneedsofthetimeandthedesireoftheFilipinopeople.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the Republic of the
Philippinestobeaffixed.
DoneintheCityofManila,this17thdayofJanuary,intheyearofOurLord,nineteenhundredand
seventythree.
(SGD.)FERDINANDE.MARCOSPresident
and the holding of a referendum on July 2728, 1973 which as evidenced by the COMELEC proclamation of
August3,1973resultedinthefollowing:
UnderthepresentconstitutionthePresident,ifhesodesires,cancontinueinofficebeyond1973.
DoyouwantPresidentMarcostocontinuebeyond1973andfinishthereformshehasinitiatedunder
MartialLaw?
18,052,016YES
1,856,744NO
(Phil.DailyExpress,August4,1973)
THEFUNDAMENTALISSUES
Firstofall,petitionerschallengethefactualpremisesandconstitutionalsufficiencyofProclamation1081.Invoking
theConstitutionof1935underwhichitwasissued,theyvigorouslymaintainthat"whiletheremayberebellionin
someremoteasinIsabela,thereisnobasisforthenationwideimpositionofmartiallaw,since:(a)nolargescale
rebellionorinsurrectionexistsinthePhilippines(b)publicsafetydoesnotrequireit,inasmuchasnodepartment
ofthecivilgovernmentisshowntohavebeenunabletoopenorfunctionbecauseofordueto,theactivitiesof
thelawlesselementsdescribedintheProclamation(c)theExecutivehasgiventhenationtounderstandand
there exists no evidence to the contrary that the armed forces can handle the situation without 'utilizing the
extraordinary of the President etc.' and (d) the problem in the Greater Manila Area ... where petitioners were
seized and arrested was, at the time martial law was, plain lawlessness and criminality." (pp. 6970 Petitioners'
Memorandum).Inhissupplementalpetition,petitionerDioknoindividuallypositsthatespeciallythesedays,with
the improved conditions of peace and order, there is no more constitutional justification for the continuance of
martiallaw.Inotherwords,petitionersquestionnotonlytheconstitutionalsufficiencybothinfactandinlawofthe
proclamationbutalsothelegalityoftheirdetentionandconstraints,independentlyofanyfindingofvalidityofthe
proclamation, while in his supplemental petition petitioner Diokno individually submits that the Court should
declarethatithasalreadybecomeillegaltocontinuethepresentmartiallawregimebecausetheemergencyfor
which it was proclaimed, if it ever existed, has already ceased, as attested by various public and official
declarationofnolessthanthePresidenthimself.Ontheotherhand,respondentswouldwanttheCourttolayits
hands off the instant petitions, claiming that under General Orders Nos. 3 and 3A, aforequoted, the President
hasorderedthattheJudiciaryshallnottryanddecidecases"involvingthevalidity,legalityorconstitutionality"of
Proclamation 1081 and any order, decree or acts issued or done pursuant to said Proclamation. They contend
most vehemently that this Court has no jurisdiction to inquire into the factual bases of the proclamation, any
questionastotheproprietyorconstitutionalsufficiencyofitsissuancebeing,accordingtothem,politicalandnon
justiciable. They point out, in this connection, that in the abovementioned referendum of January 1015, 1973
and more so in that of July 2728, 1973, the sovereign people impressed their seal of approval on the
continuation of martial law for as long as the President may deem it wise to maintain the same. And on the
assumptiontheCourtcanmakeaninquiryintothefactualbasesoftheProclamation,theyclaimtherewasmore
thanefficientjustificationforitsissuance,inthelightofthecriterionofarbitrarinesssanctionedbyUsinLansang
vs. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448. Respondents further maintain that it is only by another official proclamation by the
President, not by a declaration, that martial law may be lifted. Additionally, in their answer of July 26, 1973 to
petitioner Diokno's supplemental petition, respondents contend that the express provisions of the abovequoted
transitory provision of the New Constitution, have made indubitable that Proclamation 1081 as well as all the
impugnedGeneralOrdersareconstitutionalandvalid.
Thus,thefundamentalquestionspresentedfortheCourt'sresolutionare:
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1.DoestheSupremeCourthavejurisdictiontoresolvethemeritsoftheinstantpetitions?Putdifferently,arenot
theissueshereinrelatedtotheproprietyorconstitutionalsufficiencyoftheissuanceoftheProclamationpurely
political, which are not for the judiciary, but for the people and the political departments of the government to
determine?AndviewedfromexistingjurisprudenceinthePhilippines,isnotthedoctrinelaiddownbythisCourtin
Lansangvs.Garcia,supra,applicabletothesecases?
2.EvenassumingLansangtobeapplicable,andonthebasisofthecriterionofarbitrarinesssanctionedtherein,
canitbesaidthatthePresidentactedarbitrarily,capriciouslyorwhimsicallyinissuingProclamation1081?
3. Even assuming also that said proclamation was constitutionally issued, may not the Supreme Court declare
uponthefactsofrecordandthosejudiciallyknowntoitnowthatthenecessityformartiallaworiginallyfoundby
the President to exist has already ceased so as to make further continuance of the present martial law regime
unconstitutional?
4. Even assuming again that the placing of the country under martial law is constitutional until the President
himself declares otherwise, is there any legal justification for the arrest and detention as well as the other
constraintsupontheindividuallibertiesofthepetitioners,and,intheaffirmative,doessuchjustificationcontinue
uptothepresent,almosttwoyearsfromthetimeoftheirapprehension,therebeingnocriminalchargesofany
kind against them nor any warrants of arrest for their apprehension duly issued pursuant to the procedure
prescribedbylaw?
5.Finally,cantherestillbeanydoubtregardingtheconstitutionalityoftheissuanceofProclamation1081andall
the other proclamations and orders, decrees, instructions and acts of the President issued or done by him
pursuanttosaidProclamation,consideringthatbythetermsofSection3(2)ofArticleXVIIoftheConstitutionof
thePhilippinesof1973,"allproclamations,orders,decrees,instructionsandactspromulgated,issuedordoneby
theincumbentPresidentshallbepartofthelawoftheland,andshallremainvalid,legal,bindingandeffective"
untilrevokedorsupersededbytheincumbentPresidenthimselforbytheregularNationalAssemblyestablished
underthesameConstitution?
I
THEISSUEOFJURISDICTION
By its very nature, the issue of jurisdiction vigorously urged by the Solicitor General calls for prior resolution.
Indeed,whenevertheauthorityoftheCourttoactisseriouslychallenged,itshouldnotproceedanyfurtheruntil
that authority is clearly established. And it goes without saying that such authority may be found only in the
existinglawsand/ortheConstitution.
Foramoment,however,therewasafeelingamongsomemembersoftheCourtthattheimportofthetransitory
provisionsoftheNewConstitutionreferredtointhefifthabovehasmadetheissueofjurisdictionposedbythe
question respondents of secondary importance, if not entirely academic. Until, upon further reflection, a
consensusemergedthatforUstodeclarethatthetransitoryprovisioninvokedhasrenderedmootandacademic
anycontroversyastothelegalityoftheimpugnedactsofthePresidentistoassumethattheissueisjusticiable,
thereby bypassing the very issue of jurisdiction. We are asked to resolve. We feel that while perhaps, such
relianceonthetransitoryprovisionreferredtomaylegallysufficetodisposeofthecasesatbar,itcannotanswer
persistent queries regarding the powers of the Supreme Court in a martial law situation. It would still leave
unsettled a host of controversies related to the continued exercise of extraordinary powers by the President.
Withal,suchassumptionofjusticiabilitywouldleavetheCourtopentosuccessivepetitionsaskingthatmartiallaw
be lifted, without Our having resolved first the correctness of such assumption. Indeed, nothing short of a
categorical and definite ruling of this Court is imperative regarding the pretended nonjusticiability of the issues
herein, if the people are to know, as they must, whether the present governmental order has legitimate
constitutional foundations or it is supported by nothing more than naked force and selfcreated stilts to keep it
abovethemurkywatersofunconstitutionality.Thus,itisbutproperthatWetacklefirstthequestionsaboutthe
authority of the Court to entertain and decide these cases before discussing the materiality and effects of the
transitoryprovisionrelieduponbyrespondents.
Asamatteroffact,itisnotalonethematterofjurisdictionthatWeshoulddecide.Beyondthepurelylegalissues
placed before Us by the parties, more fundamental problems are involved in these proceedings. There are all
importantmatterswhichahistoricaldecisionlikethiscannotignoreonthepretextthatOurdutyinthepremisesis
exclusivelyjudicial.WhetherallthemembersoftheCourtlikeitornot,theCourthastoplayitsindispensableand
decisive role in resolving the problems confronting our people in the critical circumstances in which they find
themselves.Afterall,wecannotdissociateourselvesfromthem,forweareFilipinoswhomustsharethecommon
fate to which the denouement of the current situation will consign our nation. The priority issue before Us is
whether We will subject the assailed acts of the President to judicial scrutiny as to its factual bases or We will
defertohisfindingspredicatedonevidencewhichareintheverynatureofthingsofficiallyavailableonlytohim,
but in either case, our people must know that Our decision has democratic foundations and conforms with the
greatprinciplesforwhichournationexists.
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TheNewConstitutionitselfisinalargesenseaproductofthepoliticalconvulsionnowshakingprecariouslythe
unityofthenation.Upontheotherhand,thatthosepresentlyinauthorityhadahandinonewayoranotherinits
formulation,approvalandratificationcanhardlybedenied.Tojustify,therefore,therestraintuponthelibertiesof
petitioners through an exclusive reliance on the mandates of the new charter, albeit logically and technically
tenable, may not suffice to keep our people united in the faith that there is genuine democracy in the existing
orderandthattheruleoflawstillprevailsinourland.Somehowthedisturbingthoughtmaykeeplingeringwith
some,ifnotwithmany,ofourcountrymenthatbypredicatingOurdecisiononthebasisaloneofwhattheNew
Constitutionordains,Weareineffectallowingthosepresentlyinauthoritythedubiousprivilegeoflegalizingtheir
actsandexculpatingthemselvesfromtheirsupposedconstitutionaltransgressionsthroughadevicewhichmight
yethavebeenoftheirownfurtivemaking.
Besides, We should not be as naive as to ignore that in troublous times like the present, simplistic solutions,
howeversolidlybased,ofconstitutionalcontroversieslikelytohavegravepoliticalconsequenceswouldnotsound
cogentenoughunlesstheyringincompleteharmonywiththetunesetbythefoundersofournationwhenthey
solemnlyconsecratedittotheideologytheyconsideredbestconducivetothecontentmentandprosperityofall
ourpeople.AndthecommitmentofthePhilippinestotheidealsofdemocracyandfreedomiseverevidentand
indubitable. It is writ in the martyrdom of our revolutionary forbears when they violently overthrow the yoke of
Spanishdispotism.Itisanindeliblepartofthehistoryofourpassionateandzealousobservanceofdemocratic
principles and practices during the more than four decades that America was with us. It is reaffirmed in bright
crimsoninthebloodandthelivesofthecountlessFilipinoswhofoughtanddiedinorderthatourcountrymaynot
besubjugatedunderthemilitarismandtotalitarianismoftheJapanesethen,whowereevenenticinguswiththe
idea of a Greater East Asia CoProsperity Sphere. And today, that our people are showing considerable
dispositiontosuffertheimpositionofmartiallawcanonlybeexplainedbytheirbeliefthatitisthelastrecourseto
savethemselvesfromtheinroadsofideologiesantithetictothosetheycherishanduphold.
Withal,theeyesofallthepeoplesoftheworldonbothsidesofthebambooandironcurtainsarefocusedonwhat
has been happening in our country since September 21, 1972. Martial law in any country has such awesome
implicationsthatanynationunderitisnaturallyaninterestingstudysubjectfortherestofmankind.Thosewho
considerthemselvestobeourideologicalalliesmustbekeepingapprehensivewatchonhowsteadfastlyweshall
remain living and cherishing our common fundamental political tenets and ways of life, whereas those of the
opposite ideology must be eagerly anticipating how soon we will join them in the conviction that, after all, real
progressanddevelopmentcannotbeachievedwithoutgivingupindividualfreedomandlibertyandunlessthere
is concentration of power in the exercise of government authority. It is true the Philippines continues to enjoy
recognitionofallthestateswithwhomithaddiplomaticrelationsbeforemartiallawwasproclaimedbutitisnot
difficulttoimaginethatsoonasithasbecamedefiniteoranywayapparenttothoseconcernedthatthePhilippines
has ceased to adhere to the immutable concepts of freedom and democracy enshrined in its own fundamental
lawcorrespondingreactionswouldmanifestthemselvesinthetreatmentthatwillbegivenusbythesestates.
In our chosen form of government, the Supreme Court is the department that most authoritatively speaks the
language of the Constitution. Hence, how the present martial law and the constraints upon the liberties of
petitionerscanbejustifiedunderourConstitutionwhichprovidesforarepublicandemocraticgovernmentwillbe
readbythewholeworldintheconsiderationsofthisdecision.Fromthemtheywillknowwhitherwearegoingasa
nation.Moreimportantly,bythesametoken,historyandthefuturegenerationsofFilipinoswillrendertheirown
judgmentonallofuswhobythewillofDivineProvidencehavetoplayourrespectiverolesinthisepochalchapter
ofournationallife.Bythisdecision,everyoneconcernedwilldeterminehowtrulyorotherwise,thePhilippinesof
today is keeping faith with the fundamental precepts of democracy and liberty to which the nation has been
irrevocablycommittedbyourheroesandmartyrssinceitsbirth.
And we should not gloss over the fact that petitioners have come to this Court for the protection of their rights
undertheprovisionsoftheOldCharterthathaveremainedunalteredbytheNewConstitution.Itwouldnotbefair
tothem,iftheprovisionsinvokedbythemstillmeanwhattheyhadalwaysmeantbefore,todeterminethefateof
their petitions on the basis merely of a transitory provision whose consistency with democratic principles they
vigorouslychallenge.
Inthisdelicateperiodofournationallife,whenfaithineachotherandunityamongallofthecomponentelements
of our people are indispensable, We cannot treat the attitude and feelings of the petitioners, especially Senator
Diokno * who is still under detention without formal charges, with apathy and indifferent unconcern. Their pleadings evince quite distinctly an
apprehensive,nayafastdwindlingfaithinthecapacityofthisCourttorenderthemjustice.Bluntlyput,theirposeisthatthejusticetheyseekmaybefound
only in the correct construction of the 1935 Constitution, and they make no secret of their fears that because the incumbent members of the Court have
takenanoathtodefendandprotecttheNewConstitution,theirhopesofdueprotectionundertheBillofRightsoftheOldChartermayfallondeafears.
PetitionerDiokno,inparticular,withtheundisguisedconcurrenceofhischiefcounsel,formerSenatorTaada,despairinglybewailsthatalthoughtheyare
"convincedbeyondanynaggingdoubtthat(theyare)onthesideofrightandreasonandlawandjustice,(theyare)equallyconvincedthat(they)cannot
reasonablyexpecteitherrightorreason,laworjustice,toprevailin(these)case(s)."
Tobesure,Wedonotfeelboundtosoothethesubjectivedespondencynortocooldowntheinfuriatedfeelings
oflitigantsandlawyersbymeansotherthanthesheerobjectivenessanddemonstratedtechnicalaccuracyofour
decisions.Underthepeculiarmilieuofthesecases,however,itisperhapsbestthatWedonotspareanyeffortto
makeeveryoneseethatindischargingthegraveresponsibilityincumbentuponUsinthebestlightthatGodhas
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given Us to see it, We have explored every angle the parties have indicated and that We have exhausted all
jurisprudential resources within our command before arriving at our conclusions and rendering our verdict. In a
way,itcouldindeedbepartofthenobilitythatshouldneverbelostinanycourtofjusticethatnopartybeforeitis
left sulking with the thought that he lost because not all his important arguments in which he sincerely believes
havebeendulyconsideredorweighedinthebalance.
But,ofcourse,petitioners'emotionalmisgivingsaremanifestlybaseless.Itistooevidentforanyonetoignorethat
theprovisionsoftheOldConstitutionpetitionersareinvokingremainunalteredintheNewConstitutionandthat
whenitcomestothebasicpreceptsunderlyingthemainportionsofbothfundamentallaws,thereisnodisparity,
muchlessanyantagonismbetweenthem,forintruth,theyarethesameidenticaltenetstowhichourcountry,our
governmentandourpeoplehavealwaysbeenineradicablycommitted.Insofar,therefore,assaidprovisionsand
theirunderlyingprinciplesareconcerned,thenewoathtakenbythemembersoftheCourtmustbeunderstood,
notinthedisturbingsensepetitionerstakethem,butratherasacontinuingguaranteeoftheJustices'unswerving
fealtyandsteadfastadherencetotheselfsametenetsandidealsofdemocracyandlibertyembodiedintheoaths
ofloyaltytheytookwithreferencetothe1935Constitution.
ContrarytowhatisobviouslytheerroneousimpressionofpetitionerDiokno,thefundamentalreasonthatimpelled
themembersoftheCourttotakethenewoathsthatarecausinghimunwarrantedagonywaspreciselytoregain
theirindependencefromtheExecutive,inasmuchasthetransitoryprovisionsofthe1973Constitutionhad,asa
matterofcourse,subjectedthejudiciarytotheusualrulesattendantinthereorganizationofgovernmentsundera
newcharter.UnderSections9and10ofArticleXVII,"incumbentmembersoftheJudiciarymaycontinueinoffice
until they reach the age of seventy years unless sooner replaced" by the President, but "all officials whose
appointments are by this Constitution vested in the (President) shall vacate their offices upon the appointment
andqualificationoftheirsuccessors."Inotherwords,undersaidprovisions,theJusticesceasedtobepermanent.
And that is precisely why our new oaths containing the phrase "na pinagpapatuloy sa panunungkulan", which
petitioner Diokno uncharitably ridicules ignoring its real import, was prepared by the Secretary of Justice in
consultationwiththeCourt,andnotbythePresidentoranyothersubordinateintheExecutiveoffice,purposelyto
makesurethattheoathtakingceremonywhichwastobepresidedbythePresidenthimselfwouldconnoteand
signifythatthereby,infactandincontemplationoflaw,thePresidenthasalreadyexercisedthepowerconferred
upon him by the aforequoted transitory constitutional provisions to replace anyone of us with a successor at
anytime.
TherewasnoPresidentialedictatallfortheJusticestotakesuchanoath.ThePresidentinformedtheCourtthat
hewasdeterminedtorestorethepermanenceoftherespectivetenuresofitsmembers,buttherewasafeeling
thattoextendnewappointmentstothemassuccessorstothemselveswouldsoundsomehowabsurd,Andso,in
a conference among the President, the Secretary of Justice and all the Justices, a mutually acceptable
construction of the pertinent transitory provision was adopted to the effect that an official public announcement
was to be made that the incumbent Justices would be continued in their respective offices without any new
appointment, but they would take a fittingly worded oath the text of which was to be prepared in consultation
between the Secretary of Justice and the Court. Thus, by that oath taking, all the members of the Court, other
than the Chief Justice and the three new Associate Justices, who because of their new appointment are not
affected by the transitory provisions, are now equally permanent with them in their constitutional tenures, as
officiallyandpubliclyannouncedbythePresidenthimselfonthatoccasion.Otherwisestated,thereorganization
oftheSupremeCourtcontemplatedinthetransitoryprovisionsreferredto,which,incidentallywasalsoafeature
ofthetransitoryprovisionsofthe1935Constitution,albeit,limitedthenexpresslytooneyear,(Section4,Article
XVI) has already been accomplished, and all the Justices are now unreachably beyond the presidential
prerogativeeitherexplicitorimplicitinthetermsofthenewtransitoryprovisions.
Itis,therefore,inthesefaithandspiritandwiththisunderstanding,supportedwithprayersforguidanceofDivine
Providence, that We have deliberated and voted on the issues in these cases certainly, without any claim of
monopolyofwisdomandpatriotismandofloyaltytoallthatissacredtothePhilippinesandtheFilipinopeople.
II
Asalreadystated,theGovernment'sinsistentposturethattheSupremeCourtshouldabstainfrominquiringinto
the constitutional sufficiency of Proclamation 1081 is predicated on two fundamental grounds, namely, (1) that
underGeneralOrderNo.3,asamendedbyGeneralOrderNo.3A,"theJudiciary(whichincludestheSupreme
Court) shall continue to function in accordance with its present organization and personnel, and shall try and
decide in accordance with existing laws all criminal and civil cases, except the following: 1. Those involving the
validity, legality or constitutionality of Proclamation 1081 dated September 21, 1972 or of any decree, order or
acts issued, promulgated or performed by (the President) or by (his) duly designated representative pursuant
thereto,"and(2)thequestionsinvolvedinthesecasesarepoliticalandnonjusticiableand,therefore,outsidethe
domainofjudicialinquiry.
A
GENERAL ORDERS NOS. 3 AND 3A HAVE CEASED TO BE OPERATIVE INSOFAR AS THEY ENJOIN THE
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JUDICIARYOFJURISDICTIONOVERCASESINVOLVINGTHEVALIDITYOFTHEPROCLAMATIONS,ORDERS
ORACTSOFTHEPRESIDENT.
Anent the first ground thus invoked by the respondents, it is not without importance to note that the Solicitor
General relies barely on the provisions of the general orders cited without elaborating as to how the Supreme
Courtcanbeboundthereby.ConsideringthatthetotalityofthejudicialpowerisvestedintheCourtbynoless
thantheConstitution,boththeOldandtheNew,theabsenceofanyindependentshowingofhowthePresident
maybyhisownfiatconstitutionallydeclareororderotherwiseiscertainlysignificant.ItmaybethattheSolicitor
GeneralconsidereditmoreprudenttotonedownanypossiblefrontalclashwiththeCourt,butasWeseeit,the
simplistictenoroftheSolicitorGeneral'sdefensemustbeduetothefacttoowellknowntorequireanyevidential
proof that by the President's own acts, publicized here and abroad, he had made it plainly understood that
GeneralOrdersNos.3and3AarenolongeroperativeinsofarastheywereintendedtodivesttheJudiciaryof
jurisdiction to pass on the validity, legality or constitutionality of his acts under the aegis of martial law. In fact,
accordingtothePresident,itwasuponhisinstructionsgivenasearlyasSeptember24,1972,soonafterthefiling
of the present petitions, that the Solicitor General submitted his return and answer to the writs We have issued
herein.Itisamatterofpublicknowledgethatthepresident'srepeatedavowaloftheGovernment'ssubmissionto
the Court is being proudly acclaimed as the distinctive characteristic of the socalled "martial law Philippine
style",sincesuchattitudeendowesitwiththedemocraticflavorsodismallyabsentinthemartiallawprevailingin
othercountriesoftheworld.
Accordingly, even if it were to be assumed at this juncture that by virtue of the transitory provision of the New
ConstitutionmakingallordersoftheincumbentPresidentpartofthelawoftheland,GeneralOrdersNos.3and
3Aarevalid,thepositionoftherespondentsonthepresentissueofjurisdictionbasedonsaidordershasbeen
rendered untenable by the very acts of the President, which in the words of the same transitory provision have
"modified,revokedorsuperseded"them.Andinthisconnection,itisimportanttonotethatthetransitoryprovision
just referred to textually says that the acts of the incumbent President shall "remain valid, legal, binding and
effective...unlessmodified,revokedorsupersededbysubsequentproclamations,orders,decrees,instructions
orotheractsoftheincumbentPresident,orunlessexpresslyandexplicitlymodified,orrepealedbytheregular
National Assembly", thereby implying that the modificatory or revocatory acts of the president need not be as
express and explicit as in the case of the National Assembly. In other words, when it comes to acts of the
President,meredemonstratedinconsistencyofhisposterioractswithearlieroneswouldbeenoughforimplied
modificationorrevocationtobeeffective,evenifnostatementismadebyhimtosucheffect.
RationalizinghisattitudeinregardtotheSupremeCourtduringmartiallaw,PresidentMarcoshasthefollowingto
sayinhisbookentitled"NotesontheNewSocietyofthePhilippines":
Ourmartiallawisuniqueinthatitisbasedonthesupremacyofthecivilianauthorityoverthemilitary
and on complete submission to the decision of the Supreme Court, and most important of all, the
people....(p.103).
xxxxxxxxx
Thus, upon the approval by the Constitutional Convention of a new Constitution, I organized the
barangays or village councils or citizens assemblies in the barrios (a barrio is the smallest political
unitinthePhilippines).IdirectedthenewConstitutiontobesubmittedtothebarangaysorcitizens
assemblies in a formal plebiscite from January 10 to 15, 1973. The barangays voted almost
unanimously to ratify the Constitution, continue with martial law and with the reforms of the New
Society.
This action was questioned in a petition filed before our Supreme Court in the cases entitled
Javellana vs. Executive Secretary et al, G.R. No. L36143,36164, 36165, 36236 and 36283. The
issueraisedwaswhetherIhadthepowertocallaplebiscitewhetherIcouldproclaimtheratification
of the new Constitution. In raising this issue, the petitioners (who, incidentally, were Liberals or
political opposition leaders) raised the fundamental issue of the power of the President under a
proclamationofmartiallawtoissuedecrees.
Inasmuch as the issues in turn raised the question of the legitimacy of the entire Government and
also to meet the insistent suggestion that, in the event of an adverse decision, I proclaim a
revolutionarygovernment,IdecidedtosubmittotilejurisdictionoftheSupremeCourtasIhaddone
in the Lansang vs. Garcia case (already quoted) in 1971 when almost the same parties in interest
questionedmypowersasPresidenttosuspendtheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpus.(Referto
pp.1317.)
This would, at the same time, calm the fears of every cynic who had any misgivings about my
intentions and claimed that I was ready to set up a dictatorship. For who is the dictator who would
submit himself to a higher body like the Supreme Court on the question of the constitutionality or
validityofhisactions?(pp.103104.)
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xxxxxxxxx
It will be noted that I had submitted myself to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in all cases
questioningmyauthorityin1971inthecaseofLansangvs.Garciaonthequestionofthesuspension
oftheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpusandinthecasejustcitedontheproclamationofmartial
lawaswellastheotherrelatedcases.(pp.105106.)
Nothing could be more indicative, than these words of the President himself, of his resolute intent to render
GeneralOrdersNos.3and3AinoperativeinsofarastheSupremeCourt'sjurisdictionovercasesinvolvingthe
validity,legalityorconstitutionalityofhisactsareconcerned.Actually,thetenorandpurposeofthesaidgeneral
orders are standard in martial law proclamations, and the President's attitude is more of an exception to the
general practice. Be that as it may, with this development, petitioners have no reason to charge that there is a
"disrobing"oftheSupremeCourt.ButevenasthePresidentunequivocallyreaffirms,overandabovemartiallaw,
hisrespectfortheSupremeCourt'sconstitutionallyassignedroleastheguardianoftheConstitutionandasthe
finalauthorityastoitscorrectinterpretationandconstruction,itisentirelyuptotheCourttodetermineanddefine
its own constitutional prerogatives visavis the proclamation and the existing martial law situation, given the
reasonsforthedeclarationanditsavowedobjectives..
B
MAYTHESUPREMECOURTINQUIREINTOTHEFACTUALBASESOFTHEISSUANCEOFPROCLAMATION
1081TODETERMINEITSCONSTITUTIONALSUFFICIENCY?
The second ground vigorously urged by the Solicitor General is more fundamental, since, prescinding from the
forceofthegeneralordersjustdiscussed,itstrikesattheverycoreofthejudicialpowervestedintheCourtby
the people thru the Constitution. It is claimed that insofar as the instant petitions impugn the issuance of
Proclamation1081ashavingbeenissuedbythePresidentinexcessofhisconstitutionalauthority,theyraisea
political question not subject to inquiry by the courts. And with reference to the plea of the petitioners that their
arrest,detentionandotherrestraints,withoutanychargesorwarrantsdulyissuedbytheproperjudge,constitute
clear violations of their rights guaranteed by the fundamental law, the stand of the respondents is that the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has been suspended automatically in consequence of the imposition of
martiallaw,theproprietyofwhichisleftbytheConstitutiontotheexclusivediscretionofthePresident,suchthat
fortheproperexerciseofthatdiscretionheisaccountableonlytothesovereignpeople,eitherdirectlyatthepolls
orthrutheirrepresentativesbyimpeachment.
NeverbeforehastheSupremeCourtofthePhilippinesbeenconfrontedwithaproblemofsuchtranscendental
consequences and implications as the present one entails. There is here an exertion of extreme state power
involving the proclaimed assumption of the totality of government authority by the Executive, predicated on his
owndeclarationthatastateofrebellionassuming"themagnitudeofanactualstateofwaragainstourpeopleand
theRepublicofthePhilippines"exists(22ndwhereasofProclamation1081)andthat"thepublicorderandsafety
andthesecurityofthisnationdemandthatimmediate,swift,decisiveandeffectiveactionbetakentoprotectand
insure the peace, order and security of the country and its population and to maintain the authority of the
government."(19thwhereas,id.)Upontheotherhand,petitionersdenythefactualbasesoftheProclamationand
insistthatitisincumbentupontheCourt,inthenameofdemocracy,libertyandtheconstitution,toinquireintothe
veracitythereofandtodeclare,uponfindingthemtobeuntrue,thattheproclamationisunconstitutionalandvoid.
Respondents counter however, that the very nature of the proclamation demands but the court should refrain
frommakinganysuchinquiry,consideringthat,asalreadystated,thediscretionastowhetherornotmartiallaw
shouldbeimposedislodgedbytheConstitutioninthePresidentexclusively.
AsWeentertheextremelydelicatetaskofresolvingthegraveissuesthusthrustuponUs,Weareimmediately
encountered by absolute verities to guide Us all the way. The first and most important of them is that the
Constitution9isthesupremelawoftheland.Thismeansamongothersthingsallthepowersofthegovernmentandofall
itsofficialsfromthePresidentdowntothelowestemanatefromit.Noneofthemmayexerciseanypowerunlessitcanbe
tracedtheretoeithertextuallyorbynaturalandlogicalimplication.
ThesecondisthatitissettledthattheJudiciaryprovisionsoftheConstitutionpointtotheSupremeCourtasthe
ultimatearbiterofallconflictsastowhattheConstitutionoranypartthereofmeans.WhiletheotherDepartments
may adopt their own construction thereof, when such construction is challenged by the proper party in an
appropriate case wherein a decision would be impossible without determining the correct construction, the
SupremeCourt'swordonthemattercontrols.
The third is that in the same way that the Supreme Court is the designated guardian of the Constitution, the
Presidentisthespecificallyassignedprotectorofthesafety,tranquilityandterritorialintegrityofthenation.This
responsibilityofthePresidentishisaloneandmaynotbesharedbyanyotherDepartment.
Thefourthisthat,totheendjuststated,theConstitutionexpresslyprovidesthat"incaseofinvasion,insurrection
or rebellion or imminent danger thereof, when the public safety requires it, he (the Executive) "may (as a last
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resort)...placethePhilippinesoranypartthereofundermartiallaw".10
ThefifthisthatinthesamemannerthattheExecutivepowerconferredupontheExecutivebytheConstitutionis
complete,totalandunlimited,soalso,thejudicialpowervestedintheSupremeCourtandtheinferiorcourts,is
theverywholeofthatpower,withoutanylimitationorqualification.
ThesixthisthatalthoughtheBillofRightsintheConstitutionstrictlyordainsthat"nopersonshallbedeprivedof
life,libertyorpropertywithoutdueprocessoflaw", 11 even this basic guarantee of protection readily reveals that the
Constitution's concern for individual rights and liberties is not entirely above that for the national interests, since the
deprivationitenjoinsisonlythatwhichiswithoutdueprocessoflaw,andlawsarealwaysenactedinthenationalinterestor
to promote and safeguard the general welfare. Of course, it is understood that the law thus passed, whether procedural or
substantive,mustaffordthepartyconcernedthebasicelementsofjustice,suchastherighttobeheard,confrontation,and
counsel,interalia.
AndtheseventhisthatwhereastheBillofRightsofthe1935Constitutionexplicitlyenjoinsthat"(T)heprivilegeof
thewritofhabeascorpusshallnotbesuspendedexceptincasesofinvasion,insurrection,orrebellion,whenthe
public safety requires it, in any of which events the same may be suspended wherever during such period the
necessity for such suspension shall exist", 12 there is no similar injunction whether expressed or implied against the
declarationofmartiallaw.
Fromtheseincontrovertiblepostulates,itresults,firstofall,thatthemainquestionbeforeUsisnotinrealityone
of jurisdiction, for there can be no conceivable controversy, especially one involving a conflict as to the correct
construction of the Constitution, that is not contemplated to be within the judicial authority of the courts to hear
anddecide.Thejudicialpowerofthecourtsbeingunlimitedandunqualified,itextendsoverallsituationsthatcall
fortheascertainmentandprotectionoftherightsofanypartyallegedlyviolated,evenwhentheallegedviolatoris
thehighestofficialofthelandorthegovernmentitself.Itis,therefore,evidentthattheCourt'sjurisdictiontotake
cognizanceofandtodecidetheinstantpetitionsontheirmeritsisbeyondchallenge.
Inthisconnection,however,itmustbeborneinmindthatintheformofgovernmentenvisagedbytheframersof
the Constitution and adopted by our people, the Court's indisputable and plenary authority to decide does not
necessarilyimposeuponitthedutytointerposeitsfiatastheonlymeansofsettlingtheconflictingclaimsofthe
parties before it. It is ingrained in the distribution of powers in the fundamental law that hand in hand with the
vesting of the judicial power upon the Court, the Constitution has coevally conferred upon it the discretion to
determine, in consideration of the constitutional prerogatives granted to the other Departments, when to refrain
from imposing judicial solutions and instead defer to the judgment of the latter. It is in the very nature of
republican governments that certain matters are left in the residual power of the people themselves to resolve,
eitherdirectlyatthepollsorthrutheirelectedrepresentativesinthepoliticalDepartmentsofthegovernment.And
these reserved matters are easily distinguishable by their very nature, when one studiously considers the basic
junctions and responsibilities entrusted by the charter to each of the great Departments of the government. To
cite an obvious example, the protection, defense and preservation of the state against internal or external
aggressionthreateningitsveinyexistenceisfarfrombeingwithintheambitofjudicialresponsibility.Thedistinct
rolethenoftheSupremeCourtofbeingthefinalarbiterinthedeterminationofconstitutionalcontroversiesdoes
not have to be asserted in such contemplated situations, thereby to give way to the ultimate prerogative of the
peoplearticulatedthrusuffrageorthrutheactsoftheirpoliticalrepresentativestheyhaveelectedforthepurpose.
Indeed, these fundamental considerations are the ones that lie at the base of what is known in American
constitutionallawasthepoliticalquestiondoctrine,whichinthatjurisdictionisunquestionablydeemedtobepart
andparceloftheruleoflaw,exactlylikeitsapparentlymoreattractiveorpopularopposite,judicialactivism,which
isthefullestexertionofjudicialpoweruponthetheorythatunlessthecourtsinterveneinjusticemightprevail.It
has been invoked and applied by this Court in varied forms and modes of projection in several momentous
instancesinthepast, 13anditisthemainsupportofthestandoftheSolicitorGeneralontheissueofjurisdictioninthe
caseatbar.Itisalsoreferredtoasthedoctrineofjudicialselfrestraintorabstention.Butasthenomenclaturesthemselves
imply, activism and selfrestraint are both subjective attitudes, not inherent imperatives. The choice of alternatives in any
particulareventualityisnaturallydictatedbywhatintheCourt'sconsideredopinioniswhattheConstitutionenvisionsshould
bedoneinordertoaccomplishtheobjectivesofgovernmentandofnationhood.Andperhapsitmaybeaddedheretoavoid
confusion of concepts, that We are not losing sight of the traditional approach based on the doctrine of separation of
powers.Intruth,Weperceivethatevenundersuchmodeofrationalization,theexistenceofpowerissecondary,respectfor
theactsofacoordinate,coequalandcoindependentDepartmentbeingthegeneralrule,particularlywhentheissueisnot
encroachmentofdelimitedareasoffunctionsbutallegedabuseofaDepartment'sownbasicprerogatives.
Inthefinalanalysis,therefore,WeneednotindulgeinanyfurtherdiscussionastowhetherornottheCourthas
jurisdictionoverthemeritsoftheinstantpetitions.Itisdefinitethatithas.Rather,therealquestionbeforeUsis
whetherornottheCourtshouldactonthem.Stateddifferently,doWehaveherethatappropriateoccasionfor
activismonthepartoftheCourt,or,dotheimperativesofthesituationdemand,inthelightofthereservationsin
the fundamental law just discussed, that We defer to the political decision of the Executive? After mature
deliberation,andtakingallrelevantcircumstancesintoaccount,WeareconvincedthattheCourtshouldabstain
in regard to what is in all probability the most important issue raised in them, namely, whether or not the Court
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shouldinquireintotheconstitutionalsufficiencyofProclamation1081byreceivingevidencetendingtobeliethe
factual premises thereof. It is Our considered view that under the Constitution, the discretion to determine
ultimatelywhetherornotthePhilippinesoranypartthereofshouldbeplacedundermartiallawandforhowlong
islodgedexclusivelyintheExecutive,andforthisreason,itisbestthatWedefertohisjudgmentasregardsthe
existenceofthegroundstherefor,since,afterall,itisnotexpectedthattheSupremeCourtshouldsharewithhim
thedelicateconstitutionalresponsibilityofdefendingthesafety,security,tranquilityandterritorialintegrityofthe
nationinthefaceofarebellionorinvasion.Thisisnotabdicationofjudicialpower,muchlessaviolationofOur
oaths"tosupportanddefendtheConstitution"rather,thisisdeferencetoanactoftheExecutivewhich,inOur
wellconsideredview,theConstitutioncontemplatestheCourtshouldrefrainfromreviewingorinterferingwith.To
Ourmind,thefollowingconsiderations,interalia,impelnootherconclusion:
1
Ithasbeensaidthatmartiallawhasnogenerallyaccepteddefinition,muchlessaprecisemeaning.ButasWe
seeit,nomatterhowvariouslyithasbeendescribed,acommonelementisplainlyrecognizableinwhateverhas
been said about it it does not involve executive power alone. To be more exact, martial law is state power
which involves the totality of government authority, irrespective of the Department or official by whom it is
administered.Thisisbecause,asadmittedbyall,martiallawiseverygovernment'ssubstitutefortheestablished
governmentalmachineryrenderedinoperativebytheemergencythatbringsitforth,inordertomaintainwhatever
legalandsocialorderispossibleduringtheperiodofemergency,whilethegovernmentisengagedinbattlewith
theenemy.Otherwise,withthebreakdownoftheregulargovernmentauthorityortheinabilityoftheusualoffices
and officials to perform their functions without endangering the safety of all concerned, anarchy and chaos are
boundtoprevailandprotectionoflifeandpropertywouldbenil.Whatisworse,theconfusionanddisorderwould
detract the defense efforts. It is indispensable therefore that some kind of government must go on, and martial
law appears to be the logical alternative. Hence, from the point of view of safeguarding the people against
possible governmental abuses, it is not the declaration of martial law and who actually administers it that is of
supreme importance. Someone has of necessity to be in command as surrogate of the whole embattled
government.Itiswhatisactuallydonebytheadministratoraffectingindividualrightsandlibertiesthatmustpass
constitutionalstandards,evenasthesearecorrespondinglyadjustedtosuitthenecessitiesofthesituation.But
thisisnottosaythatredressofconstitutionaloffenseswouldimmediatelyandnecessarilybeavailable,foreven
theprocedureforsecuringredress,itsformandtimemustdependonwhatsuchnecessitieswillpermit.Viewedin
depth, this is all that can be visualized as contemplated in the supposedly fundamental principle invoked by
petitionerstotheeffectthatnecessityandnecessityaloneisthejustificationandthemeasureofthepowersthat
maybeexercisedundermartiallaw.
2
In countries where there is no constitutional provision sanctioning the imposition of martial law, the power to
declare or proclaim the same is nevertheless conceded to be the most vital inherent prerogative of the state
becauseitisaxiomaticthattherightofthestatetodefenditselfagainstdisintegrationorsubjugationbyanother
cannotbelessthananindividual'snaturalrightofselfdefense.Theresultingrepressionorrestraintofindividual
rightsisthereforejustifiedasthenaturalcontributionthattheindividualowestothestate,sothatthegovernment
under which he lives may survive. After all, such subordination to the general interest is supposed to be
temporary,coincidentonlywiththerequirementsoftheemergency.
At the same time, under the general practice in those countries, it is considered as nothing but logical that the
declarationorproclamationshouldbemadebytheExecutive.Soitisthatnoneofthecasescitedbypetitioners,
includingthoseofHearonvs.Calus183,S.E.24andAllenvs.OklahomaCity,52Pac.Rep.2ndSeries,pp.1054
1059,maybedeemedasabindingprecedentsustainingdefinitelythatitisinthepowerofthecourtstodeclare
anExecutive'sproclamationordeclarationofmartiallawincaseofrebellionorinsurrectiontobeunconstitutional
andunauthorized.Ourownresearchhasnotyieldedanyjurisprudenceupholdingthecontentionofpetitionerson
this point. What is clear and incontrovertible from all the cases cited by both parties is that the power of the
Executive to proclaim martial law in case of rebellion has never been challenged, not to say outlawed. It has
alwaysbeenassumed,eveniftheextentoftheauthoritythatmaybeexerciseunderithasbeensubjectedtothe
applicable provision of the constitution, with some courts holding that the enforceability of the fundamental law
withintheareaofthemartiallawregimeisunqualified,andtheothersmaintainingthatsuchenforceabilitymust
becommensuratewiththedemandsoftheemergencysituation.Inotherwords,thereisactuallynoauthoritative
jurisprudential rule for Us to follow in respect to the specific question of whether or not the Executive's
determinationofthenecessitytoimposemartiallawduringarebellionisreviewablebythejudiciary.IfWehaveto
goviatheprecedentialroute,themostthatWecanfindisthatthelegalityofanExecutive'sexerciseofthepower
toproclaimmartiallawhasneverbeenpasseduponbyanycourtinacategoricalmannersoastoleavenoroom
fordoubtorspeculation.
3
InthePhilippines,Wedonothavetoresorttoassumptionsregardinganyinherentpowerofthegovernmentto
proclaim a state of martial law. What is an implied inherent prerogative of the government in other countries is
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explicitly conferred by our people to the government in unequivocal terms in the fundamental law. More
importantlyinthisconnection,itistotheExecutivethattheauthorityisspecificallygranted"incasesofinvasion,
insurrectionorrebellion,whenpublicsafetyrequiresit",to"placethePhilippinesoranypartthereofunderMartial
Law".Tobesure,petitionersadmitthatmuch.Buttheyinsistontryingtoshowthatthefactualpremisesofthe
Proclamationarenotentirelytrueandare,inanyevent,constitutionallyinsufficient.TheyurgetheCourttopass
on the merits of this particular proposition of fact and of law in their petitions and to order thereafter the
nullificationandsettingasidethereof.
WedonotbelievetheCourtshouldinterfere.
Thepertinentconstitutionalprovisionisexplicitandunequivocal.Itreadsasfollows:
(2)ThePresidentshallbecommanderinchiefofallarmedforcesofthePhilippinesand,wheneverit
corpus,orplacethePhilippinesoranypartthereofundermartiallaw(Section10(2),ArticleVII,1935
Constitution.)
(3) SEC. 12. The prime Minister shall be commanderinchief of all armed forces of the Philippines
and, whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawlessviolence,invasion,insurrection,orrebellion.Incaseofinvasion,insurrection,orrebellion,or
imminentdangerthereof,whenthepublicsafetyrequiresit,hemaysuspendtheprivilegeofthewrit
ofhabeascorpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial (Section 12, Article IX,
1973Constitution.)
ExceptforthereferencetothePrimeMinisterintheNewConstitutioninsteadoftothePresidentasintheOld,the
wordingoftheprovisionhasremainedunalteredipssissimisverbisAccordingly,thetwoConstitutionscannotvary
inmeaning,theyshouldbeconstruedandappliedinthelightofexactlythesameconsiderations.Inthissenseat
least,petitioners'invocationofthe1935Constitutionhasnotbeenrenderedacademicbytheenforcementofthe
newcharter.Forthepurposesofthesecases,Wewillinthemainconsidertheirargumentsasiftherehasbeen
noJavellanadecision.
Now, since in those countries where martial law is an extraconstitutional concept, the Executive's proclamation
thereof,asobservedabove,hasneverbeenconsideredasoffensivetothefundamentallaw,whetherwrittenor
unwritten, and, in fact, not even challenged, what reason can there be that here in the Philippines, wherein the
Constitution directly and definitely commits the power to the Executive, another rule should obtain? Are we
FilipinossoincapableofelectinganExecutivewecantrustnottounceremoniouslycastasidehisconstitutionally
wordedoathsolemnlyandemphaticallyimposinguponhimtheduty"todefendandprotecttheConstitution"?Or
is the Court to be persuaded by possible partisan prejudice or the subjective rationalization informing personal
ambitions?
ReservingforfurtherdiscussiontheeffectofLansanguponthecompellingforceoftheopinionsinBarcelon vs.
Baker, 5 Phil. 87 and Montenegro vs. Castaeda, 91 Phil. 862, relative to the issue at hand, We cannot lightly
disregard the ponderous reasons discussed in said opinions supporting the view that the Executive's choice of
meansindealingwithafrebellionshouldbeconclusive.InBarcelon,thisCourtsaid:
Thus the question is squarely presented whether or not the judicial department of the Government
mayinvestigatethefactsuponwhichthelegislativeandexecutivebranchesoftheGovernmentacted
inprovidingforthesuspensionandinactuallysuspendingtheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpus
in said provinces. Has the GovernorGeneral, with the consent of the Commission, the right to
suspendtheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpus?Ifso,didtheGovernorGeneralsuspendthewrit
ofhabeascorpusintheProvincesofCaviteandBatangasinaccordancewithsuchauthority?
Aparagraphofsection5oftheactofCongressofJuly1,1902,provides:
That the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in cases of
maybesuspendedbythePresident,orbytheGovernorGeneralwiththeapprovalofthePhilippine
Commission,wheneverduringsuchperiodthenecessityforsuchsuspensionshallexist.
This provision of the act of Congress is the only provision giving the GovernorGeneral and the
PhilippineCommissionauthoritytosuspendtheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpus. No question
has been raised with reference to the authority of Congress to confer this authority upon the
PresidentortheGovernorGeneraloftheseIslands,withtheapprovalofthePhilippineCommission.
ThisprovisionoftheactofCongressmakestwoconditionsnecessaryinorderthatthePresidentor
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theGovernorGeneralwiththeapprovalofthePhilippineCommissionmaysuspendtheprivilegeof
thewritofhabeascorpus.Theyareasfollows:
(1)Whenthereexistsrebellion,insurrection,orinvasionand
(2)Whenpublicsafetymayrequireit.
Inotherwords,inorderthattheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpusmaybesuspended,theremust
exist rebellion, insurrection, or invasion, and the public safety must require it. This fact is admitted,
but the question is, Who shall determine whether there exists a state of rebellion, insurrection, or
invasion,andthatbyreasonthereofthepublicsafetyrequiresthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthe
writofhabeascorpus?
It has been argued and admitted that the GovernorGeneral, with the approval of the Philippine
Commission,hasdiscretion,wheninsurrection,rebellion,orinvasionactuallyexist,todecidewhether
the public safety requires the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeascorpus but the fact
whetherinsurrection,rebellion,orinvasiondoesactuallyexistisanopenquestion,whichthejudicial
department of the Government may inquire into and that the conclusions of the legislative and
executive departments (the Philippine Commission and the GovernorGeneral) of the Government
arenotconclusiveuponthatquestion.
In other words, it is contended that the judicial department of the Government may consider an
application for the writ of habeas corpus even though the privileges of the same have been
suspended, in the manner provided by law, for the purposes of taking proof upon the question
whetherthereactuallyexistsastateofinsurrection,rebellion,orinvasion.
Theapplicantshereadmitthatifastateofrebellion,insurrection,orinvasionexists,andthepublic
safety is in danger , then the President, or GovernorGeneral with the approval of the Philippine
Commission,maysuspendtheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpus.
InasmuchasthePresident,orGovernorGeneralwiththeapprovalofthePhilippineCommission,can
suspendtheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpusonly under the conditions mentioned in the said
statute,itbecomestheirdutytomakeaninvestigationoftheexistingconditionsintheArchipelago,or
any part thereof, to ascertain whether there actually exists a state of rebellion, insurrection, or
invasion, and that the public safety requires the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. When this investigation is concluded, the President, or the GovernorGeneral with the
consentofthePhilippineCommission,declaresthatthereexisttheseconditions,andthatthepublic
safety requires the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, can the judicial
departmentoftheGovernmentinvestigatethesamefactsanddeclarethatnosuchconditionsexist?
TheactofCongress,abovequoted,wiselyprovidesfortheinvestigationbytwodepartmentsofthe
Governmentthelegislativeandexecutiveoftheexistingconditions,andjointactionbythetwo
beforetheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpuscanbesuspendedintheseIslands.
If the investigation and findings of the President, or the GovernorGeneral with the approval of the
Philippine Commission, are not conclusive and final as against the judicial department of the
Government,theneveryofficerwhosedutyitistomaintainorderandprotectthelivesandproperty
ofthepeoplemayrefusetoact,andapplytothejudicialdepartmentoftheGovernmentforanother
investigationandconclusionconcerningthesameconditions,totheendthattheymaybeprotected
againstcivilactionsresultingfromillegalacts.
Owing to conditions at times, a state of insurrection, rebellion, or invasion may arise suddenly and
may jeopardize the very existence of the State. Suppose, for example, that one of the thickly
populated Governments situated near this Archipelago, anxious to extend its power and territory,
should suddenly decide to invade these Islands, and should, without warning, appear in one of the
remote harbors with a powerful fleet and at once begin to land troops. The governor or military
commander of the particular district or province notifies the GovernorGeneral by telegraph (If this
landingoftroopsandthatthepeopleofthedistrictareincollusionwithsuchinvasion.Mightnotthe
GovernorGeneralandtheCommissionacceptthistelegramassufficientevidenceandproofofthe
factscommunicatedandatoncetakesteps,eventotheextentofsuspendingtheprivilegeofthewrit
ofhabeascorpus,asmightappeartothemtobenecessarytorepelsuchinvasion?Itseemsthatall
meninterestedinthemaintainanceandstabilityoftheGovernmentwouldanswerthisquestioninthe
affirmative.
But suppose some one, who has been arrested in the district upon the ground that his detention
would assist in restoring order and in repelling the invasion, applies for the writ of habeas corpus,
alleging that no invasion actually exists may the judicial department of the Government call the
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officers actually engaged in the field before it and away from their posts of duty for the purpose of
explaining and furnishing proof to it concerning the existence or nonexistence of the facts
proclaimedtoexistbythelegislativeandexecutivebranchesoftheState?Ifso,thenthecourtsmay
effectually tie the hands of the executive, whose special duty it is to enforce the laws and maintain
order,untiltheinvadershaveactuallyaccomplishedtheirpurpose.Theinterpretationcontendedfor
here by the applicants, so pregnant with detrimental results, could not have been intended by the
CongressoftheUnitedStateswhenitenactedthelaw.
ItisthedutyofthelegislativebranchoftheGovernmenttomakesuchlawsandregulationsaswill
effectually conserve peace and good order and protect the lives and property of the citizens of the
State.ItisthedutyoftheGovernorGeneraltotakesuchstepsashedeemswiseandnecessaryfor
thepurposeofenforcingsuchlaws.Everydelayandhindranceandobstaclewhichpreventsastrict
enforcementoflawsundertheconditionsmentionednecessarilytendstojeopardizepublicinterests
andthesafetyofthewholepeople.IfthejudicialdepartmentoftheGovernment,oranyofficerinthe
Government,hasarighttocontesttheordersofthePresidentoroftheGovernorGeneralunderthe
conditionsabovesupposed,beforecomplyingwithsuchorders,thenthehandsofthePresidentor
theGovernorGeneralmaybetieduntiltheveryobjectoftherebelsorinsurrectionsorinvadershas
beenaccomplished.ButitisurgedthatthePresident,ortheGovernorGeneralwiththeapprovalof
the Philippine Commission, might be mistaken as to the actual conditions that the legislative
department the Philippine Commission might, by resolution, declare after investigation, that a
stateofrebellion,insurrection,orinvasionexists,andthatthepublicsafetyrequiresthesuspension
oftheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpus, when, as a matter of fact, no such conditions actually
existed that the President, or GovernorGeneral acting upon the authority of the Philippine
Commission,mightbyproclamationsuspendtheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpuswithoutthere
actually existing the conditions mentioned in the act of Congress. In other words, the applicants
allege in their argument in support of their application for the writ of habeas corpus, that the
legislative and executive branches of the Government might reach a wrong conclusion from their
investigationsoftheactualconditions,ormight,throughadesiretooppressandharassthepeople,
declarethatastateofrebellion,insurrection,orinvasionexistedandthatpublicsafetyrequiredthe
suspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpuswhenactuallyandinfactnosuchconditions
didexist.Wecannotassumethatthelegislativeandexecutivebrancheswillactortakeanyaction
baseduponsuchmotives.
MoreoveritcannotbeassumedthatthelegislativeandexecutivebranchesoftheGovernment,with
allthemachinerywhichthosebrancheshaveattheircommandforexaminingintotheconditionsin
anypartoftheArchipelago,willfailtoobtainallexistinginformationconcerningactualconditions.Itis
thedutyoftheexecutivebranchoftheGovernmenttoconstantlyinformthelegislativebranchofthe
GovernmentoftheconditionoftheUnionastotheprevalenceofpeaceanddisorder.Theexecutive
branch of the Government, through its numerous branches of the civil and military, ramifies every
portion of the Archipelago, and is enabled thereby to obtain information from every quarter and
corneroftheState.Canthejudicialdepartmentofthegovernment,withitsverylimitedmachineryfor
thepurposeofinvestigatinggeneralconditions,beanymoresureofascertainingthetrueconditions
throughouttheArchipelago,orinanyparticulardistrict,thantheotherbranchesofthegovernment?
Wethinknot.(Atp.9196.)
xxxxxxxxx
ThesamegeneralquestionpresentedherewaspresentedtotheSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStatesinthecase
ofMartinvs.Mott,inJanuary,1827.AnactofCongressof1795provided
That whenever the United States shall be invaded or be in imminent danger of invasion from any
foreignnationorIndiantribe,itshallbelawfulforthePresidentoftheUnitedStatestocallforthsuch
numberofthemilitiaoftheStateorStatesmostconvenienttotheplaceofdangerorsceneofaction,
ashemayjudgenecessarytorepelsuchinvasion,andtoissuehisordersforthatpurposetosuch
officerorofficersofthemilitiaasheshallthinkproper.
Inthiscase(Martinvs.Mott)thequestionwaspresentedtothecourtwhetherornotthePresident's
actionincallingoutthemilitiawasconclusiveagainstthecourts.TheSupremeCourtoftheUnited
States,inansweringthisquestion,said:.
The power thus confided by Congress to the President is, doubtless, of a very high and delicate
nature.Afreepeoplearenaturallyjealousoftheexerciseofmilitarypowerandthepowertocallthe
militia into actual service is certainly felt to be one of no ordinary magnitude. But it is not a power
which can be executed without corresponding responsibility. It is, in its terms, a limited power,
confinedtocasesofactualinvasion,orofimminentdangerofinvasion.Ifitbealimitedpower,the
questionarises,Bywhomistheexigencytobeadjudgedofanddecided?IsthePresidentthesole
andexclusivejudgewhethertheexigencyhasarisen,orisittobeconsideredasanopenquestion,
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uponwhicheveryofficertowhomtheordersofthePresidentareaddressed,maydecideforhimself,
and equally open to be contested by very militiaman who shall refuse to obey the orders of the
President? We are all of the opinion that the authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen
belongsexclusivelytothePresidentandhisdecisionisconclusiveuponallotherpersons.Wethink
that this construction necessarily results from the nature of the power itself and from the manifest
object contemplated by the act of Congress. The power itself is to be exercised upon sudden
emergencies, upon great occasions of state and under circumstances which may be vital to the
existenceoftheUnion....IfasuperiorofficerhasarighttocontesttheordersofthePresident,upon
hisowndoubtsastotheexigencyhavingarisen,itmustbeequallytherightofeveryinferiorofficer
and soldier .... Such a course would be subversive of all discipline and expose the best disposed
officertothechancesoferroneouslitigation.Besides,inmanyinstances,theevidenceuponwhich
the President might decide that there is imminent danger of invasion might be of a nature not
constitutingstricttechnicalproof,orthedisclosureoftheevidencemightrevealimportantsecretsof
statewhichthepublicinterestandevensafetymightimperiouslydemandtobekeptinconcealment.
Whenever the statute gives a discretionary power to any person, to be exercised by him upon his
ownopinionofcertainfactsitisasoundruleofconstructionthatthestatuteconstituteshimthesole
andexclusivejudgeoftheexistenceofthosefacts.Andinthepresentcaseweareallofopinionthat
suchisthetrueconstructionoftheactof1795.Itisnoanswerthatsuchpowermaybeabused,for
there is no power which is not susceptible of abuse.' (Martin vs. Mott, 12 Wheat., 19 (25 U.S.)
Vanderheydenvs.Young,11Johns.,N.Y.150.)
Justice Joseph Story for many years a member of the Supreme Court of the United States, in
discussing the question who may suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under the
ConstitutionoftheUnitedStates,said:
Itwouldseem,asthepowerisgiventoCongresstosuspendthewritofhabeascorpusincasesof
rebellion, insurrection, or invasion, that the right to judge whether the exigency has arisen must
conclusivelybelongtothatbody.'(StoryontheConstitution,5thed.,see.1342.)
Justice James Ket, for many years a justice of the supreme court of the State of New York, in
discussingthesamequestion,citesthecaseofMartinvs.Mott,andsays:.
InthatcaseitwasdecidedandsettledbytheSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStatesthatitbelonged
exclusivelytothePresidenttojudgewhentheexigencyarisesinwhichhehadauthority,underthe
Constitution, to call forth the militia, and that his decision was conclusive upon all other persons.
(Kent'sCommentaries,14thed.,vol.1,bottomp.323.)
John Randolph Tucker, for many years a professor of constitutional and international law in
WashingtonandLeeuniversity,indiscussingthisquestion,said:.
By an act passed in 1795 Congress gave to the President power to call out the militia for certain
purposes, and by subsequent acts, in 1807, power was given to him to be exercised whenever he
should deem it necessary, for the purposes stated in the Constitution and the Supreme Court
(United States) has decided that this executive discretion in making the call (for State militia) could
notbejudiciallyquestioned.'TuckerontheConstitution,Vol.II,p.581.)
JohnNortonPomeroy,aneminentlawwriteruponconstitutionalquestions,said:.
In Martin vs. Mott it was decided that under the authority given to the President by the statute of
1795,callingforththemilitiaundercertaincircumstances,thepowerisexclusivelyvestedinhimto
determine whether those circumstances exist and when he has determined by issuing his call, no
courtcanquestionhisdecision.(Pomeroy'sConstitutionalLaw,sec.476.)
HenryCampbellBlack,awellknownwriterontheConstitution,says:
ByanearlyactofCongressitwasprovidedthatincaseofaninsurrectioninanyState
againstthegovernmentthereofitshallbelawfulforthePresidentoftheUnitedStates,
onapplicationofthelegislatureofsuchState,oroftheexecutive(whenthelegislature
can not be convened), to call forth such a number of the militia of any other State or
Statesasmaybeappliedfor,ashemayjudgesufficienttosuppresssuchinsurrection.
By this act the power of deciding whether the exigency has arisen upon which the
GovernmentoftheUnitedStatesisboundtointerfereisgiventothePresident.(Black's
ConstitutionalLaw,p.102.)
Judge Thomas M. Cooley, in discussing the right of the judicial department of the Government to
interfere with the discretionary action of the other departments of the Government, in his work on
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constitutionallaw,said:
CongressmayconferuponthePresidentthepowertocallthem(themilitia)forth,and
thismakeshimtheexclusivejudgewhethertheexigencyhasarisenfortheexerciseof
the authority and renders one who refuses to obey the call liable to punishment under
militarylaw.(Cooley'sPrinciplesofConstitutionalLaw,p.100.).
But it may be argued by those who contend for the contrary doctrine, to wit, that the acts of the Governor
General,withtheapprovalofthePhilippineCommission,arenotconclusiveuponthecourtsandthatnoneofthe
foregoing citations are exactly in point, that none of these cases or authors treat of a case exactly like the one
presented. We are fortunate, however, in being able to cite, in answer to that contention, the case of Henry
WilliamBoyle,whereexactlythesamequestionwaspresentedtothesupremecourtoftheStateofIdaho,which
theapplicantspresenthereandwherethecourtsheldthedoctrineofthecasesapplied.InthecaseofBoyle,he
hadbeenarrestedaftertheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpushadbeensuspended.Heappliedforawritof
habeascorpustothesupremecourtofIdaho,alleging,amongotherthings,inhisapplication:
First:That'noinsurrection,riot,orrebellionnowexistsinShoshone
County'and
Second.That'theGovernorhasnoauthoritytoproclaimmartiallaworsuspendthewritofhabeas
corpus.
Inreplytothiscontentiononthepartoftheapplicant,Boyle,thecourtsaid:
Counselhavearguedablyandingeniouslyuponthequestionastowhethertheauthoritytosuspend
the writ of habeas corpus rests with the legislative and executive powers of the Government, but,
fromourviewsofthiscase,thatquestioncutsnofigure.Weareoftheopinionthatwhenever,forthe
purpose of putting down insurrection or rebellion, the exigencies of the case demand it, with the
successful accomplishment of this end in view, it is entirely competent for the executive or for the
militaryofficerincommand,iftherebesuch,eithertosuspendthewritordisregarditifissued.The
statutes of this State (Idaho) make it the duty of the governor, whenever such a state or condition
existsastheproclamationofthegovernorshowsdoesexistinShoshoneCounty,toproclaimsuch
locality in a state of insurrection and to call in the aid of the military of the State or of the Federal
Governmenttosuppresssuchinsurrectionandreestablishpermanentlytheascendencyofthelaw.It
would be an absurdity to say that the action of the executive, under such circumstances, may be
negativedandsetatnaughtbythejudiciary,orthattheactionoftheexecutivemaybeinterferedwith
orimpugnedbythejudiciary.Ifthecourtsaretobemadeasanctuary,aseatofrefugewhereunto
malefactorsmayfallforprotectionfrompunishmentjustlydueforthecommissionofcrimetheywill
soonceasetobethatpalladiumoftherightsofthecitizensoablydescribedbycounsel.
On application for a writ of habeas corpus, the truth of recitals of alleged facts in a proclamation
issuedbythegovernorproclaimingacertaincountytobeinastateofinsurrectionandrebellionwill
notbeinquiredintoorreviewed.TheactionofthegovernorindeclaringShoshoneCountytobein
stateofinsurrectionandrebellion,andhisactionincallingtohisaidthemilitaryforcesoftheUnited
Statesforthepurposeofrestoringgoodorderandthesupremacyofthelaw,hastheeffecttoputin
force,toalimitedextent,martiallawinsaidcounty.SuchactionisnotinviolationoftheConstitution,
but in harmony with it, being necessary for the preservation of government. In such case the
Governmentmay,likeanindividualactinginselfdefense,takethosestepsnecessarytopreserveits
existence. If hundreds of men can assemble themselves and destroy property and kill and injure
citizens,thusdefeatingtheendsofgovernment,andtheGovernmentisunabletotakealllawfuland
necessary steps to restore law and maintain order, the State will then be impotent if not entirely
destroyed,andanarchyplacedinitsstead.
It having been demonstrated to the satisfaction of the governor, after some six or seven years of
experience,thattheexecutionofthelawsinShoshoneCountythroughtheordinaryandestablished
means and methods was rendered practically impossible, it became his duty to adopt the means
prescribed by the statute for establishing in said county the supremacy of the law and insuring the
punishment of those by whose unlawful and criminal acts such a condition of things has been
broughtaboutanditisnottheprovinceofthecourtstointerfere,delay,orplaceobstructionsinthe
pathofdutyprescribedbylawfortheexecutive,butrathertorenderhimalltheaidandassistancein
theirpower,inhiseffortstobringabouttheconsummationmostdevoutlyprayedforbyeverygood,
lawabidingcitizenintheState.'(InreBoyle,45L.R.A.,1899,832.)(Atpp.99104.).
These observations are followed on pages 104 to 115 by a compilation of decided cases centrally holding that
"whenevertheConstitutionorastatutegivesadiscretionarypowertoanyperson,tobeexercisedbyhimupon
hisownopinionofcertainfacts,suchpersonistobeconsideredthesoleandexclusivejudgeoftheexistenceof
thosefacts."Forthesakeofbrevity,Weshallnotquotethediscussionanymore.Weareconfidenttherecanbe
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nodissentinsofarasthegeneralpropositionstatedisconcerned.
Notably, in the unanimous decision of this Court in Montenegro, these views are totally adopted in a very brief
passagethus:
B. In his second proposition appellant insists there is no state of invasion, insurrection, rebellion or
imminent danger thereof. 'There are' he admits 'intermittent sorties and lightning attacks by
organized bands in different places' but, he argues, 'such sorties are occassional, localized and
transitory.Andtheproclamationspeaksnomorethanofovertactsofinsurrectionandrebellion,not
ofcasesofinvasion,insurrectionorrebellionorimminentdangerthereof.'Onthissubjectitisnoted
that the President concluded from the facts recited in the proclamation, and others connected
therewith, that 'there is actual danger of rebellion which may extend throughout the country.' Such
official declaration implying much more than imminent danger of rebellion amply justifies the
suspensionofthewrit.
Tothepetitioner'sunpracticedeyetherepeatedencountersbetweendissidentelementsandmilitary
troops may seem sporadic, isolated or casual. But the officers charged with the Nation's security
analyzed the extent and pattern of such violent clashes and arrived at the conclusion that they are
warpandwoofofageneralschemetooverthrowthisgovernmentvietarmis,byforceandarms.
AndweagreewiththeSolicitorGeneralthatinthelightoftheviewsoftheUnitedStatesSupreme
CourtthruMarshall,TaneyandStoryquotedwithapprovalinBarcelonvs.Baker(5Phil.,87,pp.98
an100)theauthoritytodecidewhethertheexigencyhasarisenrequiringsuspensionbelongstothe
Presidentand'hisdecisionisfinalandconclusiveuponthecourtsanduponallotherpersons.
IndeedasJusticeJohnsonsaidinthatdecision,whereastheExecutivebranchoftheGovernmentis
enabled thru its civil and military branches to obtain information about peace and order from every
quarterandcornerofthenation,thejudicialdepartment,withitsverylimitedmachinerycannotbein
betterpositiontoascertainorevaluatetheconditionsprevailingintheArchipelago.(Atpp.886887.)
There are actually many more judicial precedents and opinions of knowledgeable and authoritative textwriters,
thatcanbecopiedhere,maintainingwithinexorablelogicwhytheExecutiveisincomparablybestequippedand
prepared to cope with internal and external aggression and that, indeed, the protection of the country against
such contingencies is his sole responsibility not supposed to be shared by the Judiciary. But the proposition
appearstoUssoplainandineluctablethattosummonallofthemtoOurassistancecouldonlyopenUstothe
suspicion that the Philippine Supreme Court has to depend on borrowed thinking to resolve the most critical
issues between individual rights, on the one hand, and state power exerted as a matter of selfdefense against
rebellion and subversion imperilling the country's own survival, on the other. Emphatically, We don't have to.
ThankGodWehaveenoughnativegeniusandindigenousmeansandresourcestocopewiththemostdelicate
problemsofstatehood.LetotherslistentoandabidebytheplatitudinousandelegantlyphraseddictainMilligan,
supra, Duncan and White, 14 they who are in and of the wealthiest and mightiest power in the world, that only actual
military combat and related operations can justify martial law, but We, who are in and of a small and weak developing
nation,letushearkenandfollowthehomespunadviceofourbarriofolkscautioningeveryonethus:
Kungangbahaymoaypawidatkawayanpagdilimngulapatlumalakasnaanghangingmagsaraka
nangbintanaatsuhayanmoangiyongbahay.(Whenyourhouseismadeofnipaandbamboo,and
you see the clouds darkening and the winds start blowing, it is time for you to close your windows
andstrengthenthesupportofyourhouse.)
ThiscouldexplainwhyundertheConstitution,martiallawcanbedeclarednotonlyincaseofactualrebellion,but
evenonlywhenthereisimminentdangerthereof.AndthatiswhytheopencourtruleestablishedinMilliganand
reiteratedinDuncanandWhiteisnotcontrollinginthisjurisdiction.
Besides,inasmuchasourpeoplehaveincludedintheConstitutionanexpresscommitmentofthepowertothe
President,whydoWehavetoresorttothepronouncementsofothercourtsofothercountrieswhereinsaidpower
isonlyimplied?RegardlessofwhatothercourtsbelievetheirExecutivemaydoinemergencies,ourtaskisnotto
slavishlyadoptwhatthosecourtshavesaid,forthereisnoevidencethatsuchwastheintentofourconstitutional
fathers. gather, We should determine for Ourselves what is best for our own circumstances in the Philippines,
evenifWehavetogivedueconsiderationtotheexperienceotherpeopleshavegonethroughundermoreorless
similarcrisesinthepast.
Inanyevent,regardlessoftheirweightinsofarasthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpusis
concerned, We consider the reasons given in the abovequoted opinions in Barcelon and Montenegro of
particularrelevancewhenitcomestotheimpositionofmartiallaw.
4
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Itmaybethattheexistenceornonexistenceorimminenceofarebellionofthemagnitudethatwouldjustifythe
imposition of martial law is an objective fact capable of judicial notice, for a rebellion that is not of general
knowledgetothepubliccannotconceivablybedangeroustopublicsafety.Butpreciselybecauseitiscapableof
judicialnotice,noinquiryisneededtodeterminetheproprietyoftheExecutive'saction.
Again,whiletheexistenceofarebellionmaybewidelyknown,itsrealextentandthedangersitmayactuallypose
to the public safety are not always easily perceptible to the unpracticed eye. In the present day practices of
rebellion, its inseparable subversion aspect has proven to be more effective and important than "the rising (of
persons) publicly and taking arms against the Government" by which the Revised Penal Code characterizes
rebellionasacrimeunderitssanction(Art.134,RevisedPenalCode).Subversionissuchacovertkindofanti
governmentactivitythatitisverydifficultevenforarmyintelligencetodetermineitsexactareaofinfluenceand
effect, not to mention the details of its forces and resources. By subversion, the rebels can extend their field of
action unnoticed even up to the highest levels of the government, where no one can always be certain of the
politicalcomplexionofthemannexttohim,andthisdoesnotexcludethecourts.Arms,ammunitionsandallkinds
of war equipment travel and are transferred in deep secrecy to strategic locations, which can be one's
neighborhood without him having any idea of what is going on. There are so many insidious ways in which
subversives act, in fact too many to enumerate, but the point that immediately suggests itself is that they are
mostlyincapableofbeingprovenincourt,sohowareWetomakeajudicialinquiryaboutthemthatcansatisfy
ourjudicialconscience?
The Constitution definitely commits it to the Executive to determine the factual bases and to forthwith act as
promptly as possible to meet the emergencies of rebellion and invasion which may be crucial to the life of the
nation.Hemustdothiswithunwaveringconviction,oranyhesitancyorindecisiononhispartwillsurelydetract
fromtheneededprecisioninhischoiceofthemeanshewouldemploytorepeltheaggression.Theapprehension
thathisdecisionmightbeheldbytheSupremeCourttobeatransgressionofthefundamentallawhehassworn
to"defendandpreserve"woulddeterhimfromactingwhenpreciselyitismosturgentandcriticalthatheshould
act, since the enemy is about to strike the mortal blow. Different men can honestly and reasonably vary in
assessing the evidentiary value of the same circumstance, and the prospect of being considered as a
constitutional felon rather than a saviour of the country should the Justices disagree with him, would put the
Executiveinanunenviablepredicament,certainlyunwiseandimprudentforanyConstitutiontocontemplatehe
should be in. But what is worse is that the Court is not equipped in any way with the means to adequately
appreciatetheinsidiouspracticesofsubversion,nottosaythatitcannotdoitwithmoreoratleastequalaccuracy
as the Executive. Besides, the Court would then be acting already with considerable hindsight considerations
whichcanimperceptiblyinfluenceitsjudgmentinoverridingtheExecutive'sfinding.
More than ever before, when rebellion was purely a surface action, and viewing the matter from all angles, it
appearsineludiblethattheCourtshouldrefrainfrominterferingwiththeExecutive'sdelicatedecision.Afterall,the
sacredrightsofindividualsenshrinedintheBillofRightsandtheotherconstitutionalprocessesevervaluableto
thepeople,butwhichadmittedlycannot,bytheway,bemoreimportantthantheverysurvivalofthenation,are
not necessarily swept away by a state of martial law, for, as already pointed out earlier, the validity of the
Proclamation is one thing, the administration of the government under it is something else that has to be done
withtheclosestadherencetothefundamentallawthattheobviousnecessitiesofthesituationwillpermit.AsWe
seeit,itisinthissensethattheConstitutionisthesupremelawequallyintimesofpeaceandofwarandforall
classesofmen,ifWemustreferagaintopetitioners'relianceonMilligan.Atthesametime,letusnotoverlook,in
connectionwiththisfavoriteauthorityofpetitioners,thattheFederalSupremeCourt'spostulationtherein,thatit
was"happilyprovedbytheresultofthegreatefforttothrowoff(the)justauthority"oftheUnitedStatesduringthe
CivilWarthattheconstitutionofthatcountrycontainswithinitselfallthatisnecessaryforitspreservation,isnot
factuallyaccurate,foralltheworldknowsthatiftheAmericanUnionsurvivedtheordealofpossibledisintegration
and is the great nation that she is today, it was not because President Lincoln confined himself strictly to the
powers vested in the presidency by the constitution, but because he was wise enough to resort to inherent
extraconstitutionalstateprerogatives,exercisablebytheExecutivealone,whichPresidentMarcosdidnothaveto
do, considering that our Constitution expressly confers upon him the authority to utilize such state power in
defenseofthenation.
5
ThehistoricaldevelopmentofthepowersofthePhilippineExecutiveunmistakablypointstothesamedirection.
Practically all the constitutions that came into being during the revolutionary period before the turn of the last
century,ofwhichtheMalolosConstitutionistypical,eitherentrustedexecutivepowertoacommissionormade
the Executive largely dependent on the legislature. When the Americans ended their military occupation, after
subduing the Aguinaldo forces of independence, they had their own version of governmental powers. In the
Philippine Bill of 1902, nothing was mentioned about martial law, and the power of the Governor General to
suspendtheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpus was conditioned on, among other things, the concurrence of
thePhilippineCommissionofwhich,notably,theGovernorGeneralwasthehead.Whenin1905,theGovernor
GeneralsuspendedthePrivilegeintheprovincesofCaviteandBatangas,thecaseofBarcelonvs.Baker,supra,
arose. Over the dissent of Justice Willard who invoked Milligan, the Supreme Court held that the proclamation
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orderingsuchsuspensionwasnotreviewablebytheJudiciary.
Withalittletouchofirony,in1916,whentheUnitedStatesCongress,withtheavowedintentofgrantinggreater
politicalautonomytothePhilippines,enactedtheJonesLaw,itremovedtheneedforlegislativeconcurrencein
regardstothesuspensionofthePrivilege,becausethelegislaturewastobeinFilipinohands,andinadditionto
preserving such power of suspension, granted the GovernorGeneral the sole authority to declare martial law,
subjectonlytorevocationbythePresidentoftheUnitedStates.Withoutforgettingthatatthattime,theGovernor
GeneralbeingthenanAmerican,thosepowersservedasweaponsofthecolonizertoconsolidateitsholdonthe
subjectpeople,suchplenitudeofpowerintheExecutivewastoappearlatertotheFilipinoleadersassomething
thatshouldbeadoptedinourfundamentallaw.SoitwasthatintheConstitutionalConventionof1934,thefirst
thePhilippineseverheldinpeacetime,thedelegates,drawingheavilyfromtheexperienceofthecountryduring
the autonomous period of the Jones Law, and perchance persuaded in no small measure by the personality of
President Manuel L. Quezon, lost no time in adopting the concept of a strong executive. Their decision was
studiedanddeliberate.Indeed,itistheunanimousobservationofallstudentsofourConstitution,thatunderit,we
have in the Philippines the strongest executive in the world. Fully aware of this feature and appearing rather
elatedbytheapparentsuccessofthedelegatestoreconcilethepossibleevilsofdictatorshipwiththeneedofan
executive who "will not only know how to govern, but will actually govern", President Claro M. Recto of the
ConventionremarkedinhisvaledictoryaddressadjourningtheAssemblyasfollows:
DuringthedebateontheExecutivePoweritwasthealmostunanimousopinionthatwehadinvested
the Executive with rather extraordinary prerogatives. There is much truth in this assertion. But it is
becausewecannotbeinsensibletotheeventsthataretranspiringaroundus,eventswhich,whenall
is said and done, are nothing but history repeating itself. In fact, we have seen how dictatorships,
whether black or red, capitalistic or proletarian, fascistic or communistic, ancient or modern, have
served as the last refuge of peoples when their parliaments fail and they are already powerless to
savethemselvesfrommisgovernmentandchaos.Learningourlessonfromthetruthofhistory,and
determinedtospareourpeopletheevilsofdictatorshipandanarchy,wehavethoughtitprudentto
establish an executive power which, subject to the fiscalization of the Assembly, and of public
opinion, will not only know how to govern, but will actually govern, with a firm and steady hand,
unembarrassed by vexations, interferences by other departments, or by unholy alliances with this
and that social group. Thus, possessed with the necessary gifts of honesty and competence, this
Executive will be able to give his people an orderly and progressive government, without need of
usurpingorabdicatingpowers,andcunningsubterfugeswillnotavailtoextenuatehisfailuresbefore
the bar of public opinion." ("The Philippine Constitution Sources, Making, Meaning, and
Application"publishedbythePhilippineLawyers'Association,p.540.)
Ofparticularrelevancetothepresentdiscussionisthefactthatwhenanattemptwasmadebyafewdelegates
ledbyDelegateSalvadorAranetaofManilatosubjecttheExecutive'spowertosuspendtheprivilegeofthewritof
habeas corpus to concurrence or review by the National Assembly and the Supreme Court, the effort did not
prosper,therebystronglyindicating,ifitdidnotmakeitindubitablydefinite,thattheintentoftheframersofthe
fundamental law is that the Executive should be the sole judge of the circumstances warranting the exercise of
the power thus granted. In any event, the only evidence of any thinking within the convention advocating the
revocationoftheBarcelondoctrineofwhichtogetherwithMilligan,theywereoroughttohavebeenaware,what
withthebestknownlawyersinthePhilippinesintheirmidst,collapsedwiththerejectionoftheAranetaproposal.
ItwasinthelightofthishistoricaldevelopmentoftheExecutivePowerthatin1951,theSupremeCourtdecided
unanimously the case of Montenegro vs. Castaeda, supra, reiterating the doctrine of conclusiveness of the
Executive'sfindingsintheBarceloncase.
Forallthatitmaybeworthyofmentionhere,ifonlybecausepracticallythesameFilipinominds,ledbyPresident
Jose P. Laurel, were largely responsible for its formulation, the Constitution of the Second Philippine Republic
bornunderaegisoftheJapaneseoccupationofthePhilippinesduringtheSecondWorldWar,providedalsofora
strongexecutive.Onthispoint,PresidentLaurelhimselfhadthefollowingtosay:
ThefundamentalreasonandnecessityforthecreationofapoliticalcenterofgravityundertheRepublicisthat,in
anyformofgovernmentandthisisespeciallytrueinanemergency,inanationalcrisistheremustbeaman
responsibleforthesecurityofthestate,theremustbeamanwithadequatepowers,tofaceanygivensituation
and meet the problems of the nation. There must be no shifting of responsibility there must be no evasion of
responsibilityandifagovernmentistobearealgovernmentandascientificgovernmenttheremustbenotwo
centersofgravitybutone.(2O.G.[J.M.A.],873[1943].)"(ThePhilippinePresidencybyIreneR.Cortes,p.14.).
TheforegoingisalogicalfollowupofwhatLaurelhadsaidinthe1934Conventionthus:
...Astrongexecutiveheisintendedtobe,becauseastrongexecutiveweshallneed,especiallyintheearlyyears
of our independent, or semiindependent existence. A weak executive is synonymous with a weak government.
Heshallnotbea'monarch'oradictatorintimeofprofoundandOctavianpeace,buthevirtuallysobecomesin
an extraordinary emergency and whatever may be his position, he bulwarks normally, the fortifications of a
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strongconstitutionalgovernment,butabnormally,inextremecases,heissuddenlyusheredinasaMinerva,full
grownandinfullpanoplyofwar,tooccupythevantageground"thereadyprotectoranddefenderofthelifeand
honorofhisnation.(Emphasissupplied.)(ThePhilippineConstitution,publishedbythePhil.LawyersAssociation,
Vol.1,1969Ed.,p.183.).
Thus,itisnotsurprisingatallthatwithoutchangingonewordintheprovisiongrantingtotheExecutivethepower
to cope with the emergencies under discussion, the 1971 Convention fortified thru related provisions in the
transitoryportionoftheConstitutiontheapplicabilityoftheBarcelonandMontenegroconceptsoftheExecutive's
power, as applied to the imposition of martial law, thereby weakening pro tanto as will be seen in the following
pages,theimpactofOurLansangdoctrine,forthepurposesofthepreciseissuenowbeforeUs.
At this juncture, it may be pointed out that the power granted to the Executive to place the country or any part
thereofundermartiallawisindependentofthelegislativegranttohimofemergencyPowersauthorizedunderthe
followingprovisionofthe1935Constitution:
Sec. 26. In times of war or other national emergency, the Congress may by law authorize the
President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to promulgate
rulesandregulationstocarryoutadeclarednationalpolicy.(Art.VI,sec.26,1935Constitution.).
Thisprovisioniscopiedverbatiminthe1973CharterexceptforthereferencetothePrimeMinisterinsteadofto
thePresidentandtheadditionofthefollowingsentenceindicatingmoreemphaticallythetemporarynatureofthe
delegation:
UnlesssoonerwithdrawnbyresolutionoftheNationalAssembly,suchpowersshallceaseuponits
nextadjournment.(Section15,ArticleVIII,1973ConstitutionofthePhilippines.)
The point that immediately surges to the mind upon a reading of this provision is that in times of war or other
nationalemergencyitisdefinitelytotheExecutivethatthepeoplethruthefundamentallawentrusttherunningof
thegovernment,eitherbydelegationofthelegislativepowertohimthruanexpressenactmentoftheLegislature
tothateffectorbydirectauthorizationfromtheConstitutionitselftoutilizeallthepowersofgovernmentshouldhe
find it necessary to place the country or any part thereof under martial law. Additional evidence of such clear
intentisthefactthatinthecourseofthedeliberationsintheConstitutionalConventionof1934oftheproposalto
incorporatetheaboveprovisioninthecharter,DelegateWenceslaoVinzonsofCamarinesNortemovedtodelete
thesameforfearthattheconcentrationofpowersinonemanmayfacilitatetheemergenceofadictatorship.He
saidinpart:
Thepowertopromulgaterulesandregulationsintimesofemergencyorwarisnotrecognizedinany
constitution except, perhaps, the Constitution of Denmark, which provides that in case of special
urgency the King may, when the Reichstag is not in session, issue laws of temporary application.
Such laws, however, shall not be contrary to the Constitution, and they shall be submitted to the
Reichstaginitsnextsession.So,eveninakingdomlikeDenmark,thepowersoftheKingarelimited
intimesofemergency.
Under the Constitution we are drafting now, there is absolutely no limit except when the National
Assemblyspecifiesattheinceptionofthegrantofpower.
Iwanttowarn,Mr.President,ofafutureconditioninourRepublicwhenweshallnolongerbeunder
thetutelageofanyforeignpower,whenweshallhavetoworkforourowndestiny.IwanttosaythatI
am not very positive in stating here that we shall have a dictatorship because the structure of the
government that we are creating permits its establishment, but the power to promulgate rules and
regulationswillgiverisetoastrongmanwhomay,inadesiretogratifyhispersonalambitions,seize
thereinsofgovernment."(Page391,VolumeFive,ThePhilippineConstitution,ItsOrigins,Making,
Meaning,andApplication,apublicationofthePhilippineLawyersAssociation,1972.).
Despitesucheloquentwarning,theassemblyvoteddownhismotion.
Itisnowcontendedthatinsteadofdeclaringmartiallaw,PresidentMarcosshouldhavesoughtfromCongressthe
approvalofanemergencypowersactsimilartoCommonwealthActs600and671passedrespectivelyonAugust
19,1940,longbeforetheJapaneseinvasion,andDecember16,1941,whentheNipponArmywasalreadyonits
waytoManilafromLingayenandotherlandingpointsintheNorth.
Tostartwith,Congresswasnotunawareoftheworseningconditionsofpeaceandorderandof,atleast,evident
insurgency,whatwiththenumerouseasilyverifiablereportsofopenrebelliousactivitiesindifferentpartsofthe
countryandtheseriesofralliesanddemonstrations,oftenbloody,inManilaitselfandothercentersofpopulation,
including those that reached not only the portals but even the session hall of the legislature, but the legislators
seemed not to be sufficiently alarmed or they either were indifferent or did not know what to do under the
circumstances.Insteadoftakingimmediatemeasurestoalleviatetheconditionsdenouncedanddecriedbythe
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rebelsandtheactivists,theydebatedandarguedlongonpalliativeswithoutcomingoutwithanythingsubstantial,
muchlesssatisfactoryintheeyesofthosewhowereseditiouslyshoutingforreforms.Inanyevent,inthefaceof
theinabilityofCongresstomeetthesituation,andpromptedbyhisappraisalofacriticalsituationthaturgently
called for immediate action, the only alternative open to the President was to resort to the other constitutional
sourceofextraordinarypowers,theConstitutionitself.
ItissignificanttonotethatCommonwealthAct671grantedthePresidentpracticallyallthepowersof
government.Itprovidedasfollows:
Sec. 1. The existence of war between the United States and other countries of Europe and Asia,
whichinvolvesthePhilippines,makesitnecessarytoinvestthePresidentwithextraordinarypowers
inordertomeettheresultingemergency.
Sec.2.PursuanttotheprovisionsofArticleVI,section16,oftheConstitution,thePresidentishereby
authorized,duringtheexistenceoftheemergency,topromulgatesuchrulesandregulationsashe
maydeemnecessarytocarryoutthenationalpolicydeclaredinsection1hereof.Accordinglyheis,
amongotherthings,empowered(a)totransfertheseatoftheGovernmentoranyofitssubdivisions,
branches, departments, offices, agencies or instrumentalities (b) to reorganize the Government of
the Commonwealth including the determination of the order of precedence of the heads of the
ExecutiveDepartments(c)tocreatenewsubdivisions,branches,departments,offices,agenciesor
instrumentalitiesofgovernmentandtoabolishanyofthosealreadyexisting(d)tocontinueinforce
laws and appropriations which would lapse or otherwise become inoperative, and to modify or
suspendtheoperationorapplicationofthoseofanadministrativecharacter(e)toimposenewtaxes
ortoincrease,reduce,suspend,orabolishthoseinexistence(f)toraisefundsthroughtheissuance
ofbondsorotherwise,andtoauthorizetheexpenditureoftheproceedsthereof(g)toauthorizethe
National, provincial, city or municipal governments to incur in overdrafts for purposes that he may
approve(h)todeclarethesuspensionofthecollectionofcreditsorthepaymentofdebtsand(i)to
exercise such other powers as he may deem necessary to enable the Government to fulfill its
responsibilitiesandtomaintainandenforceitsauthority.
Sec. 3. The President of the Philippines shall as soon as practicable upon the convening of the
CongressofthePhilippinesreporttheretoalltherulesandregulationspromulgatedbyhimunderthe
powershereingranted.
Sec. 4. This act shall take effect upon its approval, and the rules and regulations promulgated
hereundershallbeinforceandeffectuntiltheCongressofthePhilippinesshallotherwiseprovide.
Fromthisextensivegrantofimmensepowers,itmaybededucedthatthedifferencebetweenmartiallawandthe
delegationoflegislativepowercouldbejustamatterofprocedureinthattheinvestmentofauthorityintheformer
isbytheConstitutionwhileinthelatteritisbytheLegislature.Theresultingconstitutionalsituationisthesamein
bothgovernmentbytheExecutive.Itcanbesaidthateventheprimacyofmilitaryassistanceinthedischargeof
governmentresponsibilitieswouldbecoveredbytheexerciseofthedelegatedauthorityfromCongress.
What is most important, however, is that the Constitution does not prohibit the declaration of martial law just
becauseoftheauthoritygiventotheLegislativetoinvesttheExecutivewithextraordinarypowers.Itisnottobe
supposedthatinthefaceoftheinabilityorrefusaloftheLegislaturetoact,thepeopleshouldbelefthelplessand
withoutagovernmenttocopewiththeemergencyofaninternalorexternalaggression.Muchlessisitlogicalto
maintain that it is the Supreme Court that is called upon to decide what measures should be taken in the
premises.Indeed,thefundamentallawlookstotheExecutivetomakethechoiceofthemeansnotonlytorepel
the aggression but, as a necessary consequence, to undertake such curative measures and reforms as are
immediatelyavailableandfeasibletopreventtherecurrenceofthecausesoftheemergency.
Petitioners are capitalizing on the pronouncements of this Court in Lansang. We feel, however, that such
excessiverelianceisnotaltogetherwellplaced.
TheexactimportoftheLansangdoctrineisthatitiswithintheconstitutionalprerogativeoftheSupremeCourtto
inquireintotheveracityofthefactualbasesrecitedbytheExecutiveinaproclamationorderingthesuspensionof
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, for the purpose of determining whether or not the Executive acted
arbitrarilyinconcludingfromtheevidencebeforehimthattherewasindeedarebellionandthatpublicnecessity,
ascontemplatedintheConstitution,requiredsuchsuspension.Inotherwords,Weheldthereinthattheissueof
legality or illegality of a proclamation suspending the Privilege is a justiciable one, in regard to which the Court
couldmakeindependentfindingsbasedontheevidenceonwhichthePresidenthimselfacted.Actually,however,
norealhearingwasheldforthepurposeinthatcase.Whatmightperhapsbeconsideredassuchahearingwas
what took place on October 28 and 29,1971, when, because of the willingness expressed by the respondents
therein to impart to the Court classified information relevant to the cases, subject to appropriate security
measures,theCourtmetbehindcloseddoors,andinthepresenceofthreeattorneysrepresentingthepetitioners
therein and the Solicitor General it was briefed by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces and other ranking
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military officials on said classified information, after which the parties were granted time to file their respective
memorandaofobservationsonthemattersrevealedinthebriefing,whichtheydid.(See42SCRA,atpp.466
467). In the present cases there has been no such hearing, not even a briefing wherein petitioners were
represented. And it is gravely doubtful whether any move in that direction would prosper, considering there are
not enough members of the Court, who believe in the juridical relevance thereof, to constitute the required
majorityforabindingactiontoordersuchahearingorevenjustasimilarbriefingasbefore.
Bethatasitmay,theimportantpointisthatLansangreferredtotheextentofthepowersoftheCourtinregardto
aproclamationsuspendingthePrivilegewhereaswhatisbeforeUsnowisaproclamationimposingmartiallaw.
We hold that the powers of the Executive involved in the two proclamations are not of the same constitutional
level and the prerogatives of the Court relative to habeas corpus are distinct from those in the perspective of
martiallaw.
To start with, it is too evident to admit of dispute that the aforequoted constitutional provision touching on the
threepowersoftheExecutive,thecallingofthearmedforces,thesuspensionoftheprivilegeandtheimposition
of martial law contemplates varying and ascending degrees of lawlessness and public disorder. While it is true
thattextuallyanyofthethreecoursesofactionmentionedmaybetakenbytheExecutiveontheoccasionofan
invasion,insurrectionorrebellion,thedegreeofresultingrepressionofindividualrightsundereachofthemvaries
sosubstantiallythatitcannotbedoubtedthattheconstitutioncontemplatesthatthedeterminationastowhichof
themshouldbetakenshoulddependonthedegreeofgravityoftheprevailingsituation.Inotherwords,itisthe
actualmagnitudeoftherebelliontobesuppressedandthedegreeandextentofdangertopublicsafetyresulting
therefromthatdetermineswhetheritshouldbethefirst,thesecondorthethirdthatshouldbetakeninorderthat
theremaybeadirectproportionbetweenthedegreeofgravityofthecrisisandtherestraintofindividualrights
andliberties.Whenthesituationisnotveryseriousbutisneverthelessbeyondthecontroloftheregularpeace
authoritiesoftheplaceaffected,thenthearmedforcescanbecalled.Shouldtheconditionsdeteriorateinsucha
way as to involve a considerable segment of the population, thereby making it difficult to maintain order and to
differentiatetheloyalFromthedisloyalamongthepeople,withoutdetainingsomeofthem,eitherpreventivelyor
fortheirdeliverytotheproperauthoritiesaftertheemergencyorassoonasiteases,thentheprivilegeofthewrit
ofhabeascorpusmayalsobesuspended.Butthemomentthesituationassumesveryseriousproportions,tothe
extent that there is a breakdown of the regular government machinery either because the officials cannot
physicallyfunctionortheirfunctioningwouldendangerpublicsafety,martiallawmaybeimposed.Thereisthusa
markedgradationofthecircumstancesconstitutingrebellionanddangertopublicsafetyintheprovision,anditis
tobesupposedthatthemeasuretobeadoptedbytheExecutiveshouldbethatwhichthesituationdemands.
ThecallingofthearmedforcesisdonebytheExecutiveinhiscapacityasCommanderinChief.Thepowerthus
exercisedispurelyexecutiveanddoesnotcauseanydisturbanceintheconstitutionalorderinthegovernment.In
the case of suspension of the Privilege, individual rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights are restrained, but
otherwise the regular constitutional machinery and the powers and functions of the different officials of the
government, including the courts, remain unaffected. Moreover, the suspension of the Privilege, although
premised on the demand of public safety, need not be necessarily predicated on the requirements of national
securityasshouldbethecasewithmartiallaw.Again,thepowerexercisedinsuspensionisexecutivepowerand
nothing more. But when martial law is proclaimed, there is, as already observed earlier, a surrogation of the
regulargovernmentmachinerybytheconstitutionallydesignatedadministratorwiththeaidofthemilitary.Whatis
exercisedinthisinstanceisnotexecutivepoweralonebutstatepowerwhichinvolvesthetotalityofgovernment
authority,butwithoutanactualmilitarytakeover,ifonlybecausethecivilianPresidentremainsatthehead.
Inthisconnection,itisveryimportanttonotethatwhereastheBillofRightsexplicitlyprohibitsthesuspensionof
thePrivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpus except under the detailed circumstances prescribed therein, including
thelimitationsastothetimeandplacewhenandwhereitmaystaysuspended,thereisnosimilarinjunctionin
regard to the imposition of martial law. In other words, the grant of the power to declare martial law in the
ExecutiveportionoftheConstitutionisnotcountered,unlikeinthecaseofhabeascorpus,byaprohibitioninthe
BillofRights,thesanctuaryofindividualliberties.
InvokingLansang,petitionersarguethatifanorderofsuspensionofthePrivilegewhichinvolveslessrepression
ofconstitutionalprocessesthanmartiallawisreviewablebythecourts,withmorereasonshouldtheimpositionof
martiallaw,whoseeffectupontheconstitutionalrightsandprocessesismorepervasive,besubjecttoajudicial
testofconstitutionality.Viewingitfromtheangleofindividualrights,theargumentsoundsplausible,butwhenitis
considered that the framers of the Bill of Rights never bothered to put the same or any similar breaks to the
impositionofmartiallawasthatwhichtheyplacedinregardtosuspension,itcanbereadilyseenthatbecauseof
thegravityofthecrisispredicatingtheextremeremedyofmartiallaw,theconstitutionitselfmakestheinvocation
of individual rights subordinate to the national interest involved in the defense of the state against the internal
aggression that confronts it. From this consideration, it follows that whatever standard of constitutionality was
established by the Court in Lansang relative to Suspension is not necessarily the measure of the powers the
Court can exercise over the Executive's proclamation of martial law. What the Constitution purposely and with
goodreasondifferentiates,theCourtmaynotequate.
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At any rate, We do not believe this is the proper occasion for the Court to alter or modify what We said in
Lansang. All that We say here is that Lansang does not reach the martial law powers of the Executive, if only
becausethatcaseinvolvedexclusivelythequestionoflegalityofthedetention,duringtheSuspension,ofsome
individuals,thepetitionerstherein,whereashereWearedealingwiththedeprivationoflibertyofpetitionersasa
directconsequenceofmartiallaw,andineffecttherealquestionbeforeUsnowisthelegalityofthemartiallaw
regime itself, which, as already demonstrated, occupies a different level in the constitutional order of Executive
power,speciallywhenconsideredfromthepointofviewoftheBillofRights.
But even if We must refer to the considerations of the Court in formulating Lansang, We cannot disregard the
impactofcontemporaryconstitutionaldevelopmentsrelatedthereto.TheConventionof1971hadbarelystarted
itsrelevantdeliberationswhenLansangwasdecided.Itistobeassumedthatthedelegateswerewellinformed
about its import. Indeed, they must have focused their attention thereto when martial law was proclaimed in
September of 1972, if only because some of the delegates were apprehended and detained and had forthwith
filed the petitions now pending before Us. The delegates knew or ought to have known that under the existing
Constitution,theBillofRightsmadenomentionofthepossibleimpositionofmartiallawinthesectionprohibiting
thesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpus.Insteadofseeingtoitthatinthechartertheywere
draftingtheprohibitionastohabeascorpusshouldbeextendedtothedeclarationofmartiallaw,inordertomake
thecontingencythereofasdifficultasinthecaseoftheformer,theyevidentlyfoundmorereasontoconcurinthe
construction pursued by President Marcos of the prerogatives which the Constitution empowers him to utilize
during a rebellion or invasion. Accordingly, to erase further doubts on the matter, the Convention enacted the
transitoryprovisionearlierreferredtomakingtheProclamation,amongothers,partofthelawoftheland,which
provision, We deem, at this point, not as a fiat placing the Proclamation definitely beyond the pale of
unconstitutionality,butasacontemporaryauthoritativeconstructionofthecurrentcharterbythebodyprecisely
calledtoexamineitcarefullyanddetermineitsdefectsthatshouldbecorrected,totheendthattherightsofthe
peoplemaybebestsafeguarded.Verily,suchconstructionisentitledtoduerespectfromUs,particularlybecause
ithasbeenineffect,ifnotdirectly,approvedbythepeople,notonlyinthereferendumofJanuary1015,1973
assailedbypetitionersbutintheotheroneheldbysecretballotonJuly2728,1973underthesupervisionofthe
Commission on Elections. And in the light of such construction, Our considered view is that Lansang is not
controllingontheissuesregardingmartiallawinvolvedinthesecases.
Perhaps,itmaynotbeamisstoaddherethatalthoughtherecordsoftheConstitutionalConventionof1934do
notrevealtheactualreasonsfortherejectionoftheamendmentproposedbyDelegateVicenteJ.Franciscoto
include in the Bill of Rights provision regarding habeas corpus the reference made to imminent danger of
invasion,insurrectionorrebellionintheenumerationofthepowersoftheExecutiverelativetothesamesubject,it
isquitepossiblethatinthemindoftheconventionitwasnotabsolutelynecessarytosuspendthePrivilegewhen
thedangerisonlyimminentunlesstheelementofpublicsafetyinvolvedalreadyrequirestheimpositionofmartial
law.Relatedly,DelegateAranetawhoasearliermentioned,proposedtosubjectthesuspensionofthePrivilegeto
legislativeorjudicialconcurrenceorreview,andwhoappearedtobethemostbothered,amongthedelegates,
about the exertion of executive power during the emergencies contemplated, never said a word against the
manner in which the Executive was being granted the authority to impose martial law, much less proposed any
restriction upon it the way he did with the suspension of the Privilege. This goes to show that the feeling in the
assemblywastoregardmartiallawdifferentlyfromthesuspensionandtorecognizethatitsimpositionshouldnot
betramellednorshackledbyanyprovisionoftheBillofRights.
7
Thereareinsurmountablepragmaticobstaclestothetheoryofjusticiabilitysustainedbypetitioners..
The most important of this is that there is no known or recognized procedure which can be adopted in the
proposedinquiryintothefactualbasesoftheExecutive'sproclamationtoinsurethatthedegreeofjudiciousand
fairhearinganddeterminationoffactsmightbeapproximated.Admittedly,theordinaryrulesofpleading,practice
and evidence are out of the question. The relevant elemental facts are scattered throughout the length and
breathofthecountry,andthereisnoconceivablejudicialcamerathatcancatchthewholepicturewithadequate
fidelitytothetruth.Perhapsjudicialnoticecanhelp,buttheelementsofpublicsafetyarenotproperlysusceptible
ofjudicialnoticewhenitcomestocovertsubversiveactivities.Theproblemsofdemonstrationaremanifold,and
when it is borne in mind that, in the very nature of things and under universally accepted norms of state
protection,thereisawall,impenetrableeventothejudiciary,behindwhichthestaterightfullykeepsawayfrom
other Departments matters affecting national security, one will realize the futility of believing that the Court can,
assuming it were, by some curious way of reasoning, legally required to do so, properly perform its judicial
attributeswhenitcomestodetermininginthefaceofanapparentlynationwiderebellion,whetherornotmartial
lawshouldbeproclaimedbytheExecutive,insteadofresortingtothelesserremediesofcallingthearmedforces
orsuspendingthePrivilege.Besides,fortheCourttobeabletodecidewhetherornottheactionoftheExecutive
isarbitrary,itmust,injusticetobothparties,andtohiminparticular,actinthelightofthesameevidencefrom
whichhedrewhisconclusion.HowcansuchevidencebeallgatheredandpresentedtotheCourt?
SomemembersoftheCourtareofthefirmconvictionthatitisOurconstitutionaldutytoindulgeinthesuggested
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inquiry, so We can be assured in Our own conscience, and for the protection of the people, whether or not
PresidentMarcoshasactedarbitrarily.Butprescindingfromthedifficultiesofdemonstrationjustdiscussed,from
whatevidenceistheCourtgoingtodrawitsownconclusionsinthecasesatbar,whenWehavenotevenbeen
toldwhatevidencethePresidenthadbeforehim,exceptthosethatmaybeinferredfromthewhereasesofthe
Proclamationwhicharedisputedbypetitioners?Ontheotherhand,howcanWehavealltheevidencebeforeUS,
when in the very nature thereof We cannot have access to them, since they must be kept under the forbidding
coversofnationalsecurityregulations?Eventhestandingordinaryrulesofevidenceprovideinthisrespectthus:.
SEC.21.Privilegedcommunication.
xxxxxxxxx
(e)Apublicofficercannotbeexaminedduringhistermofofficeorafterwards,astocommunications
made to him in official confidence, when the court finds that the public interest would suffer by the
disclosure.(Rule130,RevisedRulesofCourtofthePhilippines).
TheinevitableconclusionisthattheConstitutionmusthaveintendedthatthedecisionoftheExecutiveshouldbe
hisalone.
If We should hold that the matter before Us is justiciable, the practical result would be that even if the Court
shouldnowdecideinthestyleofLansangthatthePresidentdidnotactarbitrarilyinissuingtheProclamation,We
would have to be ready to entertain future petitions, one after the other, filed by whosoever may be minded to
allege,forhisownpurpose,thatconditionshavesoimprovedastowarranttheliftingofmartiallaw.Accordingly,
every now and then the Court would have to hear the parties and evaluate their respective evidence. The
Government would have to appear and prove all over again the justifications for its action. The consequence
wouldbethatinsteadofdevotinghistimetothedefenseofthenation,thePresidentwouldbepreparinghimself
for the court battle. It is ridiculous to think that the members of the Constitutional Convention had conceived
placingsuchdifficultiesinthewayoftheExecutivewhichmakeofhisfunctionofdefendingthestateacontinuous
runningbattleintwoseparatefronts,onewiththeenemyanotherwiththecourts.ItissuggestedthattheCourt
cansummarilydismissanysuchfuturepetitionsincavalierfashionbysimplyholdingontothefindingWewould
makeinthesecases.Butnewallegationsandargumentsareboundtobemade,anditisdefinitelyimproperfor
UstojustsummarilyupholdtheExecutiveeverytimeacasecomesup.
WhatismoreabsurdisthattheSupremeCourtisnottheonlycourtinwhichapetitiontoliftmaybefiled.Imagine
ifpetitionswerefiledintwoorthreeCourtsofFirstInstance,whatwouldhappen?Inthisconnection,Weareinno
position to enjoin the lower courts to entertain such petitions because they may refer to the proposed lifting of
martiallawonlyintherespectiveprovinceswherethecourtsare,andWecannothold,preciselybecauseofOur
owncharacterizationofthenatureoftheissueasjusticiable,ormoresimplythattheProclamationissubjectto
the review of factual bases by the court, that any of said courts is without jurisdiction to entertain the petition.
Statedotherwise,everycourtwouldthenbeopentopassonthereasonabilityorarbitrarinessofthePresident's
refusalorfailuretoliftmartiallaw.Wedonotmeantoinsinuatethatthelowercourtjudgesmaynotbeprepared
forthepurpose,butthespectaclealoneofseveralofsuchpetitionspendinginvariouscourts,withoutvisualizing
anymore the potentiality of one judge or another upholding the proponent, is something that will not only
foreseeablycomplicateourinternationalrelationsbutwillalsodetractfromourimageasapeopletrainedinthe
field of government. All of these considerations suggest again that it is best that the Judiciary abstain from
assumingarolenotclearlyindicatedintheConstitutiontopertaintoit.
C
THE SUPREME COURT ABSTAINS FROM REVIEWING PROCLAMATION 1081, BECAUSE, IN THE LIGHT OF
THE CONSIDERATIONS HEREIN DISCUSSED, IT IS CONVINCED THAT THE CONSTITUTION
CONTEMPLATES THAT THE DECLARATION OF MARTIAL LAW SHOULD BE THE RESPONSIBILITY SOLELY
OF THE EXECUTIVE, BUT SHOULD ANY OCCASION OF OPEN DEFIANCE AND MANIFEST DISREGARD OF
THE PERTINENT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION ARISE, THE COURT IS NOT POWERLESS TO "SUPPORT
ANDDEFEND"THECONSTITUTION.
The greatest fear entertained by those who would sustain the Court's authority to review the action of the
President is that there might be occasions when an Executive drunk with power might without rhyme or reason
impose martial law upon the helpless people, using the very Constitution itself as his weapon of oppression to
establishherearealdictatorshiportotalitariangovernment.TheviewisthatitisonlytheSupremeCourtthatcan
prevent such a dismal eventuality by holding that it has the final authority and inescapable duty to define the
constitutionalboundariesofthepowersoftheExecutiveandtodetermineineverycaseproperlybroughtbeforeit
whether or not any such power has been abused beyond the limits set down by the fundamental law, and that
unlessWeholdherethattheCourtcandeterminetheconstitutionalsufficiencyofProclamation1081infactand
inlaw,theFilipinopeoplewouldhavenoprotectionagainstsuchinabusiveExecutive.
Weheredeclareemphaticallythatsuchapprehensionisdefinitelyunfounded.Precisely,inthisdecision,Weare
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holdingthattheCourthasthejurisdiction,thepowerandtheauthoritytopassonanychallengetoanExecutive's
declarationofmartiallawallegedinapropercaseaffectingprivateorindividualrightstobeunwarrantedbythe
Constitution.Inthesecases,however,wedonotseeanyneedfortheinterpositionofourauthority.Insteadwhat
appearscleartoUs,inthelightoftheconsiderationsWehavediscussabove,andsoWehold,isthattheSolicitor
General is eminently correct in contending that in the circumstantial and constitutional milieu of the impugned
Proclamation, We should abstain from conducting the suggested inquiry to determine their constitutional
sufficiency.
InthewayWeseethemartiallawprovisionoftheConstitution,onlytwohypothesescanbeconsideredrelativeto
theConstitutionalproblembeforeUs.EithertheExecutiveactsinconformitywiththeprovisionorhedoesnot.In
otherwords,eitherheimposesmartiallawbecausethereisactuallyarebellionendangeringthepublicsafetyor
hedoesitforhisownpersonaldesiretograbpower,notwithstandingtheabsenceofthefactualgroundsrequired
bythefundamentallaw.Inthelattercase,theCourtwouldhavetheconstitutionalpoweranddutytodeclarethe
proclamationissuednullandvoid.Buttodothisitdoesnothavetoconductajudicialinquirybythereceptionof
evidence. It should be guided solely by facts that are of judicial notice. Thus, if the predicative recitals of the
proclamation are confirmed by facts of general public knowledge, obviously any further inquiry would be
superfluous.Ontheotherhand,inthecontraryhypothesis,thatis,itispubliclyandgenerallyknownthatthereis
no rebellion of the nature and extent contemplated in the Constitution, no amount of evidence offered by the
Executive can judicially create such a rebellion. Indeed, as observed elsewhere in this opinion, a rebellion that
does not come to the judicial notice of the Court cannot warrant the imposition of martial law, particularly in
referencetooneimposedoverthewholecountry.ButonceitisknowntotheCourtbyjudicialnoticethatthereis
a rebellion, it would constitute anundue interference with the constitutional duties and prerogatives of the
ExecutivefortheCourttoindulgeinaninquiryastotheconstitutionalsufficiencyofhisdecision.Whetherornot
publicsafetyrequiresthedrasticactionofimposingmartiallawalreadyinvolvestheexerciseofjudgment,which
as far as We can see is committed to the responsibility of the Executive as the protector and defender of the
nation.Ourconsideredviewisthatinsuchcircumstances,theConstitutionratherexpectstheCourttodefertohis
decision.UnderthisconceptofthepowersoftheCourtrelativetotheexercisebytheExecutiveofhismartiallaw
prerogatives,theCourtdoesnotrelinquishitsauthorityasguardianoftheConstitutionandtheExecutive,guided
solely by his own sense of responsibility under his solemn oath "to defend and preserve" the Constitution, can
proceed with his task of saving the integrity of the government and the nation, without any fear that the Court
wouldreversehisjudgment.
Tobesure,itcouldhavesufficedforUstopointout,inanswertothecontentionaboutpossibleabuse,thatitis
axiomaticinconstitutionallawthatthepossibilitythatanofficialmightabusethepowersconferreduponhimby
laworbytheCharterdoesnotmeanthatthepowerdoesnotexistorshouldnotbegranted.ThisCourtaffirmed
this principle not only in Barcelon vs. Baker, quoted supra, which was the precursor perhaps of the extreme of
judicial selfrestraint or abstention in this jurisdiction but even in Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139,
reputedlythevanguardofjudicialactivisminthePhilippines,JusticeLaurelpostulatedreassuringlyonthispointin
Angarathus:"Thepossibilityofabuseisnotanargumentagainsttheconcessionofpowerasthereisnopower
that is not susceptible of abuse" (at p. 177). And We could have complemented this ratiocination with the
observation that it is most unlikely that the Filipino people would be penalized by Divine Providence with the
imposition upon them of an Executive with the frightening characteristics ominously portrayed by those who
advocate that the Court, assuming its own immunity from being abusive, arbitrary or improvident, should not
recognizeanyconstitutionallyenvisioneddeferencetotheotherDepartmentsoftheGovernment,particularlythe
Executive.
We can feel, however, that the people need further reassurance. On this score, it is opportune to recall that in
Avelinovs.Cuenco,83Phil.68,inspiteofthefactthatintheResolutionofMarch4,1949,thisCourtrefusedto
intervene in the controversy between the parties as to whether or not there was a valid election of a new
President of the Senate, upon the ground that the issue involved was purely political, in the subsequent
ResolutionofMarch14,1949,uponrealizingthatacriticalsituation,detrimentaltothenationalinterest,subsisted
as a consequence of its abstention, the Court reversed itself and assumed the power to state categorically the
correctsolutiontotheconflictbasedonitsinterpretationofthepertinentprovisionsoftheConstitution.
Again,inJanuary,1962,inthespaceofseveralhours,350appointmentstodifferentpositionsinthegovernment,
including Justices of the Supreme Court and of the Court of Appeals and judges of the lower courts, fiscals,
officersoftheArmy,directorsofbureaus,GovernoroftheCentralBank,andothersweresentbythePresident
then to the Commission on Appointments on December 29, 1961, the day preceding his last halfday in office,
December30,1961.UponthesaidappointmentsbeingimpugnedintheSupremeCourt,theCourt,aghastbythe
numberofandthespeedinthemakingofsaidappointments,thefactthattheyweremadeundercircumstances
thatbetrayednotonlylackofproperanddeliberateconsiderationofthequalificationsoftheappointeesbutalso
an evident intent to deprive the succeeding President from filling the vacancies that had been left vacant even
aftertheresultsshowingthedefeatoftheincumbentPresidenthadalreadybeenpubliclyknownandconceded,
thedeparturefromlongestablishedpracticesintheirpreparationaswellastheotherundesirablecircumstances
that surrounded the same, promptly struck them down as the product of an improvident exercise of power,
obnoxioustothepreceptsunderlyingtheprincipledgovernmentconceivedintheConstitution. 15 The violation of
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thespiritandintentoftheConstitutionappearedmanifesttotheCourtonthebasisoffactswhichweremainlyifnotallof
judicialnoticeand,therefore,needednofurtherdemonstrationinaninquiryorinvestigationbytheCourt.Undermoreorless
a similar setting of circumstances, which occurred in the latter part of the term of the President whose tenure expired on
December30,1966,theSupremecourtreiteratedtheaboverulinginGuevarravs.Inocentes,16SCRA379.
Thus everyone can see that when situations arise which on their faces and without the need of inquiry or
investigation reveal an unquestionable and palpable transgression of the Constitution, the Supreme Court has
never been without means to uphold the Constitution, the policy of judicial selfrestraint implicit therein
notwithstanding.Theprecedentsjustrelatedrelatetopeacefulcontroversies,and,ofcourse,theallegedviolation
oftheConstitutionbytheExecutiveintheexerciseofapowergrantedtohimtomeettheexigenciesofrebellion
and the dangers to public safety it entails has to be considered from a different perspective. Even then, the
SupremeCourtwouldnotbepowerlesstoact,Untilallofitsmembersareincarceratedorkilledandtherearenot
enoughofthemtoconstituteaquorum,theCourtwouldalwaysbetherereadytostrikedownaproclamationof
martiallawasunconstitutional,wheneverfromthefactsmanifestandgenerallyknowntothepeopleandtoit,and
without its having conducted any inquiry by the reception of evidence, it should appear that the declaration is
madewithoutanyrationalbasiswhatsoeverandispredicatedonlyonthedistortedmotivesoftheExecutive.For
as long, however, as the recitals or grounds given in a proclamation accord substantially with facts of judicial
notice, either because they are of public knowledge or are by their nature capable of unquestionable
demonstration, We have no reason to interfere with the discharge by the Executive of a responsibility imposed
uponhimbytheConstitutionandinwhichthereisnoindicationthereinthattheCourtshouldshare.Butwhen,as
juststated,itisgenerallyknownoritisofpublicknowledgethatthereisnorebellionor,therebeingone,thatit
poses no conceivable danger to the public safety, and, God forbid, martial law is proclaimed, the Court, even
without the need of any kind of judicial inquiry into the facts alleged in the proclamation, will certainly act and
declarethepretentiousExecutiveaconstitutionaloutlaw,withtheresultthattheregulargovernmentestablished
by the Constitution may continue in the hands of those who are constitutionally called upon to succeed him,
unlessheovercomesthelegitimategovernmentbyforce.Intruth,suchistheonlywaytheSupremeCourtshould
actindischargingitsdutytoupholdtheConstitutionbytheuseofthejudicialpower,ifitistogivetotheExecutive
ortheLegislature,asthecasemaybe,thedueregardthattheConstitutioncontemplatesshouldbeaccordedto
them in consideration of their own functions hid responsibilities implicit in the principle of separation of powers
embodiedtherein.
II
THECONSTITUTIONISMERELYINASTATEOFANAESTHESIA,SINCEAMAJORSURGERYISNEEDEDTO
SAVETHENATION'SLIFE.
The foregoing discussion covers, as must have been noted, the resolution not only of the issue of jurisdiction
raisedbytherespondentsbutalsoofthecorollaryquestionoftheapplicationoftheLansangdoctrine.Notonly
that,fromwhathasbeensaid,itisobviousthatsinceitistothePresidentthattheConstitutionhascommittedthe
discretiontoimposemartiallaw,itfollowsthathealoneshouldhavethediscretionandtheprerogativetodeclare
whenitshouldceaseorbelifted.ExactlythesameconsiderationscompellingtheconclusionthattheCourtmay
notreviewtheconstitutionalsufficiencyofhisproclamationofmartiallawmakeitineludibletoconcludethatthe
peoplehavealsoleftittotheExecutivetodecidewhenconditionswouldpermitthefullrestorationoftheregular
constitutionalprocesses.Withcharacteristicperceptiveinsight,inhisthesistobecitedinfra,JusticeGuillermoS.
SantosoftheCourtofAppeals,discoursesonthispointasfollows:
44.WhenMartialRuleisTerminated
In both England and the United States martial rule terminates ipso facto upon the cessation of the
publicemergencythatcalleditforth.Tothispropositiontherehasbeennodissent.Martialrulemust
ceasewhenthepublicsafetynolongerrequireitsfurtherexercise.
45.WhoTerminatesMartialRule
SincethedeclarationofmartialrulehasbeencommittedtothejudgmentofthePresident,itfollows
thatitsterminationistobefixedbythesameauthority.(Barcelonvs.Baker,1905,5Phil.87.)Again,
tothisviewtherecannotheanyvalidobjection.ItwouldseemonlynaturalthatsincethePresident
has been expressly authorized to declare martial rule no other authority should he permitted to
terminateit."(MartialLaw,Nature,PrinciplesandAdministrationbyGuillermoS.Santos,p.75.)
Needless to say, it is our Constitution that controls in the cases at bar, not the American theory. In fact, when
PresidentLaurelproclaimedmartiallawduringtheSecondWorldWar,heexpresslyprovided,toavoidanydoubt
aboutthematter,thus:
8.Theproclamationofmartiallawbeinganemergencymeasuredemandedbyimperativenecessity,
it shall continue as long as the need for it exists and shall terminate upon proclamation of the
PresidentoftheRepublicofthePhilippines.
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IntheinterestoftruthandtosetOurperspectivearightitmaynotbesaidthatunderProclamation1081andthe
manner in which it has been implemented, there has been a total suspension, much less an abrogation, of the
Constitution. Even textually, the ensuing orders issued by the President have left virtually unaltered the
establishedconstitutionalorderinalllevelsofgovernmentandsocietyexceptthosethathavetobeadjustedand
subjectedtopotentialchangesdemandedbythenecessitiesofthesituationandtheattainmentoftheobjectives
ofthedeclaration.Repeatedlyandemphatically,thePresidenthassolemnlyreassuredthepeoplethatthereisno
militarytakeoverandthatthedeclaredprincipleintheConstitutionthat"Civilianauthorityisatalltimessupreme
overthemilitary"(Section8,ArticleII,1973Charter)shallberigorouslyobserved.Andearlierinthisopinion,We
havealreadydiscussedhowherestoredthesecurityoftenureofthemembersoftheCourtandhowthejudicial
power has been retained by the courts, except in those cases involving matters affecting national security and
public order and safety which the situation demands should be dealt with by the executive arms of the
government.
WhenPresidentLincolnproclaimedmartiallawinKentuckyin1864,hedidnotcompletelyoverhaultheexisting
machinery,heletitcontinueinsofarasitdidnotobstructthemilitaryoperationsandrelatedactivities.Heordered
thus:
WhereasmanycitizensoftheStateofKentuckyhavejoinedtheforcesoftheinsurgents,andsuch
insurgents have, on several occasions. entered the said State of Kentucky in large force, and, not
without aid and comfort furnished by disaffected and disloyal citizens of the United States residing
therein,havenotonlydisturbedthepublicpeace,buthaveoverbornethecivilauthoritiesandmade
flagrantcivilwar,destroyingpropertyandlifeinvariouspartsoftheState:Andwhereasithasbeen
madeknowntothePresidentoftheUnitedStatesbytheofficerscommandingthenationalarmies,
that combinations have been formed in the said State of Kentucky with a purpose of inciting rebel
forcestorenewthesaidoperationsofcivilwarwithinthesaidState,andtherebytoembarrassthe
UnitedStatesarmiesnowoperatinginthesaidStateofVirginiaandGeorgia,andeventoendanger
theirsafety:...'Themartiallawhereinproclaimed,andthethingsinthatrespecthereinordered,will
notbedeemedortakentointerferewiththeholdingoflawfulelections,orwiththeproceedingsofthe
constitutionallegislatureofKentucky,orwiththeadministrationofjusticeinthecourtsoflawexisting
thereinbetweencitizensoftheUnitedStatesinsuitsorproceedingswhichdonotaffectthemilitary
operations or the constituted authorities of the government of the United States. (Martial Law,
Nature,PrinciplesandAdministrationbyGuillermoS.Santos,pp.9798.).
Incidentally, there is here a clear repudiation of the open court theory, and what is more, even the holding of
regularelectionsandlegislativesessionswerenotsuppressed.16Accordingly,theundeniablefactthatthePhilippine
Congresswasinsession,albeitabouttoadjourn,whenmartiallawwasdeclaredonSeptember21,1972isnotnecessarily
anargumentagainsttheexercisebythePresidentofthepowertomakesuchadeclaration.
PresidentLaurel'sowndeclarationofmartiallawduringtheJapaneseoccupationdidnotinvolveatotalblackout
ofconstitutionalgovernment.Itreadsinitspertinentportionsthus:
xxxxxxxxx
4.AllexistinglawsshallcontinueinforceandeffectuntilamendedorrepealedbythePresident,and
all the existing civil agencies of an executive character shall continue exercising their powers and
performingtheirfunctionsandduties,unlesstheyareinconsistentwiththetermsofthisProclamation
orincompatiblewiththeexpeditiousandeffectiveenforcementofmartiallawhereindeclared.
5.ItshallbethedutyoftheMilitaryGovernorstosuppresstreason,sedition,disorderandviolence
andtocausetobepunishedalldisturbancesofpublicpeaceandalloffendersagainstthecriminal
lawsandalsotoprotectpersonsintheirlegitimaterights.Tothisendanduntilotherwisedecreed,
the existing courts of justice shall assume jurisdiction and try offenders without unnecessary delay
and in a summary manner, in accordance with such procedural rules as may be prescribed by the
Minister of Justice. The decisions of courts of justice of the different categories in criminal cases
withintheiroriginaljurisdictionshallbefinalandunappealable:Provided,however,Thatnosentence
ofdeathshallbecarriedintoeffectwithouttheapprovalofthePresident.
6. The existing courts of justice shall continue to be invested with, and shall exercise, the same
jurisdiction in civil actions and special proceedings as are now provided in existing laws, unless
otherwisedirectedbythePresidentoftheRepublicofthePhilippines.
Proclamation1081isinnosenseanymoreconstitutionallyoffensive.Infact,inorderingdetentionofpersons,the
Proclamation pointedly limits arrests and detention only to those "presently detained, as well as all others who
mayhereafterbesimilarlydetainedforthecrimesofinsurrectionorrebellion,andallothercrimesandoffenses
committed in furtherance or on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith, for crimes
against national security and the law of nations, crimes against public order, crimes involving usurpation of
authority,rank,titleandimproperuseofnames,uniformsandinsignia,crimescommittedbypublicofficers,and
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forsuchothercrimesaswillbeenumeratedinordersthatIshallsubsequentlypromulgate,aswellascrimesasa
consequence of any violation of any decree, order or regulation promulgated by me personally or promulgated
uponmydirection."Indeed,evenintheaffectedareas,theConstitutionhasnotbeenreallysuspendedmuchless
discarded.Ascontemplatedinthefundamentallawitself,itismerelyinastateofanaesthesia,totheendthatthe
muchneededmajorsurgerytosavethenation'slifemaybesuccessfullyundertaken.
III
THE IMPOSITION OF MARTIAL LAW AUTOMATICALLY CARRIES WITH IT THE SUSPENSION OF THE
PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS IN ANY EVENT, THE PRESIDENTIAL ORDER OF ARREST
ANDDETENTIONCANNOTBEASSAILEDASDEPRIVATIONOFLIBERTYWITHOUTDUEPROCESS.
Thenextissuetoconsideristhatwhichreferstothearrestandcontinueddetentionandotherrestraintsofthe
liberties of petitioner, and their main contention in this respect is that the proclamation of martial law does not
carry with it the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, hence petitioners are entitled to
immediatereleasefromtheirconstraints.
We do not believe such contention needs extended exposition or elaboration in order to be overruled. The
primary and fundamental purpose of martial law is to maintain order and to insure the success of the battle
against the enemy by the most expeditions and efficient means without loss of time and with the minimum of
effort.Thisisselfevident.Thearrestanddetentionofthosecontributingtothedisorderandespeciallyofthose
helpingorotherwisegivingaidandcomforttotheenemyareindispensable,ifmartiallawistomeananythingat
all.Thisisbutlogical.Tofighttheenemy,tomaintainorderamidstriotouschaosandmilitaryoperations,andto
see to it that the ordinary constitutional processes for the prosecution of lawbreakers are three functions that
cannothumanlybeundertakenatthesametimebythesameauthoritieswithanyfairhopeofsuccessinanyof
them.ToquotefromMalcolmandLaurel,"Martiallawandtheprivilegeofthatwrit(ofhabeascorpusarewholly
incompatible with each other." (Malcolm and Laurel, Philippine Constitutional Law, p. 210). It simply is not too
much for the state to expect the people to tolerate or suffer inconveniences and deprivations in the national
interest,principallythesecurityandintegrityofthecountry.
MeresuspensionofthePrivilegemaybeordered,asdiscussedearlier,whenthesituationhasnotreachedvery
criticalproportionsimperillingtheveryexistenceofthenation,aslongaspublicsafetydemandsit.Itis,therefore,
absurdtocontend,thatwhenmartiallaw,whichispreciselytheultimateremedyagainstthegravestemergencies
ofinternalorexternalaggression,isproclaimed,thereisnosuspensionofthePrivilegeunlessthisisseparately
anddistinctlyordered.Consideringthatbothpowersspringfromthesamebasiccauses,itstandstoreasonthat
thegraversanctionincludesthelesser.ItisclaimedthatPresidentLaureltreatedthetwomattersseparatelyin
hisaforequotedproclamation.Wedonotbelievethattheprecedentcitedcontrols.Itonlyprovesthattoavoidany
doubt,whatPresidentLaureldidmaybeadopted.Therecanbenodenyingthepointthatwithoutsuspensionof
the Privilege, martial law would certainly be ineffective. Since martial law involves the totality of government
authority, it may be assumed that by ordering the arrest and detention of petitioners and the other persons
mentioned in the Proclamation, until ordered released by him, the President has by the tenor of such order
virtuallysuspendedthePrivilege.Relatedly,aspointedoutbytheSolicitorGeneralnolessthanpetitionerDiokno
himselfpostulatedinalectureattheU.P.LawCenterthat:
Thereareonly,asfarasIknow,twoinstanceswherepersonsmaybedetainedwithoutwarrantbut
withdueprocess.Thefirstisincasesofmartiallaworwhenthewritofhabeascorpusissuspended.
Inthosecases,itisnotthattheirdetentionislegal,itisthatwecannotinquireintothelegalityoftheir
detention.Becausemartiallawmeansactuallythesuspensionoflawandthesubstitutionofthewill
ofourCongress.ThesecondinstanceisthatwhichisprovidedforinRule113,section6oftheRules
ofCourtandSection37oftheRevisedCharteroftheCityofManila.Essentiallyitconsistsofcases
where the crime is committed right in the presence of the person Who is making the arrest or
detention. (Trial Problems in City & Municipal Courts, 1970, p. 267, U. P. Law center Judicial
ConferenceSeries.).
InhiswelldocumentedandverycarefullypreparedandcomprehensivethesisonMartialLaw,Nature,Principles
andAdministration,publishedbyCentralLawbookPublishingCo.,Inc,in1972,JusticeGuillermoS.Santosofthe
CourtofAppealsandformerlyoftheJudgeAdvocateGeneral'sService,ArmedForcesofthePhilippines,makes
thesepointedobservations:
Whethertheexistenceofmartiallawandthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpus
'areoneandthesamething',or'theformerincludesthelatterandmuchmore,'hadbeenthesubject
of'anangrywarofpamphletsbetweenProfessorsParsonsandParkeroftheHarvardLawSchoolat
theoutbreakoftheCivilWar.'(Fairman,p.43Wienerp.9.)Ithasalsobeenadifficultquestionto
decide in some jurisdictions whether the suspension of the privilege of the writ amounted to a
declarationofmartiallaw.(Winthrop,pp.820&828,citingExparteField,9Am.L.R.507Bouvier's
LawDictionary,3rdFrancisRawisEd.,1914,p.2105,citing1HalleckInt.Law549.
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In the face of the constitutional provisions (Art. 111, Sec. 1, Clause (14) and fn 9, supra.) in our
jurisdiction,thereseemstobenoroomfordoubtthatthetwoaredifferent.Whilethegroundsforthe
suspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritandtheproclamationofmartiallawarethesame,therecanbe
no question that suspension of the writ means what it says, that during the suspension of the
privilege,thewrit,ifissued,willbetonoavailbutmartiallawhasmorethanjustthiseffect.Theonly
questionwhichapparentlyremainstobedeterminedhere,is,whetherthedeclarationofmartiallaw
ipsofactocarrieswithitthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewrit,orwhetheradeclarationofmartial
law must necessarily include a declaration suspending the privilege of the writ in order to consider
the same inoperative. But it appears that the former is the better view, (Malcolm and Laurel,
Philippine Constitutional Law, p. 310) although in the United States it has been held that qualified
martialrulemayexistwherethewrithas,inlegalcontemplation,notbeensuspended,(Fairman,p.
44) and that the status of martial law does not of itself suspend the writ. (Military Law [Domestic
Disturbances],BasicFieldManual,WarDepartment,[US]fn19&15,p.17[1945].)(Seepp.4142.)
Ofcourse,Wearenotboundbytheruleinotherjurisdictions.
FormerDeanVicenteG.SincooftheCollegeofLawoftheUniversityofthePhilippines,ofwhichhebecamelater
on President, a noted authority on constitutional law from whom many of us have learned the subject, likewise
sustainstheviewthattheproclamationofmartiallawautomaticallysuspendstheprivilegeofthewritofhabeas
corpus.(V.Sinco,Phil.PoliticalLaw,p.259,11thEd.,1962)
Now,astotheconstitutionalproprietyofdetainingpersonsonsuspicionofconspiracywiththeenemywithoutthe
needoftheregularjudicialprocess,Wehavealsotheauthoritativesupportofnolessthanwhatadistinguished
memberofthisCourt,consideredasoneofthebestinformedinAmericanconstitutionallaw,Mr.JusticeEnrique
Fernando,andtheprincipalcounselofpetitioners,formerSenatorTaada,himselfanauthority,onthesubject,
hadtosayonthepointintheirjointauthorship,usedastextbookinmanylawschools,entitledConstitutionofthe
Philippines,towit:
Once martial law has been declared, arrest may be necessary not so much for punishment but by
wayofprecautiontostopdisorder.Aslongassucharrestsaremadeingoodfaithandinthehonest
belieftheyareneededtomaintainorder,thePresident,asCommanderinChief,cannotthereafter,
whenheisoutofoffice,besubjectedtoanactiononthegroundthathehadnoreasonableground
forhisbelief.Whenitcomestoadecisionbytheheadofastateuponamatterinvolvingitslife,the
ordinary rights of individuals must yield to what he deems the necessities of the moment. Public
dangerwarrantsthesubstitutionofexecutiveforjudicialprocess.(Emphasissupplied.)(Constitution
ofthePhilippinesbyTaada&Fernando,Vol.2,pp.523525.)
TheauthoritycitedbyJusticeFernandoandSenatorTaadasays:
The plaintiff's position, stated in a few words, is that the action of the governor, sanctioned to the
extent that it was by the decision of the supreme court, was the action of the state and therefore
within the 14th Amendment but that, if that action was unconstitutional, the governor got no
protection from personal liability for his unconstitutional interference with the plaintiff's rights. It is
admitted, as it must be. that the governor's declaration that a state of insurrection existed is
conclusiveofthatfact.Itseemstobeadmittedalsothatthearrestalonewouldriotnecessarilyhave
givenarighttobringthissuit.Lutherv.Borden,7How.1,45,46,12L.ed.581,600,601.Butitis
said that a detention for so many days, alleged to be without probable cause, at a time when the
courts were open, without an attempt to bring the plaintiff before them, makes a case on which he
hasarighttohaveajurypass.
Weshallnotconsiderallofthequestionsthatthefactssuggest,butshallconfineourselvestostating
what we regard as a sufficient answer to the complaint, without implying that there are not others
equallygood.Ofcourse,theplaintiff'spositionisthathehasbeendeprivedofhislibertywithoutdue
processoflaw.Butitisfamiliarthatwhatisdueprocessoflawdependsoncircumstances.Itvaries
with the subjectmatter and the necessities of the situation. Thus, summary proceedings suffice for
taxes,andexecutivedecisionsforexclusionfromthecounty.Denexdem.Murrayv.HobokenLand
&Improv.Co.18How.272,15L.ed.372UnitedStatesv.JuToy,198U.S.253,263,49L.ed.10
40,1044,25Sup.Ct.Rep.644.What,then,arethecircumstancesofthiscase?Byagreementthe
record of the proceedings upon habeas corpus was made part of the complaint, but that did not
maketheavermentsofthepetitionforthewritavermentsofthecomplaint.Thefactsthatweareto
assumearethatastateofinsurrectionexistedandthatthegovernor,withoutsufficientreasonbutin
good faith, in the course of putting the insurrection down, held the plaintiff until he thought that he
safelycouldreleasehim.
It would seem to be admitted by the plaintiff that he was president of the Western Federation of
Miners, and that, whoever was to blame, trouble was apprehended with the members of that
organization. We mention these facts not as material, but simply to put in more definite form the
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nature of the occasion on which the governor felt called upon to act. In such a situation we must
assumethathehadaright,underthestateConstitutionandlaws,tocallouttroops,aswasheldby
thesupremecourtofthestate.TheConstitutionissupplementedbyanactprovidingthat'whenan
invasion of or insurrection in the state is made or threatened, the governor shall order the national
guardtorepelorsuppressthesame.'Lawsof1897,chap.63,art.7,&2,p.204.Thatmeansthathe
shallmaketheordinaryuseofthesoldierstothatendthathemaykillpersonswhoresist,and,of
course, that he may use the milder measure of seizing the bodies of those whom he considers to
standinthewayofrestoringpeace.Sucharrestsarenotnecessarilyforpunishment,butarebyway
of precaution, to prevent the exercise of hostile power. So long as such arrests are made in good
faithandinthehonestbeliefthattheyareneededinordertoheadtheinsurrectionoff,thegovernor
isthefinaljudgeandcannotbesubjectedtoanactionafterheisoutofoffice,onthegroundthathe
hadnotreasonablegroundforhisbelief.Ifwesupposeagovernorwithaverylongtermofoffice,it
maybethatacasecouldbeimaginedinwhichthelengthoftheimprisonmentwouldraiseadifferent
question. But there is nothing in the duration of the plaintiff's detention or in the allegations of the
complaint that would warrant Submitting the judgment of the governor to revision by a It is not
allegedthathisjudgmentwasnothonest,ifthatbematerial,orthattheplaintiffwasdetainedafter
fearsoftheinsurrectionwereatanend.
Nodoubttherearecaseswheretheexpertonthespotmayhecalledupontojustifyhisconductlater
incourt,notwithstandingthefactthathehadsolecommandatthetimeandactedtothebestofhis
knowledge.Thatisthepositionofthecaptainofaship.But,eveninthatcase,greatweightisgiven
to his determination, and the matter is to be judged on the facts as they appeared then, and not
merelyinthelightoftheevent.Lawrencev.Minturn,17How.100,110,15L.ed.58,62TheStarof
Hope,9Wall.203,19L.ed.638TheGermanic(OceanicSteamNav.Co.v.Aitken)196U.S.589,
594,595,49L.ed.610,613,25Sup.Ct.Rep.317.Whenitcomestoadecisionbytheheadofthe
state upon a matter involving its life, the ordinary rights of individuals must yield to what he deems
the necessities of the moment. Public danger warrants the substitution of executive process for
judicialprocess.SeeKeelyv.Sanders, 99 U.S. 441, 446, 25 L. ed. 327, 328. (Moyer vs. Peabody,
212U.S.416,417.)
Relatedly,inthedecisionoftheSupremeCourtofColoradodealingwiththesamedetentionofCharlesH.Moyer
byorderofthestategovernor,itwasheld:
By the reply it is alleged that, notwithstanding the proclamation and determination of the Governor
that a state of insurrection existed in the county of San Miguel, that as a matter of fact these
conditionsdidnotexistatthetimeofsuchproclamationorthearrestofthepetitioner,oratanyother
time.ByS5,art.4,ofourConstitution,thegovernoristhecommanderinchiefofthemilitaryforces
ofthestate,exceptwhentheyarecalledintoactualserviceoftheUnitedStatesandheisthereby
empowered to call out the militia to suppress insurrection. It must therefore become his duty to
determineasafactwhenconditionsexistinagivenlocalitywhichdemandthat,inthedischargeof
hisdutiesaschiefexecutiveofthestate,heshallemploythemilitiatosuppress.Thisbeingtrue,the
recitals in the proclamation to the effect that a state of insurrection existed in the country of San
Miguel cannot be controverted. Otherwise, the legality of the orders of the executive would not
dependuponhisjudgment,butthejudgmentofanothercoordinatebranchofthestategovernment
............
............................
............................
.... If, then, the military may resort to the extreme of taking human life in order to suppress
insurrectionitisimpossibletoimagineuponwhathypothesisitcanbesuccessfullyclaimedthatthe
mildermeansofseizingthepersonofthoseparticipatingintheinsurrectionoraidingandabettingit
maynotberesortedto.Thepowerandauthorityofthemilitiainsuchcircumstancesarenotunlike
that of the police of a city, or the sheriff of a county, aided by his deputies or posse comitatus in
suppressingariot.Certainlysuchofficialswouldbejustifiedinarrestingtheriotersandplacingthem
in jail without warrant, and detaining the there until the riot was suppressed. Hallett J., in Re
ApplicationofShermanParker(noopinionforpublication).If,ascontendedbycounselforpetitioner,
the military, as soon as the rioter or insurrectionist is arrested, must turn him over to the civil
authoritiesofthecountry,thearrestmight,andinmanyinstanceswould,amounttoamerefarce.He
couldbereleasedonbail,andleftfreetoagainjointheriotersorengageinaidingandabettingtheir
action,and,ifagainarrested,thesameprocesswouldhavetoberepeated,andthustheactionof
themilitarywouldberenderedanullity.Again,ifitbeconcededthat,onthearrestofarioterbythe
military, he must at once be turned over to the custody of the civil officers of the county, then the
military, in seizing armed insurrectionists and depriving them of their arms, would be required to
forthwith return them to the hands of those who were employing them in acts of violence or be
subjecttoanactionofreplevinfortheirrecoverywherebyimmediatepossessionofsucharmswould
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beobtainedbetherioters,whowouldthusagainbeequippedtocontinuetheirlawlessconduct.To
denytherightofthemilitiatothosewhomtheyarrestwhileengagedinsuppressingactsofviolence
and until order is restored would lead to the most absurd results. The arrest and detention of an
insurrectionist,eitheractuallyengagedinactsofviolenceorinaidingandabettingotherstocommit
suchacts,violatesnoneofhisconstitutionalrights.Heisnottriedbyanymilitarycourt,ordeniedthe
right of trial by jury neither is he punished for violation of the law, nor held without due process of
law.Hisarrestanddetentionissuchcircumstancesmerelytopreventhimfromtakingpartoraiding
inacontinuationoftheconditionswhichthegovernor,inthedischargeofhisofficialdutiesandinthe
exercise of authority conferred by law, is endeavoring to suppress. When this end is reached, he
could no longer be restrained of his liberty by the military, but must be, just as respondents have
indicatedintheirreturntothewrit,turnedovertotheusualcivilauthoritiesofthecounty,tobedealt
with in the ordinary course of justice, and tried for stich offenses against the law as he may have
committed.Itistruethatpetitionerisnotheldbyvirtueofanywarrant,butifhisarrestanddetention
are authorized by law he cannot complain because those steps have not been taken which are
ordinarilyrequiredbeforeacitizencanbearrestedanddetained.
..........................
....The same power which determines the existence of an insurrection must also decide when the
insurrectionhasbeensuppressed.(Emphasisadded.)(ReMoyer,35Colo,159,85Pac.190[1904].)
It is evident, therefore, that regardless of whether or not the privilege of the writ of habeascorpus is expressly
suspendedduringmartiallaw,arrest,detentionandotherrestraintsoflibertyofindividualsmaynotbeassailedas
violativeofthedueprocessclause.ThePresidentialorderstosucheffectconstitutesubstantiveandprocedural
dueprocessatthesametimeandmaythereforebeinvokedasvaliddefensesagainstanyremedyorprayerfor
release. Given the validity of the declaration of martial law, the sole tests of legality of constraints otherwise
frowneduponinnormaltimesbythefundamentallawaresubstantialrelevanceandreasonableness.Inthevery
nature of things, and absent any obvious showing of palpable bad faith, the Executive should enjoy respectful
deferenceinthedeterminationofhisgrounds.Asarule,theCourtsarenotsupposedtomakeanyinquiryintothe
matter.
We accordingly hold that, as well demonstrated by the Solicitor General, a proclamation of martial law
automatically results in the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and, therefore, the arrest,
detentionandrestraintsuponpetitionersareauthorizedbytheConstitution.Inanyevent,thePresidentialorderof
arrestanddetentionconstitutedueprocessandis,therefore,avaliddefensetoanyallegationofillegalityofthe
constraints upon petitioners. We further hold that the duration of such constraints may be coextensive with
martiallawunlessotherwiseorderedbytheExecutive.
IV
THEEFFECTOFTHEAPPROVALANDRATIFICATION
OFTHENEWCONSTITUTIONONTHEINSTANT
PETITIONS
All that remains now for resolution is the question of what effect did the approval and ratification of the New
Constitutionhaveupontheinstantpetitions?
When petitioners came to this Court in September and October 1972 to impugn the legality of their arrest and
detention by virtue of Proclamation 1081 and General Order No. 2, their common fundamental theory was that
said proclamation and order were violative of the Constitution of the Philippines of 1935, not only because,
accordingtothem,therewasnojustificationforitsplacingthecountryundermartiallawbutalsobecause,even
assuming its propriety, there was allegedly no legal basis for the apprehension and detention of petitioners
withoutanywarrantofarrestandwithoutevenanychargesbeingfiledagainstthem.Thus,inhisreturnofthewrit
ofhabeascorpusissuedbytheCourt,aswellasinhisoralargumentatthehearings,theSolicitorGenerallimited
himselftobarelyinvokingtheprovisionofthesaidConstitutionempoweringthePresidenttoproclaimmartiallaw,
evenashedeniedtheallegationthattherewasnofactualbasistherefor,andsimplycontendedthatthearrest
and detention of petitioners were made pursuant to orders validly issued under the powers of the President
flowingfromtheproclamation..
A
Asalreadynoted,however,evenbeforethesecasescouldbesubmittedfordecision,onNovember30,1972,the
ConstitutionalConventionof1971approvedadraftconstitutiondesignedtosupersedetheConstitutionof1935
and on January 17, 1973, thru Proclamation 1102, the President declared that draft constitution to have been
ratified by the people in the referendum of January 1015, 1973, and, as also stated earlier, said proclamation
became the subject of two series of cases in this Court which ultimately ended with the decision of March 31,
1973 adjudging that "there is no further judicial obstacle to the New Constitution being considered in force and
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effect."AndamongthesalientandpertinentprovisionsoftheNewConstitutionortheConstitutionof1973,asthe
new charter may distinctively be referred to, is that of Section 3 (2) of Article XVII textually reproduced earlier
above.
In view of the comprehensive or allinclusive tenor of the constitutional injunction contained in said provision,
referringasitdoesto"allproclamations,orders,decrees,instructions,andactspromulgatedissued,ordoneby
theincumbentPresident",therecanbenodoubtthatProclamation1081andGeneralOrder2,hereinassailedby
petitioners,areamongthoseenjoinedtohe"partofthelawoftheland."Thequestionthatarisesthenis,didtheir
having been made part of the law of the land by no less than an express mandate of the fundamental law
precludefurthercontroversyastotheirvalidityandefficacy?
Inponderingoverthisquestion,itisimportanttobearinmindthecircumstancesthatattendedtheframingand
final approval of the draft constitution by the Convention. As already noted, two actuations of the President of
indubitabletranscendentalimportovertookthedeliberationsoftheconstituentassembly,namely,theissuanceby
himofProclamation1081placingthePhilippinesundermartiallawandhisexercise,undersaidproclamation,of
nonexecutive powers, inclusive of general legislative authority. As to be expected in a country, like the
Philippines,longaccustomedtostrictconstitutionalism,andthesuperiorityofcivilianauthorityover,themilitary,
soonenough,thesetwoactuationsspawnedconstitutionalcontroversiesofseriousdimensions,somuchsothat
several cases involving them, including the instant ones, are now pending in the Supreme Court. Surely, the
membersoftheConventionwerewellawareofthesedevelopments.Inotherwords,thedelegatesinconvention
assembledwerelivingwitnessesofthemannerinwhich,forthefirsttimeinourconstitutionalhistory,themartial
law clause of the charter was being actually implemented, and they knew the grave constitutional issues such
implementationhadprovoked.
Indeed,noconstituentassemblyCouldhavebeenbettercircumstancedtoformulatethefundamentallawofthe
land.TheConventionhadafullandfirsthandviewofthecontroversialoperationofthemostimportantpartofthe
charter it was called to improve upon its martial law clause. Verily, no other aspect of the constitution could
havecommandedmorethemostseriousattentionofthedelegates.Theykneworoughttohaveknownthatthe
placingofthecountryoranypartthereofundermartiallawcouldpossiblyaffectthecontinuedoperationtherein
oftheconstitutionoratleast,theenforceabilityofparticularprovisionsthereof.Therefore,iftheConventionfelt
thatwhatwasbeingdonebythePresidentaswitnessedbythemwasnotwithinthecontemplationoftheexisting
fundamental law or that it was inconsistent with the underlying principles of democracy and constitutionalism to
whichthenationhasbeenirrevocablycommittedsinceitsbirthandwhichweretoremainasthefoundationsof
thenewcharter,thedelegateswouldhaveconsideredittobetheirboundendutytoourpeopleandtothefuture
generations of Filipinos, to manifest their conviction by providing appropriate safeguards against any repetition
thereof in the constitution they were drafting. And so, when it is considered that as finally approved, the New
Constitution reproduces in exactly the same terms or verbatim the martial law clause of the 1935 charter, the
ineludibleconclusionisthatournewconstitutionalfathersdidnotseeanythingrepugnanttotheconceptsofthe
old constitution in what the President has done or was doing. As We see it, this attitude of the Convention
constitutes an authoritative contemporary construction of the provision in controversy, and considering that the
President'smannerofimplementingmartiallawhasbeensanctionedbythepeoplenotonlyinthereferendumof
January 1015, 1973 but also in that of July 2728, 1973, reliance on such attitude in determining the meaning
andintentofsaidprovisioncannotbeoutofplace.
In the light of these considerations, We do not see in the transitory provision under discussion any idea of
ratificationorvalidationofsomethingvoidorunauthorized.Rather,whatWeperceiveinitarerevelationsofwhat
layinthecoreofthemartiallawclauseofthe1935Constitutionasitwasconceivedandformulatedbyitswise
andfarsightedframers.Itwouldbeunreasonable,illogicalandunworthyofthe1971delegatestoimputetothem
an intent to merely ratify, confirm or validate the President's acts, on the assumption that they were originally
unauthorized by the charter, for that would imply that they were concerned only about straightening out the
present situation, when it is just as important to insure that future acts of the President are not tainted with
illegality.Wecannotentertainanythoughtthatthedelegateswerenotsufficientlyapprisedontheimplicationsof
theiracts.Indeed,theNewConstitutionhasnotimpartedexpropiovigoreany element of validity to the acts in
question,ithasonlyexpressedinblackandwhitewhattheOldConstitutiondidnotdeemnecessarytolaydown
withprecisioninrespecttothem.Viewedthisway,whatthetransitoryprovisionunderdiscussionmeansisthat
both the acts of the President before as well as those after ratification of the New Constitution are valid not
validatedand,asjuststated,whatreinforcesthisconstructionandplacesthesaidactsbeyondpossibleattacks
forunconstitutionalityaretheresultsofthetworeferendumsofJanuaryandJuly,1973.
Withal, having absolute faith in the high sense of duty and the patriotic courage of the members of the
Convention, We also reject the suggestion that they were in any way impeded, under the circumstances then
obtaining, from freely expressing themselves. We cannot for a moment entertain the thought that any other
Filipino can ever have less courage and love of country and concern for the future of our people than the
members of this Court who are presently called upon to make momentous decisions affecting no less than the
legalityandlegitimacyoftheveryGovernmentadmittedlyineffectivecontrolofthewholeterritoryofthenation,
regardlessofpossiblepersonalconsequencestothemselves.
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ThefactofthematteristhatProclamation1081didnotmakementionoftheConventionatall.Onthecontrary,
judicialnoticemaybetakenoftheincreasedfundsappropriatedbythePresidentsoastoenableittoproceed
withitsdeliberations,unbotheredbyanyapprehensionregardingtheinadequacyofthefundswhichtheCongress
had appropriated for it, and which were then fast dwindling, without any certainty of further congressional
appropriations.Indeed,whenDelegateKalawoftheFirstDistrictofRizalproposedinaformalresolutionthatthe
sessionsbesuspendeduntilaftertheliftingofmartiallaw,theassemblyvotedoverwhelminglytoturndownthe
proposal.Thereisnoevidenceatallthatanyformofunduepressurewasbroughttobearuponthedelegatesin
anyrespectrelatedtotheirconstituentfunctions.Ithasnotbeenshownthatthearrestanddetentionofanumber
ofdelegates,someofwhomarepetitionersherein,wasinanywayconnectedwithorcausedbytheiractuations
related to their constituent functions. What General Order No. 2 asserts is that the President ordered the
"SecretaryofNationalDefensetoforthwitharrestorcausethearrestandtakeintocustodytheindividualsnamed
intheattachedlist(amongthem,thesaiddelegates)andtoholdthemuntilotherwisesoorderedbymeormy
duly designated representative" for their "being active participants or for having given aid and comfort in the
conspiracytoseizepoliticalandstatepowerinthecountryandtotakeovertheGovernmentbyforce,theextent
of which has now assumed the proportion of an actual war against Our people and our legitimate Government
and in order to prevent them from further committing acts that are inimical or injurious to our people, the
Governmentandournationalinterest,andtoholdsaidindividualsuntilotherwisesoorderedbymeorbymyduly
designatedrepresentative."Eventhen,saiddelegateswereallowedtocasttheirvotesintheassemblywhenthe
finaldraftwassubmittedforapprovalofthemembersoftheConvention.Thus,itcanbesafelyassertedthatthe
freedomoftheConventiontoactandtoperformwhateverwasincumbentuponitasaconstituentbodysuffered
nosubstantialdiminutionorconstraintonaccountoftheproclamationofmartiallaw.
To reiterate then, Section 3 (2), Article XVII of the New Constitution enjoins that "all proclamations, orders,
decrees,instructionsandactspromulgated,issuedordonebytheincumbentPresidentshallbepartofthelawof
thelandandshallremainvalid,legal,bindingandeffectiveevenaftertheliftingofmartiallawortheratificationof
this Constitution, unless modified, revoked, or superseded by subsequent proclamations, orders, decrees,
instructions or other acts of the incumbent President, or unless expressly and explicitly modified or repealed by
the regular National Assembly." Notably, the provision does not only make all such proclamations, orders,
decrees,etc."partofthelawoftheland",inwhichcase,itwouldhavebeenperhapspossibletoargue,thatthey
hadjustbeenaccordedthestatusoflegislativeenactments,ordinarilysubjecttopossibleattackonconstitutional
grounds.Theprovisionactuallygoesfurther.Itexpresslyordainsthattheproclamations,orders,etc.referredto
should "remain valid, legal, binding, and effective" ... until revoked, modified, repealed or superseded in the
manners therein stipulated. What is more, the provision refers to and contemplates not only proclamations,
orders, decrees, instructions and acts of executive character, but even those essentially legislative, as may be
gatheredfromthenatureoftheproclamations,decrees,orders,etc.alreadyexistingatthetimeoftheapprovalof
the draft constitution and of the acceptance thereof by the people. Accordingly, and because there is no doubt
that Proclamation 1081 and General Order No. 2, herein challenged, are among the proclamations and orders
contemplatedinsaidprovision,theCourthasnoalternativebuttohold,asitherebyholds,inconsonancewiththe
authoritativeconstructionbytheConstitutionalConventionofthefundamentallawoftheland,thatProclamation
1081ofPresidentMarcosplacingthePhilippinesundermartiallawaswellasGeneralOrderNo.2,pursuantto
which petitioners are either in custody or restrained of their freedoms "until otherwise so ordered by (the
President) or (his) duly designated representative" are valid, legal, binding and effective, and consequently, the
continued detention of petitioner Aquino as well as the constraints on the freedoms of the other petitioners
resultingfromtheconditionsunderwhichtheywerereleasedfromcustodyarelegalandconstitutional.Wefeel
We are confirmed in this conclusion by the results of the referendum of July 2728, 1.473 in which 18,052,016
votergavetheiraffirmativeapprovaltothefollowingquestion:
DoyouwantPresidentMarcostocontinuebeyond1973andfinishthereformshehasinitiatedunder
Martiallaw?
Wehastentoaddtoavoidmisunderstandingorconfusionofconcepts,thatitisnotbecauseofthefiatorforceof
the New Constitution itself that the transitory provision is being relied upon for the purposes of the instant
petitions. At this point, and without prejudice to looking into the matter insofar as other issues and other cases
affecting martial law and the orders issued under it are concerned, all that We say is that the said provision
constitutes an authoritative contemporary construction of the martial law clause of the Constitution giving light
regardingtheemergencypowersthattheExecutivemayexerciseafteritsproclamation.
B
ButpetitionerDiokno 17would dilute the force of this conclusion by trying to find fault with the dispositive portion of the
decisionofthisCourtintheRatificationCases.Hecontendsthatactually,sixjusticesrenderedopinionsexpresslyholding
that the New Constitution has not been validly ratified in accordance with Article XV of the 1935 Constitution and that the
said dispositive portion "is not consistent with their findings, which were also the findings of the majority of the Court."
Otherwisestated,thepositionofpetitionerDioknoisthatthedecisionintheRatificationCaseshasnobindinglegalforceas
regards the question of whether or not the New Constitution is indeed in force and effect. This is practically an attempt to
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maketheCourtresolvethesamepointswhichcounselsforthepetitionersintheRatificationCasessubmittedtotheCourt
onthelastdayforthefinalityofthedecisiontherein,butwithoutaskingforeitherthereconsiderationormodificationthereof,
becausetheymerelywantedtorecordforposteritytheirownconstructionofthejudgmentoftheCourt.18
WithoutinanywayattemptingtoreopentheissuesalreadyresolvedbytheCourtinthatdecision,butforthesake
oferasinganydoubtastothetrueimportofOurjudgmenttherein,andinorderthatthosewhowouldperusethe
samemaynotbeledastraybycounsel'smisconstructionthereof,thewriterfeelsitishereopportunetosayafew
words relative to petitioner's observations, considering specially that Our discussion above is predicated on the
premisethattheNewConstitutionisinfullforceandeffect.
Tostartwith,itisevidentthatthephraseinquestionsayingthat"thereisnofurtherjudicialobstacletotheNew
Constitutionbeingconsideredinforceandeffect"wasinactualfactapprovedspecificallybythemembersofthe
Courtasthejuridicalresultoftheirvariantseparateopinions.Infact,eventhosewhodissented,exceptJustice
Zaldivar,acceptedbytheirsilencetheaccuracyofsaidconclusion.19Hadanyoftheotherjustices,particularly,Chief
JusticeMakalintalandJusticeCastrofeltthattheirjointopiniondidnotjustifysuchajudgment,theywouldhavecertainly
objected to its tenor, as Justice Zaldivar did. (See footnote 11). Surely, it is not for anyone to say now that the Court
misstateditsjudgment.
In the particular case of Counsels Taada and Arroyo, while it is true that on the last day for the finality of that
decision, they filed a "Constancia", separately from the Manifestation to the same effect of the other counsel,
discussingextensivelytheallegedinconsistencybetweenthecollectiveresultoftheopinionsofthemajorityofthe
Courtandthedispositiveportionofthejudgment,liketheothercounsel,however,theydidnotmakeanyprayer
forrelief,statingthattheironlypurposeis"tosaveourpeoplefrombeingmisledandconfused,inordertoplace
things in their proper perspective, and in order to keep faith with the 1935 Constitution. ... so that when history
passesjudgmentupontherealworthandmeaningofthehistoricResolutionofthisHonorableCourtpromulgated
on March 31, 1973, it may have all the facts before it," for which reason, the majority of the Court, over the
dissentofJusticesZaldivar,Antonio,Esguerraandthewriter,didnotconsideritnecessarytoact,believingitwas
not exactly the occasion to disabuse the minds of counsels about the juridical integrity of the Court's actuation
embodiedintheresolution.Inasense,therefore,saidcounselsshouldbedeemedtobeinestoppeltoraisethe
samepointsnowasargumentsforanyaffirmativerelief,somethingwhichtheydidnotaskforwhenitwasmore
appropriatetodoso.
In the second place, laying aside the division of views among the members of the Court on the question of
whetherornottherehasbeencompliancewiththeprovisionsofArticleXVofthe1935Constitution,thevitaland
decisive fact is that the majority of the Court held that the question of whether or not the New Constitution is
alreadyinforceandeffectisapoliticalquestionandtheCourtmustperforcedefertothejudgmentofthepolitical
departments of the government or of the people in that respect. In is true some of the Justices could not find
sufficientbasisfordeterminingwhetherornotthepeoplehaveacceptedtheNewConstitution,but,onthatpoint,
fourJustices,JusticesMakasiar,Antonio,Esguerraandthewriter,didvotecategoricallyintheaffirmative,while
twoJustices,thenChiefJusticeConcepcionandJusticeZaldivar,votedinthenegative.Andinthejointopinionof
now Chief Justice Makalintal and Justice Castro, it is crystal clear that the reference therein to their inability to
accuratelyappraisethepeople'sverdictwasmerelycasual,thethrustoftheirpositionbeingthatwhatisdecisive
isthePresident'sownattituderegardingthesituation,thatis,whetherhewouldtakethereportoftheKatipunan
ngmgaBarangaytotheeffectthatthepeoplehaveapprovedandratifiedtheNewConstitutionasdefinitiveand
final or he would prefer to submit the new charter to the same kind of election which used to be held for the
ratification of constitutional amendments, his decision either way not being subject to judicial inquiry. Stated
differently,ourdistinguishedcolleagueswereoftheviewthatwhetherornottheNewConstitutionmaybeheldto
havebeendulyratifiedpursuanttoArticleXVofthe1935Constitutionandeventheirownnegativeconclusionin
suchrespect,havenobearingontheissueoftheenforceabilityoftheNewConstitutiononthebasisofitshaving
been accepted by the people, and that although they were not possessed of sufficient knowledge to determine
this particular fact, the President's own finding thereon is conclusive upon the Court, since, according to them
suchadecisionispoliticalandoutsidethepaleofjudicialreview.Toquotetheirownwords:
However, a finding that the ratification of the draft Constitution by the Citizens Assemblies, as
certifiedbythePresidentinProclamationNo.1102,wasnotinaccordancewiththeconstitutionaland
statutory procedure laid down for the purpose does not quite resolve the questions raised in these
cases.Suchafinding,inouropinion,isonamatterwhichisessentiallyjusticiable,thatis,withinthe
powerofthisCourttoinquireinto.Itimportsnothingmorethanasimplereadingandapplicationof
thepertinentprovisionsofthe1935Constitution,oftheElectionCodeandofotherrelatedlawsand
official acts. No question of wisdom or of policy is involved. But from this finding it does not
necessarily follow that this Court may justifiably declare that the Constitution has not become
effective,andforthatreasongiveduecoursetothesepetitionorgrantthewritshereinprayedfor.
The effectivity of the Constitution in the final analysis, is the basic and ultimate question which
considerationsotherthanthecompetenceofthisCourt,arerelevantandunavoidable.
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IfindeeditbeacceptedthattheCitizensAssemblieshadratifiedthe1973Constitutionandthatsuch
ratification as well as the establishment of the government thereunder formed part of a revolution,
albeit peaceful, then the issue of whether or not that Constitution has become effective and, as a
necessary corollary whether or not the government legitimately functions under it instead of under
the 1935 Constitution, is political and therefore nonjudicial in nature. Under such a postulate what
thepeopledidintheCitizensAssembliesshouldbetakenasanexerciseoftheultimatesovereign
powers.Iftheyhadrisenupinarmsandbyforcedeposedthethenexistinggovernmentandsetupa
newgovernmentinitsplace,therecouldnotbetheleastdoubtthattheiractwouldbepoliticaland
notsubjecttojudicialreviewbutonlytothejudgmentofthesamebodypoliticact,inthecontextjust
setforth,isbasedonrealities.Ifanewgovernmentgainsauthorityanddominancethroughforce,it
can be effectively challenged only by a stronger force no Judicial review is concerned, if no force
hadbeenresortedtoandthepeople.indefianceoftheexistingConstitutionbutpeacefullybecause
oftheabsenceofanyappreciableopposition,ordainedanewConstitutionandsucceededinhaving
thegovernmentoperateunderit.Againstsucharealitytherecanbenoadequatejudicialreliefand
so courts forbear to take cognizance of the question but leave it to be decided through political
means.
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But then the President, pursuant to such recommendation. did proclaim that the Constitution had
beenratifiedandhadcomeintoeffect.Themorerelevantconsideration,therefore,asfaraswecan
see,shouldbeastowhatthePresidenthadinmindinconveningtheCitizensAssemblies,submitting
the Constitution to them and proclaiming that the favorable expression of their views was an act of
ratification. In this respect subjective factors, which defy judicial analysis and adjudication, are
necessarilyinvolved.
Inpositingtheproblemwithinanidentifiableframeofreferencewefindnoneedtoconsiderwhether
ornottheregimeestablishedbyPresidentMarcossincehedeclaredmartiallawandunderwhichthe
new Constitution was submitted to the Citizens Assemblies was a revolutionary one. The pivotal
question is rather whether or not the effectivity of the said Constitution by virtue of Presidential
ProclamationNo.1102,upontherecommendationoftheKatipunanngmgaBarangay,wasintended
to be definite and irrevocable, regardless of noncompliance with the pertinent constitutional and
statutoryprovisionsprescribingtheprocedureforratification.Wemustconfessthatafterconsidering
all the available evidence and all the relevant circumstances we have found no reasonably reliable
answertothequestion.
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Inthelightofthisseemingambivalence,thechoiceofwhatcourseofactiontopursuebelongstothe
President.WehaveearliermadereferencetosubjectivefactorsonwhichthisCourt,toourmind,is
in no position to pass judgment. Among them is the President's own assessment of the will of the
peopleasexpressedthroughtheCitizensAssembliesandoftheimportanceofthe1973Constitution
tothesuccessfulimplementationofthesocialandeconomicreformshehasstartedorenvisioned.If
he should decide that there is no turning back, that what the people recommended through the
Citizens Assemblies, as they were reported to him, demanded that the action he took pursuant
theretobefinalandirrevocable,thenjudicialreviewisoutofthequestion.
Inarticulatingourviewthattheprocedureofratificationthatwasfollowedwasnotinaccordancewith
the1935Constitutionandrelatedstatutes,wehavedischargedoursworndutyasweconceiveitto
be.ThePresidentshouldnowperhapsdecide,ifhehasnotalreadydecided,whetheradherenceto
suchprocedureisweightyenoughaconsideration,ifonlytodispelanycloudofdoubtthatmaynow
andinthefutureshroudthenation'sCharter.
InthedeliberationofthisCourtoneoftheissuesformulatedforresolutioniswhetherornotthenew
Constitution, since its submission to the Citizens Assemblies, has found acceptance among the
people,suchissuebeingrelatedtothepoliticalquestiontheorypropoundedbytherespondents.We
havenottarriedonthepointatallsincewefindnoreliablebasisonwhichtoformajudgment.Under
a regime of martial law, with the free expression of opinions through the usual media vehicles
restricted, we have no means of known, to the point of judicial certainty, whether the people have
acceptedtheConstitution.Inanyevent,wedonotfindtheissuedecisiveinsofarasourvoteinthese
cases is concerned. To interpret the Constitution that is judicial. That Constitution should be
deemed in effect because of popular acquiescence that is political, and therefore beyond the
domain of judicial review. (JAVELLANA vs THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY 50 SCRA 161162
164166167170171)20
Itonlyremainsforthewritertoreiteratehereafewconsiderationsalreadytouchedintheseparateopinionsinthe
RatificationCaseswhichinhisconsideredviewmaywellbetakenintoaccountbythosewhowouldreadagain
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thejudgmentoftheCourttherein..
1
Having come to the conclusion that the question of whether or not the New Constitution is legally in force and
effectispoliticalandoutsidethedomainofjudicialreview,itwasnotstrangethattheCourtshouldsimplyrulethat
thereshouldbenofurtherjudicialobstacletotheenforcementofthecharter,shouldthatbe,asitappearedtobe,
the intent of those actually in authority in the government. It is implicit in the political question doctrine that the
Court'sopinionastothecorrectnessofthelegalposturesinvolvedisofnomoment,forthesimplereasonthat
the remedy against any error therein lies either with the sovereign people at the polls or with the Political
departmentconcernedinthedischargeofitsownresponsibilityunderthefundamentallawoftheland,andnot
withtheCourt.Evenifitwereotherwisedesirable,ifonlyforthebenefitofthoseinterestedinthesettlementofthe
specificlegalproblemposed,anycategoricalrulingthereonwouldtranscendtheboundsofjudicialpropriety.For
the Court to hold it is without power to decide and in the same breath to actually decide is an intolerable
incongruity,henceanypronouncementorholdingmadeunderthecircumstancescouldhavenomoreforcethan
an obiter dictum, no matter how rich in erudition and precedential support. Consequently, to say that the New
Constitution may be considered by those in authority to be in force and effect because such is the mandate
expressedbythepeopleintheformannouncedbythePresident'sbutapropermannerofexpressingtheCourt's
abstentionfromwrestingthepowertodecidefromthoseinwhomsuchprerogativeisconstitutionallylodged.This
is neither to dodge a constitutional duty nor to refrain from getting involved in a controversy of transcendental
implicationsitisplainadherencetoaprincipleconsideredparamountinrepublicandemocracieswhereinthe
political question doctrine is deeply imbedded as an inextricable part of the rule of law. It is an unpardonable
misconception of the doctrine for anyone to believe that for the Supreme Court to bow to the perceptible or
audiblevoiceofthesovereignpeopleinappropriateinstancesisinanysenseadeparturefromoradisregardof
lawasappliedtopoliticalsituations,fortheveryrulethatenjoinsjudicialinterferenceinpoliticalquestionsisno
less a legal principle than any other that can be conceived, Indeed, just as, in law, judicial decision rendered
withinambitofthecourts'authoritydeservetherespectofthepeople,bythesametoken,thepeople'sverdicton
whatinherentlyistheirstodecidemustbeaccordedduedeferencebythejudiciary.Otherwise,judgeswouldbe
morepowerfulthanthepeoplebywhomtheyhavebeengivennomoreprerogativethantoactsolelywithinthe
boundariesofthejudicialsphere.Withal,acourtmayerrinfindingthatagivensituationcallsforitsabstention,in
thesamewayitmaycommitmistakesofjudgmentaboutanyordermatteritdecides,stillitsdecision,conceding
itshonesty,cannotbefaultedasanassaultontheruleoflaw.Thus,inabroadsense,itmaybesaidthatitisa
necessary corollary of the truth that the administration of justice in courts presided be human beings cannot
perfectthateventhehonestmistakeofajudgeislaw.
The writer further submits that, as pointed out in his separate opinion in the Ratification Cases, those who
vehementlyinsistthatthereferendumofJanuary1015,1973wasnotthekindofelectioncontemplatedinArticle
XV of the 1935 Constitution seem to overlook that the said provision refers only to the mode of ratifying
amendmentstheretoandmakesnomentionatallanewconstitutiondesignedtosupersedeitistobesubmitted
for approval by the people. Indeed, the writer would readily agree, as was already made clear in the
aforementioned opinion, that if what were submitted to the people in the January, 1973 referendum had been
merely an amendment or a bundle of amendments to the 1935 Constitution, the results thereof could not
constitute a valid ratification thereof. But since it was a whole integral charter that the Citizens' Assemblies had
beforetheminthatreferendum,itisevidentthattheratificationclauseinvokedcannotbecontrolling.
That a new constitution is not contemplated is indicated in the text of the provision it itself. It says: "Such
amendmentsshallbevalidaspartofthisConstitutionwhenapprovedbyamajorityofthevotescast...."Howcan
it be ever conceived that the 1973 Constitution which is an entire charter in itself, differing substantially in its
entirelyandradicallyinmostofitsprovisions,fromthe1935Constitutionbepartofthelatter?Inotherwords,the
moderatificationprescribedinArticleXVisonlyforamendmentsthatcanbemadepartofthewholeconstitution,
obviouslynottoanentirecharterpreciselypurportedtosupersedeit.
And it is but logical that a constitution cannot and should not attempt to bind future generations as to how they
woulddoawaywithitinfavorofonesuitabletotheirmorerecentneedsandaspirations.ItistruethatinTolentino
vs.Comelec,41SCRA702,thisCourt,thruthewriter,heldthat:
Inourdiscussionoftheissueofjurisdiction,WehavealreadymadeitclearthattheConventioncame
into being by a call of a joint session of Congress pursuant to Section 1 of Article XV of the
Constitution,alreadyquotedearlierinthisopinion.Wereiteratealsothatastomattersnotrelatedto
its internal operation and the performance of its assigned mission to propose amendments to the
Constitution,theConventionanditsofficersandmembersareallsubjecttoalltheprovisionsofthe
existing Constitution. Now, We hold that even as to its latter task of proposing amendments to the
Constitution,itissubjecttotheprovisionsofSection1ofArticleXV.Thismustbeso,becauseitis
plain to Us that the framers of the Constitution took care that the process of amending the same
should not be undertaken with the same ease and facility in changing an ordinary legislation.
Constitution making is the most valued power, second to none, of the people in a constitutional
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democracy such as the one our founding fathers have chosen for this nation, and which we of the
succeeding generations generally cherish. And because the Constitution affects the lives, fortunes,
futureandeveryotherconceivableaspectofthelivesofallthepeoplewithinthecountryandthose
subject to its sovereignty, every degree of care is taken in preparing and drafting it. A constitution
worthy of the people for which it is intended must not be prepared in haste without adequate
deliberation and study. It is obvious that correspondingly, any amendment of the Constitution itself,
and perforce must be conceived and prepared with as much care and deliberation. From the very
natureofthings,thedraftersofanoriginalconstitution,asalreadyobservedearlier,operatewithout
anylimitations,restraintsorinhibitionssavethosethattheymayimposeuponthemselves.Thisisnot
necessarilytrueofsubsequentconventionscalledtoamendtheoriginalconstitution.Generally,the
framers of the latter see to it that their handiwork is not lightly treated and as easily mutilated or
changed, not only for reasons purely personal but more importantly, because written constitutions
aresupposedtobedesignedsoastolastforsometime,ifnotforages,orfor,atleast,solongas
they can be adopted to the needs and exigencies of the people, hence, they must he insulated
against precipitate and hasty actions motivated by more or less passing political moods or fancies.
Thus, as a rule, the original constitutions carry with them limitations and conditions, more or less
stringent, made so by the people themselves, in regard to the process of their amendment. And
whensuchlimitationsorconditionsaresoincorporatedintheoriginalconstitution,itdoesnotliein
the delegates of any subsequent convention to claim that they may ignore and disregard such
conditionsbecausetheyareaspowerfulandomnipotentastheiroriginalcounterparts.(Atpage724
726).
But this passage should not be understood, as it was not meant to be understood, to refer to the people's
inalienablerighttocastasidethewholeconstitutionitselfwhentheyfindittobeintheirbestintereststodoso.It
wassoindicatedalreadyintheresolutiondenyingthemotionforreconsideration:
This is not to say that the people may not, in the exercise of their inherent revolutionary powers,
amendtheConstitutionorpromulgateanentirelynewoneotherwise,butaslongasanyamendment
is formulated and submitted under the aegis of the present Charter, any proposal for such
amendmentwhichisnotinconformitywiththeletter,spiritandintentoftheprovisionoftheCharter
for effecting amendments cannot receive the sanction of this Court. (Resolution of Motion for
reconsideration,Tolentinovs.ComelecG.R.No.L34150,February4,1971).
Foritisratherabsurdtothinkthatinapprovinganewfundamentallawwithwhichtheywouldreplacetheexisting
one,theyhavetoadheretothemandatesofthelatter,underpainofgettingstuckwithit,shouldtheyfall.One
caneasilyvisualizehowtheevilforceswhichdominatedtheelectoralprocessduringtheoldsocietywouldhave
goneintoplayinordertostifletheurgeforchange,hadthemodeofratificationinthemannerofpastplebiscites
been the one observed in the submission of the New Constitution. To reiterate what the writer said in the
RatificationCases:
Considerthatinthepresentcasewhatisinvolvedisnotjustanamendmentofaparticularprovision
ofanexistingConstitutionhere,itis,asIhavediscussedearlierabove,anentirelynewConstitution
thatisbeingproposed.Thisimportantcircumstancemakesagreatdealofdifference.
NolessthancounselTolentinoforhereinrespondentsPuyatandRoy,whowashimselfthepetitioner
in the case I have just referred to is, now inviting Our attention to the exact language of Article XV
andsuggestingthatthesaidArticlemaybestrictlyappliedtoproposedamendmentsbutmayhardly
govern the ratification of a new Constitution. It is particularly stressed that the Article specifically
referstonothingelsebut"amendmentstothisConstitution"whichifratified"shallbevalidaspartof
this Constitution." Indeed, how can a whole new Constitution be by any manner of reasoning an
amendmenttoanyotherconstitutionandhowcanit,ifratified,formpartofsuchotherconstitution?
...
It is not strange at all to think that the amending clause of a constitution should be confined in its
applicationonlytoproposedchangesinanypartofthesameconstitutionitself,fortheveryfactthat
anewconstitutionisbeingadoptedimpliesageneralintenttoputasidethewholeoftheoldone,and
whatwouldbereallyincongruousistheideathatinsuchaneventuality,thenewConstitutionwould
subject its going into effect any provision of the constitution it is to supersede, to use the language
preciselyofSection6,ArticleXVII,theeffectivityclause,oftheNewConstitution.Myunderstandingis
thatgenerally,constitutionsareselfborn,theyveryrarely,ifatall,comeintobeing,byvirtueofany
provision of another constitution. This must be the reason why every constitution has its own
effectivity clause, so that if, the Constitutional Convention had only anticipated the idea of the
referendumandprovidedforsuchamethodtobeusedintheratificationoftheNewConstitution,I
would have had serious doubts as to whether Article XV could have had priority of application."
(JavellanavsTheExecutiveSecretary50SCRA197198).
Since in the withdrawal motion of petitioner Diokno, the whole trust of his posture relative to the alleged non
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enforceabilityoftheConstitutionof1973revolvesaroundsupposednoncomplianceinitsratification,withArticle
XVofthe1935Charter,andinasmuchasitisevidentthattheletterandintentofthatinvokedprovisiondonot
warrant,ashasjustbeenexplained,theapplicationthereoftotheNewConstitution,forthesimplereasonthatthe
sameisnotinfactandinlawaswellasinformandinintentamereamendmenttotheOldConstitution,butan
integrallynewcharterwhichcannotconceivablybemadejustapartthereof,onecannotbutviewsaidmotionto
withdraw as having been designed for no other purpose than to serve as a vehicle for the ventilation of
petitioner'spoliticalratherthanlegaloutlookwhichdeservesscantconsiderationinthedeterminationofthemerits
ofthecasesatbar.
In any event, that a constitution need not be ratified in the manner prescribed by its predecessor and that the
possibleinvalidityofthemodeofitsratificationdoesnotaffectitsenforceability,aslongasthefactofitsapproval
by the people or their acquiescence thereto is reasonably shown, is amply demonstrated in the scholarly
dissertation made by our learned colleague, Mr. Justice Felix V. Makasiar, in his separate opinion in the
RatificationCases,whichcarriedtheconcurrenceofJusticesAntonio,Esguerraandthewriter.Andthatwhattook
place in the Philippines in January, 1973 is not an unprecedented practice peculiar to our country, is likewise
plainly shown therein, since it appears that no less than the Constitution of the United States of America, the
nation whose close adherence to constitutionalism petitioners would want the Filipinos to emulate, was also
ratifiedinawaynotinconformitywiththeArticlesofConfederationandPerpetualUnion,theConstitutionwhichit
replaced,andthereasonforitwasonlybecausethoseinauthorityfeltthatitwasimpossibletosecureratification,
iftheamendmentclauseoftheArticlesweretobeobserved,andsotheyresortedtoextraconstitutionalmeans
to accomplish their purpose of having a new constitution. Following is the pertinent portion of Mr. Justice
Makasiar's illuminating disquisition based on actual historical facts rather than on theoretical and philosophical
hypothesesonwhichpetitionerswouldseemtorely:
The classic example of an illegal submission that did not impair the validity of the ratification or
adoptionofanewConstitutionisthecaseoftheFederalConstitutionoftheUnitedStates.Itshould
be recalled that the thirteen (13) original states of the American Union which succeeded in
liberating themselves from England after the revolution which began on April 19, 1775 with the
skirmish at Lexington, Massachusetts and ended with the surrender of General Cornwallis at
Yorktown,Virginia,onOctober19,1781(EncyclopediaBrit.,Vol.1,1933Ed.,p.776)adoptedtheir
Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union, that was written from 1776 to 1777 and ratified on
March 1, 1781 (Encyclopedia Brit., Vol. 11, 1966 Ed., p. 525). About six years thereafter, the
Congress of the Confederation passed a resolution on February 21, 1787 calling for a Federal
ConstitutionalConvention"forthesoleandexpresspurposeofrevisaingthearticlesofconfederation
....'(Appendix1,TheFederalist,ModernLibraryed.,p.577,emphasissupplied).
The Convention convened at Philadelphia on May 14, 1787. Article XIII of the Articles of
ConfederationandPerpetualUnionstatedspecifically:
The articles of this confederation shall be inviolably observed by every state, and the
unionshallbeperpetualnorshallanyalterationatanytimehereafterbemadeinanyof
them unless such alteration be agreed to in a congress of the united states, and be
afterwards confirmed by the legislatures of every state. (See the Federalist, Appendix
11,ModernLibraryEd.,1937,p.584emphasissupplied).
ButtheforegoingrequirementsprescribedbytheArticlesofConfederationandPerpetualUnionfor
the alteration and for the ratification of the Federal Constitution as drafted by the Philadelphia
Conventionwerenotfollowed.FearfulthatthesaidFederalConstitutionwouldnotberatifiedbythe
state legislatures as prescribed, the Philadelphia Convention adopted a resolution requesting the
CongressoftheConfederationtopassaresolutionprovidingthattheFederalConstitutionshouldbe
submitted to elected state conventions and if ratified by the conventions in nine (9) states, not
necessarilyinallthirteen(13)states,thesaidConstitutionshalltakeeffect.
Thus,historyProfessorEdwardEarleMeadofPrincetonUniversityrecordedthat:
It would have a counsel of perfection to consign the new Constitution to the tender mercies of the
legislaturesofeachandallofthe13states.Experienceclearlyindicatedthatratificationwouldhave
had the same chance as the scriptural camel passing thru the eye of a needle. It was therefore
determinedtorecommendtoCongressthatthenewConstitutionbesubmittedtoconventionsinthe
severalstatesspeciallyelectedtopassandwhenitshouldberatifiedbynineofthethirteenstates
....' (The Federalist, Modern Library Ed., 1937, Introduction by Edward Earle Mead, pp. viiiix
emphasissupplied).
HistorianSamuelEliotMorisonsimilarlyrecounted:
The Convention, anticipating that the influence of many state politicians would be Anti
federalist,providedforratificationoftheConstitutionbypopularlyelectedconventionsin
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eachstate.SuspectingthatRhodeIsland,atleast,wouldproverecalcitrant,itdeclared
thattheConstitutionwouldgointoeffectassoonasninestatesratified.Theconvention
method had the further advantage that judges, ministers, and others ineligible to state
legislatures could be elected to a convention. The ninestate provision was, of course,
mildly revolutionary. But the Congress of the Confederation, still sitting in New York to
carryonfederalgovernmentuntilrelieved,formallysubmittedthenewconstitutiontothe
states and politely faded out before the first presidential inauguration.' (The Oxford
HistoryoftheAm.PeoplebySamuelEliotMorison,1965ed.,p.312).
And so the American Constitution was ratified by nine (9) states on June 21, 1788 and by the last
fourstatesonMay29,1790(12C.J.p.679footnote,16C.J.S.27bythestateconventionsand
not by all thirteen (13) state legislatures as required by Article XIII of the Articles of Confederation
andPerpetualUnionaforequotedandinspiteofthefactthattheFederalConstitutionasoriginally
adopted suffers from two basic infirmities, namely the absence of a bill of rights and of a provision
affirmingthepowerofjudicialreview.
The liberties of the American people were guaranteed by the subsequent amendments to the
FederalConstitution.ThedoctrineofjudicialreviewhasbecomepartofAmericanconstitutionallaw
only by virtue of a judicial pronouncement by Chief Justice Marshall in the case of Marbury vs.
Madison(1803,1Branch137).
Untilthisdate,nochallengehasbeenlaunchedagainstthevalidityoftheratificationoftheAmerican
Constitution,noragainstthelegitimacyofthegovernmentorganizedandfunctioningthereunder.
Inthe1946caseofWheelervs.BoardofTrustees(37SE2nd322,326330),whichenunciatedthe
principle that the validity of a new or revised Constitution does not depend on the method of its
submission or ratification by the people, but on the fact of fiat or approval or adoption or
acquiescence by the people, which fact of ratification or adoption or acquiescence is all that is
essential, the Court cited precisely the case of the irregular revision and ratification by state
conventionsoftheFederalConstitution,thus:
Nocaseidenticalinitsfactswiththecasenowunderconsiderationhasbeencalledto
ourattention,andwehavefoundnone,Wethinkthattheprinciplewhichweapplyinthe
instant case was very clearly applied in the creation of the constitution of the United
States. The convention created by a resolution of Congress had authority to do one
thing,andoneonly,towit,amendthearticlesofconfederation.Thistheydidnotdo,but
submittedtothesovereignpower,thepeople,anewconstitution.Inthismannerwasthe
constitutionoftheUnitedStatessubmittedtothepeopleanditbecameoperativeasthe
organiclawofthisnationwhenithadbeenproperlyadoptedbythepeople.
Pomeroy's Constitutional Law, p. 55, discussing the convention that formulated the
constitutionoftheUnitedStates,hasthistosay"Theconventionproceededtodo,and
did accomplish, what they were not authorized to do by a resolution of Congress that
calledthemtogether.Thatresolutionplainlycontemplatedamendmentstothearticlesof
confederation,tobesubmittedtoandpassedbytheCongress,andafterwardsratified
by all the state legislatures, in the manner pointed out by the existing organic law. But
theconventionsoonbecameconvincedthatanyamendmentswerepowerlesstoeffect
acurethatthediseasewastoodeeplyseatedtobereachedbysuchtentativemeans.
Theysawthesystemtheywerecalledtoimprovemustbetotallyabandoned,andthat
the national idea must be reestablished at the center of their political society. It was
objected by some members, that they had no power, no authority, to construct a new
government.Theyhadnoauthority,iftheirdecisionsweretohefinalandnoauthority
whatever, under the articles of confederation, to adopt the course they did. But they
knewthattheirlaborswereonlytobesuggestionsandthattheyaswellasanyprivate
individuals,andanyprivateindividualsaswellasthey,hadarighttoproposeaplanof
governmenttothepeoplefortheiradoption.Theywere,infact,amereassemblageof
privatecitizens,andtheirworkhadnomorebindingsanction,thanaconstitutiondrafted
by Mr. Hamilton in his office, would have had. The people, by their expressed will,
transformed this suggestion, this proposal, into an organic law, and the people might
havedonethesamewithaconstitutionsubmittedtothembyasinglecitizen.
xxxxxxxxx
... When the people adopt a completely revised constitution, the framing or submission of the
instrumentisnotwhatgivesitsbindingforceandeffect.Thefiatofthepeople,andonlythefiatofthe
people,canbreathelifeintoaConstitution.
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...Wedonothesitatetosaythatacourtisneverjustifiedinplacingbyimplicationalimitationupon
the sovereign. This would be an authorized exercise of sovereign power by the court. (In State v.
Swift69Ind.505,519,theIndianaSupremeCourtsaid:'ThepeopleofaStatemayformanoriginal
constitution,orabrogateanoldoneandformanewone,atandtime,withoutandpoliticalrestriction
excepttheconstitutionoftheUnitedStates....(37SE327328,329,emphasissupplied.)
Inthe1903caseofWestonvs.Ryan,thecourtheld:
It remains to be said that if we felt at liberty to pass upon this question, and were
compellertoholdthattheactofFebruary23,1887,isunconstitutionalandvoid,itwould
not, in our opinion, by any means follow that the amendment is not a part of our state
Constitution. In the recent case of Taylor vs. Commonwealth (Va.) 44 S.E. 754, the
Supreme Court of Virginia hold that their state Constitution of 1902, having been
acknowledgedandacceptedbytheofficersadministeringthestategovernment,andby
the people, and being in force without t opposition must be regarded as an existing
Constitution, irrespective of the question as to whether or not the convention which
promulgated it had authority so to do without submitting it to a vote of the people. In
Brittlev.People,2Neb.198,isasimilarholdingastocertainprovisionsoftheNebraska
Constitution of 1886, which were added by the Legislature at the requirement of
Congress, though never submitted to the people for their approval. (97 NW 349350
emphasissupplied).
Against the decision in the Wheeler case, supra., confirming the validity of the ratification and
adoptionoftheAmericanConstitution,inspiteofthefactthatsuchratificationwasaclearviolationof
the prescription on alteration and ratification of the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union,
petitionersinG.R.No.L36165dismissedthismostsignificanthistoricalfactbycallingtheFederal
Constitution of the United States as a revolutionary one, invoking the opinion expressed in Vol. 16,
Corpus Juris Secundum, p. 27, that it was a revolutionary constitution because it did not obey the
requirement that the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union can be amended only with the
consentofallthirteen(13)statelegislatures.Thisopiniondoesnotciteanydecidedcase,butmerely
refers to the footnotes on the brief historical account of the United States Constitution on p. 679 of
Vol.12,CJS.Petitioners,onp.18oftheirmainNotes,referUStopp.270316oftheOxfordHistory
of the American People, 1965 Ed. by Samuel Eliot Morison, who discusses the Articles of
Confederation and Perpetual Union in Chapter XVIII captioned 'Revolutionary Constitution Making,
17751781'(pp.270281).InChapterXXon'TheCreativePeriodinPolitics,17851788,'Professor
MorisondelineatesthegenersisoftheFederalConstitution,butdoesnotrefertoitevenimplicitlyas
a revolutionary constitution (pp. 297316). However, the Federal Constitution may be considered
revolutionaryfromtheviewpointofMcIverifthetermrevolutionisunderstoodin'itsWIDERsenseto
embrace decisive changes in the character of government, even though they do not involve the
violentoverthrowofanestablishedorder,...'(R.M.MacIver,TheWebofGovernment,1965ed.,p.
203).
It is rather ridiculous to refer to the American Constitution as a revolutionary constitution, The
ArtyclesofConfederationandPerpetualUnionthatwasinforcefromJuly12,1776to1788,forged
asitwasduringthewarofindependencewasrevolutionaryconstitutionofthethirteen(13)states.In
theexistingFederalConstitutionoftheUnitedStateswhichwasadoptedseven(7)ornine(9)years
after the thirteen (13) states won their independence and long after popular support for the
government of the Confederation had stabilized was not a product of a revolution. The Federal
Constitution was a 'creation of the brain and purpose of man' in an era of peace. It can only be
consideredrevolutionaryinthesensethatitisaradicaldeparturefromitspredecessor,theArticles
ofConfederationandPerpetualUnion.
It is equally absurd to affirm that the present Federal Constitution of the United States is not the
successor to the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union. The fallacy of the statement is so
obviousthatnofurtherrefutationisneeded.(50SCRA209215).
Moreover,whetheraproposalsubmittedtothepeopleisjustanamendmenttoanexistingconstitutionwithinthe
contemplation of its amendment clause or is a new charter not comprehended by its language may not be
determined solely by the simple processes of analysis of and comparison between the contents of one and the
other. Very much depends on what the constituent assembly, reflecting its understanding of the desire of the
people it represents, actually intends its handiwork to be, as such intent may be deduced from the face of the
documentitself.Forthetruthisthatwhateverchangesinformandinsubstanceaconstitutionmayundergo,as
long as the same political, social and economic ideologies as before continue to be the motivation behind such
changes, the result can never be, in a strict sense, a new constitution at all. Indeed, in such circumstance, any
alteration or modification of any provision of a constitution, no matter how extensive, can always he traced as
founded on its own bedrock, thereby proving identity. It is therefore the expressed desire of the makers of the
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charter that is decisive. And that is why the New Constitution has its own effectivity clause which makes no
referencehowsoevertoArticleXVofthepastcharter.21
Now, how the founding fathers of America must have regarded the difference between a constitutional
amendment,ontheonehand,andanewconstitution,ontheother,whentheyfoundtheArticlesofConfederation
and Perpetual Union no longer adequate for the full development of their nation, as can be deduced from the
historicalaccountabove,isatleastonecaseinpointtheyexercisedtheirrighttoratifytheirnewfundamental
lawinthemostfeasiblemanner,withoutregardtoanyconstitutionalconstraints.Andyet,itistheconstitutionthat
isreputedtohavestoodalltestsandwas,infact,themodelofmanynationalconstitutions,includingourownof
1935,ifitcannotbeaccuratelyregardedalsoasthemodelofthepresentone.
With the foregoing considerations in mind, it can be readily seen how pointless it is to contend, as petitioner
Diokno does in his motion to withdraw, that what he deems as the failure of the January, 1973 referendum to
conformwiththerequirementsofArticleXVofthe1935ConstitutiondetractsfromtheenforceabilityoftheNew
Constitution, in the light of the President's assertion contained in Proclamation 1102 that it has been approved
and ratified by the people, coupled with his evident firm and irreversible resolution to consider it to have been,
indeed,dulyratified,andinthefaceoftheindisputablefactthatthewholegovernmenteffectivelyincontrolofthe
entirePhilippineterritoryhasbeenoperatingunderitwithoutanyvisibleresistanceonthepartofanysignificant
sectorofthepopulace.ToalludetothefilingofthepetitionsinthePlebisciteandtheRatificationCasesandthe
occasionalappearancesinsomepublicplacesofsomeundergroundpropagandawhich,anyway,hasnotcutany
perceptible impression anywhere, as indicative or evidence of opposition by the people to the New Constitution
wouldbe,touseacommonplacebutaptexpression,tomistakethetreesfortheforest.
ItisthusabundantlyclearthatthepassionateandtenaciousraciocinationinpetitionerDiokno'swithdrawalmotion
tendingtoassailthecogencyofouropinionsandtheirconsistencywiththejudgmentintheRatificationCases,to
theextentofusingtermsthatcouldsignifydoubtinthegoodfaithandintellectualintegrityofsomemembersof
theCourtandoftryingtoembarrasstheCourtitselfbeforethebarofhistory,doesnotinfacthaveanyplausible
basiswhatsoever.
CONCLUSION
Theinstantcasesareunique.ToOurknowledgeneverbeforehasanynationaltribunalofthehighestauthority
been called upon to pass on the validity of a martial law order of the Executive issued in the face of actual or
imminent danger of a rebellion threatening the very existence of the nation. The petitions herein treat of no
morethanthedeprivationoflibertyofthepetitioners,butinrealitywhatisinvolvedhereisthelegitimacyofthe
governmentitself.NoSupremeCourtofanyothercountryintheworld,Wereiterate,haseverbeenconfronted
withsuchatranscendentalissue.
Thisis,therefore,adecisionthataffectsnotthepetitionersalone,butthewholecountryandallourpeople.For
thisreason,Wehaveendeavoredtothebestofourabilitytolookatalltheissuesfromeveryconceivablepointof
view. We have gone over all the jurisprudence cited by the parties, the writings of learned and knowledgeable
authoritiestheyhavequotedandwhateverWecouldavailofbyOurselves.WetrustWehavenotmisunderstood
anyofthecontentionsofthepartiesandtheirableandlearnedcounselsandthatWehavenotoverlookedany
authorityrelevanttothem.AndWemustsayWeperceivenocausetodowngradetheirloveofandloyaltytoour
commonmotherlandevenifdifferencestherearebetweenourconvictionsastohowtoearlierattainthenational
destiny. Indeed, We have not considered as really persuasive any insinuations of motivations born of political
partisanshipandpersonalambitions.
Wedonotmeantobelittleordepreciateforeignjurisprudence,butWehavedeliberatelyrefrainedfromrelyingon
alien opinions, judicial or otherwise, in order to stress that the Filipinos can solve their own problems with their
own resources intellectual or otherwise. Anyway, We doubt if there is enough relevant parallelism between
occurrencesinothercountriespasseduponbythecourtswithwhatishappeningheretoday.
Principally, by this decision, We hold that the power to proclaim martial law is lodged by the Constitution
exclusively in the Executive, but the grant of judicial power to the Supreme Court also by the Constitution is
plenary and total and, therefore, when it is a matter of judicial notice, because it is commonly known by the
general public or is capable of unquestionable demonstration, that any particular declaration of martial law is
devoid of any of the constitutionally required bases, the Court has the full authority and it would not hesitate to
strike down any such improvident proclamation and to adjudge that the legitimate government continue without
theoffendingExecutive,whoshallbereplacedinaccordancewiththerulesofsuccessionprovidedintheexisting
Constitutionandlaws.Inthecasesatbar,however,theCourt,withtheabstentionofonlyonememberwhohas
preferred not to emit any opinion on the issue at this time, holds that the President had good and sufficient
grounds in issuing Proclamation 1081, whether the same is examined in the light of its own recitals, as some
Justicesadvocate,oroffactsofjudicialnoticetogetherwiththoseundisputedintherecord,inthemannertherest
ofUshaveactuallytestedit.Wefurtherholdthatinrestrainingthelibertiesofpetitioners,thePresidenthasnot
oversteppedtheboundariesfixedbytheConstitution.
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For doctrinal purposes, it is best to add to all the foregoing that a judicial challenge against the imposition of
martiallawbytheExecutiveinthemidstoftheactualitiesofarealassaultagainsttheterritorialintegrityandlifeof
the nation, inevitably calls for the reconciliation, which We feel We have been able to effectuate here, of two
extremesintheallocationofpowersundertheConstitutiontheresortbytheExecutivetotheultimateweapon
withwhichthefundamentallawallowshimtodefendthestateagainstfactualinvasionorrebellionthreateningthe
publicsafety,ontheonehand,andtheassertionbytheSupremeCourtoftheirreducibleplenitudeofitsjudicial
authority,ontheother.Nootherconflictofprerogativesofsuchtotaldimensionscanconceivablyarisefromthe
operationofanyothertwopartsofthecharter.Thisdecisionthencouldwellbesuigeneris,hence,whateverhas
beensaidherewouldnotnecessarilygovernquestionsrelatedtoadverseclaimsofauthorityrelatedtothelower
levelsofthehierarchyofpowersintheConstitution.
Wehumblysubmitthisdecisiontothejudgmentofallourpeople,tohistoryandtothegenerationsofFilipinosstill
unborn,confidentthatitcarriesallthatWeknowandallthatWeare.AsWedothis,Wearefullyawarethatinthis
criticalstageofourlifeasanation,ouroverridingneedisunity.ItisOurferventhopethatbythisdecision,We
have duly performed Our constitutionally assigned part in the great effort to reduce if not to eliminate the
remainingfundamentalcausesofinternecinestrife.
May Divine Providence continue to always keep the Philippines in the right paths of democracy, freedom and
justiceforall!
JUDGMENT
WHEREFORE,thepetitionsinalltheaboveentitledcasesaredismissed.Nocosts.
ADDENDUM
Thefollowingaremyreasonsforvotinginfavorofgrantingthemotiontowithdraw:
It is elementary that the remedy of habeas corpus exists only against involuntary confinement. The moment,
therefore,thatafterinitiallyquestioningthelegalityofhisdetention,thepetitionerseekswithdrawalofhispetition
atanystageofthecasebeforejudgment,hisdetentionbecomesinlawautomatically,byhisownact,voluntaryor
withhisexpressconsent,hence,thereasonforfurtherinquiryintothecircumstancesthereofceasescompletely,
and the court's duty to proceed further and render judgment comes to an end. By allowing the withdrawal, no
interestofjusticewouldbeprejudiced,nojuridicalharmneedingredresscouldbecausedtoanyone.Accordingly,
thepetitioner'smotiveforhiswithdrawal,whetherexpressedorunarticulated,areabsolutelyimmaterial,albeit,in
the case at bar, petitioner himself suggests that, while acceding to his request, the members of the Court may
expresstheirviewsthereon.(SurRejoinderdatedMay21,1974,p.3).
Inthemindofthewriter,thegroundsallegedbypetitionerDioknoandhiscounselhaveanapparenttendencyto
offendthedignityoftheCourtandtounderminetherespectandfaithofthepeopleinitscapacitytoadminister
justice. What is worse, they may be false and baseless, as they are emotional and personal. Unless properly
explained,theygivetheimpressionthatmovantisimpeachingtheintegrityandgoodfaithofsomemembersof
theCourt.Inthepremises,saidpetitionerandcounselcouldberequiredtoshowcausewhytheyshouldnotbe
heldincontemptoftheCourt,buttherebeingnoformalchargetosucheffectintheinstantproceedings,andin
order not to confuse the discussion and resolution of the transcendental issues herein, it is preferable, and the
Courthasopted,totakeupthematterofthepossibleresponsibilityforcontemptseparately,eithermotupropioor
upontheinitiativeofwhoevermayallegetobeaggrievedthereby.Forthepresent,ithastobestated,however,
thatundernocircumstancesmayanypartyorcounselventhispersonalfeelingsandemotionsinanypleadingor
paper Bled with the Court, particularly while his case is pending therein. Personalities that are directed towards
the occupants of the judicial office naturally mar the legal issues before them, correspondingly making more
difficulttheirproperandimpartialresolution.Evenifthejudgesconcernedareactually,astheyaresupposedto
be,unmovedbythem,stilltherecanbenoassurancethatthelitigantsandthepublicingeneralwillbeconvinced
oftheirabsoluteimpartialityintheirsubsequentactuations,andtothatextent,theinterestsofjusticeareboundto
suffer.Itisbutinkeepingwiththehighesttraditionsofthejudiciarythatsuchimproprietiesarenotallowedtopass
unnoticed and are dealt with by the court either moto propio or upon corresponding complaint, whether in an
independentproceedingorasanincidentwithinthependingcase.Nocourtworthyofitspositionshouldtolerate
them.
But assaults upon the dignity and integrity of the court, are one thing, and the issues of the case at hand are
another.Regardlessofwhatthejudgethinksisthebeliefofthoseconcernedaboutthemotivationsofthecourt's
subsequent resolution of the issues, unless he inhibits himself from further acting in the case, circumstances
permitting,itishisinescapabledutytorenderjudgment,takingcare,ofcourse,thatheremains,infact,objective
and impartial. It is, therefore, of no moment, for the purposes of disposing of petitioner Diokno's motion to
withdraw,whetherornotthechargesleveledbyhimandhiscounselagainsttheCourtoranyofitsmembersare
foundedorunfoundedandwhetherornotthesameconstituteactionablemisconductontheirpart,asparticipants
in the case before Us and/or as members of the Bar and officers of the Court. Any possible action for such
probablemisconducthasnobearingonthequestionofwhetherornot,observingtheusualrulesandpractices,
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the Court should dismiss his main petition, the alleged illegality of his detention having been duly cured by his
voluntarysubmissionthereto.
AlltheseisnottosaythatIhavenotgiventhoughttotheimperativenecessityofresolvingtheissuesofpublic
interestraisedinpetitionerDiokno'spetition.IcanalsoseethatitisimportanttotheGovernmentthathedoesnot
escapethelegaleffectsofthedecisioninthesecases.Butifthesearethemainreasonsfordenyinghismotionto
withdraw,IbelievethattheGovernment'sapprehensionsareratherunfounded.WhileIwouldnotsaythatbyhis
withdrawal,petitionerimpliedlyadmitsthecorrectnessofthestandoftheGovernment,whatwiththeavalancheof
protestsagainstallegedinjusticeandsupposedlegalerrorsrunningthroughhispleadings,Iamoftheconsidered
viewthatinlaw,hecannotcorrectlypretendthattherulingsoftheCourtintheothercaseshereininrespectto
theissuesthereinthatarecommonwiththoseofhispetitionarenotbindingonhimatleastbyprecedentialforce.
And inasmuch as in the cases not withdrawn, all the issues of public interest raised in his case will have to be
resolved,Idonotseeanypurposeininsistingthatheshouldremainapetitionerwhenherefuses,asamatterof
conscience,toawaittheunfavorableverdictheforeseesinhisowncase,whichhehimselfanticipateswillnotset
himfreeanyway.Ofcourse,heproteststhatnothinghecansaycanconvincetheCourt,and,ontheotherhand,
perhaps,themosttechnicallyaccurateandpalpablyjustdecisionthecourtmayfashionwillnotconvincehim,but
it has to be a strange court that will yield to a litigant's point of view just because he sincerely feels he is right,
whereas it is not unusual for a litigant to pretend not to see the correctness and justice of the court's judgment
unfavorabletohisinterests.
ANTONIO,J.:
Theseapplicationsforwritsofhabeascorpus present for review Proclamation No. 1081 of the President of the
Philippines, placing the country under martial law on September 21, 1972, and the legality of the arrest and
detention of prisoners under the aforesaid proclamation. The issues posed have confronted every democratic
governmentineveryclimeandineveryage.Theyhavealwaysrecurredintimesofcrisiswhenthenation'ssafety
and continued existence are in peril. Involved is the problem of harmonizing two basic interests that lie at the
foundationofeverydemocraticconstitutionalsystem.ThefirstiscontainedinRosseau'sformulation,'thepeople's
firstintentionisthattheStateshallnotperish,"inotherwords,therightoftheStatetoitsexistence.Thesecond
are the civil liberties guaranteed by the Constitution, which "imply the existence of an organized system
maintainingpublicorderwithoutwhichlibertyitselfwouldbelostintheexcessesofunrestrainedabuses...."(Cox
vs.NewHampshire,312U.S.569[1940]).
The petitions for habeas corpus initially raise the legality of the arrest and detention of petitioners. As the
respondents, however, plead, in defense, the declaration of martial law and the consequent suspension of the
privilegeofhabeascorpus,thevalidityofProclamationNo.1081istheultimateconstitutionalissue.
HearingswereheldonSeptember26and29andOctober6,1972.1
Meanwhile, some of the petitioners were allowed to withdraw their petitions. 2 Most of the petitioners were
subsequently released from custody under certain conditions and some of them insist that their cases have not become
mootastheirfreedomofmovementisrestricted.3Asofthisdate,onlypetitionerBenignoAquino,Jr.(L35546)remainsin
militarycustody.
OnAugust11,1973,petitionerBenignoAquino,Jr.waschargedbeforethemilitarycommissionwiththecrimesof
subversionundertheAntiSubversionAct(RepublicActNo.1700),murderandillegalpossessionoffirearms.On
August23,1973,hefiledanactionforcertiorariandprohibition(L35546)withthisCourt,assailingthevalidityof
his trial before the military commission, because the creation of military tribunals for the trial of offenses
committedbyciviliansisunconstitutionalintheabsenceofastateofwarorstatusofbelligerencybeingmartial
law measures, they have ceased with the cessation of the emergency and he could not expect a fair trial
because the President of the Philippines had prejudged his case. That action is pending consideration and
decision.
OnDecember28,1973,petitionerDioknomovedtowithdrawhispetition(L35539),claimingthattherewasdelay
inthedispositionofhiscase,andthatasaconsequenceofthedecisionofthisCourtinJavellana v. Executive
Secretary(L36142,March31,1973)andoftheactionofthemembersofthisCourtintakinganoathtosupport
the New Constitution, he has reason to believe that he cannot "reasonably expect to get justice in this case."
Respondentsopposethismotiononthegroundthatpublicinterestorquestionsofpublicimportanceareinvolved
and the reasons given are factually untrue and contemptuous. On September 11, 1974, petitioner Diokno was
releasedfrommilitarycustody.Inviewofhisrelease,itwastheconsensusofthemajorityoftheCourttoconsider
hiscaseasmoot.Weshallnowproceedtodiscusstheissuesposedbytheremainingcases.
1.IsthedeterminationbythePresidentofthePhilippinesofthenecessityfortheexerciseofhispowertodeclare
martial law political, hence, final and conclusive upon the courts, or is it justiciable and, therefore, his
determinationissubjecttoreviewbythecourts?
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2.AssumingLansangtobeapplicable,canitbesaidthatthePresidentactedarbitrarilyinissuingProclamation
No.1081?
3.Assumingthattheissuesarejusticiable,cantheSupremeCourtuponthefactsofrecordandthosejudicially
knowntoItnowdeclarethatthenecessityformartiallawhasalreadyceased?
4.Underaregimeofmartiallaw,cantheCourtinquireintothelegaljustificationforthearrestanddetentionas
well as the other constraints upon the individual liberties of the petitioners? In the affirmative, does It have any
adequatelegalbasistodeclarethattheirdetentionisnolongerauthorizedbytheConstitution.
I
CONSTITUTIONINTENDEDSTRONGEXECUTIVE
The right of a government to maintain its existence is the most pervasive aspect of sovereignty. To protect the
nation'scontinuedexistence,fromexternalaswellasinternalthreats,thegovernment"isinvestedwithallthose
inherentandimpliedpowerswhich,atthetimeofadoptingtheConstitution,weregenerallyconsideredtobelong
to every government as such, and as being essential to the exercise of its functions" (Mr. Justice Bradley,
concurringinLegalTenderCases[US]12Wall.457,554,556,20L.ed.287,314,315).Toattainthisend,nearly
allotherconsiderationsaretobesubordinated.Theconstitutionalpowertoactuponthisbasicprinciplehasbeen
recognizedbyallcourtsineverynationatdifferentperiodsanddiversecircumstances.
These powers which are to be exercised for the nation's protection and security have been lodged by the
Constitution under Article VII, Section 10 (2) thereof, on the President of the Philippines, who is clothed with
exclusiveauthoritytodeterminetheoccasiononwhichthepowersshallbecalledforth.
The constitutional provision expressly vesting in the President the power to place "the Philippines or any part
thereofundermartiallawincaseofinvasion,insurrectionorrebellionorimminentdangerthereofwhenthepublic
safetyrequiresit,"4istakenbodilyfromtheJonesLawwiththedifferencethatthePresidentoftheUnitedStateshadthe
powertomodifyorvacatetheactiontakenbytheGovernorGeneral.5AlthoughtheCivilGovernor,underSection5ofthe
Philippine Bill of 1902, could, with the approval of the Philippine Commission, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpusnopowertoproclaimmartiallawwasspecificallygranted.ThispowerisnotmentionedintheFederalConstitutionof
theUnitedStates.ItsimplydesignatesthePresidentascommanderinchief:
The President shall be CommanderinChief of the Army and Navy of the United States and of the
militiaoftheseveralstateswhencalledintoactualserviceoftheUnitedStates...6
Its absence in the Federal Constitution notwithstanding, President Abraham Lincoln during the Civil War placed
some parts of the country under martial law. He predicated the exercise of this power on his authority as
CommanderinChief of the Armed Forces and on the ground of extreme necessity for the preservation of the
Union.WhennotexpresslyprovidedintheConstitution,itsjustification,therefore,wouldbenecessity.Thussome
authoritative writers view it as "not a part of the Constitution but is rather a power to preserve the Constitution
when constitutional methods prove inadequate to that end. It is the law of necessity."7 Since the meaning of the
term"martiallaw"isobscure,asisthepowerexercisablebytheChiefExecutiveundermartiallaw,resortmustbehadto
precedents.ThusthepowersoftheChiefExecutiveundertheCommanderinChiefclauseoftheFederalConstitutionhave
been drawn not only from general and specific provisions of the Constitution but from historical precedents of Presidential
actionintimesofcrises.LincolninvokedhisauthorityundertheCommanderinChiefclauseoftheFederalConstitutionfor
the series of extraordinary measures which he took during the Civil War, such as the calling of volunteers for military
service,theaugmentationoftheArmyandNavy,thepaymentof$2millionfromtheunappropriatedfundsintheTreasury
to persons unauthorized to receive it, the closing of the Post Office to "treasonable correspondence," the blockade of
Southernports,thesuspensionofthewritofhabeascorpus,thearrestsanddetentionsofpersons"whowererepresentedto
him as being engaged in or contemplating "treasonable practices" all this for the most part was done without the least
statutoryauthorizationfromCongress.TheactionsofLincoln"assertforthePresident,"accordingtoCorwin,"aninitiativeof
indefinite scope and legislative in effect in meeting the domestic aspects of a war emergency."8 The creation of public
officesisconferredbytheFederalConstitutiontoCongress.DuringWorldWar1,however,PresidentWilson,onthebasis
ofhispowerunderthe"CommanderinChief"clauseoftheFederalConstitution,created"publicoffices,"whichwerecopied
inlavishscalebyPresidentRooseveltinWorldWarII."Theprincipalcanonsofconstitutionalinterpretationareinwartime
setaside,"accordingtoCorwin,"sofarasconcernsboththescopeofnationalpowerandthecapacityofthePresidentto
gatheruntohimselfalltheconstitutionallyavailablepowersinorderthemoreeffectivelytofocusthemuponthetaskofthe
hour." 9 The presidential power, "building on accumulated precedents has taken on at times, under the stimulation of
emergencyconditions,"accordingtotwoeminentcommentators,the"dimensionsofexecutiveprerogativeasdescribedby
JohnLocke,ofapowertowit,tofillneededgapsinthelaw,oreventosupersedeitsofarasmayberequisitetorealizethe
fundamental law of nature and government, namely, that as much as may be all the members of society are to be
preserved."10
Thereisnoquestionthattheframersofthe1935Constitutionwereawareoftheseprecedentsandofthescope
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ofthepowerthathadbeenexercisedbythePresidentsoftheUnitedStatesintimesofgravecrisis.Theframers
oftheConstitution"werenotonlyidealistsbutalsopracticalmindedmen.""Whiletheyabjuredwarsofaggression
theywellknewthatforthecountrytosurviveprovisionsforitsdefensehadtobemade."11
II
TEXTUALLYDEMONSTRABLECONSTITUTIONAL
COMMITMENTOFISSUETOTHEPRESIDENT
Instead of making the President of the Philippines simply the commanderinchief of all the armed forces, with
authoritywheneveritbecomesnecessarytocalloutsucharmedforcestopreventorsuppresslawlessviolence,
invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, the framers of the 1935 Constitution expressly conferred upon him the
exclusivepowerandauthoritytosuspendtheprivilegesofthewritofhabeascorpusorplacethePhilippines,or
anypartthereof,undermartiallaw.
corpusorplacethePhilippinesoranypartthereofundermartiallaw.12
Theconditionwhichwouldwarranttheexerciseofthepowerwasnotconfinedtoactualinvasion,insurrectionor
rebellion,butalsotoimminentdangerthereof,whenthepublicsafetyrequiresit.Itisevident,therefore,thatwhile
AmericanPresidentsderivedtheseextraordinarypowersbyimplicationfromtheState'srighttoselfpreservation,
thePresidentofthePhilippineswasexpresslygrantedbytheConstitutionwithallthepowersnecessarytoprotect
thenationintimesofgraveperil.
ThesafetyandwellbeingofthenationrequiredthatthePresidentshouldnotbehamperedbylackofauthority
but was to be a "strong executive who could maintain the unity of the nation with sufficient powers and
prerogativestosavethecountryduringgreatcrisesanddangers."13
AsDelegateJoseP.Laurelcomprehensivelyexplained:
...Astrongexecutiveheisintendedtobe,becauseastrongexecutiveweshallneed,especiallyin
theearlyyearsofourindependent,orsemiindependentexistence.Aweakexecutiveissynonymous
withaweakgovernment.Heshallnotbea'monarch'oradictatorintimeofprofoundandOctavian
peace, but he virtually so becomes in an extraordinary emergency and whatever may be his
position, he bulwarks normally, the fortifications of a strong constitutional government, but
abnormally,inextremecases,heissuddenlyusheredisasaMinerva,fullgrownandinfullpanoply
ofwar,tooccupythevantagegroundasthereadyprotectoranddefenderofthelifeandhonorofhis
nation.(EmphasisSupplied.)14
TheconcentrationofanamplitudeofpowerinthehandsoftheCommanderinChiefoftheArmedForcesofthe
Philippines,whoisatthesametimetheelectedcivilianChiefofState,ispredicateduponthefactthatitishewho
mustinitiallyshouldertheburdenanddealwiththeemergency.Bythenatureofhispositionhepossessesand
wieldstheextraordinarypowersofselfpreservationofthedemocratic,constitutionalstate.Intimesofcrisisthere
isindeedunificationofresponsibilityandcentralizationofauthorityintheChiefExecutive."Theconcentrationof
governmental power in a democracy faced by an emergency," wrote Rossiter, "is a corrective to the crisis
inefficiencies inherent in the doctrine of the separation of powers. ... In normal times the separation of powers
formsadistinctobstructiontoarbitrarygovernmentalaction.Bythissametokeninabnormaltimesitmayforman
insurmountablebarriertodecisiveemergencyactioninbehalfoftheStateanditsindependentexistence.There
aremomentsinthelifeofanygovernmentwhenallthepowersmustworktogetherinunanimityofpurposeand
action, even if this means the temporary union of executive, legislative and judicial powers in the hands of one
man.Themorecompletetheseparationofpowersinaconstitutionalsystem,themoredifficultandyetthemore
necessarywillbetheirfusionintimeofcrisis."(Rossiter,ConstitutionalDictatorship,288289.)
Itwasintended,however,thattheexerciseoftheseextraordinarypowersisforthepreservationoftheState,its
democraticinstitutions,andthepermanentfreedomofitscitizens.
III
RESPONSIBILITYIMPLIESBROAD
AUTHORITYANDDISCRETION
Theconditionsofwar,ofinsurrectionorrebellion,orofanyothernationalemergencyareasvariedasthemeans
required for meeting them and it is, therefore, within the contemplation of the Constitution that t he Chief
Executive,topreservethesafetyofthenationonthosetimesofnationalperil,shouldhavethebroadestauthority
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compatiblewiththeemergencyinselectingthemeansandadoptingthemeasureswhichinhishonestjudgment
arenecessaryforthepreservationofthenation'ssafety."Thecircumstancesthatendangerthesafetyofnations
areinfinite,"wroteAlexanderHamilton,"andforthisreasonnoconstitutionalshacklescanwiselybeimposedon
thepowertowhichthecareofitiscommitted...Thisisoneofthosetruthswhichtoacorrectandunprejudiced
mind carries its own evidence along with it, and may be obscured, but cannot be made plainer by argument or
reasoning...Themeansoughttobeinproportiontotheendthepersonsfromwhoseagencytheattainmentof
anyendisexpectedoughttopossessthemeansby]whichitistobeattained."15Mr.Madisonexpressedthesame
ideainthefollowingterms:"Itisvaintoimposeconstitutionalbarrierstotheimpulseofselfpreservation.Itisworsethanin
vain,becauseitplantsintheConstitutionitselfnecessaryusurpationsofpower."16
"Unquestionably,"wroteChiefJusticeTaneyinLutherv.Borden(7How.44,[18491,12L.ed.600),"aStatemay
use its military power to put down an armed insurrection, too strong to be controlled by the civil authority. The
power is essential to the existence of every government, essential to the preservation of order and free
institutions, and is as necessary to the States of this Union as to any other government. The State itself must
determinewhatdegreeofforcethecrisisdemands.AndiftheGovernmentofRhodeIslanddeemedthearmed
oppositionsoformidable,andsoramifiedthroughouttheState,astorequiretheuseofitsmilitaryforceandthe
declarationofmartiallaw,weseenogrounduponwhichthisCourtcanquestionitsauthority."
InthePrizecases(17L.ed.476,[1863]),theCourtascribedtothePresidentoftheUnitedStates,byvirtueofhis
powersasChiefExecutiveandasCommanderinChief,thepowerwhichinLutherv.Bordenisattributedtothe
governmentasawhole,totreatofinsurrectionasastateofwar,andthesceneoftheinsurrectionasaseator
theaterofwar.AsJusticeGrierinthePrizecasessignificantlystated:"WhetherthePresidentinfulfillinghisduties
asCommanderinChief,insuppressinganinsurrection,hasmetwithsuchhostileresistance,andacivil war of
suchalarmingproportionsaswillcompelhimtoaccordtothemthecharacterofbelligerents,isaquestiontobe
decided by him, and this court must be governed by the decisions and acts of the Political Department of the
government to which this power was entrusted. 'He must determine what degree of force the crisis demands.
(Emphasissupplied.)
InHirabayashi v. United States, where the Court upheld the curfew regulations affecting persons of Japanese
ancestry as valid military measures to prevent espionage and sabotage, there was again reaffirmance of the
viewthattheConstitutionhasgrantedtothePresidentandtoCongressintheexerciseofthewarpowersa"wide
scopefortheexerciseofjudgmentanddiscretionindeterminingthenatureandextentofthethreateneddanger
andintheselectionofthemeansforresistingit."
Since the Constitution commits to the Executive and to Congress the exercise of the war power in all the
vicissitudesandconditionsofwarfare,ithasnecessarilygiventhemwidescopefortheexerciseofjudgmentand
discretion in determining the nature and extent of the threatened injury or danger and in the selection of the
meansforresistingit.ExparteQuirin,supra(317US28,29,ante,12,13,63SCt2)PrizeCases,supra(2Black
[US] 670, 17 L ed 477) Martin v. Mott, 12 Wheat. [US] 19, 29, 6 L ed 537, 540). Where, as they did here, the
conditionscallfortheexerciseofjudgmentanddiscretionandforthechoiceofmeansbythosebranchesofthe
GovernmentonwhichtheConstitutionhasplacetheresponsibilityofwarmaking,itisnotforanycourttositin
reviewofthewisdomoftheiractionorsubstituteitsjudgmentfortheirs.
The actions taken must be appraised in the light of the conditions with which the President and
Congress were confronted in the early months of 1942, many of which, since disclosed, were then
peculiarlywithintheknowledgeofthemilitaryauthorities.17
The measures to be taken in carrying on war and to suppress insurrection," according to Justice Swayne, in
Stewart v. Kahn, 18 "are not defined. The decision of all questions rests wholly in the discretion of those to
whom the substantial powers involved are confided by the Constitution. In the latter case, the power is not
limitedtovictoriesinthefieldandthedispersionoftheinsurgentforces.Itcarrieswithitinherentlythepower
toguardagainsttheimmediaterenewaloftheconflict,andtoremedytheevilswhichhavearisenfromitsrise
andprogress.
The thrust of those authorities is that the President as commanderinchief and chief executive on whom is
committedtheresponsibilityisempowered,indeedobliged,topreservethestateagainstdomesticviolenceand
alien attack. In the discharge of that duty, he necessarily is accorded a very broad authority and discretion in
ascertaining the nature and extent of the danger that confronts the nation and in selecting the means or
measuresnecessaryforthepreservationofthesafetyoftheRepublic.
Theterms"insurrection"and"rebellion"areinalargemeasureincapableofpreciseorexactlegaldefinitionsand
are more or less elastic in their meanings. As to when an act or instance of revolting against civil or political
authoritymaybeclassifiedasan"insurrection"orasa"rebellion"isaquestionbetteraddressedtothePresident,
whoundertheConstitutionistheauthorityvestedwiththepowerofascertainingtheexistenceofsuchexigencies
andchargedwiththeresponsibilityofsuppressingthem.Tosuppresssuchdangertothestate,heisnecessarily
vestedwithabroadauthorityanddiscretion,tobeexercisedundertheexigenciesofeachparticularoccasionas
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thesamemaypresentitselftohisjudgmentanddetermination.Hisactionsinthefaceofsuchemergencymust
be viewed in the context of the situation as it then confronted him. It is not for any court to sit in review of the
wisdomofhisactionascommanderinchiefortosubstituteitsjudgmentforhis.
IV
NEEDFORUNQUESTIONINGADHERENCE
TOPOLITICALDECISION
It is, however, insisted that even with the broad discretion granted to the President by the Constitution in
ascertaining whether or not conditions exist for the declaration of martial law, his findings in support of such
declarationshouldneverthelessbesubjecttojudicialreview.
ItisimportanttobearinmindthatWeareheredealingwithaplenaryandexclusivepowerconferreduponthe
Chief Executive by the Constitution. The power itself is to be exercised upon sudden emergencies, and under
circumstances which may be vital to the existence of the government. A prompt and unhesitating obedience to
orders issued in connection therewith is indispensable as every delay and obstacle to its immediate
implementationmayjeopardizethepublicinterests.
By reason of his unique position as Chief Executive and as CommanderinChief of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines,itishe,morethananyotherhighofficialofthegovernment,whohastheauthorityandthemeansof
obtaining through the various facilities in the civil and military agencies of the government under his command,
informationpromptlyandeffectively,fromeveryquarterandcornerofthestateabouttheactualpeaceandorder
condition of the country. In connection with his duty and responsibility, he is necessarily accorded the wise and
objectivecounseloftrainedandexperiencedspecialistsonthesubject.EveniftheCourtcouldobtainallavailable
information,itwouldlackthefacilityofdeterminingwhetherornottheinsurrectionorrebellionortheimminence
thereofposesadangertothepublicsafety.Norcouldthecourtsrecreateacompletepictureoftheemergencyin
the face of which the President acted, in order to adequately judge his military action. Absent any judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving judicially those questions, such a task for a court to
undertakemaywellnighbeimpossible.Ontheotherhand,thePresident,whoisresponsibleforthepeaceand
securityofthenation,isnecessarilycompelledbytheConstitutiontomakethosedeterminationsanddecisions.
The matter is committed to him for determination by criteria of political and military expediency. There exists,
therefore, no standard ascertainable by settled judicial experience by reference to which his decision can be
reviewed by the courts. 19 Indeed, those are military decisions and in their very nature, "military decisions are not
susceptible of intelligent and judicial appraisal. They do not pretend to rest on evidence, but are made on information that
oftenwouldnotbeadmissibleandonassumptionsthatcouldnotbeproved.Informationinsupportofanordercouldnotbe
disclosed to courts without danger that it would reach the enemy. Neither can courts act on communications made in
confidence.Hence,courtscanneverhaveanyrealalternativetoacceptingthemeredeclarationoftheauthoritythatissued
the order that it was reasonably necessary from a military viewpoint." 20 He is necessarily constituted the judge of the
existenceoftheexigencyinthefirstinstanceandisboundtoactaccordingtohisbeliefofthefacts.
Bothreasonandauthority,therefore,dictatethatthedeterminationofthenecessityfortheexerciseofthepower
todeclaremartiallawiswithintheexclusivedomainofthePresidentandhisdeterminationisfinalandconclusive
uponthecourtsanduponallpersons.(cf.Fairman,MartialRuleandtheSuppressionofInsurrection,p.771.) 21
Thisconstructionnecessarilyresultsfromthenatureofthepoweritself,andfromthemanifestobjectcontemplatedbythe
Constitution.
(a)Barcelonv.Baker.
The existing doctrine at the time of the framing and adoption of the 1935 Constitution was that of Barcelon v.
Baker(5Phil.87).ItenunciatedtheprinciplethatwhentheGovernorGeneralwiththeapprovalofthePhilippine
Commission, under Section 5 of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, declares that a state of rebellion,
insurrectionorinvasionexists,andbyreasonthereofthepublicsafetyrequiresthesuspensionofthePrivilegesof
habeascorpus,thisdeclarationisheldconclusiveuponthejudicialdepartmentofthegovernment.Andwhenthe
Chief Executive has decided that conditions exist justifying the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus,courtswillpresumethatsuchconditionscontinuetoexistuntilthesameauthorityhasdecidedthatsuch
conditionsnolongerexist.Thesedoctrinesarerootedonpragmaticconsiderationsandsoundreasonsofpublic
policy.The"doctrinethatwhenevertheConstitutionorastatutegivesadiscretionarypowertoanyperson,such
personistobeconsideredthesoleandexclusivejudgeoftheexistenceofthosefacts"hasbeenrecognizedby
all courts and "has never been disputed by any respectable authority." Barcelon v. Baker, supra.) The political
department, according to Chief Justice Taney in Martin v. Mott (12 Wheat 2931), is the sole judge of the
existenceofwarorinsurrection,andwhenitdeclareseitheroftheseemergenciestoexist,itsactionisnotsubject
to review or liable to be controlled by the judicial department of the State. (Citing Franklin v. State Board of
Examiners,23Cal.172,178.)
Thedanger,anddifficultieswhichwouldgrowoutoftheadoptionofacontraryruleareclearlyandablypointed
outintheBarceloncase,thus:
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If the investigation and findings of the President, or the GovernorGeneral with the approval of the
Philippine Commission, are not conclusive and final as against the judicial department of the
Government,theneveryofficerwhosedutyitistomaintainorderandprotectthelivesandproperty
ofthepeoplemayrefusetoact,andapplytothejudicialdepartmentoftheGovernmentforanother
investigationandconclusionconcerningthesameconditions,totheendthattheymaybeprotected
againstcivilactionsresultingfromillegalacts.
Owing to conditions at times, a state of insurrection, rebellion, or invasion may arise suddenly and
may jeopardize the very existence of the State. Suppose, for example, that one of the thickly
populated Governments situated near this Archipelago, anxious to extend its power and territory,
should suddenly decide to invade these Islands, and should, without warning, appear in one of the
remote harbors with a powerful fleet and at once begin to land troops. The governor or military
commander of the particular district or province notifies the GovernorGeneral by telegraph of this
landingoftroopsandthatthepeopleofthedistrictareincollusionwithsuchinvasion.Mightnotthe
GovernorGeneral and the Commission accept this telegram as sufficient and proof of the facts
communicatedandatoncetakesteps,eventotheextentofsuspendingtheprivilegeofthewritof
habeascorpus, as might appear to them to be necessary to repel such invasion? It seems that all
meninterestedinthemaintenanceandstabilityoftheGovernmentwouldanswerthisquestioninthe
affirmative.
But suppose some one, who has been arrested in the district upon the ground that his detention
would assist in restoring order and in repelling the invasion, applies for the writ of habeas corpus,
alleging that no invasion actually exists may the judicial of the Government call the of officers
actuallyengagedinthefieldbeforeitandawayfromtheirpostsofdutyforthepurposeofexplaining
andfurnishingprooftoitconcerningtheexistenceornonexistenceofthefactsproclaimedtoexistby
the legislative and executive branches of the State? If so, then the courts may effectually tie the
hands of the executive, whose special duty it is to enforce the laws and maintain order, until the
invaders have actually accomplished their purpose. The interpretation contended for here by the
applicants, so pregnant with detrimental results, could not have been intended by the Congress of
theUnitedStateswhenitenactedthelaw.
ItisthedutyofthelegislativebranchoftheGovernmenttomakestichlawsandregulationsaswill
effectually conserve peace and good order and protect the lives and property of the citizens of the
State.ItisthedutyoftheGovernorGeneraltotakestichstepsashedeemswiseandnecessaryfor
thepurposeofenforcingsuchlaws.Everydelayandhindranceandobstaclewhichpreventsastrict
enforcement of laws under the conditions mentioned necessarily tends to jeopardize public interest
andthesafetyofthewholepeople.IfthejudicialdepartmentoftheGovernment,oranyofficerinthe
Government,hasarighttocontesttheordersofthePresidentoroftheGovernorGeneralunderthe
conditionsabovesupposed,beforecomplyingwithsuchorders,thenthehandofthePresidentorthe
GovernorGeneralmaybetieduntiltheveryobjectoftherebelsorinsurrectosorinvadershasbeen
accomplished. But it is urged that the President, or the GovernorGeneral with the approval of the
PhilippineCommission,mightbemistakenastotheactualconditionsthatthelegislativedepartment
the Philippine Commission might, by resolution, declare after investigation, that a state of
rebellion, insurrection, or invasion exists, and that the public safety requires the suspension of the
privilegeofthewritofhabeascorpus,when,asamatteroffact,nosuchconditionsactuallyexisted
that the President, or GovernorGeneral acting upon the authority of the Philippine Commission,
might by proclamation suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus without there actually
existingtheconditionsmentionedintheactofCongress.Inotherwords,theapplicantsallegeintheir
argumentinsupportoftheirapplicationforthewritofthatthelevislativeandexecutivebranchesof
theGovernmentmightreachawrongconclusionfromtheirinvestigationsoftheactualconditions,or
might, through a desire to oppress and harass the people, declare that a state of rebellion,
insurrection,orinvasionexistedandthatpublicsafetyrequiredthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthe
writofhabeascorpuswhenactuallyandinfactnosuchconditionsdidexist.Wecannotassumethat
thelegislativeandexecutivebrancheswillactortakeanyactionbaseduponsuchmotives.
Moreover,itcannotbeassumedthatthelegislativeandexecutivebranchesoftheGovernment,with
allthemachinerywhichthosebrancheshaveattheircommandforexaminingintotheconditionsin
anypartoftheArchipelago,willfailtoobtainallexistinginformationconcerningactualconditions.Itis
thedutyoftheexecutivebranchoftheGovernmenttoconstantlyinformthelegislativeranchofthe
GovernmentoftheconditionoftheUnionastotheprevalenceofpeaceordisorder.Theexecutive
branchoftheGovernment,through"Itsnumerousbranchesofthecivilandmilitary,ramifiesevery
portion of the Archipelago, and is enabled thereby to obtain information from every quarter and
corner of the State. Can the judicial department of the Government, with its very limited machinery
for the purpose of investigating general conditions be any more sure of ascertaining the true
conditions through out the Archipelago or in any particular district, than the other branches of the
Government?Wethinknot.(5Phil.,pp.9396.)
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(b)TheConstitutiondalConventionof1934.
ThiswasthestateofPhilippinejurisprudenceonthematter,whentheConstitutionalConventionmetonJuly20,
1934. It must be recalled that, under the Philippine Bill of 1902, the suspension of the privilege of the writ of
habeascorpusbytheGovernorGeneralwassubjecttotheapprovalofthePhilippine(Section5,ActofCongress
ofJuly1,1902),while,underSection21oftheJonesLawof1916,thesuspensionoftheofprivilegeofthewritof
habeascorpusaswellastheproclamationofmartiallawbytheGovernorGeneralcouldbemodifiedorvacated
by the President of the United State. When the first Draft was Submitted conferring the power to suspend the
privilegeofthewritofhabeascorpusexclusivelyuponthePresident,DelegateAranetaproposedanamendment
totheeffectthattheNationalAssemblyshouldbetheorganempoweredtosuspendtheprivilegesofthehabeas
corpus and, when not session, the same may be done by the President with the consent of the majority of the
Supreme Court. Under the provisions of the Draft, Delegate Araneta argued, "the Chief Executive would be the
only authority to determine the existence of the reasons for the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus and,
accordingtoPhilippinejurisprudence,theSupremeCourtwouldrefusetoreviewthefindingsoftheExecutiveon
thematter.Consequently,headded,arrestswouldbeeffectedbymilitarymenwhoweregenerallyarbitrary.They
would be arresting persons connected with the rebellion, insurrection, invasion some of them might also be
arresting other person without any cause whatsoever. The result would be that many persons might find
themselves detained when in fact they had no connection whatsoever with the disturbances." 22 Notwithstanding
thebrilliantargumentsofDelegateAraneta,theConventionvoteddowntheamendment.Evidentwastheclearintentofthe
framers of the Charter of vesting on the President the exclusive power of suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus and the conclusive power to determine whether the exigency has arisen requiring the suspension. There was no
oppositionintheConventiontothegrantonthePresidentoftheexclusivepowertoplacethePhilippinesoranypartthereof
undermartiallaw.
Realizing the fragmentation of the Philippines into thousands of islands and of the war clouds that were then
hoveringover,EuropeandAsia,theaforesaidframersoftheCharteroptedforastrongexecutive.
The provision of Section 10, Paragraph 2, of Article VII of the 1935 Constitution was, therefore, adopted in the
lightoftheCourt'sinterpretationinBarcelonv.Baker.
(c)Montenegrov.Castaeda.
On August 30, 1952, or 17 years after the ratification of the 1935 Constitution, this Court in Montenegro v.
Castaeda(91Phil.882.887),construingthepowerofthePresidentofthePhilippinesunderArticleVII,Section
10, Paragraph 2, of the Constitution, reaffirmed the doctrine in Barcelon v. Baker, thus: "We agree with the
Solicitor General that in the light of the view of the limited States Supreme Court through Marshall, Taney and
StoryquotedwithapprovalinBarcelonv.Baker(5Phil.87,99100),theauthoritytodecidewhethertheexigency
hasarisenrequiringsuspensionbelongstothePresidentand'hisdecisionisfinalandconclusive'uponthecourts
anduponallotherpersons."
OnMontenegro'scontentionthatthereisnostateofinvasion,insurrection,rebellionorimminentdangerthereof,
asthe"intermittentsortiesandlightningattacksbyorganizedbandsindifferentplacesareoccasional,localized
and transitory," this Court explained that to the unpracticed eye the repeated encounters between dissident
elements and military troops may seem sporadic, isolated, or casual. But the officers charged with the Nation's
security,analyzedtheextentandpatternofsuchviolentclashesandarrivedattheconclusionthattheyarewarp
and woof of a general scheme to overthrow this government "vi et armis, by force of arms." This Court then
reiteratedoneofthereasonswhythefindingoftheChiefExecutivethatthereis"actualdangerofrebellion"was
accordedconclusiveness,thus:"Indeed,asJusticeJohnsonsaidinthatdecision,whereastheExecutivebranch
oftheGovernmentisenabledthruitscivilandmilitarybranchestoobtaininformationaboutpeaceandorderfrom
everyquarterandcornerofthenation,thejudicialdepartment,withitsverylimitedmachinerycannotbeinbetter
position to ascertain or evaluate the conditions prevailing in the Archipelago." (Montenegro v. Castaeda and
Balao,91Phil.,882,886887.)
ItistruethattheSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStatesinSterlingv.Constantin,23asserteditsauthoritytoreviewthe
actiontakenbytheStateGovernorofTexasunderhisproclamationofmartiallaw.However,theCourtchosenottooverturn
the principle expressed in Moyer v. Peabody that the question of necessity is "one strictly reserved for executive
discretion."Itheldthat,whilethedeclarationofisconclusive,themeasuresemployedarereviewable:
It does not follow from the fact that the executive has this range of discretion, deemed to be a
necessaryincidentofhispowertosuppressdisorderthateverysortofactiontheGovernormaytake,
no matter how unjustified by the exigency or subversive or private right and the jurisdiction of the
courts, otherwise available, is conclusively supported by mere executive fiat. The contrary is well
establishedWhatarethelimitsofmilitarydiscretion,andwhetherornottheyhavebeenoverstepped
inaparticularcasearejudicialquestions....
ThisrulinginSterlingshouldbeviewedwithinthecontextofitsfactualenvironment.Atissuewasthevalidityof
theattemptoftheGovernortoenforcebyexecutiveormilitaryordertherestrictionontheproductionofoilwells
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whichtheDistrictJudgehadrestrainedpendingproperjudicialinquiry.TheStateGovernorpredicatedhispower
undermartiallaw,althoughitwasconcededthat"atnotimehastherebeenanyactualuprisingintheterritoryat
notimehasanymilitaryforcebeenexertedtoputriotsandmobsdown."TheCourtdisapprovedtheorderofthe
Governor as it had no relation to the suppression of disorder but on the contrary it undermined the restraining
order of the District Judge. The Court declared that the Governor could not by pass the processes of
constitutionalgovernmentbysimplydeclaringmartiallawwhennobonafideemergencyexisted.Whilethiscase
shows that the judiciary can interfere when no circumstances existed which could reasonably be interpreted as
constitutinganemergency,itdidnotnecessarilyresolvethequestionwhethertheCourtcouldinterfereintheface
ofanactualemergency.
(d)Lansangv.Garcia.
Our attention, is however, invited to Lansang v. Garcia (G.R. No. L33964 etc., December 11, 1971, 42 SCRA
448) where this Court declared, in connection with the suspension of the of the writ of habeas corpus by the
PresidentofthePhilippinesonAugust21,1971,thatithastheauthoritytoinquireintotheexistenceofthefactual
basisoftheproclamationinordertodeterminetheconstitutionalsufficiencythereof.Butthisassertionofauthority
is qualified by the Court's unequivocal statement that "the function of the Court is merely to check not to
supplant the Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he has gone beyond they constitutional limits of his
jurisdiction,nottoexercisethepowervestedinhimortodeterminethewisdomofhisact."Andthatjudicialinquiry
intothebasisofthequestionedthantosatisfytheCourttonotthePresident'sdecisioniscorrectandthatpublic
safetywasendangeredbytherebellionandjustifiedthesuspensionofthewrit,butthatinsuspendingthewrit,
thePresidentdidnotactarbitrarily."
In the ascertainment of the factual basis of the suspension, however, the Court had to rely implicitly on the
findingsoftheChiefExecutive.Itdidnotconductanyindependentfactualinquiryfor,asthisCourtexplainedin
Barcelon and Montenegro, "... whereas the Executive branch of the Government is enabled thru its civil and
military branches to obtain information about peace and order from every quarter and corner of the nation, the
judicial department, with its very limited machinery cannot be in a better position to ascertain or evaluate the
conditions prevailing in the Archipelago." Indeed, such reliance on the Executive's findings would be the more
compellingwhenthedangerposedtothepublicsafetyisonearisingfromCommunistrebellionandsubversion.
We can take judicial notice of the fact that the Communists have refined their techniques of revolution, but the
ultimate object is the same "to undermine through civil disturbances and political crises the will of the ruling
class to govern, and, at a critical point, to take over State power through wellplanned and ably directed
insurrection."24Insteadofinsurrection,therewastobetheprotractedwar.Theplanwastoretreatandattackonlyatan
opportunetime."Themajorobjectiveistheannihilationoftheenemy'sfightingstrengthandintheholdingortakingofcities
and places. The holding or taking of cities and places is the result of the annihilation of the enemy's fighting strength." 25
The Vietnam War contributed its own brand of terrorism conceived by Ho Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap the silent and
simpleassassinationofvillageofficialsforthedestructionofthegovernment'sadministrativenetwork.Modernrebellionnow
is a war of sabotage and harassment, of an aggression more often concealed than open of guerrillas striking at night, of
assassins and terrorists, and of professional revolutionaries resorting to all sorts of stratagems, crafts, methods and
subterfuge,toundermineandsubvertthesecurityoftheStatetofacilitateitsviolentoverthrow.26
Intheultimateanalysis,evenassumingthatthematterisjusticiablewillWeapplythestandardssetinLansang,
byascertainingwhetherornotthePresidentactedarbitrarilyinissuingProclamationNo.1081,theresultwould
bethesame.
For the existence of an actual rebellion and insurrection in this country by a sizable group of men who have
publiclyriseninarmstooverthrowthegovernmentwasconfirmedbythisCourtinLansang.
... our jurisprudence attests abundantly to the Communist activities in the Philippines, especially in
Manilafromthelatetwentiestotheearlythirties,thenaimedprincipallyatincitementtoseditionor
rebellion, as the immediate objective. Upon the establishment of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines,themovementseemedtohavewanednotablybut,theoutbreakofWorldWarIIinthe
Pacific and the miseries, the devastation and havoc and the proliferation of unlicensed firearms
concomitant with the military occupation of the Philippines and its subsequent liberation, brought
about, in the late forties, a resurgence of the Communist threat, with such vigor as to be able to
organizeandoperateinCentralLuzonanarmycalledHUKBALAHAP,duringtheoccupation,and
renamedHukbongMapagpalayangBayan(HMB)afterliberationwhichclashedseveraltimeswith
the armed forces of the Republic. This prompted then President Quirino to issue Proclamation No.
210, dated October 22, 1950, suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas, validity of which was
upheld in Montenegro v. Castaeda. Days before the promulgation of said Proclamation, or on
October 18, 1950, members of the Communist Politburo in the Philippines were apprehended in
Manila. Subsequently accused and convicted of the crime of rebellion, they served their respective
sentences.
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The fifties saw a comparative lull in Communist activities, insofar as peace and order were
concerned.Still,onJune20,1957,RepublicActNo.1700,otherwiseknownastheAntiSubversion
Act,wasapproved,uponthegroundstatedintheverypreambleofsaidstatutethat
...theCommunistPartyofthePhilippines,althoughpurportedlyapoliticalparty,isinfact
anorganizedconspiracytooverthrowtheGovernmentoftheRepublicofthePhilippines,
notonlybyforceandviolencebutalsobydeceit,subversionandotherillegalmeans,for
the purpose of establishing in the Philippines a totalitarian regime subject to alien
dominationandcontrol
... the continued existence and activities of the Communist Party of the Philippines
constitutesaclear,presentandgravedangertothesecurityofthePhilippinesand
...inthefaceoftheorganized,systematicandpersistentsubversion,nationalinscope
but international in direction, posed by the Communist Party of the Philippines and its
activities,thereisurgentneedforlegislationtocopewiththiscontinuingmenacetothe
freedomandsecurityofthecountry....
InthelanguageoftheReportonCentralLuzon,submitted,onSeptember4,1971,bytheSenateAd
HocCommitteeofSevencopyofwhichReportwasfiledinthesebythepetitionersherein
Theyearsfollowing1963sawthesuccessiveemergenceinthecountryofseveralmass
organizations, notably the Lapiang Manggagawa (now the Socialist Party of the
Philippines) among the workers the Malayang Samahan ng Mga Magsasaka
(MASAKA), among the pasantry the Kabataang Makabayan (KM) among the
youth/students and the Movement for the Advancement of Nationalism (MAN) among
the intellectuals/professionals. The PKP has exerted allout effort to infiltrate, influence
andutilizetheseorganizationsinpromotingitsradicalbrandofnationalism.
composedmainlyofyoungradicals,constitutingtheMaoistfactionreorganizedtheCommunist
PartyofthePhilippinesearlyin1969andestablishedaNewPeople'sArmy.Thisfactionadheresto
the Maoist concept of the 'Protracted People's War' or 'War of National Liberation.' Its 'Programme
foraPeople'sDemocraticRevolution'states,interalia:
The Communist Party of the Philippines is determined to implement its general programe for a
people'sdemocraticrevolution.AllFilipinocommunistsarereadytosacrificetheirlivesfortheworthy
cause of achieving the new type of democracy, of building a new Philippines that is genuinely and
completelyindependent,democratic,united,justandprosperous.....
xxxxxxxxx
Thecentraltaskofanyrevolutionarymovementistoseizepoliticalpower.TheCommunistPartyof
the Philippines assumes this task at a time that both the international and national situations are
favorabletotakingtheroadofrevolution.
Intheyear1969,theNPAhadaccordingtotherecordsoftheDepartmentofNationalDefense
conductedraids,resortedtokidnappingandtakenpartinotherviolentincidentsnumberingover230
in which it inflicted 404 casualties, and, in turn, suffered 243 losses. In 1970, its record of violent
incidentswasaboutthesame,buttheNPAcasualtiesmorethandoubled.
Atanyrate,two(2)factsareundeniable:(a)allCommunists,whethertheybelongtothetraditional
grouportotheMaoistfaction,believethatforceandviolenceareindipensabletotheattainmentof
theirmainandultimateobjective,andactinaccordancewithsuchbelief,althoughtheymaydisagree
onthemeanstobeusedatagiventimeandinaparticularplaceand(b)thereisaNewPeoples
Army, other, of course, than the armed forces of the Republic and antagonistic thereto. Such New
People's Army is per se proof of the existence of a rebellion, especially considering that its
establishmentwasannouncedpubliclybythereorganizedCPP.Suchannouncementisinthenature
ofapublicchallengetothedulyconstitutedauthoritiesandmaybelikenedtoadeclarationofwar,
sufficient to establish a war status or a condition of belligerency, even before the actual
commencementofhostilities.
Weentertain,therefore,nodoubtsabouttheexistenceofasizablegroupofmenwhohavepublicly
risen in arms to overthrow the government and have thus been and still are engaged in rebellion
againsttheGovernmentofthePhilippines.
xxxxxxxxx
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TherecordsbeforeUsshowthat,onorbeforeAugust21,1971,theExecutivehadinformationand
reports subsequently confirmed, in many respects by the abovementioned Report of the Senate
AdHoc Committee of Seven to the effect that the Communist Party of the Philippines does not
merely adhere to Lenin's idea of a swift armed uprising that it has, also, adopted Ho Chi Minh's
terroristtacticsandresortedtotheassassinationofuncooperativelocalofficials...
Petitioner similarly fail to take into account that as per said information and reports the
reorganizedCommunistPartyofthePhilippineshas,moreover,adoptedMao'sconceptofprotracted
people's war, aimed at the paralyzation of the will to resist of the government, of the political,
economic and intellectual leadership, and of the people themselves that conformably to such
concept, the Party has placed special emphasis upon a most extensive and intensive program of
subversion by the establishment of front organizations in urban centers, the organization or armed
city partisans and, the infiltration in student groups, labor unions, and farmer and professional
groupsthattheCPPmanagedtoinfiltrateorestablishandcontrolnine(9)majorlabororganizations
organizations actively advancing the CPP interest, ... that in 1970, the Party had recorded two
hundred fiftyeight (258) major demonstrations, of which about thirtythree (33) ended in violence,
resulting in fifteen (15) killed and over five hundred (500) injured that most of these actions were
organized, coordinated or led by the aforementioned front organizations that the violent
thenumberofdemonstrationsheretoforestagedin1971hasalreadyexceededthoseof1970and
personsandtheinjurytomanymore.
Subsequenteventsasreportedhavealsoproventhatpetitioners'counselhaveunderestimated
thethreattopublicsafetyposedbytheNewPeople'sArmy.Indeed,itappearsthat,sinceAugust21,
1971,ithadinNorthernLuzonsix(6)encountersandstagedone(1)raid,inconsequenceofwhich
seven(7)soldierslosttheirlivesandtwo(2)otherswerewounded,whereastheinsurgentssuffered
five(5)casualtiesthatonAugust26,1971,awellarmedgroupofNPA,trainedbydefectorLt.Victor
Corpus,attackedtheverycommandpostofTFLAWINinIsabela,destroyingtwo(2)helicoptersand
one (1) plane, and wounding one (1) soldier that the NPA had in Central Luzon a total of four (4)
encounters,withtwo(2)killedandthree(3)woundedonthesideoftheGovernment,one(1)BSDU
killed and three (3) NPA casualties that in an encounter at Botolan, Zambales, one (1) KMSDK
leader,anunidentifieddissident,andCommanderPanchito,leaderofthedissidentgroupwerekilled
that on August 26, 1971, there was an encounter in the barrio of San Pedro, Iriga City Camarines
Sur,betweenPCandtheNPA,inwhichaPCandtwo(2)KMmemberswerekilledthatthecurrent
disturbances in Cotabato and the Lanao provinces have been rendered more complex by the
involvement of the CPP/NPA, for, in mid1971, a KM group, headed by Jovencio Esparagoza,
contactedtheHigaonantribes,intheirsettlementinMagsaysay,MisamisOriental,andofferedthem
books, pamphlets and brochures of Mao Tse Tung, as well as conducted teachins in the
reservationthatEsparagozawasreportedlykilledonSeptember22,1971,inanoperationofthePC
insaidreservationandthattherearenowtwo(2)NPAcadresinMindanao.
ItistruethatthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritwasliftedonJanuary7,1972,butitcannotbedeniedthat
soonthereafter,lawlessnessandterrorismhadreachedsuchapointthatthenationwasalreadydriftingtowards
anarchy. On September 21, 1972, when the President of the Philippines, pursuant to Article VII, section 10,
paragraph2ofthe1935Constitution,placedthePhilippinesundermartiallaw,thenationwasinthethroesofa
crisis. The authority of the constitutional government was resisted openly by a coalition of forces, of large
numbers of persons who were engaged in an armed conflict for its violent overthrow. 27 The movement with the
active material and foreign political and economic interests was engaged in an open attempt to establish by violence and
forceaseparateandindependentpoliticalstate.
Forcefulmilitaryaction,matchedwithattractivebenevolenceandasocioeconomicprogram,hasindeedbroken
thebackoftherebellioninsomeareas.Therearetobesuresignificantgainsintheeconomy,theunprecedented
increaseinexports,thebilliondollarinternationalreserve,thenewhighinrevenuecollectionsandothernotable
infrastructuresofdevelopmentandprogress.Indeedthereisainthepeople'ssenseofvalues,intheirattitudes
andmotivations.ButWepersonallytakenoticeofthefactthatevenasofthislatedate,thereisstillacontinuing
rebellion that poses a danger to the public safety. Communist insurgency and subversion, once it takes root in
anynation,isahardyplant.Apartywhosestrengthisinselected,dedicated,indoctrinatedandrigidlydisciplined
members,whichmayevennowbesecretedinstrategicpostsinindustry,schools,churchesandingovernment,
cannoteasilybeeradicated.28
The NPA (New People's Army) is pursuing a policy of strategic retreat but tactical offensive. It continues to
conduct its activities through six Regional Operational Commands (ROCs) covering Northern, Central, and
Southern Luzon, Western and Eastern Visayas, and Mindanao. Combat operations were conducted against the
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CommunistinsurgentsbythearmedforcesofthegovernmentinCagayan,Ifugao,Kalinga,Apayao,Camarines
Sur,andSorsogon.Subversiveactivitiescontinueunabatedinurbanareas.LastJanuary,1974,theMaoistgroup
known as the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) attacked and overran the military detachment at Bilaan
Sulu,andthetownofParang.ThetownofJolowasattackedbyarebelforceof500menlastFebruary6,974,
andtocovertheirretreatrazedtwothirdsofthetown.OnlythisAugust,therewasfightingbetweengovernment
troopsandmuslimrebelsarmedwithmodernandsophisticatedweaponsofwarinsomepartsofCotabatoandin
theoutskirtsofthemajorsouthernportcityofDavao.Itwouldbeanincrediblenaivetetoconcludeinthefaceof
suchareality,thattheperiltopublicsafetyhadalreadyabated.
Noristhefactthatthecourtsareopenproofthatthereisnogroundformartialruleoritscontinuance.The"open
court"theoryhasbeenderivedfromthedictuminExParteMilligan(7Wall.127[1866],viz.:"Martialrulecannot
arisefromathreatenedinvasionthenecessitymustbeactualandpresenttheinvasionrealsuchaseffectually
closes the courts and deposes the civil administration." This has been dismissed as unrealistic by authoritative
writersonthesubjectasitdoesnotpresentanaccuratedefinitionoftheallowablelimitsoftheofthePresidentof
theUnitedStates.Asamatteroffact,thelimitingforceoftheMilligancasewasmateriallymodifiedageneration
laterinanotherdecisionoftheCourtinoftheFederalSupremeCourtinMoyerv.Peabody(212U.S.78[1909]).
Speaking for the Court in Moyer v. Peabody, Justice Holmes brushed aside as immaterial the fact, which the
majority opinion in the Milligan case thought absolutely crucial viz.: martial rule can never exist where the
Courtsareopenandintheproperandunobstructedexerciseoftheirjurisdiction.Theopinionadmitted that the
Courtswereopenbutheld"thatthegovernor'sdeclarationthatastateofinsurrectionexistedisconclusiveofthat
fact."AlthoughItfoundthatthe"Governor,withoutsufficientreason,butingoodfaith,inthecourseofputtingthe
insurrectiondown,heldtheplaintiffuntilhethoughtthathecouldsafelyreleasehim,"theCourtheldthatplaintiff
Moyer had no cause of action. Stating that the Governor was empowered by employ the National Guard to
suppressinsurrection,theCourtfurtherdeclaredthat"hemaykillpersonswhoresist,andofcoursehemayuse
the milder measure of seizing the bodies of those whom he considers to stand in the way of restoring peace.
Sucharrestsarenotnecessarilyforpunishment,butarebywayofprecaution,topreventtheexerciseofhostile
power."Solongassucharrestsaremadeingoodfaithandinthehonestbeliefthattheyareneededinorderto
headinsurrectionoff,theGovernoristhefinaljudgeandcannotbesubjectedtoanactionafterheisoutofoffice
onthegroundthathehadnoreasonablegroundforhisbelief...Whenitcomestoadecisionbytheheadofstate
uponamatterinvolvingitslife,theordinaryrightsoftheindividualsmustyieldtowhathedeemsthenecessitiesof
themoment.Publicdangerwarrantsthesubstitutionofexecutiveprocessforjudicialprocess."
"Itissimplynottrue,"wroteClintonRossiterin1950,29"thatmartiallawcannotarisefromathreatenedinvasionorthat
martial law can never exist where the Courts are open. These statements do not present an accurate definition of the
allowable limits of the martial powers of President and Congress in the face of alien threats or internal disorder. Nor was
Davis'dictumonthespecificpowersofCongressinthismatteranymoreaccurate.And,howevereloquentandquotablehis
words on the untouchability of the Constitution in times of actual crisis, they do not now, and did not then, express the
realitiesofAmericanConstitutionalLaw."
In any event, this "open court" theory does not apply to the Philippine situation. Both the 1935 and the 1973
Constitutionsexpresslyauthorizethedeclarationofmartiallaw,evenwherethedangertothepublicsafetyarises
merely from the imminence of an invasion or rebellion. The fact that the civil courts are open can not be
controlling,sincetheymightbeopenandundisturbedintheirfunctionsandyetwhollyincompetenttoavertthe
threatened danger and to punish those involved in the invasion or rebellion with certainty and promptitude.
CertainlysuchatheorywhenappliedtothesituationmodernwarandofthepresentdayCommunistinsurgency
andsubversionwouldprovetobeunrealistic.30
Nor may it be argued that the employment of government resources for the building of a New Society is
inconsistent with the efforts of suppressing the rebellion and creating a legitimate public order. "Everyone
recognizedthelegalbasisforthemartialnecessity,"wrotePresidentMarcos,"thiswasthesimplesttheoryofall.
National decline and demoralization, social and economic deterioration, anarchy and rebellion were not just
statisticalreportstheyweredocumentedinthemindandbodyandordinaryexperienceofeveryFilipino.But,as
astudyofrevolutionsandideologiesproves,martialrulecouldnotinthelongrun,securethePhilippineRepublic
unlessthesocialiniquitiesandoldhabitswhichprecipitatedthemilitarynecessitywerestampedout.Hence,the
September 21 Movement for martial rule to be of any lasting benefit to the people and the nation, to justify the
national discipline, should incorporate a movement for great, perhaps even drastic, reforms in all spheres of
national life. Save the Republic, yes, but to keep it safe, we have to start remaking the society." 31 Indeed, the
creationofaNewSocietywasarealisticresponsetothecompellingneedorarevolutionarychange.
For centuries, most of our people were imprisoned in a sociocultural system that placed them in perpetual
dependence."Itmadeofthemanymerepawnsinthegameofpartisanpowerpolities,legitimized'hewsofwood
anddrawersofwater'forthelandedelite,gristforthediplomamillsandanalienatedmasssporadicallyerupting
inviolentresentmentoverimmemorialwrongs.Ruralbackwardnesswasbuiltintotheverysocialorderwherein
ourmassescouldnotmoveforwardorevendesiretogetmoving." 32The old political framework, transplanted from
theWesthadprovenindeedtobeinadequate.Theaspirationsofourpeopleforsocialjusticehadremainedunfulfilled.The
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electoral process was no model of democracy in action. To a society that has been torn up by decades of bitter political
strifeandsocialanarchy,theproblemwastherescueofthelargersocialorderfromfactionalinterests.Implicitthenwasthe
taskofcreatingalegitimatepublicorder,thecreationofpoliticalinstitutionscapableofgivingsubstancetopublicinterests.
This implied the building of coherent institutions, an effective bureaucracy and all administration capable of enlisting the
enthusiasm,supportandloyaltyofthepeople.Evidently,thepowertosuppressorinsurrectionsisriot"limitedtovictoriesin
thefieldandthedispersionoftheinsurgent.Itcarrieswithitinherentlythepowertoguardagainsttheimmediaterenewalof
theconflictandtoremedytheevils"33whichspawnedandgaverisetotheexigency.
WefindconfirmationofthiscontemporaneousconstructionofpresidentialpowersinthenewConstitution.Itmust
benotedthatwhileArt,IX,Sec.12ofthenewConstitutionembodiesthecommanderinchiefclauseofthe1935
Constitution(Art.VII,See.10[2]),itexpresslydeclaresinArt.XVII,Sec.3[2]thattheproclamations,ordersand
decrees,instructionsandactsissuedordonebytheincumbentPresident,are"partofthelawoftheland"and
are to "remain valid, legal, binding, and effective" until "modified revoked, or superseded by subsequent
proclamations, orders, decrees, instruction, or other acts of the incumbent President, or unless expressly
repealed by the regular National Assembly." Undoubtedly, the proviso refers to the present martial law regime
andthemeasurestakenunderitbythePresident.ItmustberecalledthattheprudentexercisebythePresident
of the powers under martial law not only stemmed the tide of violence and subversion but also buttressed the
people'sfaithinpublicauthority.Itisinrecognitionoftheobjectivemeritofthemeasurestakenundermartiallaw
thattheConstitutionaffirmstheirvalidity.
Thisisevidentfromthedeliberationsofthe166ManSpecialCommitteeoftheConstitutionalConvention,formed
tofinallydrafttheConstitution,atitsmeetingonOctober24,1972,ontheprovisionsofSection4ofthedraft,now
Section12ofArticleIXoftheNewConstitution,whicharequotedhereunder,towit:
DELEGATE DE GUZMAN (A.): The question, Your Honor, brings to the fore the nature and concept of
martiallaw.Asitisunderstoodbyrecognizedauthoritiesonthesubject,martiallawrestsuponthedoctrine
ofparamountnecessity.Thecontrollingconsideration,YourHonor,isnecessity.Thecrucialconsideration
istheveryexistenceoftheState,theveryexistenceoftheConstitutionandthelawsuponwhichdepend
therightsofthecitizens,andtheconditionofpeaceandordersobasictothecontinuedenjoymentofsuch
rights.Therefore,fromthisviewofthenatureofmartiallaw,thepoweristobeexercisednotonlyforthe
moreimmediateobjectofquellingthedisturbanceormeetingapublicperilwhich,inthefirstplace,caused
thedeclarationofmartiallaw,butalsotopreventtherecurrenceoftheverycauseswhichnecessitatedthe
declaration of martial law. Thus, Your Honor, I believe that when President Marcos, to cite the domestic
experience, declared that he proclaimed Martial law to save the Republic and to form a New Society, he
wasstatingthefullcoursewhichmartiallawmusthavetotakeinordertoachieveitsrationalend.Because
intheparticularcaseofthePhilippinesituation,IagreewiththePresidentthatitisnotenoughthatwebe
abletoquelltherebellionandthelawlessness,butthatweshouldalsobeabletoeliminatethemanyills
andevilsinsocietywhichhave,inthefirstplace,bredandabettedtherebellionandthelawlessness.
DELEGATELEVISTE(O.):Iagreewithyouwholeheartedly,YourHonor.That'sall,Mr.Chairman.
DELEGATE ADIL: It seems, Your Honor, that we are revolutionizing the traditional concept of martial law
which is commonly understood as a weapon to combat lawlessness and rebellion through the use of the
militaryauthorities.Ifmyunderstandingiscorrect,YourHonor,martiallawisessentiallythesubstitutionof
military power for civilian authorities in areas where such civilian authorities are unable to discharge their
functionsduetothedisturbedpeaceandorderconditionstherein.Butwithyourexplanation,YourHonor,it
seems that the martial law administrator, even if he has in the meantime succeeded in quelling the
immediate threats to the security of the state, could take measures no longer in the form of military
operationsbutessentiallyandprincipallyofthenatureofameliorativesocialaction..
DELEGATE DE GUZMAN (A.): His Honor is correct when he said that we are abandoning the narrow,
traditional and classic concept of martial law. But we are abandoning the same only to humanize it. For
YourHonorwillrecallthattheoldconceptofmartiallawisthatthelawofthecampisthelawoftheland,
which we are not ready to accept, and President Marcos, aware as he is, that the Filipino people will not
countenanceanysuppressiveandunjustaction,rightlyseeksnotonlytoimmediatelyquellandbreakthe
back of the rebel elements but to form a New Society, to create a new atmosphere which will not be a
natural habitat of discontent. Stated otherwise, the concept of martial law, as now being practiced, is not
only to restore peace and order in the streets and in the towns but to remedy the social and political
environmentsinsuchawaythatdiscontentwillnotoncemoreberenewed.
DELEGATEORTIZ(R.):Icanfeelfromthediscussion,Mr.Chairman,thatwearehavingdifficultyintrying
to ascertain the scope and limitations of martial law. To my mind, Mr. Chairman, it is constitutionally
impossibleforustoplaceinthisgreatdocument,inblackandwhite,thelimitsandtheextentofmartiallaw.
We are framing a Constitution and not a statute and unlike a statute, a Constitution must limit itself to
providingbasicconceptsandpolicieswithoutgoingintodetails.IhaveheardfromsomeoftheDelegates
here their concern that we might be, by this provision and the interpretations being given to it, departing
fromthetraditionalconceptofmartiallaw.Conceptsaremereconcepts,Mr.Chairman,butconcepts,like
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principles,mustbetestedbytheirapplicationtoexistingconditions,whetherthoseconceptsarecontained
in statutes or in a Constitution. Referring specifically to the exercise of this power by President Marcos,
doubts have been expressed in some quarters, whether in declaring martial law he could exercise
legislative and judicial powers. I would want to emphasize that the circumstances which provoked the
President in declaring martial law may not be quantified. In fact, it is completely different from a case of
invasion where the threat to national security comes from the outside. The martial law declared by the
Presidentwasoccasionedbytheactsofrebellion,subversion,lawlessnessandchaosthatarewidespread
inthecountry.Theirorigin,therefore,isinternal.Therewasnothreatfromwithout,butonlyfromwithin.But
these acts of lawlessness, rebellion, and subversion are mere manifestations of more serious upheavals
that beset the deepest core of our social order. If we shall limit and constrict martial law to its traditional
concept, in the sense that the military will be merely called upon to discharge civilian functions in areas
where the civil functionaries are not in a position to perform their normal duties or, better still, to quell
lawlessness and restore peace and order, then martial law would be a mere temporary palliative and we
shall be helpless if bound by the old maxim that martial law is the public law of military necessity, that
necessitycallsitforth,thatnecessityjustifiesitsexistence,andnecessitymeasurestheextentanddegrees
towhichitmaybeemployed.Mypointhere,YourHonor,isthatbeyondmartialnecessityliesthegraver
problemofsolvingthemaladieswhich,inthefirstplace,broughtabouttheconditionswhichprecipitatedthe
exercise of his martial authority, will be limited to merely taking a military measures to quell the rebellion
andeliminatinglawlessnessinthecountryandleavehimwithnomeansorauthoritytoeffecttheneeded
socialandeconomicreformstocreateanenduringconditionofpeaceandorder,thenweshallhavefailed
inprovidinginthisConstitutionthebasicphilosophyofmartiallawwhich,Iamsure,weareembodyinginit
forthegreatpurposeofpreservingtheState.IsaythatthepreservationoftheStateisnotlimitedmerelyto
eliminatingthethreatsthatimmediatelyconfrontit.Morethanthat,thetreasuretopreservetheStatemust
godeeperintotherootcause'softhesocialdisorderthatendangerthegeneralsafety.
DELEGATEDEGUZMAN(A.):Ineednotaddmore,Mr.Chairman,totheveryconvincing,remarksofonly
good friend and colleague, Delegate Ortiz. And I take it, Mr. Chairman, that is also the position of this
Committee.
PRESIDINGOFFICERTUPAZ(A.):Yes,alsoofthiscommittee.
DELEGATE ADIL: Just one more question, Mr. Chairman, if the distinguished Delegate from La Union
wouldoblige.
DELEGATEDEGUZMAN(A.):Allthetime,YourHonor.
DELEGATEADIL:Whenmartiallawisproclaimed,YourHonor,woulditmeanthattheConstitution,which
authorizes such proclamation, is set aside or that at least same provisions of the constitution are
suspended?
DELEGATEDEGUZMAN(A.):TheConstitutionisnotsetaside,buttheoperationofsomeofitsprovisions
must, of necessity, be restricted. If not suspended, because their continuance is inconsistent with the
proclamation of martial law. For instance, some civil liberties will have to be suspended upon the
proclamation of martial law, not because we do not value them, but simply because it is impossible to
implementthesecivillibertieshandinhandwiththeeffectiveandsuccessfulexerciseandimplementation
ofmartialpowers.Therearecertainindividualrightswhichmustberestrictedandcurtailedbecausetheir
exerciseandenjoymentwouldnegatetheimplementationofmartialauthority.ThepreservationoftheState
and its Constitution stands paramount over certain individual rights and freedom. As it were, the
Constitutionprovidesmartiallawasitsweaponforsurvival,andwhentheoccasionarises,whensuchisat
stake,prudencerequiresthatcertainindividualrightsmusthavetobescarifiedtemporarily.Forindeed,the
destructionoftheConstitutionwouldmeanthedestructionofalltherightsthatflowfromit..
DELEGATEADIL:DoesYourHonormeantosaythatwhenmartiallawisdeclaredandI,forinstance,am
detainedbythemilitaryauthorities,Icannotavailofthenormaljudicialprocessestoobtainmylibertyand
questionthelegalityofmydetention?
DELEGATEDEGUZMAN(A.):IfIamnotmistaken,YourHonor,youarereferringtotheprivilegeofthewrit
of
habeascorpus.
DELEGATEADIL:Yes,YourHonor,thatiscorrect.
DELEGATEDEGUZMAN(A.):Inthatcase,YourHonor,Itakeitthatwhenmartiallawisproclaimed,the
privilegeofthewritofisipsofactosuspendedand,therefore,ifyouareapprehendedanddetainedbythe
military authorities, more so, when your apprehension and detention were for an offense against the
security of the State, then you cannot invoke the privilege of the writ of and ask the courts to order your
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temporaryrelease.Theprivilegeofthewritof,likesomeotherindividualrights,musthavetoyieldtothe
greaterneedofpreservingtheState.Here,wehavetomakeachoicebetweentwovalues,andIsaythatin
timesofgreatperil,whentheverysafetyofthewholenationandthisConstitutionisatstake,wehaveto
electforthegreaterone.For,asIhavesaid,individualrightsassumemeaningandimportanceonlywhen
their exercise could be guaranteed by the State, and such guaranty cannot definitely be bad unless the
Stateisinapositiontoassertandenforceitsauthority.
habeascorpushabeascorpushabeascorpus
DELEGATE ADIL: Since martial law was declared by President Marcos last September 21, 1972, and
announced on September 23, 1972, the President has been issuing decrees which are in the nature of
statutes,regulatingastheydo,variousandnumerousnormsofconductofboththeprivateandthepublic
sectors.Wouldyousay,YourHonor,thatsuchexerciseoflegislativepowersbythePresidentiswithinhis
martiallawauthority?
DELEGATE DE GUZMAN (A.): Certainly, and that is the position of this Committee, As martial law
administratorandbyvirtueofhispositionasCommanderinChiefoftheArmedForces,thePresidentcould
exercise legislative and, if I may add, some judicial powers to meet the martial situation. The Chief
ExecutivemustnotbehamstrungorlimitedtohistraditionalpowersasChiefExecutive.Whenmartiallawis
declared, the declaration gives rise to the birth of powers, not strictly executive in character, but
nonethelessnecessaryandincidenttotheassumptionofmartiallawauthoritytotheendthattheStatemay
besafe.
DELEGATEADIL:IamnotatallquestioningtheconstitutionalityofthePresident'sassumptionofpowers
whicharenotstrictlyexecutiveincharacter.Indeed,Icanconcedethatwhenmartiallawisdeclared,the
Presidentcanexercisecertainjudicialandlegislativepowerswhichareessentialtoorwhichhavetodowith
the quelling of rebellion, insurrection, imminent danger thereof, or meeting an invasion. What appears
disturbingtome,andwhichIwantYourHonortoconvincemefurther,istheexerciseandassumptionby
the President or by the Prime Minister of powers, either legislative or judicial in character, which have
nothingtodowiththeconditionsofrebellion,insurrection,invasionorimminentdangerthereof.Tobemore
specific, Your Honor, and to cite to you an example, I have in mind the decree issued by the President
proclaiminganationwidelandreformordeclaringlandreformthroughoutthePhilippines.Isupposeyouwill
agreewithme,YourHonor,thatsuchadecree,oranysimilardecreeforthatmatter,hasnothingtodowith
invasion, insurrection, rebellion or imminent danger thereof. My point, Your Honor, is that this measure
basically has nothing to do with the restoration of peace and order or the quelling of rebellion or
insurrection. How could we validly say that the President's assumption of such powers is justified by the
proclamationofmartiallaw?
DELEGATE DE GUZMAN (A.): As I have repeatedly stated. Your Honor, we have now to abandon the
traditionalconceptofmartiallawasitisunderstoodinsomeforeigntextbooks.Wehavetoatmartiallaw
notasanimmutableprinciple.Rather,wemustviewitinthelightofourcontemporaryexperienceandnot
inisolationthereof.Thequellingofrebellionorlawlessnessor,inotherwords,therestorationofpeaceand
ordermayadmittedlybesaidtobetheimmediateobjectiveofmartiallaw,butthatistobegthequestion.
For how could there really be an enduring peace and order if the very causes which spawned the
conditionswhichnecessitatedtheexerciseofmartialpowersarenotremedied?Youciteasallexamplethe
decreeonlandreform.YourHonorwillhavetoadmitthatoneofthemajorcausesofsocialunrestamong
thepeasantryinoursocietyisthedeplorabletreatmentsocietyhasgiventoourpeasants.Asearlyasthe
1930's, the peasants have been agitating for agrarian reforms to the extent that during the time of
PresidentQuirinotheyalmostsucceededinoverthrowingthegovernmentbyforce.Werewetoadoptthe
traditionalconceptofmartiallaw,wewouldbeconfinedtomerelyputtingdownonepeasantuprisingafter
another, leaving unsolved the maladies that in the main brought forth those uprisings. If we are really to
establish an enduring condition of peace and order and assure through the ages the stability of our
ConstitutionandtheRepublic,Isaythatmartiallaw,beingtheultimateweaponofsurvivalprovidedforin
theConstitution,mustpenetratedeeperandseektoalleviateandcuretheillsandtheseethingfuriesdeep
in the bowels of the social structure. In a very real sense, therefore, there is a profound relationship
between the exercise by the martial law administrator of legislative and judicial powers and the ultimate
analysis,theonlyknownlimitationtomartiallawpowersistheconvenienceofthemartiallawadministrator
andthejudgmentandverdictoftheand,ofcourse,theverdictofhistoryitself.
DELEGATELEVISTE(O.):YourHonor,justforpurposesofdiscussion,mayIknowfromyouwhetherhas
beenanoccasioninthiscountrywhereanypastPresidenthadmadeuseofhismartiallawpower?
DELEGATEDEGUZMAN(A.):Iamgladthatyouaskedthatquestion,YourHonor,becauseitseemsthat
we are of the impression that since its incorporation into the 1935 Constitution, the, martial law provision
has never been availed of by any President Your Honor, that during the Japanese occupation, President
Laurelhadoccasiontodeclaremartiallaw,andIrecallthatwhenPresidentLaureldeclaredmartiallaw,he
alsoassumedlegislativeandjudicialpowers.Wemust,ofcourse,realizethatduringthetimeofPresident
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Laurel the threats to national security which precipitated the declaration came from the outside. The
threats, therefore were not internal in origin and character as those which prompted President Marcos to
issuehishistoricproclamation.If,incaseaswhathappenedduringthetimeofPresidentLaurelthe
declarationofmartiallawnecessitatedtheexerciseoflegislativepowersbythemartiallawadministrator,I
say that greater necessity calls forth the exercise of that power when the threats to national security are
posednotbyinvadersbutbytherebelliousandseditiouselements,bothoftheleftandright,fromwithin.I
saythatbecauseeveryrebellionwhetherinthiscountryorinotherforeigncountries,isusuallytheproduct
ofsocialunrestanddissatisfactionwiththeestablishedorder.Rebellionsortheactsofrebellionareusually
preceded by long suffering of those who ultimately choose to rise in arms against the government. A
rebellion is not born overnight. It is the result of an accumulation of social sufferings on the part of the
rebelsuntiltheycannolongerstandthosesufferingstothepointthat,likeavolcano,itmustsoonererupt.
In this context, the stamping out of rebellion must not be the main and only objective of martial law. The
Martial law administrator should, nay, must, take steps to remedy the crises that lie behind the rebellious
movement,evenifintheprocess,heshouldexerciselegislativeandjudicialpowers.Forwhatbenefitwould
itbeafterhavingputdownarebellionthroughtheexerciseofmartialpowerifanotherrebellionisagainin
theoffingbecausetherootcauseswhichpropelledthemovementareeverpresent?Onemightsucceedin
capturingtherebelleadersandtheirfollowers,imprisonthemforlifeor,betterstill,killtheminthefield,but
someday new leaders will pick up the torch and the tattered banners and lead another movement. Great
causesofeveryhumanundertakingdonotusuallydiewiththemenbehindthosecauses.Unlesstheroot
causes are themselves eliminated, there will be a resurgence of another rebellion and, logically, the
endlessandviciousexerciseofmartiallawauthority.Thisremindsmeofthewisewordsofanoldmanin
ourtown:Thatifyouaregoingtoclearyourfieldofweedsandgrasses,youshouldnotmerelycutthem,
butdigthemout.
PRESIDINGOFFICERTUPAZ(A.):WiththeindulgenceoftheGentlemenfromLaUnion,theChairwould
wanttohavearecessforatleasttenminutes.
DELEGATE DE GUZMAN (A.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In fact, I was about to move for it after the
gruelinginterpellationsbysomeofourcolleagueshere,butbeforewerecess,mayImovefortheapproval
ofSection4?
PRESIDINGOFFICERTUPAZ(A.):Arethereanyobjections?Therebeingnone,Section4isapproved.
Althoughthereareauthoritiestothecontrary,itisgenerallyheldthat,inconstruingconstitutionalprovisionswhich
are ambiguous or of doubtful meaning, the courts may consider the debates in the constitutional convention as
throwinglightontheintentoftheframersoftheConstitution.
34Itistruethattheintentoftheconventionisnotcontrollingbyitself,butasitsproceedingwaspreliminarytotheadoption
bythepeopleoftheConstitutiontheunderstandingoftheconventionastowhatwasmeantbythetermsofthe
constitutionalprovisionwhichwasthesubjectofthedeliberation,goesalongwaytowardexplainingtheunderstandingof
thepeoplewhentheyratifiedit.35Morethanthis,thepeoplerealizedthattheseprovisionsofthenewConstitutionwere
discussedinthelightofthetremendousforcesofchangeatworkinthenation,sincetheadventofmartiallaw.Evidentin
thehumblestvillagestothebustlingmetropolisesatthetimeweretheinfrastructuresandinstitutionalchangesmadebythe
governmentinaboldexperimenttocreateajustandcompassionatesociety.Itwaswithanawarenessofallofthese
revolutionarychanges,andtheconfidenceofthepeopleinthedeterminationandcapabilityofthenewdispensationtocarry
outitshistoricprojectofeliminatingthetraditionalsourcesofunrestinthePhilippines,thattheyoverwhelminglyapproved
thenewConstitution.
V
POLITICALQUESTION
WehaveadvertedtothefactthatourjurisprudenceattestabundantlytotheexistenceofacontinuingCommunist
rebellion and subversion, and on this point then can hardly be any dispute. The narrow question, therefore,
presentedforresolutioniswhetherthedeterminationbythePresidentofthePhilippinesofthenecessityforthe
exerciseofhisconstitutionalpowertodeclaremartiallawissubjecttoreview.Inresolvingthequestion,Were
affirm the view that the determination of the for the exercise of the power to declare martial law is within the
exclusive domain of the President, and his determination is final and conclusive upon the courts and upon all
persons.Thisconclusionnecessarilyresultsfromthefactthattheverynatureoftheexecutivedecisionispolitical,
notjudicial.Thedecisionastowhetherornotthereis.Forsuchdecision,heisdirectlyresponsibletothepeople
forwhosewelfareheisobligedtoact.Inviewoftheoftheresponsibilityreposeduponhim,itisessentialthathe
be accorded freedom of action demanded by the exigency. The power is to be exercised upon sudden
emergencies and under circumstances vital to the existence of the State. The issue is committed to him for
determination by criteria of political and military expediency. It is not pretended to rest on evidence but on
information which may not be acceptable in court. There are therefore, no standards ascertainable by settled
judicial experience or process by reference to which his decision can be judicially reviewed. In other words, his
decisionisofakindforwhichthejudicialhasneithertheaptitude,facilitiesnorresponsibilitytoundertake.Weare
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unwilling to give our assent to expressions of opinion which, although not intended, tends to cripple the
constitutional powers of the government in dealing promptly and effectively with the danger to the public safety
posedbytherebellionandCommunistsubversion.
necessityfortheexerciseofthepoweriswhollyconfidedbyourtotheChiefExecutive
Moreover,theCourtiswithoutpowertoshapemeasuresfordealingwiththeproblemsofsociety,muchlesswith
thesuppressionofrebellionorCommunistsubversion.Thenatureofjudicialpowerislargelynegative,anditis
essentialthattheopportunityoftheChiefExecutiveforwelldirectedpositiveactionindealingwiththeproblembe
preserved,iftheGovernmentistoservethebestinterestsofthepeople.Finally,asaconsequenceofthegeneral
referendum of July 2728, 1973, where 18,052,016 citizens voted overwhelmingly for the continuance of
PresidentMarcosinofficebeyond1973toenablehimtofinishthereformshehadinstitutedundermartiallaw,
the question of the legality of the proclamation of martial law, and its continuance, had undoubtedly been
removedfromjudicialintervention.
WeconcludethattheproclamationofmartiallawbythePresidentofthePhilippinesonSeptember21,1972and
itscontinuanceuntilthepresentarevalidastheyareinaccordancewiththeConstitution.
VI
COURTPRECLUDEDFROMINQUIRINGINTOLEGALITYOFARRESTANDDETENTIONOFPETITIONERS
HavingconcludedthattheProclamationofMartialLawonSeptember21,1972bythePresidentofthePhilippines
anditscontinuancearevalidandconstitutional,thearrestanddetentionofpetitioners,pursuanttoGeneralOrder
No.2datedSeptember22,1972ofthePresident,asamendedbyGeneralOrderNo.2A,datedSeptember26,
1972,maynotnowbeassailedasunconstitutionalandarbitrary.GeneralOrderNo.2directedtheSecretaryof
NationalDefensetoarrest"individualsnamedintheattachedlist,forbeingactiveparticipantsintheconspiracyto
seizepoliticalandstatepowerinthecountryandtotakeoverthegovernmentbyforce...inordertopreventthem
fromfurthercommittingactsthatareinimicalorinjurioustoourpeople,thegovernmentandournationalinterest"
and "to hold said individuals until otherwise ordered released by the President or his duly authorized
representative."ItisnotdisputedthatpetitionersareallincludedinthelistattachedtoGeneralOrderNo.2.
Itshouldbeimportanttonotethatasaconsequenceoftheproclamationofmartiallaw,theprivilegeofthewritof
has been impliedly suspended. Authoritative writers on the subject view the suspension of the writ of as an
incident,butanimportantincidentofadeclarationofmartiallaw.
habeascorpushabeascorpus
Thesuspensionofthewritofis not, in itself, a declaration of martial law it is simply an incident, though a very
importantincident,tosuchadeclaration.Butpractically,inEnglandandtheUnitedStates,theessenceofmartial
law is the suspension of the privilege of the writ of , and a declaration of martial law would be utterly useless
unlessaccompaniedbythesuspensionoftheprivilegeofsuchwrit.Hence,intheUnitedStatesthetwo,martial
lawandthesuspensionofthewritisregardedasoneandthesamething.Lutherv.Borden,7How.1Martinv.
Mott,12Wheat.19Story,Com.ontheConstitution,see.1342Johnsonv.Duncan,3Martin,N.S.530.(12L.ed.
58283).
Evidently,accordingtoJudgeSmalley,therecouldnotbeanyprivilegeofthewritofundermartiallaw(InreField,
9 Fed. Cas. 1 [1862]). The evident purpose of the suspension of the writ is to enable the executive, as a
precautionarymeasure,todetainwithoutinterferencepersonssuspectedofharboringdesignsharmfultopublic
safety(,32Fed.2nd.442,446).Inanyevent,theProclamationofMartialLaw,ineffect,suspendedtheprivilege
ofthewritwithrespecttothosedetainedforthecrimesofinsurrectionorrebellion,etc.,thus:
habeascorpusExParteZimmerman
In addition, I do hereby order that all persons presently detained, as well as all others who may hereafter be
similarlydetainedforthe,andallothercrimesandoffensescommittedinfurtheranceorontheoccasionthereof,
or incident thereto, or in connection therewith, for crimes against national security and the law of the nations,
crimes against public order, crimes involving usurpation of authority, rank, title and improper use of names,
uniforms and insignia, crimes committed by public officers, and for such other crimes as will be enumerated in
ordersthatIshallsubsequentlypromulgate,aswellascrimesasaconsequenceofanyviolationofanydecree,
orderorregulationpromulgatedbymepersonallyorpromulgateduponmydirection.(Emphasissupplied).
crimesofinsurrectionorrebellionshallbekeptunderdetentionuntilotherwiseorderedreleasedbymeorbymyduly
designatedrepresentative
GeneralOrderNo.2wasissuedtoimplementtheaforecitedprovisionsoftheProclamationofMartialLaw..
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Bythesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritof,thejudiciaryisprecludedfrominterferingwiththeordersofthe
Executivebyinquiringintothelegalityofthedetentionofpersonsinvolvedintherebellion..
habeascorpus
Thearrestanddetentionofpersonsreasonablybelievedtobeengagedin,orconnectedwith,theinsurgencyis
predicated upon the principle that in time of public disorder it is the right and duty of all citizens especially the
officer entrusted with the enforcement of the law to employ such force as may be necessary to preserve the
peaceandrestrainthosewhomaybecommittingfelonies.Encroachmentsuponpersonalliberty,aswellasupon
privatepropertyonthoseoccasions,arejustifiedbythenecessityofpreservingorderandthegreaterinterestsof
the political community. The Chief Executive, upon whom is reposed the duty to preserve the nation in those
timesofnationalperil,hascorrespondinglytherighttoexercisebroadauthorityanddiscretioncompatiblewiththe
emergencyinselectingthemeansandadoptingthemeasureswhich,inhishonestjudgment,arenecessaryfor
the preservation of the nation's safety. In case of rebellion or insurrection, the Chief Executive may "use the
mildermeasureofseizingthebodiesofthosewhomheconsiderstostandinthewayofrestoringpeace.Such
arrestsarenotnecessarilyforpunishmentbutarebywayofprecaution,topreventtheexerciseofhostilepower."
(,212U.S.78,8485[1909]53L.ed.411.)
Moyerv.Peabody
The justification for the preventive detention of individuals is that in a crisis such as invasion or domestic
insurrection"thedangertothesecurityofthenationanditsinstitutionsissogreatthatthegovernmentmusttake
measuresthattemporarilydeprivecitizensofcertainrightsinordertoensurethesurvivalofthepoliticalstructure
thatprotectsthoseandotherrightsduringordinarytimes."(,Vol.85,HarvardLawReview,March1972,No.5,p.
1286).
DevelopmentsNationalSecurity36
In,,theSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStatesupheldthedetentionofalaborleaderwhosemerepresenceinthe
areaofaviolentlabordisputewasdeemedlikelytoincitefurtherdisturbances."Solongassucharrestsaremade
ingoodfaith,"saidtheeruditeJusticeHolmes,"andinthehonestbeliefthattheyaremadeinordertoheadthe
insurrectionoff,thegovernoristhefinaljudgeandcannotbesubjectedtoanactionafterheisoutofoffice,on
thegroundthathehadnoreasonablegroundforhisbelief."
Moyerv.Peabodysupra
During World War II, persons of Japanese ancestry were evacuated from their homes in the West Coast and
interned in the interior until the loyalty of each individual could be established. In (323, U.S. 214 [244]), the
Supreme Court of the United States upheld the exclusion of these persons on the ground that among them a
substantialnumberwerelikelytobedisloyalandthat,therefore,thepresenceoftheentiregroupcreatedtherisk
of sabotage and espionage. Although the Court avoided constitutionality of the detention that followed the
evacuation, its separation of the issue of exclusion from that detention was artificial, since the separate orders
part of a single overall policy. The reasoning behind its of persons of Japanese ancestry would seem to apply
with equal force to the detention despite the greater restrictions oil movement that the latter entailed. In the
Middle East, military authorities of Israel have detained suspected Arab terrorists without trial (Dershowitz, 50
Commentaries,Dec.1970at78).
Korematsuv.UnitedStatesTerrorismandPreventiveDetention:TheCaseofIsrael,
AmongthemosteffectivecountermeasuresadoptedbythegovernmentsinSoutheastAsiatopreventthegrowth
ofCommunistpowerhasbeenthearrestanddetentionwithouttrialofkeyunitedfrontleadersofsuitabletimes.
37
The preventive detention of persons reasonably believed to be involved in the Communist rebellion and
subversion has long been recognized by all democratic governments as a necessary emergency measure for
restoringorder."Becauseofthedifficultyinpiercingthesecrecyoftightlyknitsubversiveorganizationsinorderto
determine which individuals are responsible for the violence, governments have occasionally responded to
emergencies marked by the threat or reality of sabotage or terrorism by detaining persons on the ground that
theyaredangerousandwillprobablyengageinsuchactions."
38
Inthecaseatbar,petitionerAquino(L35546)hasalreadybeenchargedwiththeviolationoftheAntiSubversion
Act (L37364) and therefore his detention is reasonably related to the dueling of the rebellion. Upon the other
hand, the other petitioners have been released but their movements are subject to certain restrictions. The
restrictions on the freedom of movement of these petitioners, as a condition for their release, are, however,
requiredbyconsiderationsofnationalsecurity.
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39Intheabsenceofwarorrebellion,therighttotravelwithinthePhilippinesmaybeconsideredconstitutionallyprotected.
Butevenundersuchcircumstancesthatfreedomisnotabsolute.Areasravagedbyfloods,fireandpestilencecanbe
quarantined,asunlimitedtraveltothoseareasmaydirectlyandmateriallyinterferewiththesafetyandwelfareofthe
inhabitantsoftheareaaffected.Duringarebellionorinsurrectiontheauthorityofthecommandertoissueandenforcepolice
regulationsintheareaoftherebellionorinsurrectioniswellrecognized.Suchregulationsmayinvolvethelimitationofthe
rightofassembly,therighttokeeparms,andrestrictionsonfreedomofmovementofcivilians.40Undoubtedly,measures
conceivedingoodfaith,inthefaceoftheemergencyanddirectlyrelatedtothequellingofthedisorderfallwithinthe
discretionofthePresidentintheexerciseofhisauthoritytosuppresstherebellionandrestorepublicorder.
We find no basis, therefore, for concluding that petitioner Aquino's continued detention and the restrictions
imposedonthemovementsoftheotherpetitionerswhowerereleased,arearbitrary.
CONCLUSION
We realize the transcendental importance of these cases. Beyond the question of deprivation of liberty of
petitionersisthenecessityoflayingatrestanydoubtonthevalidityoftheinstitutionalchangesmadetobringthe
countryoutofaneraofrebellion,nearpoliticalanarchyandeconomicstagnationandtoestablishthefoundation
ofatrulydemocraticgovernmentandajustandcompassionatesociety.Indeed,asarespecteddelegateoftwo
ConstitutionalConventionsobserved:"Theintroductionofmartiallawhasbeenanecessaryrecoursetorestore
orderandsteerthecountrysafelythroughasevereeconomicandsocialcrisis."
41Theexerciseoftheseextraordinarypowersnotonlytorestorecivilorderthrumilitaryforcebutalsotoeffecturgently
neededreformsinordertorootoutthecausesoftherebellionandCommunistsubversionmayindeedbeanexperimentin
thegovernment.Butitwasnecessaryifthenationaldemocraticinstitutionwastosurviveincompetitionwiththemore
revolutionarytypesofgovernment."Nationaldemocraticconstitutionalism,ancientthoughitsoriginmaybe,"observedDr.
C.F.Strong,42"isstillinanexperimentalstageandifitistosurviveincompetitionwithmorerevolutionarytypesof
government,wemustbepreparedtoadapttoeverchangingconditionsofmodernexistence.Thebasicpurposeofa
politicalinstitutionis,afterall,thesamewhereveritappears:tosecuresocialpeaceandprogress,safeguardindividual
rights,andpromotenationalwellbeing."
These adaptations and innovations were resorted to in order to realize the social values that constitute the
professedgoalsofthedemocraticpolity.Itwasanattempttomakethepoliticalinstitutionserveasaneffective
instrument of economic and social development. The need of the times was for a more effective mode of
decisionmaking and policyformulation to enable the nation to keep pace with the revolutionary changes that
were inexorably reshaping Philippine Society. A government, observed the then Delegate Manuel Roxas, a
MemberoftheSubCommitteeofSevenoftheSponsorshipCommitteeofthe1934ConstitutionalConvention,"is
apracticalscience,notatheory,andagovernmentcanbesuccessfulonlyifinitsstructuredueconsiderationis
giventothehabits,thecustoms,thecharacterand,asMcKinleysaidtotheidiosyncraciesofthepeople."
43
WHEREFORE, We hereby conclude that (a) the proclamation of martial law (Proclamation No. 1081) on
September21,1972bythePresidentofthePhilippinesanditscontinuance,arevalidastheyhavebeendonein
accordancewiththeConstitution,and(b)asaconsequenceofthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritofupon
theproclamationofmartiallaw,theCourtisthereforefrominquiringintothelegalityofthearrestanddetentionof
thesepetitionersorontherestrictionsimposedupontheirmovementsaftertheirreleasemilitarycustody.
habeascorpus
Accordingly,Wevotetodismissallthepetitions.
Makasiar,FernandezandAquino,JJ.,concur.
ESGUERRA,
J.:
A.PRELIMINARYSTATEMENT
OnSeptember21,1972,thePresidentissuedProclamationNo.1081placingthewholePhilippines,undermartial
law.ThisproclamationwaspubliclyannouncedbythePresidentovertheandradioontheeveningofSeptember
21, 1972. The grounds for the proclamation are recited in detail in its preamble, specifically mentioning various
actsofinsurrectionandrebellionalreadyperpetratedandabouttobecommittedagainsttheGovernmentbythe
lawlesselements of the country in order to gain political control of the state. After laying down the basis for the
establishmentofmartiallaw,thePresidentordered:
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NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines. by virtue of the powers vested
upon me by Article VII, Section 10, Paragraph (2) of the Constitution, do hereby place the entire Philippines as
defined in Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution under martial law and, in my capacity as their commanderin
chief, do hereby command the armed forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the
Philippines,preventorsuppressallformsoflawlessviolenceaswellasanyactofinsurrectionorrebellionandto
enforceobediencetoallthelawsanddecrees,ordersandregulationspromulgatedbymepersonallyoruponmy
direction.
similarly detained for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion, and all other crimes and offenses committed in
furtheranceorontheoccasionthereof,orincidentthereto,orinconnectiontherewith,forcrimesagainstnational
securityandthelawofnations,crimesagainstpublicorder,crimesinvolvingusurpationofauthority,rank,titleand
improperuseofnames,uniformsandinsignia,crimescommittedbypublicofficers,andforsuchothercrimesas
will be enumerated in orders that I shall subsequently promulgate, as well as crimes as a consequence of any
violationofanydecree,orderorregulationpromulgatedbymepersonallyorpromulgateduponmydirectionshall
bekeptunderdetentionuntilotherwiseorderedreleasedbymeorbymydulydesignatedrepresentative.
IssuedshortlyaftertheproclamationwasGeneralOrderNo.2,followedbyNo.2A,datedSeptember26,1972,
to which was attached a list of the names of various persons who had taken part in the various acts of
insurrection,rebellionandsubversionmentionedintheproclamation,andgivenaidandcomfortintheconspiracy
toseizepoliticalandstatepowerinthecountryandtakeoverthegovernmentbyforce.Theywereorderedtobe
apprehended immediately and taken into custody by the Secretary of National Defense who was to act as
representativeofthePresidentincarryingoutmartiallaw.
The petitioners herein were on September 22 and 23, 1972, arrested and taken into military custody by the
SecretaryofNationalDefensepursuanttoGeneralOrderNo.2AofthePresidentforbeingincludedinsaidlistas
havingparticipated,directlyorindirectly,orgivenaidandcomforttothoseengagedintheconspiracyandplotto
seize political and state power and to take over the Government by force. They ask this Court to set them at
liberty,claimingthattheirarrestanddetentionisillegalandunconstitutionalsincetheproclamationofmartiallaw
isarbitraryandwithoutbasisandtheallegedgroundtherefordonotexistandthecourtsareopenandnormally
functioning.
For the respondents the Solicitor General in his answer maintains that Proclamation No. 1081 is Constitutional
andvalid,havingbeenissuedinaccordancewiththeConstitutionthattheordersanddecreesissuedthereunder
are valid that the arrest and detention of petitioners pursuant thereto is likewise valid, legal and constitutional,
andthatthisCourtshouldrefrainfromissuingthedesiredwritsasthesecasesinvolveapoliticalquestion.
Afterjoinderofissues,thesecaseswereheardonSeptember26and29,1972,andonOctober6,1972,followed
bythefilingofMemorandaandNotesontheargumentsofbothparties.
Aftersubmissionofthesecasesfordecision,petitionerRamonW.Dioknofiledamotiontobeallowedtowithdraw
hispetition.Tothemotionisattachedahandwrittenletterofsaidpetitionertohiscounselstatingthereasonswhy
he wished to withdraw his petition. The principal reasons advanced by him for his action are his doubts and
misgivings on whether he can still obtain justice from this Court as at present constituted since three of the
Justices among the four who held in the ratification cases that there was no valid ratification of the New
Constitution signed on November 30, 1972 and proclaimed ratified by the President on January 17, 1973 (the
thenChiefJusticehavingretired),hadtakenanoathtosupportanddefendthesaidconstitutionthatinfilinghis
petitionheexpectedittobedecidedbetheSupremeCourtunderthe1935constitution,andthatwiththeoath
takingofthethreeremainingmembers,hecannolongerexpecttoobtainjustice.
AfterthemotiontowithdrawhadbeendeliberateduponbytheCourt,sevenjusticesvotedtograntandfivevoted
to deny the motion. There being no majority to grant the motion, it was denied. Those who voted to deny the
motion are of the view that it is not simply a matter of right to withdraw because of the great public interest
involved in his case which should be decided for the peace and tranquility of the nation, and because of the
contemptuousstatementofpetitionerDioknothatthisCourtisnolongercapableofadministeringjusticetohim.
Thisquestionshouldnolongerstandonthewaytothedispositionofthesecasesonthemerits.
B.THEISSUES.
Prescinding from the question of jurisdiction which the Solicitor General raised by reason of the President's
GeneralOrderNo.3,datedSeptember22,1972,asamendedbyGeneralOrderNo.3A,datedSeptember24,
1972, which allowed the judicial courts to regularly function but inhibited them from taking cognizance of cases
involving the validity, legality or constitutionality of the Martial Law Proclamation, or any decree, order or acts
issued,promulgatedorperformedbythePresidentorhisdulyauthorizedrepresentativepursuantthereto,from
whichpositionherelentedandhehas,accordingly,refrainedfrompressingthatissueupontheCourt,themain
issuesforresolutionarethevalidityofProclamationNo.1081declaringandestablishingmartiallawandwhether
thisCourtcaninquireintotoveracityandsufficiencyofthefactsconstitutingthegroundsforitsissuance.
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I maintain that Proclamation No. 1081 is constitutional, valid and binding that the veracity or sufficiency of its
factualbasescannotbeinquiredintobytheCourtsandthatthequestionpresentedbythepetitionsispoliticalin
natureandnotjusticiable.
Proclamation No. 1081 was issued by the President pursuant to Article VII, Section 10, paragraph 2, of the
Constitutionof1935,whichreadsasfollows:
The President shall be commanderinchief of all armed forces of the Philippines and, whether it becomes
necessary,hemaycallviolence,invasion,insurrection,orrebellion.Incaseofinvasion,insurrection,orrebellion,
or imminent danger thereof, when the public safety requires it, he may suspend the privilege of the writ of , or
placethePhilippinesoranypartthereofundermartiallaw.
habeascorpus
Thisprovisionmay,forpresentpurposes,becalledtheCommanderinChiefclause.
The above provision has no counterpart in the Constitution of the United States or in that of any state thereof
exceptthatofAlaskatoalimitedextent.TocomprehendthescopeandextentofthePresident'spowertodeclare
martiallaw,letustracethebackgroundandoriginofthisprovision.
To suppress the great rebellion in the United States, known as the Civil War which was aimed to wreck the
Federalunion,PresidentLincolnexercisedpowersnotgrantedtohimbytheConstitutionoftheUnitedStatesbut
pertainingtothecongress.Hehadsuspendedtheprivilegeofthewritofproclaimedmartiallawincertainareas
andMilitaryCommissionswereorganizedwhereitwasdeemednecessarytodosoinordertosubduetherebels
orpreventtheirsympathizersfrompromotingtherebellion.Lincolnjustifiedhisactsbysaying:
habeascorpus
Ididunderstand...thatmyoathtopreservetheConstitutiontothebestofmyabilityimposeduponmethedutyof
preserving, by every indispensable means that government that nation of which that constitution was the
organic law. Was it possible to lose the nation and yet preserve the Constitution? By general law, life and limb
must be protected, yet often a limb must be amputated to save a life but a life is never wisely given to save a
limb. I felt that measures, otherwise unconstitutional, might become lawful by becoming indispensable to the
preservation of the Constitution through the preservation of the nation. Right or wrong, I assumed this ground,
andnowavowit...(2NicholayandHay,AbrahamLincolnCompleteWorks,508(1902)).
SydneyG.Fisherinhisworkentitled"SuspensionofDuringtheWaroftheRebellion,"3Pol.ScienceQuarterly,
expressedthesameideawhenhesaid:
Habeascorpus
... Every man thinks he has a right to live and every government thinks it has a right to live. Every man when
driventothewallbyamurderousassailantwilloverridealllawstoprotecthimself,andthisiscalledthegreatright
of selfdefense. So every government, when driven to the wall by a rebellion, will trample down a constitution
beforeitwillallowitselftobedestroyed.Thismaynotbeconstitutionallaw,butitisfact.(Pp.454,484485)
Butthedifficultyoccasionedbytheabsenceofaconstitutionalpowertosuspendtheprivilegeofthewritofandto
proclaimmartiallaw,whichgreatlyhamstrungLincolnincopingeffectivelywiththecivillaw,wasobviatedwhen
our own Constitution expressly provided for the grant of that presidential power (Art. VII, Section 10, par. 2).
UnlikethelegislativepowerundertheBillofRightsofourConstitution(ArticleIII,Section1,paragraph14,1935
Constitution),thePresidentcansuspendtheprivilegeofthewritofandimposemartiallawincasesofimminent
dangerofinvasion,insurrectionorrebellionwhenthepublicsafetyrequiresit.TheCongresscouldnothavebeen
granted the power to suspend in case of imminent danger as it is not by the nature of its office in a position to
determinepromptlytheexistenceofsuchsituation.Itcanonlyseeorwitnesstheactualoccurrencethereofand
when they happen, Congress is also empowered to suspend tile privilege of the writ of as an exercise of
legislative power when the President falls to act but under no circumstances can it declare martial law as this
powerisexclusivelylodgedinthePresidentasCommanderinChief.
When the Philippine Constitution of 1935 was written, the framers decided to adopt the provisions of Section 3,
paragraph7,oftheJonesLaw,whichbecameArticle111,Section1,paragraph14,ofthe1935Constitution,and
thoseofSection21oftheJonesLawwhichbecameArticleVII,Section10,paragraph2,ofthesame.TheJones
Lawprovisionsreadasfollows:
Section3,paragraph7oftheJonesLawprovided:Thattheprivilegeofthewritofshallnotbesuspended,unless
whenincasesofrebellion,insurrection,orinvasionthepublicsafetymayrequireit,ineitherofwhicheventsthe
same may be suspended by the President, or by the GovernorGeneral, wherever during such period the
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habeascorpus
AndSection21ofthesamelawinpartprovidedthat:
... (H)e (referring to the GovernorGeneral) may, in case of rebellion or invasion, or imminent danger thereof,
whenthepublicsafetyrequiresit,suspendtheprivilegeofthewritof,orplacetheIslands,oranypartthereof,
undermartiallaw:ThatwhenevertheGovernorGeneralshallexercisethisauthority,heshallatoncenotifythe
President of the United States thereof, together with the attending facts and circumstances, and the President
shallhavepowertomodifyorvacatetheactionoftheGovernorGeneral.
habeascorpusProvided
BeforetheJonesLaw,thePhilippineBillof1902providedasfollows:
Thattheprivilegeofthewritofshallnotbesuspended,unlesswhenincasesofrebellion,insurrection,orinvasion
thepublicsafetymayrequireit,ineitherofwhicheventsthesamemaybesuspendedbythePresident,orbythe
GovernorGeneralwiththeapprovalofthePhilippineCommission,wheneverduringsuchperiodthenecessityfor
suchsuspensionshallexist.
habeascorpus
(Section2,par.7).
ThePhilippineBillof1902hadnoprovisionpertainingtothedeclarationofmartiallaw.
TheadoptionoftheJonesLawprovisionswaspromptedbytheprevailingsentimentamongthedelegatestothe
19341935 Constitutional Convention to establish a strong executive, as shown by its proceedings reported by
two of its prominent delegates (Laurel and Aruego) who recounted in their published works how the delegates
blockedthemovetosubjectthepowertosuspendtheprivilegeofthewritof,incaseofinvasion,insurrectionsor
rebellion,totheapprovaloftheNationalAssembly,butdidnothingtoblock,andallowed,thegrantofthepower,
including that to declare martial law, to the President as CommanderinChief of the Armed Forces. What is
evidentfromthisincidentisthatwhenitcomestothesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritofandestablishment
of martial law in case of the occurrence or imminent danger of the contingencies mentioned therein, and the
public safety requires it, the clear intent was to exclusively vest in the President that power, whereas Congress
canonlysuspendundertheBillofRightsprovisionwhenthereisactualoccurrenceoftheseeventsforreasons
already adverted to above. And when martial law is proclaimed, the suspension of the privilege of necessarily
follows for. the greater power includes the less. Nobody will ever doubt that there are greater restrictions to
individual liberty and freedom under martial law than under suspension of the privilege of the writ of . In the
formerhecanevenclosethecourtsifnecessaryandestablishintheirplacemilitarycommissions.Inthelatter,
theactionproceedsfromthepremisethatthecourtsareopenbutcannotgrantthewrit.
habeascorpushabeascorpushabeascorpushabeascorpus
WhentheConstitutionof1935wasbeingframed,theprevailingjurisprudenceonthematterwasthatlaiddownin
,5Phil.87.September30,1905.Inthatcasethequestionpresentedanddecidedisidenticaltowhatisraisedby
the petitioners here. This (1905) Court ruled that the judiciary may not inquire into the facts and circumstance
uponwhichthethenGovernorGeneralsuspendedtheprivilegeofthewritunderSection5ofthePhilippineBillof
1902, which granted him the same power now vested in the President, and that the findings of the Governor
General were "final and conclusive" upon the courts. Aware of this rule, the framers of the 1935 Constitution
grantedtothePresidentthepowersnowfoundinArticleVII,Section10,paragraph2,ofthe1935Constitution.
Barcelonvs.Baker
On October 22, 1950, Proclamation No. 210 suspending the privilege of the writ of was issued by the late
President Quirino. Assailed before this Court in and Balao 91 Phil. 882, as unconstitutional and unfounded, this
Courtsaid:
habeascorpusMontenegrovs.Castaeda
And we agree with the Solicitor General that in the light of the views of the United States Supreme Court thru
Marshall,TaneyandStoryquotedwithapprovalin(5Phil.87,pp.98and100)the
Barcelonvs.BakerauthoritytodecidewhethertheexigencyhasarisenrequiringsuspensionbelongstothePresidentand
'hisdecisionisfinalandconclusive'uponthecourtsanduponallotherpersons.
Butin,L33964,decidedDecember11,1971,42SCRA,448,thisCourtassertedthepowertoinquireintothe
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constitutionalsufficiencyofthefactualbasessupportingthePresident'sactioninsuspendingtheprivilegeofthe
writofunder Proclamation No. 889, dated August 21, 1971. In departing from the rule established in the Baker
andCastaedacases,thisCourtsaid:
Lansangvs.Garciahabeascorpus
Theweightof,asaprecedent,isdilutedbytwo(2)factors,namely:(a)itreliedheavilyuponinvolvingtheU.S.
President's power to , which he being the commanderinchief of all the armed forces may be exercised to
suppress or prevent any lawless violence, even without invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or imminent danger
thereof,andis,accordingly,muchbroaderthanhisauthoritytosuspendtheprivilegeofthewritof,jeopardizing
asthelatterdoesindividuallibertyand(b)theprivilegehadbeensuspendedbytheAmericanGovernorGeneral,
whoseact,asrepresentativeoftheSovereign,affectingthefreedomofitssubjects,canhardlybeequatedwith
thatofthePresidentofthePhilippinesdealingwiththefreedomoftheFilipinopeople,.Thepertinentrulinginthe
Montenegro case was based mainly upon the Barcelon case, and, hence, cannot have more weight than the
same...
Barcelonv.BakerMartinv.Mottcalloutthemilitiahabeascorpusinwhomsovereigntyresides,andfromwhomall
governmentauthorityemanates
ImaintainthatweshouldreturntotheruleintheBakerandCastaedacasesandjettisontheLansangdoctrine
whichdeniesthegrantoffull,plenaryandunrestrictedpowertothePresidenttosuspendtheprivilegeofthewrit
ofanddeclaremartiallaw.Thisdenialofunrestrictedpowerisnotinkeepingwiththeintentandpurposebehind
theconstitutionalprovisioninvolved.
habeascorpus
TheActofCongressof1795involvedinMartin&Mott(12Wheat19(1827))whichisthemainpropoftheBaker
case,heldinapplicableinLansangcage,provided:
ThatwhenevertheUnitedStatesshallbeinvadedorbeinimminentdangerofinvasionfromanyforeignnationor
Indiantribe,itshallbelawfulforthePresidentoftheUnitedStatestocallforthsuchnumberofthemilitiaofthe
StateorStatesmostconvenienttotheplaceofdangerorsceneofaction,ashemayjudgenecessarytorepel
suchinvasion...
The distinction made by this Court between the power of the President to call out the militia and his power to
suspendtheprivilegeofthewritofanddeclaremartiallawdoesnotwarrantadifferenttreatment.Theimportant
and decisive point to consider is that both powers are expressly conferred upon the President by the same
Section,exercisableonlyupontheexistenceofcertainfactsandsituations.Underthe1935Constitution(Article
VII,Section10,paragraph2,)bothpowersareembracedinthePresident'spowerasCommanderinChiefofthe
ArmedForces.
habeascorpus
TheBakerdecisionshouldnothavebeenemasculatedbycomparingthepositionthenoftheGovernorGeneral
"as the representative of the Sovereign" in relation to the Filipinos who were its "subjects". Under prevailing
conditions and democratic principles, there would be greater justification for relying on the judgment of the
PresidentofthePhilippineswhoisthechosenrepresentativeoftheFilipinopeopleandhencemoreauthoritative
inspeakingforthenationthanonthatofanAmericanGovernorGeneralthenwhopersonifiedtheburdenofan
imposedsovereigntyuponus.AndastheExecutiveofthisGovernmentwhoischargedwiththeresponsibilityof
executingthelaws,heisasmuchaguardianoftherightsandlibertiesofthepeopleasanycourtofjustice.To
judicially undercut the force and efficacy of the Baker and Montenegro doctrine is to ride rough shod over the
intent of the framers of the 1935 Constitution. Parenthetically it may be stated that the CommanderinChief
clausewasretainedinthe1973Constitution.
Although the Lansang case tried to cushion the blow administered to the constitutional provision involved by
adopting the test of reasonableness" in the exercise of the President's power, without meaning to substitute its
judgment for that of the President, yet the effect of the ruling is so far reaching that it may lead to a serious
confrontationbetweentheCourtsandthePresident.Thepowertoinquireintotheconstitutionalsufficiencyofthe
factual bases of the proclamation (grounds for the issuance of which are the same as those for martial law)
presupposesthepowertoknowwhatarethefactstobetestedbytheconstitutionalprovision.Thisistheessence
ofaninquirythedeterminationoftheconstitutionalsufficiencyofthosefactssimplyfollows.SupposethisCourt
saystheyarenotsufficienttojustifymartiallawandthePresidentsaystheyarebecausetheevidenceonwhich
he acted shows the existence of invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or the imminent danger thereof, what will
happen?Theoutcomeistoounpleasanttocontemplate.Letusnottrytorepeatinourcountrywhattranspired
between President Lincoln and Chief Justice Taney when the latter issued a writ of to set free one held by the
militaryandPresidentLincolnpracticallysaid:Taneyhasissuedhiswrit.Lethimenforceit".ExparteMerryman,
17Fed.Cas.144(No.9487)(C.C.D.Md.1861).
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PresidentLincoln,inthefaceofthegravedangerthentothenation,simplyignoreditandnothingcouldbedone
aboutit.
Thetestofreasonableness,orabsenceofarbitrarinessintheexerciseofthepresidentialpower,isallaplayof
words. The determination of the reasonableness of the act of the President calls for a consideration of the
availabilityandchoiceoflessdrasticalternativesforthePresidenttotake,andwhenthatisdonetheCourtwillin
effect be substituting its judgment for that of the President. If the Court were to limit its powers to ascertaining
whether there is evidence to support the exercise of the President's power, without determining whether or not
such evidence is true, we would have the curious spectacle of this Court having no choice but to give its
imprimaturtothevalidityofthepresidentialproclamation,asitdidintheLansangcasewhereitmerelyaccepted
the reports of the military on the facts relied upon by the President in issuing Proclamation No. 889, without
judicially determining whether or not the contents of those reports were true, In so doing, this Court simply
displayedthemiserablelimitsofitscompetenceforhavingnomeansforcheckingwhetherornotthosefactsare
true.Itwouldhavebeenmoreinkeepingwiththedignity,prestigeandproperroleofthisCourttosimplyreadand
consider the bases for the suspension as stated in the various "whereases" of the Proclamation, and then
determinewhethertheyareinconformitywiththeconstitution.Thistomeistheextentofitspower.Totranscend
itistousurporinterferewiththeexerciseofapresidentialprerogative.
This Court should not spurn the reminder that it is not the source of the panacea for all ills affecting the body
politic (Vera vs. Avelino, 77, Phil. 192). When a particular cure can come only from the political department, it
should refrain from injecting itself into the clash of political forces contending for the settlement of a public
question.Thedeterminationofwhenandhowaconstitutionallygrantedpresidentialpowershouldbeexercised
calls for the strict observance of the timehonored principle of the separation of powers and respect for a co
equal,coordinateandindependentbranchoftheGovernment.Thisisthebasicfoundationoftherulegoverning
thehandlingofapoliticalquestionthatisbeyondjudicialcompetence(Alejandrinovs.Quezon,46Phil.35Cabili
vs.Francisco,G.R.No.L4638,May8,1951Bakervs.Carr,360U.S.p.18682S.Ct.Rep.697L.Ed.2nd,
663).ItishightimetoreexamineandrepudiatetheLansangdoctrineandgivethePresidentthesoleauthorityto
decidewhenandhowtoexercisehisownconstitutionalpowers.AreturntothesanityandwisdomoftheBaker
andMontenegrodoctrineandarealizationthatjudicialpowerisunwelcomewhenaquestionpresentsattributes
that render it incapable of judicial determination, because the power to decide it devolves on another entity, is
urgently needed. It is worthwhile recalling what this Court in its sobriety and wisdom, unperturbed by the
formidableturmoils,thefiercepassionsandemotionsandthestressesofourtimes,saidintheBakercase:(The
term"GovernorGeneral"shouldread"President").
If the investigation and findings of the President, or the GovernorGeneral with the approval of the Philippine
Commission,arenotconclusiveandfinalasagainstthejudicialdepartmentoftheGovernment,theneveryofficer
whosedutyitistomaintainorderandprotectthelivesandpropertyofthepeoplemayrefusetoact,andapplyto
the judicial department of the Government for another investigation and conclusion concerning the same
conditions,totheendthattheymaybeprotectedagainstcivilactionsresultingfromillegalacts.
Owingtoconditionsattimes,astateofinsurrection,rebellionorinvasionmayarisesuddenlyandmayjeopardize
the very existence of the State. Suppose, for example, that one of the thickly populated Governments situated
nearthisArchipelago,anxioustoextenditspowerandterritory,shouldsuddenlydecidetoinvadetheseIslands,
andshould,withoutwarning,appearinoneoftheremoteharborswithapowerfulfleetandatoncebegintoland
troops.ThegovernorormilitarycommanderoftheparticulardistrictorprovincenotifiestheGovernorGeneralby
telegraphofthislandingoftroopsandthatthepeopleofthedistrictareincollusionwithsuchinvasion.Mightnot
the GovernorGeneral and the Commission accept this telegram as sufficient evidence and proof of the facts
communicated and at once take steps, even to the extent of suspending the privilege of the writ of , as might
appeartothemtobenecessarytorepelsuchinvasion?Itseemthatallmeninterestedinthemaintenanceand
stabilityoftheGovernmentwouldanswerthisquestionintheaffirmative....
habeascorpus
Butsupposesomeone,whohasbeenarrestedinthedistrictuponthegroundthathisdetentionwouldassistsin
restoringorderandinrepellingtheinvasion,appliesforthewritofallegingthatnoinvasionactuallyexistsmay
thejudicialdepartmentoftheGovernmentcalltheofficersactuallyengagedinthefieldbeforeitandawayfrom
their posts of duty for the purpose of explaining and furnishing proof to it concerning the existence or
nonexistenceofthefactsproclaimedtoexistbythelegislativeandexecutivebranchesoftheState?Ifso,then
thecourtsmayeffectuallytiethehandsoftheexecutive,whosespecialdutyitistoenforcethelawsandmaintain
order,untiltheinvadershaveactuallyaccomplishedtheirpurpose.Theinterpretationcontendedforherebythe
applicants, so pregnant with detrimental results, could not have been intended by the Congress of the United
Stateswhenitenactedthelaw.
habeascorpus
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It is the duty of the legislative branch of the Government to make such laws and regulations as will effectually
conservepeaceandgoodorderandprotectthelivesandpropertyofthecitizensoftheState.Itisthedutyofthe
GovernorGeneraltotakesuchstepsashedeemswiseandnecessaryforthepurposeofenforcingsuchlaws.
Every delay and hindrance and obstacle which prevents a strict enforcement of laws under the conditions
mentioned necessarily tends to jeopardize public interests and safety of the whole people. If the judicial
department of the Government, or any officer in the Government, has a right to contest the orders of the
PresidentoroftheGovernorGeneralundertheconditionsabovesupposed,beforecomplyingwithsuchorders,
then the hands of the President or the GovernorGeneral may be tied until the very object of the rebels or
insurrectosorinvadershasbeenaccomplished.ButitisurgedthatthePresident,ortheGovernorGeneralwith
the approval of the Philippine Commission, might be mistaken as to the actual conditions that the legislative
department the Philippine Commission might, by resolution, declare after investigation, that a state of
rebellion,insurrection,orinvasionexists,andthatthepublicsafetyrequiresthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthe
writ of , when, as a matter of fact, no such conditions actually existed that the President, or GovernorGeneral
actingupontheauthorityofthePhilippineCommission,mightbyproclamationsuspendtheprivilegeofthewritof
without there actually existing the conditions mentioned in the act of Congress. In other words, the applicants
allegeintheirargumentinsupportoftheirapplicationforthewritofthatthelegislativeandexecutivebranchesof
the Government might reach a wrong conclusion from their investigations of the actual conditions, or might,
through a desire to oppress and harass the people, declare that a state of rebellion, insurrection, or invasion
existedandthatpublicsafetyrequiredthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritofwhenactuallyandinfactno
such conditions did exist. We can not assume that the legislative and executive branches will act or take any
actionbaseduponsuchmotives.
Moreover, it can not be assumed that the legislative and executive branches of the Government, with all the
machinery which those branches have at their command for examining into the conditions in any part of the
Archipelago,willfailtoobtainallexistinginformationconcerningactualconditions.Itisthedutyoftheexecutive
branch of the Government to constantly inform the legislative branch of the Government of the condition of the
Unionastotheprevalenceofpeaceordisorder.TheexecutivebranchoftheGovernment,throughitsnumerous
branches of the civil and military, ramifies every portion of the Archipelago, and is enabled thereby to obtain
informationfromeveryquarterandcorneroftheState.CanthejudicialdepartmentoftheGovernment,withits
verylimitedmachineryforthepurposeofinvestigatinggeneralconditions,beanymoresureofascertainingthe
true conditions throughout the Archipelago, or in any particular district, than the other branches of the
Government?Wethinknot.
C.THECONCLUSION
TheresolutionofthequestionofvalidityofProclamationNo.1081andallactsdoneunderit,bydelvingintothe
sufficiency of the grounds on which the declaration of martial law is premised, involves a political question.
WhetherornotthereisconstitutionalbasisforthePresident'sactionisforhimtodecidealone.Itakeitforafact
thatheisnotanirresponsiblemanandwillactreasonablyandwisely,andnotarbitrarily.NoPresidentinhisright
mindwillproclaimmartiallawwithoutanybasisatallbutmerelytofightthehobgoblinsandmonstersofhisown
imagination. In the exercise of that power this Court should not interfere or take part in any manner, shape or
form,asitdidintheLansangcase.WhenthisCourtrequiredtheArmyofficers,whofurnishedthePresidentwith
the facts on which he acted, to present proofs to establish the basis of the suspension, this Court practically
superimposed itself on the executive by inquiring into the existence of the facts to support his action. This is
indeed unfortunate. To inquire is to know the facts as basis of action. To inquire is to decide, and to decide
includes the power to topple down or destroy what has been done or erected. This is the ultimate effect of the
Lansangdoctrine..
habeascorpus
Whenthesecurityandexistenceofthestateisjeopardizedbysophisticatedclandestineandoverseasmeansof
destruction and subversion when open avowals of attempts to dismember the Philippines are politically and
financially encouraged and supported by foreign powers when the advocates of a sinister political and social
ideology are openly storming even the bastions of military power and strength with the use of smuggled arms
furnished by those who wish this nation ill, let us leave to the Executive the unhampered determination of the
occasion for the exercise of his power, as well as the choice of the weapons for safeguarding the nation. This
Court should not, by a process of subtle reasoning and rhetorical display of legal erudition stand on the way to
effective action by virtually crippling him. Instead, it should be a rock of refuge and strength for those who are
called upon to do battle against the forces of devastating iconoclasm and ruthless vandalism that ruled our
streets,ourpublicsquaresandourschoolsbeforetheestablishmentofmartiallaw.Insteadofimposingcramping
restrictions on the executive and thereby giving the enemy aid and comfort, this Court should allow the political
departmentafullandwidelatitudeofaction.
Itfollowsthatallorders,decreesoractsofthePresidentundertheMartialLawProclamation,includingthoseof
therespondentSecretaryofNationalDefenseashisauthorizedrepresentative,arevalidandbinding.Thepeople
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haveratifiedthoseactsbytheadoptionandratificationoftheNewConstitutionasproclaimedbythePresidenton
January17,1973,andbytheReferendumheldonJuly2728,1973.Forustodeclarethemvalidinourdecision
nowhasbecomemerelyananticlimaxafterwehavedecidedintheJavellanacasethatthepeoplehaveratified
andacceptedtheNewConstitutionandthereremainsnomorejudicialobstacletoitsenforcement.
Consequently,thearrestanddetentionofthepetitioners,includingtheirfurtherdetentionaftertheratificationand
acceptanceoftheNewConstitution,andevenuptothepresent,arevalidandconstitutional.Thedurationoftheir
detention,especiallyasregardspetitionerJoseW.Diokno,isamatteraddressedtothesounddiscretionofthe
President.AstopetitionerBenignoS.Aquino,Jr.,hisdetentionisnolongeropentoquestionasformal,charges
of subversion, murder and illegal possession of firearms have been filed against him with the proper Military
Commission.
D.THEJUDGMENT
By this separate opinion I might incur the displeasure of my senior brethren who conceived and labored in
bringingforththeLansangdecisionwhichIamopenlyadvocatingtobediscardedbecausethisCourtpractically
interfered with the exercise of a purely executive power under the guise of inquiring into the constitutional
sufficiencyofthefactualbasesoftheproclamation.ByrequiringtherepresentativesofthePresidenttopresent
evidencetoshowthereasonableexerciseofhispower,IrepeatthatthisCourttrencheduponaconstitutionally
granted power of the President. In expressing my honest thoughts on a matter that I believe is of supreme
importance to the safety and security of the nation, I did so unmindful of the possible condemnation of my
colleaguesandfearlessofthejudgmentofhistory.
habeascorpus
FORALLTHEFOREGOING,Ivotetodismissallpetitions.
FERNANDEZ,
J.:
I
PROLOGUE
IhavedecidedtowritethisSeparateOpinionevenbeforethemainopinionhasbeenwritten,fornoothercasesin
thehistoryoftheRepublichaveassumedsuchtranscendentalimportanceasthecaseswhichdirectlyaroseout
of the proclamation of martial law on September 21, 1972. No other cases presented before this Court have
aroused such widespread attention, speculation, controversy, and concern. And in the language of one of the
petitioners, "the decision in these case(s), whatever it may be, will be cited in history books many, many years
from now. And it will be quoted wherever lovers of freedom ask the question What did the Court do in that
difficulthour?
OurdecisioninthevariouspetitionsnowbeforethisTribunallikeOurdecisionintheRatificationCases(L36142,
Javellanavs.TheExecutiveSecretary,etal.L36165,Roxas,etal.,vs.Melchor,etc.etal.,L36232,Monteclaro,
etal.,vs.TheExecutiveSecretary,etal.,andL36283,Dilag,etal.,vs.TheHonorableExecutiveSecretary,et
al.),mustupholdthevalidityofconstitutionalisminourcountryandoursteadfastadherencetotheRuleofLaw.
The decision should set the pattern and the thrust or Our continuous effort to locate that elusive boundary
between individual liberty and public order. It should reconcile the claims to individual or civil rights with the
equally and, at times, even more compelling needs of community existence in a spirit of Constitutionalism and
adherencetotheRuleofLaw.
Through our New Constitution, the Delegates to the Constitutional Convention and the voters in the ratification
referendum alike have given our government a fresh mandate and new guidelines in the charting of a truly
independentexistenceandtheemergenceofadynamicandprogressiveorder.ItisnowthetaskofthisCourtto
concretizeandmakeclearlyvisibletheconnectinglinksbetweenthe1935Constitutionandthe1973Constitution,
andtoconsidertheconstitutionalityofthemartiallawproclamation(No.1081)nowbeingvehementlychallenged
inthesecasesitsconstitutionalityasinitiallyproclaimedundertheoldConstitution,andtheconstitutionalityofits
continuationwhichnowfallsunderthepresentCharter.
ItisalsothefunctionofthisTribunaltohelpgivefleshandsubstancetoourpeople'saspirationsforsecureand
selfsufficientifnotabundantexistenceevenasjustice,peace,liberty,andequalityareguaranteedandassured.
It must strike the correct balance, given specific times and circumstances, between the demands of public or
socialorderandequallyinsistentclaimsofindividualliberty.
Theissuesraisedregardingtheforceandeffectivityofthe1973Constitutionhavebeenthoroughlydiscussedin
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othercases.Theyshouldnowbeasettledmatterbuthavebeenraisedanew.Thesewerediscussatlengthin
theearlierstagesoftheinstantpetitions.Themassofpleadingsandlengthyoralargumentsdweltnotonlyonthe
validity of Proclamation No. 1081 and the legality of the arrest and detention of the petitioners but also on the
effectivity of the new Constitution and other related matters as right to counsel, jurisdiction of military tribunals,
applications for amnesty, visits of relatives, conditions inside the detention camp, right to withdraw the petition,
andthelike.Whileitisnecessarytosiftthebasicissuesfromallsecondaryandincidentalmatters,wemustalso
touchonimportantrelatedissues.ItisimperativetodeclarewhattheConstitutioncommandsisthelawonthese
issues.
Theaveragecitizen,asarule,isnotveryinterestedinthedetailedintricaciessurroundingtheresolutionofconstitutional
questions.Heusuallyhasstrongviewsonthefinaloutcomeofconstitutionallitigationbutrarelybotherstoinquireintothe
labyrinthianfacetsofthecaseorthedetailedreasoningwhichusuallysupportsthedispositiveportion.
It is not so with regard to these habeas corpus cases. The explosive potentialities of Our ruling are known to
everybody.ThecountryawaitsOurdecisionwithkeenexpectations.Thegroundssupportingthedecisionarea
matter of public concern. The implication of these cases have been speculated upon, although sometimes with
limitedcomprehensionandnoticeablelackoffairness,eveninforeigncountries.
It,therefore,behoovesthemembersofthisTribunaltorendertheiropinionsasmuchaspossible,intermsandin
apresentationthatcanbeunderstoodbythepeople.
In,(31SCRA413,423)thisTribunalstatedthat"astheConstitutionisnotprimarilyalawyer'sdocument,itbeing
essentialfortheruleoflawtoobtainthatitshouldeverbepresentinthepeople'sconsciousness,itslanguageas
muchaspossibleshouldbeunderstoodinthesensetheyhaveincommonuse."
J.M.TuasonandCo.Inc.vs.LandTenureAdministration
Inthiscase,Weshouldgoonestepfurther.WeshouldnotlimitOurselvestolookingatthewordsoftheConstitutionas
ordinaryandsimplelanguagebutOurreasoninginthedecisionitselfshouldbefrankandexplicit.Ourtaskisnotamere
matterofconstitutionalconstructionandinterpretation.Throughitsdecision,thisCourtshouldalsospeakdirectlytothe
averagelayman,tothecommonpeople.
II
THEMARTIALLAWPROCLAMATION
On September 23, 1972 the President announced that, on September 21, 1972 or two days earlier, he had,
pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081, declared a state of martial law in the Philippines. The President cited and
detailed many acts of insurrection and rebellion against the government of the Republic of the Philippines
committed by lawless elements and various front organizations in order to seize political and state power.
ProclamationNo.1081concludes
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested
upon me by Article VII, Section 10, paragraph (2) of the Constitution, do hereby place the entire Philippines as
defined in Article 1, Section 1 of the Constitution under martial law and, in my capacity as their commanderin
chief, do hereby command the armed forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the
direction.
similarly detained for the crimes committed in furtherance or on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in
connection therewith, for crimes against public order, crimes involving usurpation of authority, rank, title and
improperuseofnames,uniforms,andinsignia,crimescommittedbypublicofficer,andforsuchothercrimesas
will be enumerated in Orders that I shall subsequently promulgate, as well as crimes as a consequence of any
xxxxxxxxx
III
ARRESTOFTHEPETITIONERS
Underastateofmartiallaw,petitionersorthepersonsinwhosebehalfpetitionsforwritsofhavebeenfiledwere
on various dates arrested and detained. The orders of arrest were premised on General Order No. 2 of the
PresidentdatedSeptember22,19721whichwasamendedbyGeneralOrderNo.2A,onSeptember26,1972.
GeneralOrderNo.2Areads:
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Pursuant to Proclamation Order No. 1081, dated September 21, 1972, and in my capacity as Commanderin
ChiefofalltheArmedForcesofthePhilippines,IherebyorderyouasSecretaryofNationalDefensetoforthwith
arrest or cause the arrest and take into your custody the individuals named in the attached lists for being
participantsorforhavinggivenaidandcomfortintheconspiracytoseizepoliticalandstatepowerinthecountry
andtotakeoverthegovernmentbyforce,theextentofwhichhasnowassumedtheproportionofanactualwar
againstourpeopleandourlegitimategovernmentandinordertopreventthemfromfurthercommittingactsthat
areinimicalorinjurioustoourpeople,thegovernmentandournationalinterest,andtoholdsaidindividualsuntil
otherwisesoorderedbymeorbymydulydesignatedrepresentative.
Likewise, I do hereby order you to arrest or cause the arrest and take into custody and to hold them until
otherwiseorderedreleasedbymeorbymydulydesignatedrepresentative:
1.Suchpersonsasmayhavecommittedcrimesandoffensesinfurtheranceorontheoccasionoforincidentto
orinconnectionwiththecrimesofinsurrectionorrebellionasdefinedinArticles134to138oftheRevisedPenal
Code,andothercrimesagainstpublicorderasdefinedinArticles146,147,148,149,151,153,154,155,and
156ofthesameCode
2. Such persons who may have committed crimes against national security and the laws of the nation, as
enumeratedanddefinedinTitleIoftheReviewPenalCode
xxxxxxxxx
Arrests and detentions under a martial law proclamation are not necessarily limited to those who have actually
committed crimes and offenses. More specifically, those arrested and taken into custody under General Order
No.2Afallunderthreegeneralgroups:
1.Thosewhoappeartohaveactuallycommittedcrimesandoffensesandwhoshouldbechargedandpunished
forsuchcrimesandoffensespursuanttoourpenallaws
2.Thosewhohavebeenarrestednottomakethemaccountforcrimesandoffensesbuttopreventthemfrom
committingactsinimicalorinjurioustotheobjectivesofamartiallawproclamationand
3.Thosewhoappeartohaveactuallycommittedcrimesandoffensesbutwhoseprosecutionandpunishmentis
deferred because the preventive nature of their detention is, for the moment, more important than their
punishmentforviolatingthelawsoftheland.
Criminal charges have been filed against petitioner Benigno S. Aquino, Jr., and he, therefore, may fall under
GroupNo.1andthe"preventive"aspectofGroupNo.3.Itistruethathequestionsthevalidityofthecharges,
raisesasanissuethedeprivationoffundamentalrightsofanaccused,andchallengesthejurisdictionofamilitary
commissiontotryhim.However,determinationofthesequestionsisproperlyforanotherproceedingandanother
decision.Forpurposesofthesepetitions,heandmanyotherssimilarlysituatedmayfallunderGroups1and3.
habeascorpus
PetitionerJoseW.DioknocanfallunderGroupNo.2andGroupNo.3,asfarastherecordindicates.Thus,there
may be persons arrested pursuant to General Order No. 2 who may fall under the second group but against
whomchargescouldbefiledasunderthethirdgroup.Theyhavenotbeenchargedforreasonsobviouslyrelated
to national security. The administration may have determined that, in the light of the martial law situation, it is
neitherwisenorexpedienttofilesuchchargesnow.
The constitutionality of the arrest of those arrested under Group No. 1 cannot be questioned. They have
committedacrimeandthereforecanbeorderedarrestedanddetained.
TheconstitutionalityofthearrestofthosearrestedunderGroupsNos.2and3,undermartiallawfindssupportin
thebookofJusticeFernandoandSenatorTaadathepertinentpartofsaidbookreadsasfollows:
.Aslongassucharrestaremadeingoodfaithandinthehonestbelieftheyareneededtomaintainorder,the
President. as CommanderinChief, cannot thereafter, after he is out of office, be subjected to an action on the
ground that he had no reasonable ground for his belief. When it comes to a decision by the head of the State
uponamatterinvolvingitslife,theordinaryrightsofindividual,mustyieldtowhathedeemsthenecessitiesofthe
moment.Publicdangerwarrantsthesubstitutionofexecutiveprocess.Thisisadmittedwithregardtokillingmen
intheactualclashofarmsandthesameistrueoftemporarydetentiontopreventapprehendedharm.Goodfaith
andhonestbeliefinthenecessityofthedetentiontomaintainorderthusfurnishesagooddefensetoanyclaim
forliability.(TaadaandFernando,,Vol.II,pp.10131014,1953ed.)
Oncemartiallawhasbeendeclared,arrestmaybenecessarynotsomuchforpunishmentbutbywayofprecautiontostop
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IV
THEPETITIONSFORWRITSOFHABEASCORPUS
(a)
TheGroundsTherefor:
PetitionsforwritsofwereaccordinglyfiledinthisCourtbyorinbehalfofthearrestedanddetainedindividuals.
Thepetitionscontainsubstantiallysimilargroundsandprayers.
habeascorpus
For instance, in G.R. No. L35539, Carmen I. Diokno pressed for the urgent and immediate release of Senator
JoseW.Dioknofromthecustodyofeithertherespondents,theiragents,instruments,auxiliariesorservants.Itis
allegedthattherespondentsunlawfullyorillegallyandwithoutanyvalidauthoritywhatsoever,inviolationofthe
petitioner'srightsasacitizenoftheRepublic,seizedhispersonfromhisresidenceandmovedhimtoaplaceof
confinementanddetention.ThepetitionalsoallegesthatnochargeshavebeenfiledagainstJoseW.Dioknofor
committing or having committed insurrection or rebellion or subversion and that the memorandum directing his
arrestisneitheranorderofarrestnorawarrantofarrest.
ThepetitioninG.R.No.L35546allegesthatpetitionersBenignoS.Aquino,Jr.,RamonV.Mitra,Jr.,FranciscoS.
Rodrigo, and Napoleon Rama have been illegally detained and unlawfully deprived of their personal liberty
beyondtheperiodauthorizedbylawwithoutanyformalcomplaintforanyspecificoffensehavingbeeninstituted
againstthembeforeourcourtsoflawandwithoutanyjudicialwritororderhavingbeenissuedauthorizingtheir
confinement. It is alleged that the petitioners have not committed any crime nor violated any law, rule or
regulation whether individually or in collaboration with other person or persons for which they may be detained
anddeprivedoftheirpersonallibertywithoutanyformalchargeorjudicialwarrant.
A common allegation in the various petitions challenges the validity of Presidential Proclamation No. 1081. It is
assertedthatProclamationNo.1081declaringmartiallawisillegalandunconstitutionaland,therefore,nulland
voidbecausetheconditionsunderwhichmartiallawmaybedeclaredbythePresidentdonotexist.Thepetition
inG.R.No.L35546statesthatassumingthattheconditionsforthevalidexerciseoftheextraordinarypowerto
declare martial law exist, Proclamation No. 1081 and Presidential Decrees and Orders issued pursuant thereto
areunconstitutionalandillegalinextentandscopebecausetheydeprivetheSupremeCourtofitsconstitutional
power and authority to determine the constitutionality, legality and validity of the decrees, orders, rules and
regulationsissuedpursuanttotheproclamation.Itisallegedthattheproclamationisunconstitutionalandillegal
because it divests and ousts the civil courts throughout the Philippines of the jurisdiction to decide and punish
certainoffensesundertheexistinglawsoftheland.Thepetitionemphasizesthatcivilcourtscontinuetoremain
open and have in fact never ceased to function. The petition challenges the validity of Proclamation No. 1081
becauseitgrantstothePresidentpowerswhichareotherwisevestedbytheConstitutioninotherdepartmentsof
theGovernment.
argumentigratis
Corollary to the above allegations in G.R. No. L35546 is the allegation of petitioners Veronica L. Yuyitung and
Tan Chin Hian in G.R. No. L35556 that assuming without admitting the validity of Proclamation No. 1081, the
issuanceofsuchaproclamationisnotavalidjustificationtoarrestanypersonwhimsicallyorarbitrarilyorwithout
thenecessarybasisorfoundationinherentintheproperarrestordetention.
The petition in G.R. No. 35547 alleges that petitioner E. Voltaire Garcia II has not committed the crimes of
insurrection,rebellionorsubversionnoranycrimesimilartheretonoranycrimeatall.Itstatesthathiscontinued
illegal detention prevents him from performing his function as member of the Constitutional Convention and,
therefore, deprives his district of representation which is obviously against public policy and public interest. The
petition asks the Supreme Court to take judicial notice of the fact that there was no invasion, insurrection, or
rebellionorimminentdangerthereofbeforeand/orafterthedateofProclamationNo.1081thatmayrequirefor
thepublicsafetytheplacingofanypartofthecountryundermartiallaw.Reiteratingtheallegationsintheother
petitions,itoutlineshow,throughoutthelengthandbreadthofthecountryespeciallyintheGreaterManilaarea,
allexecutiveofficesarefunctioningincompletenormalcyhowallcourtsfromthelowestmunicipalcourtstothe
SupremeCourtareinfulloperationhowthedifferentlegislativebodiesfrombarriocouncilsuptoCongressare
likewisefunctioningsmoothlyaccordingtolaw.
Petitioner Ernesto Rondon in G.R. No. L35573 alleges that pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 the President
issuedGeneralOrderNo.3whichcreatesmilitarytribunalstotakejurisdictionovercertainactsandcrimestothe
exclusionofcivilcourts.Thepetitionallegesthatthecreationofsuchmilitarytribunalsandthevestingthereofwith
judicialfunctionsarenullandvoidbecausecivilcourtsareopenandfunctioning.Itquestionstheintenttotrythe
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petitioner before the military tribunals for any crime which the respondents may impute to him. The petitioner
allegesthathehasnotengagedinanyofthecriminalactivitiesdefinedinProclamationNo.1081,that,atbest,he
is only a critic of the policies of the Government and, at worst, a civilian citizen amenable to the processes of
civilianlaw,ifatallhehascommittedanyoffense.
(b)
PresentStatusofPetitioners:
Asthingsnowstand,thedifferentpetitionersmaybedividedintofour(4)groups:
1.SomepetitionerslikeVeronicaL.Yuyitung,TanChinHian,BrenGuiao,HernandoJ.Abaya,ErnestoGranada,
LuisBeltran,RubenCusipagandWillieBaunhavealreadybeenreleasedfromcustodyoftherespondentsand
are no longer under detention. These petitioners earlier filed motions to withdraw their cases and the Court
readilyapprovedthewithdrawalofthepetitions.
2. Some petitioners like Joaquin V. Roces, Teodoro M. Locsin, Sr., Rolando Fadul Rosalind Galang, Go Eng
Guan,MaximoV.Soliven,RenatoConstantino,LuisR.Mauricio,JuanL.Mercado,RobertoOrdoezandManuel
Almariohavelikewisebeenreleasedfromrespondents'custodyandarealsonolongerdetained.However,after
an initial period of silence following their release, the petitioners have manifested that they have long been
conditionally released subject to various conditions and continuing restrictions thus implying they expect a
decisionontheirpetitions.PetitionerFranciscoS.Rodrigohasalsofiledamanifestationstatingthatwhilehewas
released from detention at Fort Bonifacio, Quezon City on December 5, 1972, his release was conditional and
subject to certain restrictions. His manifestation was filed for the purpose of showing that insofar as he is
concerned, his petition for is not moot and academic. Petitioner Francisco S. Rodrigo is, therefore, asking this
Courttorenderadecisiononhispetitionforawritof.
3.Ontheotherhand,petitionerJoseW.Dioknowasunderdetentionuntilveryrecently.Forreasonswhichwillbe
discussedlater,hehas,however,askedforandinsisteduponthewithdrawalofhispetitioninspiteofthefactthat
heisunderdetention.Beforethisopinioncouldbepromulgated,however,hehasbeenorderedreleasedbythe
PresidentontheoccasionofhisExcellency'sbirthday,September11,1974,togetherwithsomeotherdetainees
undermartiallaw.
4.PetitionerBenignoS.Aquino,Jr.,isstillunderdetention.Chargeshavebeenfiledbeforeamilitarycommission
for various crimes and offenses but the petitioner challenger the jurisdiction of military courts. He has not filed
any motion to withdraw his petition. Based on his pleadings and his challenge to the jurisdiction of military
tribunals,thepetitionerstatesthatitisincumbentuponthisCourttoruleuponthemeritsofthepetition.Hewants
information filed before civilian courts and invokes constitutional rights to free him from military detention.
PetitionerBenignoS.Aquino,Jr.,isinsistentthatthisCourtrenderadecisiononhispetitionforawritof.
habeascorpus
V
ANSWEROFRESPONDENTS:
THEISSUES
The answer of the respondents states that on September 21, 1972, the President of the Philippines, in the
exerciseofpowersvestedinhimbyArticleVII,Section10,paragraph2oftheConstitution,issuedProclamation
No.1081placingtheentirePhilippinesundermartiallaw.Alltheactsquestionedbythepetitionersarejustifiedby
ordersandinstructionsofthePresidentissuedpursuanttotheproclamationofmartiallaw.Themailquestionthat
confronts the Tribunal is, therefore, the validity of Proclamation No. 1081. If it is tainted with unconstitutionality,
thenalltheactstakenpursuanttotheproclamationarevoid.Itwillthenfollowthatthearrestanddetentionsof
thepetitionersarevoid.
Ontheotherhand,iftheproclamationofmartiallawissustained,westillhavetodetermineitsscopeandeffects.
We must answer these questions: May we inquire into the validity of its continuation? Is a suspension of the
privilegeofthewritofautomaticallyincludedinaproclamationofmartiallaw?
habeascorpus
Otherquestionsalsoarisewhich,however,needbedecidedbyUsonlyinageneralmannerinthepresentcases.
May the CommanderinChief issue orders with the force and effect of legislation? May such legislation cover
subjects which are not directly related to the conquest of the particular crisis? In other words, does the
proclamation of martial law give the President authority to pass legislation not directly related to invasion,
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insurrection,rebellion,orimminentdangerthereof.?Ifciviliancourtsareopenandfunctioning,maythePresident
issuedecreesandorderswhichtransfersomeoftheirjurisdictiontomilitarytribunals?
Incidentalissueshavealsobeenraisedinthelightofthemainissueofmartiallaw.Oneisnolongerbeforethis
Court but may be mentioned in passing. The 1973 Constitution increased the composition of the Court from
eleven(11)tofifteen(15).Atatimewhentherewereonlynine(9)memberscarriedoverfromtheoldCourt,may
theseninememberstheActingChiefJusticeandeightmembersvalidlyhearaconstitutionalissue?Istherea
quorumunderArticleX,section2(2)whichreads:
(2)Allcasesinvolvingtheconstitutionalityofatreaty,executiveagreement,orlawshallbeheardanddecidedby
the Supreme Court and no treaty, executive agreement, or law may be declared unconstitutional without the
concurrence of at least ten Members. All other cases which under its rules are required to be heard , shall be
decidedwiththeconcurrenceofatleasteightMembers.
enbancenbanc
WenowhaveaChiefJusticeandelevenmemberssotheproblemofaquorumissolved.
AnotherincidentalissueisthepowerofthisCourttoinquireintotheconditionsofdetentionofpetitioners.Andstill
another issue is whether one of the petitioners may, at a time when a decision is ready to be promulgated,
withdrawhispetitionandavoidadecisionontheissueshehasraised.
VI
ONPETITIONERDIOKNO'SMOTIONTOWITHDRAW
Thefirstissuetoresolveisanincidentalbutimportantone.Itisalsothemostrecent.
(a)
ArgumentsProandCon:
InaMotiontoWithdrawdatedDecember29,1973,petitionerJoseW.Dioknoaskedleaveofcourttowithdraw
thepetitionforfiledinhisbehalf.Heaskedforthewithdrawalofthemainpetitionandotherpleadingsfiledinthe
case.Thereasongivenforthewithdrawalwas"First,thoughIamconvincedbeyondanynaggingdoubtthatwe
are on the side of right and reason, law and justice, I am equally convinced that we cannot reasonably expect
either right or reason, law or justice to prevail in my case ... (and) Second, in view of the new oath that its
membershavetaken,thepresentSupremeCourtisanewCourtfunctioningunderanewConstitution,different
from the Court under which I applied for my release. I was willing to be judged by the old Court under the old
ConstitutionbutnotbythenewCourtunderthenewConstitutionbecauseasAlbertCamus'judgepenitentsaidin
thenovel'TheFall':'hewhoclingstoalawdoesnotfearthejudgmentthatputshiminhisplacewithinanorder
hebelievesin.Butthekeenestofhumantormentsistobejudgedwithoutlaw."
habeascorpus
On being required to comment on the petitioner's motion to withdraw, the Solicitor General stated that the
petitioner
*shouldnotbeallowedtoremovehiscasefromthisCourt.Threereasonsweregiven:(a)thatthechargeisunfairtotheSupremeCourtanditsmembers
(b)thatitisuntrueand(c)thatinthemain,itiscontemptuous.TheSolicitorGeneraldisputed,asunfair,thechargethatjusticecannotbeexpectedfrom
theSupremeCourt.HepointedoutthattheSupremeCourtdidnotinjectitselfintothecontroversybutitwasthepetitionerwhoinvokedtheCourt's
jurisdictionnotonlyinthiscasebuttheplebiscitecasesaswell.TheSolicitorGeneralnotedthatthescornwithwhichtheCourtistreatedinthemotionto
withdrawstandsinsharpcontrastwiththepraiselavishedonitwhenpetitionersbegantheseproceedings.
ItmaybenotedthattheSupremeCourtwasthencharacterizedashavingthegreatestcredibilityamongthethree
branchesofgovernment.Itwasdescribedasadispenserofjusticeandasthelastcitadeloftheirliberties.
InhisMemorandum,petitionermanifestedandstressedtheimportanceofadecision"thedecisioninthiscase,
, will be cited in history books many years from now. And it will be quoted wherever lovers of freedom ask the
question...WhatdidtheCourtdointhatdifficulthour?"(Emphasissupplied).
whateveritmaybe
ThepetitionerfurtherstatedintheMemorandumthat"thedutyofthisCourtisawesomeindeed.Itsresponsibility
toOurpeopleandtohistoryisheavierandmoreenormousthanwordsandphrasescanpossiblydescribe."
Incontrasttothisinsistenceonadecision,aportionofthemotiontowithdrawcitedbytherespondentsmaybe
repeated:
[I]tseemstomethatourpeoplehavetherighttoexpectmembersofthehighestcourtofthelandtodisplaya
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conscience more sensitive, a sense of mental honesty more consistent than those generally displayed in the
marketplace.Andithaspainedmetonotethat,inswearingtosupportthenew'Constitution',thefivemembers
oftheCourtwhohadheldthatithadnotbeenvalidlyratified,havenotfulfilledourexpectations.Idonotblame
themIdonotknowwhatIwouldhavedoneintheirplace.But,asthesametime,Icannotcontinuetoentrustmy
casetothemandIhavebecomethoroughlyconvincedthatourquestforjusticeinmycaseisfutile.(p.6).
Issuewasalsotakenbytherespondentwiththepetitioner'schargethatdespitethefindingofamajoritythatthe
newConstitutionhadnotbeenvalidlyratified,theCourtnonethelessdismissedthepetitionsseekingtostopthe
enforcement of the Constitution. The allegation that the justices of this Court took an oath to support the
Constitutionbecausetheyhadbeenallowedtocontinueinofficewaschallengedasfalsebytherespondents.
Thethirdgroundfortherespondents'oppositiontothemotiontowithdrawistheallegedlycontemptuousnature
ofthemotion.TheCommentstatesthatattacksontheCourtaremostseriousnoneofthosemadeinthepast
has put the court's integrity and capacity for justice in serious question as much as the petitioner's motion to
withdraw. According to the Solicitor General, the charge in the case at bar goes to the very foundation of our
systemofjusticeandtherespectthatisdueto,it,thatitissubversiveofpublicconfidenceintheimpartialityand
independence of courts and tends to embarrass the administration of justice. The Solicitor General manifested
that"wecannotshapetheworldoftheSupremeCourtaswewanttoseeitand,laterseeingtheworldofreality,
lashattheSupremeCourtforbetrayingourillusions."
In succeeding pleadings, petitioner Diokno pressed his motion to withdraw with even greater vigor. Counsel for
petitionerstatedthatthesocalledcharge"unfairtotheCourtanditsmembers,untrue,andcontemptuous"
wasnevermadeatallandthattheSolicitorGeneralwasputtingupastrawmanandproceedingtodemolishit.
In a fortysix (46) page Reply, he pointed out that the factual bases for deciding to withdraw the case have not
beenspecificallydenied,asindeedtheyareundeniable.Itshouldbenoted,however,thatthecitedfactualbases
gointotheverymeritsofthepetitionforthewritof:
habeascorpus
(1)Onthequestionofthevalidityofratification,six(6)membersoftheCourtheldthattheproposedConstitution
wasnotvalidlyratified.
(2)On the question of acquiescence by the Filipino people, only a minority of four (4) justices held there was
acquiescence, two (2) holding that there was no acquiescence, and four (4) holding they had no means of
knowingtothepointofjudicialcertainty,whetherthepeoplehaveacceptedtheConstitution.
(3)TheCourtdidnotrulethatthe"newConstitution"wasineffect.
(4)Theratificationcaseswereneverthelessdismissed.
Thepetitioneradded"undeniablefacts":
(1)ThepetitionforwasfiledSeptember23,1972whiletheratificationcaseswereriledJanuary20and23,1973.
habeascorpus
(2)FromthefilingofthepetitiontothedatePetitionerDioknoaskedhiscounseltowithdrawthecase,460days
hadelapsed.
(3)Onthedatethereplywasfiled,531dayshadelapsedwithoutchargesbeingfiledortrialandconvictionfor
anyoffensebeingheld.
(4)AllthemembersoftheoldCourt,whohadtakenanoathto"preserveanddefend"the1935Constitution,took
anoathonOctober29,1973todefendthe"newConstitution".
IndisputingtheSolicitorGeneral'schargethattheSupremeCourtistreatedwithscornintheMotiontoWithdraw,
thepetitionerstatedthatthetoneofthemotionmaybeoneofdismayorfrustrationbutcertainlynotofscorn.The
petitionercalledthechargegratuitousandtotallybareoffoundation.
The petitioner also pointed out that there could be no contempt of court in the motion to withdraw because the
factualbasesofhisletterareindisputableandthemotioncomesundertheprotectionoftheconstitutionalrightto
afairhearing.HeinvokedhisrighttofreeexpressionasalitigantandstressedthatacitizenoftheRepublicmay
expresshimselfthoughtfully,sincerelyandreputablywithoutfearofreprisal.Thepetitioneralsopointedoutthat
bothprincipleandprecedentjustifygrantofthemotiontowithdraw.
(b):
Myoriginalstand:Motionshouldbedenied
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Reasons
: In view of the release of Diokno before this opinion could be promulgated, I now vote to grant his motion to
withdrawhispetitionthesamehavingbecomemootandacademic.
Mypresentstand
But,Iwouldliketodiscussthemeritsofthemotionifonlytoestablishguidelinesforsimilarcasesthatmayarise
inthefuture..
As a general rule, the right of the plaintiff to dismiss his action with the consent of the Court is universally
recognized. If the plaintiff believes that the action he has commenced in order to enforce a right or to rectify a
wrong is no longer necessary or he later discovers that the right no longer exists, he should be allowed to
withdrawhiscase.Ifinthecourseoflitigation,hefindsoutthatthecourseoftheactionshallbedifferentfromthat
hehadintended,thegeneralruleisthatheshouldbepermittedtowithdrawthesame,subjecttotheapprovalof
theCourt.
The plaintiff should not be required to continue the action when it is not to his advantage to do so. Litigation
shouldbediscouragedandnotencouraged.Courtsshouldnotallowpartiestolitigatewhentheynolongerdesire
tolitigate.
It should be noted, however, that the Rules of Court do not allow automatic approval of the plaintiff's motion to
dismissafterserviceoftheanswerorofamotionforsummaryjudgment.UnderRule17,
**oncetheissuesarejoined,anactioncanbedismissedupontheplaintiffsinstanceonlyuponorderoftheCourtanduponsuchtermsandconditionsas
theCourtdeemsproper.
TherequirementintheRulesthatdismissalisdiscretionaryupontheCourtisnotwithoutsignificance.Infact,the
petitioner does not deny the authority of the Court to reject his motion as long as there are reasons for such
rejection.Heissimplyarguingthatthereisnovalidreasontodenythemotionthusimplyingthatadenialwould,
ineffect,beanabuseintheexerciseofadiscretionarypower.
IntheCourt'sdeliberations,theviewwasadvancedthatpetitioner'smotionforwithdrawalmadehisconfinement
voluntary.Idisagreed,forsaidmotion,inthelightoftheotherpleadingsandmemorandasubmittedbyhim,can
still be considered as a protest against his confinement. In other words, petitioner has not made any statement
upon which we can base a conclusion that he is agreeing voluntarily to his continued confinement and thereby
makinghiscasemootandacademic.
I submit there can be no debate over the principle that the right to withdraw a petition at this stage is not an
absolute right. What faces this Court is not its power to grant or deny the motion but whether there are sound
reasons why the motion to withdraw should be denied. If there are no sound reasons, the motion should be
granted.
Accordingtothepetitioner,thereareonlytwoinstanceswhenaCourtmayvalidlydenysuchawithdrawal
(1)Whenthewithdrawalwouldirreparablyinjureotherpartiestothecasesuchas,forexample,inclasssuits,in
probateproceedingorinordinarycivilactionswhentheadversepartyhaspleadedacounterclaimthatcannotbe
decidedwithoutfirstdecidingthemaincaseand
(2) When the withdrawal would irreparably injure the public interest by depriving the Court of the opportunity to
preventortocorrectaseriousviolationoftheConstitutionorofthelaws.
Iamnotpreparedtoacceptthepropositionortorenderanabstractopinionthatthereareindeedonlytwosuch
exceptions.TheinfinitenumberoffactualsituationsthatcancomebeforethisCourtcouldconceivablyaddoneor
twoorevenmoreexceptions.Itwouldbeimprudentorprecipitatetomakesuchacategoricalassertion.Whereit
notforthereleaseofDiokno,Iwouldhaveonmyfirmbeliefthattheimportanceofthiscaseandtheissuesraised
bythepetitionercallfordenialofthemotiontowithdraw.ThepointsablyraisedbySolicitorGeneralEstelitoP.
MendozaandAssistantSolicitorGeneralVicenteV.Mendoza,whohaveshownremarkablysplendidperformance
in shouldering almost entirely the government's defense against some of the country's most distinguished
lawyers,notablyformerSenatorLorenzoM.Taadaandabatteryofotherlawyerswhosenamesareaveritable
list of "Who is Who" in the legal profession, can be condensed into only one argument the petitioners have
brought before this Court a case of such transcendental importance that it becomes a duty to our legal
institutions,toourpeople,andtoposteritytodecideit.Wemustnotleavetheresolutionofsuchgraveissuestoa
futureday.
Furthermore,amongthepresentcasesnowbeforethisCourt,thebestforumforOurdecisionwouldhavebeen
theDioknocasefor,beforehisrelease,hewastheonlypetitionerwhowasactuallydetainedbutwithoutcharges,
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whiletherearealreadychargesfiledagainstAquino,andwithrespecttotheotherswhosecasesarestillpending
beforeUs,theyareonlyunderdetentionwithintheGreaterManilaareaorareundercommunityarrest.
habeascorpus
Thepetitionerseekstodistinguishhiscasefrom,79Phil.461.Inthatcase,thisCourtruled
Krivenkovs.RegisterofDeeds
AccordingtoRule52,section4,oftheRulesofCourt,itisdiscretionaryuponthisCourttograntawithdrawalof
appealafterthebriefshavebeenpresented.Atthetimethemotionforwithdrawalwasfiledinthiscase,notonly
had the briefs been presented, but the case had already been voted and the majority decision was being
prepared.Themotionforwithdrawalstatednoreasonwhatsoever,andtheSolicitorGeneralwasagreeabletoit.
While the motion was pending in this Court, came the new circular of the Department of Justice, instructing all
register of deeds to accept for registration all transfers of residential lots to aliens. The herein respondent
appellee was naturally one of the registers of deeds to obey the new circular, as against his own stand in this
casewhichhadbeenmaintainedbythetrialcourtandfirmlydefendedinthisCourtbytheSolicitorGeneral.Ifwe
grantthewithdrawal,theresultwouldbethatpetitionerappellantAlexanderA.Krivenkowinshiscase,notbya
decision of this Court, but by the decision or circular of the Department of Justice, issued while this case was
pendingbeforethisCourt.Whetherornotthisisthereasonwhyappellantseeksthewithdrawalofhisappealwhy
the Solicitor General readily agrees to that withdrawal, is now immaterial. What is material and indeed very
important,iswhetherornotweshouldallowinterferencewiththeregularandcompleteexercisebythisCourtof
its constitutional functions, and whether or not after having held long deliberations and after having reached a
clear and positive conviction as to what the constitutional mandate is, we may still allow our conviction to be
silenced,andtheconstitutionalmandatetobeignoredormisconceived,withalltheharmfulconsequencesthat
mightbebroughtuponthenationalpatrimony.Foritisbutnaturalthatthenewcircularbetakenfulladvantageof
by many, with the circumstance that perhaps the constitutional question may never come up again before this
court,becausebothvendorsandthevendeeswillhavenointerestbuttoupholdthevalidityoftheirtransactions,
andveryunlikelywilltheregisterofdeedsventuretodisobeytheordersoftheirsuperior.Thusthepossibilityfor
thiscourttovoiceitsconvictioninafuturecasemayberemote,withtheresultthatourindifferenceoftodaymight
signifyapermanentoffensetotheConstitution.(pp.466467)
There are indeed certain differences between the facts of the case and the facts of the current petitions. If the
factualsituationswerecompletelysimilar,formerSenatorLorenzoM.Taadawouldhavebeenthelastpersonto
insistontheDioknomotionforwithdrawal.HewastheSolicitorGeneralin1947.Heiscompletelyfamiliarwiththe
ramificationsofthecase.
KrivenkoKrivenko
Icannot,however,agreewithcounselTaadathatthedeviationsfromthefactscallforadifferentrulinginthe
instantpetitions.TheSupremeCourthasgrappledatlengthandindepthwiththevalidityoftheproclamationof
martiallaw.Ithascloselyexaminedtheresultantcurtailmentsofmelibertiesastherighttoawritofortofreedom
ofexpression.Whenitisonthevergeofissuingadecision,itissuddenlyaskedtodropthecaseandtheissues
raisedsimplybecausethepetitionerisnolongerinterestedinthedecision.Tomymind,agrantingofthemotion
wouldberecreancyandunfaithfulnesstotheCourtssworndutiesandobligations.
Krivenkohabeascorpus
As in the case, the reasons for the withdrawal are no longer significant. It is the nonsilencing of this Court on
issues of utmost public importance which really matters. It is true that petitioner Diokno is alone in seeking
withdrawalatthisstageofthecase.Thefactthatadecisioncouldpossiblystillberenderedonremainingcases
is,however,nojustificationtograntthemotion.Theissueiswhetheroneortwoorallofthepetitionersmayask
for a withdrawal of his or their petitions and hope to bring about a nondecision on the issues because of the
renderingmootandacademicofthecase.Myansweriscategoricallyinthenegative.Infact,evenitthecaseis
mootedatthisstagebythereleaseofthepetitioners,Iwouldstillvoteforadecisiononthequestionsraised.
Krivenko
Thismaybeasimplemotionforwithdrawal.Yet,Iseenodifferenceintheneedtoanswervitalquestionsthathavebeenpresented.Thepublicinterest
thatisaffectedisequallypressingandseriousifthepetitionsarecomparedtoinstancesinthepastwhentheCourtinsistedonrenderingadecision.In
fact,thereisanevenstrongerneedtointerpretthemeaningoftheconstitutionalprovisioninspiteofurgingsthatitshouldrefrainfromdoingso.
Asearlyas1937,thisCourt,speakingthroughJusticeLaurelin(65Phil,56,94)emphaticallystatedthatwhen
thecountryawaitsadecisiononanimportantconstitutionalquestion,arelaxationofgeneralrulesiscalledfor.A
decisionmustissue.
PeopleofthePhilippineIslandsv.Vera
...AllawaitthedecisionofthisCourtontheconstitutionalquestion.Considering,therefore,theimportancewhich
theinstantcasehasassumedandtopreventmultiplicityofsuits,strongreasonsofpublicpolicydemandthatthe
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constitutionality of Act No. 4221 be now resolved. ... In , , an analogous situation confronted us. We said:
"Inasmuch as the property and personal rights of nearly twelve thousand merchants are affected by these
proceedingsandinasmuchasActNo.2972isanewlawnotyetinterpretedbythecourts,intheinterestofthe
publicwelfareandfortheadvancementofpublicpolicy,wehavedeterminedtooverrulethedefenseofwantof
jurisdictioninorderthatwemaydecidethemainissue.Wehavehereanextraordinarysituationwhichcallsfora
relaxationofthegeneralrule."OurrulingonthispointwassustainedbytheSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStates.
Amorebindingauthorityinsupportoftheviewwehavetakencannotbefound.
YuCongEngvs.Trinidadsupra
In the case of (93 Phil. 17), the Supreme Court had very sound reasons to resolve on March 4, 1949 not to
decide whether or not Senator Cuenco had validly been elected Senate President. The Court ruled that the
subject matter of the proceeding to declare the petitioner the rightful President of the Philippine Senate and to
oust the respondent was not a matter for the Supreme Court in view of the separation of powers doctrine, the
political nature of the controversy, and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect its own
President.ThepowertoelectitsPresidentshouldnotbeinterferedwithnortakenoverbythejudiciary.
Avelinovs.Cuencoquowarranto
OnMarch14,1949oronlyten(10)dayslater,theCourt,byamajorityofseven,decidedtoresolvethequestions
presented to it. The Court could very well have insisted on its earlier stand that it should render no decision.
Election of the Senate President was still a matter which only the Senate should decide. And yet, in the light of
subsequenteventswhichjustifieditsintervention,partlyforthereasonsstatedintheMarch4,1949resolutionof
theCourt,andpartlybecauseofthegroundsstatedinthevariousindividualopinions,theCourtwasconstrained
todeclarepositivelythattherewasaquoruminthesessionwhereCuencowaselectedActingSenatePresident.
The Court decided to reverse a categorical position taken only ten (10) days earlier. It is clear from the
circumstances of the case that the Court was impelled by strong policy considerations to make a definite
pronouncementinthecaseinordertoconformtosubstantialjusticeandcomplywiththerequirementsofpublic
interest. As pointed out by Justice Perfecto in his concurring opinion, "This case raises vital constitutional
questionswhichnoonecansettleordecideifthisCourtshouldrefusetodecidethem."
In , (27 SCRA 853), the words of Justice Laurel were recalled in order to overcome objections to an extended
decisiononacasewhichhadbecomemootandacademic.
Gonzalesvs.CommissiononElections
Inthecourseofthedeliberations,aseriousproceduralobjectionwasraisedbyfivemembersoftheCourt(Chief
Justice Concepcion and Justices Reyes, Makalintal, Teehankee and Barredo.) It is their view that respondent
CommissiononElectionsnotbeingsoughttoberestrainedfromperforminganyspecificact,thissuitcannotbe
characterized as other than a mere request for an advisory opinion. Such a view, from the remedial law
standpoint, has much to recommend it. Nonetheless, a majority would affirm the original stand that under the
circumstances,itcouldstillrightfullybetreatedasapetitionforprohibition.
The language of Justice Laurel fits the case: 'All await the decision of this Court on the constitutional question.
Considering, therefore, the importance which the instant mm has assumed and to prevent multiplicity of suits,
strongreasonsofpublicpolicydemandthat[its]constitutionality...benowresolved.'(65Phil.56,94(1937)Cf.,
47Phil.385(1926),271US50070Lawed.,1059).Itmaylikewisebeaddedthattheexceptionalcharacterof
the situation that confronts us, the paramount public interest, and the undeniable necessity for a ruling, the
nationalelectionsbeingbarelysixmonthsaway,reinforceourstand.
YuCongEngv.Trinidad
Itwouldappearundeniable,therefore,thatbeforeusisanappropriateinvocationofourjurisdictiontopreventthe
enforcementofanallegedunconstitutionalstatute.Weareleftwithnochoicethenwemustactonthematter.
In(41SCRA1),thisCourtwassimilarlyimpelledtomakeadecisionbecauseofstrongpolicyconsiderations.A
petition to reduce the P1,195,200.00 bail imposed by the trial court had become moot and academic. The
petitionerhadescapedfromtheprovincialjail.TheCourtcouldnolongergrantanyrelief.It,however,decidedthe
case"tosetforthanewthecontrollingandauthoritativedoctrinesthatshouldbeobservedinfixingtheamountof
the bail sought in order that full respect be accorded to such a constitutional right." (at page 4). Education,
especiallyoftrialjudges,wasthereasonforansweringtheissuessquarely.
DelaCamarav.Enage
Iwouldliketoreiterate,however,thatinviewofthefactthatpetitionerDioknohasbeenreleasedontheoccasion
ofPresidentMarcos'birthday(September11),InowvotetogranttheDioknomotiontowithdrawhispetitionfora
writof,thesamehavingbecomemootandacademic.
habeascorpus
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VII
G.R.No.L35546
COURTSDUTYTODECIDEALLIMPORTANTISSUESONTHEPETITIONSOFTHEPETITIONERS
ButasalreadystatedunderthetopicIV(b)"PresentStatusofthePetitioners",manyofthem,notablyAquinoand
Rodrigo, still insist on a decision. This we must now do, for the resolution of the controversy in favor of the
petitionersorfortherespondentsisnotthecompellingconsideration.Whatisimportantandessentialisthatthe
Court declare in a manner that cannot be misunderstood what the Constitution commands and what the
Constitutionrequires.
It is true that the Court should not formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise
facts to which it is applied. It is true that a decision on a question of a constitutional nature should only be as
broadanddetailedasisnecessarytodecideit.
Thereare,therefore,thosewhowouldlimitadecisionsolelyontheTransitoryProvisionsofthe1973Constitution.
TheexerciseofmartiallawpowersunderArticleVII,Section10,paragraph2oftheformerConstitutionorArticle
VII, Section 12 of the 1973 Constitution have been subjected to intensive, searching, and wellpublished
challenges.
1IfWedecidethecasesolelyonthetransitoryprovision,uncertaintyandconfusionaboutmartiallawwouldremain.The
provisionsonmartiallawwouldstillbeunexplainedandunresolvedbythisCourt.Itiseasytoseethepatentundesirability
ofsuchasituation.
In these petitions, our people await the decision of this Court on the constitutional question. Considering,
therefore, the importance which the instant petitions have assumed, We must set forth the controlling and
authoritativedoctrines.
VII
THETHREEPRINCIPALISSUES
TheSolicitorGeneralstatedtherespondents'positionasanarrowonewhetherthearrestanddetentionofthe
petitionerswerelegal.
Itistruethatisintendedforcasesofillegalconfinementordetentionbywhichapersonisdeprivedofhisliberty
(Section1,Rule102,RulesofCourt).Itsessentialobjectistoinquireintoallmannerofinvoluntaryrestraintand
to relieve a person therefrom, if such restraint is illegal (Villavicencio vs. Lukban, 39 Phil. 778 Culauag vs.
DirectorofPrisons,17SCRA429).Whiletheissuemaybepresentedinseeminglynarrowterms,itsscopeand
implications are not that simple. The respondents argue that this Court is precluded by the Constitution from
inquiringintothelegalityofthedetentions.Theyarguethatsuchaninquiryispossibleonlywheretheprivilegeof
thewritofisavailableandinasmuchastheprivilegeofthewrithasbeensuspendedbythePresidentuponthe
proclamation of martial law, it follows that We should inhibit Ourselves from asking for the reasons why the
petitioners were arrested and detained. It is argued that the Constitution has vested the determination of the
necessityforandlegalityofdetentionsundermartiallawexclusivelyinthePresidencyacoequaldepartment
ofgovernment.
Theprincipalissues,therefore,revolvearoundfirst,thevalidityofProclamationNo.1081.Second,assumingits
originalvalidity,mayWeinquireintothevalidityofitscontinuation?Andthird,hastheprivilegeofthewritofalso
beensuspendedupontheproclamationofmartiallaw?TheextentofOurinquiryintothelegalityofthedetentions
andtheireffectsisdependentontheanswerstotheforegoingissues.
habeascorpus
IX
PROCLAMATIONNO.1081ADEVIATIONFROMTHETRADITIONALCONCEPTOFMARTIALLAWARGUMENTSON
ITSVALIDITY
InProclamationNo.1081,dateSeptember21,1972,PresidentFerdinandE.MarcosplacedtheentirePhilippines
as defined in Article 1, Section 1 of the Constitution under martial law by virtue of the power vested in the
PresidentoftheRepublicofthePhilippinesbyArticleVII,Section10,par.(2)oftheConstitutionwhichreads
ThePresidentshallbethecommanderinchiefofallarmedforcesofthePhilippinesand,wheneveritbecomes
necessary,bemaycalloutsucharmedforcestopreventorsuppresslawlessviolence,invasion,insurrection,or
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rebellion.Incaseofinvasion,insurrection,rebellionorimminentdangerthereof,whenthepublicsafetyrequires
it,hemaysuspendtheprivilegesofthewritof,orplacethePhilippinesoranypartthereofundermartiallaw.
habeascorpus
(a)
Whatismartiallaw?
AstheSolicitorGeneralpointedoutwhenaskedtosubmitdefinitionsofmartiallaw,thereareasmanydefinitions
astherearecourtrulingsandwritersonthesubject.Theresponseofthepetitionersgivesthesameimpression.
Asgoodasanythatmayhavebeenarethefollowing:
definitionsmadeinthepast
Generally speaking, martial law or, more properly, martial rule, is the temporary government and control by
militaryforceandauthorityofterritoryinwhich,byreasonoftheexistenceofwarorpubliccommotion,thecivil
governmentisinadequatetothepreservationoforderandtheenforcementoflaw.Instrictnessitisnotlawatall,
butratheracessationofallmunicipallaw,asanincidentofthejusbelliandbecauseofparamountnecessity,and
depends,foritsexistence,operationandextent,ontheimminenceofpublicperilandtheobligationtoprovidefor
the general safety. It is essentially a law or rule of force, a purely military measure, and in the final analysis is
merely the will of the officer commanding the military forces. As the offspring of necessity, it transcends and
displacestheordinarylawsoftheland,anditappliesaliketomilitaryandnonmilitarypersons,andisexercisable
alikeoverfriendsandenemies,citizensandaliens.(C.J.S.,Vol.93,pp.115116,citingcases).
Martial law is the exercise of the power which resides in the executive branch of the government to preserve
orderandinsurethepublicsafetyintimesofemergencywhenotherbranchesofthegovernmentareunableto
function,ortheirfunctioningwoulditselfthreatenthepublicsafety".(Luthervs.Borden,7Hos.(US)1,45,12Led
581, 600). "It is a law of necessity to be prescribed and administered by the executive power. Its object, the
preservation of the public safety and good order, defines its scope, which will vary with the circumstances and
necessitiesofthecase.Theexerciseofthepowermaynotextendbeyondwhatisrequiredbytheexigencywhich
callsitforth."(Mitchellvs.Harmony,13How(US)115,133,14Led75,83UnitedStatesvs.Russell,13Wall.
(US) 623, 628, 20 L ed 474, 475 Raymond vs. Thomas, 91 US 712, 716, 23 L ed 434, 435 Sterling vs.
Constantin,190.(Concurringopinion,Duncanvs.Kahanamoku327U.S.334,335,90Led706(19451946).
Ithasbeenheld,therefore,thatmartiallawisa"lawofactualmilitarynecessityinactualpresenceofwar,andis
administeredbythegeneralofthearmy,whosewillitis,subjecttoslightlimitations."(Constantinovs.Smith,D.C.
Text,57F.2d239).Underthissameruling,martiallawisstrictlynolawatall.Itisacessationofallmunicipallaw.
Inanotherdecision,ithasbeenheldthat
Allrespectablewritersandpublicistsagreeinthedefinitionofmartiallawthatitisneithermorenorlessthan
the will of the general who commands the army. It overrides and suppresses all existing laws, civil officers and
civilauthorities,bythearbitraryexerciseofmilitarpowerandeverycitizenorsubject,inotherwords,theentire
population of the country, within the confines of its power, is subjected to the mere will or caprice of the
commander.Heholdsthelives,libertyandpropertyofallinthepalmofhishands.Martiallawisregulatedbyno
knownorestablishedsystemorcodeoflaws,asitisoverandaboveallofthem.Thecommanderisthelegislator,
judgeandexecutioner.(Inre:Egan8Fed.Cas.p.367).
Otherdefinitionsmaybecited:
Martial law ... is not statutory in character and always arises out of strict military necessity. Its proclamation or
establishmentisnotexpresslyauthorizedanyoftheprovisionsoftheConstitutionitcomesintobeingonlyinthe
territoryofanenemyorinapartoftheterritoryoftheUnitedStatesintimeofwarorintimeofpeaceinwhichthe
proper civil authority is, for some controlling reason, unable to exercise its proper function. (Charles Warren,
"Spies, and the Power of Congress to Subject Certain Classes of Civilian to Trial by Military Tribunal", The
AmericanLawReviewLIII(MarchApril,1919),201292).
Thetermmartiallawreferstotheexceptionalmeasuresadoptedwhetherbythemilitaryorthecivilauthorities,in
timesofwarofdomesticdisturbance,forthepreservationoforderandthemaintenanceofthepublicauthority.
To the operation of martial law all the inhabitants of the country or of the disturbed district, aliens as well as
citizens,aresubject.(Moore,Int.LawDigestII,186.AstothesubjectionofalienstoMartialLaw,SeeMoore,II,
196).
Martiallawrelatestothedomesticterritoryinaconditionofinsurrectionorinvasion,whentheConstitutionandits
civil authorities, state or federal as the case may be, have been rendered inoperative or powerless by the
insurrectionaryorinvadingforces.Itispartofourdomesticormunicipallaw."(ArnoldF.,"TheRationaleofMartial
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G.R.No.L35546
APhilippineauthorhastriedtoreconcilethemanydefinitions.
Whatever the previous obscurity which has enveloped martial law in both the British Empire and the United
States, it is settled today that martial law is (1) the exercise of military jurisdiction (2) by the military over the
civilianpopulation(3)inadomesticterritory(4)onoccasionofseriouspublicemergenciessuchasinsurrection,
rebellion,invasionorimminentdangerthereof(5)accordingtoanunwrittenlawand(6)asnecessityrequires.
(Santos,MartialLaw,p.81).
Theexistingdefinitionsareallbasedonthetraditionalconcepts.Theyweremadeatatimewheninvasionswere
precededby48hourultimatumsfollowedbyaformaldeclarationofwar,andwheninsurrectionsandrebellions
involvedfrontalclashesbetweenopposingandwelldefinedforces.Ifonegroupwasovercomebytheother,the
losers would surrender their swords and guns. The winners, in turn, might magnanimously offer to return the
swordsandallowtheloserstoretaintheirsidearms,rifles,andhorsesforhomeuse.Inshort,therewereclear
andsportingrulesofthegamewhichweregenerallyfollows.
(b).
ModernMartialLaw
Martial law pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081, however, does not completely follow the traditional forms and
features which martial law has assumed in the past. It is modern in concept, in the light of relevant new
conditions, particularly present day rapid means of transportation, sophisticated means of communications,
unconventional weaponry, and such advanced concepts as subversion, fifth columns, the unwitting use of
innocentpersons,andtheweaponsofideologicalwarfare.
The contingencies which require a state of martial law are timehonored. They are invasion, insurrection and
rebellion.OurConstitutionalsoallowsaproclamationofmartiallawinthefaceofimminentdangerfromanyof
these three contingencies. The Constitution vests the power to declare martial law in the President under the
1935ConstitutionorthePrimeMinisterunderthe1973Constitution.Astotheform,extent,andappearanceof
martiallaw,theConstitutionandourjurisprudencearesilent.
MartiallawpursuanttoProclamationNo.1081has,however,deviatedfromthetraditionalpictureofrigidmilitary
rulesuperimposedasaresultofactualandtotalorneartotalbreakdownofgovernment.
Martiallawwasproclaimedbeforethenormaladministrationoflawandordercouldbreakdown.Courtsofjustice
werestillopenandhaveremainedopenthroughoutthestateofmartiallaw.Thenationwideanarchy,overthrow
ofgovernment,andconvulsivedisorderswhichclassicalauthorsmentionasessentialfactorsfortheproclamation
andcontinuationofmartiallawwerenotpresent.
Moreimportant,martiallawunderProclamationNo.1081hasnotresultedintheruleofthemilitary.Thewillof
the generals who command the armed forces has definitely not replaced the laws of the land. It has not
supersededcivilianauthority.Insteadoftherulebymilitaryofficials,wehavetheruleofthehighestcivilianand
electiveofficialoftheland,assistedbycivilianheadsofexecutivedepartments,civilianelectivelocalofficialsand
othercivilianofficials.MartiallawunderProclamationNo.1081hasmadeextensiveuseofmilitaryforces,notto
takeoverCivilianauthoritybuttoinsurethatcivilianauthorityiseffectivethroughoutthecountry.ThisCourtcan
very well note that it has summoned and continues to summon military officers to come before it, sometimes
personallyandatothertimesthroughcounsel.Thesemilitarycommandershavebeenrequiredtojustifytheiracts
according to our Constitution and the laws of the land. These military officers are aware that it is not their will
muchlesstheircapricebutthesovereignwillofthepeopleunderaruleoflaw,whichgovernsundermartiallaw
pursuanttoProclamationNo.1081.
ItisthisparadoxicalnatureofmartiallawinthePhilippinesthatleadstothevariousquestionsraisedintheinstantpetitions.
ItisalsothisapparentlyvariantformanditsoccasionallydivergentscopeandeffectswhichrequirethisCourttoexplain
justwhatthemartiallawprovisionoftheConstitutionmeans.
Wemust,perforce,examinetheargumentsofthepartiesonthismatter.
(c)
Respondents'Arguments
TherespondentscontendthatwhenmartiallawwasproclaimedonSeptember21,1972,therebellionandarmed
action undertaken by the lawless elements of the communist and other armed aggrupations organized to
overthrowtheRepublicofthePhilippinesbyarmedviolenceandforcehadassumedthemagnitudeofanactual
stateofwaragainstourpeopleandtheRepublicofthePhilippines.Thisdeclarationisfoundinthelast"whereas"
ofProclamationNo.1081.ThefollowingassertionsofthefactualsituationonSeptember21,1972arealsofound
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inProclamationNo.1081.
G.R.No.L35546
1. There is a group of lawless elements who are moved by a common or similar ideological conviction, design,
strategy, and goal. Their prime purpose is to stage, undertake, and wage an armed insurrection and rebellion
againstthegovernmentoftheRepublicofthePhilippinesinordertoforciblyseizepoliticalandstatepowerinthis
country.Theyhaveinfactactuallystaged,undertaken,andwagedthisinsurrectionandrebellion.Theywantto
overthrow the duly constituted government and supplant our existing political, social, economic, and legal order
withanentirelynewone.Thisnewformofgovernment,itssystemoflaws,itsconceptionofGodandreligion,its
notion of individual rights and family relations, and its political, social, economic, legal and moral precepts are
basedontheMarxist,Leninist,Maoistteachingsandbeliefs.
2. These lawless elements have entered into a conspiracy and have joined and banded their resources and
forces. They use seemingly innocent and harmless although actually destructive front organization. These
organizations have been infiltrated or deliberately formed by them through sustained and careful recruitment
among the peasantry, laborers, professionals, intellectuals, students, and mass media personnel. Their
membership has been strengthened and broadened. Their control and influence has spread over almost every
segmentandlevelofoursocietythroughouttheland.
3.Theforegoinggroupoflawlesselementsenjoytheactive,moral,andmaterialsupportofaforeignpower.In
the months of May, June and July, 1972, they brought into the country at Digoyo Point, Palanan, Isabela and
otherpointsalongthePacificcoastofLuzon,substantialquantitiesofwarmaterialsconsistingofaround3,500M
14 rifles, several dozens of 40 mm rocket launchers, large quantities of 80 mm rockets and ammunitions and
othercombatparaphernalia.
4. The lawless elements have an overall revolutionary plan. They have distributed their regional program of
actionfor1972totheirvariousfieldcommandersandpartyworkers.Theimplementationoftheprogramofaction
fromtheintensificationofrecruitmenttotheassassinationofhighgovernmentofficialsandtheestablishmentofa
provisional revolutionary government in various towns and cities has actually commenced. Various incidents of
bombings, strikes, robberies, sabotage, and demonstrations are actually in implementation of the program of
action.Liquidationmissionsaimedatrankinggovernmentofficialswereabouttobeimplementedbythefieldingof
socalledSparrowUnits.
5.ThereisanequallyseriousdisorderinMindanaoandSuluresultinginactualwaramongChristians,Muslims,
Ilagas, Barracudas, the Mindanao Independence Movement and government troops. Violent disorder in
Mindanao and Sulu resulted in over 3,000 casualties and more than 500,000 injured, displaced and homeless
persons.TheeconomyofMindanaoandSuluisparalyzed.
6. There is throughout the land a state of anarchy, lawless chaos, disorder, turmoil and destruction of a
magnitudeequivalenttoanactualwarbetweengovernmentforcesontheonehandandtheNewPeople'sArmy
andthesatelliteorganizationsontheother.
7.TheSupremeCourtinthe1971caseshasfoundthatintruthandinfactthereexistsanactualinsurrectionand
rebellioninthecountry.PortionsoftheSupremeCourtdecisionarecited.ItwasconcludedbytheSupremeCourt
thattheunlawfulactivitiesoftheaforesaidelementsposeaclear,present,andgravedangertopublicsafetyand
thesecurityofthenationisalsocited.
habeascorpus
(d)
Petitioners'Arguments:
Ontheotherhand,thepetitionersstatethatinthePhilippines"therehasbeennodisruptionatallallgovernment
offices were performing their usual functions all courts were open and in the unobstructed exercise of their
jurisdictionatthetimemartiallawwasdeclared."ThepetitionersstatethatwehavenoCivilWarinthePhilippines
andthatnoprovince,nocity,notownthroughoutthePhilippineshassecededfromtheRepublic.Theystatethat
there is no status of belligerency. There is no armed struggle carried on between two political bodies, each of
whichexercisesdefactosovereigntyoverpersonswithinadeterminateterritory,andcommandsanarmywhichis
preparedtoobservetheordinarylawsofwar.
On rebellion, the petitioners point out that the rebels have not established an organized civil government nor
occupiedasubstantialportionofthenationalterritoryand,infact,aredescribedasmere"lawlesselements."
Thepetitionersstatethat"thethrustofmartiallawcasesisthisthatfortherequirementofpublicsafetytobe
satisfied, civil authority must have either fallen away or proved inadequate for the emergency, the courts are
actuallyclosed,anditisimpossibletoadministercriminaljusticeaccordingtolaw,andthatwhererebellionreally
exists,thereisanecessitytofurnishasubstituteforthecivilauthority,thusoverthrown,andasnopowerisleft
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butthemilitary,itisallowedtogovernuntilthelawscanhavetheirfreecourse.Formartialrulecanneverexist
wherethecourtsareopenandintheunobstructedexerciseoftheirjurisdiction."ThepetitionersciteArnold,inhis
article,"TheRationaleofMartialLaw"(15ABAJ551).
civil authorities ... HAVE BEEN RENDERED INOPERATIVE OR POWERLESS by the insurrectionary or invading
forces.
Aftercitingtheforegoing,petitionersaskedthisCourttotakejudicialnoticeofthefollowing:
1.Congresswasinsessionandwasintheunobstructedexerciseofitsfunctionswhenmartialwasproclaimed
2. The Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Courts of First Instance in the Greater Manila Area where
petitioners had been arrested indeed, even the municipal and city courts were, at the time martial law was
publicly announced, open and are still open and functioning throughout the length and breadth of the land no
proofhasbeenshownthatanycourthasbeenrendered"unabletoadministerjustice,"duetotheactivitiesofthe
rebels. Ironically, it is General Order No. 3, as amended by, General Order No. 3A, issued pursuant to
ProclamationNo.1081,thatseekstorenderthempowerless,inmanycases,toadministerjustice,accordingto
theConstitutionandthelawsoftheland
3.TheConstitutionalConventionthesocalled"fourthbranch"hadbeenholdingitssessionswhenmartiallaw
was proclaimed. Despite martial law, or probably because of it, it decided to work with greater efficiency, it has
just finished its work. A "plebiscite" under martial law is being called on January 15, 1973, so the people can
"ratify"theproposedConstitution
4. In the Greater Manila Area, contrary to the speech of September 23, 1972, no university, college, or school
wasclosedduetotheactivitiesoftherebels
5. All instruments of mass communications were in operation up to September 22, 1972. The next day, free
speech and free press the very heart of free inquiry and the search for truth became nothing but empty
memories. Only the "safe newspapers and radiotv stations" were allowed to open. Political dissent was
suppressed
6.Allagenciesandinstrumentalitiesofgovernment,nationalaswellaslocal,werefunctioningwhenmartiallaw
wasproclaimed.ByGeneralOrderNo.3,theywereordered"tocontinuetofunctionundertheirpresentofficers
andemployeesandinaccordancewithexistinglaws..."
ThepetitionersstatewhyProclamationNo.1081isunconstitutional:
These indisputable facts which require no introduction of proof because they all fall within the scope of judicial
notice, under Rule 129 of the Rules of Court show that at the time martial law was declared there was
absolutely no justification for it, in fact and in law. Hence, Proclamation No. 1081 is unconstitutional and void,
because:
1.Itispredicatedontheexistenceof"themagnitudeofanactualwar"oran"actualstatusofwar"thatdoesnot
exist
2.Itisallegedlybasedonthe"statusofbelligerency"whichnoStateintheworld,noteventhePhilippines,has
extendedtotherebelsorthelawlesselementsdescribedintheProclamation
3. Although there may be rebellion in some remote places, as in Isabela, there is no justification for the
declarationofmartiallawthroughoutthePhilippines,since
a)nolargescale,nationwiderebellionorinsurrectionexistsinthePhilippines
b) public safety does not require it, inasmuch as no department of government, no government agency or
instrumentality,andevenmoreimportant,nocivilcourtofappellateororiginaljurisdictionwas,atthetimemartial
law was proclaimed, unable to open or function, or has been, at any time since the incumbent President came
into power "rendered powerless or inoperative" due to the activities of the rebels or the lawless elements
describedintheProclamation
c) The President himself declared that the armed forces can handle the situation without "utilizing the
extraordinary powers of the President" (January 1, 1972), that long before martial law was proclaimed, the
Government had the said rebellion" and the "rebels and their supporters" under control, as the Army knew the
stepbystep plot of the Communists and had an hourbyhour monitoring of the movements of the subversive
leaders.
d) The problem in the Greater Manila Area where petitioners were seized and arrested was, at the time
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martiallawwasproclaimed,plainlawlessnessandcriminality.
AsthePresidentdescribedthesituationinhisspeechofSeptember23,1972:
Lawlessness and criminality like kidnapping, smuggling, extortion, blackmail, gunrunning, hoarding and
manipulation of prices, corruption in government, tax evasion perpetrated by syndicated criminals, have
increasinglyescalated...
Thepetitionerspointedoutthatneitheranyoftheseoracombinationofall,constituteeithertheoccasionorthe
justification for the imposition of martial rule. Otherwise, since these crimes have always been with us for many
years,wewouldneverseetheendofmartiallawinthiscountry.
It is argued that since Proclamation No. 1081 is unconstitutional and void, the General Orders, issued in
pursuancetheretoandbywayofitsimplementation,mustinevitablysufferfromthesamecongenitalinfirmity.
(e)
AuthoritiescitedbytheParties
PetitionersandrespondentsalikepremisetheirargumentsonthemartiallawprovisionoftheConstitution.Both
cite decisions of foreign courts and treatises of foreign writers expounding on martial law. And yet, completely
divergentopinionsonthemeaningoftheprovisionistheresult.
Martial law is based on a law of necessity and is utilized as a measure of governmental selfdefense. It is,
therefore, an inherent power. It needs no constitutional or statutory grant before it may be wielded. As the
petitioners state (Addendum, pages 8081), it is a recognized institution in the constitutional systems of both
EnglandandAmerica,notwithstandinglackofexpressprovisionsonmartiallawinwrittenconstitutions.
We accept judicial decisions of these countries as highly persuasive, if not as precedents. The absence of
expressrecognitionintheconstitutionsorstatuteofthesecountrieshelpsexplainwhythereisdisagreementona
precisedefinition.Moreimportant,itexplainswhythenecessity,scope,andextentofmartiallawproclamations
havetobedeterminedbytheregularcourtsandwhythedecisionsare,themselves,conflicting.TheConstitutions
andstatutesaresilentordifferentfromeachother.TheCourtshavebeenforcedtogotothecommonlawandto
generalprinciplesofConstitutionalLawtolookforbasesofpowerandtoresolveproblemsarisingoutofstatesof
martial law. The various authorities cited by both petitioners and respondents in their pleadings and oral
argumentsundoubtedlyhavevaluableworthandapplicability.Theyareveryhelpfulinresolvingthemomentous
issues raised by the petitions. The fact remains, however, that they deal with an exercise of power which is
undefined. For the United States Supreme Court, the power is not specifically prescribed in the federal
Constitution. This has led foreign courts to naturally and logically look for the confining limits and restrictions of
ambiguous, cryptic, and perplexing boundaries. Since the power is not defined, the natural tendency is not to
describeitbuttolookforitslimits.AngloAmericanauthoritiesmayassistbutshouldnotcontrolbecause,here,
thelimitsarepresentanddeterminedbynolessthanthefundamentallaw.
In the Philippines, there is an ubiquitous and mandatory guide. The Constitution speaks in clear and positive
terms.Givencertainconditions,thePhilippinesoranypartthereofmaybeplacedundermartiallaw.Toresolve
theinstantpetitions,itisnecessarytofindoutwhattheConstitutioncommandsandwhattheexpresswordsofits
positive provision mean. It is the Constitution that should speak on the circumstances and qualifications of the
initiationanduseofanawesomeemergencypower..
(b):
MoreargumentsoftheRespondents
Accordingtotherespondents,theConstitutionplainlyprovidesthatthecircumstanceswhenmartiallawmaybe
declared,itsscopeanditseffectsarebeyondjudicialexamination.TherespondentscontendthatthisCourtlacks
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the instant petitions for . The Solicitor General has consistently pleaded
throughout these proceedings that the questions involved are political and nonjusticiable. He states that the
President, sworn to defend the Constitution and the Republic, proclaimed martial law pursuant to authority
expressly conferred by the Constitution. It is argued that his decision is beyond controversion because the
Constitution has made it so and that only history and the Filipino people may pass judgment on whether the
Presidenthascorrectlyactedinatimeofsupremecrisis.
habeascorpus
(a)
Moreargumentsofthepetitioners:
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Petitioners,ontheotherhand,contendthatthisTribunalistheultimateinterpreteroftheConstitution.Assuch,it
has the power and duty to declare Proclamation No. 1081 unconstitutional and void because the President has
exceededhispowers.Itisarguedthatwherebasicindividualrightsareinvolved,judicialinquiryisnotprecluded.
OntheargumentthatmartiallawistextuallyandexclusivelycommittedtothePresident,thepetitionersanswer
that under the same Constitution, the President may not disable the Courts and oust them, particularly the
SupremeCourt,oftheirjurisdictiontohearcasesassignedtothembytheConstitutionandthelaws.Petitioners
stressthattheCourtshouldactnoworthetimewillcomewhenitcannolongeract,however,muchitmaywish
to,foritshallhavecompletelylostthenthemoralforceandauthorityitstillpossessesandthevalidclaimitmay
stillhaveofbeingindependent,fearless,andjust.
X
POLITICALQUESTIONSANDCOURTSJURISDICTIONOVERTHEM
The respondents' assertion that the questions raised in these petitions are political and nonjusticiable raises a
pointwhichiseasilymisunderstood.
Whatisapoliticalquestion?
In(78Phil.1,4),thisCourtrecognizedtheproblemsintryingtomakeadefinition:
Mabanagvs.Lopez
It is a doctrine too well established to need citation of authorities, that political questions are not within the
provinceofthejudiciary,excepttotheextentthatpowertodealwithsuchquestionshasbeenconferreduponthe
courtsbyexpressconstitutionalorstatutoryprovision.(16C.J.S.,431).Thisdoctrineispredicatedontheprinciple
of the separation of powers, a principle also too well known to require elucidation or citation of authorities. The
difficultyliesindeterminingwhatmatterstallwithinthemeaningofpoliticalquestion.Thetermisnotsusceptible
of exact definition, and precedents and authorities are not always in full harmony as to the scope of the
restrictions, on this ground, on the courts to meddle with the actions of the political departments of the
government.
IthinkitistimeforthisCourttodistinguishbetweenjurisdictionoveracaseandjurisdictionovertheissueraised
inthatcase.Itiserroneoustostatethatwhenapetitionraisesanissuewhichispoliticalinnature,thisCourtis
withoutjurisdictionoverthecase..
Ithasjurisdiction
TheSupremeCourthasjurisdictiontoreceivethepetitionandtofindoutwhethertheissuesareindeedpolitical
ornot.AfindingofpoliticalquestionistheprovinceoftheCourtinallcases.Amereallegationofpoliticalquestion
doesnotautomaticallydivesttheCourtofitsjurisdiction.TheCourtmay,therefore,requirethepartiestothecase
toproveorrefutetheexistenceofapoliticalquestion.TheCourthasjurisdictiontoreceivethepleadings,tolisten
totheargumentsandtomakeupitsmind.
OncetheCourt,however,findsthattheissueispoliticalinnature,itshouldrulethatithasnojurisdictiontodecide
theissueonewayoranother.Itstillrendersadecision.Itmuststillstatethat,accordingtotheConstitution,this
matterisnotforthejudiciarybutforthepoliticaldepartmentstodecide.ThisisthetaskWemustperforminthese
petitions.Whenwedecidewhetherornottheissuesarepoliticalinnature,Weexercisejurisdiction.IfWefinda
politicalquestion,Westillhavejurisdictionoverthecasebutnotoverthespecificissue.
AlotofemotionalismisdirectedagainsttheCourtwhenitrulesthataquestionispolitical.Itisallegedthatthe
Court has surrendered its powers. The political question, it is said, "applies to all those questions of which the
Court,atagiventime,willbeoftheopinionthatitisimpoliticorinexpedienttotakejurisdiction.Sometimesthis
ideaofinexpediencywillresultfromthefearofthevastnessoftheconsequencesthatadecisiononthemerits
might entail. Sometimes, it will result from the feeling that the Court is incompetent to deal with the type of
question involved. Sometimes, it will be induced by the feeling that the matter is too high for the Courts"
(Finkelstein, "Judicial Self Limitation", 38 Harvard Law Review 328, 344) The political question doctrine is,
therefore,describedasadoctrineofjudicialopportunism.LikePontiusPilate,theCourtisaccusedoftossingthe
hot issue for others to determine. It is charged with washing its hands off a difficult or explosive situation. A
politicalquestion,itisalleged,isnothingmorethananyquestionwhichtheCourtdoesnotwanttodecide.Itis
understandable why courts should have a seemingly natural or spontaneous tendency to reject a political
question argument. The charge that the Court is abdicating a function or running away from responsibility can
striketotheverymarrowofanyjudge'sfeelings.
I do not share these misgivings. I positively reject them as wrong impressions. This Court is discharging a
constitutional duty when it determines that an issue is a political question. Because of its implications, however,
thisisafactwhichtheCourtmustalsoexplaininthesimplesttermspossible.
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The Constitution defines and limits the powers entrusted by the sovereign people to their government. First, it
declares the boundaries where the powers of government cannot go further because individual rights would be
impaired. Second, it divides the powers given to the entire government among the various departments and
constitutionalbodies.Itsprovisionsare,therefore,bothagrantandalimitationofpower.
Inotherwords,theConstitutionmaybelikenedtoamap.Thismapshowshowthepowersofsovereigntyhave
been distributed among the departments of government. It shows where there is a sharing of powers or where
checksandbalancesmaybefound.Italsoshowswherethereisadividinglinebetweengovernmentpowerand
individualliberty.Inplainerlanguage,theconstitutionalmap,likeanyothermap,carriesdifferentboundaries.The
boundariesarethedelimitation'sofpower.
ThefunctionoftheCourtistofixthoseboundarieswheneverencroachmentsarealleged.Indoingso,theCourt
interpretstheconstitutionalmap.Itdeclaresthatthispowerisexecutive,thatpowerislegislative,andthatother
powerisjudicial.Itmaysometimesstatethatacertainpower,likeimpeachment,isjudicialinnature.Nonetheless,
theconstitutionalmaphasincludedimpeachmentwithintheboundariesoflegislativefunctions.TheCourthasto
declarethatthejudicialpowerofimpeachmentisexclusivelyforthelegislaturetoexercise.
Thistaskofallocatingconstitutionalboundaries,Imustrepeat,isgiventothisCourt.Itcannotbedivestedofthis
jurisdiction.Itcannotyieldthispower.
However,whentheCourtfindsthatacertainpowerisgivenbytheConstitutiontoacoequaldepartment,itmust
defer to the decision of that department even if it appears to be seemingly judicial. It should declare that the
Constitutionhasvestedthisdeterminationintheexecutiveorthelegislature.TheCourtmust,therefore,statethat
itcannotgoanyfurther.ThesovereignpeoplethroughtheConstitutionhavedrawnaboundarywhichthisCourt
hasascertainedandwhichitmustrespect.WhentheCourtfindsapoliticalquestion,itisnot,therefore,shirking
or avoiding a duty. It is, in fact, complying with its duty. Much as it wants to go into the issues and decide the
questions, it has to decline. The Constitution has given the power of determination to another department. As
interpreteroftheConstitution,theCourthastoleadinrespectingitsboundaries.
IfweexaminethisCourt'sdefinitionofapoliticalquestionin(G.R.No.L10520,February28,1957),Wefindthat
itconformstotheforegoingexplanation.
Taadavs.Cuenco
In short, the term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary parlance, namely, a
question of policy. In other words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum (), it refers to "those questions
which,,aretobeintheirsovereigncapacity,orinregardtowhichfulldiscretionaryauthorityhasbeendelegated
to the branch of the Government." It is concerned with issues dependent upon the , not legality, of a particular
measure.(Emphasissupplied)
supraundertheConstitutiondecidedbythepeoplelegislatureorexecutivewisdom
This is a determination of constitutional boundaries. The Court has found that the Constitution has assigned a
politicalquestiontothepeoplethroughareferendumoreitheroneorbothofthepoliticaldepartments.
Amorecompletedefinitionisfoundin(369U.S.186,7LEd.2d663,1962),towit:
Bakervs.Carr
Itisapparentthatseveralformulationswhichvaryslightlyaccordingtothesettingsinwhichthequestionsarise
may describe a political question, which identifies it as essentially a function of the separation of powers.
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable
constitutionalcommitmentoftheissuetoacoordinatepoliticaldepartmentoralackofjudiciallydiscoverableand
manageablestandardsforresolvingitortheimpossibilityofdecidingwithoutaninitialpolicydeterminationofa
kindclearlyfornonjudicialdiscretionortheimpossibilityofacourt'sundertakingindependentresolutionwithout
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government or an unusual need for unquestioning
adherence to a political decision already made or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncementsbyvariousdepartmentsononequestion.
Again,theCourtmakesadeterminationthattheConstitutionhasvestedthemakingofafinaldecisioninabody
otherthantheCourt.
XI
PROCLAMATIONNO.1081ISVALIDITISPOLITICALINNATUREANDTHEREFORENOTJUSTICIABLE
HowdoestheCourtdeterminewhetheramartiallawproclamationisapoliticalquestionornot?Therespondents
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argue that only the President is authorized to determine when martial law may be proclaimed. The petitioners
insistthatthisCourtmayexamineandnullifythePresidentialdeterminationasbeyondhisconstitutionalpowers.
HastheConstitutionvestedthepowerexclusivelyinthePresident?Arethepetitionerscorrectorisittheclaimof
respondentswhichisvalid?
The rule in constitutional construction is to give effect to the intent of the authors. The authors are, first, the
framerswhowereorderedbythesovereignpeopletorepresenttheminthespecificassignmentofdraftingthe
fundamentallawandsecond,thepeople,themselves,whobytheirratificationconfirmwhattheirdelegateshave
wroughtandmanifestedasexpressionsofthesovereignwill.
How,then,doweascertaintheintentoftheauthorsonthegrantofmartiallawpowers?
Asearchforintentmustnecessarilystartwithinthefourcornersofthedocumentitself.
...Thequestionisonethenofconstitutionalconstruction.Itiswelltorecallfundamentals.Theprimarytaskisone
of ascertaining and thereafter assuring the realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the
adoptionoftheConstitution.
Welooktothelanguageofthedocumentitselfinoursearchforitsmeaning.Wedonotofcoursestopthere,but
thatiswherewebegin....(Tuazon&Co.vs.LandTenureAdministration,31SCRA413,422)
The Constitution is sufficiently explicit in locating the power to proclaim martial law. It is similarly explicit in
specifying the occasions for its exercise. "In case of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or imminent danger
thereof, when the public safety requires it, he (the President as CommanderinChief of all armed forces of the
Philippines) may suspend the privileges of the writ of or place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial
law."
habeascorpus
ThisprovisiononmartiallawisfoundinArticleVIIofthe1935Constitution.ThisArticlereferstothePresidency.
Section10,wheretheprovisionappearsasthesecondparagraph,isexclusivelydevotedtopowersconferredby
the Constitution on the President. This is in sharp contrast to the Constitution of the United States where the
suspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritofappears,notasagrantofpowerunderArticleIIontheExecutivenorin
thefirsttenamendmentsconstitutingtheirBillofRights,butinArticleIontheLegislature.Itisgivennotasagrant
ofpowerbutasalimitationonthepowersoftheFederalCongress.
habeascorpus
Itissignificantthat,asregardsthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritof,thePhilippineConstitutiontreatsit
bothasagrantofpowerinthearticleonthePresidencyandasalimitationtogovernmentactioninthearticleon
theBillofRights.Ontheotherhand,thereisnodualtreatmentofmartiallaw.Thereisonlyagrantofpowerin
Article VII to meet certain grave dangers to the Republic. Nowhere in the Constitution is it treated in terms of
limitation.
habeascorpus
In,31SCRAp.413,423,thisCourtruled:
J.M.Tuazon&Co.,Inc.vs.LandTenureAdministration
ReferencetothehistoricalbasisofthisprovisionasreflectedintheproceedingsoftheConstitutionalConvention,
twooftheextrinsicaidstoconstructionalongwithcontemporaneousunderstandingandtheconsiderationofthe
consequencesthatflowfromtheinterpretationunderconsideration,yieldsadditionallightonthematter.
Letus,therefore,lookatthehistoryoftheprovision.ItisimportanttobeguidedbytheauthorsoftheConstitution
morethanbycitationsfromforeigncourtdecisionsandquotationsfromconstitutionallawwriterswhichpetitioners
andrespondentscanseemtounendinglyculltosustaintheirdiametricallyopposedpositions..
ThePhilippineBillof1902hasnoprovisiononmartiallaw,althoughitprovided:
SECTION5....
Governor, with the approval of the Philippine Commission, whenever during such period the necessity for such
suspensionshallexist.
habeascorpus
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Bothexecutiveandlegislativesharedindecidingwhentheprivilegeofthewritmaybesuspended.
The Jones Law or Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916 required a similar sharing of power as the Philippine Bill of
1902. Instead of approval of the Philippine Commission, however it provided that the President of the United
States must be notified whenever the privilege of the writ of has been suspended or martial law has been
proclaimed.
7.DelegateYancha
3.
Delegate
Caliwara
6.
Delegate
Rosales
2. Delegate
CalderonC.
1.
5.
DelegateDelegate
Benzon Mastura
2.
Delegate
Garcia L.
M.
4.DelegateZafra
NonMembers:
1.
3.
DelegateDelegate
Corpus Santillan
8.
Delegate
Opinion
COMMITTEEONEXECUTIVEPOWER
PRESENT
Chairman:ViceChairman:
DelegateEspinaDelegdateExmundo
Members:
15.
Delegate
Zafra
7.
Delegate
Mendiola
14.
Delegate
VelosoI.
6.
Delegate
Laggui
13.
Delegate
Sumulong
5. Delegate
GuzmanV.
12.
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Delegate
Sevilia
4. Delegate
Gunigundo
11.
Delegate
Santillan
3. Delegate
GarciaL.P.
10.
Delegate
ReyesC.
2.
Delegate
Badelles
G.R.No.L35546
1.
9.
DelegateDelegate
Abad
Pepito
habeascorpus
SECTION21...HeshallberesponsibleforthefaithfulexecutionofthelawsofthePhilippineIslandsandofthe
United States operative within the Philippine Islands, and whenever it becomes necessary he may call upon
commandersofthemilitaryandnavalforcesoftheUnitedStatesintheIslands,orsummonthe,orcalloutthe
Militia, or other locally created armed forces, to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection, or
rebellionandwiththeattendingfacts,andcircumstances,thePresidentshallhavepowertomodifyorvacatethe
actionoftheGovernorGeneral.(Emphasissupplied)
possecomitatushemay,incaseofrebellionorinorinvasionorimminentdangerthereof,whenthepublicsafetyrequiresit,
suspendtheprivilegesofthewritofhabeascorpus,orplacetheislands,oranypartthereof,undermartiallawProvided,
ThatwhenevertheGovernorGeneralshallexercisethisauthority,heshallatoncenotifythePresidentoftheUnitedStates
thereof,together
The treatment of both martial law and as part of the limitations in the Bill of Rights and as part of the grant of
powers of the Chief Executive started with the Jones Law. This organic act also added "imminent danger" as a
groundforsuspension.
habeascorpus
This was the status of our constitutional law on and on martial law when the 1935 Philippine Constitution was
drafted. The most learned Philippine lawyers were among the delegates to the 1934 Constitutional Convention.
The delegates had before them the Philippine Bill of 1902 requiring approval of the legislature before the Chief
Executivemayexercisehispower.TheyhadbeforethemtheprovisionoftheJonesLawqualifyingtheGovernor
General'spowerwithsupervisionandcontrolbythePresidentoftheUnitedStateswhomaymodifyorvacatethe
former'saction.TheychosetovestthepowerexclusivelyinthePresidentofthePhilippines.Theyexpandedthe
wide scope of his authority by including "imminent danger" as an occasion for its exercise, thus deliberately
adoptingtheJonesLawprovisionminusthelimitation.Theirproposalonmartiallawwasoverwhelminglyratified
bythepeople.
habeascorpus
The choice was no perfunctory or casual one. It was the product of thorough study and deliberation. While the
debatesinthe1935ConstitutionalConventioncenteredon,theynecessarilyapplytomartiallawbecausethetwo
areinextricablylinkedinoneandthesameprovision.TheSolicitorGeneralhassummarizedthesedeliberations
onandmartiallaw.
Asamatteroffact,intheConstitutionalConvention,DelegateAranetaproposedthefollowingprovisions:
In case of rebellion, insurrection, or invasion, when the public safety requires it, the National Assembly may
suspendtheprivilegeofthewritof.IncasetheNationalAssemblyisnotinsessionthePresidentmaysuspend
the privilege of the writ of with the consent of the majority of the Supreme Court, but this suspension of the
privilege of the writ of will be revoked if the President does not call a special session of the National Assembly
withinfifteendaysfromthedecreesuspendingthewritoforiftheNationalAssemblyfailstoconfirmtheactionof
thePresidentwithin30days.(5J.Laurel,ProceedingsofthePhilippineConstitutionalConvention,259,(S.Laurel
ed.1966)
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Insupportofhisproposal,Aranetaargued,first,thatthepowertosuspendtheprivilegeofthewritofshouldbe
vestedintheNationalAssemblybecausethatpowerwas"essentially"legislative.(Id.24950)andsecond,thatin
casetheNationalAssemblywasnotinsession,thusmakingitnecessarytovestthepowerinthePresident,that
the exercise of the power be subject to the concurrence of the Supreme Court and even when the Court has
concurredinthedecisionofthePresidentthatthesuspensionwouldbeeffectiveonlyforacertainperiodunless
theNationalAssemblywasconvenedanditsratificationwassecured.(.,at255)
habeascorpusId
He was interpellated by various delegates Delegate Perez and Grageda, especially, were concerned, lest the
requirement of securing the concurrence of other branches of government in the decision of the President
depriveshimofeffectivemeansofmeetinganemergency.(.,at25556).TheCommitteeonSponsorshipheaded
byDelegateSottoopposedtheamendment.Whenfinallyputtovote,theamendmentwasrejected.(.,at259).
IdId
There are a number of points we should note regarding the proposal. First, the proposal refers only to the
suspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritof.Itdidnotapparentlycontemplatetheproclamationofmartiallaw.,the
proposal would vest the power of suspension in the National Assembly and in the President only when the
NationalAssemblyisnotinsession.,exerciseofthepowerbythePresident,issubjecttotheconcurrenceofthe
SupremeCourtandtheconfirmationoftheNationalAssembly.
habeascorpusSecondThird
TheConstitutionalConventionmusthavebeenawareoftheexperienceofPresidentLincolnduringtheAmerican
CivilWar.TheymusthavebeenawareoftheviewsexpressthenthatitwasthelegislatureandnotthePresident
who may suspend the privilege of the writ of or proclaim martial law. Surely, they were cognizant of the vast
implicationsincidenttoasuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritofandmoresototheproclamationofmartiallaw.
Thisisreflectedinthefollowingrecordsoftheproceedings:
Duringthedebatesonthefirstdraft,DelegateFranciscoproposedanamendmentinserting,asafourthcausefor
thesuspensionofthewritof,imminentdangerofthethreecausesincludedherein.Whensubmittedtoavotefor
thefirsttime,theamendmentwascarried.
habeascorpus
After his Motion for a reconsideration of the amendment was approved, Delegate Orense spoke against the
amendmentallegingthatitwouldbedangeroustomakeimminentdangeragroundforthesuspensionofthewrit
of.Inpart,hesaid:
habeascorpus
Gentlemen,thisphraseistooambiguous,andinthehandsofaPresident,whobelieveshimselfmoreorlessa
dictator,itisextremelydangerousitwouldbeaswordwithwhichhewouldbeheadus.
Indefenseoftheamendment,DelegateFranciscopointedoutthatitwasintendedtomakethispartofthebillof
rightsconformtothatpartofthedraftgivingthePresidentthepowertosuspendthewritofalsointhecaseofan
imminentdangerofinvasionorrebellion.WhenaskedbyDelegateRafolsifthephrase,imminentdanger,might
not be struck out from the corresponding provision under the executive power instead, Delegate Francisco
answered:
habeascorpus
Outright,itispossibletoeliminatethephrase,imminentdangerthereof,inthepageIhavementioned.ButIsay,
goingtotheessenceandreferringexclusivelytothenecessityofincludingthewords,ofimminentdangerorone
ortheother,Iwishtosaythefollowing:thatitshouldnotbenecessarythatthereexistarebellion,insurrection,or
invasioninorderthatmaybesuspended.Itshouldbesufficientthatthereexistsnotadangerbutanimminent
danger,andtheword,imminentshouldbemaintained.Whenthereexistsanimminentdanger,theStaterequires
foritsprotection,andforthatofallthecitizensthesuspensionofthe.
Whenputtoavoteforthesecondtime,theamendmentwasdefeatedwith72votesagainstand56votesinfavor
ofthesame.(IAruego'sFramingofthePhilippineConstitution,180181)
ButtheConventionvotedforastrongexecutive,andwroteArticleVII,Section10(2)intotheConstitution.
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TheconfermentofthepowerinthePresidentisclearanddefinite.Thattheauthoritytosuspendtheprivilegeof
the writ of and to proclaim martial law was, intended to be exclusively vested in the President, there can be no
doubt.(MemorandumforRespondentsdatedNovember17,1972,pp.1114)
habeascorpus
TheonlyconclusionIcanmakeafterascertainingtheintentoftheauthorsoftheConstitutionisthatthepowerto
proclaim martial law is exclusively vested in the President. The proclamation and its attendant circumstances
thereforeformapoliticalquestion.
Unless this Court decides that every act of the executive and of the legislature is justiciable there can be no
clearerexampleofapoliticalquestionthanProclamationNo.1081.Itistheexercisebythehighestelectiveofficial
ofthelandofasupremepoliticaldutyexclusivelyentrustedtohimbytheConstitution.Ourpeoplehaveentrusted
to the President through a specific provision of the fundamental law the awesome responsibility to wield a
powerfulweapon.Thepeoplehaveentrustedtohimtheestimationthattheperilsaresoominousandthreatening
thatthisultimateweaponofourdulyconstitutedgovernmentmustbeused.
TheSupremeCourtwasnotgiventhejurisdictiontosharethedeterminationoftheoccasionsforitsexercise.Itis
notgiventheauthoritybytheConstitutiontoexpandorlimitthescopeofitsusedependingontheallegationsof
litigants.ItisnotauthorizedbytheConstitutiontosaythatmartiallawmaybeproclaimedinIsabelaandSulubut
not in Greater Manila. Much less does it have the power nor should it even exercise the power, assuming its
existence,tonullifyaproclamationofthePresidentonamatterexclusivelyvestedinhimbytheConstitutionand
onissuessopoliticallyandemotionallycharged.TheCourt'sfunctioninsuchcasesistoassumejurisdictionfor
the purpose of finding out whether the issues constitute a political question or not. Its function is to determine
whetherornotaquestionisindeedjusticiable.
PetitionerswantthisCourttoexaminethebasesgivenbythePresidentinissuingProclamationNo.1081.They
wanttheCourttofindortotakejudicialnoticeoftheabsenceofaninsurrectionorrebellionoftheabsenceof
an imminent danger thereof. Petitioners would have this Court dispute and nullify the findings of facts of the
Presidenthimselfinamatterthatispeculiarlyexecutiveinnature.
WhyshouldWehonorthePresident'sfindings?
In cases where the issues are indisputably judicial in nature, the findings of the President are still given utmost
respect and deference. In the matter of the declaration of martial law, a power that is exclusively vested in the
President,maytheCourtdifferwiththefindings?No,becauseasWehavealreadystated,
thevalidreasonforthisexclusivegrantofpoweristhatthePresidentpossessesallthefacilitiestogathertherequireddata
andinformationandhasabroaderperspectivetoproperlyevaluatethem,betterthananyfacilityandperspectivethatthe
Courtcanhave.
AtwhatstateinaninsurrectionorhowseriousandmanifestshouldsubversiveactivitiesbecomebeforetheCourt
decidestheparticularpointwhenmartiallawmaybeproclaimed?Thepetitioners,relyingontheclassicstagesof
governmentaloverthrowasexperiencedbypreWorldWarIIexamples,wouldwaituntilallcivilcourtsareclosed
and the country is in complete chaos. Petitioners do not realize that long before the courts are closed, the
Presidentwouldhavebeenkilledorcapturedandtheenemyirrevocablyentrenchedinpower.Theauthorsofthe
Constitutionneverenvisionedthatthemartiallawpowersocarefullyanddeliberatelyincludedamongthepowers
ofthePresidentwouldbewithhelduntilsuchtimeasitmaynotbeusedatall.
Itismyfirmview,thatthedecisiontoproclaimmartiallawisanexclusivefunctionofthePresident.Ifhefindsthat
invasion,insurrection,orrebellionorimminentdangerofanyofthethreeispresent,suchfindingisconclusiveon
theCourt.Ifhefindsthatpublicsafetyrequirestheentirecountryshouldbeplacedundermartiallaw,thatfinding
isconclusiveontheCourt.Intheexerciseofsuchanemergencypowerintendedforthesupremeandinherent
rightofselfdefenseandselfpreservation,theConstitutioncannotbereadtomeanotherwise.
In(42SCRA448,480)thisCourtstatedthat"intheexerciseofsuchauthority(tosuspendtheprivilegeofthewrit
of),thefunctionoftheCourtismerelytonottothebeyondtheconstitutionallimitsofhisjurisdiction,vested
inhimortodeterminethewisdomofhisact."
Lansangvs.GarciahabeascorpuschecksupplantExecutive,ortoascertainmerelywhetherhehasgonenottoexercise
thepower
Idonotseehow,bothfromthelegalandpracticalpointsofview,theCourtcancheckthePresident'sdecisionto
proclaim martial law. The same may, perhaps, be done as regards a suspension of the privilege of the writ of
althoughIreserveamoredefinitivestatementonthatissuewhenacasesquarelyinpointonthematterisraised
beforeUs.However,martiallawposesentirelydifferentproblems.Aproclamationofmartiallawgoesbeyondthe
suspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritof,whoseeffectsarelargelyremediedwiththereleaseofdetainees.
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Upon proclaiming martial law, the President did not limit himself to ordering the arrest and detention of the
participantsandothershavingahandintheconspiracytoseizepoliticalandstatepower.Undermartiallaw,the
Presidentorderedthetakeoverorcontrolofcommunicationsmedia,publicutilities,andprivatelyownedaircraft
andwatercraft.Foreigntravelwasrestricted.Curfewwasimposedalloverthecountry.Apurgeofundesirable
governmentofficials,throughresignationsorsummaryinvestigations,waseffected.Theentireexecutivebranch
ofgovernmentwasreorganized.Acleanlinessandbeautificationcampaign,withmartiallawsanctionstoenforce
it,wasordered.Thiswasonlythebeginning.
Consequences of Proclamation No. 1081 are many and farreaching. They permeate every aspect and every
activityinthelifeofthepeople.Acourtdecisionisnotneedednorisittheproperplacetoenumeratethem.Most
obvious,ofcourse,arethePresident'sactsoflegislationontheverybroadrangeofsubjectsthatCongressused
tocover.AsearlyasNovember8,1972,thepetitionerspreparedaMemorandumstressingthispoint.
Itmaybepointedoutthatsincemartiallawwasdeclared,thePresidenthasbeenexercisinglegislativepowerthat
islodgedbytheConstitutioninCongress.Agoodnumberofthedecreespromulgatedhavenodirectrelationto
thequellingofthedisorderscausedbythelawlesselements.TheyareaimedatbuildingaNewSociety,butthey
cannotbejustifiedasavalidexerciseofmartialrule.(atpage94)
TheseimplicationsandconsequencesofmartiallawservetobolstermyviewthattheConstitutionneverintended
that this Court could examine and declare invalid the President's initial determination. The Constitution did not
intend that the Court could, in the detached and peaceful aftermath of successful martial law, reach back and
invalidateeverythingdonefromthestart.Thatwouldresultinchaos.
Iam,ofcourse,awareofthe(308U.S.371,374)doctrinewhichthisCourtadoptedin.(27SCRA533,540):ChicotCounty
DrainageDistrictvs.BaxterStateBankMunicipalityofMalabangvs.PangandapunBenito,etal
The Courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found to be
unconstitutional, was not a law that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence
affordingnobasisforthechallengeddecree.(Nortonvs.ShelbyCounty,118U.S.425,442Chicago,I&L.Ry.
Co.vs.Hackett,228U.S.559,566).Itisquiteclear,however,thatsuchbroadstatementsastotheeffectofa
determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to
suchadetermination,isanoperativefactandmayhaveconsequenceswhichcannotjustlybeignored.Thepast
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may
have to be considered in various aspects with respect to particular relations, individual and corporate, and
particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior
determinationsdeemedtohavefinalityandacteduponaccordingly,ofpublicpolicyinthelightofthenatureboth
ofthestatuteandofitspreviousapplication,demandexamination.Thesequestionsareamongthemostdifficult
of those which have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal, and it is manifest from numerous
decisionsthatanallinclusivestatementofaprincipleofabsoluteretroactiveinvaliditycannotbejustified.
And for us to venture into a judicial inquiry on the factual basis of the constitutionality of the martial law
proclamation would be to ignore the wellestablished principle of presidential privilege which exempts the
President from divulging even to the highest court of the land facts which if divulged would endanger national
security. As a matter of fact, in the latest case on this matter which was that filed against President Richard M.
Nixon, although the Supreme Court of the United States ordered the President to produce the tapes of his
conversationwithsomeofhisaidespursuanttoasubpoenaforuseinacriminalprosecutionagainstoneofhis
aides, because the claim that "disclosures of confidential conversation between the President and his close
advisors...wouldbeinconsistentwiththepublicinterest...cannotoutweigh...thelegitimateneedsofthejudicial
process" in a criminal prosecution, the Court, however, made the statement from which we can infer that if
PresidentNixonhadonlyclaimedthatthetapescontain"military,diplomaticorsensitivenationalsecuritysecrets",
itwouldhavesustainedtherefusalofNixontoproducethem.
It may be argued that the actual existence of Proclamation No. 1081 is an operative fact and that its
consequencesshouldnotbeignored.
The operative fact doctrine, however, has no application in this situation where, faced with insurrection and
rebellion,thePresidentproclaimsmartiallaw.EvenassumingthateverysinglememberofthisCourtdoubtsthe
President'sfindings,WehavetoconsiderthattheConstitutionveststhedeterminationinhim.Thestakesinvolved
aresupremeandthedeterminationmustbemadeimmediatelyanddecisively.
ThereisthepossibilitythatthePresidenthasanexaggeratedappreciationofthedangersandhasoveractedwiththeuse
oftheawesomemeasureofmartiallaw.Thefactremains,however,thattheauthorsoftheConstitutionwereawareofthis
possibilityandstillprovidedthatthepowerexclusivelybelongstohim.Itwouldbestretchingtheplainwordsofthe
ConstitutionifweweighourpersonalfindingsagainsttheofficialfindingsofthePresident.Hepossessesallthefacilitiesto
gatherdataandinformationandhasamuchbroaderperspectivetoproperlyevaluatethem.Heisperformingafunction
whichis,ofcourse,requiredbytheConstitutiontobedischargedbythePresident.
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... However, when the privilege depends solely on the broad, undifferentiated claim of public interest in the
confidentiality of such conversations, a confrontation with other values arises. that even the very important
interestinconfidentialityofpresidentialcommunicationsissignificantlydiminishedbyproductionofsuchmaterial
forincamerainspectionwithalltheprotectionthatadistrictcourtwillbeobligedtoprovide.
Absentaclaimofneedtoprotectmilitary,diplomatic,orsensitivenationalsecuritysecrets,wefinditdifficulttoacceptthe
argument
In this case the President challenges a subpoena served on him as a third party requiring the production of
materialsforuseinacriminalprosecutionontheclaimthathehasaprivilegeagainstdisclosureofconfidential
communications.Hedoesnotplacehisclaimofprivilegeonthegroundtheyare.militaryordiplomaticsecrets.As
to these areas of Art. II duties the courts have traditionally shown the utmost deference to presidential
responsibilities. In ., 333 U. S. 103,111 (1948), dealing with presidential authority involving foreign policy
considerations,theCourtsaid:
C.&S.AirLinesvs.WatermanSteamshipCorp
The President, both as Commanderinchief and as the Nation's organ for foreign affairs, has available
intelligenceserviceswhosereportsarenotandoughtnottobepublishedtotheworld.Itwouldbeintolerablethat
courts, without relevant information, should review and perhaps nullify actions of the Executive taken on
informationproperlyheldsecret..at111
Id
In the , 345 U. S. 1 (1952), dealing with a claimant's demand for evidence in a damage case, against the
Government,theCourtsaid:
UnitedStatesvs.Reynolds
Itmaybepossibletosatisfythecourt,fromallthecircumstancesofthecase,thatthereisareasonabledanger
thatcompulsionoftheevidencewillexposemilitarymatterswhich,intheinterestofnationalsecurity,shouldnot
be divulged. When this is the case, the occasion for the privilege is appropriate, and the court should not
jeopardizethesecuritywhichtheprivilegeismeanttoprotectbyinsistinguponanexaminationoftheevidence,
evenbythejudgealone,inchambers.
NocaseoftheCourt,however,hasextendedthishighdegreeofdeferencetoaPresident'sgeneralizedinterest
in confidentiality. Nowhere in the Constitution, as we have noted earlier, is there any explicit reference to a
privilegeofconfidentiality,yettotheextentthisinterestrelatestotheeffectivedischargeofaPresident'spowers,
it is constitutionally based. (United States, Petitioner, vs. Richard M. Nixon, President of the united State et al.
RichardM.Nixon,PresidentoftheUnitedStates,Petitioner,vs.UnitedStatesJuly24,1974Nos.731766and
731834SupremeCourtoftheUnitedStates)
Itisfortheabovereasonsthat,asfarastheproclamationisconcerned,theCourtshouldreverttotherulein(5
Phil. 87) and (91 Phil. 886). The only questions which the judiciary should look into are (1) Did the Constitution
confertheauthoritytosuspendtheprivilegeofthewritofandproclaimmartiallawonthePresident?and(2)Did
the President declare that he is acting under such authority and in conformance with it? The authority being
exclusivelyvestedinthePresident,hisdecisionisfinalandconclusiveupontheCourt.
Barcelonvs.BakerMontenegrovs.Castaedahabeascorpus
Insofar as the President's decision to proclaim martial law is concerned, it is, therefore, my view that under the
Constitution, the Supreme Court has no authority to inquire into the existence of a factual basis for its
proclamation.TheconstitutionalsufficiencyfortheproclamationisproperlyforthePresidentalonetodetermine.
XII
GRANTING THAT PROCLAMATION NO. 1081 IS NOT POLITICAL BUT JUSTICIABLE, IT IS STILL VALID
BECAUSETHEPRESIDENTHASNOTACTEDARBITRARILYINISSUINGIT
ItshouldbenotedthatProclamationNo.1081isnotamereconclusionthatthereisinsurrectionandrebellionin
thecountry.ThePresidentdidnotlimithimselftoacurtandlaconicdeclarationthatonthebasisofhisfindings,
thereisinsurrectionorarebellionandthathehasproclaimedmartiallaw..
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Proclamation No. 1081 specifies in twentysix (26) printed pages the various findings which led to its
promulgation.Theconspiracytooverthrowthegovernment,therapidlyexpandingranksoftheconspirators,the
raising of funds and materials under centralized direction, the maintenance of a rebel army the massive
propaganda campaign, the acts of sabotage and armed insurrection or rebellion, the previous decision of this
Court, the lawlessness and disorder in the country, the violent demonstrations led by Communist fronts, the
armedclashesbetweenrebelsandgovernmenttroops,theactivemoralandmaterialsupportofaforeignpower,
theimportationoffirearmsandwarmaterialbyrebels,thepresenceofawellscheduledprogramofrevolutionary
action, the organization of liquidation squads, the serious disorder in Mindanao and Sulu, the activities of the
Mindanao Independence Movement, the thousands killed and hundreds of thousands of injured or displaced
persons, the inadequacy of simply calling out the aimed forces or suspending the privilege of the writ of , the
alarmingly rapid escalation of rebel or subversive activities, and other evidence of insurrection or rebellion are
specifiedindetailedmanner.
habeascorpus
The findings of the President are given in a positive, detailed, and categorical form. As a matter of fact,
subsequentevents,relatedtotheCourtinaseriesofclassifiedbriefingsmadetoitbytheArmythelastonebeing
onAugust15,1974,confirmtheoverallvalidityofthePresident'sbasis.Thereisconstitutionalsufficiencyforhis
conclusion that martial law be proclaimed. Proclamation No. 1081 does not, therefore, suffer any constitutional
infirmityofarbitrariness,grantingthatthistestcanbeappliedtoit.
Itappearsproper,atthispoint,toelucidatefurtheronthetestofarbitrariness.
TheCourt'sdecisionin(42SCRA448)hasbeeninterpretedand,tomymind,misunderstoodbymanypeopleto
meanthattheCourthadcompletelyreversedand.Thereare,ofcourse,certainstatementsinthedecisionthat
give rise to this conclusion. For instance, the Court stated that the weight of , as precedent, is diluted by two
factors,namely,(a)itreliedheavilyupon(6L.ed.537)involvingtheU.S.President'spowertocalloutthemilitia
and (b) the fact that suspension of the privilege of the writ of was by the American GovernorGeneral, the
representative of the foreign sovereign. The Court stated that in the case it went into the question Did the
GovernorGeneralactinconformancewiththeauthorityvestedinhimbytheCongressoftheUnitedStates?In
otherwords,theCourtstatedthatitmadeanactualdeterminationwhetherornottheChiefExecutivehadacted
inaccordancewithlaw.TheCourtalsoaddedthatintheMontenegrocase,itconsideredthequestionwhetheror
not there really was a rebellion. The Court reviewed American jurisprudence on suspension of the privilege. It
stated that the tenor of the opinions, considered as a whole, strongly suggests the Court's conviction that the
conditions essential for the validity of proclamations or orders were in fact present. It stated that whenever the
American courts took the opposite view it had a backdrop permeated or characterized by the belief that said
conditionswereabsent.
Lansangvs.GarciaBarcelonvs.BakerMontenegrovs.CastaedaBarcelonvs.BakerMartinvs.Motthabeas
corpusBarcelon
Intruth,however,thedecisionindoesnotstatethattheCourtmayconductafullexaminationintothefactswhich
led the President to issue the proclamation. The Court's decision categorically asserts that the examination of
presidentialactsbytheCourtislimitedtoarbitrariness.TheCourtacceptedtheview
Lansangvs.Garcia
...thatjudicialinquiryintothebasisofthequestionedproclamationcangonofurtherthantosatisfytheCourtnot
that tile President's decision is correct and that public safety was endangered by the rebellion and justified the
suspensionofthewrit,butthatinsuspendingthewrit,thePresidentdidnotactarbitrarily.
TheCourtadopted,asthetestofvalidity,thedoctrinein,291U.S.502
Nebbiavs.NewYork
... If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither
arbitrarynordiscriminatory,therequirementsofdueprocessaresatisfied,andjudicialdeterminationtothateffect
rendersacourt...Withthewisdomofthepolicyadopted,withtheadequacyorpracticalityofthelawenactedto
forwardit,thecourtsarebothincompetentandunauthorizedtodeal....
functusoficio
Forpurposesofcomparisonandemphasis,theCourt,in,wentintothejudicialauthoritytoreviewdecisionsof
administrative bodies or agencies. It stated that the reviewing court determines only whether there is some
evidentiary basis for the contested administrative findings and does not undertake quantitative examination of
supportingevidence.Therefore,theCourtstatedthatitinterfereswithanadministrativefindingonlyifthereisno
evidence whatsoever in support thereof and said finding is actually arbitrary, capricious, and obviously
unauthorized.TheCourtruledthatthisapproachofdeferringtothefindingsofadministrativebodiescannoteven
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beappliedinitsaforesaidformtotestthevalidityofanactofCongressoroftheExecutive.Thepresumptionof
validity is of a much higher category. The Court emphasized that the coequality of coordinate branches of the
governmentunderourconstitutionalsystemdemandsthatthetestofvalidityofactsofCongressandofthoseof
theExecutiveshouldbefundamentallythesame.Andthistestisnotcorrectnessbutarbitrariness.
Lansangvs.Garcia
It follows, therefore, that even if I were to subscribe to the view that should not be categorically reversed as
erroneousdoctrine,mydecisionwouldbethesame.Evenunder,martiallawisvalid.
Lansangvs.GarciaLansangvs.Garcia
ThereisnothingarbitraryinthedecisiontopromulgateProclamationNo.1081.Itisnotunconstitutional.
XIII
THECONTINUATION(ANDEVENTUALLIFTING)OFTHESTATEOFMARTIALLAWISAPOLITICALQUESTION
Thecontinuationofthestateofmartiallawandtheresultingcontinuedrestrictionsonindividuallibertiesare,of
course,seriousaspectsofthemainissuewithwhichthisCourtisconcerned.
In fact, this is the more difficult question The President having acted upon an initial and positive finding that
martial law is necessary, may the Court inquire into the bases for its duration or the need for its continued
imposition?
Towardstheendofthisseparateopinion,Ianswertheargumentsofthepetitionersquestioningtheeffectivityand
legality of the new Constitution. It is my unqualified view, as explained later, that this Court in the Ratification
CasesdeclaredthenewConstitutiontobelegallyinforceandeffect.
I have to mention this view, at this juncture, because martial law was proclaimed under the old Constitution.
However,itscontinuationandeventualliftingarenowgovernedbythenewConstitution.
Theexerciseofmartiallawpowermaybelikenedtothejurisdictionofacourt.Acourtmayhavejurisdictionunder
an old law but the jurisdiction may be removed or modified by a new statute. In other words, is the continuing
stateofmartiallawvalidunderthenewConstitution?IsitalsoapoliticalquestionunderthepresentCharter?
ArticleIXofthenewConstitutiononthePrimeMinisterandtheCabinetprovides:
SEC.12.ThePrimeMinistershallbecommanderinchiefofallarmedforcesofthePhilippinesand,wheneverit
becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion,
insurrection, or rebellion. In case of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof, when the
publicsafetyrequiresit,hemaysuspendtheprivilegeofthewritof,orplacethePhilippinesoranypartthereof
undermartiallaw.
habeascorpus
ItshouldbenotedthattheaboveprovisionisaverbatimreiterationofArticleVII,Section10,Paragraph(2)ofthe
oldConstitution.
WhatwastheintentoftheframersinadoptingverbatimtheprovisionfoundintheoldConstitution?
Atthispoint,modestyandprudenceshouldinhibitmefromadvancingmyownviewsastheonlymemberofthis
Tribunalwhowasadelegatetothe1971ConstitutionalConvention.In(77Phil.192),thisCourtstated"The
theoryhasbeenproposedmodestyasidethatthedissentingmembersofthisCourtwhoweredelegatesto
theConstitutionalConventionandwere"coauthorsoftheConstitution""areinabetterpositiontointerpret"that
sameConstitutioninthisparticularlitigation.
Veravs.Avelino
ThereisnodoubtthattheirproperlyrecordedutterancesduringthedebatesandproceedingsoftheConvention
deserveweight,likethoseofanyotherdelegatetherein.Note,however,thattheproceedingsoftheConvention
"are less conclusive of the proper construction of the instrument than are legislative proceedings of the proper
constructionofastatutesinceinthelattercaseitistheintentofthelegislatureweseek,whileintheformerwe
are endeavoring to arrive at the intent of the people through the discussions and deliberations of their
representatives."(WilloughbyontheConstitution,Vol.I,pp.54,55.)
Theirwritings(ofthedelegates)commentingorexplainingthatinstrument,publishedshortlythereafter,may,like
those of Hamilton, Madison and Jay in The Federalist here in the Philippines, the book of Delegate Aruego,
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supra,andofothershavepersuasiveforce.(Op.cit.,p.55.)
Buttheirpersonalopiniononthematteratissueexpressedduringourdeliberationsstandonadifferentfooting:If
based on a "fact" known to them, but not duly established or judicially cognizable, it is immaterial, and their
brethrenarenotexpectedtotaketheirwordforit,totheprejudiceofthepartyadverselyaffected,whohadno
chance of rebuttal. If on a matter of legal hermeneutics, their conclusions may not, simply on account of
membership in the Convention, be a shade better, in the eyes of the law. There is the word "deference" to be
sure.Butdeferenceisacomplimentspontaneouslytobepaidneveratributetobedemanded.
Andifweshould(withoutintendinganydesparagement)comparetheConstitution'senactmenttoadramaonthe
stageorinactuallife,wewouldrealizethattheintelligentspectatorsorreadersoftenknowasmuch,ifnotmore,
about the real meaning, effects or tendencies of the event, or incidents thereof, as some of the actors
themselves,whosometimesbecomesoabsorbedinfulfillingtheiremotionalrolesthatthefailtowatchtheother
scenesortomeditateonthelargeraspectsofthewholeperformance,orwhatisworse,becomesoinfatuated
with their lines as to construe the entire story according to their prejudices or frustrations. Perspective and
disinterestednesshelpcertainlyalotinexaminingactionsandoccurrences."Cometothinkofit,underthetheory
thus proposed, Marshall and Holmes (names venerated by those who have devoted a sizeable portion of their
professional lives to analyzing or solving constitutional problems and developments) were not so authoritative
after all in expounding the United States Constitution because they were not members of the Federal
Conventionthatframedit!(pp.215216)"
I wish to follow the example, however, of my distinguished colleague, (18 SCRA 300) where, with characteristic
humility,hestatedinaconcurringopinion
Mr.JusticeCalixtoO.ZaldivarinPhilippineConstitutionAssociationvs.Mathay
Myopinioninthisregardisbaseduponapersonalknowledgeofhowtheconstitutionalproviso,ArticleVI,Section
14 of the Constitution, which is now in question, became a part of our present Constitution. It was the Second
National Assembly which amended our original Constitution. I was a humble Member of the Second National
Assembly,representingtheprovinceofAntique.
xxxxxxxxx
Istillhavevividrecollectionsoftheimportantpointsbroughtupduringthedeliberationsincaucusoverproposed
amendments and of the agreements arrived at. I remember too the influences that worked, and the pressures
thatwerebroughttobearupontheAssemblymen,intheeffortstobringaboutagreementsonverycontroversial
matters and thus secure the insertion of the desired amendments to the Constitution. The discussions on the
proposed amendments affecting the legislative branch of the government were specially of interest to us then
becausewewereinsomewaypersonallyaffected,asmostofuswereinterestedinrunningforreelection..
It is not my purpose here to impose on anyone my recollections of matters that were brought up during our
caucusesthen,butIonlywishtoemphasizethefactthatmyconcurringopinioninthedecisionofthecasenow
beforeUshasforitsbasismyhonestandbestrecollectionsofwhathadtranspiredorwhathadbeenexpressed,
during the caucuses held by the Members of the Second National Assembly in the deliberations which later
broughtaboutthe1940amendments.
xxxxxxxxx
I have endeavored to make a discourse of facts as I know them, because I sincerely believe that the
interpretation, embodied in the opinion penned by my esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, of the
pertinentprovisionofArticleVI,Section14ofourConstitutionisinconsonancewiththefactsandcircumstances
asIrememberthem,andasIknowthem.AsIhavestatedattheearlypartofthisconcurringopinion,itisnotmy
purposetoimposeonanyonemyrecollectionofwhattranspired,orofwhathadbeendiscussedabout,orofwhat
hadbeenagreedupon,bytheMembersoftheSecondNationalAssemblyduringthedeliberationswhichbrought
aboutthe1940amendmentstoourConstitution.Myperceptionandmymemoryareasfrailasthoseofanyother
humanbeing,andImayhaveincurredmyselfinerror.ItjusthappenedthatthefactsandthecircumstancesthatI
have herein narrated, as I remember them, have engendered in my mind an opinion, nay a conviction, which
dovetailswiththeopinionofmyillustriouscolleaguethathaspennedtheopinionforthemajorityoftheCourtin
thiscase.(atpp.316,317and327328)
ChairmanViceChairman:
Justice Zaldivar's recollections on the intent of the Second National Assembly meeting as a constituent body in
1940aremosthelpful.TherearenoexistingrecordsofthedeliberationsontheArticleVI,Section14amendment
tothe1935Constitution.Theamendmentdiscussionsanddebateswhichtookplaceduringlegislativecaucuses
areunrecordedandthisCourthasJusticeZaldivartothankforhisrecollections.
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ItisinthisspiritthatIventuremyownrecollections.Iamalsofairlycertainthatwhentheproceedingsofthe1971
Constitutional Convention are published, my observations will be sustained. When the last Constitutional
ConventionapprovedtheNewConstitutiononNovember29,1972,thedelegateswereawareofpreconvention
proposals to subject the exercise of the power by the Executive to judicial inquiry. Studies on the wisdom of
having a joint exercise of the power by the Executive and the Legislature were before the delegates. (UP Law
Center Constitution Revision Project, 1970, pp. 104108) There were ever constitutional law scholars who
questioned the power altogether and wanted it removed. They claimed that whether or not martial law is in the
Constitution, it will be declared when absolutely necessary and therefore, anticipating its use through a
constitutionalprovisionservesnousefulpurpose.
ThedelegateswerefullyawareoftheGovernmentstandontheandmartiallawprovision.Thedecisionwasfairly
recent. The powers of the Chief Executive were extensively debated. The delegation knew that in the ,
proceedings,theSolicitorGeneralhadconsistentlyandforcefullyarguedthatandwerecorrectinterpretationsof
the President's power to suspend the privilege of the writ of or place the Philippines or any part thereof under
martiallaw.
habeascorpusLansangvs.GarciaLansangvs.GarciaBarcelonvs.BakerMontenegrovs.Castaedahabeascorpus
More significant is the fact that when the new Constitution was finalized and the draft corrected and approved
priortosubmissiontothepeople,wewerealreadyunderastateofmartiallaw.Thepetitionershadbeenarrested
and various petitions filed. In fact, petitioner E. Voltaire Garcia II included in his petition the argument that his
detention pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 deprived his constituency of their representation in the
Constitutional Convention. The delegates were aware that Proclamation No. 1081 was challenged before this
CourtandthattheSolicitorGeneralsanswertoallthepetitionswasinvariablythedoctrineofpoliticalquestion.
IfitwastheintentoftheConstitutionalConventiontosubjectthePrimeMinister'sexerciseofthepowertojudicial
inquiry and/or control, the provision on martial law would have been accordingly amended. In fact, during the
deliberationsoftheCommitteesonCivilandPoliticalRightsandExecutivePower,therewereproposalsthatthe
power to proclaim martial law be subjected to control, confirmation, or reversal by Congress or the Supreme
Court, but the Convention did not accept any of these proposals and decided to simply reiterate the earlier
provision.
ItwouldbeenlighteningforustoperusethepertinentportionsoftheproceedingsoftheCommitteeonCiviland
PoliticalRightsandExecutivePower,andIquote:
RepublicofthePhilippines1971CONSTITUTIONALCONVENTIONManila
COMMITTEESONCIVILANDPOLITICALRIGHTSANDEXECUTIVEPOWER
MINUTESOFTHEMEETING(JointPublicHearing)
WEDNESDAY,SEPTEMBER8,1971SessionHall,ManilaHotel
COMMITTEEONCIVILANDPOLITICALRIGHTS
PRESENT
DelegateDelaSernaDelegateAbueg
Members:
15.
Delegate
Zafra
7.
Delegate
Laggui
14. Delegate
Siguion
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Reyna
6.
Delegate
Guzman
13.
Delegate
SantosO.
5.Delegate
Gunigundo
12.
Delegate
ReyesC.
4.Delegate
CalderonJ.
11.
Delegate
Pepito
3.
Delegate,
Aruego
10.
Delegate
Padua
2.
Delegate
Abad
G.R.No.L35546
1.
9.
DelegateDelgate
Abalos Opinion
E.
4.
Delegate
Castillo
Guest:
JusticeEnriqueFernando
OPENINGOFTHEMEETING
1.At9:50a.m.ChairmanVictorDelaSernacalledthemeetingtoorder.
2.UponcertificationoftheSecretary,the,Chairannouncedtheexistenceofa.
quorum
3.TheChairthenannouncedthattheCommitteehasfurnishedthebodyresolutionsregardingthesuspensionof
theprivilegeoftheof.TheChairmentionedsixResolutionsNumbered176,260,531,1415,239and2394.
habeascorpus
4.TheChairfurthersaidthattheresolutionscanbegroupedintothreeschoolsofthoughtthefirst,refersto
theabsoluteprohibitionagainstsuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritofbyanyauthorityinanyandalleventsthe
secondsupportsthetheorythatitmaybesuspendedbythePresidentwiththeconcurrenceofCongressorthe
SupremeCourtandthethird,referstotheremovalofthepowertosuspendfromthePresidentandtransferthe
sametotheSupremeCourt.
habeascorpus
5.TheChairthenintroducedtothememberstheguestspeaker,JusticeEnriqueFernandooftheSupremeCourt
ofthePhilippines.HeexpressedfewwordsofwelcometotheJusticeinbehalfofthetwoCommitteesconducting
thepublichearing.
6.JusticeFernandostartedhisremarksbyclarifyingthathewouldonlyanswerquestionsthatwillnotconflictwith
hisroleasJusticeoftheSupremeCourt,sincetherewasapendingcasebeforethesaidCourtwherethePower
ofthePresidenttosuspendthewritofisplacedatissue.Hesaidthatheconsideredtheprivilegeofthewritofas
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themostimportanthumanright.HeisoftheviewthatitmightbepreferrableiftheBillofRightsmakeitclearand
explicitthatatnotimeandundernocircumstancesshouldtheprivilegeofthewritbesuspended.Heclarifiedthat
even if this power to suspend the privilege of the writ were removed from the President, he still has enough
powers to prevent rebellion, sedition, insurrection or imminent danger thereof because of his power to call the
armedforcesincasetheneedforitarises.
7.TheChairaskedthefirstquestiontoJusticeFernando.BecausetheJusticesendthatitwasnotnecessaryto
grantthePresidentthepowertosuspendthewritsinceCongresscanalwayspassalawthatwouldlengthenthe
periodofdetentionofprisoners,theChairaskedifitwouldnotbeverycumbersomeforCongresstoenactsucha
lawintimesofnationalemergency.
8. Justice Fernando, in answer to the Chair's query, said that Congress can pass a law to that effect without a
nationalemergency.
9.InanswertoquestionpropoundedbyDelegateCeniza,JusticeFernandosaidin1951intheHernandezcase
he expressed the opinion that even if the privilege of the writ were suspended, the right to bail could still be
availedof.Headmitted,however,thatuptonowthereisnoclearcutrulingonthematter.Healsosaidthatthe
President,shouldnothavethesolepowertodeclareMartialLaw.
10.DelegateMendiolaalsoaskedJusticeFernandowhowoulddeterminethecircumstancesthatwouldwarrant
the detention of prisoners for a longer period than what is now provided under the Revised Penal Code. The
Justiceansweredthatiftheprisonerisheldforcrimesagainstpublicorder,thentheordinaryrulesofcriminallaw
willgovern.Thearrestingauthorities,incollaborationwiththeFiscal,willdeterminesaidcircumstances.
11. Delegate Laggui asked Justice Fernando whether he would still deny the power to suspend the writ to the
PresidentiftheConventionwritesintotheConstitutionsafeguardsagainstabuseofsaidpower.TheJusticesaid
hewouldstillsaythatthepowerbedeniedthePresidentbecauseheconsiderstheprivilegeofthewritofasthe
mostimportanthumanright.
habeascorpus
12.DelegateGunigundointerpellatedtheJusticeandaskedwhetherthelatterwouldfavorpreventivedetentionof
politicalprisonersorpoliticaloffenders.TheJusticesaidweshouldfollowtheConstitutionalProvisionsregarding
probablecause,andtherightsoftheaccusedshouldalwaysberespected.
13. Delegate Santillan asked Justice Fernando whether he would favor the proposal to delete the phrase
"imminent danger thereof" and to limit the suspension of the writ from 10 to 15 days unless Congress or the
Supreme Court would extend the same. Justice Fernando said, since he was for the denial of the power to
suspendthewrit,anythinglessthanthatwouldnotbeinconsonancewithhisstand.
14. Delegate Zafra asked Justice Fernando if it would not be dangerous for a President to declare Martial Law
becauseifhedid,themilitarymighttakeoverthegovernmentandtoppledownthePresidentandevenCongress,
therebyestablishingmilitarydictatorship.JusticeFernandosaidthatthedangerexists.
15.DelegateExmundointerpellatedJusticeFernandoandaskedthelatterwhatthePresidentofthePhilippines
should have done instead of suspending the privilege of the writ of , considering the chaos and turmoil that
prevailedpriortothesuspension.TheJusticesaidthatsinceitisthedutyofthePresidenttofaithfullyexecutethe
laws,heshouldandhecouldhavecalledoutthearmedforcestosuppressinsurrection,invasion,andrebellion.
habeascorpus
16.OtherslikeDelegatesMastura,Adil,Guzman,Pepito,Veloso,Bengzon,Leviste(O.),andCenizainterpellated
JusticeFernando.TheChairthenthankedtheJusticeforhisenlighteningspeech.Heexpressedthehopethatat
some future time the Justice would again favor the Committee with his appearance so that the members could
propoundmorequestions.
ADJOURNMENTOFMEETING
17.Themeetingwasadjournedat12noon.
PREPAREDBY:HONORABLEMACARIOCAMELLO
Typedby:CynthiaB.ArrazolaProofreadby:E.deOcampo/V.M.Umil
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MINUTESOFTHEJOINTMEETINGNo.WEDNESDAY,SEPTEMBER15,1971
CIVILANDPOLITICALRIGHTS
PRESENT
Members:
7.
Delegate
Marino
14.DelegateZosa
OPENINGOFMEETING
1.At9:30a.m.,ChairmanVictorDelaSernacalledthemeetingtoorderanddeclaredtheexistenceofaworking
quorum.
2.ChairmanGerardoS.EspinastatedthatitwasajointhearingoftheCommitteeonCivilandPoliticalRightsand
theCommitteeonExecutivePowers.
3.TheChairconfirmedthestatementofChairmanEspinaandfurtherstatedthatitwasthesecondjointhearing
ofthetwoCommittees,andintroducedSenatorJoseW.Diokno,guestspeakerforthehearing.
4.SenatorDioknothankedthejointBodyforgivinghimanopportunitytodiscusswiththemthepowertosuspend
theprivilegeofthewritofandthepowertodeclaremartiallaw.Tobeabletoresolvetheproblem,hepropounded
thequestions:(1)shouldthePresidenthavethepowertosuspendtheprivilegeofthewritof,(2)assuminghe
was given the power, under what circumstances should he be allowed to exercise it, and (3) what safeguards
shouldbeplacedupontheexerciseofthatpower.Hesurmisedthatinhisopinion,iftheonlylegalbasisforthe
grantofthepoweristobidetimetobeabletobringpersonstocourtforittodecideonthematter,assuchtimeis
alwaysavailabletothegovernment,hesawnoreasoninsuspendingtheprivilegeofthewritof,sincethesame
objectivecanbeattainedbytheimpositionofmartiallaw,whichisnotagraverstepandisnotgravelyabusedin
thepracticalpointofviewthatnoPresidentwilldeclaremartiallawunlesshecanhavethearmedforcesagree
withhimthatthereisactualinvasion,rebellionorinsurrection.HestatedthatthepresentConstitutiononlyallowed
thesuspensionoftheprivilegeincasesofextremeemergencyaffectingtheverysovereigntyoftheState,which
in his belief, is only in cages of invasion, rebellion or insurrection. He did not agree that there should be a
safeguardprovidedpriortotheissuanceoftheproclamationsuspendingtheprivilegeofthewrit,butratherafter
the writ has been suspended, by requiring either the courts or Congress to pass upon the necessity of the
suspension of the writ. He dissented with the idea that where should be a definite time period for its validity,
becauseitisdifficulttodeterminewhatshouldbeanadequateperiod,however,theSupremecourtorCongress
could always be required to act within a definite period on the validity of the suspension which he considered,
alreadyapropersafeguard.
Headdedfurtherthatthepowertoplaceanypartofthenationalterritoryundermartiallawshouldbe,limitedto
casesonlyofactualinvasion,rebellionorinsurrection.However,hestronglyfavoredthedeletionoftheprovision
"onimminentdanger",whichhestressed,isanexcuseforadictatorialPresidenttodeclaremartiallawonthethat
thereisimminentdangerwhenthereisnone.Thereisapossibility,hesaid,thatthearmedforceswillbebroken
up,inthesensethatonegroupmayfavorthePresidentandtheothermayrefusetoallowthemselvestobeused
whenthereisactuallyno"imminentdanger",sothatinsteadoftheirhelpingpreservepeaceandorder,itwould
provideanoccasionforbringingaboutrevolutions.
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5.TheChairaskedtheSenatorifthePresidentshoulddeclaremartiallawwhereimminentdangeractuallyexists
andthecivilauthoritiesarestillfunctioning.HefurtherqualifiedthatisitnottheoftheConstitutioninthephrase
"martiallaw"thatthecivilauthoritiescalluponthemilitaryauthoritiestohelpthemorisitacompleteandarbitrary
substitutionofauthoritybythemilitary.
5.1 Senator Diokno replied that the President's action in his personal opinion, is arbitrary and illegal, but who
could stop him from doing that. Even the Supreme Court is reluctant to act because it has the army to reckon
with.Heconstruedthatmartiallawcouldbelegallyexercisedonlyinplaceswhereactualfightingexistsandthe
civilauthoritiesarenolongerexercisingauthority,inwhichcasethemilitarycansupplantthecivilauthorities.He
addedthatitisalsopossibletodeclarealimitedmartiallawincertainareaswherethemilitarymayimposecurfew
andtemporarydetentionofpersonschargedofcausingandparticipatinginchaoticsituations.
6.ChairmanEspinarecognizedDelegateBritanicowhohadthefirstoptiontointerpellatetheSenator.
6.1DelegateBritanicowantedtoknowfromtheSenatorwhether,inhisopinion,thepowertosuspendthewritbe
altogetherremovedfromthePresident,andthatintheeventthispowerisretained,howshoulditbeexercisedby
thePresident?.
6.2SenatorDioknorepliedthatifthispowerisretaineditshouldheexercisedbythePresidentalonebutsubject
toreviewbyeitherCongressortheParliamentaryBodythatmayeventuallybeadopted.
6.3DelegateBritanicowantedtheviewoftheSenatorifhewasagreeabletohavethePresidentsharethepower
with the Vice President, Senate majority and minority floor leaders, Senate President, Justices of the Supreme
Court,theComelecChairmanandotherheadsoftheconstitutionalorganizations
6.4Senator Diokno replied that he is averse to sharing powers because it could not be done expediently. The
Senatorremindedthegroupthatasageneralrule,thePresidentandthePresidentoftheSenatebelongtothe
samepartyandeventhejusticesoftheSupremeCourtfallunderthesamesituation,anditwouldthenstillbethe
Presidentwhowilldecide.
7.TheChaircalledonDelegateOlmedoonhisreservationtoaskthenextquestion.
7.1DelegateOlmedowantedtoclarifyifthereisanytechnicaldistinctionbetweensuspensionoftheprivilegeof
thewritofandthewrititself.
habeascorpus
7.2SenatorDioknorepliedthatthewrititselfistheorderofthecourttothepersonhavingcustodyofthesubject
toproducehimincourt,andthatthesubjecthastheprivilegetopostbailpendingthefilingofthecaseagainst
him, if he is to be heard for an offense. He cited the decision of the Confederate Authority which says that the
privilegeofthewritreferstocriminalarrestsinwhichthepersonsarrestedhavetheprivilegetobereleasedon
bail,whichistheprivilegethatissuspended.
7.3DelegateOlmedoaskedwhethertheSenator'sstandontheabolitionofthepowertosuspendtheprivilegeof
thewritorasanalternative,thesuspensionbeexercisedwiththeparticipationofotheragencies,isbecauseof
theantiadministrationgroupclamoringforitsabolitionfromtheconstitutionalprovisions?.
7.4SenatorDioknoreiteratedhisstatementthatitishispersonalbeliefthatmartiallawisabettermeasurethan
the suspension of the privilege of the writ, which the President claims to have exercised to dismantle the
communist apparatus in the country. Whether this is justified or not remains an issue. Assuming that the
Communistsarearrestednow,newleaderswillcomeupandtakeovercommand,andthesenewonesarenot
yetknowntothemilitaryauthoritiesandsothesamecommunisticsituationcontinuestoexistandthecyclegoes
onunresolved.
7.5 As a last question, Delegate Olmedo sought to be clarified on the alternative view of the Senator that of
retainingthepowerbutitsexercisebewiththeconcurrenceofCongressandtheSupremeCourt.
7.6TheSenatorreiteratedthatheisfortheabolitionofthepower,butiftheConstitutionalConventionbelievesit
necessary to retain it, then its exercise by the executive must be subject to review and reversal, if need be, by
CongressandtheSupremeCourt.Hemaintainedthattheexerciseofthepowertosuspendtheprivilegeofthe
writisdeterminedbytwofactors:(1)legalityand,(2)wisdom.TheSupremeCourtshalldeterminethelegalityand
Congress determines the wisdom of the President's exercise of the power, and it is the Convention that can
resolvethisproblem.
8.ChairmanEspinacalledonDelegateBarrera,however,requestedtheMemberstolimittheirquestionstoonly
twotoalloweverybodytheopportunitytoquestiontheguest.
8.1DelegateBarrerastatedthattheSenatorisforthediscardingoftheconstitutionalprovisiononthepowerto
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suspendtheprivilegeofthewritofbutisfortherightofanorganofgovernmenttodeclaremartiallawbutlimited
toanactualexistenceofinvasion,rebellionorinsurrection,ThiswasconfirmedbytheSenator.DelegateBarrera
inquired whether the Senator agrees or not to the fact that in places where actual fighting or actual invasion,
rebellionorinsurrectionexists,declarationofmartiallawisunnecessarysincethecommanderinchiefhasthefull
responsibilityofexercisingeverystepnecessarytoprotectandpreservethewelfareofthenation.
habeascorpus
8.2SenatorDioknorepliedthatwhileitistruethatthepowertotakeallthenstepstopreservepeaceandorder
andprotectthepeople,isinherentpowerofsovereignty,yetitwouldcertainlybesafertoprovidethispowerof
formal declaration to prevent individual arbitrary exercise of power by military commanders in the field. He
stressedtheneedforaspecificconstitutionalprovisionwhichmustbeclearlystatedanddefinedastotheextent
oftheexerciseofsuchpowers.
9. Delegate Padua (C.) disclosed that he is an author of a resolution removing powers of the President to
suspend the privilege of the writ of as well as to declare martial law, and his point of concern lies in the
subsequentgrantofemergencypowersthatarecomplimentarytoexerciseofmartiallawbythePresidentnow
given in the present Constitution. He asked the Senator whether the criterion in the exercise of martial law to
actualinvasiononlythatis,removetheterms"rebellionandinsurrection"aspartofthecriteria,woulddiminish
the presidential power excesses and abuses. Delegate Padua cited the view of Justice Fernando that people
have the right to rebel, and this would tend to justify exclusion of rebellion and insurrection as prerequisites to
imposemartiallaw.
habeascorpus
9.1 Senator Diokno opined that the complimentary emergency powers of the President was intended by the
ConstitutiontoallowthePresidenttolegislateintheabsenceofCongressbutqualifiedthisstatementbyrevealing
thathehasnotmadedeeperstudiesalongthisparticularpoint.Healsostatedthatthestatehastohavepowerto
protectitselffromanyformofchangeotherthanthroughconstitutionalprocessesandthisconceptissharednot
onlybydemocraticbutbyanyformofgovernmentinexistence.InanswertoDelegatePadua,hesuggestedto
define what the word rebellion in the provision mean, and the term "insurrection" should be removed since
insurrectionisasmallrebellion,whichdoesnotmeritdeclarationofmartiallaw.Thisprovisioncouldwellfitinthe
BillofRightsinsteadas"theStateoranyportionthereof,maybeplacedundermartiallawonlyincaseofactual
invasionorrebellion,whenthepublicsafetysorequires."Theneliminatetheprovisiongrantingpowertosuspend
the privilege of the writ of and place the power to declare martial law among the powers of the President in
Section10,ArticleVII,perhaps.
habeascorpus
10.DelegatePatsoughtclarificationastothestandoftheSenatoronthePresidentbeingalreadyCommander
InChiefoftheArmedForces,andisthencapableofquellingrebellion,thereforethepowerofmartiallawneed
not be specified in the Constitution or that if it has to be, then it has to be in aid to civilian authorities only. He
furthersoughttheSenator'sopinionuponwhomtolodgethepowertosuspendtheprivilegeofthewritofaswell
as power to declare martial law, since he is a proponent of a form of government that would have both a
Presidentasheadofstateandprimeministerasheadofgovernment.
habeascorpus
10.1The Senator clarified his statement to Delegate Barrera that to declare martial law is a recognized power
inherenttothesovereigntyofthestateandso,neednotbementionedintheConstitution,acaseinpointisthe
United States Constitution. In reply to the second query, he stressed that, to him, there should not be such
powerslodgedonanyoneanywhere.Butiftherehastobe,thePrimeMinister,sincethePresidentisgenerallya
ceremonialofficer,andwouldnotbekeptabreastofficiallyoneverycircumstanceandhappeningofthedayinthe
country.
11.DelegateSiguionReynapointedoutthatfromthediscussions,itwouldbesafetoassumethattheonlything
thatmatterstoanexecutivewhenheisallowedtosuspendtheprivilegeofthewritornot,inhisequivalentrightto
arrestanddetainpeoplebeyondthestatutoryrequirement.HeinquiredwhethertheSenatorentertainsthesame
thinkingthattheprovisionhasoutliveditsusefulnesssincethisprovisionwasestablishedduringthedayswhen
thirddegreewasacceptedasameansofgettingatthetruthandconfessionsfrompeople.Intheabsenceofthird
degree methods, there is nothing to be gained in detaining people unless by the psychological idea that a
detaineewouldsoftentoconfession,whichisunlikely.
11.1 The Senator explained that the objective of suspending the privilege of the writ is to hold people
incommunicado citing as an example, the Philippines, if it is threatened by a Red Chinese invasion and the
authorities suspected Mr. Chan, Mr. Tan, etc. to be spies, then suspension of the privilege of the writ would
enable the government to take immediate hold of Mr. Chan, Mr. Tan and company and keep them under
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detention without right to bail. This would put them out of circulation and disable their operations. The justifying
reason therefore, lies in the need of the Armed Forces for essential time to devote on the fight against the
invaders or rebels instead of consuming time to formulate charges against these detainees and the filing of
chargesagainstthesedetaineescanbeputasideuntilsuchtimewhentheinvasionorrebellionisundercontrol.
Inshort,itistoenabletheArmedForcestobuyessentialtime.Hereiteratedthatpowertosuspendtheprivilege
of the writ of and power to declare martial law are justified only on actual invasion or rebellion, and he still
maintainedthattheformercaseisunnecessary.
habeascorpus
11.2DelegateSiguionReynafurtherqueriedtheSenatorhowtheStatecanmeetthesecurityprobleminacase
ofimminentinvasionandthepowertosuspendtheprivilegeofthewritisnolongerprovidedfor,takingasacase
inpoint,thePhilippinesituationduringtheperiodpriortotheJapanesewarwhenJapanesespieswereallover
thecountrypreparingthegroundsforitsinvasioninJapan.HowcanthePresidentorthePrimeMinistermeetthe
problemifhehasnoPowertosuspendtheprivilegeofthewrit.
11.3TheSenatorrepliedthatinsituationslikethis,theSenateshouldundertakesurveillanceworkasisdonein
theU.S.Thesuspectsarekeptundersurveillanceandwhenenoughevidenceisacquiredtheauthoritiesspring
thetraponthemandbringthemtocourtorincasethesuspectisfoundoperatingwithinanareawhereanactual
fighting is on, then the commander of the Armed Forces in the area, by virtue of his inherent military power to
restrictmovementofciviliansintheareacanapprehendandtakethemtocustodyuntilthefightisoverwithout
theneedforsuspendingtheprivilegeofthewrit.Itispartofmilitarypower.Hesuggestedasanalternativethata
degreeofflexibilityinthemanneroflegislationcanberesortedto.Citingasanexamplethelegislationonmatters
ofcrimesagainstthesecurityofthestate,detentionperiodpriortofilingthecaseincourtcanbeenlarged.There
arelawsatpresentfailingunderthiscategory.Wiretappingisunlawfulundernormalconditionsbutitisallowedin
casesinvolvingsecurityandrebellion.
12.InthefollowupclarificationbyChairmanDelaSerna,theattentionoftheSenatorwasdirectedbacktohis
former statement that pending the privilege of the writ only allows the government to hold the detainee
incommunicadobutthedetaineehasotherrightsastherighttocommunicatewithrelatives.
12.1 Senator Diokno agreed that the detainee is still entitled to other rights as the right to be represented by
counsel,butoncedetained,heissubjecttorestrictionsandcontrolbythejailer.
12.2DelegateDelaSernaaskedifthereisadifferenceinthetreatmentofdetaineeswhentheprivilegeofthe
writ is suspended and detainees arrested when the privilege is not suspended: Whether to hold a person
incommunicado, a jailer is under instruction to impose certain degree of restrictions to this person which is not
truewiththeordinaryprisoners.
12.3SenatorDioknorepliedthattherewasreallynodistinctionordifferencewritteninthelawbutthejailer,inthe
exerciseofhisduty,hasacertaindegreeofunwrittenpoweroverhisdetainees.TheSenatorhoweverdisclosed
whathappenedrecentlytopeopledetainedwhichheexperiencedastheircounsel.Thelawyerswereallowedto
talk to the detainees after a number of days had lapsed, and in fact after their statements were already taken,
after the process of interrogations were terminated. He revealed that he was informed that the detainees were
never harmed nor subject to physical pressure but the process of interrogation continued for hours and hours,
andevenatanunholyhourofmidnighttheywereawakenedforfurtherinterrogation.Methodsdesignedtoinflict
mentalandphysicaltorturetotireoutthedetainees.
13. The Chair recognized Delegates Molina and Mendiola who jointly engaged the Senator into a series of
interpellationsregardingtheSenator'spersonalopinionsandviewsontheincumbentPresidentialexerciseofhis
powers(Proclamation889and889A)suspendingtheprivilegeofthewritof.
habeascorpus
14.DelegateMutucaskedtheSenatorifthereisnodifferencebetweentheandthecases.
Barcelonvs.theBakerMontenegrovs.Castaeda
14.1TheSenatorrepliedthattherewasadifferenceandexplained:(1)Intheformercase,thesuspensionofthe
privilege of the writ should not have been done but it was done only upon joint hearing by the Philippine
CommissionandtheGovernorGeneraltograntaction.Whileinthelattercase,thesuspensionwastheexclusive
actionofthePresidentofthePhilippines.(2)Thesituationintheformercaseweresuchthatattheverybeginning
ourcourtsweremannedbyAmericanJuristsintendedtobelateronmannedbyFilipinoJurists.Thisbeingso,the
courts found it hard to rule and make a doctrine. Such action could be interpreted as tantamount to allowing
FilipinoJuriststooverruleanAmericanGovernorGeneralandbyimplication,overrulethePresidentoftheU.S.
sinceundertheJonesLaw,theprivilegeofthewritcanbesuspendedbythePresidentoftheU.S.Thiscanbe
heldlateron(today)thattheFilipinoSupremeCourtcouldreviewthefindingsofthePresidentoftheU.S.,which
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isimpossibleundertherelationbetweenacolonyanditscolonizer,and(3)thatthestandardofmoralityandtruth
wereobservedwithgreaterfidelityatthattimethantheyaretoday.
14.2DelegateMutucsoughtclarificationintheeventthattheSupremeCourtrulesthattheantisubversionlawis
notaBillofAttaindertheSenatorbeggedoff.Hestatedthathepreferrednottodiscussthedetailsandmeritsof
hispositioninthiscase,butstronglyurgedtheConventiontoconsiderrewritingtheprovisionsonthefreedomof
association.
15.TheChairwantedtoknowwhethersuspensionofthewritandtherighttobailisnotsuspended.
15.1TheSenatorstatedthatinhisopiniontherighttobailpriortofilingthecaseincourtissuspended.Whenthe
caseisfiledincourt,thecustodyofthepersonaccusedgoesfromtheexecutivetothejudiciary.Onafollowup
questionbytheChairmanseekingclarificationforthedistinctionpointedoutbytheSenatorthatrighttobailprior
to filing the case in court is suspended, the Senator explained that the provision of the privileged of the writ
consistsoftherightofapersontobereleasedifthearrestisfoundillegalbycourt,orthedetentionisarbitraryor
inabsenceofaprimafacieevidenceagainsttheperson,soiftheprivilegeofthewritissuspended,itfollowsthat
alltheotherrightsarealsosuspended.
15.2TheChairsoughttheviewoftheSenatorontheopinionofbothSecretaryAbadSantosandSolicitorAntonio
that during suspension of the privilege of the writ, an order of warrant of arrest is necessary. Senator Diokno
agreedwiththisopinion.TheChairpointedoutthatif,astheSenatorsaid,thepurposeoftheprivilegeofthewrit
is to question the legality of arrest and detention, it could be so, even if there is a valid warrant of arrest. This
wouldseemtopointoutthattheissuanceofthewarrantofarrestisunnecessary.TheSenatorreplied,NO,and
pointed out that if no case can be produced against a person detained, the arrest is unlawful and the arresting
officer is subject to prosecution. The suspension of the privilege of the writ merely makes it impossible for the
courts to order the release of the detainee. The Senator agreed substantially with the observation of the Chair
thatthislonglegalprocessrequiredtobefolloweddefeatstheverypurposeofthesuspensionoftheprivilegeof
the writ, and stated that this is the reason the executive and the military authorities resort to illegal shortcuts in
takingpeopleintocustody.Manyofthedetaineestodaywerenotissuedlegalwarrants,butwerejustinvitedto
the military headquarters. Because of these observations cited, the Senator urged the joint Body to review and
rewritetheprovisionsontheissuanceofwarrantsofarrest.
16.DelegateTupaz(D.)engagedtheSenatorinaseriesofclarificatoryquestionswhichdelvedonpointsalready
discussed by the Senator in previous interpellations by Delegates Mutuc, Barrera, Reyes, Laggui and Siguion
Reyna.TheSenatorhoweverreiteratedhisstatementthatheisfortheretentionoftheexerciseofmartiallaw,not
thatitislessharmful,butthatitislesssubjecttoabusethanthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewrit.
17. Delegate Gunigundo's interpellations were on the subject of effectivity and validity of Presidential
ProclamationsasProclamationNo.889and889A.TheSenatoremphasizedthattheeffectivityofproclamations
hinges on the time it was made public, not necessarily though, that it be published in the Official Gazette, nor
copiesofthecontentsbefurnishedthemetropolitannewspapersforpublication.
18. Senator Diokno categorically answered Delegate Sanchez that he was suggesting a proposal to totally
remove the power to suspend the writ of in the proposed Constitution, since being silent about it will allow
Congress or the President to exercise its power of such procedure. In answer to Delegate Calderon (J.), he
reiteratedthatthesuspensionofthewritofcanbeexercisedwithorwithoutbeingprovidedforintheConstitution.
19.DelegateAruegowasinformedbySenatorDioknothatthosedetainedcanonlyapplyforbailifacaseisfiled
againstadetaineeincourt,sowhatisdoneistofileapetitionfor,whichincludestherighttobail,itthecaseis
bailable.
habeascorpus
20. Delegate Velez explained that he was recommending two alternative proposals to the Executive Power
Committee:1)topreventforeverthesuspensionoftheprivilege,or2)toputsafeguards,meaningthePresident
maysuspenditbutonlyinactualcasesofinvasionorrebellionforaspecificperiodoftimeinspecificareaswhere
publicsafetyrequiresit,withtheconcurrenceoftwothirdsvoteofthemembersofCongress,ifinsession,andif
not,itwillbesubjecttotheautomaticreviewbytheSupremeCourt.
20.1 Senator Diokno was in favor of Delegate Velez' first proposal, however, in the event the thinking of the
Convention does not agree, the Senator did not want to limit the President, or whoever exercises the power to
suspend, for a specific period, because it will be inflexible and meaningless. He was not agreeable to a
concurrencebyCongressbecausehedoesnotwanttotiethehandsofthePresidentinofemergency,sinceitis
veryhardtomusteraquoruminbothhousesofCongress.However,hewasforitsreviewbytheSupremeCourt.
Hewasfortheimmediateproclamation,butalimitoftimeshouldbesetwithinwhich,thereviewshouldbemade.
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20.2DelegateBarrerainsistedthattherighttoprotectitselfisaninherentsovereignrightofanyState,sothatfor
anyorganizationofgovernmenttoexercisethosemeansofprotection(declarationofmartiallawandsuspension
oftheprivilegeofthewrit)shouldbesostatedintheConstitution,andthenecessarysafeguardsprovidedfor.
21.Delegates Barrera and Siguion Reyna engaged the Senator in a discussion criticizing the actuations of the
incumbentPresidentinconnectionwiththesuspensionofthewritof.
habeascorpus
22.TheChairthankedSenatorDioknoforhiselucidationandparticipationinthediscussionsofthetopicsforthe
day,andadjournedthejointpublichearingat12:10p.m.
PREPAREDANDEDITEDBY:(Sgd.)HON.CELSOP.TABUENA
ATTESTEDBY:
(Sgd.)VICTORDELASERNAChairmanCommitteeonCivilandPoliticalRights
Typedby:AliceG.Aquino
Proofreadby:SalomeOrtiz/VivencioGopole
KnowingtheGovernment'sstandandthePresident'saction,theConstitutionalConventiondecidedtoretainthe
martiallawpowerverbatiminthenewConstitution.Theframersnotonlyratifiedthevalidityoftheexistingstateof
martiallawbutreaffirmedthePresident'sinterpretationasthecorrectmeaningoftheconstitutionalprovisionfor
future occasion requiring its exercise. The political character of a martial law proclamation with its continuation
wasthenconfirmedbytheConstitutionConvention.
ThepoliticalcharacterofcontinuedmartiallawisalsosustainedbytheparliamentarysystemunderthenewCharter.The
powertodeclaremartiallawisvestedexclusivelyinthePrimeMinisterbyArticleIX,Section12.Followingestablished
precedents,suchavestingofpowerissupposedtomeanthatitsexerciseistotheexclusionofallotherswhomaywantto
shareinthepower.Inpractice,however,thiswillnolongerbetrue.
The 1973 Constitution joined together the Executive and the Legislative departments of the government, which
weredistinctlyseparatefromeachotherunderthe1935Constitution.TheNewCharterprovides:"Thelegislative
powershallbevestedinaNationalAssembly."(ArticleVIII,Sec.1)"TheExecutivepowershallbeexercisedby
thePrimeMinisterwiththeassistanceoftheCabinet."(ArticleIX,Sec.1)"ThePrimeMinistershallbeelectedby
a majority from among themselves." "(Article IX, Sec. 3) "The Prime Minister shall appoint the Members of the
CabinetwhoshallbetheheadsofministriesatleastamajorityofwhomshallcomefromtheNationalAssembly.
MembersoftheCabinetmayberemovedatthediscretionofthePrimeMinister."(ArticleIX,Sec.4).
Thus,wenowhaveaParliamentarysystemofgovernmentundertheNewCharter.Anessentialfeaturethereofis
thedirectresponsibilityofthePrimeMinisterandthemembersofhisCabinettotheNationalAssembly,forthey
hold their positions only for as long as they enjoy the confidence of the Assembly. More accurately, Article VIII,
Sec.13(1)providesforthewithdrawalofconfidencethroughtheelectionofasuccessororanewPrimeMinister
byamajorityvoteofallmembersoftheNationalAssembly.
APrimeMinisterunderthenewChartermustalwaystakeintoaccountthedesiresoftheNationalAssemblywhen
he makes important decisions. As a matter of fact, he and the majority of his cabinet are also members of the
NationalAssembly.Infact,theyaretheleadersofthepredominantpartyinthelegislature.Theycontrollegislative
policy.ThePrimeMinisterisresponsibletotheNationalAssemblyandmustexecuteitswillontheonehandand
he is its political leader and helps shape that will on the other. Grave public issues will be handled by the
ExecutiveandtheLegislatureactingtogether.
UnderthenewConstitution,martiallawwillbeajointresponsibilityofthetwopoliticaldepartments(executiveand
legislative)evenifitsformalproclamationisvestedsolelyinthePrimeMinister.
BeforeIcouldreleasethisopinion,Iwasabletogetthe"TranscriptoftheProceedingsofthe166manSpecial
Committee1MeetingNo.1,October24,1972"whichfullysustainsmyview,andIquote:
TRANSCRIPT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE 166MAN SPECIAL COMMITTEE MEETING NO. 1
OCTOBER24,1972
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DELEGATETUPAZ(A.):Section4
PAGE88VOL.XVINO.8
THE PRIME MINISTER SHALL BE THE COMMANDERINCHIEF OF ALL ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES AND, WHENEVER IT BECOMES NECESSARY, HE MAY CALL OUT SUCH ARMED FORCES TO
PREVENT OR SUPPRESS LAWLESS VIOLENCE, INVASION, INSURRECTION, OR REBELLION. IN CASE OF
INVASION, INSURRECTION, OR REBELLION, OR IMMINENT DANGER THEREOF, WHEN THE PUBLIC
SAFELYREQUIRESIT,HEMAYSUSPENDTHEPRIVILEGEOFTHEWRITOF,ORPLACETHEPHILIPPINES
ORANYPARTTHEREOFUNDERMARTIALLAW.
HABEASCORPUS
ThisprovisionisanexactcopyofaprovisioninthepresentConstitution.ThisprovisioncomplementsSection15,
ArticleIVontheBillofRightsofthisdraft.MayI,therefore,moveforitsapproval,Mr.Chairman?
CHAIRMANDEGUZMAN(A):Anyobservationorcomment?Yes,GentlemanfromBatangas?
DELEGATELEVISTE(O.):Thankyou,Mr.Chairman.Wenotice,YourHonor,thatinthesetwosections,Section
15 of the Bill of Rights and Section 12 of Article IX, we are, in a way of speaking, remedying the seeming
discrepancybetweensimilarprovisionsinthepresentConstitution.Bothprovisionswillnowcontainthephrase"or
incaseofimminentdangerthereof".Withsuchachange,Ibelievethatnoconflictastothetrueintentwillarisein
thefuture.Butallowme,YourHonor,torecall,briefly,ourrecentjurisprudenceonthematterofthedeclarationof
martiallawandofthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritof.YourHonorwillrecallthatundertheJonesAct,
theGovernorGeneralofthePhilippineswasgiventhepowertosuspendtheprivilegeofthewritofandtodeclare
martial law. When such power was questioned in court, the Supreme Court came out with the decision, in the
caseof,thatthefindingsoftheChiefExecutiveontheexistenceofthegroundsforthedeclarationofmartiallaw
orthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritofareconclusiveandmaynotbeinquiredintobythecourts.When
the Philippine Commonwealth was established under the 1935 Constitution, the President thereof was likewise
giventhepowertosuspendtheprivilegeofthewritofandtoproclaimordeclaremartiallawforanyofthecauses
enumeratedinthepertinentprovisions.Sometimeinthe1950's,thenPresidentQuirinosuspendedtheprivilege
ofthewritof.Whenacasearose,thatoftheSupremeCourtaffirmeditsstandin,thattheassessmentbythe
Chief Executive of the existence of the cause or causes giving rise to the proclamation of martial law or the
suspensionofthewritofisconclusiveandmaynotbecontestedinthecourts.Recently,however,onlyalittleless
thanayearago,whenPresidentMarcossuspendedtheprivilegeofthewritof,theSupremeCourtruled,inthe
case of and other companion cases, that the existence of insurrection, rebellion, invasion, or imminent danger
thereof, may be properly inquired into by the courts. Now, I would like to pose before this body, whether this
Conventionshouldnowaffirmthelatestdoctrineorwhetherweshouldreverttotheoldtheoryanddoctrineinthe
twocasesofand.
habeascorpushabeascorpusBarcelonvs.Bakerhabeascorpus
13.
Delegate
Yap
6.
Delegate
Luna
12.
Delegate
Trillana
5.
Delegate
Liwag
11.
Delegate
Sinco
4.
Delegate
Gaudiel
10.
Delegate
Serrano
3.
Delegate
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Duavit
9.
Delegate
Santillan
2.
Delegate
Davide
G.R.No.L35546
1.
8. Delegate
DelegateNepomuceno
Araneta
S.
11.
Delegate
Mutuc
22.DelegateYiguez
ABSENT
ViceChairman:
DelegateExmundo
Members:
21.
Delegate
Velez
10.
Delegate
Juaban
20.
Delegate
Tocao
9.
Delegate
Gonzales
19.
Delegate
Sanchez
8. Delegate
GarciaL.M.
18. Delegate
Sambolawan
7.
Delegate
FloresA.
17.
Delegate
Saguin
6.
Delegate
Corpus
16.
Delegate
Sagadal
5.
Delegate
Cabal
15.
Delegate
Ramos
4.
Delegate
Britanico
14.
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Delegate
Piit
3.
Delegate
Barrera
13.
Delegate
Olmedo
2.
Delegate
Astilla
G.R.No.L35546
1.
12.
DelegateDelegate
Alano Nuguid
7. Delegate
Fernandez
14.DelegateVelosoI.
EXECUTIVEPOWER
PRESENT
Chairman:
DelegateEspina
Members:
13.
Delegate
Sumulong
6.
Delegate
Falgui
12.
Delegate
Sevilia
5.
Delegate
DelaPaz
11.
Delegate
Santillan
4.
Delegate
Ceniza
10.
Delegate
Purisima
3.
Delegate
Catubig
9.
Delegate
Mastura
2.
Delegate
Badelles
Members:
1.
8.
DelegateDelegate
AldeguerGuiao
5.Delegate
GarciaE.
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10.DelegateTupazD.
G.R.No.L35546
Guest:
SenatorJoseW.Diokno
ABSENT
9.
Delegate
Seares.
4.
Delegate
DePio
8.
Delegate
Rama.
3.
Delegate
Claver
7.
Delegate
Molina
2.
Delegate
Azcua
1.
6.
DelegateDelegate
Adil
Garcia
L.
8.
Delegate
Mendiola
NonMembers:
habeascorpushabeascorpusMontenegrovs.Castaeda,Barcelonvs.BakerhabeascorpushabeascorpusLansangvs.
GarciaBarcelonvs.BakerMontenegrovs.Castaeda
DELEGATETUPAZ(A.):InviewofthefactthatChairmandeGuzmanisalsotheChairmanofSubcouncilIIon
Citizens'Rightswhichconductedanexhaustivestudyonthismatterofmartiallaw,mayIrequestthathebethe
onetoanswerqueriesonthispoint?
CHAIRMANDEGUZMAN(A.):Inthatcase,mayIrequestDelegateTupaztoactasChairmaninthemeantime?
(Atthispoint,ChairmanDeGuzmanyieldedtheChairtoDelegateAntonioTupaz)
DELEGATEDEGUZMAN(A.):Iampersonallyinfavorofabandoningthedoctrinelaiddowninthecaseof,andI
would recommend such a view to this Committee, and to the Convention as a whole. At this very moment, the
Solicitor General, in representation of President Marcos is urging the Supreme Court that such a doctrine be
abandoned and that we revert to the old theory laid down in the cases mentioned by Your Honor. Indeed, our
courts, especially the Supreme Court, where these cases are invariably taken up, are illequipped to make
findingsontheexistenceofrebellion,insurrection,orlawlessness.
Lansangvs.Garcia
DELEGATE LEVISTE (O.): But is not Your Honor aware that there are a number of resolutions filed in the
ConventionthattheChiefExecutivemaysuspendtheprivilegeofthewritoforproclaimanddeclaremartiallaw
onlyforalimitedperiodand/orwiththeconcurrenceoftheLegislature?
habeascorpus
DELEGATE DE GUZMAN (A.): Yes, Your Honor, but we are not bound. This Committee is not bound by those
resolutions.Asalreadyagreeduponwhenthe166ManSpecialCommitteewascreated,thatCommitteeofwhich
weareapartwasmerelyadvisedtotakeintoconsiderationsuchresolutions.Weshouldbearinmindalsothat
we are adopting the parliamentary system where there is more, rather than less, fusion of legislative and
executive powers. We are adopting, Your Honor, the concept and principle of an executive more directly and
immediatelyresponsibletotheLegislaturesothattheexercisebytheChiefExecutiveofanyofhispowerswillbe
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DELEGATELEVISTE(O.):Butmypoint,YourHonor,istoemphasizethefactthatthefilingofthoseresolutions
requiring even the concurrence of the National Assembly for the valid exercise by the Prime Minister of these
extraordinaryconstitutionalprerogativeindicatesthatthereisasentimentamongtheDelegatestofurtherrestrict,
ratherthanexpand,thepowers.AndIwouldsaythatthedecisionoftheSupremeCourtinwhichrepudiatedthe
doctrine earlier laid down in Baker and Castaeda lends support to that sentiment.. If we are to interpret the
provision under consideration in the way Your Honor would want it interpreted, in the sense that the factual
findingsoftheChiefExecutiveforthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritofor the declaration of martial law
would be conclusive insofar as the Judicial Department is concerned, then we are retrogressing and, in effect,
goingagainstthesentimenttofurtherrestricttheexerciseofthesegreatconstitutionalpowers.
DELEGATE DE GUZMAN (A.): I can go along with Your Honor's arguments if, as I have already stated, this
Convention opted for the presidential form of government. But as we have already opted and chosen the
parliamentarysystem,IthinkfurtherrestrictionsonthepowersoftheChiefExecutivewillnolongerbejustified.It
may be trite to repeat here, but I repeat them nevertheless, the arguments in favor of a parliamentary form of
government:thatthissystemisforastrongexecutive,butonewhoisimmediatelyandinstantlyanswerabletohis
peers at all times. Thus, should a Prime Minister suspend the privilege of the writ of or declare martial law
arbitrarily or, even perhaps, irrationally, I don't think that there can be any better or more immediate check on
such arbitrary and irrational exercise of power than the Parliament itself. The courts cannot pretend to be in a
betterpositionthantheParliamentinthisregard.FortheParliamentontheveryday,orperhapsevenonthevery
hour, that the Prime Minister proclaims martial law or suspends the privilege of the writ of may file a motion to
deposehimandshouldthismotionbesuccessful,thentheprevailingpartywithitsPrimeMinisterwilljustissue
anotherproclamationrestoringnormalcyandorder.
DELEGATELEVISTE(O.):Thankyou,YourHonor.Forthemoment,Mr.Chairman,Ihavenomorequestionsto
ask.
PRESIDINGOFFICERTUPAZ(A.):Arethereanyfurthercommentsorinterpellations?
DELEGATEQUIRINO:Justonequestion,Mr.Chairman,inconnectionwiththepointraisedbyDelegateLeviste.
PRESIDINGOFFICERTUPAZ(A.):Youmayproceed.
DELEGATE QUIRINO: Before I ask my question, Your Honor, let me state my position clearly lest I be
misunderstood. I am asking this question not because I disagree with Your Honor's position but only for the
purpose of enriching this debate with exchanges of views for future researchers and scholars. Now, if, as Your
Honorputsit,thedecisionofthePrimeMinisterontheexistenceofgroundsjustifyingthedeclarationofmartial
laworthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritofwouldnolongerbeopenedtojudicialscrutiny,wouldthatnot
enablethePrimeMinistertoabusehispowers?
habeascorpus
DELEGATEDEGUZMAN(A.):YourHonorwasnotlistening.Ijuststatedthatthereisamoreimmediatecheckon
the part of the Parliament, and aside from this practical check, it must be understood that an act of the Chief
Executivesuspendingtheprivilegeofthewritoforproclaimingmartiallawispoliticalact,theremedymustalsobe
political,inapoliticalforum,beinParliamentordirectlybeforeourpeople.Anditmustbestatedthatthereisno
powerwhichmaynotbeabused.Ithink,YourHonor,weshouldonceandforallagreeastothenatureofthis
power we are investing in the Chief Executive. Once and for all, we should agree that this power is eminently
politicalandexecutiveinnature.TheJudiciary,Isubmit,isnotthebest,muchlessisitthemostpracticalagency,
topossess,toexercise,ortolimitthispower,theneedforwhichcannotbedenied.
habeascorpus
DELEGATEQUIRINO:Well,YourHonor,Iamnotalawyer,soIhopeyouwillpardonmeifcannotfullyappreciate
whatyouaretalkingabout.Because,tome,anactispoliticalifitisdonebyapolitician.That'sall,Mr.Chairman.
PRESIDING OFFICER TUPAZ (A.): Let's be serious, please. All right, are there further interpretations or
comments?Yes,DelegateOrtiz,whatisitthatyouwanttoask?
DELEGATE ORTIZ (R.): Well, Mr. Chairman, this is not a question but just additional observations. It is
unfortunatereallythatthedoctrinefirstlaiddowninandaffirmedmorethanhalfacenturylaterinwasreversed
bytheSupremeCourtin.Isayitisunfortunatebecausemorethananyoneelse,onlythePresidentisinthebest
positiontoevaluateandtheexistenceofthecauseswhichwouldwarranttheexerciseofthisconstitutionalpower.
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Asitwere,thePrimeMinisteristheheadoftheExecutiveDepartment.Morethanthat,heistheCommanderin
ChiefofallthearmedforcesofthePhilippines.Hehas,therefore,alltheresourcesandfacilitiesnotavailableto
any other official of the government, much less to the Supreme Court, to make authoritative findings and
assessmentsofthethreatstonationalsecurity.ButevenintheLansangcase,IwouldsaythattheCourthadto
relyonthefindingsoftheExecutiveDepartment.IhavehereacopyofthedecisionoftheSupremeCourtinthat
case,andIwouldsaythattheCourthadtorelyonthefindingsoftheExecutiveDepartment.Ihavehereacopy
ofthedecisionoftheSupremeCourtinthatcase,andIwouldliketoquoteaportionthereof.Inthisdecision,the
SupremeCourtstated,andIquote:
Barcelonvs.BakerMontenegrovs.CastaedaLansangvs.Garcia
Intheyear1969,theNPAhadaccordingtotherecordsoftheDepartmentofNationalDefenseconducted
raids,resortedtokidnappingandtakenpartinotherviolentincidents,summingover230,inwhichitinflicted404
casualties and, in turn, suffered 243 losses. In 1970, its record of violent incidents was about the same but the
NPAcasualtiesmorethandoubled.
I wish to call the attention of the Members of this Committee to the phrase appearing in this portion of court's
decision, namely, "according to the records of the Department of National Defense". This phrase is, to me,
significant in the sense that even the Supreme Court itself had to rely on the records of an agency of the
ExecutiveDepartment,whichonlyprovesor,atleastindicatesanadmissiononthepartoftheCourtthatbyitself,
itisnotinapositiontomakeitsownfactualfindingsonthegroundsjustifyingthesuspensionoftheprivilegeof
the writ of in the Lansang case. In short, even in the Lansang case where the Supreme Court repudiated the
conclusiveness of executive findings on facts to justify the exercise of the power, the same court, nonetheless,
hadtoresorttosuchfindingsmadebyanarmoftheExecutiveDepartment.IfImayfurtheradd,Iwouldliketo
saythat,tomyrecollection,duringthathearingwhentheSupremecourtreceivedthisevidence,orperhapswe
maycallthempiecesofinformation,fromthemilitary,whichinformationwasclassified,therewereobjectionson
thepartofsomecounselwhowereexcludedfromthehearing,totheeffectthattheyshouldalsobeaffordedthe
opportunityofhearingsuchinformation.Allofthese,ofcourse,merelyshowtheimpracticabilityonthepartofany
court,beittheSupremeCourtoralowercourt,toreceiveevidencewhichis,perhaps,notevenacceptableunder
theRulesofCourtand,thereafter,todetermineforitselfwhethersuchevidenceorinformationislegallysufficient
forthePresidentorthePrimeMinistertoactupon.WearethereforehereabandoningtheLansangdoctrine.
habeascorpus
SOMEDELEGATES:Noobjection!Noobjection!
DELEGATEADIL:So,itisthentheunderstandingofthisCommittee,andItakeittobeitsposition,thatwhenthe
PrimeMinistersuspendstheprivilegeofthewritofordeclaresmartiallaw,thefindingsbythePrimeMinisteron
thecausesthatjustifysuchsuspensionorproclamationareconclusiveandmaynot,therefore,beinquiredintoby
thecourts.
habeascorpus
DELEGATE DE GUZMAN (A.): May not be inquired into by the courts or by anyone, and the Chief Executive is
fullyresponsibleforhisacts.Thecourts,ofcourse,arepowerlesstotakeremediesagainstanyarbitraryactsof
theChiefExecutive,butsucharbitraryact,iftherebeany,mayhecheckedbythepoliticalbranchordepartment
ofthegovernmentand,ultimately,bythepeoplethemselves.
DELEGATELEVISTE(O.):Ifthatisourunderstanding,YourHonor,whydon'tweputithere,inblackandwhite,
thatthefindingsofthePrimeMinisterontheexistenceofthegroundsforthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthe
writofortheproclamationofmartiallawareconclusiveuponthecourts?
habeascorpus
PRESIDINGOFFICERTUPAZ(A.):YourHonor,IsupposeyouareawarethatweareheredraftingaConstitution
andnotannotatinganexistingone.Ifwearetoincludeinthisdocumenteveryintentandinterpretationwehave
oneachprovision,IcannotimaginethekindofbulkofsuchConstitutionwhichweshallsubmittoourpeople.
DELEGATELEVISTE(O.):Imadethatsuggestion,YourHonor,becauseIwanttoleavenodoubtonourposition
regardingthispoint.
PRESIDINGOFFICERTUPAZ(A.):Well,Ithinktherecordsofourdeliberationsheresufficetoerasethatdoubt.
DELEGATE LEVISTE (O.): Now, Mr. Chairman, if I may go to another point, I would like to inquire whether this
provisiononthepowersoftheChiefExecutiveorthePrimeMinisterconcerningthedeclarationofmartiallawis
limited to the quelling of the suppression of rebellion, insurrection, invasion or lawlessness, or whether such a
powerincludesinittheestablishmentofaneworderofthings,anewsociety.Isaythis,YourHonor,becauseon
the evening President Marcos announced the proclamation of martial law, he underscored his action by saying
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thatheproclaimedmartiallawinorderaccordingtohim,"tosavetheRepublicandformaNewSociety".
PRESIDINGOFFICERTUPAZ(A.):DelegateDeGuzmanwillpleaseanswerthat.
DELEGATEDEGUZMAN(A.):Thequestion,YourHonor,bringstotheforethenatureandconceptofmartiallaw.
As it is understood by recognized authorities on the subject, martial law rests upon the doctrine of paramount
necessity.Thecontrollingconsideration,YourHonor,isnecessity.Thecrucialconsiderationistheveryexistence
oftheState,theveryexistenceoftheConstitutionandthelawsuponwhichdependtherightsofthecitizens,and
theconditionofpeaceandordersobasictothecontinuedenjoymentofsuchrights.Therefore,fromthisviewof
the nature of martial law, the power is to be exercised not only for the more immediate object of quelling the
disturbance or meeting a public peril which, in the first place, caused the declaration of martial law, but also to
preventtherecurrenceoftheverycauseswhichnecessitatedthedeclarationofmartiallaw.Thus,YourHonor,I
believethatwhenPresidentMarcos,tocitethedomesticexperience,declaredthatheproclaimedMartiallawto
savetheRepublicandtoformaNewSociety,hewasstatingthefullcoursewhichmartiallawmusthavetotakein
order to achieve its rational end. Because in the particular case of the Philippine situation, I agree with the
Presidentthatitisnotenoughthatwebeabletoquelltherebellionandthelawlessness,butthatweshouldalso
beabletoeliminatethemanyillsandevilsinsocietywhichhave,inthefirstplace,bredandabettedtherebellion
andthelawlessness.
DELEGATEADIL:Itseems,YourHonor,thatwearerevolutionizingthetraditionalconceptofmartiallawwhichis
commonly understood as a weapon to combat lawlessness and rebellion through the use of the military
authorities.Ifmyunderstandingiscorrect,YourHonor,martiallawisessentiallythesubstitutionofmilitarypower
for civilian authorities in areas where such civilian authorities are unable to discharge their functions due to the
disturbedpeaceandorderconditionstherein.Butwithyourexplanation,YourHonor,itseemsthatthemartiallaw
administrator,evenifhehasinthemeantimesucceededinquellingtheimmediatethreatstothesecurityofthe
state,couldtakemeasuresnolongerintheformofmilitaryoperationsbutessentiallyandprincipallyofthenature
ofameliorativesocialaction.
DELEGATEDEGUZMAN(A.):HisHonoriscorrectwhenhesaidthatweareabandoningthenarrow,traditional
and classic concept of martial law. But we are abandoning the same only to humanize it. For Your Honor will
recallthattheoldconceptofmartiallawisthatthelawofthecampisthelawoftheland,whichwearenotready
toaccept,andPresidentMarcos,aware,asheis,thattheFilipinopeoplewillnotcountenanceanysuppressive
andunjustaction,rightlyseeksnotonlytoimmediatelyquellandbreakthebackoftherebelelementsbuttoform
aNewSociety,tocreateanewatmosphere,whichwillnotbeanaturalhabitatofdiscontent.Statedotherwise,
theconceptofmartiallaw,asnowbeingpracticed,isnotonlytorestorepeaceandorderinthestreetsandinthe
towns but to remedy the social and political environments in such a way that discontent will not once more be
renewed.
DELEGATE ORTIZ (R.): I can feel from the discussion, Mr. Chairman, that we are having difficulty in trying to
ascertainthescopeandlimitationsofmartiallaw.Tomymind,Mr.Chairman,itisconstitutionallyimpossiblefor
ustoplaceinthisgreatdocument,inblackandwhite,thelimitsandtheextentofmartiallaw.Weareframinga
Constitutionandnotastatuteandunlikeastatute,aConstitutionmustlimititselftoprovidingbasicconceptsand
policieswithoutgoingintodetails.IhaveheardfromsomeoftheDelegatesheretheirconcernthatwemightbe,
by this provision and the interpretations being given to it, departing from the traditional concept of martial law.
Conceptsaremereconcepts,Mr.Chairman,butconcepts,likeprinciples,mustbetestedbytheirapplicationto
existingconditions,whetherthoseconceptsarecontainedinstatutesorinaConstitution.Referringspecificallyto
the exercise of this power by President Marcos, doubts have been expressed in some quarters, whether in
declaring martial law he could exercise legislative and judicial powers. I would want to emphasize that the
circumstances which provoked the President in declaring martial law may be quantified. In fact, it is completely
different from a case of invasion where the threat to national security comes from the outside. The martial law
declared by the President was occasioned by the acts of rebellion, subversion, lawlessness and chaos that are
widespread in the country. Their origin, therefore, is internal. There was no threat from without, but only from
within. But these acts of lawlessness, rebellion, and subversion are mere manifestations of more serious
upheavalsthatbesetthedeepestcoreofoursocialorder.Ifweshalllimitandconstrictmartiallawtoitstraditional
concept,inthesensethatthemilitarywillbemerelycalledupontodischargecivilianfunctionsinareaswherethe
civil functionaries are not in a position to perform their normal duties or, better still, to quell lawlessness and
restorepeaceandorder,thenmartiallawwouldbeameretemporarypalliativeandweshallbehelplessifbound
bytheoldmaximthatmartiallawisthepubliclawofmilitarynecessity,thatnecessitycallsitforth,thatnecessity
justifies its existence, and necessity measures the extent and degrees to which it may be employed. My point
here,YourHonor,isthatbeyondmartialnecessityliesthegraverproblemofsolvingthemaladieswhich,inthe
firstplace,broughtabouttheconditionswhichprecipitatedtheexerciseofhismartialauthority,willbelimitedto
merelytakingamilitarymeasuretoquelltherebellionandeliminatinglawlessnessinthecountryandleavehim
withnomeanstocreateanenduringconditionofpeaceandorder,thenweshallhavefailedinprovidinginthis
Constitutionthebasicphilosophyofmartiallawwhich,Iamsure,weareembodyinginitforthegreatpurposeof
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preservingtheState.IsaythatthepreservationoftheStateisnotlimitedmerelytoeliminatingthethreatsthat
immediatelyconfrontit.Morethanthat,themeasuretopreservetheStatemustgodeeperintotherootcausesof
thesocialdisorderthatendangerthegeneralsafety.
DELEGATEDEGUZMAN(A.):Ineednotaddmore,Mr.Chairman,totheveryconvincingremarksofmygood
friendandcolleague,RelegateOrtiz.AndItakeit,Mr.Chairman,thatisalsothepositionofthisCommittee.
PRESIDINGOFFICERTUPAZ(A.):Yes,alsoofthisCommittee.
DELEGATE ADIL: Just one more question, Mr. Chairman, if the distinguished Delegate from La Union would
oblige.
DELEGATE ADIL: When martial law is proclaimed, Your Honor, would it mean that the Constitution, which
authorizessuchproclamation,issetasideorthatatleastsomeprovisionsoftheConstitutionaresuspended?
DELEGATEDEGUZMAN(A.):TheConstitutionisnotsetaside,buttheoperationofsameofitsprovisionsmust,
of necessity, be restricted, if not suspended, because their continuance is inconsistent with the proclamation of
martiallaw.Forinstance,somecivillibertieswillhavetobesuspendedupontheproclamationofmartiallaw,not
becausewedonotvaluethem,butsimplybecauseitisimpossibletoimplementthesecivillibertieshandinhand
with the effective and successful exercise and implementation of martial powers. There are certain individual
rights which must be restricted and curtailed because their exercise and enjoyment would negate the
implementation of martial authority. The preservation of the State and its Constitution stands paramount over
certainindividualrightsandfreedom.Asitwere,theConstitutionprovidesmartiallawasitsweaponforsurvival,
andwhentheoccasionariseswhensuchisatstake,prudencerequiresthatcertainindividualrightsmusthaveto
be sacrificed temporarily. For indeed, the destruction of the Constitution would mean the destruction of all the
rightsthatflowfromit.
DELEGATE ADIL: Does Your Honor mean to say that when martial law is declared and I, for instance, am
detained by the military authorities, I cannot avail of the normal judicial processes to obtain my liberty and
DELEGATEDEGUZMAN(A.):IfIamnotmistaken,YourHonor,youarereferringtotheprivilegeofthewritof.
habeascorpus
DELEGATEDEGUZMAN(A.):Inthatcase,YourHonor,Itakeitthatwhenmartiallawisproclaimed,theprivilege
of the writ of is ipso facto suspended and, therefore, if you are apprehended and detained by the military
authorities,moreso,whenyourapprehensionanddetentionwereforanoffenseagainstthesecurityoftheState,
then you cannot invoke the privilege of the writ of and ask the courts to order your temporary release. The
privilegeofthewritof,likesomeotherindividualrights,musthavetoyieldtothegreaterneedofpreservingthe
State.Here,wehavetomakeachoicebetweentwovalues,andIsaythatintimesofgreatperil,whenthevery
safetyofthewholenationandthisConstitutionisatstake,wehavetoelectforthegreaterone.For,asIhave
said, individual rights assume meaning and importance only when their exercise could be guaranteed by the
State, and such guaranty cannot definitely be had unless the State is in a position to assert and enforce its
authority.
DELEGATEADIL:SincemartiallawwasdeclaredbyPresidentMarcoslastSeptember21,1972,andannounced
onSeptember23,1972,thePresidenthasbeenissuingdecreeswhichareinthenatureofstatutes,regulating,
astheydo,variousandnumerousnormsofconductofboththeprivateandthepublicsectors.Wouldyousay,
YourHonor,thatsuchexerciseoflegislativepowersbythePresidentiswithinhismartiallawauthority?
DELEGATEDEGUZMAN(A.):Certainly,andthatisthepositionofthisCommittee.Asmartiallawadministrator
andbyvirtueofhispositionasCommanderinChiefoftheArmedForces,thePresidentcouldexerciselegislative
and,ifImayadd,somejudicialpowerstomeetthemartialsituation.TheChiefExecutivemustnotbeharmstrung
orlimitedtohistraditionalpowersasChiefExecutive.Whenmartiallawisdeclared,thedeclarationgivesriseto
thebirthofpowers,notstrictlyexecutiveincharacter,butnonethelessnecessaryandincidenttotheassumption
ofmartiallawauthoritytotheendthattheStatemaybesafe.
DELEGATEADIL:IamnotatallquestioningtheconstitutionalityofthePresident'sassumptionofpowerswhich
arenotstrictlyexecutiveincharacter.Indeed,Icanconcedethatwhenmartiallawisdeclared,thePresidentcan
exercise certain judicial and legislative powers which are essential to or which have to do with the quelling of
rebellion, insurrection, imminent danger thereof, or meeting an invasion. What appears disturbing to me, and
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whichIwantYourHonortoconvincemefurther,istheexerciseandassumptionbythePresidentorbythePrime
Minister of powers, either legislative or judicial in character, which have nothing to do with the conditions of
rebellion,insurrection,invasionorimminentdangerthereof.Tobemorespecific,YourHonor,andtocitetoyou
anexample,IhaveinmindthedecreeissuedbythePresidentproclaiminganationwidelandreformordeclaring
landreformthroughoutthePhilippines.Isupposeyouwillagreewithme,YourHonor,thatsuchadecree,orany
similar decree for that matter, has nothing to do with the invasion, insurrection, rebellion or imminent danger
thereof.Mypoint,YourHonor,isthatthismeasurebasicallyhasnothingtodowiththerestorationofpeaceand
orderorthequellingofrebellionorinsurrection.HowcouldwevalidlysaythatthePresident'sassumptionofsuch
powersisjustifiedbytheproclamationofmartiallaw?
DELEGATEDEGUZMAN(A.):AsIhaverepeatedlystated,YourHonor,wehavenowtoabandonthetraditional
concept of martial law as it is understood in some foreign textbooks. We have to look at martial law not as an
immutable principle, Rather, we must view it in the light of our contemporary experience and not in isolation
thereof. The quelling of rebellion or lawlessness or, in other words, the restoration of peace and order may
admittedly be said to be the immediate objective of martial law, but that is to beg the question. For how could
therereallybeanenduringpeaceandorderiftheverycauseswhichspawnedtheconditionswhichnecessitated
theexerciseofmartialpowersarenotremedied?Youciteasanexamplethedecreeonlandreform.YourHonor
willhavetoadmitthatoneofthemajorcausesofsocialunrestamongpeasantryinoursocietyisthedeplorable
treatment society has given to our peasants. As early as the 1930's, the peasants have been agitating for
agrarian reforms to the extent that during the time of President Quirino they almost succeeded in overthrowing
thegovernmentbyforce.Werewetoadoptthetraditionalconceptofmartiallaw,wewouldbeconfinedtomerely
putting down one peasant uprising after another, leaving unsolved the maladies that in the main brought forth
those uprisings. If we are really to establish an enduring condition of peace and order and assure through the
agesthestabilityofourConstitutionandtheRepublic,Isaythatmartiallaw,beingtheultimateweaponofsurvival
provided for in the Constitution, must penetrate deeper and seek to alleviate and cure the ills and the seething
furiesdeepinthebowelsofthesocialstructure.Inaveryrealsense,therefore,thereisaprofoundrelationship
betweentheexercisebythemartiallawadministratoroflegislativeandjudicialpowersandtheultimateobjective
ofmartiallaw.AndImayaddthatintheultimateanalysis,theonlyknownlimitationtomartiallawpowersisthe
convenience of the martial law administrator and the judgment and verdict of the people and, of course, the
verdictofhistoryitself.
DELEGATE LEVISTE (O.): Your Honor, just for purpose of discussion, may I know from you whether there has
DELEGATEDEGUZMAN(A.):Iamgladthatyouaskedthatquestion,YourHonor,becauseitseemsthatweare
oftheimpressionthatsinceitsincorporationintothe1935Constitution,themartiallawprovisionhasneverbeen
availed of by the President. I recall, Your Honor, that during the Japanese occupation, President Laurel had
occasion to declare martial law, and I recall that when President Laurel declared martial law, he also assumed
legislativeandjudicialpowers.Wemust,ofcourse,realizethatduringthetimeofPresidentLaurel,thethreatsto
national security which precipitated the declaration came from the outside. The threats therefore, were not
internalinoriginandcharacterasthosewhichpromptedPresidentMarcostoissuehishistoricproclamation.If,in
caseaswhathappenedduringthetimeofPresidentLaurelthedeclarationofmartiallawnecessitatedthe
exerciseoflegislativepowersbythemartiallawadministrator,Isaythatgreaternecessitycallsforththeexercise
ofthatpowerwhenthethreatstonationalsecurityareposednotbyinvadersbutbytherebelliousandseditious
elements,bothoftheleftandright,fromwithin.Isaythatbecauseeveryrebellion,whetherinthiscountryorin
other foreign countries, is usually the product of social unrest and dissatisfaction with the established order.
Rebellionsortheactsofrebellionareusuallyprecededbylongsufferingofthosewhoultimatelychoosetorisein
arms against the government. A rebellion is not born overnight. It is the result of an accumulation of social
sufferingsonthepartoftherebelsuntiltheycannolongerstandthosesufferingstothepointthat,likeavolcano,
it must sooner erupt. In this context, the stamping out of rebellion must not be the main and only objective of
martiallaw.TheMartiallawadministratorshould,nay,must,takestepstoremedythecrisesthatliebehindthe
rebelliousmovement,evenifintheprocess,heshouldexerciselegislativeandjudicialpowers.Forwhatbenefit
woulditbeafterhavingputdownarebellionthroughtheexerciseofmartialpowerifanotherrebellionisagainin
the offing because the root causes which propelled the movement are ever present? One might succeed in
capturingtherebelleadersandtheirfollowers,imprisonthemforlifeor,betterstill,killinthefield,butsomeday
newleaderswillpickupthetorchandthetatteredbannersandleadanothermovement.Greatcausesofevery
humanundertakingdonotusuallydiewiththemenbehindthosecauses.Unlesstherootcausesarethemselves
eliminated,therewillbearesurgenceofanotherrebellionand,logicaltheendlessandviciousexerciseofmartial
lawauthority.Thisremindsmeofthewisewordsofanoldmaninourtown:Thatifyouaregoingtoclearyour
fieldofweedsandgrasses,youshouldnotmerelycutthem,butdigthemout.
PRESIDINGOFFICERTUPAZ(A.):WiththeindulgenceoftheGentlemanfromLaUnion,theChairwouldwantto
havearecessforatleasttenminutes.
DELEGATE DE GUZMAN (A.): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In fact, I was about to move for it after the grueling
interpellationsbysomeofourcolleagueshere,butbeforewerecess,mayImovefortheapprovalofSection4?
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ItisfortheforegoingreasonsthatIfindcontinuedmartiallawtobeapoliticalquestionunderthenewCharter.
The present Constitution does not give the Supreme Court any power to 'cheek the exercise of a supremely
politicalprerogative.Ifthereisanycheckingorreviewofmartiallaw,theConstitutiongivesit,nottotheSupreme
Court, but to the National Assembly. Ultimately, the checking function is vested in the people. Whether the
NationalAssemblyexpressesdispleasureandwithdrawsitsconfidencefromthePrimeMinisterthroughelection
of a successor or the Prime Minister asks the President to dissolve the National Assembly under Article VIII,
Section13,theissueofmartiallawultimatelyrestswiththepeople.Anythingdependentuponthepopularwillis,
of course, political. Although the interim National Assembly has not yet been convened, the intent of the
ConstitutionalConventiontomakethequestionpoliticalisclear.
Exclusive of the Transitory Provisions, other provisions of the present Charter may be cited. The Bill of Rights,
ArticleIV,Section15hadadded"orimminentdangerthereof"tothe1935provision.Itnowreads
SEC.15.Theprivilegeofthewritofshallnotbesuspendedexceptincasesofinvasion,insurrection,rebellion,,
whenthepublicsafetyrequiresit.
habeascorpusorimminentdangerthereof
ArticleIX,Section16,anothernewprovisionreads
SEC. 16. All powers vested in the President of the Philippines under the nineteen hundred and thirtyfive
Constitution and the laws of the land which are not herein provided for or conferred upon any official shall be
deemed,andarehereby,vestedinthePrimeMinister,unlesstheNationalAssemblyprovidesotherwise.
All the foregoing features of the new Constitution strengthen and do not decrease the exclusivity and political
natureofthepowertoproclaimmartiallawandtoliftit.
XIV
GRANTINGTHATTHECONTINUATIONOFMARTIALLAWISNOTPOLITICALBUTJUSTICIABLE,ITISSTILLVALID
UNDERTHETESTOFARBITRARINESS
Even if we grant that the continuation of martial law and the determination when to lift it are justiciable in
character, Our decision is still the same. Correctness of the President's acts, I must repeat, is not the test.
Assuming that the Court has jurisdiction to determine when martial law should he lifted, the test is still
arbitrariness.
Asidefromassertingthattherewasnobasisfortheinitialproclamationofmartiallaw,thepetitionersinsistthere
isnorealemergencyinthecountrytoday.PetitionerDioknocitesvariousnewspaperitemsreportingstatements
ofthePresidentanddefenseofficials.AmongthemareassurancesofthePresidentthatreservistswon'tundergo
combat duty, statements of Defense Secretary Ponce Enrile citing gains in peace and order, disclosures of
commandinggeneralsthattheMindanaorebellioniscrushedandTarlacisnowpeaceful,andreportsfromNueva
Ecijathattherebelbackboneisbroken.(SupplementalPetitionandMotionforImmediateReleasedatedJune29,
1973.)
The petitioners assert that the "actual state of war aspect was dropped from general orders as early as
September30,1972andthatthetransformationofaNewSocietyhasbecomethenewtheme.
It is the second purpose the building of a New Society that is now being emphasized everywhere. The
instrumentsofmasscommunicationthathavebeenallowedtooftendrumthisthemewithoutceasing.Verylittle
spaceandtimeisdevotednowtotheideaofsavingtheRepublic.Onecan,ofcourse,handlethisdifficultybya
semanticmanipulation,namely,thatthebuildingofaNewSocietyistheonlywayofsavingtheRepublic.
InaManifestationdatedJuly6,1974,petitionerDioknocitesothercircumstancesshowingthatpeaceandorder
conditionsinthecountryarenormal.
1.ThePresidentleftthecountryafewweeksagoforameetingatMenadowithPresidentSuhartoofIndonesia,
somethingheobviouslywouldnothavedoneiftherereallywasanemergency.
2.Touristsandforeigninvestorsarecomingtoourshoresinhordes,notjusttoManilabutalsoitsenvironsand
outlayingprovinces,whichtheywouldcertainlynotdoiftheywerenotassuredofsecurityandstability.
3.Basketball,chess,swimmingandevenkarateinternationaltournamentsarebeingheldinthePhilippines.The
Presidentevenattendedthelatterevent.
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4.The 1974 Miss Universe contest is scheduled to be held in Manila this month with expenses in preparation
therefor amounting to millions of pesos. The Government would not have been so thoughtless as to spend so
muchmoneyforsuchanunnecessaryaffair,ifthereisreallyan"actualandimminentdangerofinsurrectionand
rebellion."
5.Sincetheproclamationofmartiallaw,thePhilippineshashostedseveralinternationalconferences,thelatest
beingtheUnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramsessionswhichwereattendedbydelegatesandobserversfrom
sixtysix (66) countries, twentysix (26) United Nations Agencies, and the U.N.D.P. Secretariat. The event last
mentionedbroughtinsomanyvisitorsthatfacilitiesofnolessthanfourteen(14)hotelshadtobeutilized.This
canonlyhappeninacountrywherepeaceandtranquilityprevail.
Thesecircumstances,someborderingonthefrivolous,(TimeMagazine,April15,1974)allconfirmthatthe
conditions under which "persons may be detained without warrant but with due process" (to use the quotation
frompetitioner'scitedbyrespondents),nolongerexist,ifindeedtheyeverexisted,andthat,therefore,thepower
of indefinite detention claimed by the Solicitor General and the respondents for the President in their last two
pleadings, is actually and patently "beyond the pale of the law because it is violative of the human rights
guaranteedbytheConstitution."
coupledwiththePresidentclearandrepeatedassurancesthatthereis"norealemergencytoday"(DailyExpress,June22,
1973)andthat"actuallyWehaveremoved"martiallaw
While I believe that the continuation of a state of martial law is a political question under the new Constitution,
theseargumentsdeserveanswerforthesakeofourpeoplewhowillreadtheCourt'sdecision.
Iamnotconvinced,atthisstageofmartiallawthatthePresidentisactingarbitrarilyinnotliftingtheproclamation.
AManifestationdatedMay13,1974fromtherespondentsstates:
a.Pursuant to the President's constitutional powers, functions, and responsibilities in a state of martial law, he
periodically requires to be conducted a continuing assessment of the factual situation which necessitated the
promulgation of Proclamation No. 1081 on September 21, 1972 and the continuation of martial law through
ProclamationNo.1104,datedJanuary17,1973
b. The Government's current and latest assessment of the situation, including evidence of the subversive
activitiesofvariousgroupsandindividuals,indicatesthattherearestillpocketsofactualarmedinsurrectionand
rebellionincertainpartsofthecountry.Whileinthemajorareasoftheactiverebellionthemilitarychallengeto
the Republic and its duly constituted Government has been overcome and effective steps have been and are
being taken to redress the centuriesold and deepseated causes upon which the fires of insurrection and
rebellionhavefed,theessentialprocessofrehabilitationandrenascenceisaslowanddelicateprocess.Onthe
basisofsaidcurrentassessmentandofconsultationswiththepeople,thePresidentbelievesthattheexigencies
of the situation, the continued threat to peace, order, and security, the dangers to stable government and to
democraticprocessesandinstitutions,therequirementsofpublicsafety,andtheactualandimminentdangerof
insurrectionandrebellionallrequirethecontinuationoftheexerciseofpowersincidenttomartiallaw
c.Themajorityofpersonswhohadtobedetainedupontheproclamationofmartiallawhavebeenreleasedand
are now engaged in their normal pursuits. However, the President has deemed that, considering the overall
situation described above and in view of adequate evidence which can not now be declassified, the continued
detentionofcertainindividualswithoutthefilingofformalchargesincourtforsubversiveandothercriminalactsis
necessary in the interest of national security and defense to enable the Government to successfully meet the
grave threats of rebellion and insurrection. In this regard, the Secretary of National Defense and his authorized
representatives have acted in accordance with guidelines relating to national security which the President has
prescribed.
The President believes that the continued threat to peace and order, the dangers to stable government and
democratic institutions and the actual and imminent danger of insurrection and rebellion require continuation of
martial law. This finding is based on a continuing assessment of the factual situation which resulted in
ProclamationNo.1081.Ontheotherhand,petitionersbelieveotherwise.
In the exercise of judicial review, one reasonable mind assessing the factual situation now obtaining could
probablyagreewiththepetitioners.Anotherreasonablemind,however,viewingthesamefactualsituationcould
veryunderstandablyarriveatanoppositeconclusion.AssumingWehavethePower,Weshouldnottrytoweigh
evidence on either side and determine who is correct and who is wrong. As stated earlier, the test of validity is
arbitrariness and not correctness I do not doubt the President's sincerity and good faith in making the
determination outlined in the respondent's Manifestation. There can, therefore, be no finding that he is acting
arbitrarilyinnotliftingmartiallaw.
The "evidence" present by petitioner Diokno weakens his arguments. If, as he claims, the mass media are
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controlled,thenewsitemsonrebellionthathecitesshouldnotbeaccordedstrongprobativevalue.Itispossible
thatthenewsaboutrebelsandinsurrectionistactivitiesisdeliberatelyplayeddownaspartofthepeaceandorder
campaign under martial law. The news could be intended to convince those who may waver between seeking
amnestyorprolongingtherebelliontotakethefirstcourseofaction.
Infact,thereisoverwhelminglyagreaternumberofreasonablemenandwomenwhoagree,withthePresident's
findingsthanwiththepetitioners'convictions.OnJuly27,1973andJuly28,1973,votersinanationalreferendum
were asked Do you want President Marcos to continue beyond 1973 and finish the reforms he has initiated
under martial law? The Commission on Elections has reported that 18,505,216 voters answered "Yes" and
1,856,744voted"No".Thevoteofthe18,505,216peoplefromallpartsofthecountrywhoanswered"Yes"can
clearlybeinterpretedassustainingthefindingthatthePresidentisnotactingarbitrarily.Infact,itcanbereadin
no other way but to confirm even the correctness of the President's determination on the continuing need for
martial law. And since other referenda are forthcoming, a more reliable gauge of arbitrariness and correctness
thanpressclippingsisavailabletoourpeopleastheyjudgethePresident.
Thepetitioners,inurgingthisCourttodecidethepetitionsandtodecidethemintheirfavor,raisethealarmthat
unless We do so, We may never he able to decide at all. We are warned that "in the face of an assault on the
Judiciary,itwouldberidiculous,ifitwerenottragic,ifthisCourtdidnotevensomuchasdefenditself....Inthe
faceofadismantlingoftheentireconstitutionalorderofwhichtheJudiciaryisavital,indispensablepart,howcan
itevenaffordtheluxuryofacquiescenceinitsownruin?Andhowcanitcontinuetoinspirethehighrespectofthe
people,ifitmerelyindulgesinsculpturedrhetoricandfailstoprotecttheircivillibertiesinlive,concretepetitions
suchasthis?"(ReplyMemorandumforPetitionersdatedNovember30,1972,page40).Thepetitionersspeakof
"constitutionalsuicide"(,p.60)andallegethat"thegloomdeepensandisencircling,andonlyafewlightsremain.
One remaining light is that provided by this Supreme Tribunal. The entire nation now looks in its direction and
prayerfullyhopesitwillcontinueburning"(,p.81).
Ibidibid
Idonotsharethesamedoomsdayimpressionsaboutmartiallaw.Mydecisionisbasednotaloneonmysincere
convictionaboutwhattheConstitutioncommandsandwhattherelevantconstitutionalprovisionsmean.Happily,
my reading of the Constitution as a legal document coincides with what I feel is right, morally and conscience
wise,forourcountryandpeople.Itconfirmsmylifelongconvictionthatthereisindeedwisdom,profundityand
evengeniusintheseeminglyshortanduncomplicatedprovisionsofourfundamentallaw.
XV
MARTIALLAWANDTHESUSPENSIONOFTHEWRITOFHABEASCORPUS
Anotherissueintheinstantpetitionsiswhethertheprivilegeofthewritofissuspendeduponaproclamationof
martiallaw.Theanswerisobviouslyintheaffirmative.
habeascorpus
Theproclamationofmartiallawisconditionedontheoccurrenceofthegravestcontingencies.Theexerciseofa
moreabsolutepowernecessarilyincludesthelesserpowerespeciallywhereitisneededtomakethefirstpower
effective. "The suspension enables the executive, without interference from the courts or the law to arrest and
imprisonpersonsagainstwhomnolegalcrimecanbeprovedbutwhomay,nevertheless,beeffectivelyengaged
inmorningtherebellionorinvitingtheinvasion,totheimminentdangerofthepublicsafety."(Barcelonv.Baker,5
Phil.87,112).Itwouldnegatetheeffectivityofmartiallawifdetaineescouldgotothecourtsandaskforrelease
under the same grounds and following the same procedures obtaining in normal times. The President in the
dispositive paragraph of Proclamation No. 1081 ordered that all persons presently detained or others who may
thereafter be similarly detained for the crimes of insurrection and rebellion and all other crimes and offenses
committed in furtherance or on the occasion or in connection therewith shall be kept under detention until
otherwise ordered released by him or his duly designated representative. Under General Order No. 2A, the
President ordered the arrest and taking into custody of certain individuals. General Order No. 2A directs that
thesearrestedindividualswillbeheldincustodyuntilotherwiseorderedbythePresidentorhisdulydesignated
representative.ThesegeneralordersclearlyshowthatthePresidentwasprecludingcourtexaminationintothese
specifiedarrestsandcourtordersdirectingreleaseofdetainedindividuals.
Martiallawisintendedtoovercomethedangersfromrebellionorinsurrection.Thepurposewouldbesubvertedif
martiallawisdeclaredandyetindividualscommittingactsofdirectrebellionandinsurrectionoractswhichfurther
thegoalsoftherebelscannotbedetainedwithoutfilingcharges.IfthePresidentdecidestoproclaimmartiallaw
and to use all the military forces of the Philippines to preserve the Republic and safeguard the interests of the
people,itissophistrytostatethatthelesserpowerofsuspendingtheprivilegeofthewritofisnotincluded.This
is especially true where, as in these cases, the President has specifically ordered the detention without filing of
chargesofindividualswhofurtherormightfurthertherebellion.ThisappearsclearfromProclamationNo.1081
itselfandfrompertinentgeneralordersissuedpursuanttoit.
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XVI
THEEFFECTOFARTICLEXVII,SEC3(2)OFTHENEWCONSTITUTION
Thereisanotherreasonfordenyingtheinstantpetitions.
Article XII Section 3, Subsection (2) of the present Constitution (ratified on January 17, 1973) has a transitory
provisionwhichreads:
(2) All proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and acts promulgated, issued, or done by the incumbent
Presidentshallbepartofthelawoftheland,andshallremainvalidlegal,binding,andeffectiveevenafterlifting
of martial law or the ratification of this Constitution, unless modified, revoked, or superseded by subsequent
proclamations,orotheractsoftheincumbentPresident,orunlessexpresslyandexplicitlymodifiedorrepealedby
theregularNationalAssembly.
It is noted from the foregoing that all proclamations and orders of the President, specifically Proclamation No.
1081andtherelevantordersanddecreesaffectingthehereinpetitionersandotherssimilarlysituated,arebythe
expresswordsoftheConstitution,partofthelawoftheland.Infact,thetransitoryprovisionconsidersthemvalid,
legal,bindingandeffectiveevenafterliftingofmartiallawortheratificationofthisConstitution.Theyarevalidnot
only at the inception of but also during martial law. Only an express and explicit modification or repeal by the
regularNationalAssemblymaymodify,revoke,andsupersedetheproclamations,orders,decrees,instructionsor
other acts of the incumbent President under martial law. This transitory provision does not, as many people
believe,merelyvalidateProclamationNo.1081.Thissectionconfirmsthevalidityoftheproclamationunderthe
old Constitution and its continuing validity under the New Constitution. The Constitutional Convention concurred
withthePresidentanddeclaredthattheproclamationwasvalidlyissuedundertheoldCharterandcontinuesto
beconstitutionalunderthenewConstitution.Onthebasisoftheconstitutionalprovisionalone,thedeclarationof
martial law under Proclamation No. 1081 may, therefore, be justified and validated. Similarly, the orders of the
Presidentonthecontinueddetentionofthepetitionersand,ineffect,thesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritof
havebeendefinitelydeclaredvalidandconstitutional.
habeascorpus
IwishtoaddthatwiththeabovecitedportionoftheTransitoryProvision,theConstitutionalConventionwantedto
foreclose any constitutional attack on the validity of "all proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and acts
promulgated, issued, or done by the incumbent President" mentioned therein. As a matter of fact, during the
discussions of this portion of the Transitory Provision before the 166man special committee, formed to finally
drafttheConstitutionofwhichIwasamember,(beingtheViceChairmanofthepaneloffloorleaders),answering
aqueryfromDelegateLeviste,DelegatePacificadorsaid:
TRANSCRIPTOFTHEPROCEEDINGSOFTHE166MANSPECIALCOMMITTEEMEETINGNo.33NOVEMBER26,
1972
BytheprovisionsofSubsection2,wearerenderingthedecreesoftheincumbentPresidentasmorethan
merestatutes.Weareconstitutingthemashighlypoliticalacts,thevalidityofwhichcannotbeinquiredinto
even by our courts, but are appealable only to the people themselves. There will be no other way of
revokingorrepealingsuchdecreesexceptbythetwowaysmentionedinSubsection2ofSection3.
Justifying martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of by citing the transitory provisions of the
presentConstitutionleadstoanotherargumentinthepetitions.AccordingtopetitionerDiokno,thestatementsin
thedispositiveportionofthedecisionintheratificationcasesthat"thereisnofurtherjudicialobstacletothenew
Constitutionbeingconsideredinforceandeffect"isclearlynotarulingthattheNewConstitutionislegallyinforce
and effect. Petitioner Diokno stresses how carefully the Court has chosen its language. According to him, the
Court does not say that there is no further obstacle and that it says merely that there is no further obstacle.
Petitionerfindsaworldofdifferencebetweenalegalandajudicialobstacle.Everyillegalact,accordingtohim,is
barredbyalegalobstaclebutnotnecessarilybyajudicialobstacle.ThepetitionerpointsoutthattheCourtdoes
notstatethatthenewConstitutionisinforceandeffect.ItmerelyspeaksofthenewConstitutioninforceandin
effect. He alleges that between "being" and "being considered", there is again a world of difference. From the
decisionoftheSupremeCourtintheratificationcases,thepetitionerbelievesthattheCourtwastryingtomakeit
as plain as circumstances permitted that it had not decided that the new Constitution is legally and factually in
force.
habeascorpuslegaljudicialpersebeingconsidered
Other pleadings submitted in these cases have raised basically the same major issues that were raised in the
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To my mind, the dispositive portion of the Supreme Court's decision is best interpreted by the Supreme Court
itself.Noamountofargumentation,submissionofpleadings,playofwords,andsemanticnicetiescanovercome
orignorethefactthattheSupremeCourtisinterpretingandapplyingthenewConstitution.Themembershave
takenanoathtodefendthisnewConstitution.Bybothactionandwords,allthemembersofthisCourthavemade
itplainbeyondanyshadowofdoubtthatthenewConstitutionislegallyandfactuallyinforce.Thejusticesofthis
Court would be the last persons to interpret and enforce something they do not consider valid, legitimate, and
effective. It is not alone the taking of an oath to support and defend the new Constitution that indicates clearly
whattheCourtmeantwhenitrenderedthe(L36142)decision.Themeaningofthedecisionisquiteclearfrom
the fact that the Court has been enlarged beyond its earlier composition. It has reorganized itself into two
divisions. Each division is now trying cases pursuant to the New Constitution. All courts are under the
administrative supervision of the Supreme Court. An examination of decisions rendered by the Court since the
decision will show that there is constant reference to the 1973 Constitution. Its provisions form the basis for its
authority to interpret and expound on the laws. Whenever a provision of the Constitution is invoked, the Court
turnstothe1973ConstitutionasthepresentConstitution.Icanseenoclearerinterpretationofadecisionofthis
CourtthanthesevariousactsoftheCourtitself.
Javellanavs.ExecutiveSecretaryJavellanavs.ExecutiveSecretary
XVII
AFEWOTHERPOINTS
There are a few other points which I would like to answer briefly. Petitioner Francisco 'Soc' Rodrigo states that
while he was released from detention on December 5, 1972, his release is conditional and subject to some
restrictions.HeisnotallowedtoleavetheconfinesoftheGreaterManilaareaunlessspecificallyauthorizedby
themilitary.Hestatesthathispetitionforisnotmootandacademiccauseofhisrelease.
habeascorpus
ConsideringmyopinionontheconstitutionalityofProclamationNo.1081,itfollowsthatthereleaseofpetitioners
Jose W. Diokno and Benigno S. Aquino may not be ordered. The petitions for their release, as in the case of
detaineesalreadyreleased,mustbedirectedtothePresident.
*Ifsuchisthecasewithpetitionerswhoareactuallydetainedandconfined,withmorereasonshouldtheprincipleshereinenunciatedapplytothoseno
longerconfinedordetained.
2.InG.R.L35539,CarmenI.Diokno,inbehalfofherhusband,JoseW.Diokno,petitioner:
In the case of former Senator Benigno S. Aquino, criminal charges have been filed against him. As a rule, a
petition for the writ of is satisfactorily answered by a showing that a prisoner is detained on the basis of valid
criminalcharges.However,petitionerAquinochallengesthejurisdictionofthemilitarytribunalandthevalidityof
thechargesfiledagainsthim.
habeascorpus
Therefore,insofarasallissuesinthecaseofNo.2,L37364,whicharecommontotheissuesintheseinstant
petitionsareconcerned,thisdecisionapplies.OnanyotherissuenotcommontotheissuesinthesePetitions,I
amreservingmyopinionforL37364.
BenignoS.Aquinovs.MilitaryCommission
XVIII
THEREMEDIESAGAINSTCLEARABUSEOFPOWER.
The general remedy against an arbitrary, whimsical, or capricious exercise of the martial law power of the
President,asitistheremedyonallpoliticalquestions,isthevoiceofthepeopleinanelectionwhenoneisheld,
orthroughtheBarangayswhichthePresidenthimselfhasconsultedintheJuly27and28,1973referendumon
whether the people wanted President Marcos to continue beyond 1973 and finish the reforms he has initiated
under martial law. The President has officially announced a number of times that he would consult with the
Barangays periodically. Under this remedy, the people, in the exercise of their sovereign power, can base their
decision,notonlyonwhethertheactsofthePresidenthasbeenarbitrary,whimsical,orcapricioustheycanbase
theirdecisiononabroaderbasisandthatiswhether,intheirownopinion,thePresidentactedcorrectlyornot.
Or if and when the interim assembly is convened, a majority of the members thereof, as representatives of the
people, can also remedy an arbitrary, whimsical, capricious, or even an unwise exercise of the power, by so
advisingthePrimeMinistertoliftmartiallawunderpainofbeingdeposedasPrimeMinister.
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Aswedeclaretheproclamationandthecontinuationofmartiallawpoliticalandthereforenonjusticiableinnature,
Weareonlyacknowledgingtheconstitutionallimitationofthatpowertojusticiablequestionsonly,justaswehad
defined the constitutional limitations of the powers of Congress and of the Executive. As the interpreter of the
Constitution,theCourthastoleadinrespectingitsboundaries.
Our jurisprudence is replete with examples where this Court exercised its judicial power in appropriate cases
(Avelinovs.Cuenco,83Phil.17Aranetavs.Dinglasan,84Phil.368NationalistsPartyvs.Bautista,85Phil.101
Rodriguezvs.Gella,92Phil.603Ruttervs.Esteban,93Phil.68Aytonavs.Castillo,4SCRA533,tonameonly
thefew),whichshouldmorethanprovethatnomatterhowgraveorurgent,delicateorformidableandnovelor
uncommonalegalproblemis,theCourtwillknowwhenandhowtoresolveit.Specifically,itwillknowwhattodo
if,aspetitionersfear,aPresidentmaysomedaywakeupandoutoftheblueproclaimmartiallaw.Ofcourse,this
isalreadyalmostanimpossibilityundertheparliamentarysystemestablishedbytheNewConstitution.
XIX
CONCLUSION
The voluminous pleadings and the lengthy arguments supporting the petitions are generally couched in erudite
andeloquentlanguage.Itisregrettablethattheyhavebeentaintedinanumberofinstanceswithfrenziedand
bitingstatementsindicativeofasenseofexasperation.Iamcertain,however,thatthesestatementscannotaffect
thehighsenseofimpartialityofthemembersoftheCourtastheygivetheiropinioninthesecases.
ThePresidentisthehighestelectiveofficialinthecountry.Itwasnocasualorperfunctorychoicewhichelevated
himtotheposition.Itishisduty,nolessthanthatofthisCourt,tosavetheRepublicfromtheperilsofrebellion
and insurrection. In order to preserve public safety and good order, he has been forced to proclaim a state of
martiallaw.Toinsurethecontinuationofcivilianauthorityanddemocraticinstitutions,hehasutilizedthearmed
forcestoquellthearmedchallengeandtoremedytheancientevilsuponwhichrebellionandinsurrectionflourish.
The petitioners dispute the President's determination and question his motives. To them the exercise of his
constitutional powers is an abuse of executive powers and assumption of a dictatorship. Inasmuch as the real
reasonfortheimpositionofmartiallaw,accordingtopetitionerDiokno,isnottopreservethenationbuttokeep
the President in power, there is only one decision the Court should make. It should invalidate Proclamation No.
1081. The dire consequences are given by the petitioner eventual resort to arms, shedding of blood.
destruction of property and irreparable loss of invaluable lives which, of course, are the same consequence
soughttobeavoidedwhenmartiallawwasproclaimed.
TheSupremeCourtmaybethehighestcourtoftheland.Itisnot,however,asuperBeingoverandabovethe
Executive, the Legislature and the Constitution, deciding cases on an infallible sense of Truth and a faculty of
divination.Principlesofliberty,right,andjusticearenotinterpretedinanabstractanddogmaticform.Theyare
applied in the manner the sovereign people adopted our institutions of government and formulated our written
Constitution.
TheSupremeCourtcanruleontheproclamationofmartiallawonlyinsofarasitsvalidityundertheConstitutionis
raisedasanissue.IftheConstitution,astheexpressionofsovereignwill,veststhedeterminationofthenecessity
formartiallawinthePresident,theCourtshallsodeclareandrespectit.
However,thedeterminationofthewisdomortheproprietyoftheproclamationmustrestwiththepeople.Wisdom
and propriety in the making of supremely political decisions and in the exercise of political functions are for the
people to assess and determine. Under our constitutional form of government, no official or department can
effectively exercise a power unless the people support it. Review by the people may not be as clearcut and
frequentasjudicialreviewbutitisactual,present,andmostaffective.
The constitutional process and the rule of law are interpreted and enforced by the Supreme Court but their
viabilityandstrengthdependonthesupportandfaithofthepeople.Consequently,ifourpeopleallowthesystem
of government to be changed, no pronouncements of this Court can reverse the change or topple an alleged
dictatorfrompower.Onlythepeoplecandoit.
Fortunately, the trend of present events clearly shows that martial law, instead of destroying constitutional
governmentasadvancedbythepetitioners,is,infact,savingandstrengtheningit.
WHEREFORE,Ivotetorenderjudgment:(1)TogranttheDioknomotiontowithdrawhispetitionfor
habeascorpus
(2)DeclaringthatthedecisiontoproclaimmartiallawisapoliticalquestionandtheCourtmaynotexaminethe
grounds upon which Proclamation No. 1081 is based granting that the Court may do so, there is sufficient
constitutional factual basis for the same and certainly the President has not acted arbitrarily, whimsically or
capriciouslyinissuingtheProclamationthatonbothgrounds,saidProclamationNo.1081isconstitutional
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(3)Declaringthattheprivilegeofthewritofisipsofactosuspendeduponaproclamationofmartiallawandin
effect,GeneralOrderNo.2Asuspendedsaidprivilege
habeascorpus
(4)Declaringthatthecontinuationofthestateofmartiallawissimilarlyapoliticalquestionandthatitisforthe
PresidentorthePrimeMinister,undertheNewConstitution,todeterminewhenitmaybeliftedandgrantingthat
thisCourtmayexaminethefactualbasisforthecontinuationofmartiallaw,Wefindsufficientbasisforthesame
and
(5)Dismissingthevariouspetitionsforthewritofofpetitionersstilldetained,orunder"communityarrest,"within
theGreaterManilaarea,withoutcosts..
habeascorpus
MUOZPALMA,
J.:
Re"MotiontoWithdrawPetition"datedDecember29,1973:
IshallexplainwhyIvotedto.Ibelievethatapetitionforbasicallyinvolvesthelifeandlibertyofthepetitioner,and,ifforreasonsofhisownthewisdom
and/orcorrectnessofwhicharebestlefttohimtodeterminehedesirestowithdrawthesameandleavehispresentconditionofindefinitedetentionasit
is,suchishisrightwhichIasafellowhumanbeingandasamagistrateofthelawshouldnotdenyhim.Mydistinguishedcolleagueswhooptedtodeny
said"MotiontoWithdraw"arguemainlythattograntthemotionofpetitionerDioknoisfortheCourttoacceptthetruthofhisallegationsanddenyitselfthe
opportunitytoactonandresolvethebasicissuesraisedinthePetitionforwhichissuesareof"utmostpublicimportance"andinvolve"theverylifeand
existenceofthepresentGovernmentunderthenewConstitution."WhatIcansayisthattheotherPetitionsfornowbeingdecidedjointlyinthisDecision
affordaforumwherethelegalandconstitutionalquestionspresentedinDiokno'spetitioncanverywellhediscussed,dissectedtotheirminutesdetails,and
decidedbytheCourt.WhatconcernsthiswritermostisthatthethrustofDiokno'smotiontowithdrawishisbeliefthathe"cannotreasonablyexpecteither
rightorreason,laworjustice"fromthisCourtitbeinganewCourtunderthenewConstitution,adifferentCourtfromtheSupremeCourttowhichhe
originallyappliedforhisrelease.grantthemotionhabeascorpushabeascorpushabeascorpus 1 Inplainandsimplelanguage,petitionerDiokno
isbereftoffaithinthisCourtandprefersthathisfatebeleftundecidedwhoarewethentoimposeourwillonhimandforce
himtolitigateunderacloudofdistrustwherehislifeandlibertyareinextricablyinvolved?Justasloveisanemotionwhich
springsspontaneouslyfromtheheartandnevercoercedintoexistence,soalsoisfaith,trust,bornandnurturedinfreedom
andneverundercompulsion.Thus,todenypetitionerDiokno'smotionistocompelhimtohavefaithinthisCourtcanwe
dosowhenfaithhastobeearned,andcannotbeforcedintobeing?Hence,myvote.
OntheMeritsofthePetition
BecausepetitionerDiokno's"MotiontoWithdrawPetition"wasconsidereddeniedasonlysevenJusticesvotedto
grantit,
2andhisPetitionforwastobedecidedonitsmerits,andatthetimeofthewritingofthisOpinionDioknowasincustodyfor
almosttwoyearswithoutchargeshavingbeenfiledagainsthim,IresolvedtotreathisPetitiondifferentlyfromthatofthe
otherpetitionerswho,duringthependencyofthesecases,wereconditionallyreleasedfromtheprisoncampsof
respondents.However,aftercompletionofmyOpinionbutbeforetheDecisioninthesecasescouldbepromulgatedon
September12,1974,asscheduled,PresidentFerdinandE.Marcosorderedthereleaseofpetitioner,JoseW.Diokno,on
September11,1974.habeascorpus *ThisdevelopmentledtheCourttodismissthePetitionofJoseW.Dioknoforhavingbecomemootand
academic,andforcedmetorevisemyOpinionasitbecameunnecessarytodiscusstheissueofDiokno'scontinueddetention.
THEFACTS
On September 21, 1972, President Ferdinand E. Marcos signed what is now known as Proclamation No. 1081
proclaimingastateofmartiallawinthePhilippines,basedinteraliaonthefollowingconsideration:
... the rebellion and armed action undertaken by these lawless elements of the communist and other armed
aggrupationsorganizedtooverthrowtheRepublicofthePhilippinesbyarmedviolenceandforcehaveassumed
themagnitudeofanactualstateofwaragainstourpeopleandtheRepublicofthePhilippines
TheProclamationthusconcluded:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested
uponmebyArticleVII,Section10,Paragraph(2)oftheConstitution,doand,inmycapacityastheircommander
inchief, do hereby command the armed forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the
direction.
herebyplacetheentirePhilippinesasdefinedinArticleI,Section1oftheConstitutionundermartiallaw
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In addition, , as well the crimes of insurrection or rebellion, and all other crimes and offenses committed in
furtheranceorontheoccasionthereof,orincidentthereto,orin,connectiontherewith,forcrimesagainstnational
will be enumerated in Orders that I shall subsequently promulgate, as well as crimes as a consequence of any
violationofanydecree,orderorregulationpromulgatedbymepersonallyorpromulgateduponmydirectionuntil
otherwiseorderedreleasedbymeorbymydulydesignatedrepresentative.(emphasissupplied)
Idoherebyorderthatallpersonpresentlydetainedasallotherswhomayhereafterbesimilarlydetainedforshallbekeptunderdetention
OnSeptember22,GeneralOrderNo.1wasissuedfromwhichwequote:
WHEREAS,martiallawhasbeendeclaredunderProclamationNo.1081datedSept.21,1972andisnowineffect
throughouttheland
xxxxxxxxx
NOW,THEREFORE,I,FerdinandE.Marcos,PresidentofthePhilippines,byvirtueofthepowersvestedinmeby
theConstitutionasCommanderinChiefoftheArmedForcesofthePhilippines,doherebyproclaimthatIshall
govern the nation and direct the operation of the entire Government, including all its agencies and
instrumentalities, in my capacity and shall exercise all the powers and prerogatives appurtenant and incident to
mypositionassuchCommanderinChiefofallthearmedforcesofthePhilippines.
AlsoonSeptember22,GeneralOrderNo.2wassignedbythePresidentwhichprovided:
3
PursuanttoProclamationOrderNo.1081,datedSeptember21,1972,andinmycapacityasCommander
inChiefofalltheArmedForcesofthePhilippines,IasSecretaryofNationalDefensetoandtheindividuals
namedintheattachedlistsforbeingintheconspiracytoseizepoliticalandstatepowerinthecountryand
totakeoverthegovernmentbyforce,theextentofwhichhasnowassumedtheproportionofanactualwar
against our people and our legitimate government and in order to prevent them from further committing
actsthatareinimicalorinjurioustoourpeople,thegovernmentandournationalinterest,andtoholdsaid
individualsuntilotherwisesoorderedbymeorbymydulydesignatedrepresentative.(emphasissupplied).
herebyorderyouforthwitharresttakeintoyourcustodyparticipantsorhavinggivenaidandcomfort
Implementing General Order No. 2, respondent Secretary of National Defense, Hon. Juan Ponce Enrile,
immediatelyeffectedthearrestofagoodnumberofindividualsamongwhomwerethehereinpetitionerswho,by
reasonoftheirarrestwithoutchargeshavingbeenfiledagainstthem,cametothisCourttoseekreliefthrough
theirrespectivePetitionsfor,theearliestofwhich,L35538,wasfiledinthemorningofSeptember23,1972.
habeascorpus 4 TheCourtintherespectivePetitionspromptlyissuedtheWritreturnabletoit,andrequiredrespondentsto
answer.Withequaldispatchrespondentsfiledtheir"ReturntoWritandAnswertothePetition"inallthecaseswhich
containedacommon"SpecialandAffirmativeDefenses"readingasfollows:
4.OnSeptember21,1972,thePresidentofthePhilippines,intheexerciseofthepowersvestedinhimbyArticle
VII,section10,paragraph2oftheConstitution,issuedProclamationNo.1081placingtheentirePhilippinesunder
martiallaw
5.Pursuanttosaidproclamation,thePresidentissuedGeneralOrdersNos.1,2,3,3A,4,5,6,and7andLetters
of Instructions Nos. 1, 2 and 3. True copies of these documents are hereto attached and made integral parts
hereof as Annexes 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, and 11. A copy of the President's statement to the country on
September23,1972isalsoattachedasAnnex12
6.Finally,thepetitionstatesnocauseofaction.(p.21,rolloL35546)
TheAnswerprayedthatthepetitionbedismissed.
PendingresolutionofthesePetitions,petitioners,exceptfortwo,werereleasedfromcustodyondifferentdates
undera"ConditionalRelease"Orderofthesametenorasthefollowing:
*
5December1972
SUBJECT:ConditionalReleaseTO:FranciscoSocRodrigo
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1. After having been arrested and detained for subversion pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 of the
PresidentofthePhilippinesinhiscapacityasCommanderinChiefoftheArmedForcesofthePhilippines,
dated21September1972,youareherebyconditionallyreleased.
2.YouareadvisedtoabidestrictlywiththeprovisionsofProclamationNo.1081andtheensuingLOIs.Any
violationoftheseprovisionswouldsubjectyoutoimmediate(ly)arrestandconfinement.
3.Yourinvestigationwillcontinuefollowingaschedulewhichyouwilllateronbeinformed.Youareadvised
tofollowthisschedulestrictly.
4.YouarenotallowedtoleavetheconfinesofGreaterManilaAreaunlessspecificallyauthorizedbythis
Office indicating the provincial address and expected duration of stay thereat. Contact this office through
telephoneNo.971756whennecessary.
5.Youareprohibitedfromgivingorparticipatinginanyinterviewconductedbyanylocalorforeignmass
mediarepresentativeforpurposeofpublicationand/orradio/TVbroadcast.
(SGD.)MARIANOG.MIRANDALt.ColonelPAGroupCommander
PLEDGE
I HEREBY PLEDGE to conduct myself accordingly and will not engage in any subversive activity. I will
immediatelyreportanysubversiveactivitythatwillcometomyknowledge.
(SGD.)F.RODRIGO
Address:60JuanaRodriguezQuezonCity
Tel.No.702566704920702755
(p.621,rolloL35546)
Notwithstandingtheirreleasefromdetention,petitionersconcerneddidnotwithdrawtheirrespectivePetitionsfor,
whilepetitionerFranciscoRodrigofiledaManifestationdatedNovember27,1973statingthathisreleasedidnot
renderhisPetitionmootandacademic.(p.620,rolloL35546)Thetwopetitionerswhohavenotbeenreleased
uptothepresentareSenatorBenignoS.Aquino,Jr.againstwhominthemeantimecertaincriminalchargeshave
beenfiledwithMilitaryCommissionNo.2andSenatorJoseW.Dioknowhohasnotbeenchargedneitherbefore
acivilcourtnoramilitarytribunalorcommission.
habeascorpus *
THEISSUES
Thesepetitionsbeingessentiallyfortheissuanceofthewritoftheistheofthedetentionofpetitioners,andwhenwesay
detention,thatincludesthestateofthosepetitionerswhohavebeenconditionallyreleasedfromtheprisoncampsof
respondentforitisclaimedthattheirconditionalreleasestillconstitutesarestraintontheirpersonalliberty.habeas
corpusfundamentalissuelegality
The purpose of the writ of is to inquire into the cause or reason why a person is being restrained of his liberty
againsthiswill,andifthereisnolegaland/orvalidjustificationshownforsuchrestraintthewritwillforthwithissue
to restore to that person his liberty or freedom. It "exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons
from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom ... whose principal
purposeistosettheindividualatliberty."
habeascorpus5Notedauthorshaveeloquentlydescribedthewritas"thewritofliberty",6as"themostimportantandmost
immediatelyavailablesafeguardofthatliberty",7as"thegreatestofthesafeguardserectedbythecivillawagainstarbitrary
andillegalimprisonmentbywhomsoeverdetentionmaybeexercisedorordered",8andas"thegreatbulwarkofpersonal
liberty."9Theseconceptsofthewritofbringouttheblessedsacredtruththatpersonallibertyisoneofthebasicfreedoms
ofmanjealouslyprotectedbyanycivilizedsocietybyafundamentallaw,writtenorunwritten,andanydeprivationor
curtailmentofthatpersonallibertymustfindabasisinlaw,substantiveorprocedural.habeascorpus10Inthepetitions
underconsiderationrespondentsjustifythearrestanddetentionofpetitionersbyvirtueoftheproclamationofmartiallawin
thecountry.Respondentsaver(1)thattheexerciseofthepowergrantedtothePresidentoftheRepublicbySee.10(2),
Art.VIIofthe1935PhilippineConstitution,toplacethecountryoranypartthereofundermartiallaw,isnotsubjectto
judicialreview(2)thatevenifsaidexecutivepowermaybeinquiredinto,thereisfactualbasesforthePresident'saction
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and(3)thattheproclamationofmartiallawcarrieswithittheautomaticsuspensionofthewritofandconsequentlythese
petitionsshouldbedismissed.habeascorpus11WiththenewConstitutionhavingbeenadoptedinthemeantime,
respondentsposeinsubsequentpleadingsadditionalgroundsfordismissal,andtheseare:(1)thatArt.IX,Sec.12,ofthe
1973ConstitutionadoptedintototheCommanderinChiefclauseofthe1935Constitution,and(2)thatArt.XVII,section3
(2)expresslyandcategoricallydeclaresthat"",andthatmeansthepresentmartiallawregimeandallthemeasurestaken
underit,particularlyProclamationNo.1081andGeneralOrders1and2,asamended.theproclamations,orders,and
decrees,InstructionsandactsissuedordonebytheincumbentPresidentaretoform"partofthelawoftheland"andareto
"remainvalidlegal,binding,andeffectiveevenaftertheliftingofmartiallawortheratificationofthisConstitution12
Ontheotherhand,petitionersvigorouslyassert(1)amartiallawproclamationisjusticiable(2)conditionsinthe
countryasofSeptember21,1972,didnotjustifyaproclamationofmartiallaw(3)assumingthatProclamation
No.1081isvalid,GeneralOrdersNos.1,2,3,and3AareviolativeoftheConstitutionandarevoidand(4)the
returnispalpablyinsufficienttojustifycontinueddetentionofpetitioners.
13ForpetitionerDiokno,additionalargumentsweresubmitted,:(a)existingconditionstodaydonotwarrantthecontinuance
ofmartiallaw,assumingthattheproclamationwasinitiallyjustifiedand(b)theuncertaintyofpetitioner'sfaterendershis
executiveimprisonmentoppressiveandlawless.viz14
I
WeshallfirstdisposeoftheissueoftheallegedinsufficiencyoftheReturn..
Petitioners contend that respondents' "Return to Writ" which is quoted in page 6 of this Opinion is fatally
insufficientbecauseareturnmustassertfactsandnotconclusionsastothebasisofthedetention,andmustbe
supplementedbyaffidavitsorwithevidenceatthehearing,citing,186F.2d.183.
habeascorpusCarlsonvs.Landon
ThepertinentprovisionofSec.10,Rule102,RulesofCourt,onthecontentsofthereturnrequiresthatitmust
stateplainlyandunequivocablywhethertheofficertowhomthewritisaddressedhasorhasnotthepartyinhis
custody or power or under restraint, and if he has the party in his custody or power or under restraint, the
authority and the true and whole cause thereof, set forth at large, with a copy of the writ, order, execution, or
other process, if any, upon which the party is held. (pars. a and b) All that this provision of the Rules of Court
requiresthereforeisthatthereturnmuststateifthesubjectofthewritisincustodyorunderrestraintandifso,
theauthorityforsuchrestraintandthecausethereof.Itisnotnecessaryfororindispensabletothevalidityofthe
return that the evidentiary facts supporting the cause for the restraint be given or enumerated therein. In the
petitionsatbarthereturnsufficientlycomplieswiththerequirementsoftheaforementionedprovisionoftheRules
ofCourtbecauseitstatestheauthorityandthecauseforthedetentionofpetitionerswhichafterallisthepurpose
or object of a return. The authority for the detention lies in the statement in the return that the President
exercisinghispowersunderArt.VII,Sec.10(2)ofthePhilippineConstitution
15proclaimedmartiallawinthecountryandpursuanttosuchproclamationissuedGeneralOrdersIto7inclusiveand
LettersofInstruction1to3,copiesofwhichareallattachedtothereturnasannexes1to11,whilethecauseforthearrest
ofpetitionersisgiveninGeneralOrderNo.2(Annex3)whereinitisstatedthatsaidpetitionersareparticipantsorhave
givenaidandcomfortintheconspiracytoseizepoliticalandstatepowerinthecountry,etc.Atanyrate,anydeficiencyin
theaforesaidreturnconstitutesameretechnicalviolationwhichistobedisregardedinviewofthesubstantialissues
involvedinthecasesunderconsideration.Imperfectionsofformandtechnicalitiesofprocedurearetobedisregarded
unlesssubstantialrightswouldotherwisebeprejudiced,16andintheinstantcasesthereisnosuchprejudiceaspetitioners
aresufficientlyinformedoftheauthorityandcauseoftheirdetention.
II
ThenextissueisisthisCourtwithjurisdictiontoinquireintotheconstitutionalsufficiencyoftheproclamationof
martiallaw?
PetitionersasserttheauthorityofthisCourttoinquireintothenecessityofplacingthecountryundermartiallawin
thesamemannerthatitinquiredintotheconstitutionalsufficiencyofthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritof
in.
habeascorpusLansangvs.Garcia*16Respondentsaffirm,however,thatthedeterminationoftheexistenceofinvasion,
insurrection,rebellion,orimminentdangerthereof,whenthepublicsafetyrequiresitislodgedwiththePresidentunderArt.
VII,Sec.10(2),1935Constitution,andthePresident'sdeterminationisconclusiveonallpersons,includingthecourts
hence,thisCourtiswithoutjurisdictiontoresolveontheconstitutionalsufficiency,ofthebasisfortheexerciseofthat
presidentialpower,itbeingapurelypoliticalquestion.
TheConstitutionalprovisionreferredtoreads:
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ThePresidentshallbetheCommanderinChiefofallarmedforcesofthePhilippinesand,wheneveritbecomes
necessary,hemaycalloutsucharmedforcestopreventorsuppresslawlessviolence,invasion,insurrectionor
rebellion. In case of invasion, insurrection, or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof, when the public safety
requiresit,hemaysuspendtheprivilegeofthewritof,orplacethePhilippinesoranypartthereofundermartial
law.
habeascorpus17
RespondentsciteahostofAmericanauthoritiesandprincipallyfallbackontherulingsofthisCourtin,5Phil.87,
(1905)and,91Phil.882,(1952)
Barcelonvs.BakerMontenegrovs.Castaeda18whichheldthatwhethertheexigencyhasarisenrequiringthesuspension
ofthewritofbelongstothePresidentandhisdeclarationisfinalandconclusiveuponthecourtsanduponallother
persons.theauthoritytodecidehabeascorpus
The opinions of my colleagues lengthily discuss this issue of justiciability or nonjusticiability of the exercise of
executive power to proclaim martial law and I will not repeat the arguments for one or the other. I adopt by
reference their dissertation on the leading American jurisprudence and Constitutional Law authorities on the
matter, but I conclude for my part that the decision of this Court in is the better rule to adopt. In Lansang, the
Court held that it has the authority under the Constitution to inquire into the existence of a factual basis for the
issuanceofapresidentialproclamationsuspendingtheprivilegeofthewritofforthepurposeofdeterminingthe
constitutionalsufficiencythereof.
Lansangvs.Garciahabeascorpus19IfthisCourtcanmakethatinquiryintheeventofsuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewrit
of,a,theCourtcaninquireintothefactualbasisfortheproclamationofmartiallawconsideringthemoreextensiveeffects
ofthelatterontheindividualrightsofthecitizenry,foritcannotbedeniedthatmartiallawcarrieswithitcurtailmentand
infringementnotonlyofone'slibertybutalsoofpropertyrights,rightsoffreeexpressionandassembly,protectionagainst
unreasonablesearchesandseizures,privacyofcommunicationandcorrespondence,libertyofabodeandoftravel,etc.,
whichjustifyjudicialinterventiontoprotectandupholdtheselibertiesguaranteedundertheConstitution.habeas
corpusfortiori*19
In,theCourtsaidinthewordsofChiefJusticeRobertoConcepcion:
Lansang
Indeed,thegrantofpowertosuspendtheprivilegeisneitherabsolutenorunqualified.Theauthorityconferredby
theConstitution,bothundertheBillofRightsandundertheExecutiveDepartment,islimitedandconditional.The
preceptintheBillofRightsestablishesageneralrule,aswellasanexceptionthereto.Whatismore,itpostulates
the former in the , evidently to stress its importance, by providing that '(t)he privilege of the writ of shall be
suspended....'Itisonlybywayofthatitpermitsthesuspensionoftheprivilegeincasesofinvasion,insurrection,
orrebellion'or,underArt.VIIoftheConstitution,'imminentdangerthereof''whenthepublicsafetyrequires
it, in any of which events the same may be suspended wherever during such period the necessity for such
suspensionshallexist.'
negativehabeascorpusnotexception'13Forfrombeingfullandplenary,theauthoritytosuspendtheprivilegeofthewritisthuscircumscribed,
confinedandrestricted,notonlybytheprescribedsettingortheconditionsessentialtoitsexistence,but,also,asregardsthetimewhenandtheplace
whereitmaybeexercised.Thesefactorsandtheaforementionedsettingorconditionsmark,establishanddefinetheextent,theconfinesandthelimitsof
saidpower,beyondwhichitdoesnotexist.And,likethelimitationsandrestrictionsimposedbytheFundamentalLawuponthelegislativedepartment,.
Otherwise,theexplicitconstitutionalprovisionsthereonwouldbemeaningless.Surely,theframersofourConstitutioncouldnothaveintendedtoengagein
suchawastefulexerciseinfutility.....adherencetheretoandcompliancetherewithmay,withinproperbounds,beinquiredintoby
courtsofjustice
xxxxxxxxx
Article VII of the Constitution vests in the Executive the power to suspend the privilege of the writ of under
specifiedconditions.Pursuanttotheprincipleofseparationofpowersunderlyingthesystemofgovernment,the
Executive's supreme within his own sphere. HOWEVER, THE SEPARATION OF POWERS, UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION, IS NOT ABSOLUTE, WHAT IS MORE, IT GOES HAND IN HAND WITH THE SYSTEM OF
CHECKS AND BALANCES, UNDER WHICH THE EXECUTIVE IS SUPREME, AS REGARDS THE SUSPENSION
OF THE PRIVILEGE, BUT ONLY AND HE ACTS THE SPHERE ALLOTTED TO HIM BY THE BASIC LAW, AND
THE AUTHORITY TO DETERMINE WHETHER OR NOT HE HAS SO ACTED IS VESTED IN THE JUDICIAL
DEPARTMENT, WHICH, , IS, IN TURN, CONSTITUTIONALLY . (42 SCRA, pp. 473474,479480, capitalization
Ours)
habeascorpusIFWHENWITHININTHISRESPECTSUPREME
We are now called upon by respondents to reexamine the abovequoted ruling, abandon it, and return to the
principlelaiddowninand.
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BakerMontenegro20Todothat,however,wouldbetoretrogress,tosurrenderamomentousgainachievedinjudicialhistory
inthiscountry.WithLansang,thehighestCourtofthelandtakesuponitselfthegraveresponsibilityofcheckingexecutive
actionandsavingthenationfromanarbitraryanddespoticexerciseofthepresidentialpowergrantedundertheConstitution
tosuspendtheprivilegeofthewritofand/orproclaimmartiallawthatresponsibilityanddutyoftheCourtmustbe
preservedandfulfilledatallcostsifWewanttomaintainitsroleasthelastbulwarkofdemocracyinthiscountry.Tosome,
theCourtcouldhavegonefurtherindelineatingitsfunctioninthedeterminationoftheconstitutionalsufficiencyofa
proclamationsuspendingtheprivilegeofthewritofwhilethatmaybetrue,asitis,theLansangdecisionisa"giantleap"
intheinterestofjudicialsupremacyinupholdingfundamentalrightsguaranteedbytheConstitution,andforthatreasonI
cannotagreethatWediscardsaiddecisionoremasculateitsoastorenderitsrulingafarce.Thetestofarbitrarinessof
executiveactionadoptedinthedecisionisasufficientsafeguardwhatisvitaltothepeopleisthemannerbywhichthetest
isappliedbytheCourtinbothinstances,i.e.,suspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritofand/orproclamationofmartial
law.habeascorpushabeascorpushabeascorpus
III
WecometothethirdissuethevalidityofProclamation1081.Respondentscontendthatthereisfactualbasis
forthePresidenttoproclaimmartiallawinthecountry,whilepetitionersassertotherwise.
On this point, I agree with respondents that the extreme measure taken by the President to place the entire
countryundermartiallawwasnecessary.ThePresident'sactionwasneithercapriciousnorarbitrary.Anarbitrary
act is one that arises from an unrestrained exercise of the will, caprice, or personal preference of the actor
(Webster's 3rd New International Dictionary, p. 110), one which is not founded on a fair or substantial reason
(Bedford Inv. Co. vs. Folb, 180 P. 2d 361, 362, cited in Words & Phrases, Permanent Ed., Vol. 3A, p. 573), is
without adequate determining principle, nonrational, and solely dependent on the actor's will. (Sweig vs. U.S.,
D.C. Tex., 60 F. Supp. 785, Words & Phrases, , p. 562) Such is not the case with the act of the President,
because the proclamation of martial law was the result of conditions and events, not of his own making, which
undoubtedly endangered the public safety and led him to conclude that the situation was critical enough to
warranttheexerciseofhispowerundertheConstitutiontoproclaimmartiallaw.
supra
As found by this Court in : the communist activities in the country aimed principally at incitement to sedition or
rebellionbecamequiteevidentinthelatetwentiestotheearlythirtieswiththefirstconvictionsdatingOctober26,
1932, in . 57 Phil. 375, and . 57 Phil. 364 while there was a lull in such communist activities upon the
establishmentoftheCommonwealthofthePhilippinestherewasaresurgenceofthecommunistthreatinthelate
fortiesandonJune20,1957,CongressapprovedRepublicAct1700otherwiseknownastheAntiSubversionAct
which in effect outlawed the socalled Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) in 1969, the Communist Party
was reorganized and split into two groups, one of which, composed mainly of young radicals constituting the
Maoist faction, established a New People's Army the CPP managed to infiltrate or control nine major labor
organizations,exploitedtheyouthmovementandsucceededinmakingcommunistfrontsofelevenmajorstudent
or youth organizations, so that there are about thirty mass organizations actively advancing the CPP interests,
among which are the Malayang Samahan ng Magsasaka (MASAKA), the Kabataang Makabayan (KM), the
Movement for the Advancement of Nationalism (MAN), the Samahang Demokratiko ng Kabataan (SDK), the
SamahangMolave(SM),andtheMalayangPagkakaisangKabataangPilipino(MPKP).
Lansangvs.GarciaPeoplevs.Evangelista,etalPeoplevs.GuillermoCapadocia,etal21
January 3, Evening News: Huks ambushed five persons including a former mayor of Bagac, Bataan, along the
nationalroadintheprovinceandinvestigationofthePhilippineConstabularyrevealedthattheambusherswere
membersofaHukliquidationsquad.
22January4,ibid:ArmyIntelligencesourcesdisclosedthattheHukswereregroupingandsteadilybuildingupstrength
throughavigorousrecruitmentandtrainingprogram.:AnencounteroccurredinSitioBilaong,Sibul,OraniBataan,which
wasconsideredthebiggestencounterbetweentheArmedForcesandHuksinrecentyearsresultinginthekillingofa
numberofdissidents.:IntheCityofManilaschoolcampuseswerenotsparedfromclashesduringriotousdemonstrations
heldbymorethan1,500studentsoftheFarEasternUniversity,thenumberincreasingtoabout10,000ofthem,andatthe
LyceumofthePhilippinesclassesweresuspendedbecauseofabloodystudents'demonstrationresultinginthewounding
ofatleastonestudent.:Thenightbefore,scoresofstudentswereinjuredduringademonstrationattheMapuaInstituteof
Technologyinitiatedbyradicalelements.:HukscontinuedtostrikeatgovernmentforcesinSanFernando,Pampanga,and
Tarlac,Tarlac.:Ademonstrationofabout5,000farmersfromTarlacreinforcedbyKabataangMakabayanmembersclashed
withriotpolicemenaftertheyhadstonedtheUSEmbassyonRoxasBoulevard,Manila,shatteredglasswindowsofthe
building,andputtotorchanAmericanflag.:Thechurchwasnotsparedfromtheonslaughtofstudentactivismwhena
marchofactivistswasheldtoManila'sprominentCatholicchurches.,ManilaChronicle:Assaultswereintensifiedby
governmenttroopsonHukliarsintheprovincesofPampangaandTarlac.,PhilippinesHerald:TheHukspracticallywerein
controlofsixtownsintheprovinceofTarlac.:TheKabataangMakabayanwhichaccordingtotheArmedForces
IntelligencesourceshadatieupwiththeHuksstagedatumultuousdemonstrationduringastatedinneratMalacaangin
honorofUSPresidentRichardNixonwhichresultedinafreeforallfightandinjuriestoseveraldemonstrators.:Violent
studentdemonstrationswerestagedincludingaonedaynoisysiegeofMalacaangPalace.:Bloodydemonstrations
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continuednearthegatesoftheUSEmbassyonRoxasBoulevardduringwhichatleast20personsincluding6policemen,3
newsmenandseveralbystanderswereinjured.:3jeeploadsofHuksraidedthepoblacionofPorac,Pampanga,killing
sevenandwoundingsixteen.:MorepersonswerekilledinthecontinuingcarnageinPampanga.:Hukskilledtwomore
personsinPampangaandTarlacevenafterconstabularysoldierssaturatedtheprovincesonordersofPresidentMarcos.:
FivepersonsweremassacredbyHuksinPampanga.January10,ibidJanuary24,25,29,and31,ibidFebruary1,
ibidFebruary24and28,ibidApril19,ManilaChronicleMay19,PhilippinesHeraldJune12,and14July4July27,
ibidSeptember2,9,and10,Manila,DailyBulletinOctober7,and11,ManilaChronicleNovember18,ManilaDaily
BulletinNovember20,ibidNovember25,ibidDecember5,ibid
Arecitalofcontemporaryeventsfrom1969to1972takenfromreportsofleadingnewspapersinthecountrywill
givethefactualbackgroundoftheproclamationofmartiallawand,withtheindulgenceofthereader,Iamgiving
ithereunder:
1969
January 19, Philippines Herald: 400 students demonstrated at Malacaang Palace against power groups in the
country. : A bomb exploded at the Joint US Military Advisory Group Headquarters in Quezon City injuring a
Philippine Army enlisted man. : Student demonstrators mauled a palace guard. : Some 3,000 students
demonstrated at Malacaang for the second day and the National Students League announced a nationwide
boycott of classes. : Opening session of the Seventh Congress was marred by riotous demonstrations by
thousands of students and workers in front of the Legislative building during which President and Mrs. Marcos
were the target of stones and missiles as they walked to their car and 72 persons were injured in that
demonstration.:MobattackedMalacaangPalacewithignitedbottlesandfoughtwithmilitaryandpolicetroops
until early morning. : Nilo Tayag, Chairman of the Kabataang Makabayan was arrested for subversion and a
submachinegunanddocumentsconcerningCommunismwereconfiscatedfromhim.:Continueddemonstrations
wereheldinfrontoftheUSembassybuilding,inthecampusoftheFarEasternUniversityandtheUniversityof
the East, while violent between the army and the Huks in Central Luzon c continued unabated. : Violent strikes
andstudentdemonstrationswerereported.:Demonstrationscontinuedwithexplosionsofpillboxesinatleasttwo
schools. The University of the Philippines was not spared when its 18,000 students boycotted their classes to
demandacademicandnonacademicreformsintheStateUniversityresultinginthe"occupation"oftheofficeof
the President of the University by student leaders. Other schools which were scenes of violent demonstrations
wereSanSebastianCollege,UniversityoftheEast,LetranCollege,MapuaInstituteofTechnology,Universityof
Sto. Tomas, and Feati University. Student demonstrators even succeeded in "occupying the office of the
SecretaryofJusticeVicenteAbadSantosforatleastsevenhours".TheArmedForcescontinueditsencounters
withtheHuksinCentralLuzonandwiththeleadersoftheNewPeople'sArmy.:Moreinstancesofviolentstudent
demonstrations in the City were, reported, the most violent of which occurred after an indignation rally at Plaza
Lawton where pillboxes and other explosives were thrown resulting in the wounding of several students,
policemen and bystanders. Two Catholic schools and two government buildings in Calbayog City were blasted
withdynamite.:FightingwasreportedintheprovinceofCotabatobetweenwellarmedtribesmenandthelocal
policeforces,aswellasinIlocosSur,whileinCavitethePoliceChiefandtwoofhismenwereshottodeathin
front of the Hall of Justice building. : In Baguio City, Lt. Victor N. Corpus joined the New People's Army and
effectedaraidonthePhilippineMilitaryAcademyandfledwith35highpoweredgunswithammunition.
January22,ibidJanuary23,ibidJanuary24,ibidJanuary27,ibidJanuary31,ibidJune12and14,ManilaTimesJuly5,6,7,
13,19,21,23,25,26,27,and31,ibidSeptember15,18,20,25,26,27and29,ibidOctober1,3,4,6,8,13,23and24,
ibidNovember6,7,8and18,ibidDecember5,9and10,ibidDecember14,15,18,23and28,ibidDecember31,ibid
January14,ManilaTimes:FourstudentsdiedduringarallyatPlazaMirandaofthiscity.:Studentspicketedthe
PhilippineConstabularyCampatCampCrametoexpresstheirprotestontheuseofthemilitaryforcesagainst
students,andtodemandtheimpeachmentofPresidentMarcos.:Oilfirmsinthecityweretheobjectofbombings
resultingindeathtoatleasttwopersonsandinjuriestoothers.:Ahandgrenadewashurledatthetowerofthe
ABSCBNBroadcastingCorporationinQuezonCity.:AfreshmanstudentoftheUniversityofthePhilippineswas
shotandcriticallywounded,35injured,26werearrestedinviolentincidentsatthecampuswhichatthattimewas
in barricades, while in downtown Manila more than 2.000 students occupied and barricaded Claro M. Recto
Avenueand16personswereinjuredinseparateclashesbetweenthepoliceandstudents.:Aseniorengineering
student was shot when government forces drove into the heart of the University of the Philippines campus to
dispersestudentswhohadsetupbarricadesinthearea,andatleast30womenstudentswerewoundedinthe
climax of the daylong pitch battle in the University between students and the local police and soldiers. : In
downtown Manila, fighting continued between the police and student demonstrators resulting in the death of at
leasttwostudentsandwoundingofscoresofdemonstratorsandpolicemen.:TheU.P.LosBaosArmorywas
blastedbyanexplosion.:TheUnitedStatesEmbassywasagainbombed.:IntheprovinceofDavaostudentriots
erupted in the University of Mindanao killing at least one student. : At least 18 persons were killed in Cotabato
duringencountersbetweengovernmentforcesandthesocalledrebels.:Violentdemonstrationsandindignation
rallieswereheldinManilaaswellasintheprovinceofTarlac.:TwoConstabularytrooperswereambushedby
HuksunderCommanderDanteinthepoblacionofCapas,Tarlac.:AbombexplodedinQuezonCitydestroying
thestatuesymbolizingfriendshipbetweentheFilipinosandtheAmericans.:ThemonthofMaywasabloodyone.
Labor Day, May 1, was celebrated by the workers and student activists with a demonstration before Congress,
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and a clash between the demonstrators and the Police and Metrocom forces resulted in death to several
demonstratorsandinjuriestomany.:Twoarmytroopersandatleast8HuksincludingaCommanderwerekilled
during military operations against the communist New People's Army in Isabela. : Peace and order situation in
Mindanao worsened. Continued clashes between government forces and rebels resulted in the evacuation of
thousandsofMuslimsandChristiansalikefromseveraltownsinCotabatoandabandof50gunmenattackeda
party of top government officials led by Defense Secretary Juan Enrile while inspecting a Mosque where 56
MuslimswerereportedlymassacredinBarrioManalili,Carmen,Cotabato.:Violencecontinuedtobeunabatedin
ManilawithaQuezonCityactivistshotdeadand3driversinvolvedinthejeepneystrikebombedandinjured.:A
publicmeetingbeingheldatPlazaMiranda,Manila,bytheLiberalPartyforthepresentationofitscandidatesin
the general elections scheduled for November 8, 1971 was marred by what is now known as the brutal Plaza
Miranda incident where 8 persons were killed and scores were injured including the candidates of the party,
caused by the throwing of two hand grenades at the platform. : President Marcos issued a proclamation
suspendingtheprivilegeofthewritof.
January21,ibidJanuary23,ibidJanuary27,IbidFebruary2,ibidFebruary3,ibidFebruary4,5,6and7,ibidFebruary11,
ibidFebruary13,ibidFebruary17,ibidFebruary27,ibidMarch17,18,19and25,ibidApril23,EveningNewsApril30,ibidMay
2and3,PhilippinesHeraldMay7,ibidJune24,25and26,ManilatimesJune22,EveningNewsAugust21,ibidAugust23,
ibidhabeascorpus
January 12, Manila Times: President Marcos restored the privilege of the writ of in the entire country. : In the
meantime, in Congress a bill was introduced to repeal the antisubversion law. : Violent demonstrations in the
school belt resumed. : In the province of Zambales an encounter between PC troopers and the New People's
Armywasreported.March1,:TheprovinceofCavitewasplacedunderPhilippineConstabularycontrolbecause
oftherashofkillingsinwhichlocalofficialswerethevictims,oneofwhomwasCaviteCityMayorRoxas.:Araid
was conducted by the Philippine Constabulary in a house in Quezon City resulting in the seizure of 36 high
powered firearms, 2 hand grenades and a dismantled machinegun while in the province of Isabela 6 persons
including a noncommissioned officer of the 10th Infantry Battalion were killed in a gun battle between
government soldiers and the New People's Army. : The New People's Army raided Capas, Tarlac, destroying a
portion of the town hall. : More person died in Cotabato and Lanao due to continued violence. : The student
demonstrationonitswaytoCongresstoagitatefortherepealoftheantisubversionlawresultedininjuriestoa
goodnumberofstudentdemonstratorswhentheyclashedwithsecurityguardsinfrontoftheUniversityofSto.
Tomas.InanotherviolentdemonstrationinfrontofArellanoUniversityatleastonestudentwaskilledandothers
werewoundedinanencounterbetweenthedemonstratorsandsecurityguards.Pillboxexplosiveswerehurledat
the gate of Malacaang Palace and a mysterious explosion sparked a fire that gutted the northern wind of the
GreaterManilaTerminalFoodMarketinTaguig,Rizal,whichhadbeenprecededbyothermysteriousexplosions
which shattered portions of the Arca building on Taft Avenue, Pasay, during which propaganda leaflets were
foundshowingthatradicalelementswerebehindthebombings,while9sticksofdynamitewerefounddumpedin
front of the Security Bank and Trust Company branch office in Espaa Street. : Another public official, Mayor
RodolfoGanzonofIloiloCitywaswoundedinanambushand4ofhiscompanionswerekilled.:Sixmorepersons
were killed as government troopers clashed with the New People's Army in the province of Isabela. : Clashes
continued between the Army troops and the New People's Army in Isabela which led the government to send
moretroopstothatprovince.:TheUSEmbassywasagainbombedwhilestrikesinfactorieswerejoinedbyso
called activists. : Hand grenades in the town of Cabugao, Ilocos Sur were thrown resulting in the death of 13. :
ClashescontinuedbetweengovernmenttroopersandtheNewPeople'sArmyintheIlocosprovincesaswellasin
the provinces of Lanao and Zambales. : The New People's Army invaded the provinces of Samar and Leyte. :
Twobigshipmentsofdynamitesticksestimatedat10,000pieceshadalreadybeenshippedtoIlocosSurbeforea
third shipment was intercepted on a bus bound for Cabugao. : More pillbox explosions occurred in the US
Embassy during which at least 5 persons were hurt while the pickets at the embassy led by the Kabataang
Makabayan continued. : At least 30 persons were wounded when radical vanguards of about 5,000
demonstrators clashed with about 200 Metrocom troopers in the vicinity of the US Embassy. : The Philippine
Independence Day was marred by rallies of youth and worker groups which denounced US imperialism, with
demonstrators numbering about 10,000 from Southern Luzon, Central Luzon and the Greater Manila area
convergingatPlazaMirandaandduringthedemonstrationexplosionsofpillboxbombsoccurred.:Thesituation
inMindanaowascriticalandhadworsened.:Atimebombexplodedinoneoftheroomsinthesecondfloorofthe
Court of Industrial Relations building in Manila. : An explosion shattered the western section of the Philamlife
building in Ermita, Manila. : Thirtyfive persons were wounded in pillbox explosions when 2 groups of
demonstratorsclashedwitheachotheratLiwasangBonifacio,thenwithpolicemenneartheUSEmbassy,asthe
protest rallies against US imperialism held in conjunction with the July 4th celebration came to a bloody end.
DeputyPoliceChiefCol.JamesBarberswhosuffered40pelletwoundsontheleftsideofthebodywasamong
thevictims.:Raiderskilled53inZamboangafightingwasalsogoingoninLanaodelNorte.DefenseSecretary
Juan Ponce Enrile yesterday described the Mindanao developments as "grave". : President Marcos ordered
Zamboanga drive Armed Forces of the Philippines landseaair operations were launched while Mayor
Diogracias Carmona of Dimataling, Zamboanga del Sur, was killed in a new clash. : A panel of lawyers have
advised President Marcos that it would be perfectly legal for him to declare martial law, suspend elections, and
continue in office beyond 1973, if the "proper" situation develops next year. : President Marcos said that the
Communist infiltration of feuding Muslim and Christian groups in Mindanao could be just a ploy to draw away
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government troops from Central Luzon and thus leave Manila open to a Red attack. President Marcos ordered
thePCandthearmytocounterattackandrecaptureDigoyoPoint,Palanan,Isabelauponreceiptofreportsthat
outnumberedgovernmenttroopersbattlingNewPeople'sArmyguerrillasinPalananwereforcedtowithdraw.He
said that the primary target should be the suspected ammunition dump and supply depot of the New People's
ArmyonDigoyoPoint.SixteenPCofficersandenlistedmenwererescuedfrom100NewPeople'sArmyguerrillas
whohadpinnedthemdownonboardashipduringaseaandairoperations.Theoccupiedtheshipnamed"Kuya
MaruKaragatan"reportedtobeofNorthKoreanorigin.Whileinspectingtheship,some100NewPeople'sArmy
guerrillas massed on the beach and fired at them. : President Marcos said that the vessel which landed off
Palanan,Isabela,allegedlywithmilitarysuppliesandequipmentfortheNewPeople'sArmyisownedbyFilipinos
and is registered under Philippine laws. The President also saw in the landing incident evidence of a tieup
between local Communists and foreign suppliers of weapons. : Camp Crame, National PC headquarters,
announced a report from Task Force Saranay that government troopers had found hundreds of weapons of
Americanmake,including467M14rifles,in2abandonedcampsinDigoyoPoint,Palanan,Isabela.August19,:
Rallies were held to mark the first year of the Plaza Miranda bombing and suspension of the writ of by the
MovementofConcernedCitizensforCivilLibertieswhichdeclaredAugust21asanationaldayofprotestagainst
militarization.:TheDepartmentofNationalDefenseataconferenceofdefenseandmilitaryofficialsexposeda
planoftheNewPeople'sArmytosowterroranddisorderinthemajorcitiesofthecountrybeforetheendofthe
year 1972, and because of several bombing incidents at the Department of Foreign Affairs, Philamlife building,
"The Daily Star Office" a newspaper publication, the IPI building and an armored car of the Philippine Banking
Corporation, the Philippine Constabulary declared a red alert in the metropolitan area. : Six army soldiers were
killed when they were ambushed by the New People's Army in Cawayan, Isabela. September 6, : One woman
was killed and 60 others were injured when a time bomb exploded in a department store in Cariedo Street,
Quiapo,Manila,atabout8:30intheeveningofSeptember5whichincidentwasthemostseriousintheseriesof
bombingswhichtookplaceingreaterManilaandwhichaccordingtoArmyIntelligencesourceswastheworkof
"subversiveelementsouttosowfear,confusionanddisorderintheheartofthepopulation.":Terroristbombers
struck again the night before destroying three vital offices in the ground floor of the City hall of Manila and
wounding2telephoneoperators.:AgunbattleensuedbetweentheNewPeople'sArmyandMetrocomsoldiers
at Pandacan, Manila, near the Oil refineries which led to the sending of Army troops to guard oil depots. :
President Marcos warned that he has under consideration the necessity for exercising his emergency powers
undertheConstitutionindealingwithintensifiedactivitiesoflocalMaoists.:Asifinanswertothiswarningofthe
President, two time bombs exploded in the Quezon City Hall which disrupted the plenary session of the
constitutionalConventionandasubversioncaseCourtofFirstInstanceJudgeJulianLustre.
habeascorpusJanuary29,IbidFebruary2,3,5and10,IbidFebruary4,ibidIbidMarch2,ibidMarch5,ibidMarch9,ibidMarch
14,16,18,21and27,ibidMarch23,ibidMarch26,ibidApril16and17,ibidApril20and25,ibidApril26,ibidApril27,ibidApril
30,ibidMay4,ibidMay12and16,ibidMay21,ibidJune13,ibidJune18,ibidJune24,ibidJuly4,ibidJuly5,ibidJuly6,
ibidJuly7,ibidJuly8,ibidJuly9,ibidJuly10,ibidJuly15,ibidIbidhabeascorpusAugust31,ibidSeptember3,
ibidIbidSeptember10,ibidSeptember12,ibidSeptember13,ibidSeptember19,ibid
1970
1971
1972
TheforegoingeventstogetherwithotherdatainthepossessionofthePresidentasCommanderinChiefofthe
ArmedForcesledhimtoconcludethat"thereisthroughoutthelandastateofanarchyandlawlessness,chaos
and disorder, turmoil and destruction of a magnitude equivalent to an actual war between the force of our duly
constitutedgovernmentandtheNewPeople'sArmyandtheirsatelliteorganizations...inadditiontotheabove
described social disorder, there is also the equally serious disorder in Mindanao and Sulu resulting from the
unsettled conflict between certain elements of the Christian and Muslim population of Mindanao and Sulu,
between the Christian 'Ilaga' and the Muslim 'Barracudas', and between our government troops, and certain
lawlessorganizationssuchastheMindanaoIndependenceMovement...",thatthisstateof"rebellionandarmed
action" caused "serious demoralization among our people and have made the public apprehensive and fearful"
and that "public order and safety and the security of the nation demand that immediate, swift, decisive and
effectiveactionbetakentoprotectandinsurethepeace,orderandsecurityofthecountryanditspopulationand
tomaintaintheauthorityofthegovernment."(seeProclamation1081)
Petitioners vigorously dispute all the above conclusions of the President and maintain that the situation in the
countryasofSeptember21,1972,didnotwarrantaproclamationofmartiallawthus,Congresswasinsession,
thecourtswereopen,theConstitutionalConventionof1971wasinprogress,etc.Petitionersinvokeintheirfavor
the"opencourtrule"espousedintheAmericancasesof,4Wallace2,1866,and,327U.S.304,1945,90L.Ed.
688.InMilliganthemajorityoffiveJusticesoftheSupremeCourtheldamongothersthat"(M)artialrulecannever
exist where the courts are open and in the proper and unobstructed exercise of their jurisdiction", which ruling
wasreaffirmedin.
ExParteMilliganDuncanvs.KahanamokuDuncan
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MuchhasbeensaidandwrittenbymyColleaguesonthemeritsanddemeritsoftheandjurisprudence.Formy
partIshallsimplystatethatIdonotviewthesetwocasesascontrollingauthorityonwhatisthetestofan"actual
andrealnecessity"formartiallawtoexistbecausethesetwocasesweremainlyconcernedwiththejurisdictionof
a military commission (Milligan case) and a military tribunal (Duncan case) to try civilians for offenses generally
cognizablebycivilcourts,andthedecisioninthesetwocasessimplyupholdstheprinciplethatwherecourtsare
open to exercise their jurisdiction, these civilians must not be denied their rights guaranteed under the Bill of
Rights one of which is trial by jury in a civil court. "In other words, the civil courts must be utterly incapable of
trying criminals or dispensing justice in their usual manner before the Bill of Rights may be temporarily
suspended."(Duncanvs.Kahanamoku,p.703)Furthermore,Iwouldanswertheargumentsofpetitionerswith
thefollowingcriticalobservationofProfessorWilloughbyontherulingbasedonthedissentoffourJusticesinthe
case,andIquote:
MilliganDuncansupraMilligan
...Thestatementistooabsolutelymadethat'martiallawcannotarisefromathreatenedinvasion.Thenecessity
must be actual and present the invasion real, such as effectually closes the courts and deposes the civil
administration.'Itiscorrecttosaythat'thenecessitymustbeactualandpresent,'butitisnot,,astheminority
justicescorrectlypointedout,.Thebetterdoctrine,then,is,notforthecourttoattempttodetermineinadvance
withrespecttoanyoneelement,whatdoes,andwhatdoesnotcreateanecessityformartiallaw,but,asinall
othercasesoftheexerciseofofficialauthority,totestthelegalityofanactbyitsspecialcircumstances.Certainly
thefactthatthecourtsareopenandundisturbedwillinallcasesfurnishapowerfulpresumptionthatthereisno
necessity for a resort to martial law, but it should not furnish an irrebuttable presumption. (Willoughby,
ConstitutionoftheUnitedStates,Vol.3,2Ed.,p.1602,emphasissupplied)
correcttosaythatthisnecessitycannotbepresentexceptwhenthecourtsareclosedanddeposedfromcivil
administrationfortheremaybeurgentnecessityformartialruleevenwhenthecourtsareopen
Tostresshispoint,ProfessorWilloughbygavethefollowingexample:
TheEnglishdoctrineofmartiallawissubstantiallysimilartothis,andanexcellentillustrationofthepointunder
discussionisgivenbycertaineventsgrowingoutofthelateBritishBoerwar.
DuringthatstrugglemartiallawwasproclaimedbytheBritishGovernmentthroughouttheentireextentofCape
Colony,thatis,indistrictswherenoactivemilitaryoperationswerebeingconductedandwherethecourtswere
open and undisturbed, but where considerable sympathy with the Boers and disaffection with the English rule
existed.SirFrederickPollock,discussingtheproperlawofthesubjectwithreferencetothearrestofoneMarais,
upholdsthejudgmentoftheJudicialCommitteeofthePrivyCouncil(A.C.109,1902)inwhichthatcourtdeclined
to hold that the absence of open disorder, and the undisturbed operation of the courts furnished conclusive
evidencethatmartiallawwasunjustified.(,pp.16021603)
ibid
Coming back to our present situation, it can be said, that the fact that our courts were open on September 21,
1972,didnotprecludetheexistenceofan"actualandpresentnecessity"fortheproclamationofmartiallaw.As
indicated earlier, the state of communist activities as well as of other dissident movements in this country
summarizedbythisCourtinandmanifestedintherecitalofeventsgiveninthisOpinionconstitutedthe"actual
andpresentnecessity"whichledthePresidenttoplacetheentirecountryundermartiallaw.
Lansangvs.Garcia
IV
Contrarytorespondent'sclaim,theproclamationofmartiallawinthecountrydidnotcarrywithittheautomatic
suspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritofforthesereasons:,fromtheverynatureofthewritofwhichasstressed
in the early portion of this Opinion is a "writ of liberty" and the "most important and most immediately available
safeguard of that liberty", the privilege of the writ be suspended . The Bill of Rights (Art. 111, Sec. 1(14), 1935
Constitution, Art. IV, Sec. 15, 1973 Constitution) categorically states that the privilege of the writ of shall not be
suspendedforcausesthereinspecified,andtheproclamationofmartiallawisoneofthoseenumerated.
habeascorpusFirsthabeascorpuscannotbymereimplicationhabeascorpusexceptnot23Second,thesocalledCommander
inChiefclause,eitherunderArt.VII,Sec.10(2),1935Constitution,orArt.IX,Sec.12,1973Constitution,provides
specificallyforthreedifferentmodesofexecutiveactionintimesofemergency,andonemodedoesnotnecessarily
encompasstheother,,(a)callingoutthearmedforcestopreventorsuppresslawlessness,etc.,(b)suspensionofthe
privilegeofthewritof,and(e)placingthecountryorapartthereofundermartiallaw.Inthelattertwoinstancesevenifthe
causesfortheexecutiveactionarethesame,stilltheexigenciesofthesituationmaywarrantthesuspensionofthe
privilegeofthewritbutnotaproclamationofmartiallawandviceversa.Third,therecanbeanautomaticsuspensionofthe
privilegeofthewritwhen,withthedeclarationofmartiallaw,thereisatotalcollapseofthecivilauthorities,thecivilcourts
areclosed,andamilitarygovernmenttakesover,inwhicheventtheprivilegeofthewritisnecessarilysuspendedforthe
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simplereasonthatthereisnocourttoissuethewritthat,however,isnotthecasewithusatpresentbecausethemartial
lawproclaimedbythePresidentupholdsthesupremacyoftheciviloverthemilitaryauthority,vizhabeascorpus24andthe
courtsareopentoissuethewrit.
V
Respondents argue that with a valid proclamation of martial law, all orders, decrees, and other acts of the
President pursuant to said proclamation are likewise valid: that these acts were expressly declared legal and
bindinginArt.XVII,Sec.3(2),ofthe1973Constitutionwhichisnowinfullforceandeffect,andconsequentlythe
arrestofpetitionersislegal,ithavingbeenmadeinaccordancewithGeneralOrderNo.2ofthePresident.
I cannot give my unqualified assent to respondents' sweeping statement which in effect upholds the view that
whateverdefects,substantiveorprocedural,mayhavetaintedtheorders,decrees,orotheractsofthePresident
have been cured by the confirmatory vote of the sovereign people manifested through their ratification of the
1973Constitution.Icannotdoso,becauseIrefusetobelievethatapeoplethathaveembracedtheprinciplesof
democracyin"blood,sweat,andtears"wouldthusthrowawayalltheirpreciousliberties,thesacredinstitutions
enshrinedintheirConstitution,forthatwouldbetheresultifwesaythatthepeoplehavestampedtheirapproval
onalltheactsofthePresidentexecutedaftertheproclamationofmartiallawirrespectiveofanytaintofinjustice,
arbitrariness, oppression, or culpable violation of the Constitution that may characterize such acts. Surely the
peopleactingthroughtheirconstitutionaldelegatescouldnothavewrittenafundamentallawwhichguarantees
theirrightstolife,liberty,andproperty,andatthesametimeinthesameinstrumentprovidedforaweaponthat
couldspelldeathtotheserights.Nolessthanthemanconcerned,PresidentFerdinandE.Marcos,hastimeand
againemphasizedthefactthatnotwithstandingtheexistenceofmartiallawoursisagovernmentrununderthe
Constitutionandthattheproclamationofmartiallawis.
undertheRuleofLaw25Ifthatisso,andthatishowitshouldbe,thenalltheactsofthePresidentmustbowtothe
mandatesoftheConstitution.
ThatthisviewthatwetakeisthecorrectonecanbeseenfromtheverytextofSee.3(2),Art.XVIIofthe1973
Constitutionwhichprovides:
All proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and acts promulgated, issued, or done by the incumbent
President,andshallremainvalid,legal,binding,andeffectiveevenafterliftingofmartiallawortheratificationof
this Constitution, unless modified, revoked, or superseded by subsequent proclamations, orders, decrees,
instructions,orotheractsoftheincumbentPresident,orunlessexpresslyandexplicitlymodifiedorrepealedby
theregularNationalAssembly.(emphasissupplied)
shallbepartofthelawoftheland
As stated in the abovequoted provision, all the proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and acts
promulgated,issued,ordonebytheincumbentPresidentshallbethetextdidnotsaythattheyshallbepartof
thefundamentalorbasiclawtheConstitution.Indeed,theframersofthenewConstitutionwerecarefulintheir
choice of phraseology for implicit therein is the Court's power of judicial review over the acts of the incumbent
President in the exercise of his martial law powers during the period of transition from the Presidential to the
Parliamentary regime. For the effect of the aforementioned transitory provision is to invest upon said
proclamations, orders, decrees, and acts of the President the imprimatur of a law but not a constitutional
mandate. Like any other law or statute enacted by the legislative branch of the government, such orders,
decrees, etc. are subject to judicial review when proper under the Constitution to claim the contrary would be
incongruoustosaytheleastforwhiletheactsoftheregularNationalAssemblywhichisthepermanentrepository
oflegislativepowerunderthenewConstitutionaresubjecttojudicialreview,theactsofitstemporarysubstitute,
thatis,theincumbentPresident,performedduringthetransitoryperiodarenot.
partofthelawoftheland
ItiscontendedhoweverthatthetrueintentionoftheConstitutionalDelegatesinprovidingforSection3(2),Article
XVII,inthe1973ConstitutionwastoforecloseanyjudicialinquiryonthevaliditynotonlyofProclamation1081but
also of all subsequent orders, decrees issued and acts performed by the incumbent President. If that was the
intent, then why did that particular provision not state so in clear and unequivocal terms, especially since the
effectwouldbetorestrictifnottodeprivethejudicialbranchofthegovernmentofitspowerofjudicialreviewin
theseinstances?Asitis,thatis,aspresentlyworded,thisparticularprovisionwasratifiedbythepeoplebelieving
that although the acts of the incumbent President were being they still had a recourse to the judicial branch of
theirgovernmentforprotectionorredressshouldsuchactsturnouttobearbitrary,unjust,oroppressive.
madepartofthelawoftheland
GoingbacktoGeneralOrderNo.2,itsvalidityisassailedbypetitionersonthegroundthatitorderedtheirarrest
anddetentionwithoutchargeshavingbeenfiledagainstthembeforethecompetentcourtnorwarrantsfortheir
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arrestissuedbythelatter,allinviolationoftheirconstitutionalrighttodueprocessoflaw.
AstateofmartiallawvestsuponthePresidentnotonlythepowertocallthemilitaryorarmedforcestorepelan
invasion, prevent or suppress an insurrection or rebellion, whenever public safety requires it, but also the
authoritytotakesuchmeasuresasmaybenecessarytoaccomplishthepurposesoftheproclamationofmartial
law.Onesuchmeasureisthearrestanddetentionofpersonswhoareclaimedtobeparticipantsorsuspectedon
reasonablegroundstobesuch,inthecommissionofinsurrectionorrebellion,orinthecaseofaninvasion,who
give aid and comfort to the enemy, the arrest being necessary to insure public safety. It is this element of
necessity present in the case which justifies a curtailment of the rights of petitioners and so long as there is no
showing of arbitrariness or oppression in the act complained of, the Court is duty bound to sustain it as a valid
exercise of the martial law powers of the President. With the foregoing qualification, I agree with the following
statement:
When it comes to a decision by the head of the State upon a matter involving its life, the ordinary rights of
individualsmustyieldtowhathedeemsthenecessitiesofthemoment.Publicdangerwarrantsthesubstitutionof
executiveprocessforjudicialprocess.(Moyervs.Peabody,212U.S.78,53L.Ed.,pp.411,417)
TheissuanceofGeneralOrderNo.2thereforewasavalidinitialsteptakenbythePresidenttorendereffective
thesuppressionofarmedresistancetoourdulyconstitutedgovernment.
Thus,Ivoteforthedismissalofthepetitionsforofthosewhohavebeenconditionallyreleased,because:(1)The
arrest of said petitioners was effected by respondents under a valid Order of the President. (2) The petitioners
concernedhavebeenorderedreleasedfromdetention.Theprimeobjectofawritofistorelieveapersonfrom
physicalrestraintandthishasbeenaccomplishedonrespondentSecretary'sinitiative,(3)Whileitistruethatthe
release of petitioners is subject to certain conditions such as restrictions on petitioners' freedom of movement,
such restrictions are reasonable precautionary measures in the face of public danger, and I do not see any
arbitrarinessintheimpositionofsaidrestrictions.
WithrespecttothecaseofpetitionerAquino,Iconcurinthedismissalofhispetitionforreasonsthat:(1)criminal
chargeshavebeenfiledagainsthimbeforeamilitarycommissionand(2)thelegalissuesposedbyhimwhichare
germanetothisproceedingaredisposedofandresolvedinthemannerindicatedinthisOpinion.Asregardsthe
otherissuessubmittedbyAquino,IagreewithmyColleaguesthatthesamearetoberesolvedintheprohibition
andcertioraricasefiledbyhimwhichisnowpendingbeforetheCourt.
habeascorpus
CONCLUSION
In closing, may I state that it was necessary for me to write this separate Opinion because I found myself at
variance with my Colleagues on certain issues posed by these Petitions for . To recapitulate: (1) Is the
constitutionalsufficiencyofaproclamationofmartiallawbythePresidentapoliticalquestion?Iholdthatitis
notapolitical,butisajusticiableone.(2)Didtheproclamationofmartialautomaticallysuspendtheprivilegeof
the writ of ? No, is my answer. (3) Did Sec. 3(2), Art. XVII of the Transitory Provisions of the 1973 Constitution
foreclosejudicialinquiryintothevalidityofalldecrees,ordersandactsoftheincumbentPresidentexecutedafter
theproclamationofmartiallawandduringtheTransitoryPeriod?Isay:NO,becausethoseactsarestillsubjectto
thepowerofjudicialreviewifandwhentheyareshowntobearbitrary,oppressive,orunjust,inviolationofthe
Constitutionand/orthegenerallyacceptedprinciplesofInternationalLaw,usage'sandcustoms.
My conclusions may not be supported by existing jurisprudence or may even be contrary to the multiple
authorities cited by my senior Colleagues in the Court nonetheless, I humbly offer and submit them as the
spontaneous reactions of my conscience to the issues which in the words of my distinguished Colleague, Mr.
JusticeAntonioP.Barredo,affectnotthepetitionersalonebutthewholecountryandallourpeople.
SeparateOpinions
CASTRO,
J.:
I
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Theseninecasesareapplicationsforwritsof.ThepetitionsaverinsubstancethatonSeptember21,1972the
PresidentofthePhilippinesplacedthecountryundermartiallaw(Proclamation1081)thatonvariousdatesfrom
September22toSeptember30,1972,thepetitionersorthepersonsinwhosebehalftheapplicationsweremade
werearrestedbythemilitaryauthoritiesanddetained,someatFortBonifacioinMakati,Rizal,othersatCamp
AguinaldoandstillothersatCampCrame,bothinQuezonCityandthatthearrestanddetentionofthe
petitionerswereillegal,havingbeeneffectedwithoutavalidorderofacompetentcourtofjustice.
habeascorpus
WritsofwereissuedbytheCourtdirectingtherespondentsSecretaryofNationalDefense,ChiefofStaffofthe
ArmedForcesofthePhilippines,andChiefofthePhilippineConstabulary,toproducethebodiesofthepetitioners
inCourtondesignateddatesandtomakereturnstothewrits.Induetimetherespondents,throughtheSolicitor
General,filedtheirreturnstothewritsandanswerstothepetitions.Admittingthatthepetitionershadbeen
arrestedanddetained,therespondentsneverthelessjustifiedsucharrestanddetentionashavingbeenlegally
orderedbythePresidentofthePhilippinespursuanttohisproclamationofmartiallaw,thepetitionersbeing
regardedasparticipantsorashavinggivenaidandcomfort"intheconspiracytoseizepoliticalandstatepower
andtotakeoverthegovernmentbyforce."Therespondentstraversedthepetitioners'contentionthattheirarrest
anddetentionwereunconstitutional.
habeascorpuz
HearingswereheldonSeptember26and29andOctober6,1972,atwhichthepetitionerswereproducedin
Court.Thereafterthepartiesfiledmemoranda.
Meanwhile,someofthepetitioners,withleaveofCourt,withdrewtheirpetitions
1others,withoutdoingso,weresubsequentlyreleasedfromcustodyundercertainrestrictiveconditions. 2EnriqueVoltaire
GarciaII,thesolepetitionerinL35547andoneofthosereleased,havingdiedshortlyafterhisrelease,theactionwas
deemedabatedastohim.
AsofthisdateonlyJoseW.Diokno,inwhosebehalfthepetitioninL35539wasfiled,andBenignoS.Aquino,Jr.
inL35546,arestillinmilitarycustody.
OnAugust23,1973thepetitionerAquinofiledanactionforandprohibitionwiththisCourtallegingthatonAugust
11,1973chargesofmurder,subversionandillegalpossessionoffirearmswerefiledagainsthimwithamilitary
commissionthathistrialbythemilitarycourtwhichwastobeheldonAugust27,29and31,1973wasillegal
becausetheproclamationofmartiallawwasunconstitutionalandthathecouldnotexpectafairtrialbecausethe
PresidentofthePhilippines,havingprejudgedhiscase,couldreverseanyjudgmentofacquittalbythemilitary
courtandsentencehimtodeath.Thataction,docketedasL37364andentitled"No.2,"isstillpending
considerationanddecision.
certiorariBenignoS.Aquino,Jr.vs.MilitaryCommission
Ontheotherhand,JoseW.Diokno,onDecember28,1973,filedamotiontowithdrawthepetitionfiledinhis
behalf,imputingdelayinthedispositionofhiscase,andasseveratingthatbecauseofthedecisionoftheCourtin
theRatificationCases
3andtheactionofthemembersoftheCourtintakinganoathtosupportthenewConstitution,hecannot"reasonablyexpect
togetjusticeinthiscase."Therespondentsopposethemotiononthegroundsthatthereisapublicinterestinthedecision
ofthesecasesandthatthereasonsgivenforthemotiontowithdrawareuntrue,unfairandcontemptuous.
II
ThethresholdquestioniswhethertoallowthewithdrawalofthepetitioninL35539filedinbehalfofDiokno.Inhis
lettertohiscounsel,whichisthebasisofthemotiontowithdraw,Dioknostatesthefollowingconsiderations:,the
delayinthedispositionofhiscase,thedismissalofthepetitionsintheRatificationCases,contrarytotheCourt's
rulingthatthe1973Constitutionwasnotvalidlyratifiedand,theactionofthemembersoftheCourtintakingan
oathofallegiancetothenewConstitution.Dioknoassertsthat"aconsciencethatallowsamantorotbehindbars
formorethanoneyearandthreemonthswithouttrialofcourse,withoutanychargesatallisaconscience
thathasbecomestunted,ifnotstultified"andthat"inswearingtosupportthenew'Constitution,'thefivemembers
oftheCourtwhohadheldthatithadnotbeenvalidlyratified,havenotfulfilledourexpectations."Hegoesonto
say:"Idonotblamethem.IdonotknowwhatIwouldhavedoneintheirplace.But,atthesametime,Icannot
continuetoentrustmycasetothemandIhavebecomethoroughlyconvincedthatourquestforjusticeinmy
caseisfutile."
firstsecondthird
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Asalreadynoted,theSolicitorGeneral,inbehalfoftherespondents,opposesthewithdrawalofthepetitiononthe
groundofpublicinterest,addingthatthemotiontowithdrawcannotbegrantedbytheCourtwithoutineffect
admittingthe"unfair,untrueandcontemptuous"statementscontainedtherein.
Withoutpassingontheliabilityofanypartyinthiscaseforcontemptuousstatementsmade,theCourt(byavote
of5to7)deniedthemotion.
IvotedforthedenialofthemotiontowithdrawforinescapablereasonsthatInowproceedtoexpound.
Thegeneralruleisthatintheabsenceofastatuteexpresslyorimpliedlyprohibitingthewithdrawalofanaction,
thepartybringingsuchactionmaydismissitevenwithouttheconsentofthedefendantorrespondentwherethe
latterwillnotbeprejudiced,althoughitmaybenecessarytoobtainleaveofcourt.Buttherearerecognized
exceptions:whentheareinvolved.
publicinterestorquestionsofpublicimportance5Forexample,thefactthatafinaldeterminationofaquestioninvolvedin
anactionisneededorwillbeusefulasaguidefortheconductofpublicofficersortribunalsisasufficientreasonfor
retaininganactionwhichwouldorshouldotherwisebedismissed.Likewise,appealsmayberetainedifthequestions
involvedarelikelytoarisefrequentlyinthefutureunlesstheyaresettledbyacourtoflastresort.
Thus,in,
Gonzalesvs.CommissiononElections6anactionfordeclaratoryjudgmentimpugningthevalidityofRepublicActNo.4880
whichprohibitstheearlynominationofcandidatesforelectiveofficesandearlyelectioncampaignsorpartisanpolitical
activitiesbecamemootbyreasonoftheholdingofthe1967electionsbeforedecisioncouldberendered.Nonethelessthe
Courttreatedthepetitionasoneforprohibitionandrenderedjudgmentinviewof"theparamountpublicinterestandthe
undeniablenecessityforaruling,thenationalelections[of1969]beingbarelysixmonthsaway.
In,
Krivenkovs.RegisterofDeeds7theCourtdeniedthepetitiontowithdraw,anappealinviewofthepublicimportanceofthe
questionsinvolved,andlest"theconstitutionalmandate[proscribingthesaleoflandstoaliens]...beignoredor
misconceivedwithalltheharmfulconsequences...uponthenationaleconomy."
ThepetitionerDioknohasmadeallegationstotheeffectthatthePresidenthas"arrogated"untohimselfthe
powersofgovernmentby"usurping"thepowersofCongressand"ousting"thecourtsoftheirjurisdiction,thus
establishinginthiscountrya"virtualdictatorship."DioknoandhisCounselhaveinfactstressedthatthepresent
trendofeventsinthiscountrysincetheproclamationofmartiallawbearsaresemblancetothetrendofevents
thatledtotheestablishmentofadictatorshipinGermanyunderHitler.Thereisthusaprofoundpublicinterestin
theresolutionofthequestionsraisedinthecasesatbar,questionsthat,inthephraseofChiefJusticeMarshallin
,
Marburyvs.Madison8are"deeplyinterestingtothenation."Iapprehendthatinviewoftheimportoftheallegationsmade
byDioknoandhiscounsel,incalculableharmor,intheveryleast,greatdisservicemaybecausedtothenationalinterestif
thesecasesarenotdecidedonthemerits.AstheSolicitorGeneralhasobserved,"petitioner's[Diokno's]arrestand
detentionhavebeensoexploitedinthehatecampaignthattheonlywaytoprotecttheintegrityofthegovernmentisto
insistonadecisionofthiscaseintheforuminwhichthepetitionerhadchosentobringthem.Otherwise,likefestering
sores,theissuesstirredupbythislitigationwillcontinuetoagitatethenation."
Prescindingfromthepolicyconsiderationsjustdiscussed,IamgladdenedthattheCourthasnotshuntedaside
whatIregardastheinescapablemoralconstraintsinthepetitionerDiokno'smotiontowithdrawhispetitionfor.
habeascorpus9TheCourtrepudiatedthefacilerecourseofavoidingresolutionoftheissuesonthepretextthatDiokno
insistsonwithdrawinghispetition.Itisthusnotamerehappenstancethat,notwithstandingthatsevenmembersofthe
CourtareoftheviewthatDioknohasanabsoluterighttowithdrawhispetition,theCourthasconfrontedtheissuesposed
byhim,andnowresolvesthemsquarely,definitivelyandcourageously.Norespectablelegalhistorianorresponsible
chroniclerofthenation'sdestinywillthereforehaveanyreasontoleveltheindictmentthatonceuponagravenationalcrisis
theCourtabdicateditsconstitutionalprerogativeofadjudicationandforsworethesacredtrustreposedinitasthenation's
ultimatearbiterontranscendental,farreachingjusticiablequestions.
Withrespecttothereasonsgivenforthemotiontowithdraw,theCourtismindfulthatithastakensometimeto
resolvethesecases.Inexplanationletitbesaidthattheissuespresentedforresolutioninthesecasesareofthe
utmostgravityanddelicateness.Noquestionoftheawesomemagnitudeofthoseherepresentedhasever
confrontedtheCourtinallitshistory.Iamnotawarethatanyothercourt,exceptpossiblytheCircuitCourtin,
ExparteMerryman10hasdecidedlikequestionsduringtheperiodoftheemergencythatcalledfortheproclamationof
martiallaw.
ButthenintheCourtthereheldthatundertheU.S.FederalConstitutionthePresidentdidnothavepowerto
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suspendtheprivilegeofthewritof.Otherwise,wherethequestioninvolvednotpowerbutrathertheexerciseof
power,courtshavedeclinedtoruleagainstthedulylasted.AsCourtGlendonSchubertnoted,theU.S.Supreme
Court"wasunwillingto[doso]untilthewarwasoverandLincolnwasdead."
Merrymanhabeascorpus
Thus,in,
ExparteMilligan11thedecisionvoidingthepetitioner'strialbyamilitarycourtwasnotannounceduntilDecember14,1866,
aftertheCivilWarwasover.TheCivilWarbeganonMay3,1861withthecaptureofFortSumterbyConfederateforces.
LambdinMilliganwaschargedbeforeamilitarycommissionwithaidingrebels,incitinginsurrection,disloyalpracticesand
violationofthelawsofwar.HistrialranfromSeptembertoDecember1862hewasconvictedonOctober21,1864and
orderedexecutedonMay19,1865.OnMay10,1865heappliedforawritoffromtheCircuitCourtofIndianapolis.OnMay
11,JusticeDavisandJudgeMcDonaldcertifiedthattheydifferedinopinionand,therefore,pursuanttothestatuteof1802,
elevatedtheirquestionstotheSupremeCourt.OnJune3,1865thedeathsentencewascommutedtolifeimprisonmentby
PresidentJohnsonwhohadsucceededtothePresidencyaftertheassassinationofLincoln.TheSupremeCourtheardthe
parties'argumentsforeightdays,onMarch5,6,7,8,9,12and13,andApril3,1866.OnDecember14,1866thedecision
oftheSupremeCourtvoidingMilliganstrialwasannounced..habeascorpus
In,
InReMoyer12martialrulewasproclaimedinColoradoonMarch23,1904.ApplicationforawritofwasfiledwiththeState
SupremeCourtonApril14,1904,seekingthereleaseofMoyerwhohadbeendetainedundertheColoradogovernor's
proclamation.OnJune6,1904thecomplaintwasdismissedandthepetitionerwasremandedtothecustodyofthemilitary
authorities.TheCourtheldthatasanincidenttotheproclamationofmartiallaw,thepetitioner'sarrestanddetentionwere
lawful.MoyersubsequentlybroughtanactionfordamagesforhisimprisonmentfromMarch30toJune15,1904.The
complaintwasdismissedbytheCircuitCourt.Onwritoferror,theU.S.SupremeCourtaffirmed,holdingthat"Solongas
sucharrestsaremadeingoodfaithandinthehonestbeliefthattheyareneededinordertoheadtheinsurrectionoff,the
governoristhefinaljudgeandcannotbesubjectedtoanactionafterheisoutofoffice,onthegroundthathehadno
reasonablegroundforhisbelief."habeascorpus13
Finally,in,
Duncanvs.Kahanamoku14HawaiiwasplacedundermartialruleonDecember7,1941,aftertheJapanesesneakattackon
PearlHarbor.ThepetitionerDuncanwastriedbyaprovostcourtonMarch2,1944,andfoundguiltyonApril13ofassault
ontwomarinesentries.Theotherpetitioner,White,waschargedonAugust25,1942,alsobeforeaprovostcourt,with
embezzlingstocksbelongingtoanothercivilian.WhiteandDuncanquestionedthepowerofthemilitarytribunalsinpetitions
forfiledwiththeDistrictCourtofHawaiionMarch14andApril14,1944,respectively.WritsweregrantedonMay2,1944,
andaftertrialtheDistrictCourtheldthemilitarytrialsvoidandorderedthereleaseofDuncanandWhite.OnOctober24,
1944theprivilegeofthewritofwasrestoredandmartiallawwasterminatedinHawaii.Onappeal,thedecisionofthe
DistrictCourtwasreversed.habeascorpushabeascorpus15CertiorariwasgrantedbytheU.S.SupremeCourtonFebruary
12,1945.16OnFebruary25,1946theCourtheldthatthetrialsofWhiteandDuncanbythemilitarytribunalswerevoid.
Intruth,astheCourtinrecognized,itsdecisioncouldnothavebeenmadewhiletheCivilWarlasted.Justice
Daviswrote:
Milligan
DuringtheWickedRebellion,thetemperofthetimesdidnotallowthatcalmnessindeliberationanddiscussionso
necessarytoacorrectconclusionofapurelyjudicialquestion.Then,considerationsofsafetyweremingledwith
theexerciseofpowerandfeelingsandinterestsprevailedwhicharehappilyterminated.Nowthatthepublic
safetyisassured,thisquestionaswellasallothers,canbediscussedanddecidedwithoutpassionorthe
admixtureofanclementnotrequiredtoformalegaljudgment.Weapproachedtheinvestigationofthiscasefully
sensibleofthemagnitudeoftheinquiryandtheoffullandcautiousdeliberation.
17
Nodoubtthereisapoint,althoughcontroversial,intheobservationthatintheinstancesjustexamineda
successfulchallengewaspossibleonlyretroactively,afterthecessationofthehostilitieswhichwouldunderany
circumstanceshavejustifiedthejudgmentofthemilitary.
18
NordiditoffendagainstprincipleorethicsforthemembersofthisCourttotakeanoathtosupportthe1973
Constitution.AfterthisCourtdeclaredthat,withthedismissalofthepetitionsquestioningthevalidityofthe
ratificationofthenewConstitution,therewas"nolongeranyjudicialobstacletothenewConstitutionbeing
consideredinforceandeffect,"
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19itbecamethedutyofthemembersoftheCourt,letaloneallothergovernmentfunctionaries,totakeanoathtosupport
thenewConstitution.Whileitistruethatamajorityofsixjusticesdeclaredthatthe1973Constitutionwasnotvalidly
ratified,itisequallytruethatamajorityofsixjusticesheldthattheissueofitswasapoliticalquestion,whichtheCourtwas
notequippedtodetermine,dependingasitdidonfactorsforwhichthejudicialprocesswasnotfittoresolve.Resolutionof
thisquestionwasdispositiveofalltheissuespresentedintheRatificationCases.Itthusbecameuntenableforthe
membersoftheCourtwhoheldcontraryopinionstopresstheiroppositionbeyondthedecisionofthosecases.Fundamental
respectfortheruleoflawdictatedthatthemembersoftheCourttakeanoathtoupholdthenewConstitution.Thereis
nothinginthatsolemnoaththatdebasestheirindividualpersonalintegrityorrendersthemunworthyorincapableofdoing
justiceinthesecases.Nordidtheenvironmentalmilieuoftheiradjurationinanymannerdemeantheirhighofficesordetract
fromthelegitimacyoftheCourtasthehighestjudicialcollegiumoftheland.effectivity
III
FromitsAngloSaxonoriginandthroughoutitsslowevolution,theconcept,scopeandboundaries,application,
limitationsandotherfacetsofmartiallawhavebeenthesubjectofmisunderstanding,controversyanddebate.
20Tothelegalscholarinterestedinsetlegalprinciplesandprecisedistinctions,martiallawcouldbeafrustratingsubject.
Onthematterofitsdefinitionalone,itisknowntohaveasmanydefinitionsastherearenumerousauthorsandcourt
decisions(nottodiscountthedissentingopinions)onthesubject.Thedoctrinaldevelopmentofmartiallawhasrelied
mainlyoncaselaw,21andtherehavebeenrelativelyfewtypesofoccasionswheremartiallaw,beingtheextraordinary
remedythatitis,hasbeenresortedto.trulydistinctive
InthePhilippines,theonlyothernotableinstancewhenmartiallawwasdeclaredwasonSeptember22,1944,
perProclamationNo.29promulgatedbyPresidentJoseP.Laurel.Butthiswaspursuanttotheconstitutionofthe
shortlivedJapaneseOccupationRepublic,andtheeventhasnotbeenknowntobeproductiveofany
jurisprudentialpronouncementsemanatingfromthehighcourtoftheland.
NotwithstandingtheconfusedstateofjurisprudenceonthesubjectofmartiallawinEnglandandintheUnited
States,and,consequently,inthePhilippines,ausefulknowledgeofthelawonthesubjectcanfairlybehadfrom
astudyofitshistoricalbackgroundanditsrationale,itsdoctrinaldevelopment,applicableconstitutionaland
statutoryprovisions,andauthoritativecourtdecisionsandcommentaries.
LegalscholarstracethegenesisofmartiallawtoEnglandstartingfromtheageoftheTudorsandtheStuartsin
the14thcenturywhenitwasfirstutilizedforthesuppressionofrebellionsanddisorders.Itlatercametobe
employedintheBritishcoloniesanddominionswhereitsfrequentexerciseagainstBritishsubjectsgaveriseto
thecriticismthatitwasbeingexploitedasaweapontoenhanceBritishimperialism.
22
IntheUnitedStates,martiallawwasdeclaredonnumerousoccasionsfromtherevolutionaryperiodtotheCivil
War,andaftertheturnofthecentury.OneoftheearliestinstancesinAmericanhistorywasthedeclarationof
martiallawbyGen.AndrewJacksonbeforetheBattleofNewOrleansin1814.FearingthattheNewOrleans
legislaturemightcapitulatetotheBritish,heplacedtheStateunder"strictmartiallaw"andforbadetheState
legislaturetoconvene.MartiallawwasliftedaftertheAmericanvictoryoverBritisharms.TheCivilWarperiod
sawthedeclarationofmartiallawonmanyoccasionsbyboththeConfederateandtheUnionauthorities.Ithas
alsobeenresortedtoincasesofinsurrectionandrebellion,asexemplifiedbytheWhiskeyrebellion(1794in
PennsylvaniaandVirginia)andtheDorr'srebellion(1842inRhodeIsland).Martiallawhasalsobeenutilized
duringperiodsofdisaster,suchastheSanFranciscoearthquakeandfireof1906,andinindustrialdisputes
involvingviolenceanddisorder.Ithaslikewisebeenvariouslyinstitutedtopoliceelections,totakechargeofticket
salesatafootballgame,topreventtheforeclosureofmortgagestoclosearacetrack.Inanextremecase,the
governorofGeorgiaproclaimedmartiallawaroundagovernmentbuildingtoexcludefromitspremisesapublic
officialwhomhewasenjoinedfromremoving.
23
AtthecloseoftheWorldWarI,theterm"martiallaw"waserroneouslyemployedtorefertothelawadministered
inenemyterritoryoccupiedbythealliedforcespendingthearmistice.21WilliamWinthropstatesthattheearlier
confusionregardingtheconceptofmartiallaw,resultingpartlyfromthewrongdefinitionofthetermbytheDuke
ofWellingtonwhohadsaidthat"itisnothingmorenorlessthanthewillofthegeneral,"hadmisledeventhe
SupremeCourtoftheUnitedStates.
25Intheleadingcaseof,ExParteMilligan 26however,ChiefJusticeChase,inhisdissentingopinion,clarifiedandlaid
downtheclassicdistinctionsbetweenthetypesofinrelationtotheterms"martiallaw,""militarylaw"and"military
government,"whichtoagreatextentclearedtheconfusionintheapplicationoftheseterms.militaryjurisdiction
ThesedistinctionswerelaterincorporatedintheManualforCourtsMartialoftheUnitedStatesArmy,
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27afterwhichtheManualforCourtsMartialoftheArmedForcesofthePhilippines,promulgatedonDecember17,1938
pursuanttoExecutiveOrderNo.178,waspatterned.Inessence,thesedistinctionsareasfollows:
a.Militaryjurisdictioninrelationtothetermisthatexercisedbyagovernment"intheexecutionofthatbranchof
itsmunicipallawwhichregulatesitsmilitaryestablishment."(IntheU.S.andthePhilippines,thisrefersprincipally
tothestatuteswhichembodytherulesofconductanddisciplineofmembersoftheirrespectivearmedforces.In
thePhilippineswehaveforthispurposeCommonwealthActNo.408,asamended,otherwiseknownas"The
ArticleofWar").
militarylaw
b.Militaryjurisdictioninrelationtothetermisthatexercisedintimeofrebellionandcivilwarbyagovernment
temporarilygoverningthecivilpopulationofalocalitythroughitsmilitaryforces,withouttheauthorityofwritten
law,asnecessitymayrequire.
martiallaw28
c.Militaryjurisdictioninrelationtotheisthat"exercisedbyabelligerentoccupyinganenemy'sterritory."termmilitary
government29(Afamiliarexampleofamilitarygovernmentwas,ofcourse,thatestablishedandadministeredbythe
JapanesearmedforcesinthePhilippinesfrom1942to1945).
Whatistheuniversallyacceptedfundamentaljustificationofmartiallaw?Wienerin,
APracticalManualMartialLaw30venturesthisjustification:"MartialLawisthepubliclawofnecessity.Necessitycallsit
forth,necessityjustifiesitsexistence,andnecessitymeasurestheextentanddegreetowhichitmaybeemployed."
Martiallawisfoundedupontheprinciplethatthestatehasarighttoprotectitselfagainstthosewhowould
destroyit,andhasthereforebeenlikenedtotherightoftheindividualtoselfdefense.
31Itisinvokedasanextrememeasure,andrestsuponthebasicprinciplethateverystatehasthepowerofself
preservation,apowerinherentinallstates,becauseneitherthestatenorsocietywouldexistwithoutit.32
IV
Inowproceedtodiscusstheissuesposedinthesecases.
InProclamation1081,datedSeptember21,1972,thePresidentofthePhilippinesdeclaredthatlawlesselements,
supportedbyaforeignpower,werein"armedinsurrectionandrebellionagainsttheGovernmentofthe
Philippinesinordertoforciblyseizepoliticalandstatepower,overthrowthedulyconstitutedgovernmentand
supplantourexistingpolitical,social,economicandlegalorderwithanentirelynewone...basedontheMarxist
LeninistMaoistteachingsandbeliefs."Heenumeratedmanyandvariedactsofviolencecommittedinpursuance
oftheinsurrectionandrebellion.HethereforeplacedthePhilippinesundermartiallaw,commandedthearmed
forcestosuppresstheinsurrectionandrebellion,enforceobediencetohisdecrees,ordersandregulations,and
arrestanddetainthoseengagedintheinsurrectionandrebellionorinothercrimes"infurtheranceoronthe
occasionthereof,orincidenttheretoorinconnectiontherewith."ThePresidentinvokedhispowersunderarticle
VIIsection10(2)ofthe1935Constitution"tosavetheRepublicandreformoursociety."
33
ByGeneralOrderNo.2thePresidentdirectedtheSecretaryofNationalDefenseto"forthwitharrestorcausethe
arrest...theindividualsnamedintheattachedlistsforbeingparticipantsorforhavinggivenaidandcomfortin
theconspiracytoseizepoliticalandstatepowerinthecountryandtotakeoverthegovernmentbyforce...in
ordertopreventthemfromfurthercommittingactsthatareinimicalorinjurious..."TheSecretarywasdirectedto
holdincustodytheindividualssoarrested"untilotherwisesoorderedbymeorbymydulydesignated
representative."Thearrestanddetentionofthepetitionersinthesecasesappeartohavebeenmadepursuantto
thisorder.
IcannotblinkawaythestarkfactofacontinuingCommunistrebellioninthePhilippines.TheCourthasrepeatedly
takencognizanceofthisfactinseveraleasesdecidedbyit.In1971,in,
Lansangvs.Garcia34theCourt,afterreviewingthehistoryoftheCommunistmovementinthecountrysincethe1930s,
concluded:"Weentertain,therefore,nodoubtsabouttheexistenceofasizeablegroupofmenwhohavepubliclyrisenin
armstooverthrowthegovernmentandhavethusbeenandstillareengagedinrebellionagainsttheGovernmentofthe
Philippines."Itaffirmedthisfindingin197235insustainingthevalidityoftheAntiSubversionAct(RepublicAct1700).The
ActisitselfacongressionalrecognitionandacuteawarenessofthecontinuingthreatofCommunistsubversionto
democraticinstitutionsinthiscountry.Enactedin1957,ithasremainedinthestatutebooksdespiteperiodicagitationin
manyquartersforitstotalexcision.
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Attimestherebellionrequirednomorethanordinarypoliceaction,coupledwithcriminalprosecutions.Thusthe
1932CommunisttrialsresultedintheconvictionofthewellknownCommunistsoftheday:CrisantoEvangelista,
JacintoG.Manahan,DominadorJ.Ambrosio,GuillermoCapadocia,IgnacioNabongandJuanFeleo,among
others,forcrimesrangingfromillegalassociationtorebellionandsedition.
36
TheendofWorldWarIIsawtheresurgenceoftheCommunistrebellion.Nowwithanarmyforgedoutofthe
formerHukbalahaps(thearmedresistanceagainsttheJapanese)andrenamedorHMB,thethreattothesecurity
ofthestatebecamesomalevolentthatonOctober22,1950,PresidentElpidioQuirinowasimpelledtosuspend
theprivilegeofthewritof.ThisenabledtheGovernmenttoeffecttheapprehensionoftopCommunistParty
leadersGuillermoCapadocia,FlavioNava,AmadoV.Hernandez,JesusLava,JoseLava,AngelBakingand
SimeonRodriguez,amongothers.
HukbongMapagpalayangBayanhabeascorpus37WhenchallengedbyoneofthosedetainedunderthePresidential
proclamationthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritofwassustainedbytheCourt.habeascorpus38
Thebeginningofthe1970swasmarkedbytheriseofstudentactivism.Thisphenomenonsweptaroundthe
globe,anddidnotspareourowncollegesanduniversities.Soonthecampusesbecamestaginggroundsfor
studentdemonstrationsthatgenerallyendedinbloodyandnotinfrequentlylethalstreetriots.
In,
Navarrovs.Villegas39inupholdingthepoweroftheMayorofManilatodeterminetheplaceandtimefortheholdingof
publicassemblies,thisCourtnoted
ThatexperiencesinconnectionwithpresentassembliesanddemonstrationsdonotwarranttheCourt's
disbelievingrespondentMayor'sappraisalthatapublicrallyatPlazaMiranda,ascomparedtooneattheSunken
Gardensashesuggested,posesaclearerandmoreimminentdangerofpublicdisorders,breachesofthepeace,
criminalacts,andevenbloodshedasanaftermathofsuchassemblies,andpetitionerhasmanifestedthatithas
nomeansofpreventingsuchdisorders
That,consequently,everytimethatsuchassembliesareannounced,thecommunityisplacedinsuchastateof
fearandtensionthatofficesareclosedearlyandemployeesdismissedstorefrontsboardedup,classes
suspended,andtransportationdisruptedtothegeneraldetrimentofthepublic.
Ridingonthecrestofstudentunrest,theCommunistrebelliongainedmomentum.AstheCourtnotedin,
Lansangvs.Garcia40
[T]hereorganizedCommunistPartyofthePhilippineshas,moreover,adoptedMao'sconceptofprotracted
people'swar,aimedattheparalyzationofthewilltoresistofthegovernment,ofthepolitical,economicand
intellectualleadership,andofthepeoplethemselvesthatconformablytosuchconceptthePartyhas
placedspecialemphasisuponmostextensiveandintensiveprogramofsubversionbytheestablishmentof
frontorganizationsinurbancenters,theorganizationofarmedcitypartisansandtheinfiltrationinstudent
groups,laborunions,andfarmerandprofessionalgroupsthattheCPPhasmanagedtoinfiltrateor
establishandcontrolnine(9)majorlabororganizationsthatithasexploitedtheyouthmovementand
succeededinmakingCommunistfrontsofeleven(11)majorstudentoryouthorganizationsthatthereare,
accordingly,aboutthirty(30)massorganizationsactivelyadvancingtheCPPinterests,amongwhichare
theMalayangSamahanngMagsasaka(MASAKA)theKabataangMakabayan(KM),theMovementforthe
AdvancementofNationalism(MAN),theSamahangDemokratikongKabataan(SDK),theSamahang
Molave(SM),andtheMalayangPagkakaisangKabataangPilipino(MPKP)that,asofAugust,1971,the
KMhadtwohundredfortyfive(245)operationalchaptersthroughoutthePhilippines,ofwhichseventy
three(73)wereintheGreaterManilaArea,sixty(60)inNorthernLuzon,fortynine(49)inCentralLuzon,
recordedtwohundredfiftyeight(258)majordemonstrations,ofwhichaboutthirtythreei33)endedin
violence,resultinginfifteen(15)killedandoverfivehundred(500)injuredthatmostoftheseactionswere
organized,coordinatedorledbytheaforementionedfrontorganizationsthattheviolentdemonstrations
weregenerallyinstigatedbyasmall,butwelltrainedgroupofarmedagitatorsthatthenumberof
demonstrationsheretoforestakedin1971hasalreadyexceededthosein1970andthattwentyfour(24)of
thesedemonstrationswereviolent,andresultedinthedeathoffifteen(15)personsandtheinjuryofmany
more.
Themountinglevelofviolencenecessitatedthesuspension,forthesecondtime,oftheprivilegeofthewritofon
August21,1971.TheGovernment'sactionwasquestionedin.ThisCourtfoundthattheintensificationand
spreadofCommunistinsurgencyimperiledthestate.Theeventsafterthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewrit
confirmedthealarmingextentofthedangertopublicsafety:
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habeascorpusLansangvs.Garcia
Subsequenteventsasreportedhavealsoproventhatpetitioner'scounselhaveunderestimatedthethreat
topublicsafetyposedbytheNewPeople'sArmy.Indeed,itappearsthat,,ithadinNorthernLuzonsix(6)
encountersandstagedone(1)raid,inconsequenceofwhichseven(7)soldierslosttheirlivesandtwo(2)others
werewounded,whereastheinsurgentssufferedfive(5)casualtiesthatonAugust26,1971,awellarmedgroup
ofNPA,trainedbydefectorLt.VictorCorpus,attackedtheverycommandpostofTFLAWINinIsabela,
destroyingtwo(2)helicoptersandone(1)plane,andwoundingone(1)soldierthattheNPAhadinCentral
Luzonatotaloffour(4)encounters,withtwo(2)killedandthree(3)woundedonthesideoftheGovernment,one
(1)KMSDKleader,anunidentifieddissident,andCommanderPanchito,leaderofdissidentgroup,werekilled
thatonAugust26,1971,therewasanencounterintheBarrioofSanPedro,IrigaCity,CamarinesSur,between
thePCandtheNPA,inwhichaPCandtwo(2)KMmemberswerekilledthatthecurrentdisturbancesin
CotabatoandtheLanaoprovinceshavebeenrenderedmorecomplexbytheinvolvementoftheCPP/NPAfor,in
mid1971,aKMgroupheadedbyJovencioEsparagoza,contactedtheHigaonantribes,intheirsettlementin
Magsaysay,MisamisOriental,andofferedthembooks,pamphletsandbrochuresofMaoTseTung,aswellas
conductedteachinsinthereservationthatEsparagozawasreportedlykilledonSeptember22,1971,inan
operationofthePCinsaidreservationandthattherearenowtwo(2)NPAcadresinMindanao.
sinceAugust21,1971
Itshould,also,benotedthatadherentsoftheCPPanditsfrontorganizationareaccordinglytointelligence
findings,definitelycapableofpreparingpowerfulexplosivesoutoflocallyavailablematerialsthatthebombused
intheConstitutionalConventionHallwasa'claymore'mine,apowerfulexplosivedeviceusedbytheU.S.Arm
believedtohavebeenoneofmanypilferedfromtheSubicNavalBaseafewdaysbeforethatthePresidenthad
receivedintelligenceinformationtotheeffectthattherewasaJulyAugustPlaninvolvingawaveof
assassinations,kidnappings,terrorismandmissdestructionofpropertyandthatanextraordinaryoccurrence
wouldsignalthebeginningofsaideventthattheratherseriousconditionofpeaceandorderinMindanao,
particularlyinCotabatoandLanao,demandedthepresencethereinofforcessufficienttocopewiththesituation
thatasizeablepartofourarmedforcesdischargesotherfunctionsandthattheexpansionoftheCPPactivities
fromCentralLuzontootherpartsofthecountryparticularlyManilaanditssuburbstheCagayanValley,Ifugao,
Zambales,Laguna,QuezonandBicolRegion,requiredthattherestofourarmedforcesbespreadthinovera
widearea.
41
Byvirtueofthesefindings,theCourt,ledbyChiefJusticeRobertoConcepcion,unanimouslyupheldthe
suspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritof.TheCourtsaid:
habeascorpus
ConsideringthatthePresidentwasinpossessionoftheabovedataexceptthoserelatedtoeventsthat
happenedafterAugust21,1971whenthePlazaMirandaprompting,tookplace,theCourtisnotpreparedto
heldthattheExecutivehadactedarbitrarilyorgravelyabusedhisdiscretionwhenhethenconcludedthatpublic
safetyandnationalsecurityrequiredthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewrit,particularlyiftheNPAwereto
strikesimultaneouslywithviolentdemonstrationsstagedbythetwohundredfortyfive(245)KMchapters,allover
thePhilippines,withtheassistanceandcooperationofthedozensofCPPfrontorganizations,andthebombingof
watermainsandconduits,aswellaselectricpowerplantsandinstallationsapossibilitywhich,nomatterhow
remote,hewasboundtoforestall,andadangerhewasunderobligationtoanticipateandatrest.
Hehadconsultedhisadvisersandsoughttheirviews.Hehadreasontofeelthatthesituationwascriticalas,
indeed,itwasanddemandedimmediateaction.Thishetookbelievingingoodfaiththatpublicsafetyrequired
it.And,inthelightofthecircumstancesadvertedtoabove,hehadsubstantialgroundstoentertainsuchbelief."
42
ThesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritwasliftedonJanuary7,1972,butsoonthereafterchaosengulfedthe
nationagain.Alargeareaofthecountrywasinopenrebellion.TheauthorityoftheGovernmentwasfrontally
challengedbyacoalitionofforces.Itwasagainstthisbackdropofviolenceandanarchythatmartiallawwas
proclaimedonSeptember21,1972.
PersonallyItakenoticeofthiscondition,inadditiontowhattheCourthasfoundincasesthathavecometoitfor
decision,andthereisnocogentreasonformetosayasamatteroflawthatthePresidentexceededhispowers
indeclaringmartiallaw.NordoIbelievethattheSolicitorGeneral'smanifestationofMay13,1974totheeffect
thatwhileonthewholethemilitarychallengetotheRepublichasbeenovercometherearestilllargeareasof
conflictwhichwarrantthecontinuedimpositionoflaw,canbesatisfactorilycontrovertedbyorbyanyperceptive
observerofthenationalscene.
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AsIwillpointoutinthisopinion,thefactthatcourtsareopenbeacceptedasproofthattherebellionandwhich
compellinglycalledforthedeclarationofmartiallaw,nolongerimperilthepublicsafety.Norarethemanysurface
indiciaadvertedtobythepetitioners(theincreaseinthenumberoftourists,thechoiceofManilaasthe
conferencesandofaninternationalbeautycontest)toberegardedasevidencethatthethreattopublicsafehas
abated.Thereisactualarmedcombat,attendedbythesomberpanoplywar,raginginSuluandCotabato,notto
notmentiontheregionandCagayanValley.
43Iamhardputtosay,therefore,thattheGovernment'sclaimisbaseless.
Iamnotinsensitivetothepleamadehereinthenameofindividualliberty.Buttoparaphrase,
ExparteMoyer44ifitwerethelibertyaloneofthepetitionerDioknothatis.inissuewewouldprobablyresolvethedoubtin
hisfavorandgranthisapplication.ButtheSolicitorGeneral,whomustbedeemedtorepresentthePresidentandthe
ExecutiveDepartmentinthiscase,45hasmanifestedthatinthePresident'sjudgmentpeaceandtranquilitycannotbe
speedilyrestoredinthecountryunlessthepetitionersandotherslikethemmeantimeremaininmilitarycustody.For,
indeed,thecentralmatterinvolvedisnotmerelythelibertyofisolatedindividuals,butthecollectivepeace,tranquilityand
securityoftheentirenation.V.
The1935ConstitutioncommittedtothePresidentthedeterminationofthepublicexigencyorexigenciesrequiring
theproclamationofmartiallaw.ItprovidedinarticleVII,section10(2)that
ThePresidentshallbecommanderinchiefofallarmedforcesofthePhilippinesand,wheneveritbecomes
necessary,hemaycalloutsucharmedforcestopreventorsuppresslawlessviolence,
46invasion,insurrection,orrebellion.Incaseofinvasion,insurrection,orrebellion,oreminentdangerthereof,whenthe
publicsafetyrequiresit,hemaysuspendtheprivilegesofthewritoforplacethePhilippinesoranypartthereofunder
martiallaw.habeascorpus,47
Inthe1934ConstitutionalConventionitwasproposedtovestthepowertosuspendtheprivilegeofthewritofin
theNationalAssembly.Theproposal,sponsoredbyDelegateAraneta,wouldgivethispowertothePresidentonly
incaseswheretheAssemblywasnotinsessionandthenonlywiththeconsentoftheSupremeCourt.Butthe
majorityofthedelegatesentertainedthefearthattheGovernmentwouldbepowerlessinthefaceofdanger.
habeascorpus48TheyrejectedtheAranetaproposalandadoptedinsteadtheprovisionsoftheJonesLawof1916.The
framersoftheConstitutionrealizedtheneedforastrongExecutive,andthereforechosetoretaintheprovisionsofthe
formerorganicacts,49which,adaptedtotheexigenciesofcolonialadministration,naturallymadetheGovernorGenerala
strongExecutive.
ConstruingasimilarprovisionofthePhilippineBillof1902whichauthorizedtheGovernorGeneral,withthe
approvalofthePhilippineCommission,tosuspendtheprivilegeofthewritof"whenincasesofrebellion,
insurrection,orinvasionthepublicsafetymayrequireit,"thisCourtheldthattheGovernorGeneral'sfindingasto
thenecessityforsuchactionwas"conclusiveandfinal"onthejudicialdepartment.
habeascorpus50Thisrulingwasaffirmedin1952in,Montenegrovs.Castaeda51thisCourtstatingthat
theauthoritytodecidewhethertheexigencyhasarisenrequiring,thesuspensionbelongstothePresidentand
Itistruethatin
Lansangvs.Garcia52thereislanguagethatappearstodetractfromtheuniformcourseofjudicialconstructionofthe
CommanderinChiefClause.Butaclosereadingoftheopinioninthatcaseshowsthatinthemaintherewasadherenceto
precedents.Tobesure,theCourtthereassertedthepowertoinquireintothe"existenceofthefactualbases[forthe
suspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritof]inordertodeterminethesufficiencythereof,"Butthisbroadassertionofpoweris
qualifiedbytheCourt'sunambiguousstatementthat"thefunctionoftheCourtis,merelytochecknottothe
Executive,theconstitutionallimitsofhisjurisdiction,ortodeterminethewisdomofhisact."ForthisreasonthisCourt
announcedthatthetestwasnotwhetherthePresidentactedbutwhetherheactedarbitrarily.InfactthisCourtreadandas
authorizingjudicialinquiryinto"whetherornottherereallywasarebellion,asstatedintheproclamationtherein
contested."habeascorpussupplantortoascertainmerelywhetherhehasgonebeyondnottoexercisethepowervestedin
himcorrectlyBarcelonMontenegro
OfcoursethejudicialdepartmentcandeterminetheoftheconditionsfortheexerciseofthePresident'spowers
andisnotboundbytherecitalsofhisproclamation.Butwhetherinthecircumstancesobtainingpublicsafety
requiresthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritofortheproclamationofmartiallawisinitiallyforthePresident
todecide.ConsiderationsofcommitmentofthepowertotheexecutivebranchoftheGovernmentandthelackof
acceptedstandardsfordealingwithincommensurablefactors,suggestthewisdomofconsideringthePresident's
findingastopersuasiveuponthecourts.Thisconclusionresultsfromthenatureofthepowervestedinthe
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Presidentandfromtheevidentobjectcontemplated.ForthatpowerisintendedtoenabletheGovernmentto
copewithsuddenemergenciesandmeetgreatoccasionsofstateundercircumstancesthatmaybecrucialtothe
lifeofthenation.
existencehabeascorpusnecessity53
Thefactthatcourtsareopenandintheunobstructeddischargeoftheirfunctionsispointedtoasproofofthe
absenceofanyjustificationformartiallaw.Therulingin
Milligan54andDuncan55isinvoked.InbothcasestheU.S.SupremeCourtreversedconvictionsbymilitarycommissions.
InMilligantheCourtstatedthat"martiallawcannotarisefromathreatenedinvasion.Thenecessitymustbeactualand
present,theinvasionreal,suchaseffectuallyclosesthecourtsanddeposestheciviladministration."Inasimilar
expressionwasmade:"Thephrase'martiallaw'...whileintendedtoauthorizethemilitarytoactvigorouslyforthe
maintenanceofanorderlycivilgovernmentandforthedefenseoftheIslandsagainstactualorthreatenedrebellionor
invasion,wasnotintendedtoauthorizethesupplantingofcourtsbymilitarytribunals."Duncan
Butandweredecidedonthebasisofawidelydisparateconstitutionalprovision.Whatismore,totheextentthat
theymayberegardedasembodyingwhatthepetitionerscallan"opencourt"theory,theyareofdoubtful
applicabilityinthecontextof.
MilliganDuncanpresentdaysubversion
UnlikethedetailedprovisionofourConstitution,theU.S.FederalConstitutiondoesnotexplicitlyauthorizethe
U.S.Presidenttoproclaimmartiallaw.ItsimplystatesinitsarticleII,section2that"thePresidentshallbe
CommanderinChiefoftheArmyandNavyoftheUnitedStates,andoftheMilitiaoftheseveralStates,when
calledintotheactualServiceoftheUnitedStates...."Ontheotherhand,ourConstitutionauthorizesthe
proclamationofmartiallawincasesnotonlyofactualinvasion,insurrectionorrebellionbutalsoof"imminent
danger"thereof.
ItistruethatintheU.S.SupremeCourtdealtwithaU.S.statutethatintermswassimilartothePhilippine
Constitution.Section67oftheHawaiianOrganicActprovidedthat"[theTerritorialGovernor]may,incaseof
invasion,orimminentdangerthereof,whenpublicsafetyrequiresit,suspendtheprivilegeofthewritof,orplace
theTerritory,oranypartthereofundermartiallawuntilcommunicationcanbehadwiththePresident[ofthe
UnitedStates]andhisdecisionthereofmadeknown."InfacttheHawaiianOrganicAct,thatofPuertoRico,and
theJoneslawof1916,fromwhichlatterlaw,asIhaveearliernoted,theCommanderinChiefClauseofour
Constitutionwasadopted,werepartofthelegislationoftheU.S.Congressduringthecolonialperiod.Butagain,
unliketheJonesLaw,theHawaiianOrganicActalsoprovidedinitssection5thattheU.S.FederalConstitution
"shallhavethesameforceandeffectintheterritory[ofHawaii]aselsewhereintheUnitedStates.Forthisreason
itwasheldinthat"imminentdanger"ofinvasionorrebellionwasnotagroundforauthorizingthetrialofcivilians
byamilitarytribunal.Hadbeendecidedsolelyonthebasisofsection67oftheHawaiianOrganicActandhadthe
petitionersinthatcasebeentriedforoffensesconnectedwiththeprosecutionofthewar,
DuncanhabeascorpusDuncanDuncan56theprisonsentencesimposedbythemilitarytribunalswouldinallprobabilityhad
beenupheld.AsamatteroffactthosewhoarguedinthatthepoweroftheHawaiiangovernortoproclaimmartiallaw
comprehendednotonlyactualrebellionorinvasionbutalso"imminentdangerthereof"werefacedwiththeproblemof
reconciling,thetwopartsoftheHawaiianOrganicAct.Theycontendedthat"ifanypaintofsection67wouldotherwisebe
unconstitutionalsection5mustbeconstruedasextendingthe[U.S.]ConstitutiontoHawaiisubjecttothequalificationsor
limitationscontainedinsection67."Duncan57
Forsooth,ifthepowertoproclaimmartiallawisatallrecognizedinAmericanfederalconstitutionallaw,itisonly
byimplicationfromthenecessityofselfpreservationandthensubjecttothenarrowestpossibleconstruction.
NoristhereanyStateConstitutionintheUnitedStates,astheappendedlistindicates(see),whichinscopeand
explicitnesscancomparewiththeCommanderinChiefClauseofourConstitution.TheAlaskaConstitution,for
example,authorizesthegovernortoproclaimmartiallawwhenthepublicsafetyrequiresitincaseofrebellionor
actualorimminentinvasion.Buteventhenitalsoprovidesthatmartiallawshallnotlastlongerthantwentydays
unlessapprovedbyamajorityofthelegislatureinjointsession.Ontheotherhand,thepresentConstitutionof
HawaiidoesnotgranttotheStategovernorthepowertosuspendthewritofortoproclaimmartiallawasdidits
OrganicActbeforeitsadmissionasaStatetotheAmericanUnion.
Appendixhabeascorpus
Anuncriticalreadingofandislikelytooverlookthesecrucialdifferencesintextualconceptsbetweenthe
PhilippineConstitution,ontheonehand,andtheFederalandStateConstitutionsoftheUnitedStates,onthe
other.Inourcasethentheinclusionofthe"imminentdanger"phraseasagroundforthesuspensionofthe
privilegeofthewritofandfortheproclamationofmartiallawwasamatterofdeliberatechoiceandrendersthe
languageofMilligan("martiallawcannotarisefromainvasion")inappositeandthereforeinapplicable.
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ThePhilippineBillof1902providedinitssection2,paragraph7
thattheprivilegeofthewritofshallnotbesuspendedunlesswhenincasesofrebellion,insurrection,orinvasion
GovernorGeneralwiththeapprovalofthePhilippineCommission,whereverduringsuchperiodthenecessityfor
habeascorpus
TheJonesLawof1916substantiallyreenactedthisprovision.Thussection3,paragraph7thereofprovided:
thepublicsafetymayrequireit,ineitherofwhicheventsthesamemaybesuspendedbythePresidentorbythe
GovernorGeneral,whereverduringsuchperiodthenecessityforsuchsuspensionshallexist.
habeascorpus
Inaddition,theJonesLawprovidedinitssection21that
...[TheGovernorGeneral]may,incaseofrebellionorinvasion,orimminentdangerthereof,whenthepublic
safetyrequiresit,suspendtheprivilegesofthewritoforplacetheIslands,oranypartthereof,undermartiallaw:
ThatwhenevertheGovernorGeneralshallexercisethisauthority,heshallatoncenotifythePresidentofthe
UnitedStatesthereof,togetherwiththeattendingfactsandcircumstances,andthePresidentshallhavepowerto
modifyorvacatetheactionoftheGovernorGeneral.
Notethatwithrespecttothesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritof,section21mentions,asgroundtherefor,
"imminentdanger"ofinvasionorrebellion.WhentheConstitutionwasdraftedin1934,itsframers,asIhave
alreadynoted,decidedtoadopttheseprovisionsoftheJonesLaw.Whatwassection3,paragraph7,inthe
JonesLawbecamesection1(14)ofarticleIII(BillofRights)oftheConstitutionandwhatwassection21became
articleVII,section10(2)(CommanderinChiefClause).Thus,theBillofRightsprovisionreads:
habeascorpus
Theprivilegeofthewritofshallnotbesuspendedexceptincasesofinvasion,insurrection,orrebellion,whenthe
publicsafetyrequiresit,inanyof'whicheventsthesamemaybesuspendedwhereverduringsuchperiodthe
habeascorpus
Ontheotherhand,theCommanderinChiefClausestates:
necessary,hemaycalloutsucharmedforcestopreventorsuppresslawlessviolence,invasion,insurrection,or
rebellion.Incaseofinvasion,insurrection,orrebellion,orimminentdangerthereof,whenthepublicsafety
requiresit,hemaysuspendtheprivilegesofthewritof,orplacethePhilippinesoranypartthereofundermartial
law.
habeascorpus
Theattentionofthe1934ConventionwasdrawntotheapparentinconsistencybetweentheBillofRights
provisionandtheCommanderinChiefClause.Somedelegatestriedtoharmonizethetwoprovisionsbyinserting
thephrase"imminentdangerthereof"intheBillofRightsprovision,butonreconsiderationtheConvention
deletedthephrasefromthedraftoftheBillofRightsprovision,atthesametimeretainingitintheCommanderin
ChiefClause.
Whenthisapparentinconsistencywasraisedinasuit
58questioningthevalidityofPresidentQuirinosuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritof,thisCourtsustainedthePresident's
powertosuspendtheprivilegeofthewritevenonthegroundofimminentdangerofinvasion,insurrectionorrebellion.Itheld
thatastheCommanderinChiefClausewaslastintheorderoftimeandlocalpositionitshouldbedeemedcontrolling.This
rationalizationhasevokedthecriticismthattheConstitutionwasapprovedasawholeandnotinparts,butinresultthe
decisioninthatcaseiscertainlyconsistentwiththeconceptionofastrongExecutivetowhichthe1934Constitutional
Conventionwascommitted.habeascorpus
The1973Constitutionlikewiseauthorizesthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritofonthegroundofimminent
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habeascorpus
Thesocalled"opencourt"theorydoesnotapplytothePhilippinesituationbecauseour1935and1973
Constitutionsexpresslyauthorizethedeclarationofmartiallawevenwherethedangertopublicsafetyarises
merelyfromtheimminenceofinvasion,insurrection,orrebellion.Moreover,thetheoryistoosimplisticforour
day,
whatwiththeuniversallyrecognizedinsidiousnatureofCommunistsubversionanditscovertoperations.
IndeedthetheoryhasbeendismissedasunrealisticbyperceptivestudentsofPresidentialpowers.
CharlesFairmansays:
Thesemeasuresareunprecedentedbutsoisthedangerthatcalledthemintobeing.Ofcoursewearenot
withoutlaw,evenintimeofcrisis.Yetthecasestowhichoneiscitedinthedigestsdisclosesuchconfusionof
doctrineastoperplexalawyerwhosuddenlytriestofindhisbearings.Hastyrecollectionofrecallsthedictumthat
'Martialrulecannotarisefromathreatenedinvasion.Thenecessitymustbeactualandpresenttheinvasionreal,
suchaseffectuallyclosesthecourtsanddeposestheciviladministration.'NoteventheaerialattackuponPearl
Harborclosedthecourtsorofitsownforcedeposedtheciviladministrationyetitwouldbethecommon
understandingofmenthatthoseagencieswhicharechargedwiththenationaldefensesurelymusthave
authoritytotakeonthespotsomemeasureswhichinnormaltimeswouldbe.Andwhilstcollegesophomoresare
taughtthatthecasestandsasaconstitutionallandmark,thehardfactisthatoflategovernorshavefrequently
declared'martiallaw'and'war'andhavebeenjudiciallysustainedintheirmeasures.Undoubtedly,manyofthese
casesinvolvingthesuspensionofstrikerswentmuchtoofar.Butjustascertainlysoitwillbearguedhere
thedoctrineofthemajorityinExpartedoesnotgofarenoughtomeettheconditionsofmodernwar.
ExparteMilliganultraviresMilligan59
ClintonRossiterwrites:
Itissimplynottruethat'martiallawcannotarisefromathreatenedinvasion,'orthatmartialrulecanneverexist
wherethecourtsareopen.'Thesestatementsdonotpresentanaccuratedefinitionoftheallowablelimitsofthe
martialpowersofthePresidentandCongressinthefaceofalienthreatsofinternaldisorder.NorwasDavis'
dictumonthespecificpowerofCongressinthismatteranymoreaccurate.And,howevereloquentquotablehis
wordsontheuntouchabilityoftheConstitutionintimeofactualcrisis,anddidnotthen,expresstherealitiesof
Americanconstitutionallaw.
60
WilliamWinthropmakesthesethoughtfulobservations:
IthasbeendeclaredbytheSupremeCourtinthatmartiallaw'isconfinedtothelocalityofactualwar,'andalso
thatit'canneverexistwhenthecourtsareopenandintheproperandunobstructedexerciseoftheir.'Butthis
rulingwasmadebyabaremajorityfiveofthecourt,atatimeofgreatpoliticalexcitementandtheopinionof
thefourothermembers,asdeliveredbytheChiefJustice,wastotheeffectthatmartiallawisnotnecessarily
limitedtotimeofwar,butmaybeexercisedatotherperiodsof'publicdanger,'andthat,sincethey'mightbe
openandundisturbedintheexecutionoftheirfunctionsandyetwhollyincompetenttoavertthreateneddangeror
topunishwithadequatepromptitudeandcertaintytheguilty.'Itistheopinionoftheauthorthattheof,andthat
thedictumofthemajoritywasinfluencedbyaconfusingofmartiallawproperwiththatwhichexistsonlyatatime
andonthetheaterofwar,andwhichwasclearlydistinguishedfrommartiallawbytheChiefJusticeinthe
dissentingopinionthefirstcompletejudicialdefinitionofthesubject.
ExparteMilliganjurisdictionthefactthatthecivilcourtsareopenisnotcontrollingagainstsuchexercisetheviewofthe
minorityofthecourtisthesounderandmorereasonableonemilitarygovernment61(emphasissupplied)
In(ontheoccasionoftheBoerWar)JusticeMaasdorpcategoricallyaffirmedthat"theexistenceofcivilcourtsis
noproofthatmartiallawhasbecomeunnecessary.
Queenvs.Bekker62
VI
Giventhenthevalidityoftheproclamationofmartiallaw,thearrestanddetentionofthosereasonablybelievedto
beengagedinthedisorderorinformentingitiswellnighbeyondquestioning.Negatethepowertomakesuch
arrestanddetention,andmartiallawwouldbe"mereparade,andratherencourageattackthanrepelit."
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63Thus,in,Moyervs.Peabody 64theCourtsustainedtheauthorityofaStategovernortoholdtemporarilyincustodyone
whomhebelievedtobeengagedinformentingtrouble,anddeniedrecoveryagainstthegovernorfortheimprisonment.It
wassaidthat,asthegovernor"maykillpersonswhoresist,"hemayusethemildermeasureofseizingthebodiesofthose
whomheconsidersinthewayofrestoringpeace.Sucharrestsarenotnecessarilyforpunishment,butarebywayof
precautiontopreventtheexerciseofhostilepower.Solongassucharrestsaremadeingoodfaithandinthehonestbelief
thattheyareneededinordertoheadtheinsurrectionoff,theGovernoristhefinaljudgeandcannotbesubjectedtoan
actionafterheisoutofofficeonthegroundthathehadnoreasonablegroundforhisbelief."
Itistruethatin
Sterlingvs.Contantin65thesameCourtsetasidetheactionofaStategovernortakenundermartiallaw.Butthedecisionin
thatcaserestedonthegroundthattheactionsetasidehadnodirectrelationtothequellingoftheuprising.Therethe
governorofTexasissuedaproclamationstatingthatcertaincountieswereinastateofinsurrectionanddeclaringmartial
lawinthatterritory.Theproclamationrecitedthattherewasanorganizedgroupofoilandgasproducersininsurrection
againstconservationlawsoftheStateandthatthisconditionhadbroughtsuchastateofpublicfeelingthatiftheState
governmentcouldnotprotectthepublic'sinteresttheywouldtakethelawintotheirownhands.Theproclamationfurther
recitedthatitwasnecessarythattheRailroadCommissionbegiventimetomakeordersregardingoilproduction.Whenthe
Commissionissuedanorderlimitingoilproduction,thecomplainantsbroughtsuitiiitheDistrictCourtwhichissued
restrainingorders,whereuponGovernorSterlingorderedGeneralWoltersoftheTexasNationalGuardstoenforcealimiton
oilproduction.ItwasthisorderoftheStategovernorthattheDistrictCourtenjoined.OnappealtheU.S.SupremeCourt
affirmed.Afterassumingthatthegovernorhadthepowertodeclaremartiallaw,theCourtheldthattheorderrestrictingoil
productionwasnotjustifiedbytheexigenciesofthesituation.
...Fundamentally,thequestionhereisnotthepowerofthegovernortoproclaimthatastateofinsurrection,or
tumultorriot,orbreachofthepeaceexists,andthatitisnecessarytocallmilitaryforcetotheaidofthecivil
power.Nordoesthequestionrelatetothequellingofdisturbanceandtheovercomingofunlawfulresistanceto
civilauthority.ThequestionbeforeusissimplywithrespecttotheGovernor'sattempttoregulatebyexecutive
orderthelawfuluseofcomplainants'propertiesintheproductionofoil.Insteadofaffordingthemprotectioninthe
exerciseoftheirrightsasdeterminedbythecourts,hesought,byhisexecutiveorders,tomakethatexercise
impossible.
Ontheotherhand,whatisinvolvedhereisthevalidityofthedetentionorderunderwhichthepetitionerswere
orderedarrested.Suchorderis,asIhavealreadystated,avalidincidentofmartiallaw.Withrespecttosuch
questionheldthat"measures,conceivedingoodfaith,inthefaceoftheemergencyanddirectlyrelatedtothe
quellingofthedisorderorthepreventionofitscontinuance,fallwithinthediscretionoftheExecutiveinthe
exerciseofhisauthoritytomaintainpeace."
Constantin
Inthecasesatbar,therespondentshavejustifiedthearrestanddetentionofthepetitionersonthegroundof
reasonablebeliefintheircomplicityintherebellionandinsurrection.ExceptDioknoandAquino,allthepetitioners
havebeenreleasedfromcustody,althoughsubjecttodefinedrestrictionsregardingpersonalmovementand
expressionofviews.Asthedangertopublicsafetyhasnotabated,Icannotsaythatthecontinueddetentionof
DioknoandAquinoandtherestrictionsonthepersonalfreedomsoftheotherpetitionersarearbitrary,justasI
amnotpreparedtosaythatthecontinuedimpositionofmartialruleisunjustified.
AstheColoradoSupremeCourtstatedindenyingthewritofin
habeascorpusMoyer:66
Hisarrestanddetentioninsuchcircumstancesaremerelytopreventhimfromtakingpartoraidingina
continuationoftheconditionswhichthegovernor,inthedischargeofhisofficialdutiesandintheexercise
oftheauthorityconferredbylaw,isendeavoringtosuppress.
VII
Whilecourtsmayinquireintoortakejudicialnoticeoftheofconditionsclaimedtojustifytheexerciseofthepower
todeclaremartiallaw,
existence67thedeterminationofthefortheexerciseofsuchpoweriswithintheperipheryoftheconstitutionaldomainof
thePresidentandaslongasthemeasureshetakesarereasonablyrelatedtotheoccasioninvolved,interferencebythe
courtsisofficious.necessity
IamconfirmedinthisconstructionofPresidentialpowersbytheconsensusofthe1971ConstitutionalConvention
tostrengthentheconceptofastrongExecutiveandbytheconfirmationofthevalidityofactstakenordoneafter
theproclamationofmartiallawinthiscountry.The1973Constitutionexpresslyauthorizesthesuspensionofthe
privilegeofthewritofaswellastheimpositionofmartiallawnotonlyontheoccasionofactualinvasion,
insurrectionorrebellion,butalsowherethedangerthereofisimminent.68Acrimoniousdiscussiononthismatter
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hasthusbecomepointlessandshouldthereforecease.
habeascorpus
ThenewConstitutionaswellprovidesthat
Allproclamations,orders,decrees,instructions,andactspromulgated,issued,ordonebytheincumbent
Presidentshallbepartofthelawoftheland,andshallremainvalid,legal,binding,andeffectiveevenafterlifting
ofmartiallawortheratificationofthisconstitution,unlessmodified,revoked,orsupersededbysubsequent
proclamations,orders,decrees,instructions,orotheractsoftheincumbentPresident,orunlessexpresslyaid
explicitlymodifiedorrepealedbytheregularNationalAssembly.
69
TheeffectivityofthenewConstitutionisnowbeyondallmannerofdebateinviewoftheCourt'sdecisioninthe
RatificationCases70aswellasthedemonstratedacquiescencethereinbytheFilipinopeopleinthehistoricJuly
1973nationalreferendum.
VIII
Itisthusevidentthatsuspensionoftheofthewritofisunavoidablesubsumedinadeclarationofmartiallaw,
sinceonebasicobjectiveofmartialruleistoneutralizeeffectivelybyarrestandcontinueddetention(and
possiblytrialattheproperandopportunetime)thosewhoarereasonablybelievedtobeincomplicityorarein
theinsurrectionorrebellion.Thatthisissoandshouldbesoisineluctabletodenythispostulateistonegatethe
veryfundamentalofmartiallaw:thepreservationofsocietyandthesurvivalofthestate.Torecognizethe
imperativenessandrealityofmartiallawandatthesametimedissipateitsefficacybywithdrawingfromitsambit
thesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritofisapropositionIregardasfatuousandthereforerepudiate.
privilegehabeascorpusparticepscriminishabeascorpus
Invasionandinsurrection,bothofthemconditionsofviolence,arethefactualprerequisitesofmartiallaw...The
rightsofpersonandpropertypresentnoobstructiontotheauthoritiesactingundersucharegime,iftheacts
whichencroachuponthemarenecessarytothepreservationorrestorationofpublicorderandsafety..Allthe
procedureswhicharerecognizedadjunctsofexecutivecrisisgovernment...areopentothepersonswhobear
officialauthorityundermartiallaw.Thegovernmentmaywieldarbitrarypowersofpolicetoallaydisorder,arrest
anddetainwithouttrialallcitizenstakingpartinthisdisorderandevenpunishthem(),institutesearchesand
seizureswithoutwarrant,forbidpublicassemblies,setcurfewhours,suppressallfreedomofexpression,institute
courtsmartialforthesummarytrialofcrimesperpetratedinthecourseofthisregimeandcalculatedtodefeatits
purposes...
Princepsetrespublicaexjustacausapossuntremmeamauferreinotherwords,suspendthe[privilegeofthe]writof
habeascorpus71(emphasissupplied)
Thepointhereiswhethermartiallawissimplyashorthandexpressiondenotingthesuspensionofthewrit,or
whethermartiallawinvolvesnotonlythesuspensionofthewritbutmuchmorebesides....Thelatterviewis
probablysounderbecausemartiallawcertainlyinthepresentstateofitsdevelopment,isnotatalldependenton
asuspensionofthewritof....Wheretherehasbeenviolenceordisorderinfact,continueddetentionofoffenders
bythemilitaryissofarproperastoresultinadenialbythecourtsofwritsreleasingthosedetained....
habeascorpus72
IX.
Althoughtherespondents,intheirreturnstothewritsandintheiranswerstotheseveralpetitions,haveinsisted
onadisclaimerofthejurisdictionofthisCourt,onthebasisofGeneralOrdersNos.3and3A,
73theirsubsequentmanifestationsurgingdecisionofthesecasesamounttoanabandonmentofthisdefense.Inpointof
factPresidentMarcohaswritten,inunmistakablephrase,that"Ourmartiallawisuniqueinthatitisbasedonthe
supremacyofthecivilianauthorityoverthemilitaryandoncompletesubmissionofthedecisionoftheSupremeCourt....
ForwhoisthedictatorwhowouldsubmithimselftoahigherbodyliketheSupremeCourtonthequestionofthe
constitutionalityorvalidityofhisactions?"74ConstruingthisavowalofthePresidentandtherepeatedurgingsofthe
respondentsinthelightoftheabovequotedprovisionofthe1973Constitution(Art.XVII,sec.3(2)),itismysubmissionthat
GeneralOrdersNos.3and3Amustbedeemedrevokedinsofarastheytendedtooustthejudiciaryofjurisdictionover
casesinvolvingtheconstitutionalityofproclamations,decrees,ordersoractsissuedordonebythePresident.
Art.17th.Martiallawrestricted.Thatnopersoninthisstatecaninanycasebesubjectedtolawmartial,ortoany
penaltiesorpainsbyvirtueofthatlawexceptthoseemployedinthearmyandthemilitiainactualservice.
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FERNANDO,concurringanddissenting:
G.R.No.L35546
X
Insumandsubstance,Ifirmlyadheretotheseviews:(1)thattheproclamationofmartiallawinSeptember1972
bythePresidentwaswellwithintheaegisofthe1935Constitution(2)thatbecausetheCommunistrebellionhad
notabatedandinsteadtheevilfermentofsubversionhadproliferatedthroughoutthearchipelagoandinmany
placeshadexplodedintotheroarofarmedandsearingconflictwithallthesophisticatedpanoplyofwar,the
impositionofmartiallawwasan"imperativeofnationalsurvival"(3)thatthearrestanddetentionofpersonswho
were"participantsorgaveaidandcomfortintheconspiracytoseizepoliticalandstatepowerandtotakeoverthe
governmentbyforce,"werenotunconstitutionalnorarbitrary(4)thatsubsumedinthedeclarationofmartiallaw
isthesuspensionoftheofthewritof(5)thatthefactthattheregularcourtsofjusticeareopencannotbe
acceptedasproofthattherebellion.andinsurrection,whichcompellinglycalledforthedeclarationofmartiallaw,
nolongerimperilthepublicsafety(6)thatactualarmedcombathasbeenandstillisraginginCotabato,Lanao,
SuluandZamboanga,nottomentiontheBicolRegionandCagayanValley,andnationwideCommunist
subversioncontinuesunabated(7)thatthehostofdoubtsthathadplaguedthisCourtwithrespecttothevalidity
oftheratificationandconsequenteffectivityofthe1973Constitutionhasbeencompletelydispelledbyevery
rationalevaluationofthenationalreferendumofJuly1973,atwhichthepeopleconclusivelyalbeitquietly,
demonstratednationwideacquiescencein.thenewConstitutionand(8)thattheissueofthevalidityand
constitutionalityofthearrestanddetentionofallthepetitionersandoftherestrictionsimposeduponthosewho
weresubsequentlyfreed,isnowforeclosedbythetransitoryprovisionofthe1973Constitution(Art,XVII.Sec.
3(2))whichefficaciouslyvalidatesallactsmade,doneortakenbythePresident,orbyothersuponhis
instructions,undertheregimeofmartiallaw,priortotheratificationofthesaidConstitution.
privilegehabeascorpus
XI
ItisnotameresurrealsuspiciononthepartofthepetitionerDioknothattheincumbentmembersofthishighest
Tribunalofthelandhaveremovedthemselvesfromalevelofconsciencetopassjudgmentuponhispetitionfor
oraffordhimrelieffromhispredicament.Hehasactuallyarticulateditasaformalindictment.Iventuretosaythat
hisobsessionalpreoccupationontheabilityofthisCourttoreachafairjudgmentinrelationtohimhasbeen,in
nosmallmeasure,engenderedbyhismelancholyandbitterandevenperhapstraumaticdetention.Andevenas
hemakesthisseriousindictment,heatthesametimewouldwithdrawhispetitionforhopingtherebyto
achievemartyrdom,albeitdubiousandamorphous.Asacommentaryonthisindictment,Iherethatformypart
andIampersuadedthatalltheothermembersofthisCourtaresituatedsimilarlyIavowfealttothefull
intendmentandmeaningoftheoathIhavetakenasajudicialmagistrate.Utilizingthemodestendowmentsthat
Godhasgrantedme,Ihaveendeavoredinthepasteighteenyearsofmyjudicialcareerandinthefuturewill
alwaysendeavortodischargefaithfullytheresponsibilitiesappurtenanttomyhighoffice,neverfearing,
waveringorhesitatingtoreachjudgmentsthataccordwithmyconscience.
ACCORDINGLY,Ivotetodismissallthepetitions.
APPENDIXtoSeparateOpinionofJusticeFredRuizCastro
STATECONSTITUTIONALPROVISIONSREGARDINGMARTIALLAW
ALASKACONST.,art.III,sec.20:
Sec.20..Thegovernormayproclaimmartiallawwhenthepublicsafetyrequiresitincaseofrebellionoractual
orimminentinvasion.Martiallawshallnotcontinueforlongerthantwentydayswithouttheapprovalofamajority
ofthemembersofthelegislatureinjointsession.
MartialLaw
MAINECONST.,art.I,sec.14:
Sec.14..Nopersonshallbesubjecttocorporalpunishmentundermilitarylaw,exceptsuchasareemployedin
thearmyornavy,orinthemilitiawheninactualserviceintimeofwarorpublicdanger.
Corporalpunishmentundermilitarylaw
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G.R.No.L35546
Art.32..Thatnopersonexceptregularsoldiers,marines,andmarinersintheserviceofthisState,ormilitia,
wheninactualservice,oughtinanycase,tobesubjectto,orpunishablebyMartialLaw.
MartialLaw
MASSACHUSETTSCONST.,art.XXVIII:
Art.XXVIII..Nopersoncaninanycasebesubjectedtolawmartial,ortoanypenaltiesorpains,byvirtueofthat
law,exceptthoseemployedinthearmyornavy,andexceptthemilitiainactualservice,butbyauthorityofthe
legislature.
Citizensexemptfromlawmartial
NEWHAMPSHIRE,PtII,arts.34and51:
Art.34th..Nopersoncan,inanycase,besubjectedtolawmartial,ortoanypainsorpenaltiesbyvirtueofthat
law,exceptthoseemployedinthearmyornavy,andexceptthemilitiainactualservice,butbyauthorityofthe
legislature.
Martiallawlimited
Art.51st..Thegovernorofthisstateforthetimebeing.shallbecommanderinchiefofthearmyandnavy,and
allthemilitaryforcesofthestatebyseaandlandandshallhavefullpowerbyhimself,orbyanychief
commander,orotherofficer,orofficers,fromtimetotime,totrain,instruct,exerciseandgovernthemilitiaand
navyandforthespecialdefenseandsafetyofthisstate,toassembleinmartialarray,andputinwarlike
posture,theinhabitantsthereof,andtoleadandconductthem,andwiththemtoencounter,repulse,repelresist
andpursuebyforceofarms,aswellbyseaasbyland,withinandwithoutthelimitsofthisstate:andalsokill,
slay.destroy,ifnecessary,andconquerbyallfittingways,enterpriseandmeans,allandeverysuchpersonand
personsasshall,atanytimehereafter,inahostilemanner,attemptorenterprisethedestruction,invasion,
detrimentorannoyanceofthisstateandtouseandexerciseoverthearmyandnavy,andoverthemilitiain
actualservice,thelawmartialintimeofwarinvasion,andalsoinrebellion,declaredbythelegislaturetoexist,as
occasionshallnecessarilyrequire:Andsurprise,byallwaysandmeanswhatsoever,allandeverysuchpersonor
persons,withtheirships,arms,ammunition,andothergoods,asshallinahostilemannerinvade,orattemptthe
invading,conqueringorannoyingthisstateandinfinethegovernorherebyisentrustedwithallotherpowers
incidenttotheofficeofthecaptaingeneralandcommanderinchief,andadmiral,tobeexercisedagreeablyto
therulesandregulationsoftheconstitution,andthelawsofthelandprovided,thattheGovernorshallnot,atany
timehereafter,byvirtueofanypowerbythisconstitutiongranted,orhereaftertobegrantedtohimbythe
legislature,transportanyoftheinhabitantsofthisstate,orobligethemtomarchoutofthelimitsofthesame,
withouttheirfreeandvoluntaryconsent,ortheconsentofthegeneralcourt,norgrantcommissionsforexercising
thelawmartialinanycase,withouttheadviseandtheconsentofthecouncil.
Powersanddutiesofgovernorascommanderinchieflimitation
RHODEISLANDCONST.,art.I,sec.18:.
Sec.18..Themilitaryshallbeheldinstrictsubordinationtothecivilauthority.Andthelawmartialshallbeused
andexercisedinsuchcasesonlyasoccasionshallnecessarilyrequire.
Militarysubordinatemartiallaw
TENNESSEECONST.,art.1,sec.25:
Sec.25..ThatnocitizenofthisState,exceptsuchasareemployedinthearmyoftheUnitedStates,ormilitiain
actualservice,shallbesubjectedtopunishmentunderthemartialormilitarylaw.Thatmartiallaw,inthesenseof
theunrestrictedpowerofmilitaryofficers,orothers,todisposeofthepersons,libertiesorpropertyofthecitizen,
isinconsistentwiththeprinciplesoffreegovernment,andisnotconfidedtoanydepartmentofthegovernmentof
thisState.
Punishmentundermartialandmilitarylaw
VERMONTCONST.,ch.1,art.17:
WESTVIRGINIA,art,III,sec.12:
Art.III,sec.12..Standingarmies,intimeofpeace,shouldbeavoidedasdangeroustoliberty.Themilitaryshall
besubordinatetothecivilpowerandnocitizen,unlessengagedinthemilitaryserviceoftheState,shallbetried
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orpunishedbyanymilitarycourt,foranyoffensethatiscognizablebythecivilcourtsoftheState.Nosoldier
shall,intimeofpeace,bequarteredinanyhouse,withouttheconsentoftheowner,norintimeofwar,exceptin
themannertobeprescribedbylaw..
Militarysubordinatetocivilpower
J.,
Theissueinvolvedinthesepetitionsisthepreeminentproblemofthetimestheprimacytobeaccordedthe
claimsoflibertyduringperiodsofcrisis.ThereismuchthatisnovelinwhatconfrontstheCourt.Atraditional
orientationmaynotsuffice.Theapproachtakencannotbecharacterizedbyrigidityandinflexibility.Thereis
room,plentyofit,fornoveltyandinnovation.Doctrinesdeeplyrootedinthepast,thathavestoodthetestoftime
andcircumstance,mustbemadeadaptabletopresentneedsand,hopefully,serviceabletoanunknownfuture,
theeventsofwhich,torecallStory,arelockedtipintheinscrutabledesignsofamercifulProvidence.Itis
essentialthenthatintheconsiderationofthepetitionsbeforeustherebeobjectivity,calmness,and
understanding.Thedeeperthedisturbanceintheatmosphereofsecurity,themorecompellingistheneedfor
tranquilityofmind,ifreasonistoprevail.NolegalcarrieristobeinterposedtothwarttheeffortsoftheExecutive
torestorenormalcy.Heisnottobedeniedthepowertotakethatforhimmaybenecessarymeasurestomeet
emergencyconditions.Sotherealitiesofthesituationdictate.Thereshouldbeonthepartofthejudiciarythen,
sensitivitytothesocialforcesatwork,creatingconditionsofgraveunrestandturbulenceandthreateningthevery
stabilitynottosayexistence,ofthepoliticalorder.Itisinthatsettingthatthecrucialissueposedbythese
petitionsistobeappraised.Itmaybethatthisclashbetweentheprimacyoflibertyandthelegitimatedefenseof
authorityisnotsusceptibleofandefinite,clearcutsolution.Nonetheless,anattempthastobemade.Withalldue
recognitionofthemeritapparentintheexhaustive,scholarlyandeloquentdissertationsofJusticeBarredoand
myotherbrethrenaswellastheeaseandluciditywithwhichtheChiefJusticeclarifiedthecomplexissuesand
theviewsofmembersoftheCourt,Iwouldliketogiveabriefexpressiontomythoughtstorenderclearthepoints
onwhichIfindmyself,withregret,unabletobeofthesamepersuasion.
habeascorpus
IconcurinthedismissalofthepetitionofBenignoS.Aquino,Jr.solelyonthegroundthatchargeshadbeenfiled
anddissentinpartinthedismissalofthepetitionofFranciscoRodrigoandothers,
habeascorpus *whojoinedhiminhispleafortheremovaloftheconditionsontheirrelease,ontheviewthatasfarasfreedomoftravelisconcerned,it
shouldbe,onprinciple,leftunrestricted.Asoriginallyprepared,thisopinionlikewiseexplainedhisdissentinthedenialofthemotiontowithdrawinthe
petitionfiledonbehalfofJoseW.Diokno,amatternowmootandacademic.
1.Wehavetopassonpetitions.Thegreatwritoflibertyisinvolved.Rightfully,itislatitudinarianinscope.Itis
widerangingandallembracinginitsreach.Itcandigdeepintothefactstoassurethattherebenotolerationof
illegalrestraint.Detentionmustbeforacauserecognizedbylaw.Thewritimposesonthejudiciarythegrave
responsibilityofascertainingwhetheradeprivationofphysicalfreedomiswarranted.Thepartywhoiskeepinga
personincustodyhastoproducehimincourtassoonaspossible.Whatismore,hemustjustifytheactiontaken.
Onlyifitcanbedemonstratedthattherehasbeennoviolationofone'srighttolibertywillhebeabsolvedfrom
responsibility.Failingthat,theconfinementmusttherebycease.Nordoesitsufficethattherebeacourtprocess,
order,ordecisiononwhichitismadetorest.Iftherebeashowingofaviolationofconstitutionalrights,the
jurisdictionofthetribunalissuingitisousted.Moreover,eveniftherebeavalidsentence,itcannot,evenfora
moment,beextendedbeyondtheperiodprovidedforbylaw.Whenthattimecomes,heisentitledtobereleased.
Itisinthatsensethen,assowellputbyHolmes,thatthisgreatwrit"istheusualremedyforunlawful
imprisonment."
habeascorpus 1 ItdoesaffordtoborrowfromthelanguageofBirkenhead"aswiftandimperativeremedyinallcasesofillegal
restraintorconfinement."2Notthatthereisneedforactualincarceration.Acustodyforwhichthereisnosupportinlaw
sufficesforitsinvocation.Thepartyproceededagainstisusuallyapublicofficial,therunofthemillpetitionsoftencoming
fromindividualswhoforonereasonoranotherhaverunafoulofthepenallaws.Confinementcouldlikewisecomeabout
becauseofcontemptcitations,3whetherfromthejudiciaryorfromthelegislature.Itcouldalsobeduetostatutory
commands,whetheraddressedtoculturalminorities4ortopersonsdiseased.5Then,too,thisproceedingcouldbeavailed
ofbycitizenssubjectedtomilitarydiscipline6aswellasaliensseekingentryintoortobedeportedfromthecountry.7Even
thoseoutsidethegovernmentservicemaybemadetoaccountfortheiractionasinthecaseofwivesrestrainedbytheir
husbandsorchildrenwithheldfromtheproperparentorguardian.8Itisthusapparentthatanydeviationfromthelegal
normscallsfortherestorationoffreedom.Itcannotbeotherwise.Itwouldbesheermockeryofallthatsuchalegalorder
standsfor,ifanyperson'srighttoliveandworkwhereheismindedto,tomoveaboutfreely,andtoberidofany
unwarrantedfearsthathewouldjustbepickedupanddetained,isnotaccordedfullrespect.Thesignificanceofthewrit
thenforaregimeoflibertycannotbeoveremphasized.9
2.Nordoesthefactthat,atthetimeofthefilingofthesepetitionsmartiallawhadbeendeclared,callfora
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differentconclusion.Thereisofcourseimpartedtothematterahigherdegreeofcomplexity.Foritcannotbe
gainsaidthatthereasonableassumptionisthatthePresidentexercisedsuchanawesomepower,onegranted
admittedlytocopewithanemergencyorcrisissituation,becauseinhisjudgmentthesituationasthusrevealedto
himlefthimwithnochoice.WhatthePresidentdidattestedtoanexecutivedeterminationoftheexistenceofthe
conditionsthatcalledforsuchamove.Therewas,inhisopinion,aninsurrectionorrebellionofsuchmagnitude
thatpublicsafetydidrequireplacingthecountryundermartiallaw.Thatdecisionwashistomakeititisnotfor
thejudiciary.Theassessmentthusmade,forallthesympatheticconsiderationitisentitledto,isnot,however,
impressedwithfinality.ThisCourthasalimitedsphereofauthority.That,forme,istheteachingofLansang.
10Thejudicialroleisdifficult,butitisunavoidable.Thewritoflibertyhasbeeninvokedbypetitioners.Theymustbeheard,
andwemustruleontheirpetitions.
3.ThisCourthastoactthen.ThelibertyenshrinedintheConstitution,fortheprotectionofwhichisthe
appropriateremedy,imposesthatobligation.Itstaskisclear.Itmustbeperformed.Thatisatrusttowhichit
cannotberecreantWheneverthegrievancecomplainedofisdeprivationofliberty,itisitsresponsibilitytoinquire
intothematterandtorenderthedecisionappropriateunderthecircumstances.Precisely,apetitioncallsforthat
response.Forthesignificanceoflibertyinaconstitutionalregimecannotbesufficientlystressed.Witnessthese
wordsfromthethenJustice,laterChiefJustice,Concepcion:"Furthermore,individualfreedomistoobasic,tobe
denieduponmeregeneralprinciplesandabstractconsiderationofpublicsafety.Indeed,thepreservationof
libertyissuchamajorpreoccupationofourpoliticalsystemthat,notsatisfiedwithguaranteeingitsenjoymentin
theveryfirstparagraphofsection(1)oftheBillofRights,theframersofourConstitutiondevoted[twelveother]
paragraphs[thereof]totheprotectionofseveralaspectoffreedom."
habeascorpushabeascorpus11AsimilarsentimentwasgivenexpressionbythethenJustice,laterChiefJustice,Bengzon:
"LettherebelshavenoreasontoapprehendthattheircomradesnowundercustodyarebeingrailroadedintoMuntinlupa
withoutbenefitofthosefundamentalprivilegeswhichtheexperienceoftheageshasdeemedessentialfortheprotectionof
allpersonsaccusedofcrimebeforethetribunalsofjustice.Givethemtheassurancethatthejudiciary,evermindfulofits
sacredmissionwillnot,thrufaultycogitationormisplaceddevotion,upholdanydoubtfulclaimsofGovernmentalpowerin
diminutionofindividualrights,butwillalwaysclingtotheprincipleutteredlongagobyChiefJusticeMarshallthatwhenin
doubtastotheconstructionoftheConstitution,'theCourtswillfavorpersonalliberty'...."12Thepertinenceoftheabove
excerptbecomesquitemanifestwhenitisrecalledthatitsutterancewasinconnectionwithacertiorariproceedingwhere
theprecisepointatissuewaswhetherornottherighttobailcouldbeavailedofwhentheprivilegeofthewritofwas
suspended.Therewasnodecisiveoutcome,althoughtherewerefivevotesinfavorofanaffirmativeanswertoonlyfour
against.habeascorpus13Suchpronouncementsincasesarisingunderthe1935Constitutionshouldoccasion.nosurprise.
TheymerelyunderscorewhatwassovigorouslyemphasizedbythethenDelegateJoseP.Laurel,Chairmanofthe
CommitteeontheBillofRights,inhissponsorshipaddressofthedraftprovisions.Thus:"Thehistoryoftheworldisthe
historyofmanandhisardousstruggleforliberty....Itisthehistoryofthosebraveandablesoulswho,intheagesthatare
past,havelabored,foughtandbledthatthegovernmentofthelashthatsymbolofslaveryanddespotismmightendure
nomore.Itisthehistoryofthosegreatselfsacrificingmenwholivedandsufferedinanageofcruelty,painanddesolation
sothateverymanmightstand,undertheprotectionofgreatrightsandprivileges,theequalofeveryotherman.14So
shoulditbeunderthepresentConstitution.NolessapersonthanPresidentMarcosduringtheearlymonthsofthe1971
ConstitutionalConventioncategoricallyaffirmedinhis:Democracy:"Withoutfreedom,thewholeconceptofdemocracy
fallsapart."TodaysRevolution15Suchaviewhassupportinhistory.AstatementfromDr.Rizalhasacontemporaryring:
"Giveliberties,sothatnoonemayhavearighttoconspire."16Mabinilistedasanaccomplishmentoftheillfatedrevolution
againsttheAmericansthemanifestationof"ourloveoffreedomguaranteeingtoeachcitizentheexerciseofcertainrights
whichmakeourcommunallifelessconstricted,...."17
4.Equallyso,thedecisiveissueisoneoflibertynotonlybecauseofthenatureofthepetitionsbutalsobecause
thatisthemandateoftheConstitution.Thatisitsphilosophy.Itisaregimeoflibertytowhichourpeopleareso
deeplyandfirmlycommitted.
18Thefateoftheindividualpetitionershangsinthebalance.Thatisofgreatconcern.Whatisatstakehowever,ismore
thanthatmuchmore.Thereisaparamountpublicinterestinvolved.Themomentousquestionishowfarintimesof
stressfidelitycanbemanifestedtotheclaimsofliberty.SoitisordainedbytheConstitution,anditisthehighestlaw.It
mustbeobeyed.Nordoesitmakeacrucialdifference,tomymind,thatmartiallawexists.Itmaycallforamorecautious
approach.Thesimplicityofconstitutionalfundamentalismmaynotsufficeforthecomplexproblemsoftheday.Stillthe
dutyremainstoassurethatthesupremacyoftheConstitutionisupheld.Whetheringoodtimesorbad,itmustbeaccorded
theutmostrespectanddeference.Thatiswhatconstitutionalismconnotes.Itisitsdistinctivecharacteristic.Greater
restraintsmayofcoursebeimposed.Detention,tocitetheobviousexample,isnotruledoutundermartiallaw,buteventhe
veryproclamationthereofisdependentonpublicsafetymakingitimperative.Thepowers,ratherexpansive,perhapsat
timesevenlatitudinarian,allowabletheadministrationunderitsaegis,withtheconsequentdiminutionofthesphereof
liberty,arejustifiedonlyundertheassumptionthattherebythebeleagueredstateisinabetterpositiontoprotect,defend
andpreserveitself.Theyarehardlyimpressedwiththeelementofpermanence.Theycannotendurelongerthanthe
emergencythatcalledfortheexecutivehavingtomakeuseofthisextraordinaryprerogative.Whenitisathingofthepast,
martiallawmustbeatanend.Ithasnomorereasonforbeing.Ifitsproclamationisopentoobjection,oritscontinuanceno
longerwarranted,thereisallthemorereason,tofollowLaski,torespectthetraditionallimitationoflegalauthoritythat
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freedomdemands.19WiththesepetitionspreciselyrenderingperemptoryactionbythisCourt,thereistheopportunityfor
theassessmentoflibertyconsideredinaconcretesocialcontext.Withfullappreciationthenofthecomplexitiesofthisera
ofturmoilanddisquiet,itcanhopefullycontributetothedelineationofconstitutionalboundaries.Itmayevenbeableto
demonstratethatlawcanbetimelessandyettimely.habeascorpus
5.Therearerelevantquestionsthatstillremaintobeanswered.Doesnottheproclamationofmartiallawcarry
withitthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritof?Ifso,shouldnottheprincipleaboveenunciatedbesubjected
tofurtherrefinement?Iamnottoocertainthatthefirstquery.necessarilycallsforanaffirmativeanswer.
Preventivedetentionisofcourseallowable.Individualswhoarelinkedwithinvasionorrebellionmayposea
dangertothepublicbesafety.Thereisnothinginherentlyunreasonableintheirbeingconfined.Moreover,where
itisthePresidenthimself,asinthecaseofthesepetitioners,whopersonallydirectedthattheybetakenin,itis
noteasytoimputearbitrariness.Itmayhappenthoughthatofficersoflesserstaturenotimpressedwiththehigh
senseofresponsibilitywouldutilizethesituationtocausetheapprehensionofpersonswithoutsufficient
justification.Certainlyitwouldbe,tomymind,tosanctionoppressiveactsifthevalidityofsuchdetentioncannot
beinquiredintothroughpetitions.Itismorethanjustdesirablethereforethatifsuchbetheintent,therebea
specificdecreeconcerningthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritof.Eventhen,however,suchproclamation
couldbechallenged.Ifvitiatedbyconstitutionalinfirmity,thereleasemaybeordered.Evenifitwereotherwise,
theapplicantmaynotbeamongthoseastowhomtheprivilegeofthewrithasbeensuspended.Itispertinentto
noteinthisconnectionthatProclamationNo.1081specificallystates"thatallpersonspresentlydetainedaswell
asallotherswhomayhereafterbesimilarlydetainedforthecrimesofinsurrectionorrebellion,andallother
crimesandoffensescommittedinfurtheranceorontheoccasionthereof,orincidentthereto,orinconnection
therewith,forcrimesagainstnationalsecurityandthelawofnations,crimeagainstthefundamentallawsofthe
State,crimesagainstpublicorder,crimesinvolvingusurpationofauthority,rank,titleandimproperuseofnames,
uniformsandinsignia,crimescommittedbypublicofficers,andforsuchothercrimesaswillbeenumeratedin
OrdersthatIshallsubsequentlypromulgate,aswellascrimesasaconsequenceofanyviolationofanydecree,
orderorregulationpromulgatedbymepersonallyorpromulgateduponmydirectionshallbekeptunderdetention
untilotherwiseorderedreleasedbymeorbydulydesignatedrepresentative."
habeascorpushabeascorpushabeascorpus20Theimplicationappearsatunlesstheindividualdetainedisincludedamong
thosetowhomanyoftheabovecrimeoroffensemaybeimputed,heisentitledtojudicialprotection.Lastly,thequestionof
whetherornotthereiswarrantfortheviewthatmartiallawisatanendmaybedeemedpropernotonlyinthelightof
radicallyalteredconditionsbutalsobecauseofcertainexecutiveactsclearlyincompatiblewithitscontinuedexistence.
Undersuchcircumstances,anelementofajusticiablecontroversymaybediscerned.
6.Thatbringsmetothepoliticalquestiondoctrine.Itsacceptedsignificationisthatwherethematterinvolvedis
lefttoadecisionbythepeopleactingintheirsovereigncapacityortothesoledeterminationbyeitherorboththe
legislativeorexecutivebranchofthegovernment,itisbeyondjudicialcognizance.
21ThusitwasthatinsuitswherethepartyproceededagainstwaseitherthePresidentorCongress,oranyofitsbranches
forthatmatter,thecourtsrefusedtoact.22Unlesssuchbethecase,theactiontakenbyanyorboththepoliticalbranches
whetherintheformofalegislativeactoranexecutiveordercouldbetestedincourt.Whereprivaterightsareaffected,the
judiciaryhasthedutytolookintoitsvalidity.Thereisthisfurtherimplicationofthedoctrine.Ashowingthatplenarypower
isgrantedeitherdepartmentofgovernmentmaynotbeanobstacletojudicialinquiry.Itsimprovidentexerciseortheabuse
thereofmaygiverisetoajusticiablecontroversy.23Whatismore,aconstitutionalgrantofauthorityisnotusually
unrestricted.24Limitationsareprovidedforastowhatmaybedoneandhowitistoheaccomplished.Necessarilythen,it
becomestheresponsibilityofthecourtstoascertainwhetherthetwocoordinatebrancheshaveadheredtothemandateof
thefundamentallaw.Thequestionthusposedisjudicialratherthanpolitical.
7.Referenceatthispointtotheepochalopinionintheaforeciteddecision,wherethevalidityofthesuspensionof
theprivilegeofthewritofwassustainedbythisCourt,isnotamiss.Forinbothinthe1935andinthepresent
Constitutions,thepowertodeclaremartiallawisembracedinthesameprovisionwiththegrantofauthorityto
suspendtheprivilegeofthewritof,withthesamelimitstobeobservedintheexercisethereof.
Lansangv.Garciahabeascorpushabeascorpus25Itwouldfollow,therefore,thatasimilarapproachcommendsitselfonthe
questionofwhetherornotthefindingmadebythePresidentinProclamationNo.1081astotheexistenceof"rebellionand
armedactionundertakenbytheselawlesselementsofthecommunistandotherarmedaggrupationsorganizedtooverthrow
theRepublicofthePhilippinesbyarmedviolenceandforce[impressedwiththe]magnitudeofanactualstateofwaragainst
[the]peopleandtheRepublic..."26isopentojudicialinquiry.ReferencetotheopinionofChiefJusticeConcepcionwould
proveilluminating:"Indeed,thegrantofpowertosuspendtheprivilegeisneitherabsolutenorunqualified.Theauthority
conferredbytheConstitution,bothundertheBillofRightsandundertheExecutiveDepartment,islimitedandconditional.
ThepreceptintheBillofRightsestablishesageneralrule,aswellasanexceptionthereto.Whatismore,itpostulatesthe
formerinthenegative,evidentlytostressitsimportance,byprovidingthat'(t)heprivilegeofthewritofshallnotbe
suspended.....'Itisonlybywayofexceptionthatitpermitsthesuspensionoftheprivilege'incasesofinvasion,
insurrection,orrebellion'or,underArt.VIIoftheConstitution,"imminentdangerthereof"'whenthepublicsafety
requiresit,inanyofwhicheventsthesamemaybesuspendedwhereverduringsuchperiodthenecessityforsuch
suspensionshallexist.'Farfrombeingfullandplenary,theauthoritytosuspendtheprivilegeofthewritisthus
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circumscribed,confinedandrestrictednotonlybytheprescribedsettingortheconditionsessentialtoitsexistence,but
alsoasregardsthetimewhenandtheplacewhereitmaybeexercised.Thesefactorsandtheaforementionedsettingor
conditionsmark,establishanddefinetheextent,theconfinesandthelimitsofsaidpower,beyondwhichitdoesnotexist.
And,likethelimitationsandrestrictionsimposedbytheFundamentalLawuponthelegislativedepartment,adherence
theretoandcompliancetherewithmay,withinproperbounds,beinquiredintobycourtsofjustice.Otherwise,theexplicit
constitutionalprovisionsthereonwouldbemeaningless.Surely,theframersofourConstitutioncouldnothaveintendedto
engageinsuchawastefulexerciseinfutility."habeascorpus27Suchaviewwasfortifiedbythehighestateaccorded
individualfreedomasmadeclearinthesucceedingparagraphofhisopinion:"Muchlessmaytheassumptionbeindulgedin
whenwebearinmindthatourpoliticalsystemisessentiallydemocraticandrepublicanincharacterandthatthesuspension
oftheprivilegeaffectsthemostfundamentalelementofthatsystem,namely,individualfreedom.Indeed,suchfreedom
includesandconnotes,aswellasdemands,therightofeverysinglememberofourcitizenrytofreelydiscussanddissent
from,aswellascriticizeanddenounce,theviews,thepoliciesandthepracticesofthegovernmentandthepartyinpower
thathedeemsunwise,improperorinimicaltothecommonwealth,regardlessofwhetherhisownopinionisobjectively
correctornot.Theuntrammelledenjoymentandexerciseofsuchrightwhich,undercertainconditions,maybeacivic
dutyofthehighestorderisvitaltothedemocraticsystemandessentialtoitssuccessfuloperationandwholesome
growthanddevelopment."28
Thewriterwroteaconcurringanddissentingopinion.Hewasfullyinagreementwiththerestofhisbrethrenasto
thelackofconclusivenessattachedtothepresidentialdetermination.Thus:"Thedoctrineannouncedinthatsuch
aquestionispoliticalhasthusbeenlaidtorest.Itisabouttimetoo.Itoweditsexistencetothecompulsion
exertedby,a1905decision.ThisCourtwaspartlymisledbyanunduerelianceinthelattercaseonwhatis
consideredtobeauthoritativepronouncementfromsuchillustriousAmericanjuristsasMarshall,Story,and
Taney.Thatistomisreadwhatwassaidbythem.ThisismostevidentinthecaseofChiefJusticeMarshall,
whoseepochalwascited.Whythatwassoisdifficulttounderstand.Foritspeakstothecontrary.Itwasbyvirtue
ofthisdecisionthatthefunctionofjudicialreviewowesitsoriginnotwithstandingtheabsenceofanyexplicit
provisionintheAmericanConstitutionempoweringthecourtstodoso.Thus:'Itisemphaticallytheprovinceand
dutyofthejudicialdepartmenttosaywhatthelawis.Thosewhoapplytheruletoparticularcases,mustof
necessityexpoundandinterpretthatrule.Iftwolawsconflictwitheachother,thecourtsmustdecideonthe
operationofeach.Soifalawbeinoppositiontotheconstitutionifboththelawandtheconstitutionapplytoa
particularcase,sothatthecourtmusteitherdecidethatcaseconformablytothelawdisregardingthe
constitutionorconformablytotheconstitution,disregardingthelaw,thecourtmustdeterminewhichofthese
conflictingrulesgovernsthecase.Thisisoftheveryessenceofjudicialduty.If,then,thecourtsaretoregardthe
constitution,andtheconstitutionissuperiortoanyordinaryactoflegislature,theconstitution,andnotsuch
ordinaryact,mustgovernthecasetowhichtheybothapply."
Montenegrov.CastaedaBarcelonv.BakerMarburyv.Madison29
8.TorefertoLansanganew,thisCourtsustainedthepresidentialproclamationsuspendingtheprivilegeofthe
writofastherewasnoshowingofarbitrarinessintheexerciseofaprerogativebelongingtotheexecutive,the
judiciarymerelyactingasacheckontheexerciseofsuchauthority.SoChiefJusticeConcepcionmadeclearin
thisportionofhisopinion:"ArticleVIIoftheConstitutionvestsintheExecutivepowertosuspendtheprivilegeof
thewritofhabeascunderspecifiedconditions.Pursuanttotheprincipleofseparationofpowersunderlyingour
systemofgovernment,theExecutiveissupremewithinhisownsphere.However,theseparationofpowers,
undertheConstitution,isnotabsolute.Whatismore,itgoeshandinhandwiththesystemofchecksand
balances,underwhichtheExecutiveissupreme,asregardsthesuspensionoftheprivilege,butonlyifandwhen
heactswithinthesphereallottedtohimbytheBasicLaw,andtheauthoritytodeterminewhetherornothehas
soactedisvestedintheJudicialDepartment,which,,is,inturn,constitutionally.Intheexerciseofsuchauthority,
thefunctionoftheCourtismerelytochecknottosupplanttheExecutive,totheconstitutionallimitsofhis
jurisdiction,ortodeterminethewisdomofhisact.Tobesure,thepoweroftheCourttodeterminethevalidityof
thecontestedproclamationisfarfrombeingidenticalto,orevencomparablewith,itspoweroverordinarycivilor
criminalcaseselevatedtheretobyordinaryappealfrominferiorcourts,inwhichcasestheappellatecourthasall
ofthepowersofthecourtoforigin."
habeascorpusinthisrespectsupremeorascertainmerelywhetherhehasgonebeyondnottoexercisethepowervestedin
him30ThetestthentodeterminewhetherthepresidentialactionshouldbenullifiedaccordingtotheSupremeCourtisthat
ofarbitrariness.Absentsuchashowing,thereisnojustificationforannullingthepresidentialproclamation.
Onthispoint,thewriter,inaseparateopinion,hadthistosay:"Withsuchpresidentialdeterminationofthe
existenceoftheconditionsrequiredbytheConstitutiontojustifyasuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritnolonger
conclusiveontheotherbranches,thisCourtmaythuslegitimatelyinquireintoitsvalidity.Thequestionbeforeus,
itbearsrepeating,iswhetherornotProclamationNo.889asitnowstands,notasitwasoriginallyissued,isvalid.
Thestartingpointmustbearecognitionthatthepowertosuspendtheprivilegeofthewritbelongstothe
Executive,subjecttolimitations.SotheConstitutionprovides,anditistoberespected.Therangeofpermissible
inquirytobeconductedbythisTribunalisnecessarilylimitedthentotheascertainmentofwhetherornotsucha
suspension,inthelightofthecredibleinformationfurnishedthePresident,wasarbitrary.Suchatestmetwiththe
approvalofthechiefcounselforpetitioners,SenatorJoseW.Diokno.ToparaphraseFrankfurter,thequestion
beforethejudiciaryisnotthecorrectnessbutthereasonablenessoftheactiontaken.Onewhoisnotthe
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Executivebutequallyknowledgeablemayentertainadifferentview,butthedecisionrestswiththeoccupantof
theoffice.AswouldbeimmediatelyapparentevenfromacursoryperusalofthedatafurnishedthePresident,so
impressivelysummarizedintheopinionoftheChiefJustice,theimputationofarbitrarinesswouldbedifficultto
sustain.Moreover,thestepstakenbyhimtolimittheareawherethesuspensionoperatesaswellashis
instructionsattestedtoafirmresolveonhisparttokeepstrictlywithintheboundsofhisauthority.Underthe
circumstances,thedecisionreachedbytheCourtthatnofindingofunconstitutionalityiswarrantedcommends
itselfforapproval.Themostthatcanbesaidisthattherewasamanifestationofpresidentialpowerwellnigh
touchingtheextremebordersofhisconcededcompetence,beyondwhichaforbiddendomainlies.Therequisite
showingofeitherimprovidenceorabusehasnotbeenmade."
31
9.TheLansangdoctrineformeisdecisiveonthevariousissuesraisedinthiscase,mydiscussionbeingconfined
topetitionerRodrigo,aswellasotherssimilarlysituated,forundermyviewthatthepetitioninAquinoshouldbe
dismissedbecausechargeshadbeenfiled,andthepetitioninDioknoshouldbeconsideredwithdrawn,there
needbenofurtherinquiryastothemeritsoftheirrespectivecontentions.
Now,firstastothevalidityoftheproclamationitself.Itwouldseemthatitisbeyondquestioninthelightofthis
particulartransitoryprovisioninthepresentConstitution:"Allproclamations,orders,decrees,instructions,and
actspromulgated,issued,ordonebytheincumbentPresidentshallbepartofthelawoftheland,andshall
remainvalid,legal,binding,andeffectiveevenafterliftingofmartiallawortheratificationofthisConstitution,
unlessmodified,revoked,orsupersededbysubsequentproclamations,orders,decrees,instructions,orother
actsoftheincumbentPresident,orunlessexpresslyandexplicitlymodifiedorrepealedbytheregularNational
Assembly."
32Independentlyofsuchprovision,suchpresidentialproclamationcouldnotbecharacterizedasarbitraryunderthestandard
setforthintheLansangdecision.Hedidact"onthebasisofcarefullyevaluatedandverifiedinformation,[which]definitely
establishedthatlawlesselementswhoaremovedbyacommonorsimilarideologicalconviction,designstrategyandgoal
andenjoyingtheactivemoralandmaterialsupportofaforeignpowerandbeingguidedanddirectedbyintenselydevoted,
welltrained,determinedandruthlessgroupsofmenandseekingrefugeLindertheprotectionofourconstitutionallibertiesto
promoteandattaintheirends,haveenteredintoaconspiracyandhaveinfactjoinedandbandedtheirresourcesandforces
togetherfortheprimepurposeof,andinfacttheyhavebeenandareactuallystaging,undertakingandwaginganarmed
insurrectionandrebellionagainsttheGovernmentoftheRepublicofthePhilippinesinordertoforciblyseizepoliticalstate
powerinthecountryoverthrowthedulyconstitutedandsupplantourexistingpolitical,social,economic,andlegalorderwith
anentirelynewonewhoseformofgovernment,whosesystemoflaws,whoseconceptionofGodandreligion,whosenotion
ofindividualrightsandfamilyrelations,andwhosepolitical,social,economic,legalandmoralpreceptsarebasedonthe
MarxistLeninistMaoistteachingsandbeliefs...."33
Subsequenteventsdidconfirmthevalidityofsuchappraisal.Evennow,fromthepleadingsoftheSolicitor
General,theassumptionthatthesituationhasnotincertainplacesradicallychangedforthebettercannotbe
stigmatizedasdevoidoffactualfoundation.Asofthepresent,evenontheviewthatthecourtsmaydeclarethat
thecrisisconditionshaveendedandpublicsafetydoesnotrequirethecontinuanceofmartiallaw,thereisnot
enoughevidencetowarrantsuchajudicialdeclaration.Thisisnottodenythatinanappropriatecasewiththe
properparties,and,inthelanguageofJusticeLaurel,withsuchissuebeingthevery,theymaybecompelledto
assumesuchanawesomeresponsibility.Asenseofrealismaswellassoundtheorywouldplacesuchdelicate
taskontheshouldersofthisTribunal,theonlyconstitutionalcourt.SoIwouldread.
lismotajuristicRutterv.Esteban34There,whiletheMoratoriumAct35wasatfirstassumedtobevalid,withthisCourtin
suchsuitbeingpersuadedthatits"continuedoperationandenforcement"undercircumstancesthatdevelopedlater,
became"unreasonableandoppressive,"andshouldnotbeprolongedaminutelonger,...[itwas]"declarednullandvoidand
withouteffect."36Itgoeswithoutsayingthatbeforeitshouldtakesuchastep,extremecareshouldbetakenlestthe
maintenanceofpublicpeaceandorder,theprimarydutyoftheExecutive,beattendedwithextremedifficult.Itislikewise
essentialthattheevidenceofpublicsafetynolongerrequiringmartiallawbeoftheclearestandmostsatisfactory
character.Itcannotbetoostronglystressedthatwhilelibertyisaprimeobjectiveandthejudiciaryischargedwiththeduty
ofsafeguardingit,onamatterofsuchgravityduringperiodsofemergency,theexecutiveappraisalofthesituationis
deservingoftheutmostcredence.ItsufficestorecallthestresslaidbyChiefJusticeConcepcioninLansangthatits
function"ismerelytonotto"thelatter.TheallocationofauthorityintheConstitutionmadebythepeoplethemselvesto
thethreedepartmentsofgovernmentmustberespected.Thereistobenointrusionbyanyoneintothespherethatbelongs
toanother.Preciselybecauseofsuchfundamentalpostulateinthosecases,andtheremaybesuch,butperhapsrather
rare,itcouldamounttojudicialabdicationifnoinquiryweredeemedpermissibleandthequestionconsideredpolitical.check
supplant
Thelastpointis,whilethedetentionofpetitionerscouldhavebeenvalidlyordered,asdictatedbythevery
proclamationitself,ifitcontinuedforanunreasonablelengthoftime,thenhisreleasemaybesoughtina
proceeding.Thiscontentionisnotdevoidofplausibility.Evenintimesofstress,itcannotjustbeassumedthatthe
indefiniterestraintofcertainindividualsasapreventivemeasureisunavoidable.Itisnottobedeniedthatwhere
suchastateofaffairscouldbetracedtothewishesofthePresidenthimself,itcarrieswithitthepresumptionof
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validity.ThetestisagainarbitrarinessasdefinedinLansang.Itmayhappenthatthecontinuedconfinementmay
beattheinstancemerelyofamilitaryofficial,inwhichcasethereismoreleewayforjudicialscrutiny.
habeascorpus
10.Awordmoreonthewithdrawalofapetition.Onthebasicassumptionthatpreciselythegreatwritoflibertyis
availabletoapersonsubjectedtorestraintsothathecouldchallengeitsvalidity,Ifinditdifficultnottoyield
assenttoapleabytheapplicanthimselfthatheisnolongerdesirousorpursuingsuchremedy.Hehadachoice
ofwhetherornottogotocourt.Hewasfreetoacteitherway.Thefactthatatfirsthedidso,butthatlaterhewas
ofadifferentmind,doesnot,inmyopinion,alterthesituation.Thematter,forme,isstillonelefttohisfreeand
unfetteredwill.Theconclusionthenformeatleast,isthatacourtmustaccedetohiswishes.Itcouldlikewisebe
basedonhisbeliefthattherealitiesofthesituationcompeltheconclusionthatreliefcouldcomefromthe
Executive.Thatdecisionwashistomake.Itmustberespected.Moreover,ifonlybecauseofhumanitarian
considerations,consideringtheilleffectsofconfinementonhisstateofhealth,thereisequallylegalsupportfor
theviewthathisconditionalreleaseasinthecaseoftheotherdetaineeswouldnotbeinappropriate.
habeascorpus
Ifhismotionforwithdrawalcontainedphraseologythatisoffensivetothedignityofthecourt,thenperhapsthe
correspondingdisciplinaryactionmaybetaken.Forthatpurpose,andforthatpurposealone,thepetitionmaybe
consideredasstillwithinjudicialcognizance.Itistrueincertaincasesthattheissuesraisedmaybeso
transcendentalthatthereiswisdomincontinuingtheproceeding.Thewithdrawal,eventhen,forme,isnot
fraughtwithperniciousconsequences.Ifthematterwerethatsignificantorimportant,theprobabilityisthatthe
questionwillsoonbeventilatedinanotherpetition.Thereis,todealbrieflywithanotherpoint,thematterofthe
ratherharshandbitterlanguageinwhichthemotionforwithdrawalwascouched.Thatisamatteroftaste.Evenif
itwentbeyondtheboundsofthepermissible,thewithdrawalshouldbegranted.Thisformeistheprinciplethat
shouldobtain.TheratheruncharitableviewexpressedconcerningtheabilityofcertainmembersoftheCourtto
actjustlyonthemattershouldnotgiverise,inmyopinion,toundueconcern.Thatisone'sbelief,andoneis
entitledtoit.Itdoesnotfollowthattherebythepersonthusunjustifiablymalignedshouldsufferanylossofself
esteem.Afterall,itisatruismtosaythatamanonthebenchisaccountableonlytohisconscienceand,inthe
ultimateanalysis,tohisMaker.Thereisallthemorereasonthennottobeundulybotheredbytheremarksin
question.Moreover,theyemanatedfromasourcesufferingfromthepangsofdesperationbornofhiscontinued
detention.Itcouldverywellbethatthedisappointmentofexpectationsandfrustrationofhopesdidleadtosuch
anintemperateoutburst.Thereis,formeatleast,relevancetothisexcerptfromanopinionbyJusticeFrankfurter:
"Sincecourts,althoughrepresentingthelaw,...arealsosittinginjudgment,asitwere,ontheirownfunctionin
exercisingtheirpowertopunishforcontempt,itshouldbeusedonlyinflagrantcasesandwiththeutmost
forbearance.Itisalwaysbettertoerronthesideoftoleranceandevenofdisdainfulindifference."
37
toagroupreleasedfromconfinement.Theyarenolongerdetained.Ordinarilythatshouldsufficetopreclude
resorttotheremedyof.Offhand,itmaybeplausiblyassertedthattheneednolongerexists.Theprisonwall,to
paraphraseChafeeisnolongerthereithasonfunctioninexercisingtheirpowertopunishforcontempt,itshould
beusedonlyinflagrantcasesandwiththeutmostforbearance.Itisalwaysbettertoerronthesideoftolerance
andevenofdisdainfulindifference."
habeascorpus
toagroupreleasedfromconfinement.Theyarenolongerdetained.Ordinarilythatshouldsufficetopreclude
resorttotheremedyof.Offhand,itmaybeplausiblyassertedthattheneednolongerexists.Theprisonwall,to
paraphraseChafeeisnolongerthereithasfallendown.Whatistheretopenetrate?Thatisjustthepoint,
petitionerRodrigocomplains.Thatisnotreallytrue,oronlytruepartially.Therearephysicalaswellasintellectual
restraintsonhisfreedom.Hisreleaseisconditional.Therearethingshecannotsayplaceshecannotgo.Thatis
notlibertyinameaningfulsense.Thisgreatwritthenhasnotlostitssignificanceforhim,aswellasforothers
similarlysituated.ThewayhedevelopedhisargumentcallstomindCardozo'swarningthatinaworldofreality,a
juridicalconceptmaynotalwaysbepressedtothelimitofitslogic.Therearecountervailingconsiderations.The
factthathewasamongthosewhosedetentionwasorderedbythePresidentisoneofthem.Therewasthenan
executivedeterminationonthehighestlevelthatthestateofaffairsmarkedbyrebelliousactivitiesdidcallfor
certainindividualsbeingconfinedasapreventivemeasure.Unlessthereisashowingofthearbitrarinessofsuch
amove,thejudiciaryhastorespecttheactuation.Itmustbeassumedthatwhatwastobedonewiththem
thereaftermusthavebeengivensomeattention.Atoneextreme,theirpreventivedetentioncouldbeterminated
andtheirfullfreedomrestored.Attheother,itcouldbecontinuedifcircumstancesdidsowarrant.Here,there
wasamiddlewaychosen.PetitionerRodrigoaswellasseveralotherswerereleasedsubjecttoconditions.It
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cannotbedogmaticallymaintainedthatsuchasolutionwasanaffronttoreason.Notonlyforthepersonlocked
up,butperhapsevenmoresoforhisfamily,theendoftheincarcerationwasaneagerlyawaitedandhighly
welcomeevent.Thatisquiteunderstandable.Itdidjustifypetitioner'sassertionthatinsoagreeingtothe
conditionsimposed,hewasnotactingofhisownfreewill.Realistically,behadnochoiceoroneminimalatmost.
Nonetheless,itcannotbedeniedthathewasarecipientofwhatattheveryleastwasaclearmanifestationofthe
Philippinebrandofmartiallawbeingimpressedwithamildcharacter.
habeascorpus
Thisbeingapetition,theappropriatequestionforjudicialinquiryisthevalidityofthelimitssettotheconditional
releaseofpetitionerRodrigo.TheguidingprincipleissuppliedbythisringingaffirmationofJusticeMalcolm:"Any
restraintwhichwillprecludefreedomofactionissufficient."
habeascorpus38Theimplicationformeisthattheremaybeinstancesoftheproprietyoftheinvocationofthewriteven
withoutactualincarceration.Thisisoneofthem.ItishearteningthattheCourtsoviewit.Itis,tomymind,regrettable
thoughthatthereappearstobefullacceptanceofthepowerofthemilitarytoimposerestrictionsonpetitionerRodrigo's
physicalliberty.Thereisneed,itwouldseemtome,foramorediscriminatingappraisal,especiallywhereitcouldbeshown
thattheordertothateffectproceedsfromasourcelowerthanthePresident.Theextremelyhighrespectjustifiably
accordedtotheactiontakenbythehighestofficialoftheland,whobyhimselfisaseparateandindependentdepartment,
nottomentiontheoneconstitutionalofficialauthorizedtoproclaimmartiallaw,isnotindicated.Thereshouldbe,ofcourse,
nocasualorunreasoneddisregardforwhatthemilitarymaydeemtobetheappropriatemeasureunderthecircumstances.
Thisreflection,though,givesmepause.PetitionerRodrigoandotherssimilarlysituatedwerereleased.Thatstepwouldnot
havebeentakenifcircumstancesdidnotjustifyit.Itseemsthenreasonabletoassumethatfull,ratherthanrestricted,
freedomwaswarranted.Themattermaybeputforthmorecategorically,butIrefrainfromdoingso.Thereasonispractical.
Toinsistthatitshouldbethusmaycurbwhatappearstobethecommendabletendencytoputanendtothepreventive
detentionofthoseinactualconfinement.Asforrestraintsonintellectuallibertyembracedinfreedomofspeechandof
press,ofassembly,andofassociation,deferencetocontrollingauthoritiescompelmetosaythatthewritofisnotthe
propercaseforassailingthem.Itdoesnotmeanthatjudicialinquiryisforeclosed.Farfromit.Allthatisintendedtobe
conveyedisthatthisremedydoesnotlenditselftothatpurpose.Insoadvocatingthisapproach,Iamnotunmindfulthatit
mightbelookeduponaslackofawarenessforthemischiefthatmaybecausedbyirresponsibleelements,nottosaythe
rebelsthemselves.ThewordsofWilloughby,whoseviewonmartiallawisthemostsympathetictotheprimacyofliberty,
furnishtheantidote:"Aslongastheemergencylaststhen,theymustuponpainofarrestandsubsequentpunishment
refrainfromcommittingactsthatwillrendermoredifficulttherestorationofastateofnormalcyandtheenforcementoflaw.
habeascorpus39
12.Reliance,asisquiteevidentfromtheforegoing,iswellnighsolelyplacedonPhilippineauthorities.Whilethe
persuasivecharacterofAmericanConstitutionallawdoctrinesisnotentirelyathingofthepast,still,thenoveltyof
thequestionbeforeus,compelsinmyviewdeferencetothetrendindicatedbyourpastdecisions,readinthe
lightnotonlyofspecificholdingsbutalsoofthebroaderprinciplesonwhichtheyarebased.Eveniftheydonot
preciselycontrol,theydofurnishaguide.Moreover,thereseemstobeadearthofUnitedStatesSupremeCourt
pronouncementsonthesubjectofmartiallaw,duenodoubttoabsenceintheAmericanConstitutionofany
provisionconcerningit.Itisunderstandablewhynoreferencewasmadetosuchsubjectintheearliestclassicon
AmericanconstitutionallawwrittenbyJusticeStory.
40Whenthelandmark1866Milligancase 41madeitsappearance,andmuchmoresoafterSterling 42followedin1932and
Duncan43in1946,adiscussionthereofbecameunavoidable.Soitisevidentfromsubsequentcommentariesandcase
books.44Cooleythough,inhisequallyfamousworkthatwasfirstpublishedin1868contentedhimselfwithfootnote
referencestoMilligan.45Watsonvieweditinconnectionwiththesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritof.habeascorpus
46Inthenineteentwenties,therewasafullertreatmentofthequestionofmartiallaw.BurdickanticipatedWilloughbywith
thisappraisal:"Socalledmartiallaw,exceptinoccupiedterritoryofanenemy,ismerelythecallinginoftheaidofmilitary
forcesbytheexecutive,whoischargedwiththeenforcementofthelaw,withorwithoutspecialauthorizationbythe
legislature.Suchdeclarationofmartiallawdoesnotsuspendthecivillaw,thoughitmayinterferewiththeexerciseofone's
ordinaryrights.Therighttocalloutthemilitaryforcestomaintainorderandenforcethelawissimplypartofthepolice
power.Itisonlyjustifiedwhenitreasonablyappearsnecessary,andonlyjustifiessuchactsasreasonablyappear
necessarytomeettheexigency,includingthearrest,orinextremecasesthekillingofthosewhocreatethedisorderor
opposetheauthorities.Whentheexigencyisoverthemembersofthemilitaryforcesarecriminallyandcivillyliableforacts
donebeyondthescopeofreasonablenecessity.Whenhonestlyandreasonablycopingwithasituationofinsurrectionorriot
amemberofthemilitaryforcescannotbemadeliableforhisacts,andpersonsreasonablyarrestedundersuch
circumstanceswillnot,duringtheinsurrectionorriot,befreebywritof.habeascorpus47
Willoughby,asalreadynoted,waspartialtotheclaimsofliberty.Thisisquiteevidentinthisexcerptinhisopus:
"Thereis,then,strictlyspeaking,nosuchthinginAmericanlawasadeclarationofmartiallawwherebymilitary
lawissubstitutedforcivillaw.Socalleddeclarationsofmartiallaware,indeed,oftenmadebuttheirlegaleffect
goesnofurtherthantowarncitizensthatthemilitarypowershavebeencalleduponbytheexecutivetoassisthim
inthemaintenanceoflawandorder,andthat,whiletheemergencylasts,theymust,uponpainofarrestand
punishmentnotcommitanyactswhichwillinanywayrendermoredifficulttherestorationoforderandthe
enforcementoflaw.Someoftheauthoritiesstatingsubstantiallythisdoctrinearequotedinthefootnotebelow."
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48Willisspokesimilarly:"Martiallawproper,thatis,militarylawincaseofinsurrection,riots,andinvasions,isnota
substituteforthecivillaw,butisratheranaidtotheexecutionofcivillaw.Declarationsofmartiallawgonofurtherthanto
warncitizensthattheexecutivehascalleduponthemilitarypowertoassisthiminthemaintenanceoflawandorder.While
martiallawisinforce,nonewpowersaregiventotheexecutiveandnocivilrightsoftheindividual,otherthanthewritof,
aresuspended.Therelationsbetweenthecitizenandhisstateareunchanged."habeascorpus49
ItisreadilyevidentthatevenwhenMilligansuppliedtheonlyauthoritativedoctrine,BurdickandWilloughbydid
notignoretheprimacyofcivilliberties.WilliswroteafterSterling.Itwouldindeedbesurprisingifhisopinionwere
otherwise.AfterDuncan,suchanapproachbecomesevenmorestronglyfortified.Schwartz,whosetreatiseisthe
latesttobepublished,hasthissummaryofwhatheconsidersthepresentstateofAmericanlaw:"Theandcases
showplainlythatmartiallawisthepubliclawofnecessity.Necessityalonecallsitforthnecessityjustifiesits
exerciseandnecessitymeasurestheextentanddegreetowhichitmaybeemployed.Itis,thehighCourthas
affirmed,anunbendingruleoflawthattheexerciseofmilitarypower,wheretherightsofthecitizenare
concerned,mayneverbepushedbeyondwhattheexigencyrequires.Ifmartialrulesurvivesthenecessityon
whichaloneitrests,forevenasingleminute,itbecomesamereexerciseoflawlessviolence."
MilliganDuncan50Further:"isofbasicimportance.Beforeit,anumberofdecisions,includingonebythehighestCourt,
wentonthetheorythattheexecutivehadafreehandintakingmartiallawmeasures.Underthem,ithadbeenwidely
supposedthatamartiallawproclamationwassofarconclusivethatanyactiontakenunderitwasimmunefromjudicial
scrutiny.,definitelydiscreditstheseearlierdecisionsandthedoctrineofconclusivenessderivedfromthem.Under,where
martiallawmeasuresimpingeuponpersonalorpropertyrightsnormallybeyondthescopeofmilitarypower,whose
interventionislawfulonlybecauseanabnormalsituationhasmadeitnecessarytheexecutive'sipsedixitisnotofitself
conclusiveofthenecessity."Sterlingv.ConstantinSterlingv.ConstantinSterlingv.Constantin51
ItisnottobelostsightofthatthebasisforthedeclarationofmartiallawinthePhilippinesisnotmerenecessity
butanexplicitconstitutionalprovision.Ontheotherhand,Milligan,whichfurnishedthefoundationforSterling
52andDuncan 53haditsrootsintheEnglishcommonlaw.Thereispertinencethereforeinascertainingitssignificance
underthatsystem.AccordingtothenotedEnglishauthor,Dicey:"'Martiallaw,'inthepropersenseofthatterm,inwhichit
meansthesuspensionofordinarylawandthetemporarygovernmentofacountryorpartsofitbymilitarytribunals,is
unknowntothelawofEngland.WehavenothingequivalenttowhatiscalledinFrancethe'DeclarationoftheStateof
Siege,'underwhichtheauthorityordinarilyvestedinthecivilpowerforthemaintenanceoforderandpolicepassesentirely
tothearmy(autoritemilitaire).Thisisanunmistakableproofofthepermanentsupremacyofthelawunderourconstitution."
54Therewasthisqualification:"MartiallawissometimesemployedasanameforthecommonlawrightoftheCrownand
itsservantstorepelforcebyforceinthecaseofinvasion,insurrection,riot,orgenerallyofanyviolentresistancetothelaw.
Thisright,orpower,isessentialtotheveryexistenceoforderlygovernment,andismostassuredlyrecognizedinthemost
amplemannerbythelawofEngland.Itisapowerwhichhasinitselfnospecialconnectionwiththeexistenceofanarmed
force.TheCrownhastherighttoputdownbreachesofthepeace.Everysubject,whetheracivilianorasoldier,whether
whatiscalleda'servantofthegovernment,'suchforexampleasapoliceman,orapersoninnowayconnectedwiththe
administration,notonlyhastheright,butis,asamatteroflegalduty,boundtoassistinputtingdownbreachesofthe
peace.Nodoubtpolicemenorsoldiersarethepersonswho,asbeingspeciallyemployedinthemaintenanceoforder,are
mostgenerallycalledupontosuppressariot,butitisclearthatallloyalsubjectsareboundtotaketheirpartinthe
suppressionofriots."55
Thepicturewouldbeincomplete,ofcourse,ifnoreferenceweremadetoRossiter.InhisworkonConstitutional
Dictatorship,wherehediscussedcrisisgovernmentsintheFrenchRepublic,inGreatBritainandintheUnited
Statehespokeofmartialrule.Forhim,it"isanemergencydevicedesignedforuseinthecrisesofinvasionor
rebellion.Itmaybemostpreciselydefinedasanextensionofmilitarygovernmenttothecivilianpopulation,the
substitutionofthewillofamilitarycommanderforthewillofthepeople'selectedgovernment.Intheeventofan
actualorimminentinvasionbahostilepower,aconstitutionalgovernmentmaydeclaremartialruleinthe
menacedarea.Theresultisthetransferofalleffectivepowersofgovernmentfromthecivilauthoritiestothe
military,oroftenmerelytheassumptionofsuchpowersbythelatterwhentheregulargovernmenthasceasedto
function.Intheeventofarebellionitsinitiationamountstoagovernmentaldeclarationofwaronthosecitizensin
insurrectionagainstthestate.Ineithercaseitmeansmilitarydictatorshipgovernmentbythearmy,courts
martial,suspensionofcivilliberties,andthewholerangeofdictatorialactionofanexecutivenature.Inthe
moderndemocraciesthemilitaryexercisessuchdictatorshipwhileremainingsubordinateandresponsibletothe
executiveheadofthecivilgovernment.Martialrulehasavarietyofformsandpseudonyms,themostimportantof
whichare,asitisknowninthecivillawcountriesoftheBritishEmpireandtheUnitedStates,andthe,asitis
knowninthecivillawcountriesofcontinentalEuropeandLatinAmerica.Thestateofsiegeandmartiallaware
twoedgestothesamesword,andinactiontheycanhardlybedistinguished.Theinstitutionofmartialruleisa
recognitionthattherearetimesinthelivesofallcommunitieswhencrisishassocompletelydisruptedthenormal
workingsofgovernmentthatthemilitaryistheonlypowerremainingthatcanrestorepublicorderandsecurethe
executionofthelaws.
martiallawstateofsiege56
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HappilyforthePhilippines,thedeclarationofmartiallawlendsitselftotheinterpretationthattheBurdick,
Willoughby,Willis,Schwartzformulationspayingdueregardtotheprimacyoflibertypossessrelevance.Itcannot
besaidthatthemartialruleconceptofRossiter,latitudinarianinscope,hasbeenadopted,evenonthe
assumptionthatitcanbereconciledwithourConstitution.WhatisundeniableisthatPresidentMarcoshas
repeatedlymaintainedthatProclamationNo.1081waspreciselybasedontheConstitutionandthatthevalidityof
actstakenthereundercouldbepasseduponbytheSupremeCourt.Forme,thatisquitereassuring,persuaded
asIamlikewisethattheviewofRossiterisopposedtothefundamentalconceptofourpolity,whichputsa
premiumonfreedom.Noundueconcernneedthenbefeltastothecontinuingrelianceon,
Moyerv.Peabody57whereJusticeHolmesspeakingfortheCourt,statedthatthetestofthevalidityofexecutivearrestis
thattheybemade"ingoodfaithandinthehonestbeliefthattheyareneededinordertoheadtheinsurrectionoff..."58He
didstatelikewise:"Whenitcomestoadecisionbytheheadofthestateuponamatterinvolvingitslife,theordinaryrights
ofindividualsmustyieldtowhathedeemsthenecessitiesofthemoment.Publicdangerwarrantsthesubstitutionof
executiveprocessforjudicialprocess.See,99US441,446,25Led.327,328,Thiswasadmittedwithregardtokilling
menintheactualclashofarmsandwethinkitobvious,althoughitwasdisputed,thatthesameistrueoftemporary
detentiontopreventapprehendedharm."Keelyv.Sanders59Norwasthistomanifestlessthanfullregardforcivilliberties.
Hisotheropinionsindicatedthecontrary.Morespecifically,itwasfromhispen,in,ChastletonCorporationv.Sinclair
60wherethedoctrinethatthejudiciarymayinquireintowhethertheemergencywasatanend,wasgivenexpression.Thus:
"Werepeatwhatwasstatedin,...,astotherespectduetoadeclarationofthiskindbythelegislaturesofarasitrelatesto
presentfacts.But,evenastothem,acourtisnotalibertytoshutitseyestoanobviousmistake,whenthevalidityofthe
lawdependsuponthetruthofwhatisdeclared....Andstillmoreobviously,sofarasthisdeclarationlookstothefuture,it
canbenomorethanprophecy,andisliabletobecontrolledbyevents.Alawdependingupontheexistenceofan
emergencyorothercertainstateoffactstoupholditmayceasetooperateiftheemergencyceasesorthefactschange,
eventhoughvalidwhenpassed."Blockv.Hirsh61
13.ItmaysafelybeconcludedthereforethattheroleofAmericancourtsconcerningthelegalityofactstaken
duringaperiodofmartiallawisfarfromminimal.WhyitmusthesowasexplainedbyDeanRostowinthiswise:
"Unlessthecourtsrequireashowing,incaseslikethese,ofanintelligiblerelationshipbetweenmeansandends,
societyhaslostitsbasicprotectionagainsttheabuseofmilitarypower.Thegeneral'sgoodintentionmustbe
irrelevant.Thereshouldbeevidenceincourtthathismilitaryjudgmenthadasuitablebasisinfact.AsColonel
Fairman,astrongproponentofwidenedmilitarydiscretion,pointsout:'Whentheexecutivefailsorisunableto
satisfythecourtoftheevidentnecessityfortheextraordinarymeasuresithastaken,itcanhardlyexpectthe
courttoassumeitonfaith."
62ThisisthewayLasswellwouldsummarizethematter:"Onthewhole,wecanconcludethatthecourtsofthiscountry
haveabodyofancientprinciplesandrecentprecedentsthatcanbeusedtokeepataminimumunnecessary
encroachmentsuponprivaterightsbytheexecutive,civilormilitary.Thevigorandsensitivenesswithwhichthedue
processclausehasbeenaffirmedinthelasttwodecadesis,inparticular,animportantdevelopment."63
14.Itmaybethattheapproachfollowedmayforsomebeindicativeoflackoffullawarenessoftoday'sstern
realities.Itismysubmissionthattosoviewthetranscendentalissuesbeforeusistoadhereascloselyas
possibletotheidealenvisionedinExparteMilligan:"TheConstitutionisalawforrulersandforpeopleequallyin
warandpeaceandcoverswiththeshieldofitsprotectionallclassesofmenatalltimesandunderall
circumstances."
64Itisevertimelytoreiteratethatatthecoreofconstitutionalismisarobustconcernforindividualrights.Thisisnotto
denythatthejudicialprocessdoesnottakeplaceinasocialvoid.Thequestionsthatcallfordecisionaretobeexaminedin
thetotalsocialcontextwithfullappreciationoftheenvironmentalfacts,whetherviewedinitstemporalorotherrelevant
aspects.Theyhavetoreconciletimetestedprinciplestocontemporaryproblems.Legalnormscannotalwaysstandup
againstthepressureofevents.Thegreatunquestionedveritiesmaythusprovetobelessthanadequate.Somuchis
conceded.Nonetheless,evenwiththeadditionaldifficultythattheCourttodayiscompelledtoenterterrainwithboundaries
notsoclearlydefined,carryingwithittheriskofexceedingthenormallimitsofjudicialimprecision,Ifindmyselfunableto
resistthecompulsionofconstitutionalhistoryandtraditionaldoctrines.Thefactsandissuesofthepetitionsbeforeusand
themandatesofthefundamentallaw,asIviewtheminthelightofacceptedconcepts,blunttheedgeofwhatotherwise
couldbeconsiderationsofdecisiveimpact.Ifindmyselftroubledbythethoughtthat,wereitotherwise,itwouldamountto
freezingthefluxoftheturbulentpresentwithitsgraveandcriticalproblemsintheicypermanenceofjuristicdoctrines.As
ofnow,suchanuncomfortablethoughtintrudes.Hencethisbriefconcurringanddissentingopinion.
TEEHANKEE,
J.:
:ThisseparateopinionwaspreparedandscheduledtobepromulgatedwiththejudgmentoftheCourt(penned
bytheChiefJustice)onSeptember12,1974.Suchpromulgationwashoweverovertakenbythewelcomenewsof
thereleasefromdetentiononSeptember11,1974ofpetitionerJoseW.DioknoupontheorderofPresident
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FerdinandE.Marcos,andtheCourtthenresolvedtodeferpromulgationuntilthefollowingweek.Hence,PartIof
thisopiniondealingwiththeDioknopetitionshouldbereadinsuchtimecontext.
Prefatorystatement
ThetwootherpartsthereofdealingwiththeAquinoandRodrigocasesaretobereadasoftheactualdateof
promulgation,sincetheyreiterateamainthemeoftheopinionthattheCourtshouldadheretothewellgrounded
principleofnotrulingonconstitutionalissuesexceptwhennecessaryinanappropriatecase.Inthewriter'sview,
thegratifyingdevelopmentintheDioknocasewhichrenderedhispetitionmootbyvirtueofhisreleaseoncemore
demonstratesthevalidityofthisprinciple.
I.:IvoteforthegrantingofpetitionerJoseW.Diokno'smotionofDecember29,1973towithdrawthepetitionfor
filedonSeptember23,1972onhisbehalfandthesupplementalpetitionandmotionsforimmediatereleaseand
fororalargumentofJune29,1973andAugust14,1973filedinsupportthereof,asprayedfor.
OntheDioknopetitionhabeascorpus
1.Thepresentactionisoneofandthedetainee'sownwithdrawalofhispetitionisdecisive.Ifthedetaineehimself
withdrawshispetitionandnolongerwishesthisCourttopassuponthelegalityofhisdetentionandcitestheother
pendingcaseswhichhavenotbeenwithdrawnandwhereintheCourtcanruleontheconstitutionalissuesifso
minded,
habeascorpushabeascorpus1suchwithdrawalofapetitionshouldbegrantedpracticallyasamatterofabsoluteright
(whateverbethemotivationstherefor)inthesamemannerthatthewithdrawalmotionsofthepetitionersintheothercases
werepreviouslygrantedbytheCourt.habeascorpus2
Sincetherewereseven(7)membersoftheCourtwhovotedforgrantingthewithdrawalmotionasagainstfive(5)
memberswhovotedfordenyingthesameandrenderingadecision,
3submitthatthismajorityofseven(7)outoftheCourt'smembershipoftwelve(12)isasufficientmajorityforgrantingthe
prayedfor.Asimplemajorityofsevenislegallysufficientforthegrantingofawithdrawalofapetition,sinceitdoesinvolve
therenditionofa,onthemerits.ItisonlywhereadecisionistoberenderedonthemeritsbytheCourtthatthe1973
Constitutionrequirestheconcurrenceofatleasteight(8)members.withdrawalnotdecisionenbanc4
Ithereforedissentfromthemajority'sadheringtothefivememberminorityviewthatthemajorityofseven
membersisnotlegallysufficientforgrantingwithdrawalandthatadecisiononthemeritsberendered
notwithstandingthewithdrawalofthepetition.
2.Thegrantingofthewithdrawalofthepetitionisbutinconsonancewiththefundamentalprincipleonthe
exerciseofjudicialpowerwhich,inthewordsoftheSolicitorGeneral,"asJusticeLaurelemphasized,isjustifiable
onlyasanecessityfortheresolutionofanactualcaseandcontroversyandthereforeshouldbeconfinedtothe
verylismotapresented."
5
Suchwithdrawalisfurthermoreinaccordwiththerespondents'standfromthebeginningurgingtheCourtnotto
takecognizance(forwantofjurisdictionorasamatterofjudicialrestraintcitingBrandeis'injunctionthat"The
mostimportantthingwedecideiswhatnottodecide"
6)orthat"attheveryleast,thisCourtshouldpostponeconsiderationofthiscaseuntilthepresentemergencyisover." 7
Manyoftheotherpetitionersinthecasesatbarweregrantedleavetowithdrawtheirpetitions.PetitionerDiokno's
withdrawalmotionshouldlikewisebegrantedinlinewiththewellestablisheddoctrinethattheCourtwillnotrule
onconstitutionalissuesexceptwhennecessaryinanappropriatecase.
habeascorpus
3.ButtheSolicitorGeneralnowobjectstothewithdrawalonthegroundofpublicinterestandthat"thisTribunal
...hasbeenusedastheopenforumforundergroundpropagandabythosewhohavepoliticalaxestogrind"with
thecirculationofthewithdrawalmotionandthatthisCourtwouldbe"puttingthesealofapproval"andineffect
admitthe"unfair,untrueandcontemptuous"statementsmadeinthewithdrawalmotionshouldthisCourtgrant
thewithdrawal.
8IseenopointinthepositiontakenbytheSolicitorGeneralofurgingtheCourttodenythewithdrawalmotiononlytorender
adecisionthatwouldafteralldismissthepetitionandsustainrespondents'defenseofandhavetheCourtdeclareitselfto
adjudicatetheconstitutionalissuespresentedpoliticalquestionwithoutjurisdiction9andaskingtheCourttoembracethe
"pragmaticmethod"ofWilliamJameswhich"rejects...theaassumptionthatthereareimmutableprinciplesofjustice.It
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testsapropositionbyitspracticalconsequences."priori10Theobjectionsareuntenable.
Thepublicinterestobjectionismetbythefactthattherearestillpending.othercases(principallytheprohibition
caseofpetitionerBenignoS.Aquino,Jr.inanothercase,L37364questioningthefilingofgravechargesunder
theAntiSubversionAct,etc.againsthimwithamilitarycommission
11andwhichisnotyetsubmittedfordecision)wherethesameconstitutionalissuesmayberesolved.
Theotherobjectionsaretenuous:TheSolicitorGeneralrefuteshisownobjectionsinhisclosingstatementinhis
commentthat"fortheirpart,respondentsareconfidentthatintheendtheywouldbeupheldintheirdefense,as
indeedpetitionerandcounselhavepracticallyinthiscase."
confessedjudgment12
Thepropagandaobjectionisnotavalidgroundfordenyingthewithdrawalofthepetitionandshouldnotbeheld
againstpetitionerwhohadnothingwhatsoevertodowithit.Theobjectionthatgrantingthewithdrawalmotion
wouldamounttoanadmissionofthe"unfair,untrueandcontemptuousstatements"madethereinisuntenable
sinceitispatentthatgrantingthewithdrawalmotionperse(regardlessofpetitioner'sreasons)doesnotamount
toanadmissionofthetruthorvalidityofsuchreasonsandasconcededbytheSolicitorGeneral,neitherwill
denyingthewithdrawalmotionpersedisprovethereasons.
13Theuntruth,unfairnessorcostumacyofsuchreasonsmaybestbedealtwith,clarifiedorexpoundedbytheCourtandits
membersintheCourt'sresolutiongrantingwithdrawalorintheseparateopinionsoftheindividualJustices(ashasactually
beendoneandwhichthewriterwillnowproceedtodo).
4.Petitioner'sfirstreasonforwithdrawalissubjective.Aftermentioningvariousfactors,particularly,thefactthat
fiveofthesixJustices(includingthewriter)whoheldintheRatificationcases
14thatthe1973ConstitutionhadnotbeenvalidlyratifiedhadtakenonOctober29,1973anoathtoimportanddefendthe
newConstitution,heexpresseshisfeelingthat"(I)cannotreasonablyexpecteitherrightorreason,laworjustice,toprevail
inmycase,"that"theunusuallengthofthestrugglealsoindicatesthatitsconscienceislosingthebattle"andthat"sinceI
donotwishtobeapartytoanIadversedecision,Imustrenounceeverypossibilityoffavorablejudgment."15Aparty's
subjectiveevaluationoftheCourt'sactionisactuallyofnomoment,forithasalwaysbeenrecognizedthatthisCourt,
possessedofneithertheswordnorthepurse,mustultimatelyandobjectivelyrestitsauthorityonsustainedpublic
confidenceinthetruth,justice,integrityandmoralforceofitsjudgments."16
Petitioner'ssecondreasonforwithdrawalreads:"(S)econd,inviewofthenewoaththatitsmembershavetaken,
thepresentSupremeCourtisanewCourtfunctioningunderanew'Constitution,'differentfromtheCourtandthe
ConstitutionunderwhichIappliedformyrelease.IwaswillingtobejudgedbytheoldCourtundertheold
Constitution,butnotbythenewCourtunderthenewConstitution,...."
17
PetitionerisinerrorinhisassumptionthatthisCourtis"newCourtfunctioningunderanewConstitutiondifferent
fromtheCourtandtheConstitutionunderwhich[he]appliedfor[his]release."ThesameSupremeCourthas
continuedsavethatitnowoperatesunderArticleXofthe1973Constitutionwhichincreaseditscomponent
membershipfromeleventofifteenandtransferredtoitadministrativesupervisionoverallcourtsandpersonnel
thereofwiththepowerofdisciplineanddismissaloverjudgesofinferiorcourts,inthesamemannerthatthesame
RepublicofthePhilippines(ofwhichtheSupremeCourtisbutapart)hascontinuedinexistencebutnow
operatesunderthe1973Constitution.
interalia18
DuringtheperiodofninetydaysthattheRatificationcaseswerependingbeforetheCourtuntilitsdismissalofthe
casesperitsresolutionofMarch31,1973becamefinalonApril17,1973,theExecutiveDepartmentwas
operatingunderthe1973ConstitutioninaccordancewithPresidentFerdinandE.Marcos'ProclamationNo.1102
onJanuary17,1973announcingtheratificationandcorningintoeffectofthe1973ConstitutionwhilethisCourt
astheonlyothergovernmentaldepartmentcontinuedtooperatetinderthe1935Constitutionpendingitsfinal
resolutiononthesaidcaseschallengingthevalidityofProclamationNo.1102andenforcementofthenew
Constitution.(AspertheCourtresolutionofJanuary23,1973,itdeclinedtotakeoverfromtheDepartmentof
Justicetheadministrativesupervisionoverallinferiorcourtsexpressingitssensethat"itisbestthatthebe
maintaineduntilthecaseaforementioned(Javellanavs.Exec.Secretary)shallhavebeenfinallyresolved...")
statusquo
Suchasituationcouldnotlongendurewhereintheonlytwogreatdepartmentsofgovernment,theExecutiveand
theJudicial,
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19foraperiodofthreemonthswereoperatingundertwodifferentConstitutions(presidentialandparliamentary).Whenthis
Court'sresolutionofdismissaloftheRatificationcasesbyamajorityofsixtofourJusticesbecamefinalandwasentered
onApril18,1973"withtheresultthatthere(were)notenoughvotestodeclarethatthenewConstitutionisnotinforce,"
20theCourtandparticularlytheremainingthreedissentingJustices(notwithstandingtheirvotewiththreeothersthatthe
newConstitutionhadnotbeenvalidlyratified21hadtoabideundertheRuleofLawbythedecisionofthemajority
dismissingthecasesbroughttoenjointheenforcementbytheExecutiveofthenewConstitutionandhadtooperateunderit
asthefundamentalcharterofthegovernment,unlesstheyweretoturnfromlegitimatedissenttointernecinedissidencefor
whichtheyhaveneithertheinclinationnorthecapability.
TheCourtastheheadoftheJudicialDepartmentthenceforthassumedthepowerofadministrativesupervision
overallcourtsandallotherfunctionsandliabilitiesimposedonitunderthenewConstitution.Accordingly,thisand
allotherexistinginferiorcourtscontinuetodischargetheirjudicialfunctionandtohearanddetermineallpending
casesundertheold(1935)Constitution
22aswellasnewcasesunderthenew(1973)ConstitutionwiththefullsupportofthemembersoftheIntegratedBarofthe
Philippines(noneofwhomhasmadepetitioner'sclaimthatthisisa"newCourt"differentfromthe"oldCourt").
AmajorliabilityimposeduponallmembersoftheCourtandallotherofficialsandemployeeswasthatunder
ArticleXVII,section9oftheTransitoryProvisions
23whichwasdestructiveoftheirtenureandcalleduponthem"tovacatetheirrespectiveofficesupontheappointmentand
qualificationoftheirsuccessors."TheirtakingtheoathonOctober29,1973"topreserveanddefendthenewConstitution"
byvirtueoftheir"havingbeencontinuedinoffice"24ontheoccasionoftheoathtakingofthreenewmembersoftheCourt
25pursuanttoArticleXV,section4 26wasmeanttoassuretheir"continuityoftenure"bywayofthePresidenthaving
exercisedthepowerofreplacementunderthecitedprovisionandineffectreplacedthemwiththemselvesasmembersof
theCourtwiththesameorderofseniority.27
5.Thewithdrawalineffectgivescauseforjudicialabstentionandfurtheropportunity(pendingsubmittalfor
decisionoftheAquinoprohibitioncaseinL37364)toponderanddeliberateuponthehostofgraveand
fundamentalconstitutionalquestionsinvolvedwhichhavetherebybeenrenderedunnecessarytoresolvehere
andnow.
Inthebenchmarkcaseof
Lansangvs.Garcia28whentheCourtdeclaredthatthePresidentdidnotactarbitrarilyinissuinginAugust,1971
ProclamationNo.889,asamended,suspendingtheprivilegeofthewritofforpersonsdetainedforthecrimesofinsurrection
orrebellionandotherovertactscommittedbytheminfurtherancethereof,theCourtheldthroughthenChiefJustice
Concepcionthat"ournextstepwouldhavebeenthefollowing:TheCourt,oracommissionerdesignatedbyit,wouldhave
receivedevidenceonwhetherasstatedinrespondents''AnswerandReturn'saidpetitionershadbeenapprehended
anddetained'onreasonablebelief'thattheyhad'participatedinthecrimeofinsurrectionorrebellion.'habeascorpus
(However,sinceintheintervaloftwomonthsduringthependencyofthecase,criminalcomplaintshadbeenfiled
incourtagainstthepetitionersdetainees(LuzvimindoDavid,GaryOlivar,etal.),theCourtfoundthat"itisbestto
letsaidpreliminaryexaminationand/orinvestigationbecompleted,sothatpetitioners'releasecouldbeordered
bythecourtoffirstinstance,shoulditfindthatthereisnoprobablecauseagainstthem,orawarrantfortheir
arrestcouldbeissuedshouldaprobablecausebeestablishedagainstthem."
29TheCourtaccordinglyorderedthetrialcourt"toactwithutmostdispatch"inconductingthepreliminaryinvestigationfor
violationoftheAntiSubversionActand"toissuethecorrespondingwarrantsofarrest,ifprobablecauseisfoundtoexist
againstthem,orotherwise,toordertheirrelease.")
Cansuchaprocedureforreceptionofevidenceonthecontrovertedallegationsconcerningthedetentionas
indicatedinbelikewiseappliedtopetitioner'scaseconsideringhisprolongeddetentionforalmosttwoyearsnow
withoutcharges?
Lansang30Itshouldalsobeconsideredthatitisconcededthateventhoughtheprivilegeofthewritofhasbeensuspended,
itissuspendedonlyastocertainspecificcrimesandthe"answerandreturn"oftherespondentswhoholdthepetitioner
underdetentionisnotconclusiveuponthecourtswhichmayreceiveevidenceanddetermineasheldin(andasalso
providedintheAntiSubversionAct[RepublicAct1700])whetherapetitionerhasbeenapprehendedanddetainedarbitrarily
"onreasonablebelief"thathehas"participatedinthecrimeofinsurrectionorrebellion"orotherrelatedoffensesasmaybe
enumeratedintheproclamationsuspendingtheprivilegeofthewrit.habeascorpusLansanginfactor
PertinenttothisquestionistheCourt'sadoptioninofthedoctrineof
LansangSterlingvs.Constantin31enunciatedthroughU.S.ChiefJusticeHughesthatevenwhenthestatehasbeenplaced
undermartiallaw"...(W)henthereisasecuredbythatConstitution,thesubjectisinanappropriateproceedingdirected
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againsttheindividualschargedwiththetransgression.TosuchacasetheFederaljudicialpowerextends(Art.3,sec.2)
and,soextending,....substantialshowingthattheexertionofstatepowerhasoverriddenprivaterightsnecessarilyonefor
judicialinquirythecourthasalltheauthorityappropriatetoitsexercise
EquallypertinentistheCourt'sstatementthereinannouncingthemembers'unanimousconvictionthat"ithasthe
authoritytoinquireintotheexistenceofsaidfactualbases[statedintheproclamationsuspendingtheprivilegeof
thewritoforplacingthecountryundermartiallawasthecasemaybe,sincetherequirementsfortheexerciseof
thesepowersarethesameandareprovidedintheverysameclause]inordertodeterminetheconstitutional
sufficiencythereof."
habeascorpus32TheCourtstressedthereinthat"indeed,thegrantofpowertosuspendtheprivilegeisneitherabsolutenor
unqualified.TheauthorityconferreduponbytheConstitution,bothundertheBillofRightsandundertheExecutive
Department,islimitedandconditional.ThepreceptintheBillofRightsestablishesageneralrule,aswellasanexception
thereto.whatismore,itpostulatestheformerinthe,evidentlytostressitsimportance,byprovidingthat'(t)heprivilegeof
thewritofshallbesuspended....'Itisonlybywayofthatitpermitsthesuspensionoftheprivilege'incasesofinvasion,
insurrection,orrebellion'orunderArt.VIIoftheConstitution,'imminentdangerthereof''whenthepublicsafetyrequires
it,inanyofwhicheventsthesamemaybesuspendedwhereverduringsuchperiodthenecessityforsuchsuspensionshall
exist.'Farfrombeingfullandplenary,theauthoritytosuspendtheprivilegeofthewritisthuscircumscribed,confinedand
restricted,notonlybytheprescribedsettingortheconditionsessentialtoitsexistence,butalso,asregardsthetimewhen
andtheplacewhereitmaybeexercised.Thesefactorsandtheaforementionedsettingorconditionsmark,establishand
definetheextent,theconfinesandthelimitsofsaidpower,beyondwhichitdoesnotexist.And,likethelimitationsand
restrictionsimposedbytheFundamentalLawuponthelegislativedepartment,adherencetheretoandcompliancetherewith
may,withinproperbounds,beinquiredintobythecourtsofjustice.Otherwise,theexplicitconstitutionalprovisionsthereon
wouldbemeaningless.Surely,theframesofourConstitutioncouldnothaveintendedtoengageinsuchawastefulexercise
infutility."negativehabeascorpusnotexception33
Whileastateofmartiallawmaybarsuchjudicialinquiriesunderthewritofintheactualtheaterofwar,wouldthe
proscriptionapplywhenmartiallawismaintainedasaninstrumentofsocialreformandthecivilcourts(aswellas
militarycommissions)areopenandfreelyfunctioning?Whatistheextentandscopeofthevalidatingprovisionof
ArticleXVII,section3(2)oftheTransitoryProvisionsofthe1973Constitution?
habeascorpus34
Grantingthevalidationoftheinitialpreventivedetention,wouldthevalidatingprovisioncoverindefinitedetention
thereafterormayinquirybemadeastoitsreasonablerelationtomeetingtheemergencysituation?
WhatrightsundertheBillofRights,e.g.therightstodueprocessandto"speedy,impartialandpublictrial"
35maybeinvokedunderthepresentstateofmartiallaw?
Istheexerciseofmartiallawpowersfortheinstitutionalizationofreformsincompatiblewithrecognizingthe
fundamentallibertiesgrantedintheBillofRights?
ThePresidentiswellawareofthelayman'sviewofthe"centralproblemofconstitutionalisminourcontemporary
society...whetherornottheConstitutionremainsanefficientinstrumentforthemoderationofconflictwithin
society.Therearetwoaspectsofthisproblem.Oneistheregulationoffreedominordertopreventanarchy.The
otheristhelimitationofpowerinordertopreventtyranny."
36
Hence,hehasdeclaredthat"TheNewSocietylookstoindividualrightsasamatterofparamountconcern,
removedfromthevicissitudesofpoliticalcontroversyandbeyondthereachofmajorities.Wearepledgedto
upholdtheBillofRightsandastheexigenciesmaysoallow,wearedeterminedthateachprovisionshallbe
executedtothefullest,"
37andhasacknowledgedthat"martiallawnecessarilycreatesacommandsociety...[and]isaconstitutionalexpedientof
safeguardingtherepublic..."temporary38
Hehasthusdescribedtheproclamationofmartiallawand"thesettingupofacorrespondingcrisisgovernment"
asconstitutionalauthoritarianism,"whichisarecognitionthatwhilehisgovernmentisauthoritarianitisessentially
constitutionalandrecognizesthesupremacyofthenewConstitution.
Hehasfurtherdeclaredthat"martiallawshouldhavelegallyterminatedonJanuary17,1973whenthenew
Constitutionwasratified"butthat"thePopularclamormanifestedinthereferendum[was]thattheNational
Assemblyhetemporarilysuspended"andthereactionintheJuly,1973referendum"wasviolentlyagainst
stoppingtheuseofmartiallawpowers,"addingthat"Iintendtosubmitthismatteratleastnoticeayeartothe
people,andwhentheysayweshouldshifttothenormalfunctionsofgovernment,thenwewilldoso."
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39
G.R.No.L35546
Therealizationoftheprospectsforrestorationofnormalcyandfullimplementationofeachandeveryprovisionof
theBillofRightsaspledgedbythePresidentwouldthenhopefullycomesoonerratherthanlaterandprovidesan
additionalweightyreasonfortheexerciseofjudicialabstentionundertheenvironmentalcircumstancesandfor
thegrantingofthewithdrawalmotion.
II.:ImaintainmyoriginalvoteasfirstunanimouslyagreedbytheCourtfordismissalofthepetitionofBenignoS.
Aquino,Jr.onthegroundthatgravechargesagainsthimforviolationoftheAntiSubversionAct(RepublicAct
1700),etc.werefiledinAugust,1973andhencethepresentpetitionhasbeensupersededbytheprohibition
casethenfiledbyhimquestioningthefilingofthechargesagainsthimwithamilitarycommissionratherthanwith
thecivilcourts(whichcaseisnotyetsubmittedfordecision).
IntheAquinocasehabeascorpus
ThesaidprohibitioncaseinvolvesthesameconstitutionalissuesraisedintheDioknocaseandmore,concerning
theconstitutionalityofhavinghimtriedbyamilitarycommissionforoffensesallegedlycommittedbyhimlong
beforethedeclarationofmartiallaw.Thisisevidentfromthespecialandaffirmativedefensesraisedin
respondents'answerwhichfiledjustlastAugust21,1974bytheSolicitorwhichreiteratethesamedefensesinhis
answertothepetitionatbar.Hence,thesameconstitutionalissuesmaywellberesolvedifnecessaryinthe
decisionyettoberenderedbytheCourtinsaidprohibitioncase.
Ithereforedissentfromthesubsequentvoteofthemajoritytoinsteadpassuponandresolveinadvancethesaid
constitutionalissuesunnecessarilyinthepresentcase.
III.:IsubmitthatthepetitionofFrancisco"Soc"Rodrigoaswellasthepetitionsofthoseotherssimilarlyreleased
shouldbedismissedforhavingbeenrenderedmootandacademicbyvirtueoftheirreleasefromphysical
confinementanddetention.Thattheirreleasehasbeenmadesubjecttocertainconditions(e.g.notbeingallowed
toleavetheGreaterManilaareawithoutspecificauthorizationofthemilitaryauthorities)doesnotmeanthattheir
actionwouldsurvive,since"(T)herestraintoflibertywhichwouldjustifytheissuanceofthewritmustbemore
thanameremoralrestraintitmustbeactualorphysical."
IntheRodrigocasehabeascorpus40Theymayhavesomeotherjudicialrecoursefortheremovalofsuchrestraintsbuttheir
actionforcannotsurvivesincetheyarenolongerdeprivedoftheirphysicalliberty.Forthesereasonsandthosealready
expoundedhereinabove,Idissentfromthemajorityvotetopassuponandresolveinadvancetheconstitutionalissues
unnecessarilyinthepresentcase.habeascorpus
BARREDO,concurring:
J.,
Itistomymindveryunfortunatethat,forreasonsIcannotcomprehendordonotdeemconvincing,themajority
oftheCourthasagreedthatnomainopinionbepreparedforthedecisioninthese,cases.Honestly,Ifeelthatthe
groundsgivenbytheChiefJusticedonotjustifyadeviationfromtheregularpracticeofamainopinionbeing
preparedbyoneJusticeevenwhenthemembersoftheCourtarenotallagreedastothegroundsofthe
judgmentaslongasatleastasubstantialnumberofJusticesconcurinthebasiconesandthereareenough
otherJusticesconcurringintheresulttoformtherequiredmajority.Idonotseesuchvaryingsubstantialdisparity
intheviewsofthemembersoftheCourtregardingthedifferentissueshereastocallforasummarizationlikethe
onethatwasdone,withcontroversialconsequences,inJavellana.
*Actually,thesummarizationmadebytheChiefJusticedoesnotinmyopinionportrayaccuratelythespectrumofourviews,ifoneistoassaythedoctrinal
valueofthisdecision.Thedivergence'sstatedareIthinkmoreapparentthanreal.
Inanyevent,itismyconsideredviewthatahistoricaldecisionlikethis,onelikelytobe,atthesametimethatitis
ofutmosttranscendentalimportancebecauseitrevolvesaroundtheproperconstructionoftheconstitutional
provisionssecuringindividualrightsastheymaybe,affectedbythoseempoweringtheGovernmenttodefend
itselfagainstthethreatofinternalandexternalaggression,astheseareactuallyoperatinginthesettingofthe
OfficialproclamationoftheExecutivethatrebellionendangeringpublicsafetyactuallyexists,deservesbetter
treatmentfromtheCourt.Indeed,Ibelievethatourpointsofseemingvariancerespectingthequestionsbeforeus
couldhavebeenthreshedout,ifonlyenougheffortinthatdirectionhadbeenexertedbyall.Thetroubleisthat
fromtheverybeginningmanymembersoftheCourt,myselfincluded,announcedourdesiretohaveourviews
recordedforhistory,hence,individualizationratherthanconsensusbecametheorderoftheday.In
consequence,theconvenientsolutionwasforgedthataslongastherewouldbeenoughvotestosupporta
legallybindingjudgment,thereneednotbeanyopinionoftheCourt,everyonecouldgivehisownviewsandthe
ChiefJusticewouldjusttrytoanalyzetheopinionsofthosewhowouldcaretoprepareoneandthenmakea
certificationofthefinalresultofthevoting.Itwasonlyatthelastminutethat,atmysuggestion,supportedby
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JusticeCastro,theChief'spreparedcertificationwasmodifiedtoassumetheformofajudgment,therebygiving
thisdecisionabettersemblanceofrespectability.
suigeneris
Aswillbeseen,thisseparateopinionofconcurrenceisnotduetoanyirreconcilableconflictofconvictionbetween
meandanyothermemberoftheCourt.Truthtotell,attheearlystagesofoureffortstodecidethesebutafterthe
Courthadmoreorlessalreadyarrivedataconsensusastotheresult,IwasmadetounderstandthatIcould
preparetheopinionfortheCourt.Apparently,however,foronereasonoranother,someofourcolleaguesfelt
thatitisunnecessarytotouchoncertainmatterscontainedinthedraftIhadsubmitted,incompleteandunedited
asitwas,hence,theplanwasabandoned.Myexplanationthatadecisionofthisimportshouldbeaddressedin
parttothefutureandshouldattempttoanswer,asbestwecan,notonlythequestionsraisedbythepartiesbut
alsotherelevantonesthatwearecertainarebotheringmanyofourcountrymen,nottospeakofthosewhoare
interestedinthecorrectjuridicalimplicationsoftheunusualpoliticaldevelopmentsbeingwitnessedinthe
Philippinesthesedays,failedtopersuadethem.Istillfeelverystrongly,however,theneedforarticulatingthe
thoughtsthatwillenablethewholeworldtovisualizeandcomprehendtheexactlength,breathanddepthofthe
juridicalfoundationsofthecurrentconstitutionalorderandthusbebetterpositionedtorenderitsverdictthereon.
ThefollowingthenisthedraftoftheopinionIpreparedfortheCourt.IfeelIneednotadjustittogiveitthetenor
ofanindividualopinion.SomethinginsidemedictatesthatIshouldletitstandasIhadoriginallypreparedit.Iam
emboldenedtodothisbytheconvictionthatactually,whenproperlyanalyzed,itwillberealizedthatwhatever
differencestheremightbeinthevariousopinionswearesubmittingindividually,suchdifferenceslieonlyinthe
distinctivemethodsofapproachwehaveeachpreferredtoadoptratherthaninanybasicallysubstantialand
irreconcilabledisagreement.Ifwehadonlystrivenalittlemore,Iamconfident,wecouldhaveevenfounda
commonmodeofapproach.Iamreferring,ofcourse,onlytothoseofuswhosincerelyfeeltheurgencyof
resolvingthefundamentalissuesherein,regardlessofpurelytechnicalandstrainedreasonstheremightbeto
apparentlyjustifyanattitudeofindifference,ifnotconcealedantagonism,totheneedforauthoritativejudicial
clarificationofthejuridicalaspectsoftheNewSocietyinthePhilippines.
OnSeptember11,1974,petitionerDioknowasreleasedbytheorderofthePresident,"underexistingrulesand
regulations."TheCourthas,therefore,resolvedthathisparticularcasehasbecomemootandacademic,butthis
developmenthasnotaffectedtheissuesinsofarastheotherpetitioners,particularlySenatorAquino,are
concerned.AndinasmuchastheprincipalargumentsofpetitionerDiokno,althoughpresentedonlyinthe
pleadingsfiledonhisbehalf,applywithmoreorlessequalforcetotheotherpetitioners,Ifeelthatmyreference
toanddiscussionofsaidargumentsinmydraftmaywellbepreserved,ifonlytomaintainthepurported
comprehensivenessofmytreatmentofalltheimportantaspectsofthesecases.
Beforeproceedinganyfurther,IwouldliketoexplainwhyIamsayingwehavenobasicdisagreements.
ExceptforJusticesMakasiarandEsguerrawhoconsidertherecitalsintheProclamationtobeabsolutely
conclusiveuponthecourtsandofJusticeTeehankeewhoconsidersitunnecessarytoexpressanyopiniononthe
matteratthispoint,therestoreightofushaveactuallyinquiredintotheconstitutionalsufficiencyofthe
Proclamation.Wherewehavedifferedisonlyastotheextentandbasisoftheinquiry.Withoutcommitting
themselvesexpresslyastowhethertheissueisjusticiableorotherwise,theChiefJusticeandJusticeCastro
unmistakablyappeartohaveactuallyconductedaninquirywhichasfarasIcanseeisbasedonfactswhichare
uncontradictedintherecordplusadditionalfactsofjudicialnotice.Noindependentevidencehasbeen
considered,norisanyreferencemadetotheevidenceonwhichthePresidenthadacted.Ontheirpart,Justices
Antonio,FernandezandAquinoareoftheviewthattheProclamationisnotsubjecttoinquirybythecourts,but
assumingitis,theyareoftheconvictionthattherecordamplysupportsthereasonableness,orlackof
arbitrariness,ofthePresident'saction.Again,inarrivingatthislatterconclusion,theyhavereliedexclusivelyon
thesamefactualbasesutilizedbytheChiefJusticeandJusticeCastro.JusticesFernandoandMuozPalma
categoricallyholdthattheissueisjusticiableand,onthatpremise,theymadetheirowninquiry,butwithnoother
basisthanthesameundisputedfactsintherecordandfactsofjudicialnoticefromwhichtheothershavedrawn
theirconclusions.Formyself,IamjustmakingitveryclearthattheinquirywhichtheConstitutioncontemplates
forthedeterminationoftheconstitutionalsufficiencyofaproclamationofmartiallawbythePresidentshouldnot
gobeyondfactsofjudicialnoticeandthosethatmaybestatedintheproclamation,ifthesearebytheirvery
naturecapableofunquestionabledemonstration.Inotherwords,eightofusvirtuallyholdthattheExecutive's
Proclamationisnotabsolutelyconclusivebutitisnottobeinterferedwithwheneveritwithfactsundisputedin
therecordaswellasthoseofjudicialnoticeorcapableofunquestdemonstration.Thus,itisobviousthat
althoughwearesplitbetweenupholdingjusticiabilityornonjusticiability,thosewhobelieveinthelatterhave
nonethelessconductedaninquiry,whilethosewhoadheretotheformertheory,insistingonfollowingLansang,
havelimitedtheirinquirytotheuncontrovertedfactsandfactsofjudicialnotice.Indeed,thetruthisthatnoone
hasaskedforinquiryintotheevidencebeforethePresidentwhichiswhattherealimportofjusticiabilitymeans.In
thefinalanalysis,noneofushasgonebeyondwhatinmyhumbleopiniontheConstitutionpermitsinthe
premises.Inotherwords,whileadeclarationofmartiallawisnotabsolutelyconclusive,theCourt'sinquiryintoits
constitutionalsufficiencymaynot,contrarytowhatisimpliedinLansang,involvethereceptionofevidencetobe
weighedagainstthoseonwhichthePresidenthasacted,normayitextendtotheinvestigationofwhatevidence
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thePresidenthadbeforehim.Suchinquirymustbelimitedtowhatisundisputedintherecordandtowhat
accordsordoesnotaccordwithfactsofjudicialnotice.
FollowingnowismyseparateconcurringopinionwhichasIhavesaidisthedraftIsubmittedtotheCourt's
approval:
Thisisaclusterofpetitionsforseekingthereleaseofpetitionersfromdetention,uponthemaingroundthat,
allegedly,Proclamation1081issuedbyPresidentFerdinandE.MarcosonSeptember21,1972placingthewhole
countryundermartiallawaswellasthegeneralorderssubsequentlyissuedalsobythePresidentbyvirtueofthe
saidproclamation,pursuanttowhichpetitionershavebeenapprehendedanddetained,twoofthemuntilthe
present,whiletheresthavebeenreleasedconditionally,areunconstitutionalandnullandvoid,hencetheirarrest
anddetentionhavenolegalbasis.
habeascorpus
ThepetitionersinG.R.No.L35538arealljournalists,namely,JoaquinP.Roces,TeodoroM.Locsin,Rolando
Fadul,RosalindGalang,GoEngGuan,MaximoM.Soliven,RenatoConstantinoandLuisR.Mauricio.Their
petitionwasfiledataboutnoonofSeptember23,1972.
Almostthreehourslaterofthesameday,thepetitioninG.R.No.L35539wasfiled,withCarmenI.Diokno,as
petitioner,actingonbehalfofherhusband,JoseW.Diokno,asenator,whoisoneofthosestilldetained.
Twodayslater,earlyinthemorningofSeptember25,1972,thepetitionofMaximoV.Soliven,NapoleonG.
RamaandJoseMariVelez,allmediamen,wasdocketedasG.R.No.L35540.Thelasttwowerealsodelegates
totheConstitutionalConventionof1971.
Inallthethreeforegoingcases,theproperwritsofwereissuedreturnablenotlaterthan4:00p.m.ofSeptember
25,1972,andhearingofthepetitionswasheldonSeptember26,1972.
habeascorpus 1
LateintheafternoonofSeptember25,1972,anotherpetitionwasfiledonbehalfofSenatorsBenignoS.Aquino,
Jr.andRamonV.Mitra,Jr.,andformerSenatorFrancisco"Soc"Rodrigo,alsoaTVcommentator.(Delegate
NapoleonRamaalsoappearsaspetitionerinthiscase.)ItwasdocketedasG.R.No.L35546.
Thenextday,September26,1972,apetitionwasfiledbyVoltaireGarciaII,anotherdelegatetothe
ConstitutionalConvention,asG.R.No.L35547.
2
1.TheyADMITtheallegationinparagraphsIandVofthePetition
2.TheyADMITtheallegationsinparagraphIIofthePetitionthatthepetitionerswerearrestedon
September22,1972andarepresentlydetainedatFortBonifacio,Makati,Rizal,butSPECIFICALLYDENY
theallegationthattheirdetentionisillegal,thetruthbeingthatstatedinSpecialandAffirmativeDefensesof
thisAnswerandReturn
3.TheySPECIFICALLYDENYtheallegationsinparagraphsIII,IV,VIandVII,ofthePetition,thetruthof
thematterbeingthatstatedintheSpecialandAffirmativeDefensesofthisAnswerandReturn.
InthistwocasesthewritsprayedforwerealsoissuedandthepetitionswereheardtogetheronSeptember29,
1972.
InG.R.No.L35556,thepetitionwasfiledbyTanChinHianandVeronicaL.YuyitungonSeptember27,1972,
butthesamewaswithdrawnbythelatteronOctober6,1972andtheformeronOctober9,1972,sincetheywere
releasedfromcustodyonSeptember30,1972andOctober9,1972,respectively.TheCourtallowedthe
withdrawalsbyresolutiononOctober11,1972.
OnOctober2,1972,thepetitionofjournalistsAmandoDoronila,JuanL.Mercado,HernandoJ.Abaya,Ernesto
Granada,LuisBeltran,TanChinHian,(alreadyapetitionerinG.R.No.L35556)BrenGuiao,(forwhoma
subsequentpetitionwasalsofiledbyhiswifeinG.R.No.L35571,butbothpetitionsonhisbehalfwere
immediatelywithdrawnwiththeapprovaloftheCourtwhichwasgivenbyresolutiononOctober11,1972)Ruben
Cusipag,RobertoOrdoez,ManuelAlmarioandWillieBaunwasfiledinG.R.No.L35567.Allthesepetitioners,
exceptJuanL.Mercado,ManuelAlmario,andRobertoOrdoezwithdrewtheirpetitionandtheCourtallowedthe
withdrawalsbyresolutionofOctober3,1972.
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AndonOctober3,1972,ErnestoRondon,alsoadelegatetotheConstitutionalConventionandaradio
commentator,filedhispetitioninG.R.No.L35573.
Again,inalltheselastfourcases,G.R.Nos.,L35556,35567,35571and35573,thecorrespondingwritswere
issuedandajointhearingofthepetitionwasheldOctober6,1972,exceptastothepetitionerswhohadasof
thenannouncedthewithdrawaloftheirrespectivepetitions.
ThereturnsandanswersoftheSolicitorGeneralinalltheseninecases,filedonbehalfoftheprincipal
respondents,thesecretaryofNationalDefense,Hon.JuanPonceEnrile,theChiefofStaffoftheArmedForcesof
thePhilippines,GeneralRomeoEspino,andtheChiefofthePhilippineConstabulary,GeneralFidelV.Ramos,
werepracticallyidenticalasfollows:
RETURNTOWRITandANSWERTOTHEPETITION
COMENOWrespondents,bytheundersignedcounsel,andappearingbeforethisHonorableCourtonlyfor
purposesofthisaction,ashereundersetforth,herebystatebywayofreturntothewritandanswertothe
petition,asfollows:
ADMISSIONS/DENIALS
4.OnSeptember21,1972,thePresidentofthePhilippines,intheexerciseofthepowersvestedinhimby
ArticleVII,section10,paragraph2oftheConstitution,issuedProclamationNo.1081placingtheentire
Philippinesundermartiallaw
5.PursuanttosaidProclamation,thePresidentissuedGeneralOrdersNos.1,2,3,3A,4,5,6,and7and
LettersofInstructionNos.1,2and3.Truecopiesofthesedocumentsareheretoattachedandmade
integralpartshereofasAnnexes2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10and11.AcopyofthePresident'sstatementtothe
countryonSeptember23,1972isalsoattachedasAnnex12
6.Finally,thepetitionstatesnocauseofaction.
INVIEWWHEREOF,itisrespectfullyprayedofthisHonorableSupremeCourtthatthepetitionbe
dismissed.Manila,Philippines,September27,1972.
Atthehearings,thefollowingwellknownanddistinguishedmembersofthebarappearedandarguedforthe
petitioners:PetitionerDioknoarguedonhisownbehalftosupplementtheargumentsofhiscounselofrecord
Attys.JokerD.ArroyoappearedandarguedforthepetitionersinL35538andL35567FrancisE.Garchitorena,
assistedbyOscarDioknoPerez,appearedandarguedforthepetitionerinL35539RamonA.Gonzales,
assistedbyManuelB.ImbongappearedandarguedforthepetitionersinL35540SenatorsGerardoRoxasand
JovitoR.Salonga,assistedbyAttys.PedroL.Yap,SedfreyA.Ordoez,CustodioO.Parlade,LeopoldoL.Africa,
FranciscoRodrigoJr.,MagdalenoPalacolandDakilaF.Castro,appearedandarguedforthepetitionersinL
35546Atty.E.VoltaireGarciaSr.appearedandarguedinbehalfofhispetitionersoninL35547Attys.RaulI.
GocoandTeoduloR.DinoappearedforthepetitionersinL35556Atty.RobertoP.Tolentinoappearedforthe
petitionerinL35571andAtty.AquilinoPimentelJr.assistedbyAtty.ModestoR.GaliasJr.appearedandargued
forthepetitionerinL35578.
OnOctober31,1972,formerSenatorLorenzoM.Taada,togetherwithhislawyersons,AttorneysRenatoand
WigbertoTaada,enteredtheirappearanceascounselforallthepetitionersinG.R.No.L35538,exceptFadul,
GalangandGoEngGuan,forpetitionerDioknoinG.R.No.L35539andforpetitionersAquino,Mitra,Rodrigo
andRamainG.R.No.L35546.
Fortherespondents,SolicitorGeneralEstelitoP.Mendoza,AssistantSolicitorsGeneralBernardoP.Pardoand
RosalioA.deLeon(bothofwhomarejudgesnow),SolicitorReynatoS.Puno(nowAssistantSolicitorGeneral)
andSolicitorsJoseA.R.MeloandJoseA.Janoloappearedinallthecases,butonlytheSolicitorGeneral
argued.Later,AssistantSolicitorGeneralVicenteV.Mendozaalsoappearedandcosignedallthesubsequent
pleadingsandmemorandaforrespondents.
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AfterthehearingsofSeptember26and29andOctober6,1972,thepartieswererequiredtofiletheirrespective
memoranda.OnNovember9,1972petitionersinallthefiledtheirconsolidated109pagememorandum,together
withtheanswers,containedin86pages,tosome33questionsposedbytheCourtinitsresolutionofSeptember
29,1972,andlater,onDecember1,1972,an88pagereplytothememorandumofrespondents,withannexes.
InaseparateManifestationofComplianceandSubmissionfiledsimultaneouslywiththeirreply,petitioners
stressedthat:
4.ThatundersignedcounselforPetitionersdidnotaskforanyextensionoftheperiodwithinwhichtofilethe
ReplyMemorandumforPetitioners,despiteoverwhelmingpressureofwork,because
a.everydayofdelaywouldmeanonedaymoreofindescribablemiseryandanguishonthepartofPetitioners
andtheirfamilies.
b.anyfurtherdelaywouldonlydiminishwhatevertimeisleftmorethanamonth'stimewithinwhichthis
Courtcandeliberateonanddecidethesepetitions,havinginmindsomeirreversibleeventswhichmayplunge
thisnationintoanentirelynewconstitutionalorder,namely,theapprovalofthedraftoftheproposedConstitution
bytheConstitutionalConventionandthe'plebiscite'wasscheduledonJanuary15,1973
c.theproposedConstitution,if'ratified'mightprejudicethesepetitions,inviewofthefollowingtransitory
provision:
Presidentshallbepartofthelawoftheland,andshallremainvalid,legal,binding,andeffectiveevenafterthe
liftingofmartiallawortheratificationofthisConstitution,unlessmodified,revoked,orsupersededbysubsequent
proclamations,decrees,instructions,orotheractsoftheincumbentPresident,orunlessexpresslyandexplicitly
modifiedorrepealedbytheregularNationalAssembly.(ArticleXVII,sec.3,par.2oftheproposedConstitution).
5.InviewofthefactthattheywerearrestedanddetainedallegedlyinkeepingwiththeexistingConstitution,itis
onlyhumaneandjustthatthesepetitionstobeaccordedpreferenceunderRule22,section1oftheRulesof
Courtbedisposedofwhilethereisstilltimeleft,inaccordancewiththepresentConstitutionandnotin
accordancewithanewconstitutionalorderbeingusheredin,undertheaegisofamartialrule,theconstitutionality
andvalidityofwhichistheverypointatissueintheinstantpetitions
6.Since,accordingtotheunanimousviewoftheauthorities,ascitedintheirMemorandum,theoverriding
purposeofmartiallawisandcannotgobeyondthepreservationofthe,andnottoalteritorhastenits
alteration,itwouldbeextremelyunjustandinhuman,tosaytheleast,toallowthesepetitionsforthegreatwritof
libertytobeimperiled,byvirtueofanewConstitution'submission'and'ratificationofwhicharebeingpressed
undermartiallawthatwouldpurportedlyratifyallExecutiveedictsissuedandactsdoneundersaidregime
somethingthathasneverbeendoneasfarasisknownintheentirehistoryoftheAngloAmericanlegalsystem
(pp.414416,Rollo,L35539.)
constitutionalstatusquo
Atthisjuncture,itmaybestatedthatasofOctober11,1972,thefollowingpetitionershadalreadywithdrawn:
AmandoDoronila,HernandoJ.Abaya,ErnestoGranada,LuisBeltran,BrenGuiao,RubenCusipag,WillieBaun,
TanChinHianandVeronicaL.Yuyitunghence,oftheoriginalninecaseswithatotalof32petitioners,
3onlythesixaboveentitledcasesremainwith18petitioners. 4Theremainingpetitionersare:JoaquinP.Roces,TeodoroM.
Locsin,Sr.,RolandoFadul,RosalindGalang,GoEngGuan,MaximoV.Soliven,RenatoConstantino,LuisR.Mauricio,
JoseW.DioknothruCarmenDiokno,NapoleonG.Rama,JoseMariVelez,BenignoS.Aquino,RamonV.Mitra,Jr.,
FranciscoS.Rodrigo,JuanL.Mercado,RobertoOrdoez,ManuelAlmarioandErnestoRondonbutonlySenatorsDiokno
andAquinoarestillinconfinement,theresthavingbeenreleasedunderconditionshereinaftertobediscussed.Thecaseof
petitionerGarciainG.R.No.L35547isdeemedabatedonaccountofhisdeath.
Overtheoppositionoftheseremainingpetitioners,respondents'counselwasgivenseveralextensionsoftheir
periodtofiletheirmemorandum,anditwasnotuntilJanuary10,1973thattheywereabletofiletheirreplyof35
pages.Previously,theirmemorandumof77pageswasfiledonNovember17,1972.Thus,thecaseswere
declaredsubmittedfordecisiononlyonFebruary26,1973,perresolutionofevendate,onlytobereopenedlater,
aswillbestatedanon.
Inthemeanwhile,practicallythesamecounselforpetitionersinthesecasesengagedthegovernmentlawyersin
anotherandseparatetranscendentaljudicialtussleoftwostagesrelativetotheNewConstitution.OnDecember
7,1972,thefirstofthesocalledPlebisciteCases(G.R.No.L35925,CharitoPlanasvs.Comelec,G.R.No.L
35929,PabloC.Sanidadvs.Comelec,G.R.No.L35940,GerardoRoxasetal.vs.Comelec,G.R.No.L35941,
EddieB.Monteclarovs.Comelec,G.R.No.L35942,SedfreyA.Ordoezvs.Treasurer,G.R.No.L35948,Vidal
Tanvs.Comelec,G.R.No.L35953,JoseW.Dioknoetals.vs.Comelec,G.R.No.L35961,JacintoJimenezvs.
Comelec,G.R.No.L35965,RaulM.Gonzalesvs.ComelecandG.R.No.L35979,ErnestoHidalgovs.
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Comelec)wasfiled.ThesecasestookmostofthetimeoftheCourtuntilJanuary22,1973,whentheywere
declaredmootandacademicbecauseoftheissuanceofProclamation1102onJanuary17,1973,butonJanuary
20,1973,asasequeltothePlebisciteCases,JosueJavellanafiledCaseNo.G.R.No.L36142againstthe
ExecutiveSecretaryandtheSecretariesofNationalDefense,JusticeandFinance.Thisstartedthesecondseries
ofcasesknownastheRatificationCases,namely,saidG.R.No.L36142andG.R.No.L36164,G.R.No.L
36165,G.R.No.L36236,,andG.R.No.L36283,ThemainthrustofthesepetitionswasthattheNew
Constitutionhadnotbeenvalidlyratified,hencetheOldConstitutioncontinuedinforceand,therefore,whatever
provisionstheNewConstitutionmightcontaintendingtovalidatetheproclamations,orders,decrees,andactsof
theincumbentPresidentwhicharebeingrelieduponfortheapprehensionanddetentionofpetitioners,haveno
legaleffect.Inanyevent,theadventofanewconstitutionnaturallyentailedtheconsequencethatanyquestion
astothelegalityofthecontinueddetentionofpetitionersorofanyrestraintoftheirlibertiesmaynotberesolved
withouttakingintoaccountinonewayoranotherthepertinentprovisionsofthenewcharter.Accordingly,the
resolutionofthesetwoseriesofcasesbecameaprejudicialmatterwhichtheCourthadtoresolvefirst.Itwasnot
untilMarch31,1973thattheyweredecidedadverselytothepetitionersthereinanditwasonlyonApril17,1973
thatentryoffinaljudgmentwasmadetherein.
VidalTanvs.TheExecutiveSecretaryetal.,
GerardoRoxasetal.vs.AlejandroMelchoretc.etal.,EddieB.Monteclarovs.TheExecutiveSecretaryNapoleonV.Dilag
vs.TheHonorableExecutiveSecretary.
FromApril18,1973,themembershipoftheCourtwasdepletedtonine,inviewoftheretirement,effectiveon
saiddate,ofthenChiefJusticeRobertoConcepcion.Withitsnineremainingmembers,doubtswereexpressedas
towhetherornottheCourtcouldactonconstitutionalmattersofthenatureandmagnitudeofthoseraisedin
thesecases,therequiredquorumfortheresolutionofissuesofunconstitutionalityundertheNewConstitution
beingtenmembers.(Section2(2),ArticleIX,ConstitutionofthePhilippinesof1973).Prescindingfromthispoint,
itisafactthatevenifitisnotrequiredexpresslybytheConstitution,bytheCourt'sownpolicywhichthe
Constitutionauthorizesittoadopt,allcasesinvolvingconstitutionalquestionsarebeardinwhichthequorumand
atthesametimethebindingvoteisofeightJustices.Withonlyninemembersoutofapossiblemembershipof
fifteen,itwasnotexactlyfairforallconcernedthatthecourtshouldact,particularlyinacasewhichintruthdoes
notinvolveonlythosewhoareactualpartiesthereinbutthewholepeopleaswellastheGovernmentofthe
Philippines.So,theCourt,evenasitwentoninformallydiscussingthesecasesfromtimetotime,preferredto
waitfortheappointmentandqualificationofnewmembers,whichtookplaceonlyonOctober29,1973,when
JusticesEstanislaoFernandez,CeciliaMuozPalmaandRamonAquinojoinedtheCourt.
enbanc
Meantime,subsequenttotheresolutionofFebruary26,1973,declaringthesecasessubmittedfordecision,or,
moreparticularlyonJune29,1973,counselforpetitionerCarmenI.DioknoinG.R.No.fileda99page
SupplementalPetitionandMotionforImmediateReleasewhichtheCourthadtorefertotherespondents,on
whosebehalf,theSolicitorGeneralfiledanansweronJuly30,19,73.OnAugust14,1973,counselforpetitioner
Dioknofiledamotionaskingthatthesaidpetitionandmotionbesetforhearing,whichtheCourtcouldnotdo,in
viewpreciselyofthequestionofquorum.Asamatteroffact,intherelatedcaseofNo.2etal.,G.R.No.L
37364,furtherreferencetowhichwillbemadelater,apreliminaryhearinghadtobeheldbytheCourton
Sunday,August24,1973,onthesolequestionofwhetherornotwithitsmembershipofninethen,theCourt
couldactonissuesofconstitutionalityoftheactsofthePresident.
BenignoS.Aquino,Jr.vs.MilitaryCommission
Atthispoint,itmaybementionedincidentallythatthruseveralrepeatedmanifestationsandmotions,Counsel
FrancisE.GarchitorenaofPetitionerDioknoinvitedtheattentionoftheCourtnotonlytoallegeddenialtohis
clientof"theessentialaccessofandfreedomtoconferandcommunicatewithcounsel"butalsotoalleged
deplorablesubhumanconditionssurroundinghisdetention.Andinrelationtosaidmanifestationsandmotions,
onFebruary19,1973,saidpetitioner,Diokno,togetherwithpetitionerBenignoS.Aquinoandjoinedbytheir
commoncounsel,SenatorLorenzoM.TaadafiledwiththisCourtapetitionformandamusprayingthat
respondentsbecommanded"topermitpetitionerTaadatovisitandconferfreelyandactivelywithpetitioners
DioknoandAquinoatreasonablehourspursuanttotheprovisionsofRA857andRA1083andinpursuanceof
suchdecision,(todirectsaidrespondents)(1)tocleartheconferenceroomofpetitionersofallrepresentativesof
theArmedForcesandallunwantedthirdpersons,andprohibittheirpresence(2)toremoveorcausethe
removalofalllisteningdevicesandothersimilarelectronicequipmentfromtheconferenceroomofpetitioners,
withthefurtherdirectionthatnosuchinstrumentsbehereafterinstalled,and(3)todesistfromthepracticeof
examining(a)thenotestakenbypetitionerTaadaofhisconferenceswithpetitionersDioknoandAquinoand
(b)suchotherlegaldocumentsaspetitionerTaadamaybringwithhimfordiscussionwithsaidpetitioners."(G.
R.No.L36315).Forobviousreasons,saidpetitionwillberesolvedinaseparatedecision.Itmaybestatedhere,
however,thatinsaidG.R.No.L36315,inattentiontothecomplaintmadebySenatorTaadainhisReplydated
April2,1973,thatMesdamesDioknoandAquinowerenotbeingallowedtovisittheirhusbands,and,worse,their
verywhereaboutswerenotbeingmadeknowntothem,onApril6,1973,afterhearingtheexplanationsof
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counselforthereinrespondents,theCourtissuedthefollowingresolution:
UponhumanitarianconsiderationstheCourtRESOLVEDunanimouslytogrant,pendingfurtheractionbythis
Court,thatportionoftheprayerinpetitioners'Supplementand/orAmendmenttoPetition'filedonApril6,1973
thatthewivesandminorchildrenofpetitionersDioknoandAquinobeallowedtovisitthem,subjecttosuch
precautionsasrespondentsmaydeemnecessary.
Wehavetakenpainstoreciteallthecircumstancessurroundingtheprogressofthesecasesfromtheirinception
inordertocorrecttheimpressionconveyedbythepleadingsofpetitionerDiokno,thattheirdispositionhasbeen
unnecessarily,itnotdeliberately,delayed.TheCourtcannotyieldtoanyoneinbeingconcernedthatindividual
rightsandlibertiesguaranteedbythefundamentallawofthelandaredulyprotectedandsafeguarded.Itisfully
cognizantofhowimportantnotonlytothepetitionersbutalsotothemaintainanceoftheruleoflawistheissueof
legalityofthecontinuedconstraintsonthefreedomsofpetitioners.Underordinarycircumstances,itdoesnot
reallytaketheCourtmuchtimetodeterminewhetheradeprivationofpersonallibertyislegalorillegal.But,aside
fromtheunusualproceduralsetbacksrelatedabove,itjusthappensthatthebasicissuestoresolveheredonot
affectonlytheindividualrightsofpetitioners.Indeed,theimportanceofthesecasestranscendstheinterestsof
thosewho,likepetitioners,havecometotheCourt.Actually,whatisdirectlyinvolvedhereistheissueofthe
legalityoftheexistinggovernmentitself.Accordingly,Wehavetoactwithutmostcare.Besides,inasense,the
legalityoftheCourt'sownexistenceisalsoinvolvedhere,andWedonotwantanyonetoevensuspectWehave
hurriedprecipitatelytoupholdOurselves.
Inadditiontotheseconsiderations,itmustbeborneinmindthattherearethousandsofothercasesintheCourt
needingitscontinuedattention.Withitscloggeddocket.theCourt,couldillaffordtogivepetitionersany
preferencethat.wouldentailcorrespondinginjusticetootherlitigantsbeforeit.
Whatismore,undertheNewConstitution,theadministrativejurisdictionoveralllowercourts,includingtheCourt
Appeals,hasbeentransferredfromtheDepartmentofJusticetotheSupremeCourt,andbecausethat
DepartmentrefrainedfromattendingtoanyadministrativefunctionoverthecourtssinceJanuary17,1973,on
April18,1973,aftertheRatificationCasesbecamefinal,WefoundinOurhandsavastaccumulationof
administrativematterswhichhadtobeacteduponwithoutfurtherdelay,ifthesmoothandorderlyfunctioningof
thecourtshadtobemaintained.And,ofcourse.theCourthastocontinuouslyattendtoitsnewadministrative
workfromdaytoday,whatwithallkindsofcomplaintsandchargesbeingfileddailyagainstjudges,clerksof
courtandotherofficersandemployeesofthedifferentcourtsalloverthecountry,whichtheCourthastotackle.It
shouldnotbesurprisingatallthatagreatportionofoursessionshastobedevotedtotheconsiderationand
dispositionofsuchadministrativematters.
enbancenbanc
Furthermore,inthissameconnection,accountmustalsobetakenofthefactthatthetransferofthe
administrativefunctionsoftheDepartmenttotheCourtnaturallyentailedproblemsanddifficultieswhich
consumedOurtime,ifonlybecausesomeofthepersonnelhadtoacquaintthemselveswiththenewfunctions
entrustedtothem,whilecorrespondingadjustmentshadtobemadeinthedutiesandfunctionsofthepersonnel
affectedbythetransfer.
PRELIMINARYISSUES
Now,beforeproceedingtothediscussionandresolutionoftheissuesinthependingpetitions,twopreliminary
matterscallfordisposition,namely,first,themotionofpetitionerJoseW.Diokno,thrucounselSenatorTaada,to
beallowedtowithdrawhisbasicpetitionandsecond,theobjectionofpetitioner,Francisco"Soc"Rodrigo,tothe
Court'sconsideringhispetitionasmootandacademicasaconsequenceofhishavingbeenreleasedfromhis
placeofconfinementinFortBonifacio.Relatedtothelatteristheexpressmanifestationoftheotherpetitioners:
JoaquinP.Roces,TeodoroM.Locsin,Sr.,RolandoFadul,RosalindGalang,GoEngGuan,MaximoV.Soliven,
RenatoConstantino,LuisR.Mauricio,NapoleonG.Rama,JoseMariVelez.RamonV.Mitra,Jr.,JuanL.
Mercado,RobertoOrdoez,ManuelAlmarioandErnestoRondontotheeffectthattheyremainaspetitioners,
notwithstandingtheirhavingbeenreleased(underthesameconditionsasthoseimposedonpetitionerRodrigo
therebyimplyingthattheyarenotwithdrawing,as,infact,theyhavenotwithdrawaltheirpetitionsandwouldwish
themresolvedontheirmerits.(ManifestationofcounselforpetitionersdatedMarch15,1974.)
I
AnentpetitionerDiokno'smotiontowithdraw,onlysevenmembersoftheCourt,namely,ChiefJusticeMakalintal
andJusticesZaldivar,Fernando,Teehankee,MuozPalma,Aquinoandthewriterofthisopinion,votedtogrant
thesame.SaidnumberbeingshortoftheeightvotesrequiredforbindingactionoftheCourteveninanincident,
pursuanttoSection11ofRule56,thesaidmotionisdenied,withoutprejudicetotherightofeachmemberofthe
Courttorenderhisindividualopinioninregardtosaidmotion.
enbanc5
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OneofthereasonvigorouslyadvancedbypetitionerDioknoinhismotiontowithdrawisthathecannotsubmithis
casetotheSupremeCourtasitispresentlyconstituted,becauseitisdifferentfromtheoneinwhichhefiledhis
petition,andthat,furthermore,heisinvoking,notthepresentorNewConstitutionofthePhilippinesthe
incumbentJusticeshavenowsworntoprotectanddefendbuttheConstitutionof1935
6underwhichtheywereservingbefore.Indeed,inthe"ManifestationofComplianceandSubmission"filedbyhiscounselas
earlyasDecember1,1973,asimilarfeelingwasalreadyindicated,asmaybegatheredfromtheportionsthereofquoted
earlierinthisopinion.
Hadpetitionerreiteratedandinsistedonthepositionassertedbyhiminsaidmanifestationshortlyafterthe
ratificationoftheNewConstitutiononJanuary17,1973orevenlater,afterthedecisionofthisCourtinthe
RatificationCasesbecamefinalonApril17,1973,perhaps,therecouldhavebeensomekindofjustificationfor
Ourthenandtheredeclaringhispetitionmootandacademic,consideringhispersonalattitudeofrefusingto
recognizethepassingoutofthe1935constitutionandoftheSupremeCourtunderit.Butthefactisthataslate
asJune29,1973,morethansixmonthsaftertheratificationoftheNewConstitutionandmorethantwomonths
afterthisCourthaddeclaredthat"thereisnomorejudicialobstacletotheNewConstitutionbeingconsideredas
inforceandeffect",petitionerDiokno,thrucounselTaada,rileda"SupplementalPetitionandMotionfor
ImmediateRelease"whereinnaryawordmaybefoundsuggestingthepointthatboththeConstitutionheis
invokingandtheCourthehassubmittedhispetitiontohavealreadypassedintoinexistence.Onthecontrary,he
insistedinthislastmotionthat"anorderbeissued(bythisCourt)directingrespondentstoimmediatelyfile
chargesagainsthimiftheyhaveevidencesupportingthesame."Beitnoted,inthisconnection,thatbyresolution
oftheCourtofJune1,1973,ithadalreadyimplementedtheprovisionsontheJudiciaryoftheNewConstitution
andhadconstituteditselfwithitsninemembersintotheFirstDivision,therebymakingitunmistakablyclearthatit
wasalreadyoperatingastheSupremeCourtundertheNewConstitution.Thefactnowcapitalizedbypetitioner
thattheJusticestooktheoathonlyonOctober29,1973isofnosigner,thetruthbeingthatneithertheJustices'
continuationinofficeaftertheNewConstitutiontookeffectnorthevalidityorproprietyoftheCourt'sresolutionof
June1,1973justmentionedwerequestionedbyhimbefore.Accordingly,theMotioninhismotiontowithdraw
relativetotheNewConstitutionandthepresentSupremeCourtappeartobeobviousafterthoughtsintendedonly
totendcolortohisrefusaltohavetheissueofallegedillegalityofhisdetentiondulyresolved,realizingperchance
theuntenabilitythereofandtheinevitabilityofthedenialofhispetition,albeitnoneofthiswilleverbeadmitted,as
maybegatheredfromhismanifestationthathewouldnotwanttohaveanythingtodowithanyrulingoftheCourt
adversetohispretensions.Justthesame,thenewoathsoftheJusticesandtheapplicabilityheretooftheOld
andtheNewConstitutionwillbediscussedinanotherpartofthisopinion,ifonlytosatisfythecuriosityof
petitioner.
Althoughtheotherpetitionershavenotjoinedthesubjectwithdrawalmotion,itmightjustaswellbestated,for
whateverrelevantpurposeitmayserve,that,withparticularreferencetopetitionerRodrigo,aslateasNovember
27,1973,afterthreenewjusticeswereaddedtothemembershipoftheCourtinpartialobediencetothemandate
oftheNewConstitutionincreasingitstotalmembershiptofifteen,andaftertheCourthad,byresolutionof
November15,1973,alreadyconstituteditselfintotwodivisionsofsixJusticeseach,saidpetitionerfileda
Manifestation"forthepurposeofshowingthat,insofaras(he)hereinpetitionerisconcerned,hispetitionforisnot
mootandacademic."Notably,thismanifestationdealsspecificallywiththematterofhis"conditionalrelease"as
beingstillagroundforbutdoesnotevensuggestthefundamentalchangeofcircumstancesrelieduponin
petitionerDiokno'smotiontowithdraw.Onthecontrary,saidmanifestationindicatesunconditionalsubmissionof
saidpetitionertothejurisdictionofthisCourtaspresentlyconstituted.Ofsimilartenoristhemanifestationof
counselfortheremainingpetitionersinthesecasesdatedMarch15,1974.Inotherwords,itappearsquiteclearly
thatpetitionersshouldbedeemedashavingsubmittedtothejurisdictionoftheSupremeCourtasitispresently
constitutedinorderthatitmayresolvetheirpetitionsforeveninthelightoftheprovisionsoftheNewConstitution.
II
ComingnowtotheconditionsattachedtothereleaseofthepetitionersotherthanSenatorsDioknoandAquino,it
istobenotedthattheywereallgivenidenticalreleasepapersreadingasfollows:
HEADQUARTERS5THMILITARYINTELLIGENCEGROUP,ISAFPCampGeneralEmilioAguinaldoQuezonCity
M56P5December1972
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1.AfterhavingbeenarrestedanddetainedforsubversionpursuanttoProclamationNo.1081ofthePresidentof
thePhilippinesinhiscapacityasCommanderinChiefoftheArmedForcesofthePhilippines,dated21
September1972,youareherebyconditionallyreleased.
2.YouareadvisedtoabidestrictlywiththeprovisionsofProclamationNo.1081andtheensuingL0Is.Any
violationoftheseprovisionswouldsubjectyoutoimmediatearrestandconfinement.
3.Yourinvestigationwillcontinuefollowingaschedulewhichyouwilllateronbeinformed.Youareadvisedto
followthisschedulestrictly.
4.YouarenotallowedtoleavetheconfinesofGreaterManilaAreaunlessspecificallyauthorizedbythisOffice
indicatingtheprovincialaddressandexpecteddurationofstaythereat.ContactthisOfficethroughtelephoneNo.
971756whennecessary.
5.Youareprohibitedfromgivingorparticipatinginanyinterviewconductedbyanylocalorforeignmassmedia
representativeforpurposeofpublicationand/orradio/TVbroadcast.
PLEDGE
IHEREBYPLEDGEtoconductmyselfaccordinglyandwillnotengageinanysubversiveactivity.Iwillimmediately
reportanysubversiveactivitythatwillcometomyknowledge.
(SGD.)F.RODRIGOAddress:60JuanaRodriguezQuezonCityTelNo.702566704920702755
Itisthesubmissionofthesepetitionersthattheirreleaseundertheforegoingconditionsisnotabsolute,hence
theirpresentcasesbeforetheCourthavenotbecomemootandacademicandshouldnotbedismissedwithout
considerationofthemeritsthereof.Theyclaimthatintruththeyhavenotbeenfreed,becauseactually,whathas
beendonetothemisonlytoenlargeorexpandtheareaoftheirconfinementinordertoincludethewhole
GreaterManilaareainsteadofbeinglimitedbytheboundariesofthearmycampswhereintheywerepreviously
detained.Theysaythatalthoughtheyareallowedtogoelsewhere,theycandosoonlyifexpresslyand
specificallypermittedbythearmyauthorities,andthisisnothingnew,sincetheycouldalsogooutofthecamps
beforewithproperpasses.Theymaintainthattheyneveracceptedtheaboveconditionsvoluntarily.Inother
words,itistheirpositionthattheyareinactualfactbeingstillsodetainedandrestrainedoftheirlibertyagainst
theirwillastoentitletheminlawtotheremedyof.
habeascorpus
Wefindmeritinthisparticularsubmittalregardingthereachof.Wereadilyagreethatthefundamentallawofthe
landdoesnotcountenancethediminutionorrestrictionoftheindividualfreedomsofanypersoninthePhilippines
withoutdueprocessoflaw.Nooneinthiscountrymaysuffer,againsthiswill,anykindordegreeofconstraint
uponhisrighttogotoanyplacenotprohibitedbylaw,withoutbeingentitledtothisgreatwritofliberty,forithas
notbeendesignedonlyagainstillegalandinvoluntarydetentioninjails,prisonsandconcentrationcamps,butfor
allformsanddegreesofrestraint,withoutauthorityoflawortheconsentofthepersonconcerned,uponhis
freedomtomovefreely,irrespectiveofwhethertheareawithinwhichheisconfinedissmallorlarge,aslongasit
isnotcoextensivewiththatwhichmaybefreelyreachedbyanybodyelse,giventhedesireandthemeans.More
thanhalfacenturyagoin1919,thisCourtalreadydrewthebroadandallencompassingscopeofinthese
unequivocalwords:"Aprimespecificationofanapplicationforawritofisrestraintofliberty.Theessentialobject
andpurposeofthewritofistoinquireintoallmannersofinvoluntaryrestraintasdistinguishedfromvoluntary,
andtorelieveapersontherefromifsuchrestraintisillegal.Anyrestraintwhichwillprecludefreedomofactionis
sufficient."
habeascorpushabeascorpushabeascorpushabeascorpus*6Thereisnoreasonatallatthistime,hopefullytherewill
neverbeanyinthefuture,todetractawhitfromthisnobleattitude.Definitely,theconditionsunderwhichpetitionershave
beenreleasedfallshortofrestoringtothemthefreedomtowhichtheyareconstitutionallyentitled.Onlyashowingthatthe
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impositionofsaidconditionsisauthorizedbylawcanstandinthewayofanorderthattheybeimmediatelyandcompletely
withdrawnbytheproperauthoritiessothatthepetitionersmayagainbefreemenasweare.
Andso,Wecometothebasicquestioninthesecases:Arepetitionersbeingdetainedorotherwiserestrainedof
liberty,evidentlyagainsttheirwill,withoutauthorityoflawanddueprocess?
THEFACTS
Asidefromthosealreadymadereferencetoabove,theotherbackgroundfactsofthesecasesareasfollows:
OnSeptember21,1972,PresidentFerdinandE.Marcos
7signedthefollowingproclamation:
PROCLAMATIONNO.1081
PROCLAIMINGASTATEOFMARTIALLAWINTHEPHILIPPINES
WHEREAS,onthebasisofcarefullyevaluatedandverifiedinformation,itisdefinitelyestablishedthatlawless
elementswhoaremovedbyacommonorsimilarideologicalconviction,design,strategyandgoalandenjoying
theactivemoralandmaterialsupportofaforeignpowerandbeingguidedanddirectedbyintenselydevoted,well
trained,determinedandruthlessgroupsofmenandseekingrefugeundertheprotectionofourconstitutional
libertiestopromoteandattaintheirends,haveenteredintoaconspiracyandhaveinfactjoinedandbandedtheir
resourcesandforcestogetherfortheprimepurposeof,andinfacttheyhavebeenandareactuallystaging,
undertakingandwaginganarmedinsurrectionandrebellionagainsttheGovernmentoftheRepublicofthe
Philippinesinordertoforciblyseizepoliticalandstatepowerinthiscountry,overthrowthedulyconstituted
Government,andsupplantourexistingpolitical,social,economicandlegalorderwithanentirelynewonewhose
formofgovernment,whosesystemoflaws,whoseconceptionofGodandreligion,whosenotionofindividual
rightsandfamilyrelations,andwhosepolitical,social,economic,legalandmoralpreceptsarebasedonthe
MarxistLeninistMaoistteachingsandbeliefs
WHEREAS,theselawlesselements,actinginconcertthroughseeminglyinnocentandharmless,althoughactually
destructive,frontorganizationswhichhavebeeninfiltratedordeliberatelyformedbythem,havecontinuouslyand
systematicallystrengthenedandbroadenedtheirmembershipsthroughsustainedandcarefulrecruitingand
enlistmentofnewadherentsfromamongourpeasantry,laborers,professionals,intellectuals,students,andmass
mediapersonnel,andthroughsuchsustainedandcarefulrecruitmentandenlistmenthavesucceededin
spreadingandexpandingtheircontrolandinfluenceoveralmosteverysegmentandlevelofoursociety
throughoutthelandintheirceaselessefforttoerodeandweakenthepolitical,social,economic,legalandmoral
foundationsofourexistingGovernment,andtoinfluence,manipulateandmovepeasant,labor,studentand
terroristicorganizationsundertheirinfluenceorcontroltocommit,asinfacttheyhavecommittedandstillare
committing,actsofviolence,depredations,sabotageandinjuriesagainstourdulyconstitutedauthorities,against
themembersofourlawenforcementagencies,andworstofall,againstthepeacefulmembersofoursociety
WHEREAS,inthefanaticalpursuitoftheirconspiracyandwidespreadactsofviolence,depredations,sabotage
andinjuriesagainstourpeople,andinordertoprovidetheessentialinstrumenttodirectandcarryouttheir
criminaldesignandunlawfulactivities,andtoachievetheirultimatesinisterobjectives,theselawlesselements
haveinfactorganized,establishedandarenowmaintainingaCentralCommittee,composedofyoungand
dedicatedradicalstudentsandintellectuals,whichischargedwithguidinganddirectingthearmedstruggleand
propagandaassaultsagainstourdulyconstitutedGovernment,andthisCentralCommitteeisnowimposingits
willandassertingitsshamauthorityoncertainsegmentsofourpopulation,especiallyintheruralareas,through
variedmeansofsubterfuge,deceit,coercion,threats,intimidation's,machinations,treachery,violenceandother
modesofterror,andhasbeenandisillegallyexactingfinancialandotherformsofcontributesfromourpeopleto
raisefundsandmaterialresourcestosupportitsinsurrectionaryandpropagandaactivitiesagainstourduly
constitutedGovernmentandagainstourpeacelovingpeople
WHEREAS,inordertocarryout,asinfacttheyhavecarriedout,theirpremeditatedplantostage,undertakeand
wageafullscalearmedinsurrectionandrebellioninthiscountry,theselawlesselementshaveorganized,
establishedandarenowmaintainingawelltrained,wellarmedandhighlyindoctrinatedandgreatlyexpanded
insurrectionaryforce,popularlyknownasthe'NewPeople'sArmy'whichhassincevigorouslypursuedandstillis
vigorouslypursuingarelentlessandruthlessarmedstruggleagainstourdulyconstitutedGovernmentandwhose
unmitigatedforays,raids,ambuscadesassaultsandreignofterrorandactsoflawlessnessintheruralareasand
inoururbancentersbroughtaboutthetreacherousandcoldbloodedassassinationofinnocentcivilians,military
personneloftheGovernmentandlocalpublicofficialsinmanypartsofthecountry,notablyintheCagayanValley,
inCentralLuzon,intheSouthernTagalogRegion,intheBicolArea,intheVisayasandinMindanaoandwhose
daringandwantonguerrillaactivitieshavegeneratedandfearandpanicamongourpeople,havecreateda
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climateofchaosanddisorder,producedastateofpolitical,social,psychologicalandeconomicinstabilityinour
land,andhaveinflictedgreatsufferingandirreparableinjurytopersonsandpropertyinoursociety
WHEREAS,theselawlesselements,theircadres,fellowmen,friends,sympathizersandsupportershaveformany
yearsuptothepresenttimebeenmountingsustained,massiveanddestructivepropagandaassaultsagainstour
dulyconstitutedGovernmentitsintrumentalities,agenciesandofficials,andalsoagainstoursocial,political,
economicandreligiousinstitutions,throughthepublications,broadcastsanddissemination'sofdeliberately
slantedandoverlyexaggeratednewsstoriesandnewscommentariesaswellasfalse,vile,foulandscurrilous
statements,utterances,writingsandpicturesthroughthepressradiotelevisionmediaandthroughleaflets,
collegecampusnewspapersandsomenewspaperspublishedandstillbeingpublishedbytheselawless
elements,notablythe'AngBayan,''PulangBandila'andthe'AngKomunista,'allofwhichareclearlywell
conceived,intendedandcalculatedtomalignanddiscreditourdulyconstitutedGovernment,itsinstrumentalities,
agenciesandofficialsbeforeourpeople,andthusundermineanddestroythefaithandloyaltyandallegianceof
ourpeopleinandalienatetheirsupportfortheirdulyconstitutedGovernment,itsinstrumentalities,agenciesand
officials,andtherebygraduallyerodeandweakenasinfacttheyhadsoerodedandweakenedthewillofour
peopletosustainanddefendourGovernmentandourdemocraticwayoflife
WHEREAS,theselawlesselementshavingtakenuparmsagainstourdulyconstitutedGovernmentandagainst
ourpeople,andhavingcommittedandarestillcommittingactsofarmedinsurrectionandrebellionconsistingof
armedraids,forays,sorties,ambushes,wantonactsofmurders,spoilage,plunder,looting,arsons,destructionof
publicandprivatebuildings,andattacksagainstinnocentanddefenselesscivilianlivesandproperty,allofwhich
activitieshaveseriouslyendangeredandcontinuetoendangerpublicorderandsafetyandthesecurityofthe
nation,andactingwithcunningandmanifestprecisionanddeliberationandwithoutregardtothehealth,safety
andwellbeingofthepeople,arenowimplementingtheirplantocausewidespread,massiveandsystematic
destructionandparalyzationofvitalpublicutilitiesandserviceparticularlywatersystems,sourcesofelectrical
power,communicationandtransportationfacilities,tothegreatdetriment,suffering,injuryandprejudiceofour
peopleandthenationandtogenerateadeeppsychologicalfearandpanicamongourpeople
WHEREAS,theSupremeCourtinthecasesbroughtbeforeit,docketedasG.R.Nos.L33964,L33965,L
33973,L33982,L34004,L34013,L34039,L34265,andL34339,asaconsequenceofthesuspensionofthe
privilegeofthewritofbymeasPresidentofthePhilippinesinmyProclamationNo.889,datedAugust21,1971,
asamended,hasfoundthatintruthandinfactthereexistsanactualinsurrectionandrebellioninthecountrybya
sizeablegroupofmenwhohavepubliclyriseninarmstooverthrowtheGovernment.HereiswhattheSupreme
CourtsaidinitsdecisionpromulgatedonDecember11,1971:
habeascorpus
...ourjurisprudenceattestsabundantlytotheCommunistactivitiesinthePhilippines,especiallyinManila,from
thelatetwentiestotheearlythirties,thenaimedprincipallyatincitementtoseditionorrebellion,astheimmediate
objective.UpontheestablishmentoftheCommonwealthofthePhilippines,themovementseemedtohave
warnednotablybut,theoutbreakofWorldWarIIinthePacificandthemiseries,thedevastationandhavoc,and
theproliferationofunlicensedfirearmsconcomitantwiththemilitaryoccupationofthePhilippinesandits
subsequentliberation,broughtabout,inthelateforties,aresurgenceoftheCommunistthreat,withsuchvigoras
tobeabletoorganizeandoperateinCentralLuzonanarmycalledHUKBALAHAP,duringtheoccupation,and
renamedHukbongMapagpalayangBayan(HMB)afterliberationwhichclashedseveraltimeswiththeArmed
ForcesoftheRepublic.ThispromptedthenPresidentQuirinotoissueProclamationNo.210,datedOctober22,
1950,suspendingtheprivilegeofthewritofthevalidityofwhichwasupheldin.Daysbeforethepromulgationof
saidProclamation,oronOctober18,1950,membersoftheCommunistPolitburointhePhilippineswere
apprehendedinManila.Subsequentlyaccusedandconvictedofthecrimeofrebellion,theyservedtheir
respectivesentences.
habeascorpusMontenegrov.Castaeda
ThefiftiessawacomparativelullinCommunistactivities,insofaraspeaceandorderwereconcerned.Still,on
June20,1957,RepublicActNo.1700,otherwiseknownastheAntiSubversionAct,wasapproved,uponthe
groundsstatedintheverypreambleofsaidstatutethat
...theCommunistPartyofthePhilippines,althoughpurportedlyapoliticalparty,isinfactanorganizedconspiracy
tooverthrowtheGovernmentoftheRepublicofthePhilippines,notonlybyforceandviolencebutalsobydeceit,
subversionandotherillegalmeans,forthepurposeofestablishinginthePhilippinesatotalitarianregimesubject
toaliendominationandcontrol,
...thecontinuedexistenceandactivitiesoftheCommunistPartyofthePhilippinesconstitutesaclear,presentand
gravedangertothesecurityofthePhilippinesand
...inthefaceoftheorganized,systematicandpersistentsubversion,nationalinscopebutinternationalin
direction,posedbytheCommunistPartyofthePhilippinesanditsactivities,thereisurgentneedforspecial
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legislationtocopewiththiscontinuingmenacetothefreedomandsecurityofthecountry....
InthelanguageoftheReportonCentralLuzon,submitted,onSeptember4,1971,bytheSenateAdHoc
CommitteeofSevencopyofwhichReportwasfiledinthesecasesbythepetitionersherein
Theyearsfollowing1963sawthesuccessiveemergenceinthecountryofseveralmassorganizations,notably
theLapiangManggagawa(nowtheSocialistPartyofthePhilippines)amongtheworkers,theMalayangSamahan
ngmgaMagsasaka(MASAKA)amongthepeasantrytheKabataangMakabayan(KM)amongthe
youth/studentsandtheMovementfortheAdvancementofNationalism(MAN)amongthe
intellectuals/professionals,thePKPhasexertedalloutefforttoinfiltrate,influenceandutilizetheseorganizations
inpromotingitsradicalbrandofnationalism.
composedmainlyofyoungradicals,constitutingtheMaoistfactionreorganizedtheCommunistPartyofthe
Philippinesearlyin1969andestablishedaNewPeople'sArmy.ThisfactionadherestotheMaoistconceptofthe
'ProtractedPeople'sWar'or'WarofNationalLiberation.'Its'ProgrammeforaPeople'sDemocraticRevolution
states,:
interalia
TheCommunistPartyofthePhilippinesisdeterminedtoimplementitsgeneralprogrammeforapeople's
democraticrevolution.AllFilipinocommunistsarereadytosacrificetheirlivesfortheworthycauseofachieving
thenewtypeofdemocracy,ofbuildinganewPhilippinesthatisgenuinelyandcompletelyindependent,
democratic,united,justandprosperous...
Thecentraltaskofanyrevolutionarymovementistoseizepoliticalpower.TheCommunistPartyofthe
Philippinesassumesthistaskatatimethatboththeinternationalandnationalsituationsarefavorable,totaking
theroadofarmedrevolution...
raids,resortedtokidnappingsandtakenpartinotherviolentincidentsnumberingover230,inwhichitinflicted
404casualties,and,inturn,suffered243losses.In1970,itsrecordofviolentincidentswasaboutthesame,but
theNPAcasualtiesmorethandoubled.
Atanyrate,two(2)factsareundeniable:(a)allCommunists,whethertheybelongtothetraditionalgrouporto
theMaoistfaction,believethatforceandviolenceareindispensabletotheattainmentoftheirmainandultimate
objective,andactinaccordancewithsuchbelief,althoughtheydisagreeonthemeanstobeusedatagiventime
andinaparticularplaceand(b)thereisaNewPeople'sArmy,other,ofcourse,thantheArmedForcesofthe
Republicandantagonisticthereto.SuchNewPeople'sArmyisperseproofoftheexistenceoftherebellion,
especiallyconsideringthatitsestablishmentwasannouncedpubliclybythereorganizedCPP.Such
announcementisinthenatureofapublicchallengetothedulyconstitutionAuthoritiesandmaybelikenedtoa
declarationofwar,sufficienttoestablishawarstatusoraconditionofbelligerencyevenbeforetheactual
commencementofhostilities.
Weentertaintherefore,nodoubtsabouttheexistenceofasizeablegroupofmenwhohavepubliclyriseninarms
tooverthrowtheGovernmentandhavethusbeenandstillareengageinrebellionagainsttheGovernmentofthe
Philippines.
WHEREAS,theselawlesselementshavetoaconsiderableextentsucceededinimpedingourdulyconstituted
authoritiesfromperformingtheirfunctionsanddischargingtheirdutiesandresponsibilitiesinaccordancewithour
lawsandourConstitutiontothegreatdamage,prejudiceanddetrimentofthepeopleandthenation
WHEREAS,itisevidentthatthereisthroughoutthelandastateofanarchyandlawlessness,chaosanddisorder,
turmoilanddestructionofamagnitudeequivalenttoanactualwarbetweentheforcesofourdulyconstituted
GovernmentandtheNewPeople'sArmyandtheirsatelliteorganizationsbecauseoftheunmitigatedforays,
raids,ambuscades,assaults,violence,murders,assassinations,actsofterror,deceits,coercions,threats,
intimidation's,treachery,machinations,arsons,plundersanddepredationscommittedandbeingcommittedby
theaforesaidlawlesselementswhohavepledgedtothewholenationthattheywillnotstoptheirdastardlyeffort
andschemeuntilandunlesstheyhavefullyattainedtheirprimaryandultimatepurposeofforciblyseizingpolitical
andstatepowerinthiscountrybyoverthrowingourpresentdulyconstitutedGovernment,bydestroyingour
democraticwayoflifeandourestablishedsecularandreligiousinstitutionsandbeliefs,andbysupplantingour
existingpolitical,social,economic,legalandmoralorderwithanentirelynewonewhoseformofgovernment,
whosemotionofindividualrightsandfamilyrelations,andwhosepolitical,social,economicandmoralprecepts
arebasedontheMarxistLeninistMaoistteachingsandbeliefs
WHEREAS,theSupremeCourtinitssaiddecisionconcludedthattheunlawfulactivitiesoftheaforesaidlawless
elementsactuallyposeaclear,presentandgravedangertopublicsafetyandthesecurityofthenationandin
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G.R.No.L35546
...theExecutivehadinformationandreportssubsequentlyconfirmed,inmanybytheabovementionedReport
oftheSenateAdHocCommitteeofSeventotheeffectthattheCommunistPartyofthePhilippinesdoesnot
merelyadheretoLenin'sideaofaswiftarmeduprisingthatithas,also,adoptedHoChiMinh'sterroristtactics
andresortedtotheassassinationofuncooperativelocalofficialsthat,inlinewiththispolicy,theinsurgentshave
killed5mayors,20barriocaptainsand3chiefsofpolicethattherewerefourteen(14)meaningfulbombing
incidentsintheGreaterManilaAreain1970thattheConstitutionalConventionHallwasbombedonJune12,
1971that,soonafterthePlazaMirandaincident,theNAWASAmainpipeattheQuezonCitySanJuanboundary
wasbombedthatthiswasfollowedcloselybythebombingoftheManilaCityHall,theCOMELECBuilding,the
CongressBuildingandtheMERALCOsubstationatCubao,QuezonCityandthattherespectiveresidencesof
SenatorJoseJ.RoyandCongressmanEduardoCojuangcowere,likewise,bombed,asweretheMERALCO
mainofficepremises,alongOrtigasAvenue,andtheDoctor'sPharmaceuticals,Inc.Building,inCaloocanCity.
...thereorganizedCommunistPartyofthePhilippineshas,moreover,adoptedMao'sconceptofprotracted
people'swar,aimedattheparalyzationofthewilltoresistoftheGovernment,ofthepolitical,economicand
intellectualleadership,andofthepeoplethemselvesthatconformablytosuchconcept,thePartyhasplaced
specialemphasisuponamostextensiveandintensiveprogramofsubversionbetheestablishmentoffront
organizationsinurbancenters,theorganizationofarmedcitypartisansandtheinfiltrationinstudentgroups,
laborunions,andfarmerandprofessionalgroupsthattheCPPhasmanagedtoinfiltrateorestablishandcontrol
nine(9)majorlabororganizationsthatithasexploitedtheyouthmovementandsucceededinmaking
Communistfrontsofeleven(11)majorstudentoryouthorganizationsthatthereare,accordingly,aboutthirty
(30)massorganizationsactivelyadvancingtheCPPinterests,amongwhicharetheMalayangSamahanng
Magsasaka(MASAKA),theKabataangMakabayan(KM),theMovementfortheAdvancementofNationalism
(MAN),theSamahangDemokratikongKabataan(SDK),theSamahangMolave(SM)andtheMalayang
PagkakaisangKabataangPilipino(MPKP)that,asofAugust,1971,theKMhadtwohundredfortyfive(245)
operationalchaptersthroughoutthePhilippinesofwhichseventythree(73)wereintheGreaterManilaArea,sixty
(60)inNorthernLuzon,fortynine(49)inCentralLuzon,fortytwo(42)intheVisayasandtwentyone(21)in
MindanaoandSuluthatin1970,thePartyhadrecordedtwohundredfiftyeight(258)majordemonstrations,of
whichaboutthirtythree(33)endedinviolence,resultinginfifteen(15)killedandoverfivehundred(500)injured
thatmostoftheseactionswereorganized,coordinatedorledbytheaforementionedfrontorganizationsthatthe
violentdemonstrationsweregenerallyinstigatedbyasmall,butwelltrainedgroupofarmedagitatorsthatthe
numberofdemonstrationsheretoforestagedin1971hasalreadyexceededthoseof1970andthattwentyfour
(24)ofthesedemonstrationswereviolent,andresultedinthedeathoffifteen(15)personsandtheinjuryofmany
more.
Subsequentevents...havealsoproven...thethreattopublicsafetyposedbytheNewPeople'sArmy.Indeed,it
appearsthat,sinceAugust21,1971,ithadinNorthernLuzonsix(6)encountersandstagedone(1)raid,in
consequencesofwhichsevensoldierslosttheirlivesandtwo(2)otherswerewounded,whereastheinsurgents
sufferedfive(5)casualtiesthatonAugust26,1971,awellarmedgroupofNPA,trainedbydefectorLt.Victor
Corpus,attackedtheverycommandpostofTFLAWINinIsabela,destroyingtwo(2)helicoptersandone(1)
plane,andwoundingone(1)soldierthattheNPAhadinCentralLuzonatotaloffour(4)encounters,withtwo(2)
killedandthree(3)woundedonthesideoftheGovernment,one(1)BSDUkilledandthree(3)KMSDKleader,an
unidentifieddissident,andCommanderPanchito,leaderofthedissidentgroupwerekilledthatonAugust26,
1971,therewasanencounterinthebarrioofSanPedro,IrigaCity,CamarinesSur,betweenthePCandthe
NPA,inwhichaPCandtwo(2)KMmemberswerekilledthatthecurrentdisturbancesinCotabatoandthe
LanaoprovinceshavebeenrenderedmorecomplexbytheinvolvementoftheCPP/NPA,for,inmid1971,aKM
group,headedbyJovencioEsparagoza,contactedtheHigaonantribes,intheirsettlementinMagsaysay,
MisamisOriental,andofferedthembooks,pamphletsandbrochuresofMaoTseTung,aswellasconducted
teachinsinthereservationthatEsparagozawasreportedlykilledonSeptember22,1971,inanoperationofthe
PCinsaidreservationandthattherearenowtwo(2)NPAcadresinMindanao.
Itshould,alsobenotedthatadherentsoftheCPPanditsfrontorganizationsare,accordingtointelligence
findings,definitelycapableofpreparingpowerfulexplosivesoutoflocallyavailablematerialsthatthebombused
intheConstitutionalConventionHallwasa'Claymore'mine,apowerfulexplosivedeviceusedbytheU.S.Army,
believedtohavebeenoneofmanypilferedfromtheSubicNavalBaseafewdaysbeforethatthePresidenthad
receivedintelligenceinformationtotheeffectthattherewasaJulyAugustPlaninvolvingawaveof
assassinations,kidnappings,terrorismandmassdestructionofpropertyandthatanextraordinaryoccurrence
wouldsignalthebeginningofsaideventthattheratherseriousconditionofpeaceandorderinMindanao,
particularlyinCotabatoandLanao,demandedthepresencethereinofforcessufficienttocopewiththesituation
thatasizeablepartofourarmedforcesdischargesotherfunctions,andthattheexpansionoftheCPPactivities
fromCentralLuzontootherpartsofthecountry,particularlyManilaanditssuburbs,theCagayanValley,Ifugao,
Zambales,Laguna,QuezonandtheBicolRegion,requiredthattherestofourarmedforcesbespreadthinover
awidearea.
WHEREAS,intheunwaveringprosecutionoftheirrevolutionarywaragainsttheFilipinopeopleandtheirduly
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constitutedGovernment,theaforesaidlawlesselementshave,inthemonthsofMay,JuneandJuly,1972,
succeededinbringingandintroducingintothecountryatDigoyoPoint,Palanan,Isabelaandatother
undeterminedpointsalongthePacificcoastlineofLuzon,asubstantialquantityofwarmaterialconsistingofM14
riflesestimatedtobesome3,500pieces,severaldozensof40mmrocketlauncherswhicharesaidtobeChicom
copiesofaRussianprototyperocketlauncher,largequantitiesof80mmrocketsandammunitions,andother
combatparaphernalia,ofwhichwarmaterialsomehadbeendiscoveredandcapturedbygovernmentmilitary
forces,andthebringingandintroductionofsuchquantityandtypeofwarmaterialintothecountryisamutebut
eloquentproofofthesinisterplanoftheaforesaidlawyerselementstohastentheescalationoftheirpresent
revolutionarywaragainsttheFilipinopeopleandtheirlegitimateGovernment
WHEREAS,intheexecutionoftheiroverallrevolutionaryplan,theaforesaidlawlesselementshavepreparedand
releasedtotheirvariousfieldcommandersandPartyworkersadocumentcaptioned'REGIONALPROGRAMOF
ACTION1972,'acopyofwhichwascapturedbyelementsofthe116thand119thPhilippineConstabulary
CompaniesonJune18,1972atBarrioTaringsing,Cordon,Isabela,thetextofwhichreadsasfollows:
REGIONALPROGRAMOFACTION1972
ThefollowingRegionalProgramofAction1972ispreparedtobecarriedoutaspartoftheoverallplanofthe
partytofomentdiscontentandprecipitatethetideofnationwidemassrevolution.ThefascistMarcosandhis
reactionaryofCongressisexpectedtopreparethemselvesforthe1973hence:
JanuaryJune:
1.Intensifyrecruitmentofnewpartymembersespeciallyfromtheworkersfarmersclass.Cadresarebeing
trainedinordertoorganizethedifferentregionalbureaus.Thesebureausmustconcentrateonmassactionand
organizationtoadvancementofthemassrevolutionarymovement.Referenceistothe'BoradorngProgramasa
PagkilosatUlatngPanlipunangPagsisiyasat'asapprovedbytheCentralCommittee.
2.RecruitandtrainarmedcitypartisansandurbanguerrillasandorganizethemintounitsunderPartycadres
andactivitiesofmassorganizations.Theseunitsmustundergospecializedtrainingonexplosivesanddemolition
andotherandotherformsofsabotage.
3.IntensifyrecruitmentandtrainingofnewmembersfortheNewPeople'sArmyinpreparationforlimited
offensiveinselectedareasintheregions.
4.Supportamoreaggressiveprogramofagitationandproragandaagainstthereactionaryarmedforcesand
againsttheConCon.
JulyAugust:
DuringthisperiodthePartyexpectsthepuppetMarcosgovernmenttoallowincreaseinbusratesthus
aggravatingfurthertheplightofstudents,workersandthefarmers.
1.AllRegionalPartyCommitteesmustplanforageneralstrikemovement.TheRegionalOperationalCommands
mustplanforarmedsupportifthefascistforcesofMarcoswilltrytointimidatetheoppressedFilipinomasses.
2.Conductsabotageagainstschools,collegesanduniversitieshikingtuitionfees.
3.Conductsabotageandagitationagainstpuppetjudgesandcourtshearingcasesagainsttoppartyleaders.
4.CreateregionalchaosanddisordertodramatizetheinabilityofthefascistMarcosGovernmenttokeepand
maintainpeaceandorderthru:
a)RobberyandholdupofbankscontrolledbyAmericanimperialistsandthosebelongingtotheenemiesofthe
people.
b)Attackmilitarycamps,USbasesandtowns.
c)Moreviolentstrikesanddemonstrations.
SeptemberOctober:
Increaseintensityofviolence,disorderandconfusion:
1.Intensifysabotageandbombingofgovernmentbuildingsandembassiesandotherutilities:
a)Congress.
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b)SupremeCourt.
c)ConCon.
d)CityHall.
e)USEmbassy.
f)FacilitiesofUSBases.
g)ProvincialCapitols.
h)PowerPlants.
i)PLDT.
j)RadioStations.
2.Sporadicattacksoncamps,townsandcities.
3.AssassinatehighGovernmentofficialsofCongress,Judiciary,ConConandprivateindividualssympatheticto
puppetMarcos.
4.Establishprovisionalrevolutionarygovernmentintownsandcitieswiththesupportofthemasses.
5.Withthesympatheticsupportofourallies,establishprovisionalprovincialrevolutionarygovernments.
CENTRALCOMMITTEECOMMUNISTPARTYOFTHEPHILIPPINES
WHEREAS,inlinewiththeir'REGIONALPROGRAMOFACTION1972,'theaforesaidlawlesselementshaveof
latebeenconductingintensifiedactsofviolenceandterrorism'sduringthecurrentyearintheGreaterManila
AreasuchasthebombingoftheArcabuildingatTaftAvenue,PasayCity,onMarch15oftheFilipinasOrient
AirwaysboardroomatDomesticRoad,PasayCityonApril23oftheVietnameseEmbassyonMay30ofthe
CourtofIndustrialRelationsonJune23ofthePhilippineTrustCompanybranchofficeinCubao,QuezonCityon
June24ofthePhilamlifebuildingatUnitedNationsAvenue,Manila,onJuly3oftheTabacaleraCigar&
CigaretteFactoryCompoundatMarquezdeComillas,ManilaonJuly27ofthePLDTexchangeofficeatEast
Avenue,QuezonCity,andofthePhilippineSugarInstitutebuildingatNorthAvenue,Diliman,QuezonCity,both
onAugust15oftheDepartmentofSocialWelfarebuildingatSanRafaelStreet,Sampaloc,Manila,onAugust17
ofawatermainonAuroraBoulevardandMadisonAvenue,QuezonCityonAugust19ofthePhilamlifebuilding
againonAugust30thistimecausingseveredestructionontheFarEastBankandTrustCompanybuilding
nearbyofthearmoredcarandbuildingofthePhilippineBankingCorporationaswellasthebuildingsofthe
InvestmentDevelopment,Inc.andtheDailyStarPublicationswhenanotherexplosiontookplaceonRailroad
Street,PortArea,ManilaalsoonAugust30ofJoe'sDepartmentStoreonCariedoStreet,Quiapo,Manila,on
September5,causingdeathtoonewomanandinjuriestosome38individualsandoftheCityHallofManilaon
September8ofthewatermainsinSanJuan,RizalonSeptember12oftheSanMiguelBuildinginMakati,Rizal
onSeptember14andoftheQuezonCityHallonSeptember18,1972,aswellastheattemptedbombingofthe
CongressBuildingonJuly18,whenanunexplodedbombwasfoundintheSenatePublicationDivisionandthe
attemptedbombingoftheDepartmentofForeignAffairsonAugust30
WHEREAS,inlinewiththesame'REGIONALPROGRAMOFACTION1972,'theaforesaidlawlesselementshave
alsofieldedintheGreaterManilaareaseveraloftheir'SparrowUnits'or'SimbadUnits'toundertakeliquidation
missionsagainstrankinggovernmentofficials,militarypersonnelandprominentcitizensandtofurtherheighten
thedestruction'sanddepredationsalreadyinflictedbythemuponourinnocentpeople,allofwhicharebeing
deliberatelydonetosowterror,fearandchaosamongstourpopulationandtomaketheGovernmentlookso
helplessandincapableofprotectingthelivesandpropertyofourpeople
WHEREAS,inadditiontotheabovedescribedsocialdisorder,thereisalsotheequallyseriousdisorderin
MindanaoandSuluresultingfromtheunsettledconflictbetweencertainelementsoftheChristianandMuslim
populationofMindanaoandSulu,betweentheChristian'Ilagas'andtheMuslim'Barracudas,'andbetweenour
Governmenttroops,andcertainlawlessorganizationssuchastheMindanaoIndependenceMovement
WHEREAS,theMindanaoIndependenceMovementwiththeactivematerialandfinancialassistanceofforeign
politicalandeconomicinterests,isengagedinanopenandunconcealedattempttoestablishbyviolenceand
forceaseparateandindependentpoliticalstateoutoftheislandsofMindanaoandSuluwhicharehistorically,
politicallyandbylawpartsoftheterritoriesandwithinthejurisdictionandsovereigntyoftheRepublicofthe
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WHEREAS,becauseoftheaforesaiddisorderresultingfromarmedclashes,killings,massacres,arsons,rapes,
pillages,destructionofwholevillagesandtownsandtheinevitablecessationofagriculturalandindustrial
operations,allofwhichhavebeenbroughtaboutbytheviolenceinflictedbytheChristians,theMuslims,the
'Ilagas,'the'Barracudas,'andtheMindanaoIndependenceMovementagainsteachotherandagainstour
governmenttroops,agreatmanypartsoftheislandsofMindanaoandSuluarevirtuallynowinastateofactual
war
WHEREAS,theviolentdisorderinMindanaoandSuluhastodateresultedinthekillingofover1,000civiliansand
about2,000armedMuslimsandChristians,nottomentionthemorethanfivehundredthousandofinjured
displacedandhomelesspersonsaswellasthegreatnumberofcasualtiesamongourgovernmenttroops,and
theparalyzationoftheeconomyofMindanaoandSulu
WHEREAS,becauseoftheforegoingactsofarmedinsurrection,wantondestructionofhumanandlivesand
property,unabatedandunrestrainedpropagandaattacksagainsttheGovernmentanditsinstitutions,
instrumentalities,agenciesandofficials,andtherapidlyexpandingranksoftheaforesaidlawlesselements,and
becauseofthespreadinglawlessnessandanarchythroughoutthelandallofwhichpreventedtheGovernmentto
exerciseitsauthority,extenditscitizenrytheprotectionofitslawsandingeneralexerciseitssovereigntyoverall
ofitsterritories,causedseriousdemoralizationamongourpeopleandhavemadetheapprehensiveandfearful,
andfinallybecausepublicorderandsafetyandthesecurityofthisnationdemandthatimmediate,swift,decisive
andeffectiveactionbetakentoprotectandinsurethepeace,orderandsecurityofthecountryanditspopulation
andtomaintaintheauthorityoftheGovernment
WHEREAS,incasesofinvasion,insurrectionorrebellionorimminentdangerthereof,I,asPresidentofthe
Philippines,haveundertheConstitution,threecourseofactionopentome,namely:(a)calloutthearmedforces
tosuppressthepresentlawlessviolence(b)suspendtheprivilegeofthewritoftomakethearrestand
apprehensionoftheselawlesselementseasierandmoreeffectiveor(c)placethePhilippinesoranypartthereof
undermartiallaw
habeascorpus
WHEREAS,Ihavealreadyutilizedthefirsttwocoursesofaction,first,bycallinguponthearmedforcesto
suppresstheaforesaidlawlessviolence,committingtothatspecificjobalmost50%oftheentirearmedforcesof
thecountryandcreatingseveraltaskforcesforthatpurposesuchasTaskForceSaranay,TaskForcePalanan,
TaskForceIsarog,TaskForcePagkakaisaandTaskForceLancafand,second,bysuspendingtheprivilegeof
thewritofonAugust21,1971uptoJanuary11,1972,butinspiteofallthat,bothcoursesofactionwerefound
inadequateandineffectivetocontain,muchlesssolve,thepresentrebellionandlawlessnessinthecountryas
shownbythefactthat:
habeascorpus
1.Theradicallefthasincreasedthenumberandareaofoperationofitsfrontorganizationsandhasintensified
therecruitmentandtrainingofnewadherentsintheurbanandruralareasespeciallyfromamongtheyouth
2.TheKabataangMakabayan(KM),themostmilitantandoutspokenfrontorganizationoftheradicalleft,has
increasedthenumberofitschaptersfrom200asoftheendof1970to317asofJuly31,1972andits
membershipfrom10,000asoftheendof1970to15,000asoftheendofJuly,1972,showingveryclearlythe
rapidgrowthofthecommunistmovementinthiscountry
3.TheSamahangDemokratikongKabataan(SDK),anothermilitantandoutspokenfrontorganizationofthe
radicalleft,hasalsoincreasedthenumberofitschaptersfromaninsignificantnumberattheendof1970to159
asoftheendofJuly,1972andhasnowamembershipofsome1,495highlyindoctrinated,intenselycommitted
andalmostfanaticallydevotedindividuals
4.TheNewPeople'sArmy,themostactiveandthemostviolentandruthlessmilitaryarmoftheradicalleft,has
increaseditstotalstrengthfromanestimated6,500composedof560regulars,1,500combatsupportand4,400
servicesupport)asofJanuary1,1972toabout7,900(composedof1,028regulars,1,800combatsupportand
5,025servicesupport)asofJuly31,1972,showingamarkedincreaseinitsregulartroopsofover100%insuch
ashortperiodofsixmonths
5.TheestablishmentofsanctuariesfortheinsurgentsinIsabela,inZambales,inCamarinesSur,andinsome
partsofMindanao,adevelopmentheretoforeunknowninourcampaignagainstsubversionandinsurgencyinthis
country
6.Thedisappearanceanddroppingoutofschoolofsome3,000highschoolandcollegestudentsandwhoare
reportedtohavejoinedwiththeinsurgentsfortraininginthehandlingoffirearmsandexplosives
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7.Thebringingandintroductionintothecountryofsubstantialwarmaterialconsistingofmilitaryhardwareand
suppliesthroughtheMVKaragatanatDigoyoPoint,Palanan,Isabela,andthefactthatmanyofthesemilitary
hardwareandsuppliesarenowinthehandsoftheinsurgentsandarebeingusedagainstourGovernment
troops
8.Theinfiltrationandcontrolofthemediabypersonswhoaresympathetictotheinsurgentsandtheconsequent
intensificationoftheirpropagandaassaultagainsttheGovernmentandthemilitaryestablishmentofthe
Government
9.Theformationatthegrassrootlevelof'politicalpowerorgans,'heretoforeunknowninthehistoryofthe
Communistmovementinthiscountry,composedofBarrioOrganizingCommittees(BOCs)tomobilizethebarrio
peopleforactiveinvolvementintherevolutiontheBarrioRevolutionaryCommittees(BRCs)toactas'local
governmentsinbarriosconsideredasCPP/NPAbailiwickstheWorkersOrganizingCommittees(WOCs)to
organizeworkersfromallsectorstheSchoolOrganizingCommittees(SOCs)toconductagitationand
propagandaactivitiesandhelpintheexpansionoffrontgroupsamongthestudentryandtheCommunity
OrganizingCommittees(COCs)whichoperateintheurbanareasinthesamemannerasthe(BOCs)
WHEREAS,therebellionandarmedactionundertakenbytheselawlesselementsofthecommunistandother
armedaggrupationsorganizedtooverthrowtheRepublicofthePhilippinesbyarmedviolenceandforcehave
assumedthemagnitudeofanactualstateofwaragainstourpeopleandtheRepublicofthePhilippines
NOW,THEREFORE,I,FERDINANDE.MARCOS,PresidentofthePhilippines,byvirtueofthepowersvested
uponmebyArticleVII,Section10,Paragraph(2)oftheConstitution,doherebyplacetheentirePhilippinesas
definedinArticleI,Section1oftheConstitutionundermartiallawand,inmycapacityastheirCommanderin
Chief,doherebycommandtheArmedForcesofthePhilippines,tomaintainlawandorderthroughoutthe
direction.
Inaddition,Idoherebyorderthatallpersonspresentlydetained,aswellasallotherswhomayhereafterbe
similarlydetainedforthecrimesofinsurrectionorrebellion,andallothercrimesandoffensescommittedin
willbeenumeratedinordersthatIshallsubsequentlypromulgate,aswellascrimesasaconsequenceofany
INWITNESSWHEREOF,IhavehereuntosetmyhandandcausedthesealoftheRepublicofthePhilippinesto
beaffixed.
DoneintheCityofManila,this21stdayofSeptember,intheyearofOurLord,nineteenhundredandseventy
two,
OnSeptember22,1972at9o'clockintheevening,clearancefortheimplementationoftheproclamationwas
granted,andforwith,thefollowinggeneralorder,amongothers,wasissued:
GENERALORDERNO.2
(ORDERINGTHESECRETARYOFNATIONALDEFENSETOARRESTTHEPERSONSNAMEDINTHE
ATTACHEDLIST,ASWELLASOTHERPERSONSWHOMAYHAVECOMMITTEDCRIMESANDOFFENSES
ENUMERATEDINTHEORDER).
PursuanttoProclamationNo.1081,datedSeptember21,1972,inmycapacityasCommanderinChiefofallthe
ArmedForcesofthePhilippinesandforbeingactiveparticipantsintheconspiracyandstatepowerinthecountry
andtotakeovertheGovernmentbyforce,theextentofwhichhasnowassumedtheproportionofanactualwar
againstourpeopleandtheirlegitimateGovernmentandinordertopreventthemfromfurthercommittingacts
thatareinimicalorinjurioustoourpeople,theGovernmentandournationalinterest,Iherebyorderyouas
SecretaryofNationalDefensetoforwitharrestorcausethearrestandtakeintoyourcustodytheindividuals
namedintheattachedlistandtoholdthemuntilotherwisesoorderedbymeorbymydulydesignated
representative.
Likewise,Idoherebyorderyoutoarrestandtakeintocustodyandtoholdthemuntilotherwiseorderedreleased
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bymeorbymydulyauthorizedrepresentative,suchpersonsasmayhavecommittedcrimesandoffensesin
furtheranceorontheoccasionoforincidenttoorinconnectionwiththecrimesofinsurrectionorrebellion,aswell
aspersonswhohavecommittedcrimesagainstnationalsecurityandthelawofnations,crimesagainstthe
fundamentallawsofthestate,crimesagainstpublicorder,crimesinvolvingusurpationofauthority,title,improper
useofname,uniformandinsignia,includingpersonsguiltyofcrimesaspublicofficers,aswellasthosepersons
whomayhaveviolatedanydecreeororderpromulgatedbymepersonallyorpromulgateduponmydirection.
two.
(SGD.)FERDINANDE.MARCOSPRESIDENTREPUBLICOFTHEPHILIPPINES
Inthelistreferredtointhisorderwerethenames,amongothers,ofallthepetitionersherein.Thus,fromshortly
aftermidnightofSeptember22,1972untiltheywereallapprehended,petitionersweretakenonebyone,either
fromtheirhomesorplacesofwork,byofficersandmenoftheArmedForcesofthePhilippines,withouttheusual
warrantofarrest,andonlyuponordersoftherespondentSecretaryofNationalDefensedirectedtohisco
respondent,theChiefofStaffoftheArmedForces.TheyhavebeensincethenconfinedeitheratCamp
Bonifacio,CampCrameorsomeothermilitarycamp,until,asearlieradvertedto,theywerereleasedsubjectto
certainconditions,withtheexceptionofpetitionersDioknoandAquino,whoarestillincustodyuptothepresent.
Theparticularcaseofpetitioner,Aquino.
AsregardspetitionerAquino,itappearsfromhisallegationsinhispetitionandsupplementalpetitionfor
prohibitioninG.R.No.L37364,alreadyreferredtoearlier,(1)thatonAugust11,1973,sixcriminalcharges,for
illegalpossessionoffirearms,etc.,murderandviolationofRA1700ortheAntiSubversionAct,werefiledagainst
himwithMilitaryCommissionNo.2,createdunderGeneralOrdersNos.8,12and39,(2)thatonAugust28,
1973,thePresidentcreated,thruAdministrativeOrderNo.355,aspecialcommitteetoundertakethepreliminary
investigationorreinvestigationofsaidcharges,and(3)thathequestionsthelegalityofhisprosecutionina
militarycommissioninsteadofinaregularciviliancourtaswellasthecreationofthespecialcommittee,notonly
becauseofallegedinvalidityofProclamation1081andGeneralOrderNo.2andtheordersauthorizingthe
creationofmilitarycommissionsbutalsobecauseAdministrativeOrderNo.355constitutesallegedlyadenialof
theequalprotectionofthelawstohimandtotheothersaffectedthereby.
Fromtheproceduralstandpoint,thesedevelopmentsdidnotwarrantthefilingofaseparatepetition.A
supplementalpetitioninG.R.No.L35546,whereinheisoneofthepetitioners,wouldhavesufficed.But
inasmuchaspetitionerAquinohaschosentofileanindependentspecialcivilactionforprohibitioninsaidG.R.
No.L37364withoutwithdrawinghispetitionforinG.R.No.L35546,Wewishtomakeitclearthatinthis
decision,theCourtisgoingtoresolve,forpurposesofthepetitionofsaidpetitioner,onlytheissueshehasraised
thatarecommonwiththoseoftherestofthepetitionersinallthesecases,therebyleavingforresolutioninG.R.
No.L37364alltheissuesthatarepeculiaronlytohim.Inotherwords,insofaraspetitionerAquinoisconcerned,
theCourtwillresolveinthisdecisionthequestionoflegalityofhisdetentionbyvirtueofProclamation1081and
GeneralOrderNo.2,suchthatinG.R.No.L37364,whatwillberesolvedwillbeonlytheconstitutionalissues
relatedtothefilingofchargesagainsthimwithMilitaryCommissionNo.2,premisedalreadyonwhateverwillbe
theCourt'sresolutionintheinstantcasesregardingProclamation1081andGeneralOrderNo.2.
Withrespecttotheotherpetitioners,noneofthemstandschargedwithanyoffensebeforeanycourtormilitary
commission.Infact,theyallcontendthattheyhavenotcommittedanyactforwhichtheycanbeheldcriminally
liable.
Goingbacktothefacts,itmaybementioned,atthisjuncture,thatonthedayProclamation1081wassigned,the
CongressofthePhilippineswasactuallyholdingaspecialsessionscheduledtoendonSeptember22,1972.It
hadbeeninuninterruptedsessionsinceitsregularopeninginJanuary,1972.Itsregularsessionwasadjourned
onMay18,1972,followedbythreespecialsessionofthirtydayseach,
8fromMay19toJune22,June23toJuly27andJuly28toAugust31,andonespecialsessionoftwentydays,from
September1toSeptember22.Asamatteroffact,petitionerAquinowasinaconferenceofajointcommitteeoftheSenate
andtheHouseofRepresentativeswhenhewasarrestedinoneoftheroomsoftheHiltonHotelinManila.
ItmustalsobestatedatthispointthatonNovember30,1972,theConstitutionalConventionof1971,which
convenedonJune1,1971andhadbeenincontinuoussessionsincethen,approvedaNewConstitutionthaton
January17,1973,Proclamation1102wasissuedproclaimingtheratificationthereofandthatintheRatification
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G.R.No.L35546
furtherjudicialobstacletotheNewConstitutionbeingconsideredinforceandeffect."Amongthepertinent
provisionsoftheNewConstitutionisSection3(2)ofArticleXVIIwhichreadsthus:
(2)Allproclamations,orders,decrees,instructions,andactspromulgated,issued,ordonebytheincumbent
ofmartiallawortheratificationofthisConstitution,unlessmodified,revoked,orsupersededbysubsequent
proclamations,orders,decrees,instructions,orotheractsoftheincumbentPresident,orunlessexpresslyand
explicitlymodifiedorrepeatedbytheregularNationalAssembly.
Beforeclosingthisnarrationoffacts,itisrelevanttostatethatrelativetopetitionerDiokno'smotiontowithdraw,
respondentfiledunderdateofMay13,1974thefollowingManifestation:
COMENOWrespondents,bytheundersignedcounsel,andtothisHonorableCourtrespectfullysubmitthis
manifestation:
1.InaMotiondatedDecember29,1973petitioner,throughcounsel,prayedforthewithdrawaloftheabove
entitledcase,moreparticularlythepleadingsfiledtherein,Respondents'CommentsdatedJanuary17,1974,
petitioners'ReplydatedMarch7,1974,andrespondents'RejoinderdatedMarch27,1974weresubsequently
submittedtothisHonorableCourt:
2.ThemotiontowithdrawhasbeenusedforpropagandapurposesagainsttheGovernment,includingthe
Supreme.CourtLately,thepropagandahasbeenintensifiedandthedetentionofpetitionerandthependencyof
hiscaseinthisCourthavebeenexploited
3.Weareawarethattheissuesraisedinthiscaseareoftheutmostgravityanddelicacy.Thisisthereasonwe
saidthatthedecisioninthesecasesshouldbepostponeduntiltheemergency,whichcalledfortheproclamation
ofmartiallaw,isover.Whilethispositionisamplysupportedbyprecedentsandisbasedonsoundpolicy
considerations,wenowfeelthattoprotecttheintegrityofgovernmentinstitutions,includingthisCourt,from
scurrilouspropagandanowbeingwagedwithrelentlessness,itwouldbeinthegreaterinterestoftheNationto
havethemotiontowithdrawresolvedandifdenied,tohavethepetitionitselfdecided
4.Thisisnottosaythattheemergencyisover,butonlytoexpressajudgmentthatinviewofrecenttactics
employedinthepropagandaagainsttheGovernment,itispreferableinthenationalinteresttohavetheissues
stirredbythislitigationsettledinthisforum.For,indeed,wemuststateandreiteratethat:
a.PursuanttothePresident'sconstitutionalpowers,functions,andresponsibilitiesinastateofmartiallaw,he
periodicallyrequirestobeconductedacontinuingassessmentofthefactualsituationwhichnecessitatedthe
promulgationofProclamationNo.1081onSeptember21,1972andthecontinuationofmartiallawthrough
ProclamationNo.1104,datedJanuary17,1973
b.TheGovernment'scurrentandlatestassessmentofthesituation,includingevidenceofthesubversive
theRepublicanditsdulyconstitutedGovernmenthasbeenovercomeandeffectivestepshavebeenandare
beingtakentoredressthecenturiesoldanddeepseatedcausesuponwhichthefiresofinsurrectionand
ofthesituation,thecontinuedthreattopeace,order,andsecurity,thedangerstostablegovernmentandto
arenowengagedintheirnormalpursuits.However,thePresidenthasdeemedthat,consideringtheoverall
situationdescribedaboveandinviewofadequateevidencewhichcannotnowbedeclassified,thecontinued
necessaryintheinterestofnationalsecurityanddefensetoenabletheGovernmenttosuccessfullymeetthe
gravethreatsofrebellionandinsurrection.Inthisregard,theSecretaryofNationalDefenseandhisauthorized
representativeshaveactedinaccordancewithguidelinesrelatingtonationalsecuritywhichthePresidenthas
prescribed.
Respectfullysubmitted.Manila,Philippines,May13,1974.(Vol.II,Rollo,L35539.)
andthatearlier,inconnectionwiththeissueofjurisdictionoftheSupremeCourtovertheinstantcases,the
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respondentsinvokedGeneralOrdersNos.3and3Areading,asfollows:
GENERALORDERNO.3
WHEREAS,martiallawhavingbeendeclaredunderProclamationNo.1081,datedSeptember21,1972andis
nowineffectthroughouttheland
WHEREAS,martiallaw,havingbeendeclaredbecauseofwantondestructionoflivesandproperty,widespread
lawlessnessandanarchyandchaosanddisordernowprevailingthroughoutthecountry,whichconditionhas
beenbroughtaboutbygroupsofmenwhoareactivelyengagedinacriminalconspiracytoseizepoliticaland
statepowerinthePhilippinesinordertotakeovertheGovernmentbyforceandviolence,theyextentofwhich
hasnowassumedtheproportionofanactualwaragainstourpeopleandtheirlegitimateGovernmentand
WHEREAS,inordertomakemoreeffectivetheimplementationoftheaforesaidProclamationNo.1081without
undulyaffectingtheoperationsoftheGovernment,andinordertoendthepresentnationalemergencywithinthe
shortestpossibletime
NOW,THEREFORE,I,FERDINANDE.MARCOS,CommanderinChiefofalltheArmedForcesofthePhilippines,
andpursuanttoProclamationNo.1081,datedSeptember21,1972,doherebyorderthathenceforthallexecutive
departments,bureaus,offices,agenciesandinstrumentalitiesoftheNationalGovernment,governmentowedor
controlledcorporations,aswellasallgovernmentsofalltheprovinces,cities,municipalitiesandbarrios
throughoutthelandshallcontinuetofunctionundertheirpresentofficersandemployeesandinaccordancewith
existinglaws,untilotherwiseorderedbymeorbymydulydesignatedrepresentative.
IdoherebyfurtherorderthattheJudiciaryshallcontinuetofunctioninaccordancewithitspresentorganization
andpersonnel,andshalltryanddecideinaccordancewithexistinglawsallcriminalandcivilcases,exceptthe
followingcases:
1.Thoseinvolvingthevalidity,legalityorconstitutionalityofanydecree,orderoractsissued,promulgatedor
performedbymeorbymydulydesignatedrepresentativepursuanttoProclamationNo.1081,datedSeptember
21,1972.
2.Thoseinvolvingthevalidityorconstitutionalityofanyrules,orders,oractsissued,promulgatedorperformed
bypublicservantspursuanttodecrees,orders,rulesandregulationsissuedandpromulgatedbymeorbymy
dulydesignatedrepresentativepursuanttoProclamationNo.1081,datedSeptember21,1972.
3.Thoseinvolvingcrimesagainstnationalsecurityandthelawofnations.
4.ThoseinvolvingcrimesagainstthefundamentallawsoftheState.
5.Thoseinvolvingcrimesagainstpublicorder.
6.Thosecrimesinvolvingusurpationofauthority,rank,title,andimproperuseofnames,uniforms,andinsignia.
7.Thoseinvolvingcrimescommittedbypublicofficers.
two.
(SGD.)FERDINANDE.MARCOSPresidentRepublicofthePhilippines".
GENERALORDERNO.3A.
Subparagraph1ofthesecondparagraphofthedispositiveportionofGeneralOrderNo.3,datedSeptember22,
1972,isherebyamendedtoreadasfollows:
xxxxxxxxx
1.Thoseinvolvingthevalidity,legality,orconstitutionalityofProclamationNo.1081,datedSeptember21,1972,
orofanydecree,orderoractsissued,promulgatedorperformedbymeorbymydulydesignatedrepresentative
pursuantthereto.
xxxxxxxxx
DoneintheCityofManila,this24thdayofSeptember,intheyearofOurLord,nineteenhundredandseventy
two.
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LikewiserelevantaretheissuancebythePresidentonJanuary17,1973ofProclamation1104readingthus:
PROCLAMATIONNO.1104
DECLARINGTHECONTINUATIONOFMARTIALLAW.
WHEREAS,Barangays(CitizensAssemblies)werecreatedinbarriosinmunicipalitiesandindistricts/wardsin
charteredcitiespursuanttoPresidentialDecreeNo.86,datedDecember31,1972,composedofallpersonswho
areresidentsofthebarrio,districtorwardforatleastsixmonths,fifteenyearsofageorover,citizensofthe
PhilippinesandwhoareregisteredinthelistofCitizenAssemblymemberskeptbythebarrio,districtorward
secretary
WHEREAS,thesaidBarangayswereestablishedpreciselytobroadenthebaseofcitizenparticipationinthe
democraticprocessandtoaffordampleopportunitiesforthecitizenrytoexpresstheirviewsonimportantnational
issues
WHEREAS,pursuanttoPresidentialDecreeNo.86A,datedJanuary5,1973andPresidentialDecreeNo.86B,
datedJanuary7,1973,thequestionwasposedbeforetheBarangays:Doyouwantmartiallawtocontinue?
WHEREAS,fifteenmilliontwohundredtwentyfourthousandfivehundredeighteen(15,224,518)votedforthe
continuationofmartiallawasagainstonlyeighthundredfortythreethousandfiftyone(843,051)whovoted
againstit
NOW,THEREFORE,I,FERDINANDE.MARCOS,PresidentofthePhilippines,byvirtueofthepowersinme
vestedbytheConstitution,doherebydeclarethatmartiallawshallcontinueinaccordancewiththeneedsofthe
timeandthedesireoftheFilipinopeople.
INWITNESSWHEREOF,IhavehereuntosetmyhandandcausedthesealoftheRepublicofthePhilippinesto
beaffixed.
DoneintheCityofManila,this17thdayofJanuary,intheyearofOurLord,nineteenhundredandseventythree.
andtheholdingofareferendumonJuly2728,1973whichasevidencedbytheCOMELECproclamationof
August3,1973resultedinthefollowing:
DoyouwantPresidentMarcostocontinuebeyond1973andfinishthereformshehasinitiatedunderMartial
Law?
18,052,016YES
1,856,744NO
(Phil.DailyExpress,August4,1973)
THEFUNDAMENTALISSUES
Firstofall,petitionerschallengethefactualpremisesandconstitutionalsufficiencyofProclamation1081.Invoking
theConstitutionof1935underwhichitwasissued,theyvigorouslymaintainthat"whiletheremayberebellionin
someremoteasinIsabela,thereisnobasisforthenationwideimpositionofmartiallaw,since:(a)nolargescale
rebellionorinsurrectionexistsinthePhilippines(b)publicsafetydoesnotrequireit,inasmuchasnodepartment
ofthecivilgovernmentisshowntohavebeenunabletoopenorfunctionbecauseofordueto,theactivitiesof
thelawlesselementsdescribedintheProclamation(c)theExecutivehasgiventhenationtounderstandand
thereexistsnoevidencetothecontrarythatthearmedforcescanhandlethesituationwithout'utilizingthe
extraordinaryofthePresidentetc.'and(d)theproblemintheGreaterManilaArea...wherepetitionerswere
seizedandarrestedwas,atthetimemartiallawwas,plainlawlessnessandcriminality."(pp.6970Petitioners'
Memorandum).Inhissupplementalpetition,petitionerDioknoindividuallypositsthatespeciallythesedays,with
theimprovedconditionsofpeaceandorder,thereisnomoreconstitutionaljustificationforthecontinuanceof
martiallaw.Inotherwords,petitionersquestionnotonlytheconstitutionalsufficiencybothinfactandinlawofthe
proclamationbutalsothelegalityoftheirdetentionandconstraints,independentlyofanyfindingofvalidityofthe
proclamation,whileinhissupplementalpetitionpetitionerDioknoindividuallysubmitsthattheCourtshould
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G.R.No.L35546
whichitwasproclaimed,ifiteverexisted,hasalreadyceased,asattestedbyvariouspublicandofficial
declarationofnolessthanthePresidenthimself.Ontheotherhand,respondentswouldwanttheCourttolayits
handsofftheinstantpetitions,claimingthatunderGeneralOrdersNos.3and3A,aforequoted,thePresident
hasorderedthattheJudiciaryshallnottryanddecidecases"involvingthevalidity,legalityorconstitutionality"of
Proclamation1081andanyorder,decreeoractsissuedordonepursuanttosaidProclamation.Theycontend
mostvehementlythatthisCourthasnojurisdictiontoinquireintothefactualbasesoftheproclamation,any
questionastotheproprietyorconstitutionalsufficiencyofitsissuancebeing,accordingtothem,politicalandnon
justiciable.Theypointout,inthisconnection,thatintheabovementionedreferendumofJanuary1015,1973
andmoresointhatofJuly2728,1973,thesovereignpeopleimpressedtheirsealofapprovalonthe
continuationofmartiallawforaslongasthePresidentmaydeemitwisetomaintainthesame.Andonthe
assumptiontheCourtcanmakeaninquiryintothefactualbasesoftheProclamation,theyclaimtherewasmore
thanefficientjustificationforitsissuance,inthelightofthecriterionofarbitrarinesssanctionedbyUsin,42SCRA
448.RespondentsfurthermaintainthatitisonlybyanotherofficialproclamationbythePresident,notbya
declaration,thatmartiallawmaybelifted.Additionally,intheiranswerofJuly26,1973topetitionerDiokno's
supplementalpetition,respondentscontendthattheexpressprovisionsoftheabovequotedtransitoryprovision
oftheNewConstitution,havemadeindubitablethatProclamation1081aswellasalltheimpugnedGeneral
Ordersareconstitutionalandvalid.
Lansangvs.Garcia
Thus,thefundamentalquestionspresentedfortheCourt'sresolutionare:
1.DoestheSupremeCourthavejurisdictiontoresolvethemeritsoftheinstantpetitions?Putdifferently,arenot
theissueshereinrelatedtotheproprietyorconstitutionalsufficiencyoftheissuanceoftheProclamationpurely
political,whicharenotforthejudiciary,butforthepeopleandthepoliticaldepartmentsofthegovernmentto
determine?AndviewedfromexistingjurisprudenceinthePhilippines,isnotthedoctrinelaiddownbythisCourtin
,applicabletothesecases?
Lansangvs.Garcia,supra
2.EvenassumingLansangtobeapplicable,andonthebasisofthecriterionofarbitrarinesssanctionedtherein,
canitbesaidthatthePresidentactedarbitrarily,capriciouslyorwhimsicallyinissuingProclamation1081?
3.Evenassumingalsothatsaidproclamationwasconstitutionallyissued,maynottheSupremeCourtdeclare
uponthefactsofrecordandthosejudiciallyknowntoitnowthatthenecessityformartiallaworiginallyfoundby
thePresidenttoexisthasalreadyceasedsoastomakefurthercontinuanceofthepresentmartiallawregime
unconstitutional?
4.EvenassumingagainthattheplacingofthecountryundermartiallawisconstitutionaluntilthePresident
himselfdeclaresotherwise,isthereanylegaljustificationforthearrestanddetentionaswellastheother
constraintsupontheindividuallibertiesofthepetitioners,and,intheaffirmative,doessuchjustificationcontinue
uptothepresent,almosttwoyearsfromthetimeoftheirapprehension,therebeingnocriminalchargesofany
kindagainstthemnoranywarrantsofarrestfortheirapprehensiondulyissuedpursuanttotheprocedure
prescribedbylaw?
5.Finally,cantherestillbeanydoubtregardingtheconstitutionalityoftheissuanceofProclamation1081andall
theotherproclamationsandorders,decrees,instructionsandactsofthePresidentissuedordonebyhim
pursuanttosaidProclamation,consideringthatbythetermsofSection3(2)ofArticleXVIIoftheConstitutionof
thePhilippinesof1973,"allproclamations,orders,decrees,instructionsandactspromulgated,issuedordoneby
theincumbentPresidentshallbepartofthelawoftheland,andshallremainvalid,legal,bindingandeffective"
untilrevokedorsupersededbytheincumbentPresidenthimselforbytheregularNationalAssemblyestablished
underthesameConstitution?
I
THEISSUEOFJURISDICTION
Byitsverynature,theissueofjurisdictionvigorouslyurgedbytheSolicitorGeneralcallsforpriorresolution.
Indeed,whenevertheauthorityoftheCourttoactisseriouslychallenged,itshouldnotproceedanyfurtheruntil
thatauthorityisclearlyestablished.Anditgoeswithoutsayingthatsuchauthoritymaybefoundonlyinthe
existinglawsand/ortheConstitution.
Foramoment,however,therewasafeelingamongsomemembersoftheCourtthattheimportofthetransitory
provisionsoftheNewConstitutionreferredtointhefifthabovehasmadetheissueofjurisdictionposedbythe
questionrespondentsofsecondaryimportance,ifnotentirelyacademic.Until,uponfurtherreflection,a
consensusemergedthatforUstodeclarethatthetransitoryprovisioninvokedhasrenderedmootandacademic
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anycontroversyastothelegalityoftheimpugnedactsofthePresidentistoassumethattheissueisjusticiable,
therebybypassingtheveryissueofjurisdiction.Weareaskedtoresolve.Wefeelthatwhileperhaps,such
relianceonthetransitoryprovisionreferredtomaylegallysufficetodisposeofthecasesatbar,itcannotanswer
persistentqueriesregardingthepowersoftheSupremeCourtinamartiallawsituation.Itwouldstillleave
unsettledahostofcontroversiesrelatedtothecontinuedexerciseofextraordinarypowersbythePresident.
Withal,suchassumptionofjusticiabilitywouldleavetheCourtopentosuccessivepetitionsaskingthatmartiallaw
belifted,withoutOurhavingresolvedfirstthecorrectnessofsuchassumption.Indeed,nothingshortofa
categoricalanddefiniterulingofthisCourtisimperativeregardingthepretendednonjusticiabilityoftheissues
herein,ifthepeoplearetoknow,astheymust,whetherthepresentgovernmentalorderhaslegitimate
constitutionalfoundationsoritissupportedbynothingmorethannakedforceandselfcreatedstiltstokeepit
abovethemurkywatersofunconstitutionality.Thus,itisbutproperthatWetacklefirstthequestionsaboutthe
authorityoftheCourttoentertainanddecidethesecasesbeforediscussingthematerialityandeffectsofthe
transitoryprovisionrelieduponbyrespondents.
Asamatteroffact,itisnotalonethematterofjurisdictionthatWeshoulddecide.Beyondthepurelylegalissues
placedbeforeUsbytheparties,morefundamentalproblemsareinvolvedintheseproceedings.Thereareall
importantmatterswhichahistoricaldecisionlikethiscannotignoreonthepretextthatOurdutyinthepremisesis
exclusivelyjudicial.WhetherallthemembersoftheCourtlikeitornot,theCourthastoplayitsindispensableand
decisiveroleinresolvingtheproblemsconfrontingourpeopleinthecriticalcircumstancesinwhichtheyfind
themselves.Afterall,wecannotdissociateourselvesfromthem,forweareFilipinoswhomustsharethecommon
fatetowhichthedenouementofthecurrentsituationwillconsignournation.ThepriorityissuebeforeUsis
whetherWewillsubjecttheassailedactsofthePresidenttojudicialscrutinyastoitsfactualbasesorWewill
defertohisfindingspredicatedonevidencewhichareintheverynatureofthingsofficiallyavailableonlytohim,
butineithercase,ourpeoplemustknowthatOurdecisionhasdemocraticfoundationsandconformswiththe
greatprinciplesforwhichournationexists.
TheNewConstitutionitselfisinalargesenseaproductofthepoliticalconvulsionnowshakingprecariouslythe
unityofthenation.Upontheotherhand,thatthosepresentlyinauthorityhadahandinonewayoranotherinits
formulation,approvalandratificationcanhardlybedenied.Tojustify,therefore,therestraintuponthelibertiesof
petitionersthroughanexclusiverelianceonthemandatesofthenewcharter,albeitlogicallyandtechnically
tenable,maynotsufficetokeepourpeopleunitedinthefaiththatthereisgenuinedemocracyintheexisting
orderandthattheruleoflawstillprevailsinourland.Somehowthedisturbingthoughtmaykeeplingeringwith
some,ifnotwithmany,ofourcountrymenthatbypredicatingOurdecisiononthebasisaloneofwhattheNew
Constitutionordains,Weareineffectallowingthosepresentlyinauthoritythedubiousprivilegeoflegalizingtheir
actsandexculpatingthemselvesfromtheirsupposedconstitutionaltransgressionsthroughadevicewhichmight
yethavebeenoftheirownfurtivemaking.
Besides,Weshouldnotbeasnaiveastoignorethatintroubloustimeslikethepresent,simplisticsolutions,
howeversolidlybased,ofconstitutionalcontroversieslikelytohavegravepoliticalconsequenceswouldnotsound
cogentenoughunlesstheyringincompleteharmonywiththetunesetbythefoundersofournationwhenthey
solemnlyconsecratedittotheideologytheyconsideredbestconducivetothecontentmentandprosperityofall
ourpeople.AndthecommitmentofthePhilippinestotheidealsofdemocracyandfreedomiseverevidentand
indubitable.Itiswritinthemartyrdomofourrevolutionaryforbearswhentheyviolentlyoverthrowtheyokeof
Spanishdispotism.Itisanindeliblepartofthehistoryofourpassionateandzealousobservanceofdemocratic
principlesandpracticesduringthemorethanfourdecadesthatAmericawaswithus.Itisreaffirmedinbright
crimsoninthebloodandthelivesofthecountlessFilipinoswhofoughtanddiedinorderthatourcountrymaynot
besubjugatedunderthemilitarismandtotalitarianismoftheJapanesethen,whowereevenenticinguswiththe
ideaofaGreaterEastAsiaCoProsperitySphere.Andtoday,thatourpeopleareshowingconsiderable
dispositiontosuffertheimpositionofmartiallawcanonlybeexplainedbytheirbeliefthatitisthelastrecourseto
savethemselvesfromtheinroadsofideologiesantithetictothosetheycherishanduphold.
Withal,theeyesofallthepeoplesoftheworldonbothsidesofthebambooandironcurtainsarefocusedonwhat
hasbeenhappeninginourcountrysinceSeptember21,1972.Martiallawinanycountryhassuchawesome
implicationsthatanynationunderitisnaturallyaninterestingstudysubjectfortherestofmankind.Thosewho
considerthemselvestobeourideologicalalliesmustbekeepingapprehensivewatchonhowsteadfastlyweshall
remainlivingandcherishingourcommonfundamentalpoliticaltenetsandwaysoflife,whereasthoseofthe
oppositeideologymustbeeagerlyanticipatinghowsoonwewilljointhemintheconvictionthat,afterall,real
progressanddevelopmentcannotbeachievedwithoutgivingupindividualfreedomandlibertyandunlessthere
isconcentrationofpowerintheexerciseofgovernmentauthority.ItistruethePhilippinescontinuestoenjoy
recognitionofallthestateswithwhomithaddiplomaticrelationsbeforemartiallawwasproclaimedbutitisnot
difficulttoimaginethatsoonasithasbecamedefiniteoranywayapparenttothoseconcernedthatthePhilippines
hasceasedtoadheretotheimmutableconceptsoffreedomanddemocracyenshrinedinitsownfundamental
lawcorrespondingreactionswouldmanifestthemselvesinthetreatmentthatwillbegivenusbythesestates.
Inourchosenformofgovernment,theSupremeCourtisthedepartmentthatmostauthoritativelyspeaksthe
languageoftheConstitution.Hence,howthepresentmartiallawandtheconstraintsuponthelibertiesof
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G.R.No.L35546
readbythewholeworldintheconsiderationsofthisdecision.Fromthemtheywillknowwhitherwearegoingasa
nation.Moreimportantly,bythesametoken,historyandthefuturegenerationsofFilipinoswillrendertheirown
judgmentonallofuswhobythewillofDivineProvidencehavetoplayourrespectiverolesinthisepochalchapter
ofournationallife.Bythisdecision,everyoneconcernedwilldeterminehowtrulyorotherwise,thePhilippinesof
todayiskeepingfaithwiththefundamentalpreceptsofdemocracyandlibertytowhichthenationhasbeen
irrevocablycommittedbyourheroesandmartyrssinceitsbirth.
AndweshouldnotglossoverthefactthatpetitionershavecometothisCourtfortheprotectionoftheirrights
undertheprovisionsoftheOldCharterthathaveremainedunalteredbytheNewConstitution.Itwouldnotbefair
tothem,iftheprovisionsinvokedbythemstillmeanwhattheyhadalwaysmeantbefore,todeterminethefateof
theirpetitionsonthebasismerelyofatransitoryprovisionwhoseconsistencywithdemocraticprinciplesthey
vigorouslychallenge.
Inthisdelicateperiodofournationallife,whenfaithineachotherandunityamongallofthecomponentelements
ofourpeopleareindispensable,Wecannottreattheattitudeandfeelingsofthepetitioners,especiallySenator
Diokno
*whoisstillunderdetentionwithoutformalcharges,withapathyandindifferentunconcern.Theirpleadingsevincequitedistinctlyanapprehensive,naya
fastdwindlingfaithinthecapacityofthisCourttorenderthemjustice.Bluntlyput,theirposeisthatthejusticetheyseekmaybefoundonlyinthecorrect
constructionofthe1935Constitution,andtheymakenosecretoftheirfearsthatbecausetheincumbentmembersoftheCourthavetakenanoathto
defendandprotecttheNewConstitution,theirhopesofdueprotectionundertheBillofRightsoftheOldChartermayfallondeafears.PetitionerDiokno,
inparticular,withtheundisguisedconcurrenceofhischiefcounsel,formerSenatorTaada,despairinglybewailsthatalthoughtheyare"convincedbeyond
anynaggingdoubtthat(theyare)onthesideofrightandreasonandlawandjustice,(theyare)equallyconvincedthat(they)cannotreasonablyexpect
eitherrightorreason,laworjustice,toprevailin(these)case(s)."
Tobesure,Wedonotfeelboundtosoothethesubjectivedespondencynortocooldowntheinfuriatedfeelings
oflitigantsandlawyersbymeansotherthanthesheerobjectivenessanddemonstratedtechnicalaccuracyofour
decisions.Underthepeculiarmilieuofthesecases,however,itisperhapsbestthatWedonotspareanyeffortto
makeeveryoneseethatindischargingthegraveresponsibilityincumbentuponUsinthebestlightthatGodhas
givenUstoseeit,WehaveexploredeveryanglethepartieshaveindicatedandthatWehaveexhaustedall
jurisprudentialresourceswithinourcommandbeforearrivingatourconclusionsandrenderingourverdict.Ina
way,itcouldindeedbepartofthenobilitythatshouldneverbelostinanycourtofjusticethatnopartybeforeitis
leftsulkingwiththethoughtthathelostbecausenotallhisimportantargumentsinwhichhesincerelybelieves
havebeendulyconsideredorweighedinthebalance.
But,ofcourse,petitioners'emotionalmisgivingsaremanifestlybaseless.Itistooevidentforanyonetoignorethat
theprovisionsoftheOldConstitutionpetitionersareinvokingremainunalteredintheNewConstitutionandthat
whenitcomestothebasicpreceptsunderlyingthemainportionsofbothfundamentallaws,thereisnodisparity,
muchlessanyantagonismbetweenthem,forintruth,theyarethesameidenticaltenetstowhichourcountry,our
governmentandourpeoplehavealwaysbeenineradicablycommitted.Insofar,therefore,assaidprovisionsand
theirunderlyingprinciplesareconcerned,thenewoathtakenbythemembersoftheCourtmustbeunderstood,
notinthedisturbingsensepetitionerstakethem,butratherasacontinuingguaranteeoftheJustices'unswerving
fealtyandsteadfastadherencetotheselfsametenetsandidealsofdemocracyandlibertyembodiedintheoaths
ofloyaltytheytookwithreferencetothe1935Constitution.
ContrarytowhatisobviouslytheerroneousimpressionofpetitionerDiokno,thefundamentalreasonthatimpelled
themembersoftheCourttotakethenewoathsthatarecausinghimunwarrantedagonywaspreciselytoregain
theirindependencefromtheExecutive,inasmuchasthetransitoryprovisionsofthe1973Constitutionhad,asa
matterofcourse,subjectedthejudiciarytotheusualrulesattendantinthereorganizationofgovernmentsundera
newcharter.UnderSections9and10ofArticleXVII,"incumbentmembersoftheJudiciarymaycontinueinoffice
untiltheyreachtheageofseventyyearsunlesssoonerreplaced"bythePresident,but"allofficialswhose
appointmentsarebythisConstitutionvestedinthe(President)shallvacatetheirofficesupontheappointment
andqualificationoftheirsuccessors."Inotherwords,undersaidprovisions,theJusticesceasedtobepermanent.
Andthatispreciselywhyournewoathscontainingthephrase"napinagpapatuloysapanunungkulan",which
petitionerDioknouncharitablyridiculesignoringitsrealimport,waspreparedbytheSecretaryofJusticein
consultationwiththeCourt,andnotbythePresidentoranyothersubordinateintheExecutiveoffice,purposelyto
makesurethattheoathtakingceremonywhichwastobepresidedbythePresidenthimselfwouldconnoteand
signifythatthereby,infactandincontemplationoflaw,thePresidenthasalreadyexercisedthepowerconferred
uponhimbytheaforequotedtransitoryconstitutionalprovisionstoreplaceanyoneofuswithasuccessorat
anytime.
TherewasnoPresidentialedictatallfortheJusticestotakesuchanoath.ThePresidentinformedtheCourtthat
hewasdeterminedtorestorethepermanenceoftherespectivetenuresofitsmembers,buttherewasafeeling
thattoextendnewappointmentstothemassuccessorstothemselveswouldsoundsomehowabsurd,Andso,in
aconferenceamongthePresident,theSecretaryofJusticeandalltheJustices,amutuallyacceptable
constructionofthepertinenttransitoryprovisionwasadoptedtotheeffectthatanofficialpublicannouncement
wastobemadethattheincumbentJusticeswouldbecontinuedintheirrespectiveofficeswithoutanynew
appointment,buttheywouldtakeafittinglywordedoaththetextofwhichwastobepreparedinconsultation
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G.R.No.L35546
thantheChiefJusticeandthethreenewAssociateJustices,whobecauseoftheirnewappointmentarenot
affectedbythetransitoryprovisions,arenowequallypermanentwiththemintheirconstitutionaltenures,as
officiallyandpubliclyannouncedbythePresidenthimselfonthatoccasion.Otherwisestated,thereorganization
oftheSupremeCourtcontemplatedinthetransitoryprovisionsreferredto,which,incidentallywasalsoafeature
ofthetransitoryprovisionsofthe1935Constitution,albeit,limitedthenexpresslytooneyear,(Section4,Article
XVI)hasalreadybeenaccomplished,andalltheJusticesarenowunreachablybeyondthepresidential
prerogativeeitherexplicitorimplicitinthetermsofthenewtransitoryprovisions.
Itis,therefore,inthesefaithandspiritandwiththisunderstanding,supportedwithprayersforguidanceofDivine
Providence,thatWehavedeliberatedandvotedontheissuesinthesecasescertainly,withoutanyclaimof
monopolyofwisdomandpatriotismandofloyaltytoallthatissacredtothePhilippinesandtheFilipinopeople.
II
Asalreadystated,theGovernment'sinsistentposturethattheSupremeCourtshouldabstainfrominquiringinto
theconstitutionalsufficiencyofProclamation1081ispredicatedontwofundamentalgrounds,namely,(1)that
underGeneralOrderNo.3,asamendedbyGeneralOrderNo.3A,"theJudiciary(whichincludestheSupreme
Court)shallcontinuetofunctioninaccordancewithitspresentorganizationandpersonnel,andshalltryand
decideinaccordancewithexistinglawsallcriminalandcivilcases,exceptthefollowing:1.Thoseinvolvingthe
validity,legalityorconstitutionalityofProclamation1081datedSeptember21,1972orofanydecree,orderor
actsissued,promulgatedorperformedby(thePresident)orby(his)dulydesignatedrepresentativepursuant
thereto,"and(2)thequestionsinvolvedinthesecasesarepoliticalandnonjusticiableand,therefore,outsidethe
domainofjudicialinquiry.
A
GENERALORDERSNOS.3AND3AHAVECEASEDTOBEOPERATIVEINSOFARASTHEYENJOINTHE
JUDICIARYOFJURISDICTIONOVERCASESINVOLVINGTHEVALIDITYOFTHEPROCLAMATIONS,ORDERS
ORACTSOFTHEPRESIDENT.
Anentthefirstgroundthusinvokedbytherespondents,itisnotwithoutimportancetonotethattheSolicitor
GeneralreliesbarelyontheprovisionsofthegeneralorderscitedwithoutelaboratingastohowtheSupreme
Courtcanbeboundthereby.ConsideringthatthetotalityofthejudicialpowerisvestedintheCourtbynoless
thantheConstitution,boththeOldandtheNew,theabsenceofanyindependentshowingofhowthePresident
maybyhisownfiatconstitutionallydeclareororderotherwiseiscertainlysignificant.ItmaybethattheSolicitor
GeneralconsidereditmoreprudenttotonedownanypossiblefrontalclashwiththeCourt,butasWeseeit,the
simplistictenoroftheSolicitorGeneral'sdefensemustbeduetothefacttoowellknowntorequireanyevidential
proofthatbythePresident'sownacts,publicizedhereandabroad,hehadmadeitplainlyunderstoodthat
GeneralOrdersNos.3and3AarenolongeroperativeinsofarastheywereintendedtodivesttheJudiciaryof
jurisdictiontopassonthevalidity,legalityorconstitutionalityofhisactsundertheaegisofmartiallaw.Infact,
accordingtothePresident,itwasuponhisinstructionsgivenasearlyasSeptember24,1972,soonafterthefiling
ofthepresentpetitions,thattheSolicitorGeneralsubmittedhisreturnandanswertothewritsWehaveissued
herein.Itisamatterofpublicknowledgethatthepresident'srepeatedavowaloftheGovernment'ssubmissionto
theCourtisbeingproudlyacclaimedasthedistinctivecharacteristicofthesocalled"martiallawPhilippine
style",sincesuchattitudeendowesitwiththedemocraticflavorsodismallyabsentinthemartiallawprevailingin
othercountriesoftheworld.
Accordingly,evenifitweretobeassumedatthisjuncturethatbyvirtueofthetransitoryprovisionoftheNew
ConstitutionmakingallordersoftheincumbentPresidentpartofthelawoftheland,GeneralOrdersNos.3and
3Aarevalid,thepositionoftherespondentsonthepresentissueofjurisdictionbasedonsaidordershasbeen
rendereduntenablebytheveryactsofthePresident,whichinthewordsofthesametransitoryprovisionhave
"modified,revokedorsuperseded"them.Andinthisconnection,itisimportanttonotethatthetransitoryprovision
justreferredtotextuallysaysthattheactsoftheincumbentPresidentshall"remainvalid,legal,bindingand
effective...unlessmodified,revokedorsupersededbysubsequentproclamations,orders,decrees,instructions
orotheractsoftheincumbentPresident,orunlessexpresslyandexplicitlymodified,orrepealedbytheregular
NationalAssembly",therebyimplyingthatthemodificatoryorrevocatoryactsofthepresidentneednotbeas
expressandexplicitasinthecaseoftheNationalAssembly.Inotherwords,whenitcomestoactsofthe
President,meredemonstratedinconsistencyofhisposterioractswithearlieroneswouldbeenoughforimplied
modificationorrevocationtobeeffective,evenifnostatementismadebyhimtosucheffect.
RationalizinghisattitudeinregardtotheSupremeCourtduringmartiallaw,PresidentMarcoshasthefollowingto
sayinhisbookentitled"NotesontheNewSocietyofthePhilippines":
Ourmartiallawisuniqueinthatitisbasedonthesupremacyofthecivilianauthorityoverthemilitaryandon
completesubmissiontothedecisionoftheSupremeCourt,andmostimportantofall,thepeople....(p.103).
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Thus,upontheapprovalbytheConstitutionalConventionofanewConstitution,Iorganizedthebarangaysor
villagecouncilsorcitizensassembliesinthebarrios(abarrioisthesmallestpoliticalunitinthePhilippines).I
directedthenewConstitutiontobesubmittedtothebarangaysorcitizensassembliesinaformalplebiscitefrom
January10to15,1973.ThebarangaysvotedalmostunanimouslytoratifytheConstitution,continuewithmartial
lawandwiththereformsoftheNewSociety.
ThisactionwasquestionedinapetitionfiledbeforeourSupremeCourtinthecasesentitled,G.R.No.L
36143,36164,36165,36236and36283.TheissueraisedwaswhetherIhadthepowertocallaplebiscite
whetherIcouldproclaimtheratificationofthenewConstitution.Inraisingthisissue,thepetitioners(who,
incidentally,wereLiberalsorpoliticaloppositionleaders)raisedthefundamentalissueofthepowerofthe
Presidentunderaproclamationofmartiallawtoissuedecrees.
Javellanavs.ExecutiveSecretaryetal
InasmuchastheissuesinturnraisedthequestionofthelegitimacyoftheentireGovernmentandalsotomeet
theinsistentsuggestionthat,intheeventofanadversedecision,Iproclaimarevolutionarygovernment,Idecided
tosubmittotilejurisdictionoftheSupremeCourtasIhaddoneinthecase(alreadyquoted)in1971whenalmost
thesamepartiesininterestquestionedmypowersasPresidenttosuspendtheprivilegeofthewritof.(Referto
pp.1317.).
Thiswould,atthesametime,calmthefearsofeverycynicwhohadanymisgivingsaboutmyintentionsand
claimedthatIwasreadytosetupadictatorship.Forwhoisthedictatorwhowouldsubmithimselftoahigher
bodyliketheSupremeCourtonthequestionoftheconstitutionalityorvalidityofhisactions?(pp.103104.)
xxxxxxxxx
ItwillbenotedthatIhadsubmittedmyselftothejurisdictionoftheSupremeCourtinallcasesquestioningmy
authorityin1971inthecaseofonthequestionofthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritofandinthecasejust
citedontheproclamationofmartiallawaswellastheotherrelatedcases.(pp.105106.)
Nothingcouldbemoreindicative,thanthesewordsofthePresidenthimself,ofhisresoluteintenttorender
GeneralOrdersNos.3and3AinoperativeinsofarastheSupremeCourt'sjurisdictionovercasesinvolvingthe
validity,legalityorconstitutionalityofhisactsareconcerned.Actually,thetenorandpurposeofthesaidgeneral
ordersarestandardinmartiallawproclamations,andthePresident'sattitudeismoreofanexceptiontothe
generalpractice.Bethatasitmay,withthisdevelopment,petitionershavenoreasontochargethatthereisa
"disrobing"oftheSupremeCourt.ButevenasthePresidentunequivocallyreaffirms,overandabovemartiallaw,
hisrespectfortheSupremeCourt'sconstitutionallyassignedroleastheguardianoftheConstitutionandasthe
finalauthorityastoitscorrectinterpretationandconstruction,itisentirelyuptotheCourttodetermineanddefine
itsownconstitutionalprerogativesvisavistheproclamationandtheexistingmartiallawsituation,giventhe
reasonsforthedeclarationanditsavowedobjectives..
B
MAYTHESUPREMECOURTINQUIREINTOTHEFACTUALBASESOFTHEISSUANCEOFPROCLAMATION
1081TODETERMINEITSCONSTITUTIONALSUFFICIENCY?
ThesecondgroundvigorouslyurgedbytheSolicitorGeneralismorefundamental,since,prescindingfromthe
forceofthegeneralordersjustdiscussed,itstrikesattheverycoreofthejudicialpowervestedintheCourtby
thepeoplethrutheConstitution.Itisclaimedthatinsofarastheinstantpetitionsimpugntheissuanceof
Proclamation1081ashavingbeenissuedbythePresidentinexcessofhisconstitutionalauthority,theyraisea
politicalquestionnotsubjecttoinquirybythecourts.Andwithreferencetothepleaofthepetitionersthattheir
arrest,detentionandotherrestraints,withoutanychargesorwarrantsdulyissuedbytheproperjudge,constitute
clearviolationsoftheirrightsguaranteedbythefundamentallaw,thestandoftherespondentsisthatthe
privilegeofthewritofhasbeensuspendedautomaticallyinconsequenceoftheimpositionofmartiallaw,the
proprietyofwhichisleftbytheConstitutiontotheexclusivediscretionofthePresident,suchthatfortheproper
exerciseofthatdiscretionheisaccountableonlytothesovereignpeople,eitherdirectlyatthepollsorthrutheir
representativesbyimpeachment.
habeascorpus
NeverbeforehastheSupremeCourtofthePhilippinesbeenconfrontedwithaproblemofsuchtranscendental
consequencesandimplicationsasthepresentoneentails.Thereishereanexertionofextremestatepower
involvingtheproclaimedassumptionofthetotalityofgovernmentauthoritybytheExecutive,predicatedonhis
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theRepublicofthePhilippines"exists(22ndwhereasofProclamation1081)andthat"thepublicorderandsafety
andthesecurityofthisnationdemandthatimmediate,swift,decisiveandeffectiveactionbetakentoprotectand
insurethepeace,orderandsecurityofthecountryanditspopulationandtomaintaintheauthorityofthe
government."(19thwhereas,.)Upontheotherhand,petitionersdenythefactualbasesoftheProclamationand
insistthatitisincumbentupontheCourt,inthenameofdemocracy,libertyandtheconstitution,toinquireintothe
veracitythereofandtodeclare,uponfindingthemtobeuntrue,thattheproclamationisunconstitutionalandvoid.
Respondentscounterhowever,thattheverynatureoftheproclamationdemandsbutthecourtshouldrefrain
frommakinganysuchinquiry,consideringthat,asalreadystated,thediscretionastowhetherornotmartiallaw
shouldbeimposedislodgedbytheConstitutioninthePresidentexclusively.
id
AsWeentertheextremelydelicatetaskofresolvingthegraveissuesthusthrustuponUs,Weareimmediately
encounteredbyabsoluteveritiestoguideUsalltheway.Thefirstandmostimportantofthemisthatthe
Constitution
9isthesupremelawoftheland.Thismeansamongothersthingsallthepowersofthegovernmentandofallitsofficials
fromthePresidentdowntothelowestemanatefromit.Noneofthemmayexerciseanypowerunlessitcanbetraced
theretoeithertextuallyorbynaturalandlogicalimplication..
ThesecondisthatitissettledthattheJudiciaryprovisionsoftheConstitutionpointtotheSupremeCourtasthe
ultimatearbiterofallconflictsastowhattheConstitutionoranypartthereofmeans.WhiletheotherDepartments
mayadopttheirownconstructionthereof,whensuchconstructionischallengedbytheproperpartyinan
appropriatecasewhereinadecisionwouldbeimpossiblewithoutdeterminingthecorrectconstruction,the
SupremeCourt'swordonthemattercontrols.
ThethirdisthatinthesamewaythattheSupremeCourtisthedesignatedguardianoftheConstitution,the
Presidentisthespecificallyassignedprotectorofthesafety,tranquilityandterritorialintegrityofthenation.This
responsibilityofthePresidentishisaloneandmaynotbesharedbyanyotherDepartment.
Thefourthisthat,totheendjuststated,theConstitutionexpresslyprovidesthat"incaseofinvasion,insurrection
orrebellionorimminentdangerthereof,whenthepublicsafetyrequiresit,he(theExecutive)"may(asalast
resort)...placethePhilippinesoranypartthereofundermartiallaw".
10
ThefifthisthatinthesamemannerthattheExecutivepowerconferredupontheExecutivebytheConstitutionis
complete,totalandunlimited,soalso,thejudicialpowervestedintheSupremeCourtandtheinferiorcourts,is
theverywholeofthatpower,withoutanylimitationorqualification.
ThesixthisthatalthoughtheBillofRightsintheConstitutionstrictlyordainsthat"nopersonshallbedeprivedof
life,libertyorpropertywithoutdueprocessoflaw",
11eventhisbasicguaranteeofprotectionreadilyrevealsthattheConstitution'sconcernforindividualrightsandlibertiesis
notentirelyabovethatforthenationalinterests,sincethedeprivationitenjoinsisonlythatwhichiswithoutdueprocessof
law,andlawsarealwaysenactedinthenationalinterestortopromoteandsafeguardthegeneralwelfare.Ofcourse,itis
understoodthatthelawthuspassed,whetherproceduralorsubstantive,mustaffordthepartyconcernedthebasicelements
ofjustice,suchastherighttobeheard,confrontation,andcounsel,.interalia
AndtheseventhisthatwhereastheBillofRightsofthe1935Constitutionexplicitlyenjoinsthat"(T)heprivilegeof
thewritofshallnotbesuspendedexceptincasesofinvasion,insurrection,orrebellion,whenthepublicsafety
requiresit,inanyofwhicheventsthesamemaybesuspendedwhereverduringsuchperiodthenecessityfor
suchsuspensionshallexist",
habeascorpus12thereisnosimilarinjunctionwhetherexpressedorimpliedagainstthedeclarationofmartiallaw.
Fromtheseincontrovertiblepostulates,itresults,firstofall,thatthemainquestionbeforeUsisnotinrealityone
ofjurisdiction,fortherecanbenoconceivablecontroversy,especiallyoneinvolvingaconflictastothecorrect
constructionoftheConstitution,thatisnotcontemplatedtobewithinthejudicialauthorityofthecourtstohear
anddecide.Thejudicialpowerofthecourtsbeingunlimitedandunqualified,itextendsoverallsituationsthatcall
fortheascertainmentandprotectionoftherightsofanypartyallegedlyviolated,evenwhentheallegedviolatoris
thehighestofficialofthelandorthegovernmentitself.Itis,therefore,evidentthattheCourt'sjurisdictiontotake
cognizanceofandtodecidetheinstantpetitionsontheirmeritsisbeyondchallenge.
Inthisconnection,however,itmustbeborneinmindthatintheformofgovernmentenvisagedbytheframersof
theConstitutionandadoptedbyourpeople,theCourt'sindisputableandplenaryauthoritytodecidedoesnot
necessarilyimposeuponitthedutytointerposeitsfiatastheonlymeansofsettlingtheconflictingclaimsofthe
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6/20/2015partiesbeforeit.Itisingrainedinthedistributionofpowersinthefundamentallawthathandinhandwiththe
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vestingofthejudicialpowerupontheCourt,theConstitutionhascoevallyconferreduponitthediscretionto
determine,inconsiderationoftheconstitutionalprerogativesgrantedtotheotherDepartments,whentorefrain
fromimposingjudicialsolutionsandinsteaddefertothejudgmentofthelatter.Itisintheverynatureof
republicangovernmentsthatcertainmattersareleftintheresidualpowerofthepeoplethemselvestoresolve,
eitherdirectlyatthepollsorthrutheirelectedrepresentativesinthepoliticalDepartmentsofthegovernment.And
thesereservedmattersareeasilydistinguishablebytheirverynature,whenonestudiouslyconsidersthebasic
junctionsandresponsibilitiesentrustedbythechartertoeachofthegreatDepartmentsofthegovernment.To
citeanobviousexample,theprotection,defenseandpreservationofthestateagainstinternalorexternal
aggressionthreateningitsveinyexistenceisfarfrombeingwithintheambitofjudicialresponsibility.Thedistinct
rolethenoftheSupremeCourtofbeingthefinalarbiterinthedeterminationofconstitutionalcontroversiesdoes
nothavetobeassertedinsuchcontemplatedsituations,therebytogivewaytotheultimateprerogativeofthe
peoplearticulatedthrusuffrageorthrutheactsoftheirpoliticalrepresentativestheyhaveelectedforthepurpose.
Indeed,thesefundamentalconsiderationsaretheonesthatlieatthebaseofwhatisknowninAmerican
constitutionallawasthepoliticalquestiondoctrine,whichinthatjurisdictionisunquestionablydeemedtobepart
andparceloftheruleoflaw,exactlylikeitsapparentlymoreattractiveorpopularopposite,judicialactivism,which
isthefullestexertionofjudicialpoweruponthetheorythatunlessthecourtsinterveneinjusticemightprevail.It
hasbeeninvokedandappliedbythisCourtinvariedformsandmodesofprojectioninseveralmomentous
instancesinthepast,
13anditisthemainsupportofthestandoftheSolicitorGeneralontheissueofjurisdictioninthecaseatbar.Itisalso
referredtoasthedoctrineofjudicialselfrestraintorabstention.Butasthenomenclaturesthemselvesimply,activismand
selfrestraintarebothsubjectiveattitudes,notinherentimperatives.Thechoiceofalternativesinanyparticulareventuality
isnaturallydictatedbywhatintheCourt'sconsideredopinioniswhattheConstitutionenvisionsshouldbedoneinorderto
accomplishtheobjectivesofgovernmentandofnationhood.Andperhapsitmaybeaddedheretoavoidconfusionof
concepts,thatWearenotlosingsightofthetraditionalapproachbasedonthedoctrineofseparationofpowers.Intruth,We
perceivethatevenundersuchmodeofrationalization,theexistenceofpowerissecondary,respectfortheactsofa
coordinate,coequalandcoindependentDepartmentbeingthegeneralrule,particularlywhentheissueisnotencroachment
ofdelimitedareasoffunctionsbutallegedabuseofaDepartment'sownbasicprerogatives.
Inthefinalanalysis,therefore,WeneednotindulgeinanyfurtherdiscussionastowhetherornottheCourthas
jurisdictionoverthemeritsoftheinstantpetitions.Itisdefinitethatithas.Rather,therealquestionbeforeUsis
whetherornottheCourtshouldactonthem.Stateddifferently,doWehaveherethatappropriateoccasionfor
activismonthepartoftheCourt,or,dotheimperativesofthesituationdemand,inthelightofthereservationsin
thefundamentallawjustdiscussed,thatWedefertothepoliticaldecisionoftheExecutive?Aftermature
deliberation,andtakingallrelevantcircumstancesintoaccount,WeareconvincedthattheCourtshouldabstain
inregardtowhatisinallprobabilitythemostimportantissueraisedinthem,namely,whetherornottheCourt
shouldinquireintotheconstitutionalsufficiencyofProclamation1081byreceivingevidencetendingtobeliethe
factualpremisesthereof.ItisOurconsideredviewthatundertheConstitution,thediscretiontodetermine
ultimatelywhetherornotthePhilippinesoranypartthereofshouldbeplacedundermartiallawandforhowlong
islodgedexclusivelyintheExecutive,andforthisreason,itisbestthatWedefertohisjudgmentasregardsthe
existenceofthegroundstherefor,since,afterall,itisnotexpectedthattheSupremeCourtshouldsharewithhim
thedelicateconstitutionalresponsibilityofdefendingthesafety,security,tranquilityandterritorialintegrityofthe
nationinthefaceofarebellionorinvasion.Thisisnotabdicationofjudicialpower,muchlessaviolationofOur
oaths"tosupportanddefendtheConstitution"rather,thisisdeferencetoanactoftheExecutivewhich,inOur
wellconsideredview,theConstitutioncontemplatestheCourtshouldrefrainfromreviewingorinterferingwith.To
Ourmind,thefollowingconsiderations,,impelnootherconclusion:
interalia
1
Ithasbeensaidthatmartiallawhasnogenerallyaccepteddefinition,muchlessaprecisemeaning.ButasWe
seeit,nomatterhowvariouslyithasbeendescribed,acommonelementisplainlyrecognizableinwhateverhas
beensaidaboutititdoesnotinvolveexecutivepoweralone.Tobemoreexact,martiallawisstatepower
whichinvolvesthetotalityofgovernmentauthority,irrespectiveoftheDepartmentorofficialbywhomitis
administered.Thisisbecause,asadmittedbyall,martiallawiseverygovernment'ssubstitutefortheestablished
governmentalmachineryrenderedinoperativebytheemergencythatbringsitforth,inordertomaintainwhatever
legalandsocialorderispossibleduringtheperiodofemergency,whilethegovernmentisengagedinbattlewith
theenemy.Otherwise,withthebreakdownoftheregulargovernmentauthorityortheinabilityoftheusualoffices
andofficialstoperformtheirfunctionswithoutendangeringthesafetyofallconcerned,anarchyandchaosare
boundtoprevailandprotectionoflifeandpropertywouldbenil.Whatisworse,theconfusionanddisorderwould
detractthedefenseefforts.Itisindispensablethereforethatsomekindofgovernmentmustgoon,andmartial
lawappearstobethelogicalalternative.Hence,fromthepointofviewofsafeguardingthepeopleagainst
possiblegovernmentalabuses,itisnotthedeclarationofmartiallawandwhoactuallyadministersitthatisof
supremeimportance.Someonehasofnecessitytobeincommandassurrogateofthewholeembattled
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government.Itiswhatisactuallydonebytheadministratoraffectingindividualrightsandlibertiesthatmustpass
constitutionalstandards,evenasthesearecorrespondinglyadjustedtosuitthenecessitiesofthesituation.But
thisisnottosaythatredressofconstitutionaloffenseswouldimmediatelyandnecessarilybeavailable,foreven
theprocedureforsecuringredress,itsformandtimemustdependonwhatsuchnecessitieswillpermit.Viewedin
depth,thisisallthatcanbevisualizedascontemplatedinthesupposedlyfundamentalprincipleinvokedby
petitionerstotheeffectthatnecessityandnecessityaloneisthejustificationandthemeasureofthepowersthat
maybeexercisedundermartiallaw.
2
Incountrieswherethereisnoconstitutionalprovisionsanctioningtheimpositionofmartiallaw,thepowerto
declareorproclaimthesameisneverthelessconcededtobethemostvitalinherentprerogativeofthestate
becauseitisaxiomaticthattherightofthestatetodefenditselfagainstdisintegrationorsubjugationbyanother
cannotbelessthananindividual'snaturalrightofselfdefense.Theresultingrepressionorrestraintofindividual
rightsisthereforejustifiedasthenaturalcontributionthattheindividualowestothestate,sothatthegovernment
underwhichhelivesmaysurvive.Afterall,suchsubordinationtothegeneralinterestissupposedtobe
temporary,coincidentonlywiththerequirementsoftheemergency.
Atthesametime,underthegeneralpracticeinthosecountries,itisconsideredasnothingbutlogicalthatthe
declarationorproclamationshouldbemadebytheExecutive.Soitisthatnoneofthecasescitedbypetitioners,
includingthoseof183,S.E.24and,52Pac.Rep.2ndSeries,pp.10541059,maybedeemedasabinding
precedentsustainingdefinitelythatitisinthepowerofthecourtstodeclareanExecutive'sproclamationor
declarationofmartiallawincaseofrebellionorinsurrectiontobeunconstitutionalandunauthorized.Ourown
researchhasnotyieldedanyjurisprudenceupholdingthecontentionofpetitionersonthispoint.Whatisclearand
incontrovertiblefromallthecasescitedbybothpartiesisthatthepoweroftheExecutivetoproclaimmartiallawin
caseofrebellionhasneverbeenchallenged,nottosayoutlawed.Ithasalwaysbeenassumed,eveniftheextent
oftheauthoritythatmaybeexerciseunderithasbeensubjectedtotheapplicableprovisionoftheconstitution,
withsomecourtsholdingthattheenforceabilityofthefundamentallawwithintheareaofthemartiallawregimeis
unqualified,andtheothersmaintainingthatsuchenforceabilitymustbecommensuratewiththedemandsofthe
emergencysituation.Inotherwords,thereisactuallynoauthoritativejurisprudentialruleforUstofollowin
respecttothespecificquestionofwhetherornottheExecutive'sdeterminationofthenecessitytoimposemartial
lawduringarebellionisreviewablebythejudiciary.IfWehavetogoviatheprecedentialroute,themostthatWe
canfindisthatthelegalityofanExecutive'sexerciseofthepowertoproclaimmartiallawhasneverbeenpassed
uponbyanycourtinacategoricalmannersoastoleavenoroomfordoubtorspeculation.
Hearonvs.CalusAllenvs.OklahomaCity
3
InthePhilippines,Wedonothavetoresorttoassumptionsregardinganyinherentpowerofthegovernmentto
proclaimastateofmartiallaw.Whatisanimpliedinherentprerogativeofthegovernmentinothercountriesis
explicitlyconferredbyourpeopletothegovernmentinunequivocaltermsinthefundamentallaw.More
importantlyinthisconnection,itistotheExecutivethattheauthorityisspecificallygranted"incasesofinvasion,
insurrectionorrebellion,whenpublicsafetyrequiresit",to"placethePhilippinesoranypartthereofunderMartial
Law".Tobesure,petitionersadmitthatmuch.Buttheyinsistontryingtoshowthatthefactualpremisesofthe
Proclamationarenotentirelytrueandare,inanyevent,constitutionallyinsufficient.TheyurgetheCourttopass
onthemeritsofthisparticularpropositionoffactandoflawintheirpetitionsandtoorderthereafterthe
nullificationandsettingasidethereof.
WedonotbelievetheCourtshouldinterfere.
Thepertinentconstitutionalprovisionisexplicitandunequivocal.Itreadsasfollows:
(2)ThePresidentshallbecommanderinchiefofallarmedforcesofthePhilippinesand,wheneveritbecomes
requiresit,hemaysuspendtheprivilegesofthewritof,orplacethePhilippinesoranypartthereofundermartial
law(Section10(2),ArticleVII,1935Constitution.)
habeascorpus
(3)SEC.12.TheprimeMinistershallbecommanderinchiefofallarmedforcesofthePhilippinesand,whenever
itbecomesnecessary,hemaycalloutsucharmedforcestopreventorsuppresslawlessviolence,invasion,
insurrection,orrebellion.Incaseofinvasion,insurrection,orrebellion,orimminentdangerthereof,whenthe
publicsafetyrequiresit,hemaysuspendtheprivilegeofthewritoforplacethePhilippinesoranypartthereof
undermartial(Section12,ArticleIX,1973Constitution.)
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ExceptforthereferencetothePrimeMinisterintheNewConstitutioninsteadoftothePresidentasintheOld,the
wordingoftheprovisionhasremainedunalteredAccordingly,thetwoConstitutionscannotvaryinmeaning,they
shouldbeconstruedandappliedinthelightofexactlythesameconsiderations.Inthissenseatleast,petitioners'
invocationofthe1935Constitutionhasnotbeenrenderedacademicbytheenforcementofthenewcharter.For
thepurposesofthesecases,WewillinthemainconsidertheirargumentsasiftherehasbeennoJavellana
decision.
ipssissimisverbis
Now,sinceinthosecountrieswheremartiallawisanextraconstitutionalconcept,theExecutive'sproclamation
thereof,asobservedabove,hasneverbeenconsideredasoffensivetothefundamentallaw,whetherwrittenor
unwritten,and,infact,notevenchallenged,whatreasoncantherebethathereinthePhilippines,whereinthe
ConstitutiondirectlyanddefinitelycommitsthepowertotheExecutive,anotherruleshouldobtain?Arewe
FilipinossoincapableofelectinganExecutivewecantrustnottounceremoniouslycastasidehisconstitutionally
wordedoathsolemnlyandemphaticallyimposinguponhimtheduty"todefendandprotecttheConstitution"?Or
istheCourttobepersuadedbypossiblepartisanprejudiceorthesubjectiverationalizationinformingpersonal
ambitions?
ReservingforfurtherdiscussiontheeffectofLansanguponthecompellingforceoftheopinionsin,5Phil.87and
,91Phil.862,relativetotheissueathand,Wecannotlightlydisregardtheponderousreasonsdiscussedinsaid
opinionssupportingtheviewthattheExecutive'schoiceofmeansindealingwithafrebellionshouldbe
conclusive.InBarcelon,thisCourtsaid:
Barcelonvs.BakerMontenegrovs.Castaeda
ThusthequestionissquarelypresentedwhetherornotthejudicialdepartmentoftheGovernmentmay
investigatethefactsuponwhichthelegislativeandexecutivebranchesoftheGovernmentactedinprovidingfor
thesuspensionandinactuallysuspendingtheprivilegeofthewritofinsaidprovinces.HastheGovernor
General,withtheconsentoftheCommission,therighttosuspendtheprivilegeofthewritof?Ifso,didthe
GovernorGeneralsuspendthewritofintheProvincesofCaviteandBatangasinaccordancewithsuchauthority?
Aparagraphofsection5oftheactofCongressofJuly1,1902,provides:
habeascorpus
ThisprovisionoftheactofCongressistheonlyprovisiongivingtheGovernorGeneralandthePhilippine
Commissionauthoritytosuspendtheprivilegeofthewritof.Noquestionhasbeenraisedwithreferencetothe
authorityofCongresstoconferthisauthorityuponthePresidentortheGovernorGeneraloftheseIslands,with
theapprovalofthePhilippineCommission.
habeascorpus
ThisprovisionoftheactofCongressmakestwoconditionsnecessaryinorderthatthePresidentortheGovernor
GeneralwiththeapprovalofthePhilippineCommissionmaysuspendtheprivilegeofthewritof.Theyareas
follows:
habeascorpus
(1)Whenthereexistsrebellion,insurrection,orinvasionand
(2)Whenpublicsafetymayrequireit.
Inotherwords,inorderthattheprivilegeofthewritofmaybesuspended,theremustexistrebellion,insurrection,
orinvasion,andthepublicsafetymustrequireit.Thisfactisadmitted,butthequestionis,Whoshalldetermine
whetherthereexistsastateofrebellion,insurrection,orinvasion,andthatbyreasonthereofthepublicsafety
requiresthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritof?
IthasbeenarguedandadmittedthattheGovernorGeneral,withtheapprovalofthePhilippineCommission,has
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G.R.No.L35546
suspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritofbutthefactwhetherinsurrection,rebellion,orinvasiondoesactually
existisanopenquestion,whichthejudicialdepartmentoftheGovernmentmayinquireintoandthatthe
conclusionsofthelegislativeandexecutivedepartments(thePhilippineCommissionandtheGovernorGeneral)
oftheGovernmentarenotconclusiveuponthatquestion.
habeascorpus
Inotherwords,itiscontendedthatthejudicialdepartmentoftheGovernmentmayconsideranapplicationforthe
writofeventhoughtheprivilegesofthesamehavebeensuspended,inthemannerprovidedbylaw,forthe
purposesoftakingproofuponthequestionwhetherthereactuallyexistsastateofinsurrection,rebellion,or
invasion.
habeascorpus
Theapplicantshereadmitthatifastateofrebellion,insurrection,orinvasionexists,andthepublicsafetyisin
danger,thenthePresident,orGovernorGeneralwiththeapprovalofthePhilippineCommission,maysuspend
theprivilegeofthewritof.
habeascorpus
InasmuchasthePresident,orGovernorGeneralwiththeapprovalofthePhilippineCommission,cansuspend
theprivilegeofthewritofonlyundertheconditionsmentionedinthesaidstatute,itbecomestheirdutytomake
aninvestigationoftheexistingconditionsintheArchipelago,oranypartthereof,toascertainwhetherthere
actuallyexistsastateofrebellion,insurrection,orinvasion,andthatthepublicsafetyrequiresthesuspensionof
theprivilegeofthewritof.Whenthisinvestigationisconcluded,thePresident,ortheGovernorGeneralwiththe
consentofthePhilippineCommission,declaresthatthereexisttheseconditions,andthatthepublicsafety
requiresthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritof,canthejudicialdepartmentoftheGovernmentinvestigate
thesamefactsanddeclarethatnosuchconditionsexist?
TheactofCongress,abovequoted,wiselyprovidesfortheinvestigationbytwodepartmentsoftheGovernment
thelegislativeandexecutiveoftheexistingconditions,andjointactionbythetwobeforetheprivilegeofthe
writofcanbesuspendedintheseIslands.
habeascorpus
IftheinvestigationandfindingsofthePresident,ortheGovernorGeneralwiththeapprovalofthePhilippine
thejudicialdepartmentoftheGovernmentforanotherinvestigationandconclusionconcerningthesame
Owingtoconditionsattimes,astateofinsurrection,rebellion,orinvasionmayarisesuddenlyandmayjeopardize
theveryexistenceoftheState.Suppose,forexample,thatoneofthethicklypopulatedGovernmentssituated
telegraph(Ifthislandingoftroopsandthatthepeopleofthedistrictareincollusionwithsuchinvasion.Mightnot
theGovernorGeneralandtheCommissionacceptthistelegramassufficientevidenceandproofofthefacts
communicatedandatoncetakesteps,eventotheextentofsuspendingtheprivilegeofthewritof,asmight
appeartothemtobenecessarytorepelsuchinvasion?Itseemsthatallmeninterestedinthemaintainanceand
stabilityoftheGovernmentwouldanswerthisquestionintheaffirmative.
habeascorpus
Butsupposesomeone,whohasbeenarrestedinthedistrictuponthegroundthathisdetentionwouldassistin
restoringorderandinrepellingtheinvasion,appliesforthewritof,allegingthatnoinvasionactuallyexistsmay
theirpostsofdutyforthepurposeofexplainingandfurnishingprooftoitconcerningtheexistenceornon
existenceofthefactsproclaimedtoexistbythelegislativeandexecutivebranchesoftheState?Ifso,thenthe
courtsmayeffectuallytiethehandsoftheexecutive,whosespecialdutyitistoenforcethelawsandmaintain
applicants,sopregnantwithdetrimentalresults,couldnothavebeenintendedbytheCongressoftheUnited
habeascorpus
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G.R.No.L35546
Everydelayandhindranceandobstaclewhichpreventsastrictenforcementoflawsundertheconditions
mentionednecessarilytendstojeopardizepublicinterestsandthesafetyofthewholepeople.Ifthejudicial
departmentoftheGovernment,oranyofficerintheGovernment,hasarighttocontesttheordersofthe
thenthehandsofthePresidentortheGovernorGeneralmaybetieduntiltheveryobjectoftherebelsor
insurrectionsorinvadershasbeenaccomplished.ButitisurgedthatthePresident,ortheGovernorGeneralwith
theapprovalofthePhilippineCommission,mightbemistakenastotheactualconditionsthatthelegislative
departmentthePhilippineCommissionmight,byresolution,declareafterinvestigation,thatastateof
writof,when,asamatteroffact,nosuchconditionsactuallyexistedthatthePresident,orGovernorGeneral
withoutthereactuallyexistingtheconditionsmentionedintheactofCongress.Inotherwords,theapplicants
allegeintheirargumentinsupportoftheirapplicationforthewritof,thatthelegislativeandexecutivebranches
oftheGovernmentmightreachawrongconclusionfromtheirinvestigationsoftheactualconditions,ormight,
throughadesiretooppressandharassthepeople,declarethatastateofrebellion,insurrection,orinvasion
suchconditionsdidexist.Wecannotassumethatthelegislativeandexecutivebrancheswillactortakeany
MoreoveritcannotbeassumedthatthelegislativeandexecutivebranchesoftheGovernment,withallthe
machinerywhichthosebrancheshaveattheircommandforexaminingintotheconditionsinanypartofthe
branchoftheGovernmenttoconstantlyinformthelegislativebranchoftheGovernmentoftheconditionofthe
Unionastotheprevalenceofpeaceanddisorder.TheexecutivebranchoftheGovernment,throughits
numerousbranchesofthecivilandmilitary,ramifieseveryportionoftheArchipelago,andisenabledtherebyto
obtaininformationfromeveryquarterandcorneroftheState.Canthejudicialdepartmentofthegovernment,
withitsverylimitedmachineryforthepurposeofinvestigatinggeneralconditions,beanymoresureof
ascertainingthetrueconditionsthroughouttheArchipelago,orinanyparticulardistrict,thantheotherbranches
ofthegovernment?Wethinknot.(Atp.9196.)
xxxxxxxxx
ThesamegeneralquestionpresentedherewaspresentedtotheSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStatesinthecase
of,inJanuary,1827.AnactofCongressof1795provided
Martinvs.Mott
suchinvasion,andtoissuehisordersforthatpurposetosuchofficerorofficersofthemilitiaasheshallthink
proper.
Inthiscase(Martinvs.Mott)thequestionwaspresentedtothecourtwhetherornotthePresident'sactionin
callingoutthemilitiawasconclusiveagainstthecourts.TheSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStates,inanswering
thisquestion,said:.
ThepowerthusconfidedbyCongresstothePresidentis,doubtless,ofaveryhighanddelicatenature.Afree
peoplearenaturallyjealousoftheexerciseofmilitarypowerandthepowertocallthemilitiaintoactualserviceis
certainlyfelttobeoneofnoordinarymagnitude.Butitisnotapowerwhichcanbeexecutedwithout
correspondingresponsibility.Itis,initsterms,alimitedpower,confinedtocasesofactualinvasion,orofimminent
dangerofinvasion.Ifitbealimitedpower,thequestionarises,Bywhomistheexigencytobeadjudgedofand
decided?IsthePresidentthesoleandexclusivejudgewhethertheexigencyhasarisen,orisittobeconsidered
asanopenquestion,uponwhicheveryofficertowhomtheordersofthePresidentareaddressed,maydecidefor
himself,andequallyopentobecontestedbyverymilitiamanwhoshallrefusetoobeytheordersofthe
President?Wearealloftheopinionthattheauthoritytodecidewhethertheexigencyhasarisenbelongs
exclusivelytothePresidentandhisdecisionisconclusiveuponallotherpersons.Wethinkthatthisconstruction
necessarilyresultsfromthenatureofthepoweritselfandfromthemanifestobjectcontemplatedbytheactof
Congress.Thepoweritselfistobeexerciseduponsuddenemergencies,upongreatoccasionsofstateand
undercircumstanceswhichmaybevitaltotheexistenceoftheUnion....Ifasuperiorofficerhasarighttocontest
theordersofthePresident,uponhisowndoubtsastotheexigencyhavingarisen,itmustbeequallytherightof
everyinferiorofficerandsoldier....Suchacoursewouldbesubversiveofalldisciplineandexposethebest
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6/20/2015disposedofficertothechancesoferroneouslitigation.Besides,inmanyinstances,theevidenceuponwhichthe
G.R.No.L35546
Presidentmightdecidethatthereisimminentdangerofinvasionmightbeofanaturenotconstitutingstrict
technicalproof,orthedisclosureoftheevidencemightrevealimportantsecretsofstatewhichthepublicinterest
andevensafetymightimperiouslydemandtobekeptinconcealment.
Wheneverthestatutegivesadiscretionarypowertoanyperson,tobeexercisedbyhimuponhisownopinionof
certainfactsitisasoundruleofconstructionthatthestatuteconstituteshimthesoleandexclusivejudgeofthe
existenceofthosefacts.Andinthepresentcaseweareallofopinionthatsuchisthetrueconstructionoftheact
of1795.Itisnoanswerthatsuchpowermaybeabused,forthereisnopowerwhichisnotsusceptibleofabuse.'
(Martinvs.Mott,12Wheat.,19(25U.S.)Vanderheydenvs.Young,11Johns.,N.Y.150.)
JusticeJosephStoryformanyyearsamemberoftheSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStates,indiscussingthe
questionwhomaysuspendtheprivilegeofthewritofhabeascorpusundertheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates,
said:
Itwouldseem,asthepowerisgiventoCongresstosuspendthewritofincasesofrebellion,insurrection,or
invasion,thattherighttojudgewhethertheexigencyhasarisenmustconclusivelybelongtothatbody.'(Storyon
theConstitution,5thed.,see.1342.)
habeascorpus
JusticeJamesKet,formanyyearsajusticeofthesupremecourtoftheStateofNewYork,indiscussingthesame
question,citesthecaseofMartinvs.Mott,andsays:.
InthatcaseitwasdecidedandsettledbytheSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStatesthatitbelongedexclusivelyto
thePresidenttojudgewhentheexigencyarisesinwhichhehadauthority,undertheConstitution,tocallforththe
militia,andthathisdecisionwasconclusiveuponallotherpersons.(Kent'sCommentaries,14thed.,vol.1,
bottomp.323.)
JohnRandolphTucker,formanyyearsaprofessorofconstitutionalandinternationallawinWashingtonandLee
university,indiscussingthisquestion,said:.
Byanactpassedin1795CongressgavetothePresidentpowertocalloutthemilitiaforcertainpurposes,andby
subsequentacts,in1807,powerwasgiventohimtobeexercisedwheneverheshoulddeemitnecessary,forthe
purposesstatedintheConstitutionandtheSupremeCourt(UnitedStates)hasdecidedthatthisexecutive
discretioninmakingthecall(forStatemilitia)couldnotbejudiciallyquestioned.'TuckerontheConstitution,Vol.
II,p.581.)
JohnNortonPomeroy,aneminentlawwriteruponconstitutionalquestions,said:.
InitwasdecidedthatundertheauthoritygiventothePresidentbythestatuteof1795,callingforththemilitia
undercertaincircumstances,thepowerisexclusivelyvestedinhimtodeterminewhetherthosecircumstances
existandwhenhehasdeterminedbyissuinghiscall,nocourtcanquestionhisdecision.(Pomeroy's
ConstitutionalLaw,sec.476.)
Martinvs.Mott
HenryCampbellBlack,awellknownwriterontheConstitution,says:
ByanearlyactofCongressitwasprovidedthatincaseofaninsurrectioninanyStateagainstthegovernment
thereofitshallbelawfulforthePresidentoftheUnitedStates,onapplicationofthelegislatureofsuchState,orof
theexecutive(whenthelegislaturecannotbeconvened),tocallforthsuchanumberofthemilitiaofanyother
StateorStatesasmaybeappliedfor,ashemayjudgesufficienttosuppresssuchinsurrection.Bythisactthe
powerofdecidingwhethertheexigencyhasarisenuponwhichtheGovernmentoftheUnitedStatesisboundto
interfereisgiventothePresident.(Black'sConstitutionalLaw,p.102.)
JudgeThomasM.Cooley,indiscussingtherightofthejudicialdepartmentoftheGovernmenttointerferewith
thediscretionaryactionoftheotherdepartmentsoftheGovernment,inhisworkonconstitutionallaw,said:
CongressmayconferuponthePresidentthepowertocallthem(themilitia)forth,andthismakeshimthe
exclusivejudgewhethertheexigencyhasarisenfortheexerciseoftheauthorityandrendersonewhorefusesto
obeythecallliabletopunishmentundermilitarylaw.(Cooley'sPrinciplesofConstitutionalLaw,p.100.).
Butitmaybearguedbythosewhocontendforthecontrarydoctrine,towit,thattheactsoftheGovernor
General,withtheapprovalofthePhilippineCommission,arenotconclusiveuponthecourtsandthatnoneofthe
foregoingcitationsareexactlyinpoint,thatnoneofthesecasesorauthorstreatofacaseexactlyliketheone
presented.Wearefortunate,however,inbeingabletocite,inanswertothatcontention,thecaseofHenry
WilliamBoyle,whereexactlythesamequestionwaspresentedtothesupremecourtoftheStateofIdaho,which
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6/20/2015theapplicantspresenthereandwherethecourtsheldthedoctrineofthecasesapplied.InthecaseofBoyle,he
G.R.No.L35546
hadbeenarrestedaftertheprivilegeofthewritofhadbeensuspended.Heappliedforawritoftothesupreme
courtofIdaho,alleging,amongotherthings,inhisapplication:
First:That'noinsurrection,riot,orrebellionnowexistsinShoshoneCounty'and
Second.That'theGovernorhasnoauthoritytoproclaimmartiallaworsuspendthewritof.
habeascorpus
Inreplytothiscontentiononthepartoftheapplicant,Boyle,thecourtsaid:
Counselhavearguedablyandingeniouslyuponthequestionastowhethertheauthoritytosuspendthewritof
restswiththelegislativeandexecutivepowersoftheGovernment,but,fromourviewsofthiscase,thatquestion
cutsnofigure.Weareoftheopinionthatwhenever,forthepurposeofputtingdowninsurrectionorrebellion,the
exigenciesofthecasedemandit,withthesuccessfulaccomplishmentofthisendinview,itisentirelycompetent
fortheexecutiveorforthemilitaryofficerincommand,iftherebesuch,eithertosuspendthewritordisregarditif
issued.ThestatutesofthisState(Idaho)makeitthedutyofthegovernor,wheneversuchastateorcondition
existsastheproclamationofthegovernorshowsdoesexistinShoshoneCounty,toproclaimsuchlocalityina
stateofinsurrectionandtocallintheaidofthemilitaryoftheStateoroftheFederalGovernmenttosuppress
suchinsurrectionandreestablishpermanentlytheascendencyofthelaw.Itwouldbeanabsurditytosaythatthe
actionoftheexecutive,undersuchcircumstances,maybenegativedandsetatnaughtbythejudiciary,orthat
theactionoftheexecutivemaybeinterferedwithorimpugnedbythejudiciary.Ifthecourtsaretobemadea
sanctuary,aseatofrefugewhereuntomalefactorsmayfallforprotectionfrompunishmentjustlydueforthe
commissionofcrimetheywillsoonceasetobethatpalladiumoftherightsofthecitizensoablydescribedby
counsel.
habeascorpus
Onapplicationforawritof,thetruthofrecitalsofallegedfactsinaproclamationissuedbythegovernor
proclaimingacertaincountytobeinastateofinsurrectionandrebellionwillnotbeinquiredintoorreviewed.The
actionofthegovernorindeclaringShoshoneCountytobeinstateofinsurrectionandrebellion,andhisactionin
callingtohisaidthemilitaryforcesoftheUnitedStatesforthepurposeofrestoringgoodorderandthe
supremacyofthelaw,hastheeffecttoputinforce,toalimitedextent,martiallawinsaidcounty.Suchactionis
notinviolationoftheConstitution,butinharmonywithit,beingnecessaryforthepreservationofgovernment.In
suchcasetheGovernmentmay,likeanindividualactinginselfdefense,takethosestepsnecessarytopreserve
itsexistence.Ifhundredsofmencanassemblethemselvesanddestroypropertyandkillandinjurecitizens,thus
defeatingtheendsofgovernment,andtheGovernmentisunabletotakealllawfulandnecessarystepstorestore
lawandmaintainorder,theStatewillthenbeimpotentifnotentirelydestroyed,andanarchyplacedinitsstead.
habeascorpus
Ithavingbeendemonstratedtothesatisfactionofthegovernor,aftersomesixorsevenyearsofexperience,that
theexecutionofthelawsinShoshoneCountythroughtheordinaryandestablishedmeansandmethodswas
renderedpracticallyimpossible,itbecamehisdutytoadoptthemeansprescribedbythestatuteforestablishing
insaidcountythesupremacyofthelawandinsuringthepunishmentofthosebywhoseunlawfulandcriminalacts
suchaconditionofthingshasbeenbroughtaboutanditisnottheprovinceofthecourtstointerfere,delay,or
placeobstructionsinthepathofdutyprescribedbylawfortheexecutive,butrathertorenderhimalltheaidand
assistanceintheirpower,inhiseffortstobringabouttheconsummationmostdevoutlyprayedforbyeverygood,
lawabidingcitizenintheState.'(InreBoyle,45L.R.A.,1899,832.)(Atpp.99104.).
Theseobservationsarefollowedonpages104to115byacompilationofdecidedcasescentrallyholdingthat
"whenevertheConstitutionorastatutegivesadiscretionarypowertoanyperson,tobeexercisedbyhimupon
hisownopinionofcertainfacts,suchpersonistobeconsideredthesoleandexclusivejudgeoftheexistenceof
thosefacts."Forthesakeofbrevity,Weshallnotquotethediscussionanymore.Weareconfidenttherecanbe
nodissentinsofarasthegeneralpropositionstatedisconcerned.
Notably,intheunanimousdecisionofthisCourtinMontenegro,theseviewsaretotallyadoptedinaverybrief
passagethus:
B.Inhissecondpropositionappellantinsiststhereisnostateofinvasion,insurrection,rebellionorimminent
dangerthereof.'Thereare'headmits'intermittentsortiesandlightningattacksbyorganizedbandsindifferent
places'but,heargues,'suchsortiesareoccassional,localizedandtransitory.Andtheproclamationspeaksno
morethanofovertactsofinsurrectionandrebellion,notofcasesofinvasion,insurrectionorrebellionorimminent
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6/20/2015dangerthereof.'OnthissubjectitisnotedthatthePresidentconcludedfromthefactsrecitedintheproclamation,
G.R.No.L35546
andothersconnectedtherewith,that'thereisactualdangerofrebellionwhichmayextendthroughoutthe
country.'Suchofficialdeclarationimplyingmuchmorethanimminentdangerofrebellionamplyjustifiesthe
suspensionofthewrit.
Tothepetitioner'sunpracticedeyetherepeatedencountersbetweendissidentelementsandmilitarytroopsmay
seemsporadic,isolatedorcasual.ButtheofficerschargedwiththeNation'ssecurityanalyzedtheextentand
patternofsuchviolentclashesandarrivedattheconclusionthattheyarewarpandwoofofageneralschemeto
overthrowthisgovernment,byforceandarms.
vietarmis
AndweagreewiththeSolicitorGeneralthatinthelightoftheviewsoftheUnitedStatesSupremeCourtthru
Marshall,TaneyandStoryquotedwithapprovalinBarcelonvs.Baker(5Phil.,87,pp.98an100)theauthorityto
decidewhethertheexigencyhasarisenrequiringsuspensionbelongstothePresidentand'hisdecisionisfinal
andconclusiveuponthecourtsanduponallotherpersons.
IndeedasJusticeJohnsonsaidinthatdecision,whereastheExecutivebranchoftheGovernmentisenabledthru
itscivilandmilitarybranchestoobtaininformationaboutpeaceandorderfromeveryquarterandcornerofthe
nation,thejudicialdepartment,withitsverylimitedmachinerycannotbeinbetterpositiontoascertainor
evaluatetheconditionsprevailingintheArchipelago.(Atpp.886887.)
Thereareactuallymanymorejudicialprecedentsandopinionsofknowledgeableandauthoritativetextwriters,
thatcanbecopiedhere,maintainingwithinexorablelogicwhytheExecutiveisincomparablybestequippedand
preparedtocopewithinternalandexternalaggressionandthat,indeed,theprotectionofthecountryagainst
suchcontingenciesishissoleresponsibilitynotsupposedtobesharedbytheJudiciary.Buttheproposition
appearstoUssoplainandineluctablethattosummonallofthemtoOurassistancecouldonlyopenUstothe
suspicionthatthePhilippineSupremeCourthastodependonborrowedthinkingtoresolvethemostcritical
issuesbetweenindividualrights,ontheonehand,andstatepowerexertedasamatterofselfdefenseagainst
rebellionandsubversionimperillingthecountry'sownsurvival,ontheother.Emphatically,Wedon'thaveto.
ThankGodWehaveenoughnativegeniusandindigenousmeansandresourcestocopewiththemostdelicate
problemsofstatehood.LetotherslistentoandabidebytheplatitudinousandelegantlyphraseddictainMilligan,,
DuncanandWhite,
supra14theywhoareinandofthewealthiestandmightiestpowerintheworld,thatonlyactualmilitarycombatandrelated
operationscanjustifymartiallaw,butWe,whoareinandofasmallandweakdevelopingnation,letushearkenandfollow
thehomespunadviceofourbarriofolkscautioningeveryonethus:
Kungangbahaymoaypawidatkawayanpagdilimngulapatlumalakasnaanghangingmagsarakanang
bintanaatsuhayanmoangiyongbahay.(Whenyourhouseismadeofnipaandbamboo,andyouseetheclouds
darkeningandthewindsstartblowing,itistimeforyoutocloseyourwindowsandstrengthenthesupportofyour
house.)
ThiscouldexplainwhyundertheConstitution,martiallawcanbedeclarednotonlyincaseofactualrebellion,but
evenonlywhenthereisimminentdangerthereof.AndthatiswhytheopencourtruleestablishedinMilliganand
reiteratedinDuncanandWhiteisnotcontrollinginthisjurisdiction.
Besides,inasmuchasourpeoplehaveincludedintheConstitutionanexpresscommitmentofthepowertothe
President,whydoWehavetoresorttothepronouncementsofothercourtsofothercountrieswhereinsaidpower
isonlyimplied?RegardlessofwhatothercourtsbelievetheirExecutivemaydoinemergencies,ourtaskisnotto
slavishlyadoptwhatthosecourtshavesaid,forthereisnoevidencethatsuchwastheintentofourconstitutional
fathers.gather,WeshoulddetermineforOurselveswhatisbestforourowncircumstancesinthePhilippines,
evenifWehavetogivedueconsiderationtotheexperienceotherpeopleshavegonethroughundermoreorless
similarcrisesinthepast.
Inanyevent,regardlessoftheirweightinsofarasthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritofisconcerned,We
considerthereasonsgivenintheabovequotedopinionsinBarcelonandMontenegroofparticularrelevance
whenitcomestotheimpositionofmartiallaw.
habeascorpus
4
Itmaybethattheexistenceornonexistenceorimminenceofarebellionofthemagnitudethatwouldjustifythe
impositionofmartiallawisanobjectivefactcapableofjudicialnotice,forarebellionthatisnotofgeneral
knowledgetothepubliccannotconceivablybedangeroustopublicsafety.Butpreciselybecauseitiscapableof
judicialnotice,noinquiryisneededtodeterminetheproprietyoftheExecutive'saction.
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6/20/2015Again,whiletheexistenceofarebellionmaybewidelyknown,itsrealextentandthedangersitmayactuallypose
G.R.No.L35546
tothepublicsafetyarenotalwayseasilyperceptibletotheunpracticedeye.Inthepresentdaypracticesof
rebellion,itsinseparablesubversionaspecthasproventobemoreeffectiveandimportantthan"therising(of
persons)publiclyandtakingarmsagainsttheGovernment"bywhichtheRevisedPenalCodecharacterizes
rebellionasacrimeunderitssanction(Art.134,RevisedPenalCode).Subversionissuchacovertkindofanti
governmentactivitythatitisverydifficultevenforarmyintelligencetodetermineitsexactareaofinfluenceand
effect,nottomentionthedetailsofitsforcesandresources.Bysubversion,therebelscanextendtheirfieldof
actionunnoticedevenuptothehighestlevelsofthegovernment,wherenoonecanalwaysbecertainofthe
politicalcomplexionofthemannexttohim,andthisdoesnotexcludethecourts.Arms,ammunitionsandallkinds
ofwarequipmenttravelandaretransferredindeepsecrecytostrategiclocations,whichcanbeone's
neighborhoodwithouthimhavinganyideaofwhatisgoingon.Therearesomanyinsidiouswaysinwhich
subversivesact,infacttoomanytoenumerate,butthepointthatimmediatelysuggestsitselfisthattheyare
mostlyincapableofbeingprovenincourt,sohowareWetomakeajudicialinquiryaboutthemthatcansatisfy
ourjudicialconscience?
TheConstitutiondefinitelycommitsittotheExecutivetodeterminethefactualbasesandtoforthwithactas
promptlyaspossibletomeettheemergenciesofrebellionandinvasionwhichmaybecrucialtothelifeofthe
nation.Hemustdothiswithunwaveringconviction,oranyhesitancyorindecisiononhispartwillsurelydetract
fromtheneededprecisioninhischoiceofthemeanshewouldemploytorepeltheaggression.Theapprehension
thathisdecisionmightbeheldbytheSupremeCourttobeatransgressionofthefundamentallawhehassworn
to"defendandpreserve"woulddeterhimfromactingwhenpreciselyitismosturgentandcriticalthatheshould
act,sincetheenemyisabouttostrikethemortalblow.Differentmencanhonestlyandreasonablyvaryin
assessingtheevidentiaryvalueofthesamecircumstance,andtheprospectofbeingconsideredasa
constitutionalfelonratherthanasaviourofthecountryshouldtheJusticesdisagreewithhim,wouldputthe
Executiveinanunenviablepredicament,certainlyunwiseandimprudentforanyConstitutiontocontemplatehe
shouldbein.ButwhatisworseisthattheCourtisnotequippedinanywaywiththemeanstoadequately
appreciatetheinsidiouspracticesofsubversion,nottosaythatitcannotdoitwithmoreoratleastequalaccuracy
astheExecutive.Besides,theCourtwouldthenbeactingalreadywithconsiderablehindsightconsiderations
whichcanimperceptiblyinfluenceitsjudgmentinoverridingtheExecutive'sfinding.
Morethaneverbefore,whenrebellionwaspurelyasurfaceaction,andviewingthematterfromallangles,it
appearsineludiblethattheCourtshouldrefrainfrominterferingwiththeExecutive'sdelicatedecision.Afterall,the
sacredrightsofindividualsenshrinedintheBillofRightsandtheotherconstitutionalprocessesevervaluableto
thepeople,butwhichadmittedlycannot,bytheway,bemoreimportantthantheverysurvivalofthenation,are
notnecessarilysweptawaybyastateofmartiallaw,for,asalreadypointedoutearlier,thevalidityofthe
Proclamationisonething,theadministrationofthegovernmentunderitissomethingelsethathastobedone
withtheclosestadherencetothefundamentallawthattheobviousnecessitiesofthesituationwillpermit.AsWe
seeit,itisinthissensethattheConstitutionisthesupremelawequallyintimesofpeaceandofwarandforall
classesofmen,ifWemustreferagaintopetitioners'relianceonMilligan.Atthesametime,letusnotoverlook,in
connectionwiththisfavoriteauthorityofpetitioners,thattheFederalSupremeCourt'spostulationtherein,thatit
was"happilyprovedbytheresultofthegreatefforttothrowoff(the)justauthority"oftheUnitedStatesduringthe
CivilWarthattheconstitutionofthatcountrycontainswithinitselfallthatisnecessaryforitspreservation,isnot
factuallyaccurate,foralltheworldknowsthatiftheAmericanUnionsurvivedtheordealofpossibledisintegration
andisthegreatnationthatsheistoday,itwasnotbecausePresidentLincolnconfinedhimselfstrictlytothe
powersvestedinthepresidencybytheconstitution,butbecausehewaswiseenoughtoresorttoinherent
extraconstitutionalstateprerogatives,exercisablebytheExecutivealone,whichPresidentMarcosdidnothaveto
do,consideringthatourConstitutionexpresslyconfersuponhimtheauthoritytoutilizesuchstatepowerin
defenseofthenation.
5
ThehistoricaldevelopmentofthepowersofthePhilippineExecutiveunmistakablypointstothesamedirection.
Practicallyalltheconstitutionsthatcameintobeingduringtherevolutionaryperiodbeforetheturnofthelast
century,ofwhichtheMalolosConstitutionistypical,eitherentrustedexecutivepowertoacommissionormade
theExecutivelargelydependentonthelegislature.WhentheAmericansendedtheirmilitaryoccupation,after
subduingtheAguinaldoforcesofindependence,theyhadtheirownversionofgovernmentalpowers.Inthe
PhilippineBillof1902,nothingwasmentionedaboutmartiallaw,andthepoweroftheGovernorGeneralto
suspendtheprivilegeofthewritofwasconditionedon,amongotherthings,theconcurrenceofthePhilippine
Commissionofwhich,notably,theGovernorGeneralwasthehead.Whenin1905,theGovernorGeneral
suspendedthePrivilegeintheprovincesofCaviteandBatangas,thecaseof,arose.OverthedissentofJustice
WillardwhoinvokedMilligan,theSupremeCourtheldthattheproclamationorderingsuchsuspensionwasnot
reviewablebytheJudiciary.
habeascorpusBarcelonvs.Baker,supra
Withalittletouchofirony,in1916,whentheUnitedStatesCongress,withtheavowedintentofgrantinggreater
politicalautonomytothePhilippines,enactedtheJonesLaw,itremovedtheneedforlegislativeconcurrencein
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6/20/2015regardstothesuspensionofthePrivilege,becausethelegislaturewastobeinFilipinohands,andinadditionto
G.R.No.L35546
preservingsuchpowerofsuspension,grantedtheGovernorGeneralthesoleauthoritytodeclaremartiallaw,
subjectonlytorevocationbythePresidentoftheUnitedStates.Withoutforgettingthatatthattime,theGovernor
GeneralbeingthenanAmerican,thosepowersservedasweaponsofthecolonizertoconsolidateitsholdonthe
subjectpeople,suchplenitudeofpowerintheExecutivewastoappearlatertotheFilipinoleadersassomething
thatshouldbeadoptedinourfundamentallaw.SoitwasthatintheConstitutionalConventionof1934,thefirst
thePhilippineseverheldinpeacetime,thedelegates,drawingheavilyfromtheexperienceofthecountryduring
theautonomousperiodoftheJonesLaw,andperchancepersuadedinnosmallmeasurebythepersonalityof
PresidentManuelL.Quezon,lostnotimeinadoptingtheconceptofastrongexecutive.Theirdecisionwas
studiedanddeliberate.Indeed,itistheunanimousobservationofallstudentsofourConstitution,thatunderit,we
haveinthePhilippinesthestrongestexecutiveintheworld.Fullyawareofthisfeatureandappearingrather
elatedbytheapparentsuccessofthedelegatestoreconcilethepossibleevilsofdictatorshipwiththeneedofan
executivewho"willnotonlyknowhowtogovern,butwillactuallygovern",PresidentClaroM.Rectoofthe
ConventionremarkedinhisvaledictoryaddressadjourningtheAssemblyasfollows:
DuringthedebateontheExecutivePoweritwasthealmostunanimousopinionthatwehadinvestedthe
Executivewithratherextraordinaryprerogatives.Thereismuchtruthinthisassertion.Butitisbecausewecannot
beinsensibletotheeventsthataretranspiringaroundus,eventswhich,whenallissaidanddone,arenothing
buthistoryrepeatingitself.Infact,wehaveseenhowdictatorships,whetherblackorred,capitalisticor
proletarian,fascisticorcommunistic,ancientormodern,haveservedasthelastrefugeofpeopleswhentheir
parliamentsfailandtheyarealreadypowerlesstosavethemselvesfrommisgovernmentandchaos.Learningour
lessonfromthetruthofhistory,anddeterminedtospareourpeopletheevilsofdictatorshipandanarchy,we
havethoughtitprudenttoestablishanexecutivepowerwhich,subjecttothefiscalizationoftheAssembly,andof
publicopinion,willnotonlyknowhowtogovern,butwillactuallygovern,withafirmandsteadyhand,
unembarrassedbyvexations,interferencesbyotherdepartments,orbyunholyallianceswiththisandthatsocial
group.Thus,possessedwiththenecessarygiftsofhonestyandcompetence,thisExecutivewillbeabletogive
hispeopleanorderlyandprogressivegovernment,withoutneedofusurpingorabdicatingpowers,andcunning
subterfugeswillnotavailtoextenuatehisfailuresbeforethebarofpublicopinion."("ThePhilippineConstitution
Sources,Making,Meaning,andApplication"publishedbythePhilippineLawyers'Association,p.540.)
Ofparticularrelevancetothepresentdiscussionisthefactthatwhenanattemptwasmadebyafewdelegates
ledbyDelegateSalvadorAranetaofManilatosubjecttheExecutive'spowertosuspendtheprivilegeofthewritof
toconcurrenceorreviewbytheNationalAssemblyandtheSupremeCourt,theeffortdidnotprosper,thereby
stronglyindicating,ifitdidnotmakeitindubitablydefinite,thattheintentoftheframersofthefundamentallawis
thattheExecutiveshouldbethesolejudgeofthecircumstanceswarrantingtheexerciseofthepowerthus
granted.Inanyevent,theonlyevidenceofanythinkingwithintheconventionadvocatingtherevocationofthe
BarcelondoctrineofwhichtogetherwithMilligan,theywereoroughttohavebeenaware,whatwiththebest
knownlawyersinthePhilippinesintheirmidst,collapsedwiththerejectionoftheAranetaproposal.
habeascorpus
ItwasinthelightofthishistoricaldevelopmentoftheExecutivePowerthatin1951,theSupremeCourtdecided
unanimouslythecaseof,reiteratingthedoctrineofconclusivenessoftheExecutive'sfindingsintheBarcelon
case.
Montenegrovs.Castaeda,supra
Forallthatitmaybeworthyofmentionhere,ifonlybecausepracticallythesameFilipinominds,ledbyPresident
JoseP.Laurel,werelargelyresponsibleforitsformulation,theConstitutionoftheSecondPhilippineRepublic
bornunderaegisoftheJapaneseoccupationofthePhilippinesduringtheSecondWorldWar,providedalsofora
strongexecutive.Onthispoint,PresidentLaurelhimselfhadthefollowingtosay:
ThefundamentalreasonandnecessityforthecreationofapoliticalcenterofgravityundertheRepublicisthat,in
anyformofgovernmentandthisisespeciallytrueinanemergency,inanationalcrisistheremustbeaman
responsibleforthesecurityofthestate,theremustbeamanwithadequatepowers,tofaceanygivensituation
andmeettheproblemsofthenation.Theremustbenoshiftingofresponsibilitytheremustbenoevasionof
responsibilityandifagovernmentistobearealgovernmentandascientificgovernmenttheremustbenotwo
centersofgravitybutone.(2O.G.[J.M.A.],873[1943].)"(ThePhilippinePresidencybyIreneR.Cortes,p.14.).
TheforegoingisalogicalfollowupofwhatLaurelhadsaidinthe1934Conventionthus:
ofourindependent,orsemiindependentexistence.Aweakexecutiveissynonymouswithaweakgovernment.
Heshallnotbea'monarch'oradictatorintimeofprofoundandOctavianpeace,andwhatevermaybehis
position,hebulwarksnormally,thefortificationsofastrongconstitutionalgovernment,butabnormally,inextreme
cases,heissuddenlyusheredinasaMinerva,fullgrownandinfullpanoplyofwar,(Emphasissupplied.)(The
PhilippineConstitution,publishedbythePhil.LawyersAssociation,Vol.1,1969Ed.,p.183.).
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6/20/2015buthevirtuallysobecomesinanextraordinaryemergencytooccupythevantageground"thereadyprotectoranddefender
G.R.No.L35546
ofthelifeandhonorofhisnation.
Thus,itisnotsurprisingatallthatwithoutchangingonewordintheprovisiongrantingtotheExecutivethepower
tocopewiththeemergenciesunderdiscussion,the1971Conventionfortifiedthrurelatedprovisionsinthe
transitoryportionoftheConstitutiontheapplicabilityoftheBarcelonandMontenegroconceptsoftheExecutive's
power,asappliedtotheimpositionofmartiallaw,therebyweakeningprotantoaswillbeseeninthefollowing
pages,theimpactofOurLansangdoctrine,forthepurposesofthepreciseissuenowbeforeUs.
Atthisjuncture,itmaybepointedoutthatthepowergrantedtotheExecutivetoplacethecountryoranypart
thereofundermartiallawisindependentofthelegislativegranttohimofemergencyPowersauthorizedunderthe
followingprovisionofthe1935Constitution:
Sec.26.Intimesofwarorothernationalemergency,theCongressmaybylawauthorizethePresident,fora
limitedperiodandsubjecttosuchrestrictionsasitmayprescribe,topromulgaterulesandregulationstocarryout
adeclarednationalpolicy.(Art.VI,sec.26,1935Constitution.).
Thisprovisioniscopiedverbatiminthe1973CharterexceptforthereferencetothePrimeMinisterinsteadofto
thePresidentandtheadditionofthefollowingsentenceindicatingmoreemphaticallythetemporarynatureofthe
delegation:
UnlesssoonerwithdrawnbyresolutionoftheNationalAssembly,suchpowersshallceaseuponitsnext
adjournment.(Section15,ArticleVIII,1973ConstitutionofthePhilippines.)
Thepointthatimmediatelysurgestotheminduponareadingofthisprovisionisthatintimesofwarorother
nationalemergencyitisdefinitelytotheExecutivethatthepeoplethruthefundamentallawentrusttherunningof
thegovernment,eitherbydelegationofthelegislativepowertohimthruanexpressenactmentoftheLegislature
tothateffectorbydirectauthorizationfromtheConstitutionitselftoutilizeallthepowersofgovernmentshouldhe
finditnecessarytoplacethecountryoranypartthereofundermartiallaw.Additionalevidenceofsuchclear
intentisthefactthatinthecourseofthedeliberationsintheConstitutionalConventionof1934oftheproposalto
incorporatetheaboveprovisioninthecharter,DelegateWenceslaoVinzonsofCamarinesNortemovedtodelete
thesameforfearthattheconcentrationofpowersinonemanmayfacilitatetheemergenceofadictatorship.He
saidinpart:
Thepowertopromulgaterulesandregulationsintimesofemergencyorwarisnotrecognizedinanyconstitution
except,perhaps,theConstitutionofDenmark,whichprovidesthatincaseofspecialurgencytheKingmay,when
theReichstagisnotinsession,issuelawsoftemporaryapplication.Suchlaws,however,shallnotbecontraryto
theConstitution,andtheyshallbesubmittedtotheReichstaginitsnextsession.So,eveninakingdomlike
Denmark,thepowersoftheKingarelimitedintimesofemergency.
UndertheConstitutionwearedraftingnow,thereisabsolutelynolimitexceptwhentheNationalAssembly
specifiesattheinceptionofthegrantofpower.
Iwanttowarn,Mr.President,ofafutureconditioninourRepublicwhenweshallnolongerbeunderthetutelage
ofanyforeignpower,whenweshallhavetoworkforourowndestiny.IwanttosaythatIamnotverypositivein
statingherethatweshallhaveadictatorshipbecausethestructureofthegovernmentthatwearecreating
permitsitsestablishment,butthepowertopromulgaterulesandregulationswillgiverisetoastrongmanwho
may,inadesiretogratifyhispersonalambitions,seizethereinsofgovernment."(Page391,VolumeFive,The
PhilippineConstitution,ItsOrigins,Making,Meaning,andApplication,apublicationofthePhilippineLawyers
Association,1972.).
Despitesucheloquentwarning,theassemblyvoteddownhismotion.
Itisnowcontendedthatinsteadofdeclaringmartiallaw,PresidentMarcosshouldhavesoughtfromCongressthe
approvalofanemergencypowersactsimilartoCommonwealthActs600and671passedrespectivelyonAugust
19,1940,longbeforetheJapaneseinvasion,andDecember16,1941,whentheNipponArmywasalreadyonits
waytoManilafromLingayenandotherlandingpointsintheNorth.
Tostartwith,Congresswasnotunawareoftheworseningconditionsofpeaceandorderandof,atleast,evident
insurgency,whatwiththenumerouseasilyverifiablereportsofopenrebelliousactivitiesindifferentpartsofthe
countryandtheseriesofralliesanddemonstrations,oftenbloody,inManilaitselfandothercentersofpopulation,
includingthosethatreachednotonlytheportalsbuteventhesessionhallofthelegislature,butthelegislators
seemednottobesufficientlyalarmedortheyeitherwereindifferentordidnotknowwhattodounderthe
circumstances.Insteadoftakingimmediatemeasurestoalleviatetheconditionsdenouncedanddecriedbythe
rebelsandtheactivists,theydebatedandarguedlongonpalliativeswithoutcomingoutwithanythingsubstantial,
muchlesssatisfactoryintheeyesofthosewhowereseditiouslyshoutingforreforms.Inanyevent,inthefaceof
theinabilityofCongresstomeetthesituation,andpromptedbyhisappraisalofacriticalsituationthaturgently
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G.R.No.L35546
sourceofextraordinarypowers,theConstitutionitself.
ItissignificanttonotethatCommonwealthAct671grantedthePresidentpracticallyallthepowersofgovernment.
Itprovidedasfollows:
Sec.1.TheexistenceofwarbetweentheUnitedStatesandothercountriesofEuropeandAsia,whichinvolves
thePhilippines,makesitnecessarytoinvestthePresidentwithextraordinarypowersinordertomeetthe
resultingemergency.
Sec.2.PursuanttotheprovisionsofArticleVI,section16,oftheConstitution,thePresidentisherebyauthorized,
duringtheexistenceoftheemergency,topromulgatesuchrulesandregulationsashemaydeemnecessaryto
carryoutthenationalpolicydeclaredinsection1hereof.Accordinglyheis,amongotherthings,empowered(a)
totransfertheseatoftheGovernmentoranyofitssubdivisions,branches,departments,offices,agenciesor
instrumentalities(b)toreorganizetheGovernmentoftheCommonwealthincludingthedeterminationoftheorder
ofprecedenceoftheheadsoftheExecutiveDepartments(c)tocreatenewsubdivisions,branches,departments,
offices,agenciesorinstrumentalitiesofgovernmentandtoabolishanyofthosealreadyexisting(d)tocontinuein
forcelawsandappropriationswhichwouldlapseorotherwisebecomeinoperative,andtomodifyorsuspendthe
operationorapplicationofthoseofanadministrativecharacter(e)toimposenewtaxesortoincrease,reduce,
suspend,orabolishthoseinexistence(f)toraisefundsthroughtheissuanceofbondsorotherwise,andto
authorizetheexpenditureoftheproceedsthereof(g)toauthorizetheNational,provincial,cityormunicipal
governmentstoincurinoverdraftsforpurposesthathemayapprove(h)todeclarethesuspensionofthe
collectionofcreditsorthepaymentofdebtsand(i)toexercisesuchotherpowersashemaydeemnecessaryto
enabletheGovernmenttofulfillitsresponsibilitiesandtomaintainandenforceitsauthority.
Sec.3.ThePresidentofthePhilippinesshallassoonaspracticableupontheconveningoftheCongressofthe
Philippinesreporttheretoalltherulesandregulationspromulgatedbyhimunderthepowershereingranted.
Sec.4.Thisactshalltakeeffectuponitsapproval,andtherulesandregulationspromulgatedhereundershallbe
inforceandeffectuntiltheCongressofthePhilippinesshallotherwiseprovide.
Fromthisextensivegrantofimmensepowers,itmaybededucedthatthedifferencebetweenmartiallawandthe
delegationoflegislativepowercouldbejustamatterofprocedureinthattheinvestmentofauthorityintheformer
isbytheConstitutionwhileinthelatteritisbytheLegislature.Theresultingconstitutionalsituationisthesamein
bothgovernmentbytheExecutive.Itcanbesaidthateventheprimacyofmilitaryassistanceinthedischargeof
governmentresponsibilitieswouldbecoveredbytheexerciseofthedelegatedauthorityfromCongress.
Whatismostimportant,however,isthattheConstitutiondoesnotprohibitthedeclarationofmartiallawjust
becauseoftheauthoritygiventotheLegislativetoinvesttheExecutivewithextraordinarypowers.Itisnottobe
supposedthatinthefaceoftheinabilityorrefusaloftheLegislaturetoact,thepeopleshouldbelefthelplessand
withoutagovernmenttocopewiththeemergencyofaninternalorexternalaggression.Muchlessisitlogicalto
maintainthatitistheSupremeCourtthatiscalledupontodecidewhatmeasuresshouldbetakeninthe
premises.Indeed,thefundamentallawlookstotheExecutivetomakethechoiceofthemeansnotonlytorepel
theaggressionbut,asanecessaryconsequence,toundertakesuchcurativemeasuresandreformsasare
immediatelyavailableandfeasibletopreventtherecurrenceofthecausesoftheemergency.
PetitionersarecapitalizingonthepronouncementsofthisCourtinLansang.Wefeel,however,thatsuch
excessiverelianceisnotaltogetherwellplaced.
TheexactimportoftheLansangdoctrineisthatitiswithintheconstitutionalprerogativeoftheSupremeCourtto
inquireintotheveracityofthefactualbasesrecitedbytheExecutiveinaproclamationorderingthesuspensionof
theprivilegeofthewritof,forthepurposeofdeterminingwhetherornottheExecutiveactedarbitrarilyin
concludingfromtheevidencebeforehimthattherewasindeedarebellionandthatpublicnecessity,as
contemplatedintheConstitution,requiredsuchsuspension.Inotherwords,Weheldthereinthattheissueof
legalityorillegalityofaproclamationsuspendingthePrivilegeisajusticiableone,inregardtowhichtheCourt
couldmakeindependentfindingsbasedontheevidenceonwhichthePresidenthimselfacted.Actually,however,
norealhearingwasheldforthepurposeinthatcase.Whatmightperhapsbeconsideredassuchahearingwas
whattookplaceonOctober28and29,1971,when,becauseofthewillingnessexpressedbytherespondents
thereintoimparttotheCourtclassifiedinformationrelevanttothecases,subjecttoappropriatesecurity
measures,theCourtmetbehindcloseddoors,andinthepresenceofthreeattorneysrepresentingthepetitioners
thereinandtheSolicitorGeneralitwasbriefedbytheChiefofStaffoftheArmedForcesandotherranking
militaryofficialsonsaidclassifiedinformation,afterwhichthepartiesweregrantedtimetofiletheirrespective
memorandaofobservationsonthemattersrevealedinthebriefing,whichtheydid.(See42SCRA,atpp.466
467).Inthepresentcasestherehasbeennosuchhearing,notevenabriefingwhereinpetitionerswere
represented.Anditisgravelydoubtfulwhetheranymoveinthatdirectionwouldprosper,consideringthereare
notenoughmembersoftheCourt,whobelieveinthejuridicalrelevancethereof,toconstitutetherequired
majorityforabindingactiontoordersuchahearingorevenjustasimilarbriefingasbefore.
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Bethatasitmay,theimportantpointisthatLansangreferredtotheextentofthepowersoftheCourtinregardto
aproclamationsuspendingthePrivilegewhereaswhatisbeforeUsnowisaproclamationimposingmartiallaw.
WeholdthatthepowersoftheExecutiveinvolvedinthetwoproclamationsarenotofthesameconstitutional
levelandtheprerogativesoftheCourtrelativetoaredistinctfromthoseintheperspectiveofmartiallaw.
habeascorpus
Tostartwith,itistooevidenttoadmitofdisputethattheaforequotedconstitutionalprovisiontouchingonthe
threepowersoftheExecutive,thecallingofthearmedforces,thesuspensionoftheprivilegeandtheimposition
ofmartiallawcontemplatesvaryingandascendingdegreesoflawlessnessandpublicdisorder.Whileitistrue
thattextuallyanyofthethreecoursesofactionmentionedmaybetakenbytheExecutiveontheoccasionofan
invasion,insurrectionorrebellion,thedegreeofresultingrepressionofindividualrightsundereachofthemvaries
sosubstantiallythatitcannotbedoubtedthattheconstitutioncontemplatesthatthedeterminationastowhichof
themshouldbetakenshoulddependonthedegreeofgravityoftheprevailingsituation.Inotherwords,itisthe
actualmagnitudeoftherebelliontobesuppressedandthedegreeandextentofdangertopublicsafetyresulting
therefromthatdetermineswhetheritshouldbethefirst,thesecondorthethirdthatshouldbetakeninorderthat
theremaybeadirectproportionbetweenthedegreeofgravityofthecrisisandtherestraintofindividualrights
andliberties.Whenthesituationisnotveryseriousbutisneverthelessbeyondthecontroloftheregularpeace
authoritiesoftheplaceaffected,thenthearmedforcescanbecalled.Shouldtheconditionsdeteriorateinsucha
wayastoinvolveaconsiderablesegmentofthepopulation,therebymakingitdifficulttomaintainorderandto
differentiatetheloyalFromthedisloyalamongthepeople,withoutdetainingsomeofthem,eitherpreventivelyor
fortheirdeliverytotheproperauthoritiesaftertheemergencyorassoonasiteases,thentheprivilegeofthewrit
ofmayalsobesuspended.Butthemomentthesituationassumesveryseriousproportions,totheextentthat
thereisabreakdownoftheregulargovernmentmachineryeitherbecausetheofficialscannotphysicallyfunction
ortheirfunctioningwouldendangerpublicsafety,martiallawmaybeimposed.Thereisthusamarkedgradation
ofthecircumstancesconstitutingrebellionanddangertopublicsafetyintheprovision,anditistobesupposed
thatthemeasuretobeadoptedbytheExecutiveshouldbethatwhichthesituationdemands.
habeascorpus
ThecallingofthearmedforcesisdonebytheExecutiveinhiscapacityasCommanderinChief.Thepowerthus
exercisedispurelyexecutiveanddoesnotcauseanydisturbanceintheconstitutionalorderinthegovernment.In
thecaseofsuspensionofthePrivilege,individualrightsguaranteedbytheBillofRightsarerestrained,but
otherwisetheregularconstitutionalmachineryandthepowersandfunctionsofthedifferentofficialsofthe
government,includingthecourts,remainunaffected.Moreover,thesuspensionofthePrivilege,although
premisedonthedemandofpublicsafety,neednotbenecessarilypredicatedontherequirementsofnational
securityasshouldbethecasewithmartiallaw.Again,thepowerexercisedinsuspensionisexecutivepowerand
nothingmore.Butwhenmartiallawisproclaimed,thereis,asalreadyobservedearlier,asurrogationofthe
regulargovernmentmachinerybytheconstitutionallydesignatedadministratorwiththeaidofthemilitary.Whatis
exercisedinthisinstanceisnotexecutivepoweralonebutstatepowerwhichinvolvesthetotalityofgovernment
authority,butwithoutanactualmilitarytakeover,ifonlybecausethecivilianPresidentremainsatthehead.
Inthisconnection,itisveryimportanttonotethatwhereastheBillofRightsexplicitlyprohibitsthesuspensionof
thePrivilegeofthewritofexceptunderthedetailedcircumstancesprescribedtherein,includingthelimitationsas
tothetimeandplacewhenandwhereitmaystaysuspended,thereisnosimilarinjunctioninregardtothe
impositionofmartiallaw.Inotherwords,thegrantofthepowertodeclaremartiallawintheExecutiveportionof
theConstitutionisnotcountered,unlikeinthecaseof,byaprohibitionintheBillofRights,thesanctuaryof
individualliberties.
InvokingLansang,petitionersarguethatifanorderofsuspensionofthePrivilegewhichinvolveslessrepression
ofconstitutionalprocessesthanmartiallawisreviewablebythecourts,withmorereasonshouldtheimpositionof
martiallaw,whoseeffectupontheconstitutionalrightsandprocessesismorepervasive,besubjecttoajudicial
testofconstitutionality.Viewingitfromtheangleofindividualrights,theargumentsoundsplausible,butwhenitis
consideredthattheframersoftheBillofRightsneverbotheredtoputthesameoranysimilarbreakstothe
impositionofmartiallawasthatwhichtheyplacedinregardtosuspension,itcanbereadilyseenthatbecauseof
thegravityofthecrisispredicatingtheextremeremedyofmartiallaw,theconstitutionitselfmakestheinvocation
ofindividualrightssubordinatetothenationalinterestinvolvedinthedefenseofthestateagainsttheinternal
aggressionthatconfrontsit.Fromthisconsideration,itfollowsthatwhateverstandardofconstitutionalitywas
establishedbytheCourtinLansangrelativetoSuspensionisnotnecessarilythemeasureofthepowersthe
CourtcanexerciseovertheExecutive'sproclamationofmartiallaw.WhattheConstitutionpurposelyandwith
goodreasondifferentiates,theCourtmaynotequate.
Atanyrate,WedonotbelievethisistheproperoccasionfortheCourttoalterormodifywhatWesaidin
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6/20/2015Lansang.AllthatWesayhereisthatLansangdoesnotreachthemartiallawpowersoftheExecutive,ifonly
G.R.No.L35546
becausethatcaseinvolvedexclusivelythequestionoflegalityofthedetention,duringtheSuspension,ofsome
individuals,thepetitionerstherein,whereashereWearedealingwiththedeprivationoflibertyofpetitionersasa
directconsequenceofmartiallaw,andineffecttherealquestionbeforeUsnowisthelegalityofthemartiallaw
regimeitself,which,asalreadydemonstrated,occupiesadifferentlevelintheconstitutionalorderofExecutive
power,speciallywhenconsideredfromthepointofviewoftheBillofRights.
ButevenifWemustrefertotheconsiderationsoftheCourtinformulatingLansang,Wecannotdisregardthe
impactofcontemporaryconstitutionaldevelopmentsrelatedthereto.TheConventionof1971hadbarelystarted
itsrelevantdeliberationswhenLansangwasdecided.Itistobeassumedthatthedelegateswerewellinformed
aboutitsimport.Indeed,theymusthavefocusedtheirattentiontheretowhenmartiallawwasproclaimedin
Septemberof1972,ifonlybecausesomeofthedelegateswereapprehendedanddetainedandhadforthwith
filedthepetitionsnowpendingbeforeUs.Thedelegateskneworoughttohaveknownthatundertheexisting
Constitution,theBillofRightsmadenomentionofthepossibleimpositionofmartiallawinthesectionprohibiting
thesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritof.Insteadofseeingtoitthatinthechartertheyweredraftingthe
prohibitionastoshouldbeextendedtothedeclarationofmartiallaw,inordertomakethecontingencythereofas
difficultasinthecaseoftheformer,theyevidentlyfoundmorereasontoconcurintheconstructionpursuedby
PresidentMarcosoftheprerogativeswhichtheConstitutionempowershimtoutilizeduringarebellionor
invasion.Accordingly,toerasefurtherdoubtsonthematter,theConventionenactedthetransitoryprovision
earlierreferredtomakingtheProclamation,amongothers,partofthelawoftheland,whichprovision,Wedeem,
atthispoint,notasafiatplacingtheProclamationdefinitelybeyondthepaleofunconstitutionality,butasa
contemporaryauthoritativeconstructionofthecurrentcharterbythebodypreciselycalledtoexamineitcarefully
anddetermineitsdefectsthatshouldbecorrected,totheendthattherightsofthepeoplemaybebest
safeguarded.Verily,suchconstructionisentitledtoduerespectfromUs,particularlybecauseithasbeenin
effect,ifnotdirectly,approvedbythepeople,notonlyinthereferendumofJanuary1015,1973assailedby
petitionersbutintheotheroneheldbysecretballotonJuly2728,1973underthesupervisionoftheCommission
onElections.Andinthelightofsuchconstruction,OurconsideredviewisthatLansangisnotcontrollingonthe
issuesregardingmartiallawinvolvedinthesecases.
Perhaps,itmaynotbeamisstoaddherethatalthoughtherecordsoftheConstitutionalConventionof1934do
notrevealtheactualreasonsfortherejectionoftheamendmentproposedbyDelegateVicenteJ.Franciscoto
includeintheBillofRightsprovisionregardingthereferencemadetoimminentdangerofinvasion,insurrectionor
rebellionintheenumerationofthepowersoftheExecutiverelativetothesamesubject,itisquitepossiblethatin
themindoftheconventionitwasnotabsolutelynecessarytosuspendthePrivilegewhenthedangerisonly
imminentunlesstheelementofpublicsafetyinvolvedalreadyrequirestheimpositionofmartiallaw.Relatedly,
DelegateAranetawhoasearliermentioned,proposedtosubjectthesuspensionofthePrivilegetolegislativeor
judicialconcurrenceorreview,andwhoappearedtobethemostbothered,amongthedelegates,aboutthe
exertionofexecutivepowerduringtheemergenciescontemplated,neversaidawordagainstthemannerin
whichtheExecutivewasbeinggrantedtheauthoritytoimposemartiallaw,muchlessproposedanyrestriction
uponitthewayhedidwiththesuspensionofthePrivilege.Thisgoestoshowthatthefeelingintheassemblywas
toregardmartiallawdifferentlyfromthesuspensionandtorecognizethatitsimpositionshouldnotbetramelled
norshackledbyanyprovisionoftheBillofRights.
habeascorpus
7
Thereareinsurmountablepragmaticobstaclestothetheoryofjusticiabilitysustainedbypetitioners..
Themostimportantofthisisthatthereisnoknownorrecognizedprocedurewhichcanbeadoptedinthe
proposedinquiryintothefactualbasesoftheExecutive'sproclamationtoinsurethatthedegreeofjudiciousand
fairhearinganddeterminationoffactsmightbeapproximated.Admittedly,theordinaryrulesofpleading,practice
andevidenceareoutofthequestion.Therelevantelementalfactsarescatteredthroughoutthelengthand
breathofthecountry,andthereisnoconceivablejudicialcamerathatcancatchthewholepicturewithadequate
fidelitytothetruth.Perhapsjudicialnoticecanhelp,buttheelementsofpublicsafetyarenotproperlysusceptible
ofjudicialnoticewhenitcomestocovertsubversiveactivities.Theproblemsofdemonstrationaremanifold,and
whenitisborneinmindthat,intheverynatureofthingsandunderuniversallyacceptednormsofstate
protection,thereisawall,impenetrableeventothejudiciary,behindwhichthestaterightfullykeepsawayfrom
otherDepartmentsmattersaffectingnationalsecurity,onewillrealizethefutilityofbelievingthattheCourtcan,
assumingitwere,bysomecuriouswayofreasoning,legallyrequiredtodoso,properlyperformitsjudicial
attributeswhenitcomestodetermininginthefaceofanapparentlynationwiderebellion,whetherornotmartial
lawshouldbeproclaimedbytheExecutive,insteadofresortingtothelesserremediesofcallingthearmedforces
orsuspendingthePrivilege.Besides,fortheCourttobeabletodecidewhetherornottheactionoftheExecutive
isarbitrary,itmust,injusticetobothparties,andtohiminparticular,actinthelightofthesameevidencefrom
whichhedrewhisconclusion.HowcansuchevidencebeallgatheredandpresentedtotheCourt?
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6/20/2015SomemembersoftheCourtareofthefirmconvictionthatitisOurconstitutionaldutytoindulgeinthesuggested
G.R.No.L35546
inquiry,soWecanbeassuredinOurownconscience,andfortheprotectionofthepeople,whetherornot
PresidentMarcoshasactedarbitrarily.Butprescindingfromthedifficultiesofdemonstrationjustdiscussed,from
whatevidenceistheCourtgoingtodrawitsownconclusionsinthecasesatbar,whenWehavenotevenbeen
toldwhatevidencethePresidenthadbeforehim,exceptthosethatmaybeinferredfromthewhereasesofthe
Proclamationwhicharedisputedbypetitioners?Ontheotherhand,howcanWehavealltheevidencebeforeUS,
whenintheverynaturethereofWecannothaveaccesstothem,sincetheymustbekeptundertheforbidding
coversofnationalsecurityregulations?Eventhestandingordinaryrulesofevidenceprovideinthisrespectthus:.
SEC.21..
Privilegedcommunication
xxxxxxxxx
(e)Apublicofficercannotbeexaminedduringhistermofofficeorafterwards,astocommunicationsmadetohim
inofficialconfidence,whenthecourtfindsthatthepublicinterestwouldsufferbythedisclosure.(Rule130,
RevisedRulesofCourtofthePhilippines).
TheinevitableconclusionisthattheConstitutionmusthaveintendedthatthedecisionoftheExecutiveshouldbe
hisalone.
IfWeshouldholdthatthematterbeforeUsisjusticiable,thepracticalresultwouldbethateveniftheCourt
shouldnowdecideinthestyleofLansangthatthePresidentdidnotactarbitrarilyinissuingtheProclamation,We
wouldhavetobereadytoentertainfuturepetitions,oneaftertheother,filedbywhosoevermaybemindedto
allege,forhisownpurpose,thatconditionshavesoimprovedastowarranttheliftingofmartiallaw.Accordingly,
everynowandthentheCourtwouldhavetohearthepartiesandevaluatetheirrespectiveevidence.The
Governmentwouldhavetoappearandprovealloveragainthejustificationsforitsaction.Theconsequence
wouldbethatinsteadofdevotinghistimetothedefenseofthenation,thePresidentwouldbepreparinghimself
forthecourtbattle.ItisridiculoustothinkthatthemembersoftheConstitutionalConventionhadconceived
placingsuchdifficultiesinthewayoftheExecutivewhichmakeofhisfunctionofdefendingthestateacontinuous
runningbattleintwoseparatefronts,onewiththeenemyanotherwiththecourts.ItissuggestedthattheCourt
cansummarilydismissanysuchfuturepetitionsincavalierfashionbysimplyholdingontothefindingWewould
makeinthesecases.Butnewallegationsandargumentsareboundtobemade,anditisdefinitelyimproperfor
UstojustsummarilyupholdtheExecutiveeverytimeacasecomesup.
WhatismoreabsurdisthattheSupremeCourtisnottheonlycourtinwhichapetitiontoliftmaybefiled.Imagine
ifpetitionswerefiledintwoorthreeCourtsofFirstInstance,whatwouldhappen?Inthisconnection,Weareinno
positiontoenjointhelowercourtstoentertainsuchpetitionsbecausetheymayrefertotheproposedliftingof
martiallawonlyintherespectiveprovinceswherethecourtsare,andWecannothold,preciselybecauseofOur
owncharacterizationofthenatureoftheissueasjusticiable,ormoresimplythattheProclamationissubjectto
thereviewoffactualbasesbythecourt,thatanyofsaidcourtsiswithoutjurisdictiontoentertainthepetition.
Statedotherwise,everycourtwouldthenbeopentopassonthereasonabilityorarbitrarinessofthePresident's
refusalorfailuretoliftmartiallaw.Wedonotmeantoinsinuatethatthelowercourtjudgesmaynotbeprepared
forthepurpose,butthespectaclealoneofseveralofsuchpetitionspendinginvariouscourts,withoutvisualizing
anymorethepotentialityofonejudgeoranotherupholdingtheproponent,issomethingthatwillnotonly
foreseeablycomplicateourinternationalrelationsbutwillalsodetractfromourimageasapeopletrainedinthe
fieldofgovernment.AlloftheseconsiderationssuggestagainthatitisbestthattheJudiciaryabstainfrom
assumingarolenotclearlyindicatedintheConstitutiontopertaintoit.
C
THESUPREMECOURTABSTAINSFROMREVIEWINGPROCLAMATION1081,BECAUSE,INTHELIGHTOF
THECONSIDERATIONSHEREINDISCUSSED,ITISCONVINCEDTHATTHECONSTITUTION
CONTEMPLATESTHATTHEDECLARATIONOFMARTIALLAWSHOULDBETHERESPONSIBILITYSOLELY
OFTHEEXECUTIVE,BUTSHOULDANYOCCASIONOFOPENDEFIANCEANDMANIFESTDISREGARDOF
THEPERTINENTCONSTITUTIONALPROVISIONARISE,THECOURTISNOTPOWERLESSTO"SUPPORT
ANDDEFEND"THECONSTITUTION.
ThegreatestfearentertainedbythosewhowouldsustaintheCourt'sauthoritytoreviewtheactionofthe
PresidentisthattheremightbeoccasionswhenanExecutivedrunkwithpowermightwithoutrhymeorreason
imposemartiallawuponthehelplesspeople,usingtheveryConstitutionitselfashisweaponofoppressionto
establishherearealdictatorshiportotalitariangovernment.TheviewisthatitisonlytheSupremeCourtthatcan
preventsuchadismaleventualitybyholdingthatithasthefinalauthorityandinescapabledutytodefinethe
constitutionalboundariesofthepowersoftheExecutiveandtodetermineineverycaseproperlybroughtbeforeit
whetherornotanysuchpowerhasbeenabusedbeyondthelimitssetdownbythefundamentallaw,andthat
unlessWeholdherethattheCourtcandeterminetheconstitutionalsufficiencyofProclamation1081infactand
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6/20/2015inlaw,theFilipinopeoplewouldhavenoprotectionagainstsuchinabusiveExecutive.
G.R.No.L35546
Weheredeclareemphaticallythatsuchapprehensionisdefinitelyunfounded.Precisely,inthisdecision,Weare
holdingthattheCourthasthejurisdiction,thepowerandtheauthoritytopassonanychallengetoanExecutive's
declarationofmartiallawallegedinapropercaseaffectingprivateorindividualrightstobeunwarrantedbythe
Constitution.Inthesecases,however,wedonotseeanyneedfortheinterpositionofourauthority.Insteadwhat
appearscleartoUs,inthelightoftheconsiderationsWehavediscussabove,andsoWehold,isthattheSolicitor
Generaliseminentlycorrectincontendingthatinthecircumstantialandconstitutionalmilieuoftheimpugned
Proclamation,Weshouldabstainfromconductingthesuggestedinquirytodeterminetheirconstitutional
sufficiency.
InthewayWeseethemartiallawprovisionoftheConstitution,onlytwohypothesescanbeconsideredrelativeto
theConstitutionalproblembeforeUs.EithertheExecutiveactsinconformitywiththeprovisionorhedoesnot.In
otherwords,eitherheimposesmartiallawbecausethereisactuallyarebellionendangeringthepublicsafetyor
hedoesitforhisownpersonaldesiretograbpower,notwithstandingtheabsenceofthefactualgroundsrequired
bythefundamentallaw.Inthelattercase,theCourtwouldhavetheconstitutionalpoweranddutytodeclarethe
proclamationissuednullandvoid.Buttodothisitdoesnothavetoconductajudicialinquirybythereceptionof
evidence.Itshouldbeguidedsolelybyfactsthatareofjudicialnotice.Thus,ifthepredicativerecitalsofthe
proclamationareconfirmedbyfactsofgeneralpublicknowledge,obviouslyanyfurtherinquirywouldbe
superfluous.Ontheotherhand,inthecontraryhypothesis,thatis,itispubliclyandgenerallyknownthatthereis
norebellionofthenatureandextentcontemplatedintheConstitution,noamountofevidenceofferedbythe
Executivecanjudiciallycreatesucharebellion.Indeed,asobservedelsewhereinthisopinion,arebellionthat
doesnotcometothejudicialnoticeoftheCourtcannotwarranttheimpositionofmartiallaw,particularlyin
referencetooneimposedoverthewholecountry.ButonceitisknowntotheCourtbyjudicialnoticethatthereis
arebellion,itwouldconstituteanundueinterferencewiththeconstitutionaldutiesandprerogativesofthe
ExecutivefortheCourttoindulgeinaninquiryastotheconstitutionalsufficiencyofhisdecision.Whetherornot
publicsafetyrequiresthedrasticactionofimposingmartiallawalreadyinvolvestheexerciseofjudgment,which
asfarasWecanseeiscommittedtotheresponsibilityoftheExecutiveastheprotectoranddefenderofthe
nation.Ourconsideredviewisthatinsuchcircumstances,theConstitutionratherexpectstheCourttodefertohis
decision.UnderthisconceptofthepowersoftheCourtrelativetotheexercisebytheExecutiveofhismartiallaw
prerogatives,theCourtdoesnotrelinquishitsauthorityasguardianoftheConstitutionandtheExecutive,guided
solelybyhisownsenseofresponsibilityunderhissolemnoath"todefendandpreserve"theConstitution,can
proceedwithhistaskofsavingtheintegrityofthegovernmentandthenation,withoutanyfearthattheCourt
wouldreversehisjudgment.
Tobesure,itcouldhavesufficedforUstopointout,inanswertothecontentionaboutpossibleabuse,thatitis
axiomaticinconstitutionallawthatthepossibilitythatanofficialmightabusethepowersconferreduponhimby
laworbytheCharterdoesnotmeanthatthepowerdoesnotexistorshouldnotbegranted.ThisCourtaffirmed
thisprinciplenotonlyinquoted,whichwastheprecursorperhapsoftheextremeofjudicialselfrestraintor
abstentioninthisjurisdictionbutevenin,63Phil.139,reputedlythevanguardofjudicialactivisminthe
Philippines,JusticeLaurelpostulatedreassuringlyonthispointinAngarathus:"Thepossibilityofabuseisnotan
argumentagainsttheconcessionofpowerasthereisnopowerthatisnotsusceptibleofabuse"(atp.177).And
WecouldhavecomplementedthisratiocinationwiththeobservationthatitismostunlikelythattheFilipinopeople
wouldbepenalizedbyDivineProvidencewiththeimpositionuponthemofanExecutivewiththefrightening
characteristicsominouslyportrayedbythosewhoadvocatethattheCourt,assumingitsownimmunityfrombeing
abusive,arbitraryorimprovident,shouldnotrecognizeanyconstitutionallyenvisioneddeferencetotheother
DepartmentsoftheGovernment,particularlytheExecutive.
Barcelonvs.Baker,supraAngaravs.ElectoralCommission
Wecanfeel,however,thatthepeopleneedfurtherreassurance.Onthisscore,itisopportunetorecallthatin,83
Phil.68,inspiteofthefactthatintheResolutionofMarch4,1949,thisCourtrefusedtointerveneinthe
controversybetweenthepartiesastowhetherornottherewasavalidelectionofanewPresidentoftheSenate,
uponthegroundthattheissueinvolvedwaspurelypolitical,inthesubsequentResolutionofMarch14,1949,
uponrealizingthatacriticalsituation,detrimentaltothenationalinterest,subsistedasaconsequenceofits
abstention,theCourtreverseditselfandassumedthepowertostatecategoricallythecorrectsolutiontothe
conflictbasedonitsinterpretationofthepertinentprovisionsoftheConstitution.
Avelinovs.Cuenco
Again,inJanuary,1962,inthespaceofseveralhours,350appointmentstodifferentpositionsinthegovernment,
includingJusticesoftheSupremeCourtandoftheCourtofAppealsandjudgesofthelowercourts,fiscals,
officersoftheArmy,directorsofbureaus,GovernoroftheCentralBank,andothersweresentbythePresident
thentotheCommissiononAppointmentsonDecember29,1961,thedayprecedinghislasthalfdayinoffice,
December30,1961.UponthesaidappointmentsbeingimpugnedintheSupremeCourt,theCourt,aghastbythe
numberofandthespeedinthemakingofsaidappointments,thefactthattheyweremadeundercircumstances
thatbetrayednotonlylackofproperanddeliberateconsiderationofthequalificationsoftheappointeesbutalso
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G.R.No.L35546
aftertheresultsshowingthedefeatoftheincumbentPresidenthadalreadybeenpubliclyknownandconceded,
thedeparturefromlongestablishedpracticesintheirpreparationaswellastheotherundesirablecircumstances
thatsurroundedthesame,promptlystruckthemdownastheproductofanimprovidentexerciseofpower,
obnoxioustothepreceptsunderlyingtheprincipledgovernmentconceivedintheConstitution.
15TheviolationofthespiritandintentoftheConstitutionappearedmanifesttotheCourtonthebasisoffactswhichwere
mainlyifnotallofjudicialnoticeand,therefore,needednofurtherdemonstrationinaninquiryorinvestigationbytheCourt.
Undermoreorlessasimilarsettingofcircumstances,whichoccurredinthelatterpartofthetermofthePresidentwhose
tenureexpiredonDecember30,1966,theSupremecourtreiteratedtheaboverulingin,16SCRA379.Guevarravs.
Inocentes
Thuseveryonecanseethatwhensituationsarisewhichontheirfacesandwithouttheneedofinquiryor
investigationrevealanunquestionableandpalpabletransgressionoftheConstitution,theSupremeCourthas
neverbeenwithoutmeanstoupholdtheConstitution,thepolicyofjudicialselfrestraintimplicittherein
notwithstanding.Theprecedentsjustrelatedrelatetopeacefulcontroversies,and,ofcourse,theallegedviolation
oftheConstitutionbytheExecutiveintheexerciseofapowergrantedtohimtomeettheexigenciesofrebellion
andthedangerstopublicsafetyitentailshastobeconsideredfromadifferentperspective.Eventhen,the
SupremeCourtwouldnotbepowerlesstoact,Untilallofitsmembersareincarceratedorkilledandtherearenot
enoughofthemtoconstituteaquorum,theCourtwouldalwaysbetherereadytostrikedownaproclamationof
martiallawasunconstitutional,wheneverfromthefactsmanifestandgenerallyknowntothepeopleandtoit,and
withoutitshavingconductedanyinquirybythereceptionofevidence,itshouldappearthatthedeclarationis
madewithoutanyrationalbasiswhatsoeverandispredicatedonlyonthedistortedmotivesoftheExecutive.For
aslong,however,astherecitalsorgroundsgiveninaproclamationaccordsubstantiallywithfactsofjudicial
notice,eitherbecausetheyareofpublicknowledgeorarebytheirnaturecapableofunquestionable
demonstration,WehavenoreasontointerferewiththedischargebytheExecutiveofaresponsibilityimposed
uponhimbytheConstitutionandinwhichthereisnoindicationthereinthattheCourtshouldshare.Butwhen,as
juststated,itisgenerallyknownoritisofpublicknowledgethatthereisnorebellionor,therebeingone,thatit
posesnoconceivabledangertothepublicsafety,and,Godforbid,martiallawisproclaimed,theCourt,even
withouttheneedofanykindofjudicialinquiryintothefactsallegedintheproclamation,willcertainlyactand
declarethepretentiousExecutiveaconstitutionaloutlaw,withtheresultthattheregulargovernmentestablished
bytheConstitutionmaycontinueinthehandsofthosewhoareconstitutionallycalledupontosucceedhim,
unlessheovercomesthelegitimategovernmentbyforce.Intruth,suchistheonlywaytheSupremeCourtshould
actindischargingitsdutytoupholdtheConstitutionbytheuseofthejudicialpower,ifitistogivetotheExecutive
ortheLegislature,asthecasemaybe,thedueregardthattheConstitutioncontemplatesshouldbeaccordedto
theminconsiderationoftheirownfunctionshidresponsibilitiesimplicitintheprincipleofseparationofpowers
embodiedtherein.
II
THECONSTITUTIONISMERELYINASTATEOFANAESTHESIA,SINCEAMAJORSURGERYISNEEDEDTO
SAVETHENATION'SLIFE.
Theforegoingdiscussioncovers,asmusthavebeennoted,theresolutionnotonlyoftheissueofjurisdiction
raisedbytherespondentsbutalsoofthecorollaryquestionoftheapplicationoftheLansangdoctrine.Notonly
that,fromwhathasbeensaid,itisobviousthatsinceitistothePresidentthattheConstitutionhascommittedthe
discretiontoimposemartiallaw,itfollowsthathealoneshouldhavethediscretionandtheprerogativetodeclare
whenitshouldceaseorbelifted.ExactlythesameconsiderationscompellingtheconclusionthattheCourtmay
notreviewtheconstitutionalsufficiencyofhisproclamationofmartiallawmakeitineludibletoconcludethatthe
peoplehavealsoleftittotheExecutivetodecidewhenconditionswouldpermitthefullrestorationoftheregular
constitutionalprocesses.Withcharacteristicperceptiveinsight,inhisthesistobecitedinfra,JusticeGuillermoS.
SantosoftheCourtofAppeals,discoursesonthispointasfollows:
44.
WhenMartialRuleisTerminated
InbothEnglandandtheUnitedStatesmartialruleterminatesipsofactouponthecessationofthepublic
emergencythatcalleditforth.Tothispropositiontherehasbeennodissent.Martialrulemustceasewhenthe
publicsafetynolongerrequireitsfurtherexercise.
45.
WhoTerminatesMartialRule
SincethedeclarationofmartialrulehasbeencommittedtothejudgmentofthePresident,itfollowsthatits
terminationistobefixedbythesameauthority.(Barcelonvs.Baker,1905,5Phil.87.)Again,tothisviewthere
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G.R.No.L35546
todeclaremartialrulenootherauthorityshouldhepermittedtoterminateit."(MartialLaw,Nature,Principlesand
AdministrationbyGuillermoS.Santos,p.75.)
Needlesstosay,itisourConstitutionthatcontrolsinthecasesatbar,nottheAmericantheory.Infact,when
PresidentLaurelproclaimedmartiallawduringtheSecondWorldWar,heexpresslyprovided,toavoidanydoubt
aboutthematter,thus:
8.Theproclamationofmartiallawbeinganemergencymeasuredemandedbyimperativenecessity,itshall
continueaslongastheneedforitexistsandshallterminateuponproclamationofthePresidentoftheRepublic
ofthePhilippines.
IntheinterestoftruthandtosetOurperspectivearightitmaynotbesaidthatunderProclamation1081andthe
mannerinwhichithasbeenimplemented,therehasbeenatotalsuspension,muchlessanabrogation,ofthe
Constitution.Eventextually,theensuingordersissuedbythePresidenthaveleftvirtuallyunalteredthe
establishedconstitutionalorderinalllevelsofgovernmentandsocietyexceptthosethathavetobeadjustedand
subjectedtopotentialchangesdemandedbythenecessitiesofthesituationandtheattainmentoftheobjectives
ofthedeclaration.Repeatedlyandemphatically,thePresidenthassolemnlyreassuredthepeoplethatthereisno
militarytakeoverandthatthedeclaredprincipleintheConstitutionthat"Civilianauthorityisatalltimessupreme
overthemilitary"(Section8,ArticleII,1973Charter)shallberigorouslyobserved.Andearlierinthisopinion,We
havealreadydiscussedhowherestoredthesecurityoftenureofthemembersoftheCourtandhowthejudicial
powerhasbeenretainedbythecourts,exceptinthosecasesinvolvingmattersaffectingnationalsecurityand
publicorderandsafetywhichthesituationdemandsshouldbedealtwithbytheexecutivearmsofthe
government.
WhenPresidentLincolnproclaimedmartiallawinKentuckyin1864,hedidnotcompletelyoverhaultheexisting
machinery,heletitcontinueinsofarasitdidnotobstructthemilitaryoperationsandrelatedactivities.Heordered
thus:
WhereasmanycitizensoftheStateofKentuckyhavejoinedtheforcesoftheinsurgents,andsuchinsurgents
have,onseveraloccasions.enteredthesaidStateofKentuckyinlargeforce,and,notwithoutaidandcomfort
furnishedbydisaffectedanddisloyalcitizensoftheUnitedStatesresidingtherein,havenotonlydisturbedthe
publicpeace,buthaveoverbornethecivilauthoritiesandmadeflagrantcivilwar,destroyingpropertyandlifein
variouspartsoftheState:AndwhereasithasbeenmadeknowntothePresidentoftheUnitedStatesbythe
officerscommandingthenationalarmies,thatcombinationshavebeenformedinthesaidStateofKentuckywith
apurposeofincitingrebelforcestorenewthesaidoperationsofcivilwarwithinthesaidState,andtherebyto
embarrasstheUnitedStatesarmiesnowoperatinginthesaidStateofVirginiaandGeorgia,andevento
endangertheirsafety:...'Themartiallawhereinproclaimed,andthethingsinthatrespecthereinordered,willnot
bedeemedortakentointerferewiththeholdingoflawfulelections,orwiththeproceedingsoftheconstitutional
legislatureofKentucky,orwiththeadministrationofjusticeinthecourtsoflawexistingthereinbetweencitizensof
theUnitedStatesinsuitsorproceedingswhichdonotaffectthemilitaryoperationsortheconstitutedauthorities
ofthegovernmentoftheUnitedStates.(MartialLaw,Nature,PrinciplesandAdministrationbyGuillermoS.
Santos,pp.9798.).
Incidentally,thereishereaclearrepudiationoftheopencourttheory,andwhatismore,eventheholdingof
regularelectionsandlegislativesessionswerenotsuppressed.16Accordingly,theundeniablefactthatthe
PhilippineCongresswasinsession,albeitabouttoadjourn,whenmartiallawwasdeclaredonSeptember21,
1972isnotnecessarilyanargumentagainsttheexercisebythePresidentofthepowertomakesucha
declaration.
PresidentLaurel'sowndeclarationofmartiallawduringtheJapaneseoccupationdidnotinvolveatotalblackout
ofconstitutionalgovernment.Itreadsinitspertinentportionsthus:
xxxxxxxxx
4.AllexistinglawsshallcontinueinforceandeffectuntilamendedorrepealedbythePresident,andallthe
existingcivilagenciesofanexecutivecharactershallcontinueexercisingtheirpowersandperformingtheir
functionsandduties,unlesstheyareinconsistentwiththetermsofthisProclamationorincompatiblewiththe
expeditiousandeffectiveenforcementofmartiallawhereindeclared.
5.ItshallbethedutyoftheMilitaryGovernorstosuppresstreason,sedition,disorderandviolenceandtocause
tobepunishedalldisturbancesofpublicpeaceandalloffendersagainstthecriminallawsandalsotoprotect
personsintheirlegitimaterights.Tothisendanduntilotherwisedecreed,theexistingcourtsofjusticeshall
assumejurisdictionandtryoffenderswithoutunnecessarydelayandinasummarymanner,inaccordancewith
suchproceduralrulesasmaybeprescribedbytheMinisterofJustice.Thedecisionsofcourtsofjusticeofthe
differentcategoriesincriminalcaseswithintheiroriginaljurisdictionshallbefinalandunappealable:,Thatno
sentenceofdeathshallbecarriedintoeffectwithouttheapprovalofthePresident.
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G.R.No.L35546
6.Theexistingcourtsofjusticeshallcontinuetobeinvestedwith,andshallexercise,thesamejurisdictionincivil
actionsandspecialproceedingsasarenowprovidedinexistinglaws,unlessotherwisedirectedbythePresident
oftheRepublicofthePhilippines.
Proclamation1081isinnosenseanymoreconstitutionallyoffensive.Infact,inorderingdetentionofpersons,the
Proclamationpointedlylimitsarrestsanddetentiononlytothose"presentlydetained,aswellasallotherswho
mayhereafterbesimilarlydetainedforthecrimesofinsurrectionorrebellion,andallothercrimesandoffenses
committedinfurtheranceorontheoccasionthereof,orincidentthereto,orinconnectiontherewith,forcrimes
againstnationalsecurityandthelawofnations,crimesagainstpublicorder,crimesinvolvingusurpationof
authority,rank,titleandimproperuseofnames,uniformsandinsignia,crimescommittedbypublicofficers,and
forsuchothercrimesaswillbeenumeratedinordersthatIshallsubsequentlypromulgate,aswellascrimesasa
consequenceofanyviolationofanydecree,orderorregulationpromulgatedbymepersonallyorpromulgated
uponmydirection."Indeed,evenintheaffectedareas,theConstitutionhasnotbeenreallysuspendedmuchless
discarded.Ascontemplatedinthefundamentallawitself,itismerelyinastateofanaesthesia,totheendthatthe
muchneededmajorsurgerytosavethenation'slifemaybesuccessfullyundertaken.
III
THEIMPOSITIONOFMARTIALLAWAUTOMATICALLYCARRIESWITHITTHESUSPENSIONOFTHE
PRIVILEGEOFTHEWRITOFHABEASCORPUSINANYEVENT,THEPRESIDENTIALORDEROFARREST
ANDDETENTIONCANNOTBEASSAILEDASDEPRIVATIONOFLIBERTYWITHOUTDUEPROCESS.
Thenextissuetoconsideristhatwhichreferstothearrestandcontinueddetentionandotherrestraintsofthe
libertiesofpetitioner,andtheirmaincontentioninthisrespectisthattheproclamationofmartiallawdoesnot
carrywithitthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritof,hencepetitionersareentitledtoimmediatereleasefrom
theirconstraints.
habeascorpus
Wedonotbelievesuchcontentionneedsextendedexpositionorelaborationinordertobeoverruled.The
primaryandfundamentalpurposeofmartiallawistomaintainorderandtoinsurethesuccessofthebattle
againsttheenemybythemostexpeditionsandefficientmeanswithoutlossoftimeandwiththeminimumof
effort.Thisisselfevident.Thearrestanddetentionofthosecontributingtothedisorderandespeciallyofthose
helpingorotherwisegivingaidandcomforttotheenemyareindispensable,ifmartiallawistomeananythingat
all.Thisisbutlogical.Tofighttheenemy,tomaintainorderamidstriotouschaosandmilitaryoperations,andto
seetoitthattheordinaryconstitutionalprocessesfortheprosecutionoflawbreakersarethreefunctionsthat
cannothumanlybeundertakenatthesametimebythesameauthoritieswithanyfairhopeofsuccessinanyof
them.ToquotefromMalcolmandLaurel,"Martiallawandtheprivilegeofthatwrit(ofarewhollyincompatible
witheachother."(MalcolmandLaurel,PhilippineConstitutionalLaw,p.210).Itsimplyisnottoomuchforthe
statetoexpectthepeopletotolerateorsufferinconveniencesanddeprivationsinthenationalinterest,principally
thesecurityandintegrityofthecountry.
habeascorpus
MeresuspensionofthePrivilegemaybeordered,asdiscussedearlier,whenthesituationhasnotreachedvery
criticalproportionsimperillingtheveryexistenceofthenation,aslongaspublicsafetydemandsit.Itis,therefore,
absurdtocontend,thatwhenmartiallaw,whichispreciselytheultimateremedyagainstthegravestemergencies
ofinternalorexternalaggression,isproclaimed,thereisnosuspensionofthePrivilegeunlessthisisseparately
anddistinctlyordered.Consideringthatbothpowersspringfromthesamebasiccauses,itstandstoreasonthat
thegraversanctionincludesthelesser.ItisclaimedthatPresidentLaureltreatedthetwomattersseparatelyin
hisaforequotedproclamation.Wedonotbelievethattheprecedentcitedcontrols.Itonlyprovesthattoavoidany
doubt,whatPresidentLaureldidmaybeadopted.Therecanbenodenyingthepointthatwithoutsuspensionof
thePrivilege,martiallawwouldcertainlybeineffective.Sincemartiallawinvolvesthetotalityofgovernment
authority,itmaybeassumedthatbyorderingthearrestanddetentionofpetitionersandtheotherpersons
mentionedintheProclamation,untilorderedreleasedbyhim,thePresidenthasbythetenorofsuchorder
virtuallysuspendedthePrivilege.Relatedly,aspointedoutbytheSolicitorGeneralnolessthanpetitionerDiokno
himselfpostulatedinalectureattheU.P.LawCenterthat:
Thereareonly,asfarasIknow,twoinstanceswherepersonsmaybedetainedwithoutwarrantbutwithdue
process.Thefirstisincasesofmartiallaworwhenthewritofissuspended.Inthosecases,itisnotthattheir
detentionislegal,itisthatwecannotinquireintothelegalityoftheirdetention.Becausemartiallawmeans
actuallythesuspensionoflawandthesubstitutionofthewillofourCongress.Thesecondinstanceisthatwhich
isprovidedforinRule113,section6oftheRulesofCourtandSection37oftheRevisedCharteroftheCityof
Manila.EssentiallyitconsistsofcaseswherethecrimeiscommittedrightinthepresenceofthepersonWhois
makingthearrestordetention.(TrialProblemsinCity&MunicipalCourts,1970,p.267,U.P.LawcenterJudicial
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6/20/2015ConferenceSeries.).
G.R.No.L35546
habeascorpus
InhiswelldocumentedandverycarefullypreparedandcomprehensivethesisonMartialLaw,Nature,Principles
andAdministration,publishedbyCentralLawbookPublishingCo.,Inc,in1972,JusticeGuillermoS.Santosofthe
CourtofAppealsandformerlyoftheJudgeAdvocateGeneral'sService,ArmedForcesofthePhilippines,makes
thesepointedobservations:
Whethertheexistenceofmartiallawandthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritof'areoneandthesame
thing',or'theformerincludesthelatterandmuchmore,'hadbeenthesubjectof'anangrywarofpamphlets
betweenProfessorsParsonsandParkeroftheHarvardLawSchoolattheoutbreakoftheCivilWar.'(Fairman,p.
43Wienerp.9.)Ithasalsobeenadifficultquestiontodecideinsomejurisdictionswhetherthesuspensionofthe
privilegeofthewritamountedtoadeclarationofmartiallaw.(Winthrop,pp.820&828,citingExparteField,9
Am.L.R.507Bouvier'sLawDictionary,3rdFrancisRawisEd.,1914,p.2105,citing1HalleckInt.Law549.
habeascorpus
Inthefaceoftheconstitutionalprovisions(Art.111,Sec.1,Clause(14)andfn9,.)inourjurisdiction,there
seemstobenoroomfordoubtthatthetwoaredifferent.Whilethegroundsforthesuspensionoftheprivilegeof
thewritandtheproclamationofmartiallawarethesame,therecanbenoquestionthatsuspensionofthewrit
meanswhatitsays,thatduringthesuspensionoftheprivilege,thewrit,ifissued,willbetonoavailbutmartial
lawhasmorethanjustthiseffect.Theonlyquestionwhichapparentlyremainstobedeterminedhere,is,whether
thedeclarationofmartiallawipsofactocarrieswithitthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewrit,orwhethera
declarationofmartiallawmustnecessarilyincludeadeclarationsuspendingtheprivilegeofthewritinorderto
considerthesameinoperative.Butitappearsthattheformeristhebetterview,(MalcolmandLaurel,Philippine
ConstitutionalLaw,p.310)althoughintheUnitedStatesithasbeenheldthatqualifiedmartialrulemayexist
wherethewrithas,inlegalcontemplation,notbeensuspended,(Fairman,p.44)andthatthestatusofmartial
lawdoesnotofitselfsuspendthewrit.(MilitaryLaw[DomesticDisturbances],BasicFieldManual,War
Department,[US]fn19&15,p.17[1945].)(Seepp.4142.)
supra
Ofcourse,Wearenotboundbytheruleinotherjurisdictions.
FormerDeanVicenteG.SincooftheCollegeofLawoftheUniversityofthePhilippines,ofwhichhebecamelater
onPresident,anotedauthorityonconstitutionallawfromwhommanyofushavelearnedthesubject,likewise
sustainstheviewthattheproclamationofmartiallawautomaticallysuspendstheprivilegeofthewritof.(V.
Sinco,Phil.PoliticalLaw,p.259,11thEd.,1962)
habeascorpus
Now,astotheconstitutionalproprietyofdetainingpersonsonsuspicionofconspiracywiththeenemywithoutthe
needoftheregularjudicialprocess,Wehavealsotheauthoritativesupportofnolessthanwhatadistinguished
memberofthisCourt,consideredasoneofthebestinformedinAmericanconstitutionallaw,Mr.JusticeEnrique
Fernando,andtheprincipalcounselofpetitioners,formerSenatorTaada,himselfanauthority,onthesubject,
hadtosayonthepointintheirjointauthorship,usedastextbookinmanylawschools,entitledConstitutionofthe
Philippines,towit:
Oncemartiallawhasbeendeclared,arrestmaybenecessarynotsomuchforpunishmentbutbywayof
precautiontostopdisorder.Aslongassucharrestsaremadeingoodfaithandinthehonestbelieftheyare
neededtomaintainorder,thePresident,asCommanderinChief,cannotthereafter,whenheisoutofoffice,be
subjectedtoanactiononthegroundthathehadnoreasonablegroundforhisbelief..(Emphasissupplied.)
(ConstitutionofthePhilippinesbyTaada&Fernando,Vol.2,pp.523525.)
Whenitcomestoadecisionbytheheadofastateuponamatterinvolvingitslife,theordinaryrightsofindividualsmust
yieldtowhathedeemsthenecessitiesofthemoment.Publicdangerwarrantsthesubstitutionofexecutiveforjudicial
process
TheauthoritycitedbyJusticeFernandoandSenatorTaadasays:
Theplaintiff'sposition,statedinafewwords,isthattheactionofthegovernor,sanctionedtotheextentthatitwas
bythedecisionofthesupremecourt,wastheactionofthestateandthereforewithinthe14thAmendmentbut
that,ifthatactionwasunconstitutional,thegovernorgotnoprotectionfrompersonalliabilityforhis
unconstitutionalinterferencewiththeplaintiff'srights.Itisadmitted,asitmustbe.thatthegovernor'sdeclaration
thatastateofinsurrectionexistedisconclusiveofthatfact.Itseemstobeadmittedalsothatthearrestalone
wouldriotnecessarilyhavegivenarighttobringthissuit.,7How.1,45,46,12L.ed.581,600,601.Butitissaid
thatadetentionforsomanydays,allegedtobewithoutprobablecause,atatimewhenthecourtswereopen,
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6/20/2015withoutanattempttobringtheplaintiffbeforethem,makesacaseonwhichhehasarighttohaveajurypass.
G.R.No.L35546
Lutherv.Borden
Weshallnotconsiderallofthequestionsthatthefactssuggest,butshallconfineourselvestostatingwhatwe
regardasasufficientanswertothecomplaint,withoutimplyingthattherearenotothersequallygood.Ofcourse,
theplaintiff'spositionisthathehasbeendeprivedofhislibertywithoutdueprocessoflaw.Butitisfamiliarthat
whatisdueprocessoflawdependsoncircumstances.Itvarieswiththesubjectmatterandthenecessitiesofthe
situation.Thus,summaryproceedingssufficefortaxes,andexecutivedecisionsforexclusionfromthecounty.
Denexdem...18How.272,15L.ed.372,198U.S.253,263,49L.ed.1040,1044,25Sup.Ct.Rep.644.
What,then,arethecircumstancesofthiscase?Byagreementtherecordoftheproceedingsuponwasmadepart
ofthecomplaint,butthatdidnotmaketheavermentsofthepetitionforthewritavermentsofthecomplaint.The
factsthatwearetoassumearethatastateofinsurrectionexistedandthatthegovernor,withoutsufficientreason
butingoodfaith,inthecourseofputtingtheinsurrectiondown,heldtheplaintiffuntilhethoughtthathesafely
couldreleasehim.
Murrayv.HobokenLand&ImprovCoUnitedStatesv.JuToyhabeascorpus
ItwouldseemtobeadmittedbytheplaintiffthathewaspresidentoftheWesternFederationofMiners,andthat,
whoeverwastoblame,troublewasapprehendedwiththemembersofthatorganization.Wementionthesefacts
notasmaterial,butsimplytoputinmoredefiniteformthenatureoftheoccasiononwhichthegovernorfeltcalled
upontoact.Insuchasituationwemustassumethathehadaright,underthestateConstitutionandlaws,tocall
outtroops,aswasheldbythesupremecourtofthestate.TheConstitutionissupplementedbyanactproviding
that'whenaninvasionoforinsurrectioninthestateismadeorthreatened,thegovernorshallorderthenational
guardtorepelorsuppressthesame.'Lawsof1897,chap.63,art.7,&2,p.204.Thatmeansthatheshallmake
theordinaryuseofthesoldierstothatendthathemaykillpersonswhoresist,and,ofcourse,thathemayuse
themildermeasureofseizingthebodiesofthosewhomheconsiderstostandinthewayofrestoringpeace.
Sucharrestsarenotnecessarilyforpunishment,butarebywayofprecaution,topreventtheexerciseofhostile
power.Solongassucharrestsaremadeingoodfaithandinthehonestbeliefthattheyareneededinorderto
headtheinsurrectionoff,thegovernoristhefinaljudgeandcannotbesubjectedtoanactionafterheisoutof
office,onthegroundthathehadnotreasonablegroundforhisbelief.Ifwesupposeagovernorwithaverylong
termofoffice,itmaybethatacasecouldbeimaginedinwhichthelengthoftheimprisonmentwouldraisea
differentquestion.Butthereisnothinginthedurationoftheplaintiff'sdetentionorintheallegationsofthe
complaintthatwouldwarrantSubmittingthejudgmentofthegovernortorevisionbyaItisnotallegedthathis
judgmentwasnothonest,ifthatbematerial,orthattheplaintiffwasdetainedafterfearsoftheinsurrectionwere
atanend.
Nodoubttherearecaseswheretheexpertonthespotmayhecalledupontojustifyhisconductlaterincourt,
notwithstandingthefactthathehadsolecommandatthetimeandactedtothebestofhisknowledge.Thatisthe
positionofthecaptainofaship.But,eveninthatcase,greatweightisgiventohisdetermination,andthematter
istobejudgedonthefactsastheyappearedthen,andnotmerelyinthelightoftheevent.,17How.100,110,
15L.ed.58,62TheStarofHope,9Wall.203,19L.ed.638TheGermanic(OceanicSteamNav.Co.v.Aitken)
196U.S.589,594,595,49L.ed.610,613,25Sup.Ct.Rep.317.Whenitcomestoadecisionbytheheadofthe
stateuponamatterinvolvingitslife,theordinaryrightsofindividualsmustyieldtowhathedeemsthenecessities
ofthemoment.Publicdangerwarrantsthesubstitutionofexecutiveprocessforjudicialprocess.See,99U.S.
441,446,25L.ed.327,328.(Moyervs.Peabody,212U.S.416,417.)
Lawrencev.MinturnKeelyv.Sanders
Relatedly,inthedecisionoftheSupremeCourtofColoradodealingwiththesamedetentionofCharlesH.by
orderofthestategovernor,itwasheld:
Moyer
....If,then,themilitarymayresorttotheextremeoftakinghumanlifeinordertosuppressinsurrectionitis
impossibletoimagineuponwhathypothesisitcanbesuccessfullyclaimedthatthemildermeansofseizing
thepersonofthoseparticipatingintheinsurrectionoraidingandabettingitmaynotberesortedto.The
powerandauthorityofthemilitiainsuchcircumstancesarenotunlikethatofthepoliceofacity,orthe
sheriffofacounty,aidedbyhisdeputiesorpossecomitatusinsuppressingariot..HallettJ.,inRe
ApplicationofShermanParker(noopinionforpublication)..Hecouldbereleasedonbail,andleftfreeto
againjointheriotersorengageinaidingandabettingtheiraction,and,ifagainarrested,thesameprocess
wouldhavetoberepeated,andthustheactionofthemilitarywouldberenderedanullity.Again,ifitbe
concededthat,onthearrestofarioterbythemilitary,hemustatoncebeturnedovertothecustodyofthe
civilofficersofthecounty,thenthemilitary,inseizingarmedinsurrectionistsanddeprivingthemoftheir
arms,wouldberequiredtoforthwithreturnthemtothehandsofthosewhowereemployingtheminactsof
violenceorbesubjecttoanactionofreplevinfortheirrecoverywherebyimmediatepossessionofsuch
armswouldbeobtainedbetherioters,whowouldthusagainbeequippedtocontinuetheirlawless
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conduct..Thearrestanddetentionofaninsurrectionist,eitheractuallyengagedinactsofviolenceorin
aidingandabettingotherstocommitsuchacts,violatesnoneofhisconstitutionalrights.Heisnottriedby
anymilitarycourt,ordeniedtherightoftrialbyjuryneitherishepunishedforviolationofthelaw,norheld
withoutdueprocessoflaw.His.Whenthisendisreached,hecouldnolongerberestrainedofhisliberty
bythemilitary,butmustbe,justasrespondentshaveindicatedintheirreturntothewrit,turnedovertothe
usualcivilauthoritiesofthecounty,tobedealtwithintheordinarycourseofjustice,andtriedforstich
offensesagainstthelawashemayhavecommitted.Itistruethatpetitionerisnotheldbyvirtueofany
warrant,butifhisarrestanddetentionareauthorizedbylawhecannotcomplainbecausethosestepshave
notbeentakenwhichareordinarilyrequiredbeforeacitizencanbearrestedanddetained.
Certainlysuchofficialswouldbejustifiedinarrestingtheriotersandplacingtheminjailwithoutwarrant,anddetaining
thethereuntiltheriotwassuppressedIf,ascontendedbycounselforpetitioner,themilitary,assoonastherioteror
insurrectionistisarrested,mustturnhimovertothecivilauthoritiesofthecountry,thearrestmight,andinmany
instanceswould,amounttoamerefarceTodenytherightofthemilitiatothosewhomtheyarrestwhileengagedin
suppressingactsofviolenceanduntilorderisrestoredwouldleadtothemostabsurdresultsarrestanddetentionis
suchcircumstancesmerelytopreventhimfromtakingpartoraidinginacontinuationoftheconditionswhichthe
governor,inthedischargeofhisofficialdutiesandintheexerciseofauthorityconferredbylaw,isendeavoringto
suppress
Bythereplyitisallegedthat,notwithstandingtheproclamationanddeterminationoftheGovernorthatastateof
insurrectionexistedinthecountyofSanMiguel,thatasamatteroffacttheseconditionsdidnotexistatthetime
ofsuchproclamationorthearrestofthepetitioner,oratanyothertime.ByS5,art.4,ofourConstitution,the
governoristhecommanderinchiefofthemilitaryforcesofthestate,exceptwhentheyarecalledintoactual
serviceoftheUnitedStatesandheistherebyempoweredtocalloutthemilitiatosuppressinsurrection.Itmust
thereforebecomehisdutytodetermineasafactwhenconditionsexistinagivenlocalitywhichdemandthat,in
thedischargeofhisdutiesaschiefexecutiveofthestate,heshallemploythemilitiatosuppress..Otherwise,the
legalityoftheordersoftheexecutivewouldnotdependuponhisjudgment,butthejudgmentofanother
coordinatebranchofthestategovernment............
Thisbeingtrue,therecitalsintheproclamationtotheeffectthatastateofinsurrectionexistedinthecountryofSanMiguel
cannotbecontroverted
........................................................
..........................
.....(Emphasissupplied.)(ReMoyer,35Colo,159,85Pac.190[1904].)
Thesamepowerwhichdeterminestheexistenceofaninsurrectionmustalsodecidewhentheinsurrectionhasbeen
suppressed
Itisevident,therefore,thatregardlessofwhetherornottheprivilegeofthewritofisexpresslysuspendedduring
martiallaw,arrest,detentionandotherrestraintsoflibertyofindividualsmaynotbeassailedasviolativeofthe
dueprocessclause.ThePresidentialorderstosucheffectconstitutesubstantiveandproceduraldueprocessat
thesametimeandmaythereforebeinvokedasvaliddefensesagainstanyremedyorprayerforrelease.Given
thevalidityofthedeclarationofmartiallaw,thesoletestsoflegalityofconstraintsotherwisefrowneduponin
normaltimesbythefundamentallawaresubstantialrelevanceandreasonableness.Intheverynatureofthings,
andabsentanyobviousshowingofpalpablebadfaith,theExecutiveshouldenjoyrespectfuldeferenceinthe
determinationofhisgrounds.Asarule,theCourtsarenotsupposedtomakeanyinquiryintothematter.
habeascorpus
Weaccordinglyholdthat,aswelldemonstratedbytheSolicitorGeneral,aproclamationofmartiallaw
automaticallyresultsinthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritofand,therefore,thearrest,detentionand
restraintsuponpetitionersareauthorizedbytheConstitution.Inanyevent,thePresidentialorderofarrestand
detentionconstitutedueprocessandis,therefore,avaliddefensetoanyallegationofillegalityoftheconstraints
uponpetitioners.Wefurtherholdthatthedurationofsuchconstraintsmaybecoextensivewithmartiallawunless
otherwiseorderedbytheExecutive.
habeascorpus
IV
THEEFFECTOFTHEAPPROVALANDRATIFICATIONOFTHENEWCONSTITUTIONONTHEINSTANT
PETITIONS
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6/20/2015
G.R.No.L35546
AllthatremainsnowforresolutionisthequestionofwhateffectdidtheapprovalandratificationoftheNew
Constitutionhaveupontheinstantpetitions?
WhenpetitionerscametothisCourtinSeptemberandOctober1972toimpugnthelegalityoftheirarrestand
detentionbyvirtueofProclamation1081andGeneralOrderNo.2,theircommonfundamentaltheorywasthat
saidproclamationandorderwereviolativeoftheConstitutionofthePhilippinesof1935,notonlybecause,
accordingtothem,therewasnojustificationforitsplacingthecountryundermartiallawbutalsobecause,even
assumingitspropriety,therewasallegedlynolegalbasisfortheapprehensionanddetentionofpetitioners
withoutanywarrantofarrestandwithoutevenanychargesbeingfiledagainstthem.Thus,inhisreturnofthewrit
ofissuedbytheCourt,aswellasinhisoralargumentatthehearings,theSolicitorGenerallimitedhimselfto
barelyinvokingtheprovisionofthesaidConstitutionempoweringthePresidenttoproclaimmartiallaw,evenas
hedeniedtheallegationthattherewasnofactualbasistherefor,andsimplycontendedthatthearrestand
detentionofpetitionersweremadepursuanttoordersvalidlyissuedunderthepowersofthePresidentflowing
fromtheproclamation..
habeascorpus
A
Asalreadynoted,however,evenbeforethesecasescouldbesubmittedfordecision,onNovember30,1972,the
ConstitutionalConventionof1971approvedadraftconstitutiondesignedtosupersedetheConstitutionof1935
andonJanuary17,1973,thruProclamation1102,thePresidentdeclaredthatdraftconstitutiontohavebeen
ratifiedbythepeopleinthereferendumofJanuary1015,1973,and,asalsostatedearlier,saidproclamation
becamethesubjectoftwoseriesofcasesinthisCourtwhichultimatelyendedwiththedecisionofMarch31,
1973adjudgingthat"thereisnofurtherjudicialobstacletotheNewConstitutionbeingconsideredinforceand
effect."AndamongthesalientandpertinentprovisionsoftheNewConstitutionortheConstitutionof1973,asthe
newchartermaydistinctivelybereferredto,isthatofSection3(2)ofArticleXVIItextuallyreproducedearlier
above.
Inviewofthecomprehensiveorallinclusivetenoroftheconstitutionalinjunctioncontainedinsaidprovision,
referringasitdoesto"allproclamations,orders,decrees,instructions,andactspromulgatedissued,ordoneby
theincumbentPresident",therecanbenodoubtthatProclamation1081andGeneralOrder2,hereinassailedby
petitioners,areamongthoseenjoinedtohe"partofthelawoftheland."Thequestionthatarisesthenis,didtheir
havingbeenmadepartofthelawofthelandbynolessthananexpressmandateofthefundamentallaw
precludefurthercontroversyastotheirvalidityandefficacy?
Inponderingoverthisquestion,itisimportanttobearinmindthecircumstancesthatattendedtheframingand
finalapprovalofthedraftconstitutionbytheConvention.Asalreadynoted,twoactuationsofthePresidentof
indubitabletranscendentalimportovertookthedeliberationsoftheconstituentassembly,namely,theissuanceby
himofProclamation1081placingthePhilippinesundermartiallawandhisexercise,undersaidproclamation,of
nonexecutivepowers,inclusiveofgenerallegislativeauthority.Astobeexpectedinacountry,likethe
Philippines,longaccustomedtostrictconstitutionalism,andthesuperiorityofcivilianauthorityover,themilitary,
soonenough,thesetwoactuationsspawnedconstitutionalcontroversiesofseriousdimensions,somuchsothat
severalcasesinvolvingthem,includingtheinstantones,arenowpendingintheSupremeCourt.Surely,the
membersoftheConventionwerewellawareofthesedevelopments.Inotherwords,thedelegatesinconvention
assembledwerelivingwitnessesofthemannerinwhich,forthefirsttimeinourconstitutionalhistory,themartial
lawclauseofthecharterwasbeingactuallyimplemented,andtheyknewthegraveconstitutionalissuessuch
implementationhadprovoked.
Indeed,noconstituentassemblyCouldhavebeenbettercircumstancedtoformulatethefundamentallawofthe
land.TheConventionhadafullandfirsthandviewofthecontroversialoperationofthemostimportantpartofthe
charteritwascalledtoimproveuponitsmartiallawclause.Verily,nootheraspectoftheconstitutioncould
havecommandedmorethemostseriousattentionofthedelegates.Theykneworoughttohaveknownthatthe
placingofthecountryoranypartthereofundermartiallawcouldpossiblyaffectthecontinuedoperationtherein
oftheconstitutionoratleast,theenforceabilityofparticularprovisionsthereof.Therefore,iftheConventionfelt
thatwhatwasbeingdonebythePresidentaswitnessedbythemwasnotwithinthecontemplationoftheexisting
fundamentallaworthatitwasinconsistentwiththeunderlyingprinciplesofdemocracyandconstitutionalismto
whichthenationhasbeenirrevocablycommittedsinceitsbirthandwhichweretoremainasthefoundationsof
thenewcharter,thedelegateswouldhaveconsideredittobetheirboundendutytoourpeopleandtothefuture
generationsofFilipinos,tomanifesttheirconvictionbyprovidingappropriatesafeguardsagainstanyrepetition
thereofintheconstitutiontheyweredrafting.Andso,whenitisconsideredthatasfinallyapproved,theNew
Constitutionreproducesinexactlythesametermsorverbatimthemartiallawclauseofthe1935charter,the
ineludibleconclusionisthatournewconstitutionalfathersdidnotseeanythingrepugnanttotheconceptsofthe
oldconstitutioninwhatthePresidenthasdoneorwasdoing.AsWeseeit,thisattitudeoftheConvention
constitutesanauthoritativecontemporaryconstructionoftheprovisionincontroversy,andconsideringthatthe
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G.R.No.L35546
January1015,1973butalsointhatofJuly2728,1973,relianceonsuchattitudeindeterminingthemeaning
andintentofsaidprovisioncannotbeoutofplace.
Inthelightoftheseconsiderations,Wedonotseeinthetransitoryprovisionunderdiscussionanyideaof
ratificationorvalidationofsomethingvoidorunauthorized.Rather,whatWeperceiveinitarerevelationsofwhat
layinthecoreofthemartiallawclauseofthe1935Constitutionasitwasconceivedandformulatedbyitswise
andfarsightedframers.Itwouldbeunreasonable,illogicalandunworthyofthe1971delegatestoimputetothem
anintenttomerelyratify,confirmorvalidatethePresident'sacts,ontheassumptionthattheywereoriginally
unauthorizedbythecharter,forthatwouldimplythattheywereconcernedonlyaboutstraighteningoutthe
presentsituation,whenitisjustasimportanttoinsurethatfutureactsofthePresidentarenottaintedwith
illegality.Wecannotentertainanythoughtthatthedelegateswerenotsufficientlyapprisedontheimplicationsof
theiracts.Indeed,theNewConstitutionhasnotimpartedanyelementofvaliditytotheactsinquestion,ithasonly
expressedinblackandwhitewhattheOldConstitutiondidnotdeemnecessarytolaydownwithprecisionin
respecttothem.Viewedthisway,whatthetransitoryprovisionunderdiscussionmeansisthatboththeactsofthe
PresidentbeforeaswellasthoseafterratificationoftheNewConstitutionarevalidnotvalidatedand,asjust
stated,whatreinforcesthisconstructionandplacesthesaidactsbeyondpossibleattacksforunconstitutionality
aretheresultsofthetworeferendumsofJanuaryandJuly,1973.
expropiovigore
Withal,havingabsolutefaithinthehighsenseofdutyandthepatrioticcourageofthemembersofthe
Convention,Wealsorejectthesuggestionthattheywereinanywayimpeded,underthecircumstancesthen
obtaining,fromfreelyexpressingthemselves.Wecannotforamomententertainthethoughtthatanyother
Filipinocaneverhavelesscourageandloveofcountryandconcernforthefutureofourpeoplethanthe
membersofthisCourtwhoarepresentlycalledupontomakemomentousdecisionsaffectingnolessthanthe
legalityandlegitimacyoftheveryGovernmentadmittedlyineffectivecontrolofthewholeterritoryofthenation,
regardlessofpossiblepersonalconsequencestothemselves.
ThefactofthematteristhatProclamation1081didnotmakementionoftheConventionatall.Onthecontrary,
judicialnoticemaybetakenoftheincreasedfundsappropriatedbythePresidentsoastoenableittoproceed
withitsdeliberations,unbotheredbyanyapprehensionregardingtheinadequacyofthefundswhichtheCongress
hadappropriatedforit,andwhichwerethenfastdwindling,withoutanycertaintyoffurthercongressional
appropriations.Indeed,whenDelegateKalawoftheFirstDistrictofRizalproposedinaformalresolutionthatthe
sessionsbesuspendeduntilaftertheliftingofmartiallaw,theassemblyvotedoverwhelminglytoturndownthe
proposal.Thereisnoevidenceatallthatanyformofunduepressurewasbroughttobearuponthedelegatesin
anyrespectrelatedtotheirconstituentfunctions.Ithasnotbeenshownthatthearrestanddetentionofanumber
ofdelegates,someofwhomarepetitionersherein,wasinanywayconnectedwithorcausedbytheiractuations
relatedtotheirconstituentfunctions.WhatGeneralOrderNo.2assertsisthatthePresidentorderedthe
"SecretaryofNationalDefensetoforthwitharrestorcausethearrestandtakeintocustodytheindividualsnamed
intheattachedlist(amongthem,thesaiddelegates)andtoholdthemuntilotherwisesoorderedbymeormy
dulydesignatedrepresentative"fortheir"beingactiveparticipantsorforhavinggivenaidandcomfortinthe
conspiracytoseizepoliticalandstatepowerinthecountryandtotakeovertheGovernmentbyforce,theextent
ofwhichhasnowassumedtheproportionofanactualwaragainstOurpeopleandourlegitimateGovernment
andinordertopreventthemfromfurthercommittingactsthatareinimicalorinjurioustoourpeople,the
Governmentandournationalinterest,andtoholdsaidindividualsuntilotherwisesoorderedbymeorbymyduly
designatedrepresentative."Eventhen,saiddelegateswereallowedtocasttheirvotesintheassemblywhenthe
finaldraftwassubmittedforapprovalofthemembersoftheConvention.Thus,itcanbesafelyassertedthatthe
freedomoftheConventiontoactandtoperformwhateverwasincumbentuponitasaconstituentbodysuffered
nosubstantialdiminutionorconstraintonaccountoftheproclamationofmartiallaw.
Toreiteratethen,Section3(2),ArticleXVIIoftheNewConstitutionenjoinsthat"allproclamations,orders,
decrees,instructionsandactspromulgated,issuedordonebytheincumbentPresidentshallbepartofthelawof
thelandandshallremainvalid,legal,bindingandeffectiveevenaftertheliftingofmartiallawortheratificationof
thisConstitution,unlessmodified,revoked,orsupersededbysubsequentproclamations,orders,decrees,
instructionsorotheractsoftheincumbentPresident,orunlessexpresslyandexplicitlymodifiedorrepealedby
theregularNationalAssembly."Notably,theprovisiondoesnotonlymakeallsuchproclamations,orders,
decrees,etc."partofthelawoftheland",inwhichcase,itwouldhavebeenperhapspossibletoargue,thatthey
hadjustbeenaccordedthestatusoflegislativeenactments,ordinarilysubjecttopossibleattackonconstitutional
grounds.Theprovisionactuallygoesfurther.Itexpresslyordainsthattheproclamations,orders,etc.referredto
should"remainvalid,legal,binding,andeffective"...untilrevoked,modified,repealedorsupersededinthe
mannersthereinstipulated.Whatismore,theprovisionreferstoandcontemplatesnotonlyproclamations,
orders,decrees,instructionsandactsofexecutivecharacter,buteventhoseessentiallylegislative,asmaybe
gatheredfromthenatureoftheproclamations,decrees,orders,etc.alreadyexistingatthetimeoftheapprovalof
thedraftconstitutionandoftheacceptancethereofbythepeople.Accordingly,andbecausethereisnodoubt
thatProclamation1081andGeneralOrderNo.2,hereinchallenged,areamongtheproclamationsandorders
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6/20/2015contemplatedinsaidprovision,theCourthasnoalternativebuttohold,asitherebyholds,inconsonancewiththe
G.R.No.L35546
authoritativeconstructionbytheConstitutionalConventionofthefundamentallawoftheland,thatProclamation
1081ofPresidentMarcosplacingthePhilippinesundermartiallawaswellasGeneralOrderNo.2,pursuantto
whichpetitionersareeitherincustodyorrestrainedoftheirfreedoms"untilotherwisesoorderedby(the
President)or(his)dulydesignatedrepresentative"arevalid,legal,bindingandeffective,andconsequently,the
continueddetentionofpetitionerAquinoaswellastheconstraintsonthefreedomsoftheotherpetitioners
resultingfromtheconditionsunderwhichtheywerereleasedfromcustodyarelegalandconstitutional.Wefeel
WeareconfirmedinthisconclusionbytheresultsofthereferendumofJuly2728,1973inwhich18,052,016
votergavetheiraffirmativeapprovaltothefollowingquestion:
DoyouwantPresidentMarcostocontinuebeyond1973andfinishthereformshehasinitiatedunderMartiallaw?
Wehastentoaddtoavoidmisunderstandingorconfusionofconcepts,thatitisnotbecauseofthefiatorforceof
theNewConstitutionitselfthatthetransitoryprovisionisbeingrelieduponforthepurposesoftheinstant
petitions.Atthispoint,andwithoutprejudicetolookingintothematterinsofarasotherissuesandothercases
affectingmartiallawandtheordersissuedunderitareconcerned,allthatWesayisthatthesaidprovision
constitutesanauthoritativecontemporaryconstructionofthemartiallawclauseoftheConstitutiongivinglight
regardingtheemergencypowersthattheExecutivemayexerciseafteritsproclamation.
B
ButpetitionerDiokno
17woulddilutetheforceofthisconclusionbytryingtofindfaultwiththedispositiveportionofthedecisionofthisCourtin
theRatificationCases.Hecontendsthatactually,sixjusticesrenderedopinionsexpresslyholdingthattheNewConstitution
hasnotbeenvalidlyratifiedinaccordancewithArticleXVofthe1935Constitutionandthatthesaiddispositiveportion"is
notconsistentwiththeirfindings,whichwerealsothefindingsofthemajorityoftheCourt."Otherwisestated,thepositionof
petitionerDioknoisthatthedecisionintheRatificationCaseshasnobindinglegalforceasregardsthequestionofwhether
ornottheNewConstitutionisindeedinforceandeffect.ThisispracticallyanattempttomaketheCourtresolvethesame
pointswhichcounselsforthepetitionersintheRatificationCasessubmittedtotheCourtonthelastdayforthefinalityof
thedecisiontherein,butwithoutaskingforeitherthereconsiderationormodificationthereof,becausetheymerelywantedto
recordforposteritytheirownconstructionofthejudgmentoftheCourt.18
WithoutinanywayattemptingtoreopentheissuesalreadyresolvedbytheCourtinthatdecision,butforthesake
oferasinganydoubtastothetrueimportofOurjudgmenttherein,andinorderthatthosewhowouldperusethe
samemaynotbeledastraybycounsel'smisconstructionthereof,thewriterfeelsitishereopportunetosayafew
wordsrelativetopetitioner'sobservations,consideringspeciallythatOurdiscussionaboveispredicatedonthe
premisethattheNewConstitutionisinfullforceandeffect.
Tostartwith,itisevidentthatthephraseinquestionsayingthat"thereisnofurtherjudicialobstacletotheNew
Constitutionbeingconsideredinforceandeffect"wasinactualfactapprovedspecificallybythemembersofthe
Courtasthejuridicalresultoftheirvariantseparateopinions.Infact,eventhosewhodissented,exceptJustice
Zaldivar,acceptedbytheirsilencetheaccuracyofsaidconclusion.
19Hadanyoftheotherjustices,particularly,ChiefJusticeMakalintalandJusticeCastrofeltthattheirjointopiniondidnot
justifysuchajudgment,theywouldhavecertainlyobjectedtoitstenor,asJusticeZaldivardid.(Seefootnote11).Surely,it
isnotforanyonetosaynowthattheCourtmisstateditsjudgment.
IntheparticularcaseofCounselsTaadaandArroyo,whileitistruethatonthelastdayforthefinalityofthat
decision,theyfileda"Constancia",separatelyfromtheManifestationtothesameeffectoftheothercounsel,
discussingextensivelytheallegedinconsistencybetweenthecollectiveresultoftheopinionsofthemajorityofthe
Courtandthedispositiveportionofthejudgment,liketheothercounsel,however,theydidnotmakeanyprayer
forrelief,statingthattheironlypurposeis"tosaveourpeoplefrombeingmisledandconfused,inordertoplace
thingsintheirproperperspective,andinordertokeepfaithwiththe1935Constitution....sothatwhenhistory
passesjudgmentupontherealworthandmeaningofthehistoricResolutionofthisHonorableCourtpromulgated
onMarch31,1973,itmayhaveallthefactsbeforeit,"forwhichreason,themajorityoftheCourt,overthe
dissentofJusticesZaldivar,Antonio,Esguerraandthewriter,didnotconsideritnecessarytoact,believingitwas
notexactlytheoccasiontodisabusethemindsofcounselsaboutthejuridicalintegrityoftheCourt'sactuation
embodiedintheresolution.Inasense,therefore,saidcounselsshouldbedeemedtobeinestoppeltoraisethe
samepointsnowasargumentsforanyaffirmativerelief,somethingwhichtheydidnotaskforwhenitwasmore
appropriatetodoso.
Inthesecondplace,layingasidethedivisionofviewsamongthemembersoftheCourtonthequestionof
whetherornottherehasbeencompliancewiththeprovisionsofArticleXVofthe1935Constitution,thevitaland
decisivefactisthatthemajorityoftheCourtheldthatthequestionofwhetherornottheNewConstitutionis
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G.R.No.L35546
departmentsofthegovernmentorofthepeopleinthatrespect.InistruesomeoftheJusticescouldnotfind
sufficientbasisfordeterminingwhetherornotthepeoplehaveacceptedtheNewConstitution,but,onthatpoint,
fourJustices,JusticesMakasiar,Antonio,Esguerraandthewriter,didvotecategoricallyintheaffirmative,while
twoJustices,thenChiefJusticeConcepcionandJusticeZaldivar,votedinthenegative.Andinthejointopinionof
nowChiefJusticeMakalintalandJusticeCastro,itiscrystalclearthatthereferencethereintotheirinabilityto
accuratelyappraisethepeople'sverdictwasmerelycasual,thethrustoftheirpositionbeingthatwhatisdecisive
isthePresident'sownattituderegardingthesituation,thatis,whetherhewouldtakethereportoftheKatipunan
ngmgaBarangaytotheeffectthatthepeoplehaveapprovedandratifiedtheNewConstitutionasdefinitiveand
finalorhewouldprefertosubmitthenewchartertothesamekindofelectionwhichusedtobeheldforthe
ratificationofconstitutionalamendments,hisdecisioneitherwaynotbeingsubjecttojudicialinquiry.Stated
differently,ourdistinguishedcolleagueswereoftheviewthatwhetherornottheNewConstitutionmaybeheldto
havebeendulyratifiedpursuanttoArticleXVofthe1935Constitutionandeventheirownnegativeconclusionin
suchrespect,havenobearingontheissueoftheenforceabilityoftheNewConstitutiononthebasisofitshaving
beenacceptedbythepeople,andthatalthoughtheywerenotpossessedofsufficientknowledgetodetermine
thisparticularfact,thePresident'sownfindingthereonisconclusiveupontheCourt,since,accordingtothem
suchadecisionispoliticalandoutsidethepaleofjudicialreview.Toquotetheirownwords:
However,afindingthattheratificationofthedraftConstitutionbytheCitizensAssemblies,ascertifiedbythe
PresidentinProclamationNo.1102,wasnotinaccordancewiththeconstitutionalandstatutoryprocedurelaid
downforthepurposedoesnotquiteresolvethequestionsraisedinthesecases.Suchafinding,inouropinion,is
onamatterwhichisessentiallyjusticiable,thatis,withinthepowerofthisCourttoinquireinto.Itimportsnothing
morethanasimplereadingandapplicationofthepertinentprovisionsofthe1935Constitution,oftheElection
Codeandofotherrelatedlawsandofficialacts.Noquestionofwisdomorofpolicyisinvolved.Butfromthis
findingitdoesnotnecessarilyfollowthatthisCourtmayjustifiablydeclarethattheConstitutionhasnotbecome
effective,andforthatreasongiveduecoursetothesepetitionorgrantthewritshereinprayedfor.Theeffectivity
oftheConstitutioninthefinalanalysis,isthebasicandultimatequestionwhichconsiderationsotherthanthe
competenceofthisCourt,arerelevantandunavoidable.
xxxxxxxxx
IfindeeditbeacceptedthattheCitizensAssemblieshadratifiedthe1973Constitutionandthatsuchratification
aswellastheestablishmentofthegovernmentthereunderformedpartofarevolution,albeitpeaceful,thenthe
issueofwhetherornotthatConstitutionhasbecomeeffectiveand,asanecessarycorollarywhetherornotthe
governmentlegitimatelyfunctionsunderitinsteadofunderthe1935Constitution,ispoliticalandthereforenon
judicialinnature.UndersuchapostulatewhatthepeopledidintheCitizensAssembliesshouldbetakenasan
exerciseoftheultimatesovereignpowers.Iftheyhadrisenupinarmsandbyforcedeposedthethenexisting
governmentandsetupanewgovernmentinitsplace,therecouldnotbetheleastdoubtthattheiractwouldbe
politicalandnotsubjecttojudicialreviewbutonlytothejudgmentofthesamebodypoliticact,inthecontextjust
setforth,isbasedonrealities.Ifanewgovernmentgainsauthorityanddominancethroughforce,itcanbe
effectivelychallengedonlybyastrongerforcenoJudicialreviewisconcerned,ifnoforcehadbeenresortedto
andthepeople.indefianceoftheexistingConstitutionbutpeacefullybecauseoftheabsenceofanyappreciable
opposition,ordainedanewConstitutionandsucceededinhavingthegovernmentoperateunderit.Againstsuch
arealitytherecanbenoadequatejudicialreliefandsocourtsforbeartotakecognizanceofthequestionbut
leaveittobedecidedthroughpoliticalmeans.
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ButthenthePresident,pursuanttosuchrecommendation.didproclaimthattheConstitutionhadbeenratified
andhadcomeintoeffect.Themorerelevantconsideration,therefore,asfaraswecansee,shouldbeastowhat
thePresidenthadinmindinconveningtheCitizensAssemblies,submittingtheConstitutiontothemand
proclaimingthatthefavorableexpressionoftheirviewswasanactofratification.Inthisrespectsubjectivefactors,
whichdefyjudicialanalysisandadjudication,arenecessarilyinvolved.
Inpositingtheproblemwithinanidentifiableframeofreferencewefindnoneedtoconsiderwhetherornotthe
regimeestablishedbyPresidentMarcossincehedeclaredmartiallawandunderwhichthenewConstitutionwas
submittedtotheCitizensAssemblieswasarevolutionaryone.Thepivotalquestionisratherwhetherornotthe
effectivityofthesaidConstitutionbyvirtueofPresidentialProclamationNo.1102,upontherecommendationof
theKatipunanngmgaBarangay,wasintendedtobedefiniteandirrevocable,regardlessofnoncompliancewith
thepertinentconstitutionalandstatutoryprovisionsprescribingtheprocedureforratification.Wemustconfess
thatafterconsideringalltheavailableevidenceandalltherelevantcircumstanceswehavefoundnoreasonably
reliableanswertothequestion.
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Inthelightofthisseemingambivalence,thechoiceofwhatcourseofactiontopursuebelongstothePresident.
WehaveearliermadereferencetosubjectivefactorsonwhichthisCourt,toourmind,isinnopositiontopass
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6/20/2015judgment.AmongthemisthePresident'sownassessmentofthewillofthepeopleasexpressedthroughthe
G.R.No.L35546
CitizensAssembliesandoftheimportanceofthe1973Constitutiontothesuccessfulimplementationofthesocial
andeconomicreformshehasstartedorenvisioned.Ifheshoulddecidethatthereisnoturningback,thatwhat
thepeoplerecommendedthroughtheCitizensAssemblies,astheywerereportedtohim,demandedthatthe
actionhetookpursuanttheretobefinalandirrevocable,thenjudicialreviewisoutofthequestion.
Inarticulatingourviewthattheprocedureofratificationthatwasfollowedwasnotinaccordancewiththe1935
Constitutionandrelatedstatutes,wehavedischargedoursworndutyasweconceiveittobe.ThePresident
shouldnowperhapsdecide,ifhehasnotalreadydecided,whetheradherencetosuchprocedureisweighty
enoughaconsideration,ifonlytodispelanycloudofdoubtthatmaynowandinthefutureshroudthenation's
Charter.
InthedeliberationofthisCourtoneoftheissuesformulatedforresolutioniswhetherornotthenewConstitution,
sinceitssubmissiontotheCitizensAssemblies,hasfoundacceptanceamongthepeople,suchissuebeing
relatedtothepoliticalquestiontheorypropoundedbytherespondents.Wehavenottarriedonthepointatall
sincewefindnoreliablebasisonwhichtoformajudgment.Underaregimeofmartiallaw,withthefree
expressionofopinionsthroughtheusualmediavehiclesrestricted,wehavenomeansofknown,tothepointof
judicialcertainty,whetherthepeoplehaveacceptedtheConstitution.Inanyevent,wedonotfindtheissue
decisiveinsofarasourvoteinthesecasesisconcerned.TointerprettheConstitutionthatisjudicial.That
Constitutionshouldbedeemedineffectbecauseofpopularacquiescencethatispolitical,andtherefore
beyondthedomainofjudicialreview.(JAVELLANAvsTHEEXECUTIVESECRETARY50SCRA161162
164166167170171)
20
Itonlyremainsforthewritertoreiteratehereafewconsiderationsalreadytouchedintheseparateopinionsinthe
RatificationCaseswhichinhisconsideredviewmaywellbetakenintoaccountbythosewhowouldreadagain
thejudgmentoftheCourttherein.
1
HavingcometotheconclusionthatthequestionofwhetherornottheNewConstitutionislegallyinforceand
effectispoliticalandoutsidethedomainofjudicialreview,itwasnotstrangethattheCourtshouldsimplyrulethat
thereshouldbenofurtherjudicialobstacletotheenforcementofthecharter,shouldthatbe,asitappearedtobe,
theintentofthoseactuallyinauthorityinthegovernment.Itisimplicitinthepoliticalquestiondoctrinethatthe
Court'sopinionastothecorrectnessofthelegalposturesinvolvedisofnomoment,forthesimplereasonthat
theremedyagainstanyerrorthereinlieseitherwiththesovereignpeopleatthepollsorwiththePolitical
departmentconcernedinthedischargeofitsownresponsibilityunderthefundamentallawoftheland,andnot
withtheCourt.Evenifitwereotherwisedesirable,ifonlyforthebenefitofthoseinterestedinthesettlementofthe
specificlegalproblemposed,anycategoricalrulingthereonwouldtranscendtheboundsofjudicialpropriety.For
theCourttoholditiswithoutpowertodecideandinthesamebreathtoactuallydecideisanintolerable
incongruity,henceanypronouncementorholdingmadeunderthecircumstancescouldhavenomoreforcethan
anobiter,nomatterhowrichineruditionandprecedentialsupport.Consequently,tosaythattheNew
Constitutionmaybeconsideredbythoseinauthoritytobeinforceandeffectbecausesuchisthemandate
expressedbythepeopleintheformannouncedbythePresident'sbutapropermannerofexpressingtheCourt's
abstentionfromwrestingthepowertodecidefromthoseinwhomsuchprerogativeisconstitutionallylodged.This
isneithertododgeaconstitutionaldutynortorefrainfromgettinginvolvedinacontroversyoftranscendental
implicationsitisplainadherencetoaprincipleconsideredparamountinrepublicandemocracieswhereinthe
politicalquestiondoctrineisdeeplyimbeddedasaninextricablepartoftheruleoflaw.Itisanunpardonable
misconceptionofthedoctrineforanyonetobelievethatfortheSupremeCourttobowtotheperceptibleor
audiblevoiceofthesovereignpeopleinappropriateinstancesisinanysenseadeparturefromoradisregardof
lawasappliedtopoliticalsituations,fortheveryrulethatenjoinsjudicialinterferenceinpoliticalquestionsisno
lessalegalprinciplethananyotherthatcanbeconceived,Indeed,justas,inlaw,judicialdecisionrendered
withinambitofthecourts'authoritydeservetherespectofthepeople,bythesametoken,thepeople'sverdicton
whatinherentlyistheirstodecidemustbeaccordedduedeferencebythejudiciary.Otherwise,judgeswouldbe
morepowerfulthanthepeoplebywhomtheyhavebeengivennomoreprerogativethantoactsolelywithinthe
boundariesofthejudicialsphere.Withal,acourtmayerrinfindingthatagivensituationcallsforitsabstention,in
thesamewayitmaycommitmistakesofjudgmentaboutanyordermatteritdecides,stillitsdecision,conceding
itshonesty,cannotbefaultedasanassaultontheruleoflaw.Thus,inabroadsense,itmaybesaidthatitisa
necessarycorollaryofthetruththattheadministrationofjusticeincourtspresidedbehumanbeingscannot
perfectthateventhehonestmistakeofajudgeislaw.
dictum
Thewriterfurthersubmitsthat,aspointedoutinhisseparateopinionintheRatificationCases,thosewho
vehementlyinsistthatthereferendumofJanuary1015,1973wasnotthekindofelectioncontemplatedinArticle
XVofthe1935Constitutionseemtooverlookthatthesaidprovisionrefersonlytothemodeofratifying
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G.R.No.L35546
forapprovalbythepeople.Indeed,thewriterwouldreadilyagree,aswasalreadymadeclearinthe
aforementionedopinion,thatifwhatweresubmittedtothepeopleintheJanuary,1973referendumhadbeen
merelyanamendmentorabundleofamendmentstothe1935Constitution,theresultsthereofcouldnot
constituteavalidratificationthereof.ButsinceitwasawholeintegralcharterthattheCitizens'Assemblieshad
beforetheminthatreferendum,itisevidentthattheratificationclauseinvokedcannotbecontrolling.
Thatanewconstitutionisnotcontemplatedisindicatedinthetextoftheprovisionititself.Itsays:"Such
amendmentsshallbevalidaspartofthisConstitutionwhenapprovedbyamajorityofthevotescast...."Howcan
itbeeverconceivedthatthe1973Constitutionwhichisanentirecharterinitself,differingsubstantiallyinits
entirelyandradicallyinmostofitsprovisions,fromthe1935Constitutionbepartofthelatter?Inotherwords,the
moderatificationprescribedinArticleXVisonlyforamendmentsthatcanbemadepartofthewholeconstitution,
obviouslynottoanentirecharterpreciselypurportedtosupersedeit.
Anditisbutlogicalthataconstitutioncannotandshouldnotattempttobindfuturegenerationsastohowthey
woulddoawaywithitinfavorofonesuitabletotheirmorerecentneedsandaspirations.Itistruethatin,41
SCRA702,thisCourt,thruthewriter,heldthat:
Tolentinovs.Comelec
Inourdiscussionoftheissueofjurisdiction,WehavealreadymadeitclearthattheConventioncameintobeing
byacallofajointsessionofCongresspursuanttoSection1ofArticleXVoftheConstitution,alreadyquoted
earlierinthisopinion.Wereiteratealsothatastomattersnotrelatedtoitsinternaloperationandtheperformance
ofitsassignedmissiontoproposeamendmentstotheConstitution,theConventionanditsofficersandmembers
areallsubjecttoalltheprovisionsoftheexistingConstitution.Now,Weholdthatevenastoitslattertaskof
proposingamendmentstotheConstitution,itissubjecttotheprovisionsofSection1ofArticleXV.Thismustbe
so,becauseitisplaintoUsthattheframersoftheConstitutiontookcarethattheprocessofamendingthesame
shouldnotbeundertakenwiththesameeaseandfacilityinchanginganordinarylegislation.Constitutionmaking
isthemostvaluedpower,secondtonone,ofthepeopleinaconstitutionaldemocracysuchastheoneour
foundingfathershavechosenforthisnation,andwhichweofthesucceedinggenerationsgenerallycherish.And
becausetheConstitutionaffectsthelives,fortunes,futureandeveryotherconceivableaspectofthelivesofall
thepeoplewithinthecountryandthosesubjecttoitssovereignty,everydegreeofcareistakeninpreparingand
draftingit.Aconstitutionworthyofthepeopleforwhichitisintendedmustnotbepreparedinhastewithout
adequatedeliberationandstudy.Itisobviousthatcorrespondingly,anyamendmentoftheConstitutionitself,and
perforcemustbeconceivedandpreparedwithasmuchcareanddeliberation.Fromtheverynatureofthings,the
draftersofanoriginalconstitution,asalreadyobservedearlier,operatewithoutanylimitations,restraintsor
inhibitionssavethosethattheymayimposeuponthemselves.Thisisnotnecessarilytrueofsubsequent
conventionscalledtoamendtheoriginalconstitution.Generally,theframersofthelatterseetoitthattheir
handiworkisnotlightlytreatedandaseasilymutilatedorchanged,notonlyforreasonspurelypersonalbutmore
importantly,becausewrittenconstitutionsaresupposedtobedesignedsoastolastforsometime,ifnotforages,
orfor,atleast,solongastheycanbeadoptedtotheneedsandexigenciesofthepeople,hence,theymusthe
insulatedagainstprecipitateandhastyactionsmotivatedbymoreorlesspassingpoliticalmoodsorfancies.
Thus,asarule,theoriginalconstitutionscarrywiththemlimitationsandconditions,moreorlessstringent,made
sobythepeoplethemselves,inregardtotheprocessoftheiramendment.Andwhensuchlimitationsor
conditionsaresoincorporatedintheoriginalconstitution,itdoesnotlieinthedelegatesofanysubsequent
conventiontoclaimthattheymayignoreanddisregardsuchconditionsbecausetheyareaspowerfuland
omnipotentastheiroriginalcounterparts.(Atpage724726).
Butthispassageshouldnotbeunderstood,asitwasnotmeanttobeunderstood,torefertothepeople's
inalienablerighttocastasidethewholeconstitutionitselfwhentheyfindittobeintheirbestintereststodoso.It
wassoindicatedalreadyintheresolutiondenyingthemotionforreconsideration:
Thisisnottosaythatthepeoplemaynot,intheexerciseoftheirinherentrevolutionarypowers,amendthe
Constitutionorpromulgateanentirelynewoneotherwise,butaslongasanyamendmentisformulatedand
submittedundertheaegisofthepresentCharter,anyproposalforsuchamendmentwhichisnotinconformity
withtheletter,spiritandintentoftheprovisionoftheCharterforeffectingamendmentscannotreceivethe
sanctionofthisCourt.(ResolutionofMotionforreconsideration,Tolentinovs.ComelecG.R.No.L34150,
February4,1971).
Foritisratherabsurdtothinkthatinapprovinganewfundamentallawwithwhichtheywouldreplacetheexisting
one,theyhavetoadheretothemandatesofthelatter,underpainofgettingstuckwithit,shouldtheyfall.One
caneasilyvisualizehowtheevilforceswhichdominatedtheelectoralprocessduringtheoldsocietywouldhave
goneintoplayinordertostifletheurgeforchange,hadthemodeofratificationinthemannerofpastplebiscites
beentheoneobservedinthesubmissionoftheNewConstitution.Toreiteratewhatthewritersaidinthe
RatificationCases:
Considerthatinthepresentcasewhatisinvolvedisnotjustanamendmentofaparticularprovisionofanexisting
261/374
6/20/2015Constitutionhere,itis,asIhavediscussedearlierabove,anentirelynewConstitutionthatisbeingproposed.
G.R.No.L35546
Thisimportantcircumstancemakesagreatdealofdifference.
NolessthancounselTolentinoforhereinrespondentsPuyatandRoy,whowashimselfthepetitionerinthecaseI
havejustreferredtois,nowinvitingOurattentiontotheexactlanguageofArticleXVandsuggestingthatthesaid
Articlemaybestrictlyappliedtoproposedamendmentsbutmayhardlygoverntheratificationofanew
Constitution.ItisparticularlystressedthattheArticlespecificallyreferstonothingelsebut"amendmentstothis
Constitution"whichifratified"shallbevalidaspartofthisConstitution."Indeed,howcanawholenewConstitution
bebyanymannerofreasoninganamendmenttoanyotherconstitutionandhowcanit,ifratified,formpartof
suchotherconstitution?...
Itisnotstrangeatalltothinkthattheamendingclauseofaconstitutionshouldbeconfinedinitsapplicationonly
toproposedchangesinanypartofthesameconstitutionitself,fortheveryfactthatanewconstitutionisbeing
adoptedimpliesageneralintenttoputasidethewholeoftheoldone,andwhatwouldbereallyincongruousis
theideathatinsuchaneventuality,thenewConstitutionwouldsubjectitsgoingintoeffectanyprovisionofthe
constitutionitistosupersede,tousethelanguagepreciselyofSection6,ArticleXVII,theeffectivityclause,ofthe
NewConstitution.Myunderstandingisthatgenerally,constitutionsareselfborn,theyveryrarely,ifatall,come
intobeing,byvirtueofanyprovisionofanotherconstitution.Thismustbethereasonwhyeveryconstitutionhas
itsowneffectivityclause,sothatif,theConstitutionalConventionhadonlyanticipatedtheideaofthereferendum
andprovidedforsuchamethodtobeusedintheratificationoftheNewConstitution,Iwouldhavehadserious
doubtsastowhetherArticleXVcouldhavehadpriorityofapplication.(JavellanavsTheExecutiveSecretary50
SCRA197198).
SinceinthewithdrawalmotionofpetitionerDiokno,thewholetrustofhisposturerelativetotheallegednon
enforceabilityoftheConstitutionof1973revolvesaroundsupposednoncomplianceinitsratification,withArticle
XVofthe1935Charter,andinasmuchasitisevidentthattheletterandintentofthatinvokedprovisiondonot
warrant,ashasjustbeenexplained,theapplicationthereoftotheNewConstitution,forthesimplereasonthatthe
sameisnotinfactandinlawaswellasinformandinintentamereamendmenttotheOldConstitution,butan
integrallynewcharterwhichcannotconceivablybemadejustapartthereof,onecannotbutviewsaidmotionto
withdrawashavingbeendesignedfornootherpurposethantoserveasavehiclefortheventilationof
petitioner'spoliticalratherthanlegaloutlookwhichdeservesscantconsiderationinthedeterminationofthemerits
ofthecasesatbar.
Inanyevent,thataconstitutionneednotberatifiedinthemannerprescribedbyitspredecessorandthatthe
possibleinvalidityofthemodeofitsratificationdoesnotaffectitsenforceability,aslongasthefactofitsapproval
bythepeopleortheiracquiescencetheretoisreasonablyshown,isamplydemonstratedinthescholarly
dissertationmadebyourlearnedcolleague,Mr.JusticeFelixV.Makasiar,inhisseparateopinioninthe
RatificationCases,whichcarriedtheconcurrenceofJusticesAntonio,Esguerraandthewriter.Andthatwhattook
placeinthePhilippinesinJanuary,1973isnotanunprecedentedpracticepeculiartoourcountry,islikewise
plainlyshowntherein,sinceitappearsthatnolessthantheConstitutionoftheUnitedStatesofAmerica,the
nationwhosecloseadherencetoconstitutionalismpetitionerswouldwanttheFilipinostoemulate,wasalso
ratifiedinawaynotinconformitywiththeArticlesofConfederationandPerpetualUnion,theConstitutionwhichit
replaced,andthereasonforitwasonlybecausethoseinauthorityfeltthatitwasimpossibletosecureratification,
iftheamendmentclauseoftheArticlesweretobeobserved,andsotheyresortedtoextraconstitutionalmeans
toaccomplishtheirpurposeofhavinganewconstitution.FollowingisthepertinentportionofMr.Justice
Makasiar'silluminatingdisquisitionbasedonactualhistoricalfactsratherthanontheoreticalandphilosophical
hypothesesonwhichpetitionerswouldseemtorely:
Theclassicexampleofanillegalsubmissionthatdidnotimpairthevalidityoftheratificationoradoptionofanew
ConstitutionisthecaseoftheFederalConstitutionoftheUnitedStates.Itshouldberecalledthatthethirteen(13)
originalstatesoftheAmericanUnionwhichsucceededinliberatingthemselvesfromEnglandafterthe
revolutionwhichbeganonApril19,1775withtheskirmishatLexington,Massachusettsandendedwiththe
surrenderofGeneralCornwallisatYorktown,Virginia,onOctober19,1781(EncyclopediaBrit.,Vol.1,1933Ed.,
p.776)adoptedtheirArticlesofConfederationandPerpetualUnion,thatwaswrittenfrom1776to1777and
ratifiedonMarch1,1781(EncyclopediaBrit.,Vol.11,1966Ed.,p.525).Aboutsixyearsthereafter,theCongress
oftheConfederationpassedaresolutiononFebruary21,1787callingforaFederalConstitutionalConvention
"....'(Appendix1,TheFederalist,ModernLibraryed.,p.577,emphasissupplied).
forthesoleandexpresspurposeofrevisaingthearticlesofconfederation
TheConventionconvenedatPhiladelphiaonMay14,1787.ArticleXIIIoftheArticlesofConfederationand
PerpetualUnionstatedspecifically:
Thearticlesofthisconfederationshallbeinviolablyobservedbyeverystate,andtheunionshallbeperpetualnor
.(SeetheFederalist,Appendix11,ModernLibraryEd.,1937,p.584emphasissupplied).
shallanyalterationatanytimehereafterbemadeinanyofthemunlesssuchalterationbeagreedtoinacongressofthe
262/374
6/20/2015unitedstates,andbeafterwardsconfirmedbythelegislaturesofeverystate
G.R.No.L35546
ButtheforegoingrequirementsprescribedbytheArticlesofConfederationandPerpetualUnionforthealteration
andfortheratificationoftheFederalConstitutionasdraftedbythePhiladelphiaConventionwerenotfollowed.
FearfulthatthesaidFederalConstitutionwouldnotberatifiedbythestatelegislaturesasprescribed,the
PhiladelphiaConventionadoptedaresolutionrequestingtheCongressoftheConfederationtopassaresolution
providingthattheFederalConstitutionshouldbesubmittedtoelectedstateconventionsandifratifiedbythe
conventionsinnine(9)states,notnecessarilyinallthirteen(13)states,thesaidConstitutionshalltakeeffect.
Thus,historyProfessorEdwardEarleMeadofPrincetonUniversityrecordedthat:
ItwouldhaveacounselofperfectiontoconsignthenewConstitutiontothetendermerciesofthelegislaturesof
eachandallofthe13states.Experienceclearlyindicatedthatratificationwouldhavehadthesamechanceas
thescripturalcamelpassingthrutheeyeofaneedle.....'(TheFederalist,ModernLibraryEd.,1937,Introduction
byEdwardEarleMead,pp.viiiixemphasissupplied).
ItwasthereforedeterminedtorecommendtoCongressthatthenewConstitutionbesubmittedtoconventionsintheseveral
statesspeciallyelectedtopassandwhenitshouldberatifiedbynineofthethirteenstates
HistorianSamuelEliotMorisonsimilarlyrecounted:
TheConvention,anticipatingthattheinfluenceofmanystatepoliticianswouldbeAntifederalist,providedfor
ratificationoftheConstitutionbypopularlyelectedconventionsineachstate.SuspectingthatRhodeIsland,at
least,wouldproverecalcitrant,itdeclaredthattheConstitutionwouldgointoeffectassoonasninestatesratified.
Theconventionmethodhadthefurtheradvantagethatjudges,ministers,andothersineligibletostatelegislatures
couldbeelectedtoaconvention.Theninestateprovisionwas,ofcourse,mildlyrevolutionary.ButtheCongress
oftheConfederation,stillsittinginNewYorktocarryonfederalgovernmentuntilrelieved,formallysubmittedthe
newconstitutiontothestatesandpolitelyfadedoutbeforethefirstpresidentialinauguration.'(TheOxfordHistory
oftheAm.PeoplebySamuelEliotMorison,1965ed.,p.312).
AndsotheAmericanConstitutionwasratifiedbynine(9)statesonJune21,1788andbythelastfourstateson
May29,1790(12C.J.p.679footnote,16C.J.S.27bythestateconventionsandnotbyallthirteen(13)state
legislaturesasrequiredbyArticleXIIIoftheArticlesofConfederationandPerpetualUnionaforequotedandin
spiteofthefactthattheFederalConstitutionasoriginallyadoptedsuffersfrom
twobasicinfirmities,namelytheabsenceofabillofrightsandofaprovisionaffirmingthepowerofjudicialreview.
ThelibertiesoftheAmericanpeoplewereguaranteedbythesubsequentamendmentstotheFederal
Constitution.ThedoctrineofjudicialreviewhasbecomepartofAmericanconstitutionallawonlybyvirtueofa
judicialpronouncementbyChiefJusticeMarshallinthecaseof(1803,1Branch137).
Marburyvs.Madison
Untilthisdate,nochallengehasbeenlaunchedagainstthevalidityoftheratificationoftheAmericanConstitution,
noragainstthelegitimacyofthegovernmentorganizedandfunctioningthereunder.
Inthe1946caseof(37SE2nd322,326330),whichenunciatedtheprinciplethatthevalidityofaneworrevised
Constitutiondoesnotdependonthemethodofitssubmissionorratificationbythepeople,but,theCourtcited
preciselythecaseoftheirregularrevisionandratificationbystateconventionsoftheFederalConstitution,thus:
Wheelervs.BoardofTrusteesonthefactoffiatorapprovaloradoptionoracquiescencebythepeople,whichfactof
ratificationoradoptionoracquiescenceisallthatisessential
Nocaseidenticalinitsfactswiththecasenowunderconsiderationhasbeencalledtoourattention,andwehave
foundnone,Wethinkthattheprinciplewhichweapplyintheinstantcasewasveryclearlyappliedinthecreation
oftheconstitutionoftheUnitedStates.TheconventioncreatedbyaresolutionofCongresshadauthoritytodo
onething,andoneonly,towit,amendthearticlesofconfederation.Thistheydidnotdo,butsubmittedtothe
sovereignpower,thepeople,anewconstitution.InthismannerwastheconstitutionoftheUnitedStates
submittedtothepeopleanditbecameoperativeastheorganiclawofthisnationwhenithadbeenproperly
adoptedbythepeople.
Pomeroy'sConstitutionalLaw,p.55,discussingtheconventionthatformulatedtheconstitutionoftheUnited
States,hasthistosay"Theconventionproceededtodo,anddidaccomplish,whattheywerenotauthorizedtodo
byaresolutionofCongressthatcalledthemtogether.Thatresolutionplainlycontemplatedamendmentstothe
articlesofconfederation,tobesubmittedtoandpassedbytheCongress,andafterwardsratifiedbyallthestate
legislatures,inthemannerpointedoutbytheexistingorganiclaw.Buttheconventionsoonbecameconvinced
thatanyamendmentswerepowerlesstoeffectacurethatthediseasewastoodeeplyseatedtobereachedby
suchtentativemeans.Theysawthesystemtheywerecalledtoimprovemustbetotallyabandoned,andthatthe
263/374
6/20/2015nationalideamustbereestablishedatthecenteroftheirpoliticalsociety.Itwasobjectedbysomemembers,that
G.R.No.L35546
theyhadnopower,noauthority,toconstructanewgovernment.Theyhadnoauthority,iftheirdecisionswereto
hefinalandnoauthoritywhatever,underthearticlesofconfederation,toadoptthecoursetheydid.Butthey
knewthattheirlaborswereonlytobesuggestionsandthattheyaswellasanyprivateindividuals,andany
privateindividualsaswellasthey,hadarighttoproposeaplanofgovernmenttothepeoplefortheiradoption.
Theywere,infact,amereassemblageofprivatecitizens,andtheirworkhadnomorebindingsanction,thana
constitutiondraftedbyMr.Hamiltoninhisoffice,wouldhavehad.Thepeople,bytheirexpressedwill,
transformedthissuggestion,thisproposal,intoanorganiclaw,andthepeoplemighthavedonethesamewitha
constitutionsubmittedtothembyasinglecitizen.
xxxxxxxxx
...
Whenthepeopleadoptacompletelyrevisedconstitution,theframingorsubmissionoftheinstrumentisnotwhatgivesits
bindingforceandeffect.Thefiatofthepeople,andonlythefiatofthepeople,canbreathelifeintoaConstitution.
....(InStatev.Swift69Ind.505,519,theIndianaSupremeCourtsaid:'ThepeopleofaStatemayforman
originalconstitution,orabrogateanoldoneandformanewone,atandtime,withoutandpoliticalrestriction
excepttheconstitutionoftheUnitedStates....(37SE327328,329,emphasissupplied.)
Wedonothesitatetosaythatacourtisneverjustifiedinplacingbyimplicationalimitationuponthesovereign.Thiswould
beanauthorizedexerciseofsovereignpowerbythecourt
Inthe1903caseof,thecourtheld:
Westonvs.Ryan
Itremainstobesaidthatifwefeltatlibertytopassuponthisquestion,andwerecompellertoholdthattheactof
February23,1887,isunconstitutionalandvoid,itwouldnot,inouropinion,byanymeansfollowthatthe
amendmentisnotapartofourstateConstitution.Intherecentcaseof(Va.)44S.E.754,.In,2Neb.198,isa
similarholdingastocertainprovisionsoftheNebraskaConstitutionof1886,whichwereaddedbytheLegislature
attherequirementofCongress,thoughneversubmittedtothepeoplefortheirapproval.(97NW349350
emphasissupplied).
Taylorvs.CommonwealththeSupremeCourtofVirginiaholdthattheirstateConstitutionof1902,havingbeen
acknowledgedandacceptedbytheofficersadministeringthestategovernment,andbythepeople,andbeinginforce
withouttoppositionmustberegardedasanexistingConstitution,irrespectiveofthequestionastowhetherornotthe
conventionwhichpromulgatedithadauthoritysotodowithoutsubmittingittoavoteofthepeopleBrittlev.People
AgainstthedecisionintheWheelercase,.,confirmingthevalidityoftheratificationandadoptionoftheAmerican
Constitution,inspiteofthefactthatsuchratificationwasaclearviolationoftheprescriptiononalterationand
ratificationoftheArticlesofConfederationandPerpetualUnion,petitionersinG.R.No.L36165dismissedthis
mostsignificanthistoricalfactbycallingtheFederalConstitutionoftheUnitedStatesasarevolutionaryone,
invokingtheopinionexpressedinVol.16,CorpusJurisSecundum,p.27,thatitwasarevolutionaryconstitution
becauseitdidnotobeytherequirementthattheArticlesofConfederationandPerpetualUnioncanbeamended
onlywiththeconsentofallthirteen(13)statelegislatures.Thisopiniondoesnotciteanydecidedcase,butmerely
referstothefootnotesonthebriefhistoricalaccountoftheUnitedStatesConstitutiononp.679ofVol.12,CJS.
Petitioners,onp.18oftheirmainNotes,referUStopp.270316ofthe,1965Ed.bySamuelEliotMorison,who
discussestheArticlesofConfederationandPerpetualUnioninChapterXVIIIcaptioned'Revolutionary
ConstitutionMaking,17751781'(pp.270281).InChapterXXon'TheCreativePeriodinPolitics,17851788,'
ProfessorMorisondelineatesthegenersisoftheFederalConstitution,butdoesnotrefertoitevenimplicitlyasa
revolutionaryconstitution(pp.297316).However,theFederalConstitutionmaybeconsideredrevolutionaryfrom
theviewpointofMcIverifthetermisunderstoodin'itsWIDERsensetoembracedecisivechangesinthe
characterofgovernment,eventhoughtheydonotinvolvetheviolentoverthrowofanestablishedorder,...'(R.M.
MacIver,TheWebofGovernment,1965ed.,p.203).
supraOxfordHistoryoftheAmericanPeoplerevolution
ItisratherridiculoustorefertotheAmericanConstitutionasarevolutionaryconstitution,TheArtyclesof
ConfederationandPerpetualUnionthatwasinforcefromJuly12,1776to1788,forgedasitwasduringthewar
ofindependencewasrevolutionaryconstitutionofthethirteen(13)states.IntheexistingFederalConstitutionof
theUnitedStateswhichwasadoptedseven(7)ornine(9)yearsafterthethirteen(13)stateswontheir
independenceandlongafterpopularsupportforthegovernmentoftheConfederationhadstabilizedwasnota
productofarevolution.TheFederalConstitutionwasa'creationofthebrainandpurposeofman'inaneraof
peace.Itcanonlybeconsideredrevolutionaryinthesensethatitisaradicaldeparturefromitspredecessor,the
ArticlesofConfederationandPerpetualUnion.
264/374
6/20/2015ItisequallyabsurdtoaffirmthatthepresentFederalConstitutionoftheUnitedStatesisnotthesuccessortothe
G.R.No.L35546
ArticlesofConfederationandPerpetualUnion.Thefallacyofthestatementissoobviousthatnofurtherrefutation
isneeded.().
50SCRA209215
Moreover,whetheraproposalsubmittedtothepeopleisjustanamendmenttoanexistingconstitutionwithinthe
contemplationofitsamendmentclauseorisanewcharternotcomprehendedbyitslanguagemaynotbe
determinedsolelybythesimpleprocessesofanalysisofandcomparisonbetweenthecontentsofoneandthe
other.Verymuchdependsonwhattheconstituentassembly,reflectingitsunderstandingofthedesireofthe
peopleitrepresents,actuallyintendsitshandiworktobe,assuchintentmaybededucedfromthefaceofthe
documentitself.Forthetruthisthatwhateverchangesinformandinsubstanceaconstitutionmayundergo,as
longasthesamepolitical,socialandeconomicideologiesasbeforecontinuetobethemotivationbehindsuch
changes,theresultcanneverbe,inastrictsense,anewconstitutionatall.Indeed,insuchcircumstance,any
alterationormodificationofanyprovisionofaconstitution,nomatterhowextensive,canalwayshetracedas
foundedonitsownbedrock,therebyprovingidentity.Itisthereforetheexpresseddesireofthemakersofthe
charterthatisdecisive.AndthatiswhytheNewConstitutionhasitsowneffectivityclausewhichmakesno
referencehowsoevertoArticleXVofthepastcharter.
21
Now,howthefoundingfathersofAmericamusthaveregardedthedifferencebetweenaconstitutional
amendment,ontheonehand,andanewconstitution,ontheother,whentheyfoundtheArticlesofConfederation
andPerpetualUnionnolongeradequateforthefulldevelopmentoftheirnation,ascanbededucedfromthe
historicalaccountabove,isatleastonecaseinpointtheyexercisedtheirrighttoratifytheirnewfundamental
lawinthemostfeasiblemanner,withoutregardtoanyconstitutionalconstraints.Andyet,itistheconstitutionthat
isreputedtohavestoodalltestsandwas,infact,themodelofmanynationalconstitutions,includingourownof
1935,ifitcannotbeaccuratelyregardedalsoasthemodelofthepresentone.
Withtheforegoingconsiderationsinmind,itcanbereadilyseenhowpointlessitistocontend,aspetitioner
Dioknodoesinhismotiontowithdraw,thatwhathedeemsasthefailureoftheJanuary,1973referendumto
conformwiththerequirementsofArticleXVofthe1935ConstitutiondetractsfromtheenforceabilityoftheNew
Constitution,inthelightofthePresident'sassertioncontainedinProclamation1102thatithasbeenapproved
andratifiedbythepeople,coupledwithhisevidentfirmandirreversibleresolutiontoconsiderittohavebeen,
indeed,dulyratified,andinthefaceoftheindisputablefactthatthewholegovernmenteffectivelyincontrolofthe
entirePhilippineterritoryhasbeenoperatingunderitwithoutanyvisibleresistanceonthepartofanysignificant
sectorofthepopulace.ToalludetothefilingofthepetitionsinthePlebisciteandtheRatificationCasesandthe
occasionalappearancesinsomepublicplacesofsomeundergroundpropagandawhich,anyway,hasnotcutany
perceptibleimpressionanywhere,asindicativeorevidenceofoppositionbythepeopletotheNewConstitution
wouldbe,touseacommonplacebutaptexpression,tomistakethetreesfortheforest.
ItisthusabundantlyclearthatthepassionateandtenaciousraciocinationinpetitionerDiokno'swithdrawalmotion
tendingtoassailthecogencyofouropinionsandtheirconsistencywiththejudgmentintheRatificationCases,to
theextentofusingtermsthatcouldsignifydoubtinthegoodfaithandintellectualintegrityofsomemembersof
theCourtandoftryingtoembarrasstheCourtitselfbeforethebarofhistory,doesnotinfacthaveanyplausible
basiswhatsoever.
CONCLUSION
Theinstantcasesareunique.ToOurknowledgeneverbeforehasanynationaltribunalofthehighestauthority
beencalledupontopassonthevalidityofamartiallaworderoftheExecutiveissuedinthefaceofactualor
imminentdangerofarebellionthreateningtheveryexistenceofthenation.Thepetitionshereintreatofno
morethanthedeprivationoflibertyofthepetitioners,butinrealitywhatisinvolvedhereisthelegitimacyofthe
governmentitself.NoSupremeCourtofanyothercountryintheworld,Wereiterate,haseverbeenconfronted
withsuchatranscendentalissue.
Thisis,therefore,adecisionthataffectsnotthepetitionersalone,butthewholecountryandallourpeople.For
thisreason,Wehaveendeavoredtothebestofourabilitytolookatalltheissuesfromeveryconceivablepointof
view.Wehavegoneoverallthejurisprudencecitedbytheparties,thewritingsoflearnedandknowledgeable
authoritiestheyhavequotedandwhateverWecouldavailofbyOurselves.WetrustWehavenotmisunderstood
anyofthecontentionsofthepartiesandtheirableandlearnedcounselsandthatWehavenotoverlookedany
authorityrelevanttothem.AndWemustsayWeperceivenocausetodowngradetheirloveofandloyaltytoour
commonmotherlandevenifdifferencestherearebetweenourconvictionsastohowtoearlierattainthenational
destiny.Indeed,Wehavenotconsideredasreallypersuasiveanyinsinuationsofmotivationsbornofpolitical
partisanshipandpersonalambitions.
Wedonotmeantobelittleordepreciateforeignjurisprudence,butWehavedeliberatelyrefrainedfromrelyingon
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6/20/2015alienopinions,judicialorotherwise,inordertostressthattheFilipinoscansolvetheirownproblemswiththeir
G.R.No.L35546
ownresourcesintellectualorotherwise.Anyway,Wedoubtifthereisenoughrelevantparallelismbetween
occurrencesinothercountriespasseduponbythecourtswithwhatishappeningheretoday.
Principally,bythisdecision,WeholdthatthepowertoproclaimmartiallawislodgedbytheConstitution
exclusivelyintheExecutive,butthegrantofjudicialpowertotheSupremeCourtalsobytheConstitutionis
plenaryandtotaland,therefore,whenitisamatterofjudicialnotice,becauseitiscommonlyknownbythe
generalpublicoriscapableofunquestionabledemonstration,thatanyparticulardeclarationofmartiallawis
devoidofanyoftheconstitutionallyrequiredbases,theCourthasthefullauthorityanditwouldnothesitateto
strikedownanysuchimprovidentproclamationandtoadjudgethatthelegitimategovernmentcontinuewithout
theoffendingExecutive,whoshallbereplacedinaccordancewiththerulesofsuccessionprovidedintheexisting
Constitutionandlaws.Inthecasesatbar,however,theCourt,withtheabstentionofonlyonememberwhohas
preferrednottoemitanyopinionontheissueatthistime,holdsthatthePresidenthadgoodandsufficient
groundsinissuingProclamation1081,whetherthesameisexaminedinthelightofitsownrecitals,assome
Justicesadvocate,oroffactsofjudicialnoticetogetherwiththoseundisputedintherecord,inthemannertherest
ofUshaveactuallytestedit.Wefurtherholdthatinrestrainingthelibertiesofpetitioners,thePresidenthasnot
oversteppedtheboundariesfixedbytheConstitution.
Fordoctrinalpurposes,itisbesttoaddtoalltheforegoingthatajudicialchallengeagainsttheimpositionof
martiallawbytheExecutiveinthemidstoftheactualitiesofarealassaultagainsttheterritorialintegrityandlifeof
thenation,inevitablycallsforthereconciliation,whichWefeelWehavebeenabletoeffectuatehere,oftwo
extremesintheallocationofpowersundertheConstitutiontheresortbytheExecutivetotheultimateweapon
withwhichthefundamentallawallowshimtodefendthestateagainstfactualinvasionorrebellionthreateningthe
publicsafety,ontheonehand,andtheassertionbytheSupremeCourtoftheirreducibleplenitudeofitsjudicial
authority,ontheother.Nootherconflictofprerogativesofsuchtotaldimensionscanconceivablyarisefromthe
operationofanyothertwopartsofthecharter.Thisdecisionthencouldwellbe,hence,whateverhasbeensaid
herewouldnotnecessarilygovernquestionsrelatedtoadverseclaimsofauthorityrelatedtothelowerlevelsof
thehierarchyofpowersintheConstitution.
suigeneris
Wehumblysubmitthisdecisiontothejudgmentofallourpeople,tohistoryandtothegenerationsofFilipinosstill
unborn,confidentthatitcarriesallthatWeknowandallthatWeare.AsWedothis,Wearefullyawarethatinthis
criticalstageofourlifeasanation,ouroverridingneedisunity.ItisOurferventhopethatbythisdecision,We
havedulyperformedOurconstitutionallyassignedpartinthegreatefforttoreduceifnottoeliminatethe
remainingfundamentalcausesofinternecinestrife.
MayDivineProvidencecontinuetoalwayskeepthePhilippinesintherightpathsofdemocracy,freedomand
justiceforall!
JUDGMENT
WHEREFORE,thepetitionsinalltheaboveentitledcasesaredismissed.Nocosts.
ADDENDUM
Thefollowingaremyreasonsforvotinginfavorofgrantingthemotiontowithdraw:
Itiselementarythattheremedyofexistsonlyagainstinvoluntaryconfinement.Themoment,therefore,thatafter
initiallyquestioningthelegalityofhisdetention,thepetitionerseekswithdrawalofhispetitionatanystageofthe
casebeforejudgment,hisdetentionbecomesinlawautomatically,byhisownact,voluntaryorwithhisexpress
consent,hence,thereasonforfurtherinquiryintothecircumstancesthereofceasescompletely,andthecourt's
dutytoproceedfurtherandrenderjudgmentcomestoanend.Byallowingthewithdrawal,nointerestofjustice
wouldbeprejudiced,nojuridicalharmneedingredresscouldbecausedtoanyone.Accordingly,thepetitioner's
motiveforhiswithdrawal,whetherexpressedorunarticulated,areabsolutelyimmaterial,albeit,inthecaseatbar,
petitionerhimselfsuggeststhat,whileaccedingtohisrequest,themembersoftheCourtmayexpresstheirviews
thereon.(SurRejoinderdatedMay21,1974,p.3).
habeascorpus
Inthemindofthewriter,thegroundsallegedbypetitionerDioknoandhiscounselhaveanapparenttendencyto
offendthedignityoftheCourtandtounderminetherespectandfaithofthepeopleinitscapacitytoadminister
justice.Whatisworse,theymaybefalseandbaseless,astheyareemotionalandpersonal.Unlessproperly
explained,theygivetheimpressionthatmovantisimpeachingtheintegrityandgoodfaithofsomemembersof
theCourt.Inthepremises,saidpetitionerandcounselcouldberequiredtoshowcausewhytheyshouldnotbe
heldincontemptoftheCourt,buttherebeingnoformalchargetosucheffectintheinstantproceedings,andin
ordernottoconfusethediscussionandresolutionofthetranscendentalissuesherein,itispreferable,andthe
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6/20/2015Courthasopted,totakeupthematterofthepossibleresponsibilityforcontemptseparately,eithermotupropioor
G.R.No.L35546
upontheinitiativeofwhoevermayallegetobeaggrievedthereby.Forthepresent,ithastobestated,however,
thatundernocircumstancesmayanypartyorcounselventhispersonalfeelingsandemotionsinanypleadingor
paperBledwiththeCourt,particularlywhilehiscaseispendingtherein.Personalitiesthataredirectedtowards
theoccupantsofthejudicialofficenaturallymarthelegalissuesbeforethem,correspondinglymakingmore
difficulttheirproperandimpartialresolution.Evenifthejudgesconcernedareactually,astheyaresupposedto
be,unmovedbythem,stilltherecanbenoassurancethatthelitigantsandthepublicingeneralwillbeconvinced
oftheirabsoluteimpartialityintheirsubsequentactuations,andtothatextent,theinterestsofjusticeareboundto
suffer.Itisbutinkeepingwiththehighesttraditionsofthejudiciarythatsuchimproprietiesarenotallowedtopass
unnoticedandaredealtwithbythecourteitheroruponcorrespondingcomplaint,whetherinanindependent
proceedingorasanincidentwithinthependingcase.Nocourtworthyofitspositionshouldtoleratethem.
motopropio
Butassaultsuponthedignityandintegrityofthecourt,areonething,andtheissuesofthecaseathandare
another.Regardlessofwhatthejudgethinksisthebeliefofthoseconcernedaboutthemotivationsofthecourt's
subsequentresolutionoftheissues,unlessheinhibitshimselffromfurtheractinginthecase,circumstances
permitting,itishisinescapabledutytorenderjudgment,takingcare,ofcourse,thatheremains,infact,objective
andimpartial.Itis,therefore,ofnomoment,forthepurposesofdisposingofpetitionerDiokno'smotionto
withdraw,whetherornotthechargesleveledbyhimandhiscounselagainsttheCourtoranyofitsmembersare
foundedorunfoundedandwhetherornotthesameconstituteactionablemisconductontheirpart,asparticipants
inthecasebeforeUsand/orasmembersoftheBarandofficersoftheCourt.Anypossibleactionforsuch
probablemisconducthasnobearingonthequestionofwhetherornot,observingtheusualrulesandpractices,
theCourtshoulddismisshismainpetition,theallegedillegalityofhisdetentionhavingbeendulycuredbyhis
voluntarysubmissionthereto.
AlltheseisnottosaythatIhavenotgiventhoughttotheimperativenecessityofresolvingtheissuesofpublic
interestraisedinpetitionerDiokno'spetition.IcanalsoseethatitisimportanttotheGovernmentthathedoesnot
escapethelegaleffectsofthedecisioninthesecases.Butifthesearethemainreasonsfordenyinghismotionto
withdraw,IbelievethattheGovernment'sapprehensionsareratherunfounded.WhileIwouldnotsaythatbyhis
withdrawal,petitionerimpliedlyadmitsthecorrectnessofthestandoftheGovernment,whatwiththeavalancheof
protestsagainstallegedinjusticeandsupposedlegalerrorsrunningthroughhispleadings,Iamoftheconsidered
viewthatinlaw,hecannotcorrectlypretendthattherulingsoftheCourtintheothercaseshereininrespectto
theissuesthereinthatarecommonwiththoseofhispetitionarenotbindingonhimatleastbyprecedentialforce.
Andinasmuchasinthecasesnotwithdrawn,alltheissuesofpublicinterestraisedinhiscasewillhavetobe
resolved,Idonotseeanypurposeininsistingthatheshouldremainapetitionerwhenherefuses,asamatterof
conscience,toawaittheunfavorableverdictheforeseesinhisowncase,whichhehimselfanticipateswillnotset
himfreeanyway.Ofcourse,heproteststhatnothinghecansaycanconvincetheCourt,and,ontheotherhand,
perhaps,themosttechnicallyaccurateandpalpablyjustdecisionthecourtmayfashionwillnotconvincehim,but
ithastobeastrangecourtthatwillyieldtoalitigant'spointofviewjustbecausehesincerelyfeelsheisright,
whereasitisnotunusualforalitiganttopretendnottoseethecorrectnessandjusticeofthecourt'sjudgment
unfavorabletohisinterests.
ANTONIO,
J.:
TheseapplicationsforwritsofpresentforreviewProclamationNo.1081ofthePresidentofthePhilippines,
placingthecountryundermartiallawonSeptember21,1972,andthelegalityofthearrestanddetentionof
prisonersundertheaforesaidproclamation.Theissuesposedhaveconfrontedeverydemocraticgovernmentin
everyclimeandineveryage.Theyhavealwaysrecurredintimesofcrisiswhenthenation'ssafetyandcontinued
existenceareinperil.Involvedistheproblemofharmonizingtwobasicintereststhatlieatthefoundationofevery
democraticconstitutionalsystem.ThefirstiscontainedinRosseau'sformulation,'thepeople'sfirstintentionis
thattheStateshallnotperish,"inotherwords,therightoftheStatetoitsexistence.Thesecondarethecivil
libertiesguaranteedbytheConstitution,which"implytheexistenceofanorganizedsystemmaintainingpublic
orderwithoutwhichlibertyitselfwouldbelostintheexcessesofunrestrainedabuses...."(Coxvs.New
Hampshire,312U.S.569[1940]).
habeascorpus
Thepetitionsforinitiallyraisethelegalityofthearrestanddetentionofpetitioners.Astherespondents,however,
plead,indefense,thedeclarationofmartiallawandtheconsequentsuspensionoftheprivilegeof,thevalidityof
ProclamationNo.1081istheultimateconstitutionalissue.
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6/20/2015HearingswereheldonSeptember26and29andOctober6,1972.
G.R.No.L35546
Meanwhile,someofthepetitionerswereallowedtowithdrawtheirpetitions.
2Mostofthepetitionersweresubsequentlyreleasedfromcustodyundercertainconditionsandsomeoftheminsistthat
theircaseshavenotbecomemootastheirfreedomofmovementisrestricted.3Asofthisdate,onlypetitionerBenigno
Aquino,Jr.(L35546)remainsinmilitarycustody.
OnAugust11,1973,petitionerBenignoAquino,Jr.waschargedbeforethemilitarycommissionwiththecrimesof
subversionundertheAntiSubversionAct(RepublicActNo.1700),murderandillegalpossessionoffirearms.On
August23,1973,hefiledanactionforcertiorariandprohibition(L35546)withthisCourt,assailingthevalidityof
histrialbeforethemilitarycommission,becausethecreationofmilitarytribunalsforthetrialofoffenses
committedbyciviliansisunconstitutionalintheabsenceofastateofwarorstatusofbelligerencybeingmartial
lawmeasures,theyhaveceasedwiththecessationoftheemergencyandhecouldnotexpectafairtrial
becausethePresidentofthePhilippineshadprejudgedhiscase.Thatactionispendingconsiderationand
decision.
OnDecember28,1973,petitionerDioknomovedtowithdrawhispetition(L35539),claimingthattherewasdelay
inthedispositionofhiscase,andthatasaconsequenceofthedecisionofthisCourtin(L36142,March31,1973)
andoftheactionofthemembersofthisCourtintakinganoathtosupporttheNewConstitution,hehasreasonto
believethathecannot"reasonablyexpecttogetjusticeinthiscase."Respondentsopposethismotiononthe
groundthatpublicinterestorquestionsofpublicimportanceareinvolvedandthereasonsgivenarefactually
untrueandcontemptuous.OnSeptember11,1974,petitionerDioknowasreleasedfrommilitarycustody.Inview
ofhisrelease,itwastheconsensusofthemajorityoftheCourttoconsiderhiscaseasmoot.Weshallnow
proceedtodiscusstheissuesposedbytheremainingcases.
Javellanav.ExecutiveSecretary
1.IsthedeterminationbythePresidentofthePhilippinesofthenecessityfortheexerciseofhispowertodeclare
martiallawpolitical,hence,finalandconclusiveuponthecourts,orisitjusticiableand,therefore,his
determinationissubjecttoreviewbythecourts?
2.AssumingLansangtobeapplicable,canitbesaidthatthePresidentactedarbitrarilyinissuingProclamation
No.1081?
3.Assumingthattheissuesarejusticiable,cantheSupremeCourtuponthefactsofrecordandthosejudicially
knowntoItnowdeclarethatthenecessityformartiallawhasalreadyceased?
4.Underaregimeofmartiallaw,cantheCourtinquireintothelegaljustificationforthearrestanddetentionas
wellastheotherconstraintsupontheindividuallibertiesofthepetitioners?Intheaffirmative,doesIthaveany
adequatelegalbasistodeclarethattheirdetentionisnolongerauthorizedbytheConstitution.
I
CONSTITUTIONINTENDEDSTRONGEXECUTIVE
Therightofagovernmenttomaintainitsexistenceisthemostpervasiveaspectofsovereignty.Toprotectthe
nation'scontinuedexistence,fromexternalaswellasinternalthreats,thegovernment"isinvestedwithallthose
inherentandimpliedpowerswhich,atthetimeofadoptingtheConstitution,weregenerallyconsideredtobelong
toeverygovernmentassuch,andasbeingessentialtotheexerciseofitsfunctions"(Mr.JusticeBradley,
concurringinLegalTenderCases[US]12Wall.457,554,556,20L.ed.287,314,315).Toattainthisend,nearly
allotherconsiderationsaretobesubordinated.Theconstitutionalpowertoactuponthisbasicprinciplehasbeen
recognizedbyallcourtsineverynationatdifferentperiodsanddiversecircumstances.
Thesepowerswhicharetobeexercisedforthenation'sprotectionandsecurityhavebeenlodgedbythe
ConstitutionunderArticleVII,Section10(2)thereof,onthePresidentofthePhilippines,whoisclothedwith
exclusiveauthoritytodeterminetheoccasiononwhichthepowersshallbecalledforth.
TheconstitutionalprovisionexpresslyvestinginthePresidentthepowertoplace"thePhilippinesoranypart
thereofundermartiallawincaseofinvasion,insurrectionorrebellionorimminentdangerthereofwhenthepublic
safetyrequiresit,"
4istakenbodilyfromtheJonesLawwiththedifferencethatthePresidentoftheUnitedStateshadthepowertomodifyor
vacatetheactiontakenbytheGovernorGeneral.5AlthoughtheCivilGovernor,underSection5ofthePhilippineBillof
1902,could,withtheapprovalofthePhilippineCommission,suspendtheprivilegeofthewritofnopowertoproclaimmartial
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6/20/2015lawwasspecificallygranted.ThispowerisnotmentionedintheFederalConstitutionoftheUnitedStates.Itsimply
G.R.No.L35546
designatesthePresidentascommanderinchief:habeascorpus
ThePresidentshallbeCommanderinChiefoftheArmyandNavyoftheUnitedStatesandofthemilitiaofthe
severalstateswhencalledintoactualserviceoftheUnitedStates...
6
ItsabsenceintheFederalConstitutionnotwithstanding,PresidentAbrahamLincolnduringtheCivilWarplaced
somepartsofthecountryundermartiallaw.Hepredicatedtheexerciseofthispoweronhisauthorityas
CommanderinChiefoftheArmedForcesandonthegroundofextremenecessityforthepreservationofthe
Union.WhennotexpresslyprovidedintheConstitution,itsjustification,therefore,wouldbenecessity.Thussome
authoritativewritersviewitas"notapartoftheConstitutionbutisratherapowertopreservetheConstitution
whenconstitutionalmethodsproveinadequatetothatend.Itisthelawofnecessity."
7Sincethemeaningoftheterm"martiallaw"isobscure,asisthepowerexercisablebytheChiefExecutiveundermartial
law,resortmustbehadtoprecedents.ThusthepowersoftheChiefExecutiveundertheCommanderinChiefclauseofthe
FederalConstitutionhavebeendrawnnotonlyfromgeneralandspecificprovisionsoftheConstitutionbutfromhistorical
precedentsofPresidentialactionintimesofcrises.LincolninvokedhisauthorityundertheCommanderinChiefclauseof
theFederalConstitutionfortheseriesofextraordinarymeasureswhichhetookduringtheCivilWar,suchasthecallingof
volunteersformilitaryservice,theaugmentationoftheArmyandNavy,thepaymentof$2millionfromtheunappropriated
fundsintheTreasurytopersonsunauthorizedtoreceiveit,theclosingofthePostOfficeto"treasonablecorrespondence,"
theblockadeofSouthernports,thesuspensionofthewritof,thearrestsanddetentionsofpersons"whowererepresented
tohimasbeingengagedinorcontemplating"treasonablepractices"allthisforthemostpartwasdonewithouttheleast
statutoryauthorizationfromCongress.TheactionsofLincoln"assertforthePresident,"accordingtoCorwin,"aninitiativeof
indefinitescopeandlegislativeineffectinmeetingthedomesticaspectsofawaremergency."habeascorpus8Thecreation
ofpublicofficesisconferredbytheFederalConstitutiontoCongress.DuringWorldWar1,however,PresidentWilson,on
thebasisofhispowerunderthe"CommanderinChief"clauseoftheFederalConstitution,created"publicoffices,"which
werecopiedinlavishscalebyPresidentRooseveltinWorldWarII."Theprincipalcanonsofconstitutionalinterpretationare
inwartimesetaside,"accordingtoCorwin,"sofarasconcernsboththescopeofnationalpowerandthecapacityofthe
Presidenttogatheruntohimselfalltheconstitutionallyavailablepowersinorderthemoreeffectivelytofocusthemuponthe
taskofthehour."9Thepresidentialpower,"buildingonaccumulatedprecedentshastakenonattimes,underthe
stimulationofemergencyconditions,"accordingtotwoeminentcommentators,the"dimensionsofexecutiveprerogativeas
describedbyJohnLocke,ofapowertowit,tofillneededgapsinthelaw,oreventosupersedeitsofarasmayberequisite
torealizethefundamentallawofnatureandgovernment,namely,thatasmuchasmaybeallthemembersofsocietyareto
bepreserved."10
Thereisnoquestionthattheframersofthe1935Constitutionwereawareoftheseprecedentsandofthescope
ofthepowerthathadbeenexercisedbythePresidentsoftheUnitedStatesintimesofgravecrisis.Theframers
oftheConstitution"werenotonlyidealistsbutalsopracticalmindedmen.""Whiletheyabjuredwarsofaggression
theywellknewthatforthecountrytosurviveprovisionsforitsdefensehadtobemade."11.
II
TEXTUALLYDEMONSTRABLECONSTITUTIONALCOMMITMENTOFISSUETOTHEPRESIDENT
InsteadofmakingthePresidentofthePhilippinessimplythecommanderinchiefofallthearmedforces,with
authoritywheneveritbecomesnecessarytocalloutsucharmedforcestopreventorsuppresslawlessviolence,
invasion,insurrection,orrebellion,theframersofthe1935Constitutionexpresslyconferreduponhimthe
exclusivepowerandauthoritytosuspendtheprivilegesofthewritoforplacethePhilippines,oranypartthereof,
undermartiallaw.
habeascorpus
requiresit,hemaysuspendtheprivilegesofthewritoforplacethePhilippinesoranypartthereofundermartial
law.
habeascorpus2
Theconditionwhichwouldwarranttheexerciseofthepowerwasnotconfinedtoactualinvasion,insurrectionor
rebellion,butalsoto,whenthepublicsafetyrequiresit.Itisevident,therefore,thatwhileAmericanPresidents
derivedtheseextraordinarypowersbyimplicationfromtheState'srighttoselfpreservation,thePresidentofthe
PhilippineswasexpresslygrantedbytheConstitutionwithallthepowersnecessarytoprotectthenationintimes
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6/20/2015ofgraveperil.
G.R.No.L35546
imminentdangerthereof
ThesafetyandwellbeingofthenationrequiredthatthePresidentshouldnotbehamperedbylackofauthority
butwastobea"strongexecutivewhocouldmaintaintheunityofthenationwithsufficientpowersand
prerogativestosavethecountryduringgreatcrisesanddangers."
13
AsDelegateJoseP.Laurelcomprehensivelyexplained:
ofourindependent,orsemiindependentexistence.Aweakexecutiveissynonymouswithaweakgovernment.
Heshallnotbea'monarch'oradictatorintimeofprofoundandOctavianpeace,andwhatevermaybehis
position,hebulwarksnormally,thefortificationsofastrongconstitutionalgovernment,butabnormally,inextreme
cases,heissuddenlyusheredisasaMinerva,fullgrownandinfullpanoplyofwar,.(EmphasisSupplied.)
buthevirtuallysobecomesinanextraordinaryemergencytooccupythevantagegroundasthereadyprotectorand
defenderofthelifeandhonorofhisnation14
TheconcentrationofanamplitudeofpowerinthehandsoftheCommanderinChiefoftheArmedForcesofthe
Philippines,whoisatthesametimetheelectedcivilianChiefofState,ispredicateduponthefactthatitishewho
mustinitiallyshouldertheburdenanddealwiththeemergency.Bythenatureofhispositionhepossessesand
wieldstheextraordinarypowersofselfpreservationofthedemocratic,constitutionalstate.Intimesofcrisisthere
isindeedunificationofresponsibilityandcentralizationofauthorityintheChiefExecutive."Theconcentrationof
governmentalpowerinademocracyfacedbyanemergency,"wroteRossiter,"isacorrectivetothecrisis
inefficienciesinherentinthedoctrineoftheseparationofpowers....Innormaltimestheseparationofpowers
formsadistinctobstructiontoarbitrarygovernmentalaction.Bythissametokeninabnormaltimesitmayforman
insurmountablebarriertodecisiveemergencyactioninbehalfoftheStateanditsindependentexistence.There
aremomentsinthelifeofanygovernmentwhenallthepowersmustworktogetherinunanimityofpurposeand
action,evenifthismeansthetemporaryunionofexecutive,legislativeandjudicialpowersinthehandsofone
man.Themorecompletetheseparationofpowersinaconstitutionalsystem,themoredifficultandyetthemore
necessarywillbetheirfusionintimeofcrisis."(Rossiter,ConstitutionalDictatorship,288289.)
Itwasintended,however,thattheexerciseoftheseextraordinarypowersisforthepreservationoftheState,its
democraticinstitutions,andthepermanentfreedomofitscitizens.
III
RESPONSIBILITYIMPLIESBROADAUTHORITYANDDISCRETION
Theconditionsofwar,ofinsurrectionorrebellion,orofanyothernationalemergencyareasvariedasthemeans
requiredformeetingthemanditis,therefore,withinthecontemplationoftheConstitutionthattheChief
Executive,topreservethesafetyofthenationonthosetimesofnationalperil,shouldhavethebroadestauthority
compatiblewiththeemergencyinselectingthemeansandadoptingthemeasureswhichinhishonestjudgment
arenecessaryforthepreservationofthenation'ssafety."Thecircumstancesthatendangerthesafetyofnations
areinfinite,"wroteAlexanderHamilton,"andforthisreasonnoconstitutionalshacklescanwiselybeimposedon
thepowertowhichthecareofitiscommitted...Thisisoneofthosetruthswhichtoacorrectandunprejudiced
mindcarriesitsownevidencealongwithit,andmaybeobscured,butcannotbemadeplainerbyargumentor
reasoning...Themeansoughttobeinproportiontotheendthepersonsfromwhoseagencytheattainmentof
anyendisexpectedoughttopossessthemeansby]whichitistobeattained."
15Mr.Madisonexpressedthesameideainthefollowingterms:"Itisvaintoimposeconstitutionalbarrierstotheimpulseof
selfpreservation.Itisworsethaninvain,becauseitplantsintheConstitutionitselfnecessaryusurpationsofpower."16
"Unquestionably,"wroteChiefJustice(7How.44,[18491,12L.ed.600),"aStatemayuseitsmilitarypowertoput
downanarmedinsurrection,toostrongtobecontrolledbythecivilauthority.Thepowerisessentialtothe
existenceofeverygovernment,essentialtothepreservationoforderandfreeinstitutions,andisasnecessaryto
theStatesofthisUnionastoanyothergovernment.TheStateitselfmustdeterminewhatdegreeofforcethe
crisisdemands.AndiftheGovernmentofRhodeIslanddeemedthearmedoppositionsoformidable,andso
ramifiedthroughouttheState,astorequiretheuseofitsmilitaryforceandthedeclarationofmartiallaw,wesee
nogrounduponwhichthisCourtcanquestionitsauthority."
TaneyinLutherv.Borden
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6/20/2015InthePrizecases(17L.ed.476,[1863]),theCourtascribedtothePresidentoftheUnitedStates,byvirtueofhis
G.R.No.L35546
powersasChiefExecutiveandasCommanderinChief,thepowerwhichinisattributedtothegovernmentasa
whole,totreatofinsurrectionasastateofwar,andthesceneoftheinsurrectionasaseatortheaterofwar.As
JusticeGrierinthePrizecasessignificantlystated:"WhetherthePresidentinfulfillinghisdutiesasCommander
inChief,insuppressinganinsurrection,hasmetwithsuchhostileresistance,andaofthegovernmenttowhich
thispowerwasentrusted.'Hemustdeterminewhatdegreeofforcethecrisisdemands.(Emphasissupplied.)
Lutherv.Bordencivilwarofsuchalarmingproportionsaswillcompelhimtoaccordtothemthecharacterofbelligerents,is
aquestiontobedecidedbyhim,andthiscourtmustbegovernedbythedecisionsandactsofthePoliticalDepartment
In,wheretheCourtupheldthecurfewregulationsaffectingpersonsofJapaneseancestryasvalidmilitary
measurestopreventespionageandsabotage,therewasagainreaffirmanceoftheviewthattheConstitutionhas
grantedtothePresidentandtoCongressintheexerciseofthewarpowersa"widescopefortheexerciseof
judgmentanddiscretionindeterminingthenatureandextentofthethreateneddangerandintheselectionofthe
meansforresistingit."
Hirabayashiv.UnitedStates
SincetheConstitutioncommitstotheExecutiveandtoCongresstheexerciseofthewarpowerinallthe
vicissitudesandconditionsofwarfare,ithasnecessarilygiventhemwidescopefortheexerciseofjudgmentand
discretionindeterminingthenatureandextentofthethreatenedinjuryordangerandintheselectionofthe
meansforresistingit.ExparteQuirin,(317US28,29,ante,12,13,63SCt2)PrizeCases,(2Black[US]670,
17Led477)Martinv.Mott,12Wheat.[US]19,29,6Led537,540).Where,astheydidhere,theconditionscall
fortheexerciseofjudgmentanddiscretionandforthechoiceofmeansbythosebranchesoftheGovernmenton
whichtheConstitutionhasplacetheresponsibilityofwarmaking,itisnotforanycourttositinreviewofthe
wisdomoftheiractionorsubstituteitsjudgmentfortheirs.
suprasupra
TheactionstakenmustbeappraisedinthelightoftheconditionswithwhichthePresidentandCongresswere
confrontedintheearlymonthsof1942,manyofwhich,sincedisclosed,werethenpeculiarlywithintheknowledge
ofthemilitaryauthorities.
17
Themeasurestobetakenincarryingonwarandtosuppressinsurrection,"accordingtoJusticeSwayne,in,Stewartv.
Kahn18"arenotdefined.Thedecisionofallquestionsrestswhollyinthediscretionofthosetowhomthesubstantialpowers
involvedareconfidedbytheConstitution.Inthelattercase,thepowerisnotlimitedtovictoriesinthefieldandthe
dispersionoftheinsurgentforces.Itcarrieswithitinherentlythepowertoguardagainsttheimmediaterenewalofthe
conflict,andtoremedytheevilswhichhavearisenfromitsriseandprogress.
ThethrustofthoseauthoritiesisthatthePresidentascommanderinchiefandchiefexecutiveonwhomis
committedtheresponsibilityisempowered,indeedobliged,topreservethestateagainstdomesticviolenceand
alienattack.Inthedischargeofthatduty,henecessarilyisaccordedaverybroadauthorityanddiscretionin
ascertainingthenatureandextentofthedangerthatconfrontsthenationandinselectingthemeansor
measuresnecessaryforthepreservationofthesafetyoftheRepublic.
Theterms"insurrection"and"rebellion"areinalargemeasureincapableofpreciseorexactlegaldefinitionsand
aremoreorlesselasticintheirmeanings.Astowhenanactorinstanceofrevoltingagainstcivilorpolitical
authoritymaybeclassifiedasan"insurrection"orasa"rebellion"isaquestionbetteraddressedtothePresident,
whoundertheConstitutionistheauthorityvestedwiththepowerofascertainingtheexistenceofsuchexigencies
andchargedwiththeresponsibilityofsuppressingthem.Tosuppresssuchdangertothestate,heisnecessarily
vestedwithabroadauthorityanddiscretion,tobeexercisedundertheexigenciesofeachparticularoccasionas
thesamemaypresentitselftohisjudgmentanddetermination.Hisactionsinthefaceofsuchemergencymust
beviewedinthecontextofthesituationasitthenconfrontedhim.Itisnotforanycourttositinreviewofthe
wisdomofhisactionascommanderinchiefortosubstituteitsjudgmentforhis.
IV
NEEDFORUNQUESTIONINGADHERENCETOPOLITICALDECISION
Itis,however,insistedthatevenwiththebroaddiscretiongrantedtothePresidentbytheConstitutionin
ascertainingwhetherornotconditionsexistforthedeclarationofmartiallaw,hisfindingsinsupportofsuch
declarationshouldneverthelessbesubjecttojudicialreview.
ItisimportanttobearinmindthatWeareheredealingwithaplenaryandexclusivepowerconferreduponthe
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6/20/2015ChiefExecutivebytheConstitution.Thepoweritselfistobeexerciseduponsuddenemergencies,andunder
G.R.No.L35546
circumstanceswhichmaybevitaltotheexistenceofthegovernment.Apromptandunhesitatingobedienceto
ordersissuedinconnectiontherewithisindispensableaseverydelayandobstacletoitsimmediate
implementationmayjeopardizethepublicinterests.
ByreasonofhisuniquepositionasChiefExecutiveandasCommanderinChiefoftheArmedForcesofthe
Philippines,itishe,morethananyotherhighofficialofthegovernment,whohastheauthorityandthemeansof
obtainingthroughthevariousfacilitiesinthecivilandmilitaryagenciesofthegovernmentunderhiscommand,
informationpromptlyandeffectively,fromeveryquarterandcornerofthestateabouttheactualpeaceandorder
conditionofthecountry.Inconnectionwithhisdutyandresponsibility,heisnecessarilyaccordedthewiseand
objectivecounseloftrainedandexperiencedspecialistsonthesubject.EveniftheCourtcouldobtainallavailable
information,itwouldlackthefacilityofdeterminingwhetherornottheinsurrectionorrebellionortheimminence
thereofposesadangertothepublicsafety.Norcouldthecourtsrecreateacompletepictureoftheemergencyin
thefaceofwhichthePresidentacted,inordertoadequatelyjudgehismilitaryaction.Absentanyjudicially
discoverableandmanageablestandardsforresolvingjudiciallythosequestions,suchataskforacourtto
undertakemaywellnighbeimpossible.Ontheotherhand,thePresident,whoisresponsibleforthepeaceand
securityofthenation,isnecessarilycompelledbytheConstitutiontomakethosedeterminationsanddecisions.
Thematteriscommittedtohimfordeterminationbycriteriaofpoliticalandmilitaryexpediency.Thereexists,
therefore,nostandardascertainablebysettledjudicialexperiencebyreferencetowhichhisdecisioncanbe
reviewedbythecourts.
19Indeed,thosearemilitarydecisionsandintheirverynature,"militarydecisionsarenotsusceptibleofintelligentand
judicialappraisal.Theydonotpretendtorestonevidence,butaremadeoninformationthatoftenwouldnotbeadmissible
andonassumptionsthatcouldnotbeproved.Informationinsupportofanordercouldnotbedisclosedtocourtswithout
dangerthatitwouldreachtheenemy.Neithercancourtsactoncommunicationsmadeinconfidence.Hence,courtscan
neverhaveanyrealalternativetoacceptingthemeredeclarationoftheauthoritythatissuedtheorderthatitwasreasonably
necessaryfromamilitaryviewpoint."20Heisnecessarilyconstitutedthejudgeoftheexistenceoftheexigencyinthefirst
instanceandisboundtoactaccordingtohisbeliefofthefacts.
Bothreasonandauthority,therefore,dictatethatthedeterminationofthenecessityfortheexerciseofthepower
todeclaremartiallawiswithintheexclusivedomainofthePresidentandhisdeterminationisfinalandconclusive
uponthecourtsanduponallpersons.(cf.Fairman,MartialRuleandtheSuppressionofInsurrection,p.771.)
21Thisconstructionnecessarilyresultsfromthenatureofthepoweritself,andfromthemanifestobjectcontemplatedby
theConstitution.
Thedanger,anddifficultieswhichwouldgrowoutoftheadoptionofacontraryruleareclearlyandablypointed
outintheBarceloncase,thus:
(a).
Barcelonv.Baker
Theexistingdoctrineatthetimeoftheframingandadoptionofthe1935Constitutionwasthatof(5Phil.87)..
AndwhentheChiefExecutivehasdecidedthatconditionsexistjustifyingthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthe
writof,.Thesedoctrinesarerootedonpragmaticconsiderationsandsoundreasonsofpublicpolicy.The
"doctrinethatwhenevertheConstitutionorastatutegivesadiscretionarypowertoanyperson,suchpersonisto
beconsideredthesoleandexclusivejudgeoftheexistenceofthosefacts"hasbeenrecognizedbyallcourtsand
"hasneverbeendisputedbyanyrespectableauthority.",.)Thepoliticaldepartment,accordingtoChiefJustice
Taneyin(12Wheat2931),isthesolejudgeoftheexistenceofwarorinsurrection,andwhenitdeclareseitherof
theseemergenciestoexist,itsactionisnotsubjecttorevieworliabletobecontrolledbythejudicialdepartment
oftheState.(Citing,23Cal.172,178.)
Barcelonv.BakerItenunciatedtheprinciplethatwhentheGovernorGeneralwiththeapprovalofthePhilippine
Commission,underSection5oftheActofCongressofJuly1,1902,declaresthatastateofrebellion,insurrectionor
invasionexists,andbyreasonthereofthepublicsafetyrequiresthesuspensionofthePrivilegesofhabeascorpus,this
declarationisheldconclusiveuponthejudicialdepartmentofthegovernmenthabeascorpuscourtswillpresumethatsuch
conditionscontinuetoexistuntilthesameauthorityhasdecidedthatsuchconditionsnolongerexistBarcelonv.
BakersupraMartinv.MottFranklinv.StateBoardofExaminers
Commission,arenotconclusiveandfinalasagainstthejudicialdepartmentoftheGovernment,thenwhoseduty
itistomaintainorderandprotectthelivesandpropertyofthepeopleandconclusionconcerningthesame
everyofficermayrefusetoact,andapplytothejudicialdepartmentoftheGovernmentforanotherinvestigation
Owingtoconditionsattimes,astateofinsurrection,rebellion,orinvasionmayarisesuddenlyandmayjeopardize
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6/20/2015theveryexistenceoftheState.Suppose,forexample,thatoneofthethicklypopulatedGovernmentssituated
G.R.No.L35546
andthatthepeopleofthedistrictareincollusionwithsuchinvasion.andtheCommissionandproofofthefacts
communicated,eventotheextentofsuspendingtheprivilegeofthewritof,asmightappeartothemtobe
necessarytorepelsuchinvasion?Itseemsthatallmeninterestedinthemaintenanceandstabilityofthe
Governmentwouldanswerthisquestionintheaffirmative.
telegraphofthislandingoftroopsMightnottheGovernorGeneralacceptthistelegramassufficientandatoncetake
stepshabeascorpus
Butsupposesomeone,whohasbeenarrestedinthedistrictuponthegroundthathisdetentionwouldassistin
restoringorderandinrepellingtheinvasion,appliesforthewritof,allegingthatnoinvasionactuallyexiststoit
concerningtheexistenceornonexistenceofthefactsproclaimedtoexistbythelegislativeandexecutive
branchesoftheState?Ifso,thenthecourtsmayeffectuallytiethehandsoftheexecutive,whosespecialdutyitis
toenforcethelawsandmaintainorder,untiltheinvadershaveactuallyaccomplishedtheirpurpose.The
interpretationcontendedforherebytheapplicants,sopregnantwithdetrimentalresults,couldnothavebeen
intendedbytheCongressoftheUnitedStateswhenitenactedthelaw.
habeascorpusmaythejudicialoftheGovernmentcalltheofofficersactuallyengagedinthefieldbeforeitandawayfrom
theirpostsofdutyforthepurposeofexplainingandfurnishingproof
ItisthedutyofthelegislativebranchoftheGovernmenttomakestichlawsandregulationsaswilleffectually
GovernorGeneraltotakestichstepsashedeemswiseandnecessaryforthepurposeofenforcingsuchlaws.
mentionednecessarilytendstojeopardizepublicinterestandthesafetyofthewholepeople..Butitisurgedthat
thePresident,ortheGovernorGeneralwiththeapprovalofthePhilippineCommission,mightbemistakenasto
theactualconditionsthatthelegislativedepartmentthePhilippineCommissionmight,byresolution,declare
afterinvestigation,thatastateofrebellion,insurrection,orinvasionexists,andthatthepublicsafetyrequiresthe
suspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritof,when,asamatteroffact,nosuchconditionsactuallyexistedthatthe
President,orGovernorGeneralactingupontheauthorityofthePhilippineCommission,mightbyproclamation
suspendtheprivilegeofthewritofwithoutthereactuallyexistingtheconditionsmentionedintheactofCongress.
Inotherwords,theapplicantsallegeintheirargumentinsupportoftheirapplicationforthewritofthatthe
levislativeandexecutivebranchesoftheGovernmentmightreachawrongconclusionfromtheirinvestigationsof
theactualconditions,ormight,throughadesiretooppressandharassthepeople,declarethatastateof
rebellion,insurrection,orinvasionexistedandthatpublicsafetyrequiredthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthe
writofwhenactuallyandinfactnosuchconditionsdidexist.Wecannotassumethatthelegislativeandexecutive
brancheswillactortakeanyactionbaseduponsuchmotives.
IfthejudicialdepartmentoftheGovernment,oranyofficerintheGovernment,hasarighttocontesttheordersofthe
PresidentoroftheGovernorGeneralundertheconditionsabovesupposed,beforecomplyingwithsuchorders,thenthe
handofthePresidentortheGovernorGeneralmaybetieduntiltheveryobjectoftherebelsorinsurrectosorinvadershas
beenaccomplishedhabeascorpushabeascorpushabeascorpus
Moreover,itcannotbeassumedthatthelegislativeandexecutivebranchesoftheGovernment,withallthe
branchoftheGovernmenttoconstantlyinformthelegislativeranchoftheGovernmentoftheconditionofthe
Unionastotheprevalenceofpeaceordisorder.TheexecutivebranchoftheGovernment,through"Itsnumerous
branchesofthecivilandmilitary,ramifieseveryportionoftheArchipelago,andisenabledtherebytoobtain
verylimitedmachineryforthepurposeofinvestigatinggeneralconditionsbeanymoresureofascertainingthe
trueconditionsthroughouttheArchipelagoorinanyparticulardistrict,thantheotherbranchesofthe
Government?Wethinknot.(5Phil.,pp.9396.)
(b)
TheConstitutiondalConventionof1934.
ThiswasthestateofPhilippinejurisprudenceonthematter,whentheConstitutionalConventionmetonJuly20,
1934.Itmustberecalledthat,underthePhilippineBillof1902,thesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritofbythe
GovernorGeneralwassubjecttotheapprovalofthePhilippine(Section5,ActofCongressofJuly1,1902),
while,underSection21oftheJonesLawof1916,thesuspensionoftheofprivilegeofthewritofaswellasthe
proclamationofmartiallawbytheGovernorGeneralcouldbemodifiedorvacatedbythePresidentoftheUnited
State.WhenthefirstDraftwasSubmittedconferringthepowertosuspendtheprivilegeofthewritofexclusively
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6/20/2015uponthePresident,DelegateAranetaproposedanamendmenttotheeffectthattheNationalAssemblyshould
G.R.No.L35546
betheorganempoweredtosuspendtheprivilegesoftheand,whennotsession,thesamemaybedonebythe
PresidentwiththeconsentofthemajorityoftheSupremeCourt.UndertheprovisionsoftheDraft,Delegate
Aranetaargued,"theChiefExecutivewouldbetheonlyauthoritytodeterminetheexistenceofthereasonsforthe
suspensionofthewritofand,accordingtoPhilippinejurisprudence,theSupremeCourtwouldrefusetoreview
thefindingsoftheExecutiveonthematter.Consequently,headded,arrestswouldbeeffectedbymilitarymen
whoweregenerallyarbitrary.Theywouldbearrestingpersonsconnectedwiththerebellion,insurrection,
invasionsomeofthemmightalsobearrestingotherpersonwithoutanycausewhatsoever.Theresultwouldbe
thatmanypersonsmightfindthemselvesdetainedwheninfacttheyhadnoconnectionwhatsoeverwiththe
disturbances."
habeascorpushabeascorpushabeascorpushabeascorpushabeascorpus22Notwithstandingthebrilliantargumentsof
DelegateAraneta,theConventionvoteddowntheamendment.EvidentwastheclearintentoftheframersoftheCharterof
vestingonthePresidenttheexclusivepowerofsuspendingtheprivilegeofthewritofandtheconclusivepowerto
determinewhethertheexigencyhasarisenrequiringthesuspension.TherewasnooppositionintheConventiontothegrant
onthePresidentoftheexclusivepowertoplacethePhilippinesoranypartthereofundermartiallaw.habeascorpus
RealizingthefragmentationofthePhilippinesintothousandsofislandsandofthewarcloudsthatwerethen
hoveringover,EuropeandAsia,theaforesaidframersoftheCharteroptedforastrongexecutive.
TheprovisionofSection10,Paragraph2,ofArticleVIIofthe1935Constitutionwas,therefore,adoptedinthe
lightoftheCourt'sinterpretationin.
Barcelonv.Baker
(c)
Montenegrov.Castaeda.
OnAugust30,1952,or17yearsaftertheratificationofthe1935Constitution,thisCourtin(91Phil.882.887),
construingthepowerofthePresidentofthePhilippinesunderArticleVII,Section10,Paragraph2,ofthe
Constitution,reaffirmedthedoctrinein,thus:"WeagreewiththeSolicitorGeneralthatinthelightoftheviewof
thelimitedStatesSupremeCourtthroughMarshall,TaneyandStoryquotedwithapprovalin(5Phil.87,99100),
theauthoritytodecidewhethertheexigencyhasarisenrequiringsuspensionbelongstothePresidentandupon
thecourtsanduponallotherpersons."
Montenegrov.CastaedaBarcelonv.BakerBarcelonv.Baker'hisdecisionisfinalandconclusive'
OnMontenegro'scontentionthatthereisnostateofinvasion,insurrection,rebellionorimminentdangerthereof,
asthe"intermittentsortiesandlightningattacksbyorganizedbandsindifferentplacesareoccasional,localized
andtransitory,"thisCourtexplainedthattotheunpracticedeyetherepeatedencountersbetweendissident
elementsandmilitarytroopsmayseemsporadic,isolated,orcasual.ButtheofficerschargedwiththeNation's
security,analyzedtheextentandpatternofsuchviolentclashesandarrivedattheconclusionthattheyarewarp
andwoofofageneralschemetooverthrowthisgovernment",byforceofarms."ThisCourtthenreiteratedone
ofthereasonswhythefindingoftheChiefExecutivethatthereis"actualdangerofrebellion"wasaccorded
conclusiveness,thus:"Indeed,asJusticeJohnsonsaidinthatdecision,whereastheExecutivebranchofthe
Governmentisenabledthruitscivilandmilitarybranchestoobtaininformationaboutpeaceandorderfromevery
quarterandcornerofthenation,thejudicialdepartment,withitsverylimitedmachinerycannotbeinbetter
positiontoascertainorevaluatetheconditionsprevailingintheArchipelago."(,91Phil.,882,886887.)
vietarmisMontenegrov.CastaedaandBalao
ItistruethattheSupremeCourtofthe,
UnitedStatesinSterlingv.Constantin23asserteditsauthoritytoreviewtheactiontakenbytheStateGovernorofTexas
underhisproclamationofmartiallaw.However,theCourtchosenottooverturntheprincipleexpressedinthatthequestion
ofis"onestrictlyreservedforexecutivediscretion."Itheldthat,whilethedeclarationofisconclusive,themeasures
employedarereviewable:Moyerv.Peabodynecessity
Itdoesnotfollowfromthefactthattheexecutivehasthisrangeofdiscretion,deemedtobeanecessaryincident
ofhispowertosuppressdisorderthateverysortofactiontheGovernormaytake,nomatterhowunjustifiedby
theexigencyorsubversiveorprivaterightandthejurisdictionofthecourts,otherwiseavailable,isconclusively
supportedbymereexecutivefiat.ThecontraryiswellestablishedWhatarethelimitsofmilitarydiscretion,and
whetherornottheyhavebeenoversteppedinaparticularcasearejudicialquestions....
ThisrulinginSterlingshouldbeviewedwithinthecontextofitsfactualenvironment.Atissuewasthevalidityof
theattemptoftheGovernortoenforcebyexecutiveormilitaryordertherestrictionontheproductionofoilwells
whichtheDistrictJudgehadrestrainedpendingproperjudicialinquiry.TheStateGovernorpredicatedhispower
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6/20/2015undermartiallaw,althoughitwasconcededthat"atnotimehastherebeenanyactualuprisingintheterritoryat
G.R.No.L35546
notimehasanymilitaryforcebeenexertedtoputriotsandmobsdown."TheCourtdisapprovedtheorderofthe
Governorasithadnorelationtothesuppressionofdisorderbutonthecontraryitunderminedtherestraining
orderoftheDistrictJudge.TheCourtdeclaredthattheGovernorcouldnotbypasstheprocessesof
constitutionalgovernmentbysimplydeclaringmartiallawwhennoemergencyexisted.Whilethiscaseshowsthat
thejudiciarycaninterferewhenexistedwhichcouldreasonablybeinterpretedasconstitutinganemergency,itdid
notnecessarilyresolvethequestionwhethertheCourtcouldinterfereinthefaceofan.
bonafidenocircumstancesactualemergency
(d)
Lansangv.Garcia.
Ourattention,ishowever,invitedto(G.R.No.L33964etc.,December11,1971,42SCRA448)wherethisCourt
declared,inconnectionwiththesuspensionoftheofthewritofbythePresidentofthePhilippinesonAugust21,
1971,thatithastheauthoritytoinquireintotheexistenceofthefactualbasisoftheproclamationinorderto
determinetheconstitutionalsufficiencythereof.ButthisassertionofauthorityisqualifiedbytheCourt's
unequivocalstatementthat"thefunctionoftheCourtismerelytochecknottotheExecutive,ortoofhis
jurisdiction,ortodeterminethewisdomofhisact."Andthatjudicialinquiryintothebasisofthequestionedthanto
satisfytheCourttonotthePresident'sdecisionisandthatpublicsafetywasendangeredbytherebellionand
justifiedthesuspensionofthewrit,butthatinsuspendingthewrit,thePresidentdidnotact."
Lansangv.Garciahabeascorpussupplantascertainmerelywhetherhehasgonebeyondtheyconstitutionallimitsnotto
exercisethepowervestedinhimcorrectarbitrarily
Intheascertainmentofthefactualbasisofthesuspension,however,theCourthadtorelyimplicitlyonthe
findingsoftheChiefExecutive.Itdidnotconductanyindependentfactualinquiryfor,asthisCourtexplainedin
BarcelonandMontenegro,"...whereastheExecutivebranchoftheGovernmentisenabledthruitsciviland
militarybranchestoobtaininformationaboutpeaceandorderfromeveryquarterandcornerofthenation,the
judicialdepartment,withitsverylimitedmachinerycannotbeinabetterpositiontoascertainorevaluatethe
conditionsprevailingintheArchipelago."Indeed,suchrelianceontheExecutive'sfindingswouldbethemore
compellingwhenthedangerposedtothepublicsafetyisonearisingfromCommunistrebellionandsubversion.
WecantakejudicialnoticeofthefactthattheCommunistshaverefinedtheirtechniquesofrevolution,butthe
ultimateobjectisthesame"tounderminethroughcivildisturbancesandpoliticalcrisesthewilloftheruling
classtogovern,and,atacriticalpoint,totakeoverStatepowerthroughwellplannedandablydirected
insurrection."
24Insteadofinsurrection,therewastobetheprotractedwar.Theplanwastoretreatandattackonlyatanopportunetime.
"Themajorobjectiveistheannihilationoftheenemy'sfightingstrengthandintheholdingortakingofcitiesandplaces.The
holdingortakingofcitiesandplacesistheresultoftheannihilationoftheenemy'sfightingstrength."25TheVietnamWar
contributeditsownbrandofterrorismconceivedbyHoChiMinhandVoNguyenGiapthesilentandsimpleassassination
ofvillageofficialsforthedestructionofthegovernment'sadministrativenetwork.Modernrebellionnowisawarofsabotage
andharassment,ofanaggressionmoreoftenconcealedthanopenofguerrillasstrikingatnight,ofassassinsandterrorists,
andofprofessionalrevolutionariesresortingtoallsortsofstratagems,crafts,methodsandsubterfuge,toundermineand
subvertthesecurityoftheStatetofacilitateitsviolentoverthrow.26
Intheultimateanalysis,evenassumingthatthematterisjusticiablewillWeapplythestandardssetin,by
ascertainingwhetherornotthePresidentactedarbitrarilyinissuingProclamationNo.1081,theresultwouldbe
thesame.
Lansang
Fortheexistenceofanactualrebellionandinsurrectioninthiscountrybyasizablegroupofmenwhohave
publiclyriseninarmstooverthrowthegovernmentwasconfirmedbythisCourtinLansang.
TheCommunistPartyofthePhilippinesisdeterminedtoimplementitsgeneralprogrameforapeople's
democraticrevolution.AllFilipinocommunistsarereadytosacrificetheirlivesfortheworthycauseof
achievingthenewtypeofdemocracy,ofbuildinganewPhilippinesthatisgenuinelyandcompletely
independent,democratic,united,justandprosperous.....
...ourjurisprudenceattestsabundantlytotheCommunistactivitiesinthePhilippines,especiallyinManilafromthe
latetwentiestotheearlythirties,thenaimedprincipallyatincitementtoseditionorrebellion,astheimmediate
objective.UpontheestablishmentoftheCommonwealthofthePhilippines,themovementseemedtohavewaned
notablybut,theoutbreakofWorldWarIIinthePacificandthemiseries,thedevastationandhavocandthe
proliferationofunlicensedfirearmsconcomitantwiththemilitaryoccupationofthePhilippinesanditssubsequent
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6/20/2015liberation,broughtabout,inthelateforties,aresurgenceoftheCommunistthreat,withsuchvigorastobeable
G.R.No.L35546
toorganizeandoperateinCentralLuzonanarmycalledHUKBALAHAP,duringtheoccupation,andrenamed
HukbongMapagpalayangBayan(HMB)afterliberationwhichclashedseveraltimeswiththearmedforcesof
theRepublic.ThispromptedthenPresidentQuirinotoissueProclamationNo.210,datedOctober22,1950,
suspendingtheprivilegeofthewritofhabeas,validityofwhichwasupheldin.Daysbeforethepromulgationof
saidProclamation,oronOctober18,1950,membersoftheCommunistPolitburointhePhilippineswere
apprehendedinManila.Subsequentlyaccusedandconvictedofthecrimeofrebellion,theyservedtheir
respectivesentences.
Montenegrov.Castaeda
ThefiftiessawacomparativelullinCommunistactivities,insofaraspeaceandorderwereconcerned.Still,on
June20,1957,RepublicActNo.1700,otherwiseknownastheAntiSubversionAct,wasapproved,uponthe
groundstatedintheverypreambleofsaidstatutethat
...theCommunistPartyofthePhilippines,althoughpurportedlyapoliticalparty,isinfactanorganizedconspiracy
tooverthrowtheGovernmentoftheRepublicofthePhilippines,notonlybyforceandviolencebutalsobydeceit,
subversionandotherillegalmeans,forthepurposeofestablishinginthePhilippinesatotalitarianregimesubject
toaliendominationandcontrol
...thecontinuedexistenceandactivitiesoftheCommunistPartyofthePhilippinesconstitutesaanddangertothe
securityofthePhilippinesand
clear,presentgrave
...inthefaceoftheorganized,systematicandpersistentsubversion,nationalinscopebutinternationalin
direction,posedbytheCommunistPartyofthePhilippinesanditsactivities,thereisurgentneedforlegislationto
copewiththiscontinuingmenacetothefreedomandsecurityofthecountry....
InthelanguageoftheReportonCentralLuzon,submitted,onSeptember4,1971,bytheSenateAdHoc
CommitteeofSevencopyofwhichReportwasfiledinthesebythepetitionersherein
Theyearsfollowing1963sawthesuccessiveemergenceinthecountryofseveralmassorganizations,notably
theLapiangManggagawa(nowtheSocialistPartyofthePhilippines)amongtheworkerstheMalayangSamahan
ngMgaMagsasaka(MASAKA),amongthepasantrytheKabataangMakabayan(KM)amongtheyouth/students
andtheMovementfortheAdvancementofNationalism(MAN)amongtheintellectuals/professionals.ThePKP
hasexertedalloutefforttoinfiltrate,influenceandutilizetheseorganizationsinpromotingitsradicalbrandof
nationalism.
composedmainlyofyoungradicals,constitutingtheMaoistfactionreorganizedtheCommunistPartyofthe
Philippinesearlyin1969andestablishedaNewPeople'sArmy.ThisfactionadherestotheMaoistconceptofthe
'ProtractedPeople'sWar'or'WarofNationalLiberation.'Its'ProgrammeforaPeople'sDemocraticRevolution'
states,
interalia:
xxxxxxxxx
Thecentraltaskofanyrevolutionarymovementistoseizepoliticalpower.Theatatimethatboththe
internationalandnationalsituationsarefavorabletotakingtheroadofrevolution.
CommunistPartyofthePhilippinesassumesthistask
raids,resortedtokidnappingandtakenpartinotherviolentincidentsnumberingover230inwhichitinflicted404
casualties,and,inturn,suffered243losses.In1970,itsrecordofviolentincidentswasaboutthesame,butthe
Atanyrate,two(2)factsareundeniable:(a)allCommunists,whethertheybelongtothetraditionalgrouporto
theMaoistfaction,believethatforceandviolenceareindipensabletotheattainmentoftheirmainandultimate
objective,andactinaccordancewithsuchbelief,althoughtheymaydisagreeonthemeanstobeusedatagiven
timeandinaparticularplaceand(b)thereisaNewPeoplesArmy,other,ofcourse,thanthearmedforcesofthe
Republicandantagonisticthereto.SuchNewPeople'sArmyisproofoftheexistenceofarebellion,especially
consideringthatitsestablishmentwasbythereorganizedCPP.Suchannouncementisinthenatureofapublic
challengetothedulyconstitutedauthoritiesandmaybelikenedtoadeclarationofwar,sufficienttoestablisha
warstatusoraconditionofbelligerency,evenbeforetheactualcommencementofhostilities.
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6/20/2015perseannouncedpublicly
G.R.No.L35546
Weentertain,therefore,nodoubtsabouttheexistenceofasizablegroupofmenwhohavepubliclyriseninarms
tooverthrowthegovernmentandhavethusbeenandstillareengagedinrebellionagainsttheGovernmentofthe
Philippines.
xxxxxxxxx
TherecordsbeforeUsshowthat,onorbeforeAugust21,1971,theExecutivehadinformationandreports
subsequentlyconfirmed,inmanyrespectsbytheabovementionedReportoftheSenateAdHocCommitteeof
SeventotheeffectthattheCommunistPartyofthePhilippinesdoesnotmerelyadheretoLenin'sideaofa
swiftarmeduprisingthatithas,also,adoptedHoChiMinh'sterroristtacticsandresortedtotheassassinationof
uncooperativelocalofficials...
Petitionersimilarlyfailtotakeintoaccountthataspersaidinformationandreportsthereorganized
CommunistPartyofthePhilippineshas,moreover,adoptedMao'sconceptofprotractedpeople'swar,aimedat
theparalyzationofthewilltoresistofthegovernment,ofthepolitical,economicandintellectualleadership,andof
thepeoplethemselvesthatconformablytosuchconcept,thePartyhasplacedspecialemphasisuponamost
extensiveandintensiveprogramofsubversionbytheestablishmentoffrontorganizationsinurbancenters,the
organizationorarmedcitypartisansand,theinfiltrationinstudentgroups,laborunions,andfarmerand
professionalgroupsthattheCPPmanagedtoinfiltrateorestablishandcontrolnine(9)majorlabor
organizationsthatithasexploitedtheyouthmovementandsucceededinmakingCommunistfrontsofeleven
(11)majorstudentoryouthorganizationsthatthereare,accordingly,aboutthirty(30)massorganizations
activelyadvancingtheCPPinterest,...thatin1970,thePartyhadrecordedtwohundredfiftyeight(258)major
demonstrations,ofwhichaboutthirtythree(33)endedinviolence,resultinginfifteen(15)killedandoverfive
hundred(500)injuredthatmostoftheseactionswereorganized,coordinatedorledbytheaforementionedfront
organizationsthattheviolentdemonstrationsweregenerallyinstigatedbyasmall,butwelltrainedgroupof
armedagitatorsthatthenumberofdemonstrationsheretoforestagedin1971hasalreadyexceededthoseof
1970andthattwentyfour(24)ofthesedemonstrationswereviolent,andresultedinthedeathoffifteen(15)
personsandtheinjurytomanymore.
Subsequenteventsasreportedhavealsoproventhatpetitioners'counselhaveunderestimatedtheposed
bytheNewPeople'sArmy.Indeed,itappearsthat,,ithadinNorthernLuzonsix(6)encountersandstagedone
(1)raid,inconsequenceofwhichseven(7)soldierslosttheirlivesandtwo(2)otherswerewounded,whereasthe
insurgentssufferedfive(5)casualtiesthatonAugust26,1971,awellarmedgroupofNPA,trainedbydefector
Lt.VictorCorpus,attackedtheverycommandpostofTFLAWINinIsabela,destroyingtwo(2)helicoptersand
one(1)plane,andwoundingone(1)soldierthattheNPAhadinCentralLuzonatotaloffour(4)encounters,with
two(2)killedandthree(3)woundedonthesideoftheGovernment,one(1)BSDUkilledandthree(3)NPA
casualtiesthatinanencounteratBotolan,Zambales,one(1)KMSDKleader,anunidentifieddissident,and
CommanderPanchito,leaderofthedissidentgroupwerekilledthatonAugust26,1971,therewasanencounter
inthebarrioofSanPedro,IrigaCityCamarinesSur,betweenPCandtheNPA,inwhichaPCandtwo(2)KM
memberswerekilledthatthecurrentdisturbancesinCotabatoandtheLanaoprovinceshavebeenrendered
morecomplexbytheinvolvementoftheCPP/NPA,for,inmid1971,aKMgroup,headedbyJovencio
Esparagoza,contactedtheHigaonantribes,intheirsettlementinMagsaysay,MisamisOriental,andofferedthem
books,pamphletsandbrochuresofMaoTseTung,aswellasconductedteachinsinthereservationthat
EsparagozawasreportedlykilledonSeptember22,1971,inanoperationofthePCinsaidreservationandthat
therearenowtwo(2)NPAcadresinMindanao.
threattopublicsafetysinceAugust21,1971
ItistruethatthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritwasliftedonJanuary7,1972,butitcannotbedeniedthat
soonthereafter,lawlessnessandterrorismhadreachedsuchapointthatthenationwasalreadydriftingtowards
anarchy.OnSeptember21,1972,whenthePresidentofthePhilippines,pursuanttoArticleVII,section10,
paragraph2ofthe1935Constitution,placedthePhilippinesundermartiallaw,thenationwasinthethroesofa
crisis.Theauthorityoftheconstitutionalgovernmentwasresistedopenlybyacoalitionofforces,oflarge
numbersofpersonswhowereengagedinanarmedconflictforitsviolentoverthrow.
27Themovementwiththeactivematerialandforeignpoliticalandeconomicinterestswasengagedinanopenattemptto
establishbyviolenceandforceaseparateandindependentpoliticalstate.
Forcefulmilitaryaction,matchedwithattractivebenevolenceandasocioeconomicprogram,hasindeedbroken
thebackoftherebellioninsomeareas.Therearetobesuresignificantgainsintheeconomy,theunprecedented
increaseinexports,thebilliondollarinternationalreserve,thenewhighinrevenuecollectionsandothernotable
infrastructuresofdevelopmentandprogress.Indeedthereisainthepeople'ssenseofvalues,intheirattitudes
andmotivations.ButWepersonallytakenoticeofthefactthatevenasofthislatedate,thereisstillacontinuing
rebellionthatposesadangertothepublicsafety.Communistinsurgencyandsubversion,onceittakesrootin
anynation,isahardyplant.Apartywhosestrengthisinselected,dedicated,indoctrinatedandrigidlydisciplined
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G.R.No.L35546
cannoteasilybeeradicated.
28
TheNPA(NewPeople'sArmy)ispursuingapolicyofstrategicretreatbuttacticaloffensive.Itcontinuesto
conductitsactivitiesthroughsixRegionalOperationalCommands(ROCs)coveringNorthern,Central,and
SouthernLuzon,WesternandEasternVisayas,andMindanao.Combatoperationswereconductedagainstthe
CommunistinsurgentsbythearmedforcesofthegovernmentinCagayan,Ifugao,Kalinga,Apayao,Camarines
Sur,andSorsogon.Subversiveactivitiescontinueunabatedinurbanareas.LastJanuary,1974,theMaoistgroup
knownastheMoroNationalLiberationFront(MNLF)attackedandoverranthemilitarydetachmentatBilaan
Sulu,andthetownofParang.ThetownofJolowasattackedbyarebelforceof500menlastFebruary6,974,
andtocovertheirretreatrazedtwothirdsofthetown.OnlythisAugust,therewasfightingbetweengovernment
troopsandmuslimrebelsarmedwithmodernandsophisticatedweaponsofwarinsomepartsofCotabatoandin
theoutskirtsofthemajorsouthernportcityofDavao.Itwouldbeanincrediblenaivetetoconcludeinthefaceof
suchareality,thattheperiltopublicsafetyhadalreadyabated.
Noristhefactthatthecourtsareopenproofthatthereisnogroundformartialruleoritscontinuance.The"open
court"theoryhasbeenderivedfromthedictuminExParteMilligan(7Wall.127[1866],.:"Martialrulecannot
arisefromathreatenedinvasionthenecessitymustbeactualandpresenttheinvasionrealsuchaseffectually
closesthecourtsanddeposestheciviladministration."Thishasbeendismissedasunrealisticbyauthoritative
writersonthesubjectasitdoesnotpresentanaccuratedefinitionoftheallowablelimitsoftheofthePresidentof
theUnitedStates.Asamatteroffact,thelimitingforceofthecasewasmateriallymodifiedagenerationlaterin
anotherdecisionoftheCourtinoftheFederalSupremeCourtin(212U.S.78[1909]).
vizMilliganMoyerv.Peabody
SpeakingfortheCourtin,JusticeHolmesbrushedasideasthefact,whichthemajorityopinioninthecase
thoughtabsolutelycrucial.:martialrulecanneverexistwheretheCourtsareopenandintheproperand
unobstructedexerciseoftheirjurisdiction.Theopinionbutheld"thatthegovernor'sdeclarationthatastateof
insurrectionexistedisconclusiveofthatfact."AlthoughItfoundthatthe"Governor,withoutsufficientreason,but
in,inthecourseofputtingtheinsurrectiondown,heldtheplaintiffuntilhethoughtthathecouldsafelyrelease
him,"theCourtheldthatplaintiffMoyerhadnocauseofaction.StatingthattheGovernorwasempoweredby
employtheNationalGuardtosuppressinsurrection,theCourtfurtherdeclaredthat"hemaykillpersonswho
resist,andofcoursehemayusethemildermeasureofseizingthebodiesofthosewhomheconsiderstostandin
thewayofrestoringpeace.Sucharrestsarenotnecessarilyforpunishment,."Solongassucharrestsaremade
ingoodfaithandinthehonestbeliefthattheyareneededinordertoheadinsurrectionoff,theGovernoristhe
and...Whenitcomestoadecisionbytheheadofstateuponamatterinvolvingitslife,.Publicdangerwarrants
thesubstitutionofexecutiveprocessforjudicialprocess."
Moyerv.PeabodyimmaterialMilliganvizadmittedthattheCourtswereopengoodfaithbutarebywayofprecaution,to
preventtheexerciseofhostilepowerfinaljudgecannotbesubjectedtoanactionafterheisoutofofficeonthegroundthat
hehadnoreasonablegroundforhisbelieftheordinaryrightsoftheindividualsmustyieldtowhathedeemsthenecessities
ofthemoment
"Itissimplytrue,"wroteClintonRossiterin1950,
not29"that.ThesestatementsdefinitionoftheallowablelimitsofthemartialpowersofPresidentandCongressintheface
ofalienthreatsorNorwasDavis'dictumonthespecificpowersofCongressinthismatteranymoreaccurate.And,
howevereloquentandquotablehiswordsontheuntouchabilityoftheConstitutionintimesofactualcrisis,,expressthe
realitiesofAmericanConstitutionalLaw."martiallawcannotarisefromathreatenedinvasionorthatmartiallawcannever
existwheretheCourtsareopendonotpresentanaccurateinternaldisorder.theydonotnow,anddidnotthen
Inanyevent,this"opencourt"theorydoesnotapplytothePhilippinesituation.Boththe1935andthe1973
Constitutionsexpresslyauthorizethedeclarationofmartiallaw,evenwherethedangertothepublicsafetyarises
merelyfromtheimminenceofaninvasionorrebellion.Thefactthatthecivilcourtsareopencannotbe
controlling,sincetheymightbeopenandundisturbedintheirfunctionsandyetwhollyincompetenttoavertthe
threateneddangerandtopunishthoseinvolvedintheinvasionorrebellionwithcertaintyandpromptitude.
CertainlysuchatheorywhenappliedtothesituationmodernwarandofthepresentdayCommunistinsurgency
andsubversionwouldprovetobeunrealistic.
30
NormayitbearguedthattheemploymentofgovernmentresourcesforthebuildingofaNewSocietyis
inconsistentwiththeeffortsofsuppressingtherebellionandcreatingalegitimatepublicorder."Everyone
recognizedthelegalbasisforthemartialnecessity,"wrotePresidentMarcos,"thiswasthesimplesttheoryofall.
Nationaldeclineanddemoralization,socialandeconomicdeterioration,anarchyandrebellionwerenotjust
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6/20/2015statisticalreportstheyweredocumentedinthemindandbodyandordinaryexperienceofeveryFilipino.But,as
G.R.No.L35546
astudyofrevolutionsandideologiesproves,inthelongrun,securethePhilippineRepublic.Hence,the
September21Movementformartialruletobeofanylastingbenefittothepeopleandthenation,tojustifythe
nationaldiscipline,shouldincorporateamovementforgreat,perhapsevendrastic,reformsinallspheresof
nationallife.SavetheRepublic,yes,buttokeepitsafe,wehavetostartremakingthesociety."
martialrulecouldnotunlessthesocialiniquitiesandoldhabitswhichprecipitatedthemilitarynecessitywerestampedout
31Indeed,thecreationofaNewSocietywasarealisticresponsetothecompellingneedorarevolutionarychange.
Forcenturies,mostofourpeoplewereimprisonedinasocioculturalsystemthatplacedtheminperpetual
dependence."Itmadeofthemanymerepawnsinthegameofpartisanpowerpolities,legitimized'hewsofwood
anddrawersofwater'forthelandedelite,gristforthediplomamillsandanalienatedmasssporadicallyerupting
inviolentresentmentoverimmemorialwrongs.Ruralbackwardnesswasbuiltintotheverysocialorderwherein
ourmassescouldnotmoveforwardorevendesiretogetmoving."
32Theoldpoliticalframework,transplantedfromtheWesthadprovenindeedtobeinadequate.Theaspirationsofourpeople
forsocialjusticehadremainedunfulfilled.Theelectoralprocesswasnomodelofdemocracyinaction.Toasocietythathas
beentornupbydecadesofbitterpoliticalstrifeandsocialanarchy,theproblemwastherescueofthelargersocialorder
fromfactionalinterests.Implicitthenwasthetaskofcreatingalegitimatepublicorder,thecreationofpoliticalinstitutions
capableofgivingsubstancetopublicinterests.Thisimpliedthebuildingofcoherentinstitutions,aneffectivebureaucracy
andalladministrationcapableofenlistingtheenthusiasm,supportandloyaltyofthepeople.Evidently,thepowerto
suppressorinsurrectionsisriot"limitedtovictoriesinthefieldandthedispersionoftheinsurgent.Itcarrieswithit
inherentlythepowertoguardagainsttheimmediaterenewaloftheconflictandtoremedytheevils"33whichspawnedand
gaverisetotheexigency.
WefindconfirmationofthiscontemporaneousconstructionofpresidentialpowersinthenewConstitution.Itmust
benotedthatwhileArt,IX,Sec.12ofthenewConstitutionembodiesthecommanderinchiefclauseofthe1935
Constitution(Art.VII,See.10[2]),itexpresslydeclaresinArt.XVII,Sec.3[2]thattheproclamations,ordersand
decrees,instructionsandactsissuedordonebytheincumbentPresident,are"partofthelawoftheland"and
areto"remainvalid,legal,binding,andeffective"until"modifiedrevoked,orsupersededbysubsequent
proclamations,orders,decrees,instruction,orotheractsoftheincumbentPresident,orunlessexpressly
repealedbytheregularNationalAssembly."Undoubtedly,theprovisoreferstothepresentmartiallawregime
andthemeasurestakenunderitbythePresident.ItmustberecalledthattheprudentexercisebythePresident
ofthepowersundermartiallawnotonlystemmedthetideofviolenceandsubversionbutalsobuttressedthe
people'sfaithinpublicauthority.Itisinrecognitionoftheobjectivemeritofthemeasurestakenundermartiallaw
thattheConstitutionaffirmstheirvalidity.
Thisisevidentfromthedeliberationsofthe166ManSpecialCommitteeoftheConstitutionalConvention,formed
tofinallydrafttheConstitution,atitsmeetingonOctober24,1972,ontheprovisionsofSection4ofthedraft,now
Section12ofArticleIXoftheNewConstitution,whicharequotedhereunder,towit:
Asitisunderstoodbyrecognizedauthoritiesonthesubject,martiallawrestsuponthedoctrineofparamount
thenatureofmartiallaw,thepoweristobeexercisednotonlyforthemoreimmediateobjectofquellingthe
disturbanceormeetingapublicperilwhich,inthefirstplace,causedthedeclarationofmartiallaw,butalsoto
ordertoachieveitsrationalend.BecauseintheparticularcaseofthePhilippinesituation,Iagreewiththe
andthelawlessness.
commonlyunderstoodasaweapontocombatlawlessnessandrebellionthroughtheuseofthemilitary
forcivilianauthoritiesinareaswheresuchcivilianauthoritiesareunabletodischargetheirfunctionsduetothe
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6/20/2015DELEGATEDEGUZMAN(A.):HisHonoriscorrectwhenhesaidthatweareabandoningthenarrow,traditional
G.R.No.L35546
andclassicconceptofmartiallaw.Butweareabandoningthesameonlytohumanizeit.ForYourHonorwill
toaccept,andPresidentMarcos,awareasheis,thattheFilipinopeoplewillnotcountenanceanysuppressive
andunjustaction,rightlyseeksnotonlytoimmediatelyquellandbreakthebackoftherebelelementsbuttoform
aNewSociety,tocreateanewatmospherewhichwillnotbeanaturalhabitatofdiscontent.Statedotherwise,the
conceptofmartiallaw,asnowbeingpracticed,isnotonlytorestorepeaceandorderinthestreetsandinthe
townsbuttoremedythesocialandpoliticalenvironmentsinsuchawaythatdiscontentwillnotoncemorebe
renewed.
DELEGATEORTIZ(R.):Icanfeelfromthediscussion,Mr.Chairman,thatwearehavingdifficultyintryingto
bythisprovisionandtheinterpretationsbeinggiventoit,departingfromthetraditionalconceptofmartiallaw.
theexerciseofthispowerbyPresidentMarcos,doubtshavebeenexpressedinsomequarters,whetherin
declaringmartiallawhecouldexerciselegislativeandjudicialpowers.Iwouldwanttoemphasizethatthe
circumstanceswhichprovokedthePresidentindeclaringmartiallawmaynotbequantified.Infact,itiscompletely
differentfromacaseofinvasionwherethethreattonationalsecuritycomesfromtheoutside.Themartiallaw
declaredbythePresidentwasoccasionedbytheactsofrebellion,subversion,lawlessnessandchaosthatare
widespreadinthecountry.Theirorigin,therefore,isinternal.Therewasnothreatfromwithout,butonlyfrom
within.Buttheseactsoflawlessness,rebellion,andsubversionaremeremanifestationsofmoreserious
civilfunctionariesarenotinapositiontoperformtheirnormaldutiesor,betterstill,toquelllawlessnessand
justifiesitsexistence,andnecessitymeasurestheextentanddegreestowhichitmaybeemployed.Mypoint
merelytakingamilitarymeasurestoquelltherebellionandeliminatinglawlessnessinthecountryandleavehim
withnomeansorauthoritytoeffecttheneededsocialandeconomicreformstocreateanenduringconditionof
peaceandorder,thenweshallhavefailedinprovidinginthisConstitutionthebasicphilosophyofmartiallaw
which,Iamsure,weareembodyinginitforthegreatpurposeofpreservingtheState.Isaythatthepreservation
oftheStateisnotlimitedmerelytoeliminatingthethreatsthatimmediatelyconfrontit.Morethanthat,the
treasuretopreservetheStatemustgodeeperintotherootcause'softhesocialdisorderthatendangerthe
generalsafety.
DELEGATEDEGUZMAN(A.):Ineednotaddmore,Mr.Chairman,totheveryconvincing,remarksofonlygood
friendandcolleague,DelegateOrtiz.AndItakeit,Mr.Chairman,thatisalsothepositionofthisCommittee.
PRESIDINGOFFICERTUPAZ(A.):Yes,alsoofthiscommittee.
DELEGATEADIL:Justonemorequestion,Mr.Chairman,ifthedistinguishedDelegatefromLaUnionwould
oblige.
authorizessuchproclamation,issetasideorthatatleastsameprovisionsoftheconstitutionaresuspended?
DELEGATEDEGUZMAN(A.):TheConstitutionisnotsetaside,buttheoperationofsomeofitsprovisionsmust,
ofnecessity,berestricted.Ifnotsuspended,becausetheircontinuanceisinconsistentwiththeproclamationof
withtheeffectiveandsuccessfulexerciseandimplementationofmartialpowers.Therearecertainindividual
rightswhichmustberestrictedandcurtailedbecausetheirexerciseandenjoymentwouldnegatethe
implementationofmartialauthority.ThepreservationoftheStateanditsConstitutionstandsparamountover
andwhentheoccasionarises,whensuchisatstake,prudencerequiresthatcertainindividualrightsmusthaveto
bescarifiedtemporarily.Forindeed,thedestructionoftheConstitutionwouldmeanthedestructionofallthe
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6/20/2015detainedbythemilitaryauthorities,Icannotavailofthenormaljudicialprocessestoobtainmylibertyand
G.R.No.L35546
DELEGATEDEGUZMAN(A.):IfIamnotmistaken,YourHonor,youarereferringtotheprivilegeofthewritof
habeascorpus.
ofthewritofisipsofactosuspendedand,therefore,ifyouareapprehendedanddetainedbythemilitary
thenyoucannotinvoketheprivilegeofthewritofandaskthecourtstoorderyourtemporaryrelease.The
said,individualrightsassumemeaningandimportanceonlywhentheirexercisecouldbeguaranteedbythe
State,andsuchguarantycannotdefinitelybebadunlesstheStateisinapositiontoassertandenforceits
authority.
onSeptember23,1972,thePresidenthasbeenissuingdecreeswhichareinthenatureofstatutes,regulatingas
theydo,variousandnumerousnormsofconductofboththeprivateandthepublicsectors.Wouldyousay,Your
Honor,thatsuchexerciseoflegislativepowersbythePresidentiswithinhismartiallawauthority?
DELEGATEDEGUZMAN(A.):Certainly,andthatisthepositionofthisCommittee,Asmartiallawadministrator
and,ifImayadd,somejudicialpowerstomeetthemartialsituation.TheChiefExecutivemustnotbehamstrung
exercisecertainjudicialandlegislativepowerswhichareessentialtoorwhichhavetodowiththequellingof
rebellion,insurrection,imminentdangerthereof,ormeetinganinvasion.Whatappearsdisturbingtome,and
Ministerofpowers,eitherlegislativeorjudicialincharacter,whichhavenothingtodowiththeconditionsof
similardecreeforthatmatter,hasnothingtodowithinvasion,insurrection,rebellionorimminentdangerthereof.
Mypoint,YourHonor,isthatthismeasurebasicallyhasnothingtodowiththerestorationofpeaceandorderor
thequellingofrebellionorinsurrection.HowcouldwevalidlysaythatthePresident'sassumptionofsuchpowers
isjustifiedbytheproclamationofmartiallaw?
DELEGATEDEGUZMAN(A.):AsIhaverepeatedlystated.YourHonor,wehavenowtoabandonthetraditional
conceptofmartiallawasitisunderstoodinsomeforeigntextbooks.Wehavetoatmartiallawnotasan
immutableprinciple.Rather,wemustviewitinthelightofourcontemporaryexperienceandnotinisolation
thereof.Thequellingofrebellionorlawlessnessor,inotherwords,therestorationofpeaceandordermay
admittedlybesaidtobetheimmediateobjectiveofmartiallaw,butthatistobegthequestion.Forhowcould
theexerciseofmartialpowersarenotremedied?Youciteasallexamplethedecreeonlandreform.YourHonor
willhavetoadmitthatoneofthemajorcausesofsocialunrestamongthepeasantryinoursocietyisthe
deplorabletreatmentsocietyhasgiventoourpeasants.Asearlyasthe1930's,thepeasantshavebeenagitating
foragrarianreformstotheextentthatduringthetimeofPresidentQuirinotheyalmostsucceededinoverthrowing
puttingdownonepeasantuprisingafteranother,leavingunsolvedthemaladiesthatinthemainbroughtforth
thoseuprisings.Ifwearereallytoestablishanenduringconditionofpeaceandorderandassurethroughthe
providedforintheConstitution,mustpenetratedeeperandseektoalleviateandcuretheillsandtheseething
betweentheexercisebythemartiallawadministratoroflegislativeandjudicialpowersandtheultimateanalysis,
theonlyknownlimitationtomartiallawpowersistheconvenienceofthemartiallawadministratorandthe
judgmentandverdictoftheand,ofcourse,theverdictofhistoryitself.
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6/20/2015DELEGATELEVISTE(O.):YourHonor,justforpurposesofdiscussion,mayIknowfromyouwhetherhasbeen
G.R.No.L35546
anoccasioninthiscountrywhereanypastPresidenthadmadeuseofhismartiallawpower?
DELEGATEDEGUZMAN(A.):Iamgladthatyouaskedthatquestion,YourHonor,becauseitseemsthatweare
oftheimpressionthatsinceitsincorporationintothe1935Constitution,the,martiallawprovisionhasneverbeen
availedofbyanyPresidentYourHonor,thatduringtheJapaneseoccupation,PresidentLaurelhadoccasionto
declaremartiallaw,andIrecallthatwhenPresidentLaureldeclaredmartiallaw,healsoassumedlegislativeand
judicialpowers.Wemust,ofcourse,realizethatduringthetimeofPresidentLaurelthethreatstonationalsecurity
whichprecipitatedthedeclarationcamefromtheoutside.Thethreats,thereforewerenotinternalinoriginand
characterasthosewhichpromptedPresidentMarcostoissuehishistoricproclamation.If,incaseaswhat
happenedduringthetimeofPresidentLaurelthedeclarationofmartiallawnecessitatedtheexerciseof
legislativepowersbythemartiallawadministrator,Isaythatgreaternecessitycallsforththeexerciseofthat
powerwhenthethreatstonationalsecurityareposednotbyinvadersbutbytherebelliousandseditious
elements,bothoftheleftandright,fromwithin.Isaythatbecauseeveryrebellionwhetherinthiscountryorin
otherforeigncountries,isusuallytheproductofsocialunrestanddissatisfactionwiththeestablishedorder.
armsagainstthegovernment.Arebellionisnotbornovernight.Itistheresultofanaccumulationofsocial
itmustsoonererupt.Inthiscontext,thestampingoutofrebellionmustnotbethemainandonlyobjectiveof
capturingtherebelleadersandtheirfollowers,imprisonthemforlifeor,betterstill,killtheminthefield,but
somedaynewleaderswillpickupthetorchandthetatteredbannersandleadanothermovement.Greatcauses
ofeveryhumanundertakingdonotusuallydiewiththemenbehindthosecauses.Unlesstherootcausesare
themselveseliminated,therewillbearesurgenceofanotherrebellionand,logically,theendlessandvicious
exerciseofmartiallawauthority.Thisremindsmeofthewisewordsofanoldmaninourtown:Thatifyouare
goingtoclearyourfieldofweedsandgrasses,youshouldnotmerelycutthem,butdigthemout.
PRESIDINGOFFICERTUPAZ(A.):WiththeindulgenceoftheGentlemenfromLaUnion,theChairwouldwantto
DELEGATEDEGUZMAN(A.):Thankyou,Mr.Chairman.Infact,Iwasabouttomoveforitafterthegrueling
Althoughthereareauthoritiestothecontrary,itisgenerallyheldthat,inconstruingconstitutionalprovisionswhich
areambiguousorofdoubtfulmeaning,thecourtsmayconsiderthedebatesintheconstitutionalconventionas
throwinglightontheintentoftheframersoftheConstitution.
34Itistruethattheintentoftheconventionisnotcontrollingbyitself,butasitsproceedingwaspreliminarytotheadoption
bythepeopleoftheConstitutiontheunderstandingoftheconventionastowhatwasmeantbythetermsofthe
constitutionalprovisionwhichwasthesubjectofthedeliberation,goesalongwaytowardexplainingtheunderstandingof
thepeoplewhentheyratifiedit.35Morethanthis,thepeoplerealizedthattheseprovisionsofthenewConstitutionwere
discussedinthelightofthetremendousforcesofchangeatworkinthenation,sincetheadventofmartiallaw.Evidentin
thehumblestvillagestothebustlingmetropolisesatthetimeweretheinfrastructuresandinstitutionalchangesmadebythe
governmentinaboldexperimenttocreateajustandcompassionatesociety.Itwaswithanawarenessofallofthese
revolutionarychanges,andtheconfidenceofthepeopleinthedeterminationandcapabilityofthenewdispensationtocarry
outitshistoricprojectofeliminatingthetraditionalsourcesofunrestinthePhilippines,thattheyoverwhelminglyapproved
thenewConstitution.
V
POLITICALQUESTION
WehaveadvertedtothefactthatourjurisprudenceattestabundantlytotheexistenceofacontinuingCommunist
rebellionandsubversion,andonthispointthencanhardlybeanydispute.Thenarrowquestion,therefore,
presentedforresolutioniswhetherthedeterminationbythePresidentofthePhilippinesofthenecessityforthe
exerciseofhisconstitutionalpowertodeclaremartiallawissubjecttoreview.Inresolvingthequestion,Were
affirmtheviewthatthedeterminationofthefortheexerciseofthepowertodeclaremartiallawiswithinthe
exclusivedomainofthePresident,andhisdeterminationisfinalandconclusiveuponthecourtsanduponall
persons.Thisconclusionnecessarilyresultsfromthefactthattheverynatureoftheexecutivedecisionispolitical,
notjudicial.Thedecisionastowhetherornotthereis.Forsuchdecision,heisdirectlyresponsibletothepeople
forwhosewelfareheisobligedtoact.Inviewoftheoftheresponsibilityreposeduponhim,itisessentialthathe
beaccordedfreedomofactiondemandedbytheexigency.Thepoweristobeexerciseduponsudden
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6/20/2015emergenciesandundercircumstancesvitaltotheexistenceoftheState.Theissueiscommittedtohimfor
G.R.No.L35546
determinationbycriteriaofpoliticalandmilitaryexpediency.Itisnotpretendedtorestonevidencebuton
informationwhichmaynotbeacceptableincourt.Therearetherefore,nostandardsascertainablebysettled
judicialexperienceorprocessbyreferencetowhichhisdecisioncanbejudiciallyreviewed.Inotherwords,his
decisionisofakindforwhichthejudicialhasneithertheaptitude,facilitiesnorresponsibilitytoundertake.Weare
unwillingtogiveourassenttoexpressionsofopinionwhich,althoughnotintended,tendstocripplethe
constitutionalpowersofthegovernmentindealingpromptlyandeffectivelywiththedangertothepublicsafety
posedbytherebellionandCommunistsubversion.
necessityfortheexerciseofthepoweriswhollyconfidedbyourtotheChiefExecutive
Moreover,theCourtiswithoutpowertoshapemeasuresfordealingwiththeproblemsofsociety,muchlesswith
thesuppressionofrebellionorCommunistsubversion.Thenatureofjudicialpowerislargelynegative,anditis
essentialthattheopportunityoftheChiefExecutiveforwelldirectedpositiveactionindealingwiththeproblembe
preserved,iftheGovernmentistoservethebestinterestsofthepeople.Finally,asaconsequenceofthegeneral
referendumofJuly2728,1973,where18,052,016citizensvotedoverwhelminglyforthecontinuanceof
PresidentMarcosinofficebeyond1973toenablehimtofinishthereformshehadinstitutedundermartiallaw,
thequestionofthelegalityoftheproclamationofmartiallaw,anditscontinuance,hadundoubtedlybeen
removedfromjudicialintervention.
WeconcludethattheproclamationofmartiallawbythePresidentofthePhilippinesonSeptember21,1972and
itscontinuanceuntilthepresentarevalidastheyareinaccordancewiththeConstitution.
VI
COURTPRECLUDEDFROMINQUIRINGINTOLEGALITYOFARRESTANDDETENTIONOFPETITIONERS
HavingconcludedthattheProclamationofMartialLawonSeptember21,1972bythePresidentofthePhilippines
anditscontinuancearevalidandconstitutional,thearrestanddetentionofpetitioners,pursuanttoGeneralOrder
No.2datedSeptember22,1972ofthePresident,asamendedbyGeneralOrderNo.2A,datedSeptember26,
1972,maynotnowbeassailedasunconstitutionalandarbitrary.GeneralOrderNo.2directedtheSecretaryof
NationalDefensetoarrest"individualsnamedintheattachedlist,forbeingactiveparticipantsintheconspiracyto
seizepoliticalandstatepowerinthecountryandtotakeoverthegovernmentbyforce...inordertopreventthem
fromfurthercommittingactsthatareinimicalorinjurioustoourpeople,thegovernmentandournationalinterest"
and"toholdsaidindividualsuntilotherwiseorderedreleasedbythePresidentorhisdulyauthorized
representative."ItisnotdisputedthatpetitionersareallincludedinthelistattachedtoGeneralOrderNo.2.
Itshouldbeimportanttonotethatasaconsequenceoftheproclamationofmartiallaw,theprivilegeofthewritof
hasbeenimpliedlysuspended.Authoritativewritersonthesubjectviewthesuspensionofthewritofasan
incident,butanimportantincidentofadeclarationofmartiallaw.
Thesuspensionofthewritofisnot,initself,adeclarationofmartiallawitissimplyanincident,thoughavery
importantincident,tosuchadeclaration.Butpractically,inEnglandandtheUnitedStates,theessenceofmartial
lawisthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritof,andadeclarationofmartiallawwouldbeutterlyuseless
unlessaccompaniedbythesuspensionoftheprivilegeofsuchwrit.Hence,intheUnitedStatesthetwo,martial
lawandthesuspensionofthewritisregardedasoneandthesamething.Lutherv.Borden,7How.1Martinv.
Mott,12Wheat.19Story,Com.ontheConstitution,see.1342Johnsonv.Duncan,3Martin,N.S.530.(12L.ed.
58283).
Evidently,accordingtoJudgeSmalley,therecouldnotbeanyprivilegeofthewritofundermartiallaw(InreField,
9Fed.Cas.1[1862]).Theevidentpurposeofthesuspensionofthewritistoenabletheexecutive,asa
precautionarymeasure,todetainwithoutinterferencepersonssuspectedofharboringdesignsharmfultopublic
safety(,32Fed.2nd.442,446).Inanyevent,theProclamationofMartialLaw,ineffect,suspendedtheprivilege
ofthewritwithrespecttothosedetainedforthecrimesofinsurrectionorrebellion,etc.,thus:
habeascorpusExParteZimmerman
similarlydetainedforthe,andallothercrimesandoffensescommittedinfurtheranceorontheoccasionthereof,
orincidentthereto,orinconnectiontherewith,forcrimesagainstnationalsecurityandthelawofthenations,
crimesagainstpublicorder,crimesinvolvingusurpationofauthority,rank,titleandimproperuseofnames,
uniformsandinsignia,crimescommittedbypublicofficers,andforsuchothercrimesaswillbeenumeratedin
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6/20/2015ordersthatIshallsubsequentlypromulgate,aswellascrimesasaconsequenceofanyviolationofanydecree,
G.R.No.L35546
orderorregulationpromulgatedbymepersonallyorpromulgateduponmydirection.(Emphasissupplied).
crimesofinsurrectionorrebellionshallbekeptunderdetentionuntilotherwiseorderedreleasedbymeorbymyduly
designatedrepresentative
GeneralOrderNo.2wasissuedtoimplementtheaforecitedprovisionsoftheProclamationofMartialLaw.
Bythesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritof,thejudiciaryisprecludedfrominterferingwiththeordersofthe
Executivebyinquiringintothelegalityofthedetentionofpersonsinvolvedintherebellion.
habeascorpus
Thearrestanddetentionofpersonsreasonablybelievedtobeengagedin,orconnectedwith,theinsurgencyis
predicatedupontheprinciplethatintimeofpublicdisorderitistherightanddutyofallcitizensespeciallythe
officerentrustedwiththeenforcementofthelawtoemploysuchforceasmaybenecessarytopreservethe
peaceandrestrainthosewhomaybecommittingfelonies.Encroachmentsuponpersonalliberty,aswellasupon
privatepropertyonthoseoccasions,arejustifiedbythenecessityofpreservingorderandthegreaterinterestsof
thepoliticalcommunity.TheChiefExecutive,uponwhomisreposedthedutytopreservethenationinthose
timesofnationalperil,hascorrespondinglytherighttoexercisebroadauthorityanddiscretioncompatiblewiththe
emergencyinselectingthemeansandadoptingthemeasureswhich,inhishonestjudgment,arenecessaryfor
thepreservationofthenation'ssafety.Incaseofrebellionorinsurrection,theChiefExecutivemay"usethe
mildermeasureofseizingthebodiesofthosewhomheconsiderstostandinthewayofrestoringpeace.Such
arrestsarenotnecessarilyforpunishmentbutarebywayofprecaution,topreventtheexerciseofhostilepower."
(,212U.S.78,8485[1909]53L.ed.411.)
Moyerv.Peabody
Thejustificationforthepreventivedetentionofindividualsisthatinacrisissuchasinvasionordomestic
insurrection"thedangertothesecurityofthenationanditsinstitutionsissogreatthatthegovernmentmusttake
measuresthattemporarilydeprivecitizensofcertainrightsinordertoensurethesurvivalofthepoliticalstructure
thatprotectsthoseandotherrightsduringordinarytimes."(,Vol.85,HarvardLawReview,March1972,No.5,p.
1286).
DevelopmentsNationalSecurity36
In,,theSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStatesupheldthedetentionofalaborleaderwhosemerepresenceinthe
areaofaviolentlabordisputewasdeemedlikelytoincitefurtherdisturbances."Solongassucharrestsaremade
ingoodfaith,"saidtheeruditeJusticeHolmes,"andinthehonestbeliefthattheyaremadeinordertoheadthe
insurrectionoff,thegovernoristhefinaljudgeandcannotbesubjectedtoanactionafterheisoutofoffice,on
thegroundthathehadnoreasonablegroundforhisbelief."
Moyerv.Peabodysupra
DuringWorldWarII,personsofJapaneseancestrywereevacuatedfromtheirhomesintheWestCoastand
internedintheinterioruntiltheloyaltyofeachindividualcouldbeestablished.In(323,U.S.214[244]),the
SupremeCourtoftheUnitedStatesupheldtheexclusionofthesepersonsonthegroundthatamongthema
substantialnumberwerelikelytobedisloyalandthat,therefore,thepresenceoftheentiregroupcreatedtherisk
ofsabotageandespionage.AlthoughtheCourtavoidedconstitutionalityofthedetentionthatfollowedthe
evacuation,itsseparationoftheissueofexclusionfromthatdetentionwasartificial,sincetheseparateorders
partofasingleoverallpolicy.ThereasoningbehinditsofpersonsofJapaneseancestrywouldseemtoapply
withequalforcetothedetentiondespitethegreaterrestrictionsoilmovementthatthelatterentailed.Inthe
MiddleEast,militaryauthoritiesofIsraelhavedetainedsuspectedArabterroristswithouttrial(Dershowitz,50
Commentaries,Dec.1970at78).
Korematsuv.UnitedStatesTerrorismandPreventiveDetention:TheCaseofIsrael,
AmongthemosteffectivecountermeasuresadoptedbythegovernmentsinSoutheastAsiatopreventthegrowth
ofCommunistpowerhasbeenthearrestanddetentionwithouttrialofkeyunitedfrontleadersofsuitabletimes.
37
ThepreventivedetentionofpersonsreasonablybelievedtobeinvolvedintheCommunistrebellionand
subversionhaslongbeenrecognizedbyalldemocraticgovernmentsasanecessaryemergencymeasurefor
restoringorder."Becauseofthedifficultyinpiercingthesecrecyoftightlyknitsubversiveorganizationsinorderto
determinewhichindividualsareresponsiblefortheviolence,governmentshaveoccasionallyrespondedto
emergenciesmarkedbythethreatorrealityofsabotageorterrorismbydetainingpersonsonthegroundthat
theyaredangerousandwillprobablyengageinsuchactions."
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6/20/201538
G.R.No.L35546
Inthecaseatbar,petitionerAquino(L35546)hasalreadybeenchargedwiththeviolationoftheAntiSubversion
Act(L37364)andthereforehisdetentionisreasonablyrelatedtotheduelingoftherebellion.Upontheother
hand,theotherpetitionershavebeenreleasedbuttheirmovementsaresubjecttocertainrestrictions.The
restrictionsonthefreedomofmovementofthesepetitioners,asaconditionfortheirrelease,are,however,
requiredbyconsiderationsofnationalsecurity.
39Intheabsenceofwarorrebellion,therighttotravelwithinthePhilippinesmaybeconsideredconstitutionallyprotected.
Butevenundersuchcircumstancesthatfreedomisnotabsolute.Areasravagedbyfloods,fireandpestilencecanbe
quarantined,asunlimitedtraveltothoseareasmaydirectlyandmateriallyinterferewiththesafetyandwelfareofthe
inhabitantsoftheareaaffected.Duringarebellionorinsurrectiontheauthorityofthecommandertoissueandenforcepolice
regulationsintheareaoftherebellionorinsurrectioniswellrecognized.Suchregulationsmayinvolvethelimitationofthe
rightofassembly,therighttokeeparms,andrestrictionsonfreedomofmovementofcivilians.40Undoubtedly,measures
conceivedingoodfaith,inthefaceoftheemergencyanddirectlyrelatedtothequellingofthedisorderfallwithinthe
discretionofthePresidentintheexerciseofhisauthoritytosuppresstherebellionandrestorepublicorder.
Wefindnobasis,therefore,forconcludingthatpetitionerAquino'scontinueddetentionandtherestrictions
imposedonthemovementsoftheotherpetitionerswhowerereleased,arearbitrary.
CONCLUSION
Werealizethetranscendentalimportanceofthesecases.Beyondthequestionofdeprivationoflibertyof
petitionersisthenecessityoflayingatrestanydoubtonthevalidityoftheinstitutionalchangesmadetobringthe
countryoutofaneraofrebellion,nearpoliticalanarchyandeconomicstagnationandtoestablishthefoundation
ofatrulydemocraticgovernmentandajustandcompassionatesociety.Indeed,asarespecteddelegateoftwo
ConstitutionalConventionsobserved:"Theintroductionofmartiallawhasbeenanecessaryrecoursetorestore
orderandsteerthecountrysafelythroughasevereeconomicandsocialcrisis."
41Theexerciseoftheseextraordinarypowersnotonlytorestorecivilorderthrumilitaryforcebutalsotoeffecturgently
neededreformsinordertorootoutthecausesoftherebellionandCommunistsubversionmayindeedbeanexperimentin
thegovernment.Butitwasnecessaryifthenationaldemocraticinstitutionwastosurviveincompetitionwiththemore
revolutionarytypesofgovernment."Nationaldemocraticconstitutionalism,ancientthoughitsoriginmaybe,"observedDr.
C.F.Strong,42"isstillinanexperimentalstageandifitistosurviveincompetitionwithmorerevolutionarytypesof
government,wemustbepreparedtoadapttoeverchangingconditionsofmodernexistence.Thebasicpurposeofa
politicalinstitutionis,afterall,thesamewhereveritappears:tosecuresocialpeaceandprogress,safeguardindividual
rights,andpromotenationalwellbeing."
Theseadaptationsandinnovationswereresortedtoinordertorealizethesocialvaluesthatconstitutethe
professedgoalsofthedemocraticpolity.Itwasanattempttomakethepoliticalinstitutionserveasaneffective
instrumentofeconomicandsocialdevelopment.Theneedofthetimeswasforamoreeffectivemodeof
decisionmakingandpolicyformulationtoenablethenationtokeeppacewiththerevolutionarychangesthat
wereinexorablyreshapingPhilippineSociety.Agovernment,observedthethenDelegateManuelRoxas,a
MemberoftheSubCommitteeofSevenoftheSponsorshipCommitteeofthe1934ConstitutionalConvention,"is
apracticalscience,notatheory,andagovernmentcanbesuccessfulonlyifinitsstructuredueconsiderationis
giventothehabits,thecustoms,thecharacterand,asMcKinleysaidtotheidiosyncraciesofthepeople."
43
WHEREFORE,Weherebyconcludethat(a)theproclamationofmartiallaw(ProclamationNo.1081)on
September21,1972bythePresidentofthePhilippinesanditscontinuance,arevalidastheyhavebeendonein
accordancewiththeConstitution,and(b)asaconsequenceofthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritofupon
theproclamationofmartiallaw,theCourtisthereforefrominquiringintothelegalityofthearrestanddetentionof
thesepetitionersorontherestrictionsimposedupontheirmovementsaftertheirreleasemilitarycustody.
habeascorpus
Accordingly,Wevotetodismissallthepetitions.
Makasiar,FernandezandAquino,JJ.,concur.
ESGUERRA,
J.:
A.PRELIMINARYSTATEMENT
285/374
6/20/2015OnSeptember21,1972,thePresidentissuedProclamationNo.1081placingthewholePhilippines,undermartial
G.R.No.L35546
law.ThisproclamationwaspubliclyannouncedbythePresidentovertheandradioontheeveningofSeptember
21,1972.Thegroundsfortheproclamationarerecitedindetailinitspreamble,specificallymentioningvarious
actsofinsurrectionandrebellionalreadyperpetratedandabouttobecommittedagainsttheGovernmentbythe
lawlesselementsofthecountryinordertogainpoliticalcontrolofthestate.Afterlayingdownthebasisforthe
establishmentofmartiallaw,thePresidentordered:
NOW,THEREFORE,I,FERDINANDE.MARCOS,PresidentofthePhilippines.byvirtueofthepowersvested
uponmebyArticleVII,Section10,Paragraph(2)oftheConstitution,doherebyplacetheentirePhilippinesas
definedinArticleI,Section1oftheConstitutionundermartiallawand,inmycapacityastheircommanderin
chief,doherebycommandthearmedforcesofthePhilippines,tomaintainlawandorderthroughoutthe
direction.
similarlydetainedforthecrimesofinsurrectionorrebellion,andallothercrimesandoffensescommittedin
willbeenumeratedinordersthatIshallsubsequentlypromulgate,aswellascrimesasaconsequenceofany
IssuedshortlyaftertheproclamationwasGeneralOrderNo.2,followedbyNo.2A,datedSeptember26,1972,
towhichwasattachedalistofthenamesofvariouspersonswhohadtakenpartinthevariousactsof
insurrection,rebellionandsubversionmentionedintheproclamation,andgivenaidandcomfortintheconspiracy
toseizepoliticalandstatepowerinthecountryandtakeoverthegovernmentbyforce.Theywereorderedtobe
apprehendedimmediatelyandtakenintocustodybytheSecretaryofNationalDefensewhowastoactas
representativeofthePresidentincarryingoutmartiallaw.
ThepetitionershereinwereonSeptember22and23,1972,arrestedandtakenintomilitarycustodybythe
SecretaryofNationalDefensepursuanttoGeneralOrderNo.2AofthePresidentforbeingincludedinsaidlistas
havingparticipated,directlyorindirectly,orgivenaidandcomforttothoseengagedintheconspiracyandplotto
seizepoliticalandstatepowerandtotakeovertheGovernmentbyforce.TheyaskthisCourttosetthemat
liberty,claimingthattheirarrestanddetentionisillegalandunconstitutionalsincetheproclamationofmartiallaw
isarbitraryandwithoutbasisandtheallegedgroundtherefordonotexistandthecourtsareopenandnormally
functioning.
FortherespondentstheSolicitorGeneralinhisanswermaintainsthatProclamationNo.1081isConstitutional
andvalid,havingbeenissuedinaccordancewiththeConstitutionthattheordersanddecreesissuedthereunder
arevalidthatthearrestanddetentionofpetitionerspursuanttheretoislikewisevalid,legalandconstitutional,
andthatthisCourtshouldrefrainfromissuingthedesiredwritsasthesecasesinvolveapoliticalquestion.
Afterjoinderofissues,thesecaseswereheardonSeptember26and29,1972,andonOctober6,1972,followed
bythefilingofMemorandaandNotesontheargumentsofbothparties.
Aftersubmissionofthesecasesfordecision,petitionerRamonW.Dioknofiledamotiontobeallowedtowithdraw
hispetition.Tothemotionisattachedahandwrittenletterofsaidpetitionertohiscounselstatingthereasonswhy
hewishedtowithdrawhispetition.Theprincipalreasonsadvancedbyhimforhisactionarehisdoubtsand
misgivingsonwhetherhecanstillobtainjusticefromthisCourtasatpresentconstitutedsincethreeofthe
JusticesamongthefourwhoheldintheratificationcasesthattherewasnovalidratificationoftheNew
ConstitutionsignedonNovember30,1972andproclaimedratifiedbythePresidentonJanuary17,1973(the
thenChiefJusticehavingretired),hadtakenanoathtosupportanddefendthesaidconstitutionthatinfilinghis
petitionheexpectedittobedecidedbetheSupremeCourtunderthe1935constitution,andthatwiththeoath
takingofthethreeremainingmembers,hecannolongerexpecttoobtainjustice.
AfterthemotiontowithdrawhadbeendeliberateduponbytheCourt,sevenjusticesvotedtograntandfivevoted
todenythemotion.Therebeingnomajoritytograntthemotion,itwasdenied.Thosewhovotedtodenythe
motionareoftheviewthatitisnotsimplyamatterofrighttowithdrawbecauseofthegreatpublicinterest
involvedinhiscasewhichshouldbedecidedforthepeaceandtranquilityofthenation,andbecauseofthe
contemptuousstatementofpetitionerDioknothatthisCourtisnolongercapableofadministeringjusticetohim.
Thisquestionshouldnolongerstandonthewaytothedispositionofthesecasesonthemerits.
B.THEISSUES.
PrescindingfromthequestionofjurisdictionwhichtheSolicitorGeneralraisedbyreasonofthePresident's
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6/20/2015GeneralOrderNo.3,datedSeptember22,1972,asamendedbyGeneralOrderNo.3A,datedSeptember24,
G.R.No.L35546
1972,whichallowedthejudicialcourtstoregularlyfunctionbutinhibitedthemfromtakingcognizanceofcases
involvingthevalidity,legalityorconstitutionalityoftheMartialLawProclamation,oranydecree,orderoracts
issued,promulgatedorperformedbythePresidentorhisdulyauthorizedrepresentativepursuantthereto,from
whichpositionherelentedandhehas,accordingly,refrainedfrompressingthatissueupontheCourt,themain
issuesforresolutionarethevalidityofProclamationNo.1081declaringandestablishingmartiallawandwhether
thisCourtcaninquireintotoveracityandsufficiencyofthefactsconstitutingthegroundsforitsissuance.
ImaintainthatProclamationNo.1081isconstitutional,validandbindingthattheveracityorsufficiencyofits
factualbasescannotbeinquiredintobytheCourtsandthatthequestionpresentedbythepetitionsispoliticalin
natureandnotjusticiable.
ProclamationNo.1081wasissuedbythePresidentpursuanttoArticleVII,Section10,paragraph2,ofthe
Constitutionof1935,whichreadsasfollows:
ThePresidentshallbecommanderinchiefofallarmedforcesofthePhilippinesand,whetheritbecomes
necessary,hemaycallviolence,invasion,insurrection,orrebellion.Incaseofinvasion,insurrection,orrebellion,
orimminentdangerthereof,whenthepublicsafetyrequiresit,hemaysuspendtheprivilegeofthewritof,or
placethePhilippinesoranypartthereofundermartiallaw.
habeascorpus
Thisprovisionmay,forpresentpurposes,becalledtheCommanderinChiefclause.
TheaboveprovisionhasnocounterpartintheConstitutionoftheUnitedStatesorinthatofanystatethereof
exceptthatofAlaskatoalimitedextent.TocomprehendthescopeandextentofthePresident'spowertodeclare
martiallaw,letustracethebackgroundandoriginofthisprovision.
TosuppressthegreatrebellionintheUnitedStates,knownastheCivilWarwhichwasaimedtowreckthe
Federalunion,PresidentLincolnexercisedpowersnotgrantedtohimbytheConstitutionoftheUnitedStatesbut
pertainingtothecongress.Hehadsuspendedtheprivilegeofthewritofproclaimedmartiallawincertainareas
andMilitaryCommissionswereorganizedwhereitwasdeemednecessarytodosoinordertosubduetherebels
orpreventtheirsympathizersfrompromotingtherebellion.Lincolnjustifiedhisactsbysaying:
habeascorpus
Ididunderstand...thatmyoathtopreservetheConstitutiontothebestofmyabilityimposeduponmethedutyof
preserving,byeveryindispensablemeansthatgovernmentthatnationofwhichthatconstitutionwasthe
organiclaw.WasitpossibletolosethenationandyetpreservetheConstitution?Bygenerallaw,lifeandlimb
mustbeprotected,yetoftenalimbmustbeamputatedtosavealifebutalifeisneverwiselygiventosavea
limb.Ifeltthatmeasures,otherwiseunconstitutional,mightbecomelawfulbybecomingindispensabletothe
preservationoftheConstitutionthroughthepreservationofthenation.Rightorwrong,Iassumedthisground,
andnowavowit...(2NicholayandHay,AbrahamLincolnCompleteWorks,508(1902)).
SydneyG.Fisherinhisworkentitled"SuspensionofDuringtheWaroftheRebellion,"3Pol.ScienceQuarterly,
expressedthesameideawhenhesaid:
Habeascorpus
...Everymanthinkshehasarighttoliveandeverygovernmentthinksithasarighttolive.Everymanwhen
driventothewallbyamurderousassailantwilloverridealllawstoprotecthimself,andthisiscalledthegreatright
ofselfdefense.Soeverygovernment,whendriventothewallbyarebellion,willtrampledownaconstitution
beforeitwillallowitselftobedestroyed.Thismaynotbeconstitutionallaw,butitisfact.(Pp.454,484485)
Butthedifficultyoccasionedbytheabsenceofaconstitutionalpowertosuspendtheprivilegeofthewritofandto
proclaimmartiallaw,whichgreatlyhamstrungLincolnincopingeffectivelywiththecivillaw,wasobviatedwhen
ourownConstitutionexpresslyprovidedforthegrantofthatpresidentialpower(Art.VII,Section10,par.2).
UnlikethelegislativepowerundertheBillofRightsofourConstitution(ArticleIII,Section1,paragraph14,1935
Constitution),thePresidentcansuspendtheprivilegeofthewritofandimposemartiallawincasesofimminent
dangerofinvasion,insurrectionorrebellionwhenthepublicsafetyrequiresit.TheCongresscouldnothavebeen
grantedthepowertosuspendincaseofimminentdangerasitisnotbythenatureofitsofficeinapositionto
determinepromptlytheexistenceofsuchsituation.Itcanonlyseeorwitnesstheactualoccurrencethereofand
whentheyhappen,Congressisalsoempoweredtosuspendtileprivilegeofthewritofasanexerciseof
legislativepowerwhenthePresidentfallstoactbutundernocircumstancescanitdeclaremartiallawasthis
powerisexclusivelylodgedinthePresidentasCommanderinChief.
287/374
6/20/2015WhenthePhilippineConstitutionof1935waswritten,theframersdecidedtoadopttheprovisionsofSection3,
G.R.No.L35546
paragraph7,oftheJonesLaw,whichbecameArticle111,Section1,paragraph14,ofthe1935Constitution,and
thoseofSection21oftheJonesLawwhichbecameArticleVII,Section10,paragraph2,ofthesame.TheJones
Lawprovisionsreadasfollows:
Section3,paragraph7oftheJonesLawprovided:Thattheprivilegeofthewritofshallnotbesuspended,unless
whenincasesofrebellion,insurrection,orinvasionthepublicsafetymayrequireit,ineitherofwhicheventsthe
samemaybesuspendedbythePresident,orbytheGovernorGeneral,whereverduringsuchperiodthe
habeascorpus
AndSection21ofthesamelawinpartprovidedthat:
...(H)e(referringtotheGovernorGeneral)may,incaseofrebellionorinvasion,orimminentdangerthereof,
whenthepublicsafetyrequiresit,suspendtheprivilegeofthewritof,orplacetheIslands,oranypartthereof,
undermartiallaw:ThatwhenevertheGovernorGeneralshallexercisethisauthority,heshallatoncenotifythe
PresidentoftheUnitedStatesthereof,togetherwiththeattendingfactsandcircumstances,andthePresident
shallhavepowertomodifyorvacatetheactionoftheGovernorGeneral.
BeforetheJonesLaw,thePhilippineBillof1902providedasfollows:
habeascorpus
(Section2,par.7).
ThePhilippineBillof1902hadnoprovisionpertainingtothedeclarationofmartiallaw.
TheadoptionoftheJonesLawprovisionswaspromptedbytheprevailingsentimentamongthedelegatestothe
19341935ConstitutionalConventiontoestablishastrongexecutive,asshownbyitsproceedingsreportedby
twoofitsprominentdelegates(LaurelandAruego)whorecountedintheirpublishedworkshowthedelegates
blockedthemovetosubjectthepowertosuspendtheprivilegeofthewritof,incaseofinvasion,insurrectionsor
rebellion,totheapprovaloftheNationalAssembly,butdidnothingtoblock,andallowed,thegrantofthepower,
includingthattodeclaremartiallaw,tothePresidentasCommanderinChiefoftheArmedForces.Whatis
evidentfromthisincidentisthatwhenitcomestothesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritofandestablishment
ofmartiallawincaseoftheoccurrenceorimminentdangerofthecontingenciesmentionedtherein,andthe
publicsafetyrequiresit,theclearintentwastoexclusivelyvestinthePresidentthatpower,whereasCongress
canonlysuspendundertheBillofRightsprovisionwhenthereisactualoccurrenceoftheseeventsforreasons
alreadyadvertedtoabove.Andwhenmartiallawisproclaimed,thesuspensionoftheprivilegeofnecessarily
followsfor.thegreaterpowerincludestheless.Nobodywilleverdoubtthattherearegreaterrestrictionsto
individuallibertyandfreedomundermartiallawthanundersuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritof.Inthe
formerhecanevenclosethecourtsifnecessaryandestablishintheirplacemilitarycommissions.Inthelatter,
theactionproceedsfromthepremisethatthecourtsareopenbutcannotgrantthewrit.
WhentheConstitutionof1935wasbeingframed,theprevailingjurisprudenceonthematterwasthatlaiddownin
,5Phil.87.September30,1905.Inthatcasethequestionpresentedanddecidedisidenticaltowhatisraisedby
thepetitionershere.This(1905)Courtruledthatthejudiciarymaynotinquireintothefactsandcircumstance
uponwhichthethenGovernorGeneralsuspendedtheprivilegeofthewritunderSection5ofthePhilippineBillof
1902,whichgrantedhimthesamepowernowvestedinthePresident,andthatthefindingsoftheGovernor
Generalwere"finalandconclusive"uponthecourts.Awareofthisrule,theframersofthe1935Constitution
grantedtothePresidentthepowersnowfoundinArticleVII,Section10,paragraph2,ofthe1935Constitution.
Barcelonvs.Baker
OnOctober22,1950,ProclamationNo.210suspendingtheprivilegeofthewritofwasissuedbythelate
PresidentQuirino.AssailedbeforethisCourtinandBalao91Phil.882,asunconstitutionalandunfounded,this
Courtsaid:
288/374
6/20/2015habeascorpusMontenegrovs.Castaeda
G.R.No.L35546
AndweagreewiththeSolicitorGeneralthatinthelightoftheviewsoftheUnitedStatesSupremeCourtthru
Marshall,TaneyandStoryquotedwithapprovalin(5Phil.87,pp.98and100)the
Barcelonvs.BakerauthoritytodecidewhethertheexigencyhasarisenrequiringsuspensionbelongstothePresidentand
Butin,L33964,decidedDecember11,1971,42SCRA,448,thisCourtassertedthepowertoinquireintothe
constitutionalsufficiencyofthefactualbasessupportingthePresident'sactioninsuspendingtheprivilegeofthe
writofunderProclamationNo.889,datedAugust21,1971.IndepartingfromtheruleestablishedintheBaker
andCastaedacases,thisCourtsaid:
Theweightof,asaprecedent,isdilutedbytwo(2)factors,namely:(a)itreliedheavilyuponinvolvingtheU.S.
President'spowerto,whichhebeingthecommanderinchiefofallthearmedforcesmaybeexercisedto
suppressorpreventanylawlessviolence,evenwithoutinvasion,insurrectionorrebellion,orimminentdanger
thereof,andis,accordingly,muchbroaderthanhisauthoritytosuspendtheprivilegeofthewritof,jeopardizing
asthelatterdoesindividuallibertyand(b)theprivilegehadbeensuspendedbytheAmericanGovernorGeneral,
whoseact,asrepresentativeoftheSovereign,affectingthefreedomofitssubjects,canhardlybeequatedwith
thatofthePresidentofthePhilippinesdealingwiththefreedomoftheFilipinopeople,.Thepertinentrulinginthe
MontenegrocasewasbasedmainlyupontheBarceloncase,and,hence,cannothavemoreweightthanthe
same...
Barcelonv.BakerMartinv.Mottcalloutthemilitiahabeascorpusinwhomsovereigntyresides,andfromwhomall
governmentauthorityemanates
ImaintainthatweshouldreturntotheruleintheBakerandCastaedacasesandjettisontheLansangdoctrine
whichdeniesthegrantoffull,plenaryandunrestrictedpowertothePresidenttosuspendtheprivilegeofthewrit
ofanddeclaremartiallaw.Thisdenialofunrestrictedpowerisnotinkeepingwiththeintentandpurposebehind
theconstitutionalprovisioninvolved.
habeascorpus
TheActofCongressof1795involvedinMartin&Mott(12Wheat19(1827))whichisthemainpropoftheBaker
case,heldinapplicableinLansangcage,provided:
suchinvasion...
ThedistinctionmadebythisCourtbetweenthepowerofthePresidenttocalloutthemilitiaandhispowerto
suspendtheprivilegeofthewritofanddeclaremartiallawdoesnotwarrantadifferenttreatment.Theimportant
anddecisivepointtoconsideristhatbothpowersareexpresslyconferreduponthePresidentbythesame
Section,exercisableonlyupontheexistenceofcertainfactsandsituations.Underthe1935Constitution(Article
VII,Section10,paragraph2,)bothpowersareembracedinthePresident'spowerasCommanderinChiefofthe
ArmedForces.
habeascorpus
TheBakerdecisionshouldnothavebeenemasculatedbycomparingthepositionthenoftheGovernorGeneral
"astherepresentativeoftheSovereign"inrelationtotheFilipinoswhowereits"subjects".Underprevailing
conditionsanddemocraticprinciples,therewouldbegreaterjustificationforrelyingonthejudgmentofthe
PresidentofthePhilippineswhoisthechosenrepresentativeoftheFilipinopeopleandhencemoreauthoritative
inspeakingforthenationthanonthatofanAmericanGovernorGeneralthenwhopersonifiedtheburdenofan
imposedsovereigntyuponus.AndastheExecutiveofthisGovernmentwhoischargedwiththeresponsibilityof
executingthelaws,heisasmuchaguardianoftherightsandlibertiesofthepeopleasanycourtofjustice.To
judiciallyundercuttheforceandefficacyoftheBakerandMontenegrodoctrineistorideroughshodoverthe
intentoftheframersofthe1935Constitution.ParentheticallyitmaybestatedthattheCommanderinChief
clausewasretainedinthe1973Constitution.
AlthoughtheLansangcasetriedtocushiontheblowadministeredtotheconstitutionalprovisioninvolvedby
adoptingthetestofreasonableness"intheexerciseofthePresident'spower,withoutmeaningtosubstituteits
judgmentforthatofthePresident,yettheeffectoftherulingissofarreachingthatitmayleadtoaserious
confrontationbetweentheCourtsandthePresident.Thepowertoinquireintotheconstitutionalsufficiencyofthe
factualbasesoftheproclamation(groundsfortheissuanceofwhicharethesameasthoseformartiallaw)
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6/20/2015presupposesthepowertoknowwhatarethefactstobetestedbytheconstitutionalprovision.Thisistheessence
G.R.No.L35546
ofaninquirythedeterminationoftheconstitutionalsufficiencyofthosefactssimplyfollows.SupposethisCourt
saystheyarenotsufficienttojustifymartiallawandthePresidentsaystheyarebecausetheevidenceonwhich
heactedshowstheexistenceofinvasion,insurrectionorrebellion,ortheimminentdangerthereof,whatwill
happen?Theoutcomeistoounpleasanttocontemplate.Letusnottrytorepeatinourcountrywhattranspired
betweenPresidentLincolnandChiefJusticeTaneywhenthelatterissuedawritoftosetfreeoneheldbythe
militaryandPresidentLincolnpracticallysaid:Taneyhasissuedhiswrit.Lethimenforceit".ExparteMerryman,
17Fed.Cas.144(No.9487)(C.C.D.Md.1861).
PresidentLincoln,inthefaceofthegravedangerthentothenation,simplyignoreditandnothingcouldbedone
aboutit.
Thetestofreasonableness,orabsenceofarbitrarinessintheexerciseofthepresidentialpower,isallaplayof
words.ThedeterminationofthereasonablenessoftheactofthePresidentcallsforaconsiderationofthe
availabilityandchoiceoflessdrasticalternativesforthePresidenttotake,andwhenthatisdonetheCourtwillin
effectbesubstitutingitsjudgmentforthatofthePresident.IftheCourtweretolimititspowerstoascertaining
whetherthereisevidencetosupporttheexerciseofthePresident'spower,withoutdeterminingwhetherornot
suchevidenceistrue,wewouldhavethecuriousspectacleofthisCourthavingnochoicebuttogiveits
imprimaturtothevalidityofthepresidentialproclamation,asitdidintheLansangcasewhereitmerelyaccepted
thereportsofthemilitaryonthefactsrelieduponbythePresidentinissuingProclamationNo.889,without
judiciallydeterminingwhetherornotthecontentsofthosereportsweretrue,Insodoing,thisCourtsimply
displayedthemiserablelimitsofitscompetenceforhavingnomeansforcheckingwhetherornotthosefactsare
true.Itwouldhavebeenmoreinkeepingwiththedignity,prestigeandproperroleofthisCourttosimplyreadand
considerthebasesforthesuspensionasstatedinthevarious"whereases"oftheProclamation,andthen
determinewhethertheyareinconformitywiththeconstitution.Thistomeistheextentofitspower.Totranscend
itistousurporinterferewiththeexerciseofapresidentialprerogative.
ThisCourtshouldnotspurnthereminderthatitisnotthesourceofthepanaceaforallillsaffectingthebody
politic(Veravs.Avelino,77,Phil.192).Whenaparticularcurecancomeonlyfromthepoliticaldepartment,it
shouldrefrainfrominjectingitselfintotheclashofpoliticalforcescontendingforthesettlementofapublic
question.Thedeterminationofwhenandhowaconstitutionallygrantedpresidentialpowershouldbeexercised
callsforthestrictobservanceofthetimehonoredprincipleoftheseparationofpowersandrespectforaco
equal,coordinateandindependentbranchoftheGovernment.Thisisthebasicfoundationoftherulegoverning
thehandlingofapoliticalquestionthatisbeyondjudicialcompetence(Alejandrinovs.Quezon,46Phil.35Cabili
vs.Francisco,G.R.No.L4638,May8,1951Bakervs.Carr,360U.S.p.18682S.Ct.Rep.697L.Ed.2nd,
663).ItishightimetoreexamineandrepudiatetheLansangdoctrineandgivethePresidentthesoleauthorityto
decidewhenandhowtoexercisehisownconstitutionalpowers.AreturntothesanityandwisdomoftheBaker
andMontenegrodoctrineandarealizationthatjudicialpowerisunwelcomewhenaquestionpresentsattributes
thatrenderitincapableofjudicialdetermination,becausethepowertodecideitdevolvesonanotherentity,is
urgentlyneeded.ItisworthwhilerecallingwhatthisCourtinitssobrietyandwisdom,unperturbedbythe
formidableturmoils,thefiercepassionsandemotionsandthestressesofourtimes,saidintheBakercase:(The
term"GovernorGeneral"shouldread"President").
thejudicialdepartmentoftheGovernmentforanotherinvestigationandconclusionconcerningthesame
Owingtoconditionsattimes,astateofinsurrection,rebellionorinvasionmayarisesuddenlyandmayjeopardize
theveryexistenceoftheState.Suppose,forexample,thatoneofthethicklypopulatedGovernmentssituated
telegraphofthislandingoftroopsandthatthepeopleofthedistrictareincollusionwithsuchinvasion.Mightnot
theGovernorGeneralandtheCommissionacceptthistelegramassufficientevidenceandproofofthefacts
communicatedandatoncetakesteps,eventotheextentofsuspendingtheprivilegeofthewritof,asmight
appeartothemtobenecessarytorepelsuchinvasion?Itseemthatallmeninterestedinthemaintenanceand
stabilityoftheGovernmentwouldanswerthisquestionintheaffirmative....
habeascorpus
Butsupposesomeone,whohasbeenarrestedinthedistrictuponthegroundthathisdetentionwouldassistsin
restoringorderandinrepellingtheinvasion,appliesforthewritofallegingthatnoinvasionactuallyexistsmay
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6/20/2015theirpostsofdutyforthepurposeofexplainingandfurnishingprooftoitconcerningtheexistenceor
G.R.No.L35546
nonexistenceofthefactsproclaimedtoexistbythelegislativeandexecutivebranchesoftheState?Ifso,then
thecourtsmayeffectuallytiethehandsoftheexecutive,whosespecialdutyitistoenforcethelawsandmaintain
applicants,sopregnantwithdetrimentalresults,couldnothavebeenintendedbytheCongressoftheUnited
habeascorpus
ItisthedutyofthelegislativebranchoftheGovernmenttomakesuchlawsandregulationsaswilleffectually
mentionednecessarilytendstojeopardizepublicinterestsandsafetyofthewholepeople.Ifthejudicial
departmentoftheGovernment,oranyofficerintheGovernment,hasarighttocontesttheordersofthe
thenthehandsofthePresidentortheGovernorGeneralmaybetieduntiltheveryobjectoftherebelsor
insurrectosorinvadershasbeenaccomplished.ButitisurgedthatthePresident,ortheGovernorGeneralwith
theapprovalofthePhilippineCommission,mightbemistakenastotheactualconditionsthatthelegislative
departmentthePhilippineCommissionmight,byresolution,declareafterinvestigation,thatastateof
writof,when,asamatteroffact,nosuchconditionsactuallyexistedthatthePresident,orGovernorGeneral
withoutthereactuallyexistingtheconditionsmentionedintheactofCongress.Inotherwords,theapplicants
allegeintheirargumentinsupportoftheirapplicationforthewritofthatthelegislativeandexecutivebranchesof
theGovernmentmightreachawrongconclusionfromtheirinvestigationsoftheactualconditions,ormight,
throughadesiretooppressandharassthepeople,declarethatastateofrebellion,insurrection,orinvasion
suchconditionsdidexist.Wecannotassumethatthelegislativeandexecutivebrancheswillactortakeany
Moreover,itcannotbeassumedthatthelegislativeandexecutivebranchesoftheGovernment,withallthe
branchoftheGovernmenttoconstantlyinformthelegislativebranchoftheGovernmentoftheconditionofthe
Unionastotheprevalenceofpeaceordisorder.TheexecutivebranchoftheGovernment,throughitsnumerous
branchesofthecivilandmilitary,ramifieseveryportionoftheArchipelago,andisenabledtherebytoobtain
verylimitedmachineryforthepurposeofinvestigatinggeneralconditions,beanymoresureofascertainingthe
trueconditionsthroughouttheArchipelago,orinanyparticulardistrict,thantheotherbranchesofthe
Government?Wethinknot.
C.THECONCLUSION
TheresolutionofthequestionofvalidityofProclamationNo.1081andallactsdoneunderit,bydelvingintothe
sufficiencyofthegroundsonwhichthedeclarationofmartiallawispremised,involvesapoliticalquestion.
WhetherornotthereisconstitutionalbasisforthePresident'sactionisforhimtodecidealone.Itakeitforafact
thatheisnotanirresponsiblemanandwillactreasonablyandwisely,andnotarbitrarily.NoPresidentinhisright
mindwillproclaimmartiallawwithoutanybasisatallbutmerelytofightthehobgoblinsandmonstersofhisown
imagination.IntheexerciseofthatpowerthisCourtshouldnotinterfereortakepartinanymanner,shapeor
form,asitdidintheLansangcase.WhenthisCourtrequiredtheArmyofficers,whofurnishedthePresidentwith
thefactsonwhichheacted,topresentproofstoestablishthebasisofthesuspension,thisCourtpractically
superimposeditselfontheexecutivebyinquiringintotheexistenceofthefactstosupporthisaction.Thisis
indeedunfortunate.Toinquireistoknowthefactsasbasisofaction.Toinquireistodecide,andtodecide
includesthepowertotoppledownordestroywhathasbeendoneorerected.Thisistheultimateeffectofthe
Lansangdoctrine..
habeascorpus
Whenthesecurityandexistenceofthestateisjeopardizedbysophisticatedclandestineandoverseasmeansof
destructionandsubversionwhenopenavowalsofattemptstodismemberthePhilippinesarepoliticallyand
financiallyencouragedandsupportedbyforeignpowerswhentheadvocatesofasinisterpoliticalandsocial
ideologyareopenlystormingeventhebastionsofmilitarypowerandstrengthwiththeuseofsmuggledarms
furnishedbythosewhowishthisnationill,letusleavetotheExecutivetheunhampereddeterminationofthe
occasionfortheexerciseofhispower,aswellasthechoiceoftheweaponsforsafeguardingthenation.This
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6/20/2015Courtshouldnot,byaprocessofsubtlereasoningandrhetoricaldisplayoflegaleruditionstandonthewayto
G.R.No.L35546
effectiveactionbyvirtuallycripplinghim.Instead,itshouldbearockofrefugeandstrengthforthosewhoare
calledupontodobattleagainsttheforcesofdevastatingiconoclasmandruthlessvandalismthatruledour
streets,ourpublicsquaresandourschoolsbeforetheestablishmentofmartiallaw.Insteadofimposingcramping
restrictionsontheexecutiveandtherebygivingtheenemyaidandcomfort,thisCourtshouldallowthepolitical
departmentafullandwidelatitudeofaction.
Itfollowsthatallorders,decreesoractsofthePresidentundertheMartialLawProclamation,includingthoseof
therespondentSecretaryofNationalDefenseashisauthorizedrepresentative,arevalidandbinding.Thepeople
haveratifiedthoseactsbytheadoptionandratificationoftheNewConstitutionasproclaimedbythePresidenton
January17,1973,andbytheReferendumheldonJuly2728,1973.Forustodeclarethemvalidinourdecision
nowhasbecomemerelyananticlimaxafterwehavedecidedintheJavellanacasethatthepeoplehaveratified
andacceptedtheNewConstitutionandthereremainsnomorejudicialobstacletoitsenforcement.
Consequently,thearrestanddetentionofthepetitioners,includingtheirfurtherdetentionaftertheratificationand
acceptanceoftheNewConstitution,andevenuptothepresent,arevalidandconstitutional.Thedurationoftheir
detention,especiallyasregardspetitionerJoseW.Diokno,isamatteraddressedtothesounddiscretionofthe
President.AstopetitionerBenignoS.Aquino,Jr.,hisdetentionisnolongeropentoquestionasformal,charges
ofsubversion,murderandillegalpossessionoffirearmshavebeenfiledagainsthimwiththeproperMilitary
Commission.
D.THEJUDGMENT
BythisseparateopinionImightincurthedispleasureofmyseniorbrethrenwhoconceivedandlaboredin
bringingforththeLansangdecisionwhichIamopenlyadvocatingtobediscardedbecausethisCourtpractically
interferedwiththeexerciseofapurelyexecutivepowerundertheguiseofinquiringintotheconstitutional
sufficiencyofthefactualbasesoftheproclamation.ByrequiringtherepresentativesofthePresidenttopresent
evidencetoshowthereasonableexerciseofhispower,IrepeatthatthisCourttrencheduponaconstitutionally
grantedpowerofthePresident.InexpressingmyhonestthoughtsonamatterthatIbelieveisofsupreme
importancetothesafetyandsecurityofthenation,Ididsounmindfulofthepossiblecondemnationofmy
colleaguesandfearlessofthejudgmentofhistory.
habeascorpus
FORALLTHEFOREGOING,Ivotetodismissallpetitions.
FERNANDEZ,
J.:
I
PROLOGUE
IhavedecidedtowritethisSeparateOpinionevenbeforethemainopinionhasbeenwritten,fornoothercasesin
thehistoryoftheRepublichaveassumedsuchtranscendentalimportanceasthecaseswhichdirectlyaroseout
oftheproclamationofmartiallawonSeptember21,1972.NoothercasespresentedbeforethisCourthave
arousedsuchwidespreadattention,speculation,controversy,andconcern.Andinthelanguageofoneofthe
petitioners,"thedecisioninthesecase(s),whateveritmaybe,willbecitedinhistorybooksmany,manyyears
fromnow.AnditwillbequotedwhereverloversoffreedomaskthequestionWhatdidtheCourtdointhat
difficulthour?
OurdecisioninthevariouspetitionsnowbeforethisTribunallikeOurdecisionintheRatificationCases(L36142,
Javellanavs.TheExecutiveSecretary,etal.L36165,Roxas,etal.,vs.Melchor,etc.etal.,L36232,Monteclaro,
etal.,vs.TheExecutiveSecretary,etal.,andL36283,Dilag,etal.,vs.TheHonorableExecutiveSecretary,et
al.),mustupholdthevalidityofconstitutionalisminourcountryandoursteadfastadherencetotheRuleofLaw.
ThedecisionshouldsetthepatternandthethrustorOurcontinuousefforttolocatethatelusiveboundary
betweenindividuallibertyandpublicorder.Itshouldreconciletheclaimstoindividualorcivilrightswiththe
equallyand,attimes,evenmorecompellingneedsofcommunityexistenceinaspiritofConstitutionalismand
adherencetotheRuleofLaw.
ThroughourNewConstitution,theDelegatestotheConstitutionalConventionandthevotersintheratification
referendumalikehavegivenourgovernmentafreshmandateandnewguidelinesinthechartingofatruly
independentexistenceandtheemergenceofadynamicandprogressiveorder.ItisnowthetaskofthisCourtto
concretizeandmakeclearlyvisibletheconnectinglinksbetweenthe1935Constitutionandthe1973Constitution,
andtoconsidertheconstitutionalityofthemartiallawproclamation(No.1081)nowbeingvehementlychallenged
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6/20/2015inthesecasesitsconstitutionalityasinitiallyproclaimedundertheoldConstitution,andtheconstitutionalityof
G.R.No.L35546
itscontinuationwhichnowfallsunderthepresentCharter.
ItisalsothefunctionofthisTribunaltohelpgivefleshandsubstancetoourpeople'saspirationsforsecureand
selfsufficientifnotabundantexistenceevenasjustice,peace,liberty,andequalityareguaranteedandassured.
Itmuststrikethecorrectbalance,givenspecifictimesandcircumstances,betweenthedemandsofpublicor
socialorderandequallyinsistentclaimsofindividualliberty.
Theissuesraisedregardingtheforceandeffectivityofthe1973Constitutionhavebeenthoroughlydiscussedin
othercases.Theyshouldnowbeasettledmatterbuthavebeenraisedanew.Thesewerediscussatlengthin
theearlierstagesoftheinstantpetitions.Themassofpleadingsandlengthyoralargumentsdweltnotonlyonthe
validityofProclamationNo.1081andthelegalityofthearrestanddetentionofthepetitionersbutalsoonthe
effectivityofthenewConstitutionandotherrelatedmattersasrighttocounsel,jurisdictionofmilitarytribunals,
applicationsforamnesty,visitsofrelatives,conditionsinsidethedetentioncamp,righttowithdrawthepetition,
andthelike.Whileitisnecessarytosiftthebasicissuesfromallsecondaryandincidentalmatters,wemustalso
touchonimportantrelatedissues.ItisimperativetodeclarewhattheConstitutioncommandsisthelawonthese
issues.
Theaveragecitizen,asarule,isnotveryinterestedinthedetailedintricaciessurroundingtheresolutionof
constitutionalquestions.Heusuallyhasstrongviewsonthefinaloutcomeofconstitutionallitigationbutrarely
botherstoinquireintothelabyrinthianfacetsofthecaseorthedetailedreasoningwhichusuallysupportsthe
dispositiveportion.
Itisnotsowithregardtothesehabeascorpuscases.TheexplosivepotentialitiesofOurrulingareknownto
everybody.ThecountryawaitsOurdecisionwithkeenexpectations.Thegroundssupportingthedecisionarea
matterofpublicconcern.Theimplicationofthesecaseshavebeenspeculatedupon,althoughsometimeswith
limitedcomprehensionandnoticeablelackoffairness,eveninforeigncountries.
It,therefore,behoovesthemembersofthisTribunaltorendertheiropinionsasmuchaspossible,intermsandin
apresentationthatcanbeunderstoodbythepeople.
In,(31SCRA413,423)thisTribunalstatedthat"astheConstitutionisnotprimarilyalawyer'sdocument,itbeing
essentialfortheruleoflawtoobtainthatitshouldeverbepresentinthepeople'sconsciousness,itslanguageas
muchaspossibleshouldbeunderstoodinthesensetheyhaveincommonuse."
J.M.TuasonandCo.Inc.vs.LandTenureAdministration
Inthiscase,Weshouldgoonestepfurther.WeshouldnotlimitOurselvestolookingatthewordsofthe
ConstitutionasordinaryandsimplelanguagebutOurreasoninginthedecisionitselfshouldbefrankandexplicit.
Ourtaskisnotamerematterofconstitutionalconstructionandinterpretation.Throughitsdecision,thisCourt
shouldalsospeakdirectlytotheaveragelayman,tothecommonpeople.
II
THEMARTIALLAWPROCLAMATION
OnSeptember23,1972thePresidentannouncedthat,onSeptember21,1972ortwodaysearlier,hehad,
pursuanttoProclamationNo.1081,declaredastateofmartiallawinthePhilippines.ThePresidentcitedand
detailedmanyactsofinsurrectionandrebellionagainstthegovernmentoftheRepublicofthePhilippines
committedbylawlesselementsandvariousfrontorganizationsinordertoseizepoliticalandstatepower.
ProclamationNo.1081concludes
uponmebyArticleVII,Section10,paragraph(2)oftheConstitution,doherebyplacetheentirePhilippinesas
definedinArticle1,Section1oftheConstitutionundermartiallawand,inmycapacityastheircommanderin
chief,doherebycommandthearmedforcesofthePhilippines,tomaintainlawandorderthroughoutthe
direction.
similarlydetainedforthecrimescommittedinfurtheranceorontheoccasionthereof,orincidentthereto,orin
connectiontherewith,forcrimesagainstpublicorder,crimesinvolvingusurpationofauthority,rank,titleand
improperuseofnames,uniforms,andinsignia,crimescommittedbypublicofficer,andforsuchothercrimesas
willbeenumeratedinOrdersthatIshallsubsequentlypromulgate,aswellascrimesasaconsequenceofany
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6/20/2015
III
ARRESTOFTHEPETITIONERS
Underastateofmartiallaw,petitionersorthepersonsinwhosebehalfpetitionsforwritsofhavebeenfiledwere
onvariousdatesarrestedanddetained.TheordersofarrestwerepremisedonGeneralOrderNo.2ofthe
PresidentdatedSeptember22,1972
habeascorpus1whichwasamendedbyGeneralOrderNo.2A,onSeptember26,1972.GeneralOrderNo.2Areads:
PursuanttoProclamationOrderNo.1081,datedSeptember21,1972,andinmycapacityasCommanderin
ChiefofalltheArmedForcesofthePhilippines,IherebyorderyouasSecretaryofNationalDefensetoforthwith
arrestorcausethearrestandtakeintoyourcustodytheindividualsnamedintheattachedlistsforbeing
participantsorforhavinggivenaidandcomfortintheconspiracytoseizepoliticalandstatepowerinthecountry
andtotakeoverthegovernmentbyforce,theextentofwhichhasnowassumedtheproportionofanactualwar
againstourpeopleandourlegitimategovernmentandinordertopreventthemfromfurthercommittingactsthat
areinimicalorinjurioustoourpeople,thegovernmentandournationalinterest,andtoholdsaidindividualsuntil
otherwisesoorderedbymeorbymydulydesignatedrepresentative.
Likewise,Idoherebyorderyoutoarrestorcausethearrestandtakeintocustodyandtoholdthemuntil
otherwiseorderedreleasedbymeorbymydulydesignatedrepresentative:
1.Suchpersonsasmayhavecommittedcrimesandoffensesinfurtheranceorontheoccasionoforincidentto
orinconnectionwiththecrimesofinsurrectionorrebellionasdefinedinArticles134to138oftheRevisedPenal
Code,andothercrimesagainstpublicorderasdefinedinArticles146,147,148,149,151,153,154,155,and
156ofthesameCode
2.Suchpersonswhomayhavecommittedcrimesagainstnationalsecurityandthelawsofthenation,as
enumeratedanddefinedinTitleIoftheReviewPenalCode
xxxxxxxxx
Arrestsanddetentionsunderamartiallawproclamationarenotnecessarilylimitedtothosewhohaveactually
committedcrimesandoffenses.Morespecifically,thosearrestedandtakenintocustodyunderGeneralOrder
No.2Afallunderthreegeneralgroups:
1.Thosewhoappeartohaveactuallycommittedcrimesandoffensesandwhoshouldbechargedandpunished
forsuchcrimesandoffensespursuanttoourpenallaws
2.Thosewhohavebeenarrestednottomakethemaccountforcrimesandoffensesbuttopreventthemfrom
committingactsinimicalorinjurioustotheobjectivesofamartiallawproclamationand
3.Thosewhoappeartohaveactuallycommittedcrimesandoffensesbutwhoseprosecutionandpunishmentis
deferredbecausethepreventivenatureoftheirdetentionis,forthemoment,moreimportantthantheir
punishmentforviolatingthelawsoftheland.
Oncemartiallawhasbeendeclared,arrestmaybenecessarynotsomuchforpunishmentbutbywayof
precautiontostopdisorder.Aslongassucharrestaremadeingoodfaithandinthehonestbelieftheyare
neededtomaintainorder,thePresident.asCommanderinChief,cannotthereafter,afterheisoutofoffice,be
subjectedtoanactiononthegroundthathehadnoreasonablegroundforhisbelief.Whenitcomestoadecision
bytheheadoftheStateuponamatterinvolvingitslife,theordinaryrightsofindividual,mustyieldtowhathe
deemsthenecessitiesofthemoment.Publicdangerwarrantsthesubstitutionofexecutiveprocess.Thisis
admittedwithregardtokillingmenintheactualclashofarmsandthesameistrueoftemporarydetentionto
preventapprehendedharm.Goodfaithandhonestbeliefinthenecessityofthedetentiontomaintainorderthus
furnishesagooddefensetoanyclaimforliability.(TaadaandFernando,,Vol.II,pp.10131014,1953ed.)
ConstitutionofthePhilippines
CriminalchargeshavebeenfiledagainstpetitionerBenignoS.Aquino,Jr.,andhe,therefore,mayfallunder
GroupNo.1andthe"preventive"aspectofGroupNo.3.Itistruethathequestionsthevalidityofthecharges,
raisesasanissuethedeprivationoffundamentalrightsofanaccused,andchallengesthejurisdictionofamilitary
commissiontotryhim.However,determinationofthesequestionsisproperlyforanotherproceedingandanother
decision.Forpurposesofthesepetitions,heandmanyotherssimilarlysituatedmayfallunderGroups1and3.
habeascorpus
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6/20/2015PetitionerJoseW.DioknocanfallunderGroupNo.2andGroupNo.3,asfarastherecordindicates.Thus,there
G.R.No.L35546
maybepersonsarrestedpursuanttoGeneralOrderNo.2whomayfallunderthesecondgroupbutagainst
whomchargescouldbefiledasunderthethirdgroup.Theyhavenotbeenchargedforreasonsobviouslyrelated
tonationalsecurity.Theadministrationmayhavedeterminedthat,inthelightofthemartiallawsituation,itis
neitherwisenorexpedienttofilesuchchargesnow.
TheconstitutionalityofthearrestofthosearrestedunderGroupNo.1cannotbequestioned.Theyhave
committedacrimeandthereforecanbeorderedarrestedanddetained.
TheconstitutionalityofthearrestofthosearrestedunderGroupsNos.2and3,undermartiallawfindssupportin
thebookofJusticeFernandoandSenatorTaadathepertinentpartofsaidbookreadsasfollows:
IV
THEPETITIONSFORWRITSOFHABEASCORPUS
(a)
TheGroundsTherefor:
PetitionsforwritsofwereaccordinglyfiledinthisCourtbyorinbehalfofthearrestedanddetainedindividuals.
Thepetitionscontainsubstantiallysimilargroundsandprayers.
habeascorpus
Forinstance,inG.R.No.L35539,CarmenI.DioknopressedfortheurgentandimmediatereleaseofSenator
JoseW.Dioknofromthecustodyofeithertherespondents,theiragents,instruments,auxiliariesorservants.Itis
allegedthattherespondentsunlawfullyorillegallyandwithoutanyvalidauthoritywhatsoever,inviolationofthe
petitioner'srightsasacitizenoftheRepublic,seizedhispersonfromhisresidenceandmovedhimtoaplaceof
confinementanddetention.ThepetitionalsoallegesthatnochargeshavebeenfiledagainstJoseW.Dioknofor
committingorhavingcommittedinsurrectionorrebellionorsubversionandthatthememorandumdirectinghis
arrestisneitheranorderofarrestnorawarrantofarrest.
ThepetitioninG.R.No.L35546allegesthatpetitionersBenignoS.Aquino,Jr.,RamonV.Mitra,Jr.,FranciscoS.
Rodrigo,andNapoleonRamahavebeenillegallydetainedandunlawfullydeprivedoftheirpersonalliberty
beyondtheperiodauthorizedbylawwithoutanyformalcomplaintforanyspecificoffensehavingbeeninstituted
againstthembeforeourcourtsoflawandwithoutanyjudicialwritororderhavingbeenissuedauthorizingtheir
confinement.Itisallegedthatthepetitionershavenotcommittedanycrimenorviolatedanylaw,ruleor
regulationwhetherindividuallyorincollaborationwithotherpersonorpersonsforwhichtheymaybedetained
anddeprivedoftheirpersonallibertywithoutanyformalchargeorjudicialwarrant.
AcommonallegationinthevariouspetitionschallengesthevalidityofPresidentialProclamationNo.1081.Itis
assertedthatProclamationNo.1081declaringmartiallawisillegalandunconstitutionaland,therefore,nulland
voidbecausetheconditionsunderwhichmartiallawmaybedeclaredbythePresidentdonotexist.Thepetition
inG.R.No.L35546statesthatassumingthattheconditionsforthevalidexerciseoftheextraordinarypowerto
declaremartiallawexist,ProclamationNo.1081andPresidentialDecreesandOrdersissuedpursuantthereto
areunconstitutionalandillegalinextentandscopebecausetheydeprivetheSupremeCourtofitsconstitutional
powerandauthoritytodeterminetheconstitutionality,legalityandvalidityofthedecrees,orders,rulesand
regulationsissuedpursuanttotheproclamation.Itisallegedthattheproclamationisunconstitutionalandillegal
becauseitdivestsandouststhecivilcourtsthroughoutthePhilippinesofthejurisdictiontodecideandpunish
certainoffensesundertheexistinglawsoftheland.Thepetitionemphasizesthatcivilcourtscontinuetoremain
openandhaveinfactneverceasedtofunction.ThepetitionchallengesthevalidityofProclamationNo.1081
becauseitgrantstothePresidentpowerswhichareotherwisevestedbytheConstitutioninotherdepartmentsof
theGovernment.
argumentigratis
CorollarytotheaboveallegationsinG.R.No.L35546istheallegationofpetitionersVeronicaL.Yuyitungand
TanChinHianinG.R.No.L35556thatassumingwithoutadmittingthevalidityofProclamationNo.1081,the
issuanceofsuchaproclamationisnotavalidjustificationtoarrestanypersonwhimsicallyorarbitrarilyorwithout
thenecessarybasisorfoundationinherentintheproperarrestordetention.
ThepetitioninG.R.No.35547allegesthatpetitionerE.VoltaireGarciaIIhasnotcommittedthecrimesof
insurrection,rebellionorsubversionnoranycrimesimilartheretonoranycrimeatall.Itstatesthathiscontinued
illegaldetentionpreventshimfromperforminghisfunctionasmemberoftheConstitutionalConventionand,
therefore,depriveshisdistrictofrepresentationwhichisobviouslyagainstpublicpolicyandpublicinterest.The
petitionaskstheSupremeCourttotakejudicialnoticeofthefactthattherewasnoinvasion,insurrection,or
rebellionorimminentdangerthereofbeforeand/orafterthedateofProclamationNo.1081thatmayrequirefor
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6/20/2015thepublicsafetytheplacingofanypartofthecountryundermartiallaw.Reiteratingtheallegationsintheother
G.R.No.L35546
petitions,itoutlineshow,throughoutthelengthandbreadthofthecountryespeciallyintheGreaterManilaarea,
allexecutiveofficesarefunctioningincompletenormalcyhowallcourtsfromthelowestmunicipalcourtstothe
SupremeCourtareinfulloperationhowthedifferentlegislativebodiesfrombarriocouncilsuptoCongressare
likewisefunctioningsmoothlyaccordingtolaw.
PetitionerErnestoRondoninG.R.No.L35573allegesthatpursuanttoProclamationNo.1081thePresident
issuedGeneralOrderNo.3whichcreatesmilitarytribunalstotakejurisdictionovercertainactsandcrimestothe
exclusionofcivilcourts.Thepetitionallegesthatthecreationofsuchmilitarytribunalsandthevestingthereofwith
judicialfunctionsarenullandvoidbecausecivilcourtsareopenandfunctioning.Itquestionstheintenttotrythe
petitionerbeforethemilitarytribunalsforanycrimewhichtherespondentsmayimputetohim.Thepetitioner
allegesthathehasnotengagedinanyofthecriminalactivitiesdefinedinProclamationNo.1081,that,atbest,he
isonlyacriticofthepoliciesoftheGovernmentand,atworst,aciviliancitizenamenabletotheprocessesof
civilianlaw,ifatallhehascommittedanyoffense.
(b)
PresentStatusofPetitioners:
Asthingsnowstand,thedifferentpetitionersmaybedividedintofour(4)groups:
1.SomepetitionerslikeVeronicaL.Yuyitung,TanChinHian,BrenGuiao,HernandoJ.Abaya,ErnestoGranada,
LuisBeltran,RubenCusipagandWillieBaunhavealreadybeenreleasedfromcustodyoftherespondentsand
arenolongerunderdetention.ThesepetitionersearlierfiledmotionstowithdrawtheircasesandtheCourt
readilyapprovedthewithdrawalofthepetitions.
2.SomepetitionerslikeJoaquinV.Roces,TeodoroM.Locsin,Sr.,RolandoFadulRosalindGalang,GoEng
Guan,MaximoV.Soliven,RenatoConstantino,LuisR.Mauricio,JuanL.Mercado,RobertoOrdoezandManuel
Almariohavelikewisebeenreleasedfromrespondents'custodyandarealsonolongerdetained.However,after
aninitialperiodofsilencefollowingtheirrelease,thepetitionershavemanifestedthattheyhavelongbeen
conditionallyreleasedsubjecttovariousconditionsandcontinuingrestrictionsthusimplyingtheyexpecta
decisionontheirpetitions.PetitionerFranciscoS.Rodrigohasalsofiledamanifestationstatingthatwhilehewas
releasedfromdetentionatFortBonifacio,QuezonCityonDecember5,1972,hisreleasewasconditionaland
subjecttocertainrestrictions.Hismanifestationwasfiledforthepurposeofshowingthatinsofarasheis
concerned,hispetitionforisnotmootandacademic.PetitionerFranciscoS.Rodrigois,therefore,askingthis
Courttorenderadecisiononhispetitionforawritof.
3.Ontheotherhand,petitionerJoseW.Dioknowasunderdetentionuntilveryrecently.Forreasonswhichwillbe
discussedlater,hehas,however,askedforandinsisteduponthewithdrawalofhispetitioninspiteofthefactthat
heisunderdetention.Beforethisopinioncouldbepromulgated,however,hehasbeenorderedreleasedbythe
PresidentontheoccasionofhisExcellency'sbirthday,September11,1974,togetherwithsomeotherdetainees
undermartiallaw.
4.PetitionerBenignoS.Aquino,Jr.,isstillunderdetention.Chargeshavebeenfiledbeforeamilitarycommission
forvariouscrimesandoffensesbutthepetitionerchallengerthejurisdictionofmilitarycourts.Hehasnotfiled
anymotiontowithdrawhispetition.Basedonhispleadingsandhischallengetothejurisdictionofmilitary
tribunals,thepetitionerstatesthatitisincumbentuponthisCourttoruleuponthemeritsofthepetition.Hewants
informationfiledbeforeciviliancourtsandinvokesconstitutionalrightstofreehimfrommilitarydetention.
PetitionerBenignoS.Aquino,Jr.,isinsistentthatthisCourtrenderadecisiononhispetitionforawritof.
habeascorpus
V
ANSWEROFRESPONDENTS:
THEISSUES
TheansweroftherespondentsstatesthatonSeptember21,1972,thePresidentofthePhilippines,inthe
exerciseofpowersvestedinhimbyArticleVII,Section10,paragraph2oftheConstitution,issuedProclamation
No.1081placingtheentirePhilippinesundermartiallaw.Alltheactsquestionedbythepetitionersarejustifiedby
ordersandinstructionsofthePresidentissuedpursuanttotheproclamationofmartiallaw.Themailquestionthat
confrontstheTribunalis,therefore,thevalidityofProclamationNo.1081.Ifitistaintedwithunconstitutionality,
thenalltheactstakenpursuanttotheproclamationarevoid.Itwillthenfollowthatthearrestanddetentionsof
thepetitionersarevoid.
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6/20/2015Ontheotherhand,iftheproclamationofmartiallawissustained,westillhavetodetermineitsscopeandeffects.
G.R.No.L35546
Wemustanswerthesequestions:Mayweinquireintothevalidityofitscontinuation?Isasuspensionofthe
privilegeofthewritofautomaticallyincludedinaproclamationofmartiallaw?
habeascorpus
Otherquestionsalsoarisewhich,however,needbedecidedbyUsonlyinageneralmannerinthepresentcases.
MaytheCommanderinChiefissueorderswiththeforceandeffectoflegislation?Maysuchlegislationcover
subjectswhicharenotdirectlyrelatedtotheconquestoftheparticularcrisis?Inotherwords,doesthe
proclamationofmartiallawgivethePresidentauthoritytopasslegislationnotdirectlyrelatedtoinvasion,
insurrection,rebellion,orimminentdangerthereof.?Ifciviliancourtsareopenandfunctioning,maythePresident
issuedecreesandorderswhichtransfersomeoftheirjurisdictiontomilitarytribunals?
Incidentalissueshavealsobeenraisedinthelightofthemainissueofmartiallaw.Oneisnolongerbeforethis
Courtbutmaybementionedinpassing.The1973ConstitutionincreasedthecompositionoftheCourtfrom
eleven(11)tofifteen(15).Atatimewhentherewereonlynine(9)memberscarriedoverfromtheoldCourt,may
theseninememberstheActingChiefJusticeandeightmembersvalidlyhearaconstitutionalissue?Istherea
quorumunderArticleX,section2(2)whichreads:
(2)Allcasesinvolvingtheconstitutionalityofatreaty,executiveagreement,orlawshallbeheardanddecidedby
theSupremeCourtandnotreaty,executiveagreement,orlawmaybedeclaredunconstitutionalwithoutthe
concurrenceofatleasttenMembers.Allothercaseswhichunderitsrulesarerequiredtobeheard,shallbe
decidedwiththeconcurrenceofatleasteightMembers.
enbancenbanc
WenowhaveaChiefJusticeandelevenmemberssotheproblemofaquorumissolved.
AnotherincidentalissueisthepowerofthisCourttoinquireintotheconditionsofdetentionofpetitioners.Andstill
anotherissueiswhetheroneofthepetitionersmay,atatimewhenadecisionisreadytobepromulgated,
withdrawhispetitionandavoidadecisionontheissueshehasraised.
VI
ONPETITIONERDIOKNO'SMOTIONTOWITHDRAW
Thefirstissuetoresolveisanincidentalbutimportantone.Itisalsothemostrecent.
(a)
ArgumentsProandCon:
InaMotiontoWithdrawdatedDecember29,1973,petitionerJoseW.Dioknoaskedleaveofcourttowithdraw
thepetitionforfiledinhisbehalf.Heaskedforthewithdrawalofthemainpetitionandotherpleadingsfiledinthe
case.Thereasongivenforthewithdrawalwas"First,thoughIamconvincedbeyondanynaggingdoubtthatwe
areonthesideofrightandreason,lawandjustice,Iamequallyconvincedthatwecannotreasonablyexpect
eitherrightorreason,laworjusticetoprevailinmycase...(and)Second,inviewofthenewoaththatits
membershavetaken,thepresentSupremeCourtisanewCourtfunctioningunderanewConstitution,different
fromtheCourtunderwhichIappliedformyrelease.IwaswillingtobejudgedbytheoldCourtundertheold
ConstitutionbutnotbythenewCourtunderthenewConstitutionbecauseasAlbertCamus'judgepenitentsaidin
thenovel'TheFall':'hewhoclingstoalawdoesnotfearthejudgmentthatputshiminhisplacewithinanorder
hebelievesin.Butthekeenestofhumantormentsistobejudgedwithoutlaw."
habeascorpus
Onbeingrequiredtocommentonthepetitioner'smotiontowithdraw,theSolicitorGeneralstatedthatthe
petitioner
*shouldnotbeallowedtoremovehiscasefromthisCourt.Threereasonsweregiven:(a)thatthechargeisunfairtotheSupremeCourtanditsmembers
(b)thatitisuntrueand(c)thatinthemain,itiscontemptuous.TheSolicitorGeneraldisputed,asunfair,thechargethatjusticecannotbeexpectedfrom
theSupremeCourt.HepointedoutthattheSupremeCourtdidnotinjectitselfintothecontroversybutitwasthepetitionerwhoinvokedtheCourt's
jurisdictionnotonlyinthiscasebuttheplebiscitecasesaswell.TheSolicitorGeneralnotedthatthescornwithwhichtheCourtistreatedinthemotionto
withdrawstandsinsharpcontrastwiththepraiselavishedonitwhenpetitionersbegantheseproceedings.
ItmaybenotedthattheSupremeCourtwasthencharacterizedashavingthegreatestcredibilityamongthethree
branchesofgovernment.Itwasdescribedasadispenserofjusticeandasthelastcitadeloftheirliberties.
InhisMemorandum,petitionermanifestedandstressedtheimportanceofadecision"thedecisioninthiscase,
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6/20/2015,willbecitedinhistorybooksmanyyearsfromnow.Anditwillbequotedwhereverloversoffreedomaskthe
G.R.No.L35546
question...WhatdidtheCourtdointhatdifficulthour?"(Emphasissupplied).
whateveritmaybe
ThepetitionerfurtherstatedintheMemorandumthat"thedutyofthisCourtisawesomeindeed.Itsresponsibility
toOurpeopleandtohistoryisheavierandmoreenormousthanwordsandphrasescanpossiblydescribe."
Incontrasttothisinsistenceonadecision,aportionofthemotiontowithdrawcitedbytherespondentsmaybe
repeated:
[I]tseemstomethatourpeoplehavetherighttoexpectmembersofthehighestcourtofthelandtodisplaya
consciencemoresensitive,asenseofmentalhonestymoreconsistentthanthosegenerallydisplayedinthe
marketplace.Andithaspainedmetonotethat,inswearingtosupportthenew'Constitution',thefivemembers
oftheCourtwhohadheldthatithadnotbeenvalidlyratified,havenotfulfilledourexpectations.Idonotblame
themIdonotknowwhatIwouldhavedoneintheirplace.But,asthesametime,Icannotcontinuetoentrustmy
casetothemandIhavebecomethoroughlyconvincedthatourquestforjusticeinmycaseisfutile.(p.6).
Issuewasalsotakenbytherespondentwiththepetitioner'schargethatdespitethefindingofamajoritythatthe
newConstitutionhadnotbeenvalidlyratified,theCourtnonethelessdismissedthepetitionsseekingtostopthe
enforcementoftheConstitution.TheallegationthatthejusticesofthisCourttookanoathtosupportthe
Constitutionbecausetheyhadbeenallowedtocontinueinofficewaschallengedasfalsebytherespondents.
Thethirdgroundfortherespondents'oppositiontothemotiontowithdrawistheallegedlycontemptuousnature
ofthemotion.TheCommentstatesthatattacksontheCourtaremostseriousnoneofthosemadeinthepast
hasputthecourt'sintegrityandcapacityforjusticeinseriousquestionasmuchasthepetitioner'smotionto
withdraw.AccordingtotheSolicitorGeneral,thechargeinthecaseatbargoestotheveryfoundationofour
systemofjusticeandtherespectthatisdueto,it,thatitissubversiveofpublicconfidenceintheimpartialityand
independenceofcourtsandtendstoembarrasstheadministrationofjustice.TheSolicitorGeneralmanifested
that"wecannotshapetheworldoftheSupremeCourtaswewanttoseeitand,laterseeingtheworldofreality,
lashattheSupremeCourtforbetrayingourillusions."
Insucceedingpleadings,petitionerDioknopressedhismotiontowithdrawwithevengreatervigor.Counselfor
petitionerstatedthatthesocalledcharge"unfairtotheCourtanditsmembers,untrue,andcontemptuous"
wasnevermadeatallandthattheSolicitorGeneralwasputtingupastrawmanandproceedingtodemolishit.
Inafortysix(46)pageReply,hepointedoutthatthefactualbasesfordecidingtowithdrawthecasehavenot
beenspecificallydenied,asindeedtheyareundeniable.Itshouldbenoted,however,thatthecitedfactualbases
gointotheverymeritsofthepetitionforthewritof:
habeascorpus
(1)Onthequestionofthevalidityofratification,six(6)membersoftheCourtheldthattheproposedConstitution
wasnotvalidlyratified.
(2)OnthequestionofacquiescencebytheFilipinopeople,onlyaminorityoffour(4)justicesheldtherewas
acquiescence,two(2)holdingthattherewasnoacquiescence,andfour(4)holdingtheyhadnomeansof
knowingtothepointofjudicialcertainty,whetherthepeoplehaveacceptedtheConstitution.
(3)TheCourtdidnotrulethatthe"newConstitution"wasineffect.
(4)Theratificationcaseswereneverthelessdismissed.
Thepetitioneradded"undeniablefacts":
(1)ThepetitionforwasfiledSeptember23,1972whiletheratificationcaseswereriledJanuary20and23,1973.
habeascorpus
(2)FromthefilingofthepetitiontothedatePetitionerDioknoaskedhiscounseltowithdrawthecase,460days
hadelapsed.
(3)Onthedatethereplywasfiled,531dayshadelapsedwithoutchargesbeingfiledortrialandconvictionfor
anyoffensebeingheld.
(4)AllthemembersoftheoldCourt,whohadtakenanoathto"preserveanddefend"the1935Constitution,took
anoathonOctober29,1973todefendthe"newConstitution".
Mypresentstand:InviewofthereleaseofDioknobeforethisopinioncouldbepromulgated,Inowvotetogrant
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6/20/2015hismotiontowithdrawhispetitionthesamehavingbecomemootandacademic.
G.R.No.L35546
IndisputingtheSolicitorGeneral'schargethattheSupremeCourtistreatedwithscornintheMotiontoWithdraw,
thepetitionerstatedthatthetoneofthemotionmaybeoneofdismayorfrustrationbutcertainlynotofscorn.The
petitionercalledthechargegratuitousandtotallybareoffoundation.
Thepetitioneralsopointedoutthattherecouldbenocontemptofcourtinthemotiontowithdrawbecausethe
factualbasesofhisletterareindisputableandthemotioncomesundertheprotectionoftheconstitutionalrightto
afairhearing.HeinvokedhisrighttofreeexpressionasalitigantandstressedthatacitizenoftheRepublicmay
expresshimselfthoughtfully,sincerelyandreputablywithoutfearofreprisal.Thepetitioneralsopointedoutthat
bothprincipleandprecedentjustifygrantofthemotiontowithdraw.
(b)
Myoriginalstand:Motionshouldbedenied:
Reasons:
But,Iwouldliketodiscussthemeritsofthemotionifonlytoestablishguidelinesforsimilarcasesthatmayarise
inthefuture.
Asageneralrule,therightoftheplaintifftodismisshisactionwiththeconsentoftheCourtisuniversally
recognized.Iftheplaintiffbelievesthattheactionhehascommencedinordertoenforcearightortorectifya
wrongisnolongernecessaryorhelaterdiscoversthattherightnolongerexists,heshouldbeallowedto
withdrawhiscase.Ifinthecourseoflitigation,hefindsoutthatthecourseoftheactionshallbedifferentfromthat
hehadintended,thegeneralruleisthatheshouldbepermittedtowithdrawthesame,subjecttotheapprovalof
theCourt.
Theplaintiffshouldnotberequiredtocontinuetheactionwhenitisnottohisadvantagetodoso.Litigation
shouldbediscouragedandnotencouraged.Courtsshouldnotallowpartiestolitigatewhentheynolongerdesire
tolitigate.
Itshouldbenoted,however,thattheRulesofCourtdonotallowautomaticapprovaloftheplaintiff'smotionto
dismissafterserviceoftheanswerorofamotionforsummaryjudgment.UnderRule17,
**oncetheissuesarejoined,anactioncanbedismissedupontheplaintiffsinstanceonlyuponorderoftheCourtanduponsuchtermsandconditionsas
theCourtdeemsproper.
TherequirementintheRulesthatdismissalisdiscretionaryupontheCourtisnotwithoutsignificance.Infact,the
petitionerdoesnotdenytheauthorityoftheCourttorejecthismotionaslongastherearereasonsforsuch
rejection.Heissimplyarguingthatthereisnovalidreasontodenythemotionthusimplyingthatadenialwould,
ineffect,beanabuseintheexerciseofadiscretionarypower.
IntheCourt'sdeliberations,theviewwasadvancedthatpetitioner'smotionforwithdrawalmadehisconfinement
voluntary.Idisagreed,forsaidmotion,inthelightoftheotherpleadingsandmemorandasubmittedbyhim,can
stillbeconsideredasaprotestagainsthisconfinement.Inotherwords,petitionerhasnotmadeanystatement
uponwhichwecanbaseaconclusionthatheisagreeingvoluntarilytohiscontinuedconfinementandthereby
makinghiscasemootandacademic.
Isubmittherecanbenodebateovertheprinciplethattherighttowithdrawapetitionatthisstageisnotan
absoluteright.WhatfacesthisCourtisnotitspowertograntordenythemotionbutwhethertherearesound
reasonswhythemotiontowithdrawshouldbedenied.Iftherearenosoundreasons,themotionshouldbe
granted.
Accordingtothepetitioner,thereareonlytwoinstanceswhenaCourtmayvalidlydenysuchawithdrawal
(1)Whenthewithdrawalwouldirreparablyinjureotherpartiestothecasesuchas,forexample,inclasssuits,in
probateproceedingorinordinarycivilactionswhentheadversepartyhaspleadedacounterclaimthatcannotbe
decidedwithoutfirstdecidingthemaincaseand
(2)WhenthewithdrawalwouldirreparablyinjurethepublicinterestbydeprivingtheCourtoftheopportunityto
preventortocorrectaseriousviolationoftheConstitutionorofthelaws.
Iamnotpreparedtoacceptthepropositionortorenderanabstractopinionthatthereareindeedonlytwosuch
exceptions.TheinfinitenumberoffactualsituationsthatcancomebeforethisCourtcouldconceivablyaddoneor
twoorevenmoreexceptions.Itwouldbeimprudentorprecipitatetomakesuchacategoricalassertion.Whereit
notforthereleaseofDiokno,Iwouldhaveonmyfirmbeliefthattheimportanceofthiscaseandtheissuesraised
bythepetitionercallfordenialofthemotiontowithdraw.ThepointsablyraisedbySolicitorGeneralEstelitoP.
MendozaandAssistantSolicitorGeneralVicenteV.Mendoza,whohaveshownremarkablysplendidperformance
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6/20/2015inshoulderingalmostentirelythegovernment'sdefenseagainstsomeofthecountry'smostdistinguished
G.R.No.L35546
lawyers,notablyformerSenatorLorenzoM.Taadaandabatteryofotherlawyerswhosenamesareaveritable
listof"WhoisWho"inthelegalprofession,canbecondensedintoonlyoneargumentthepetitionershave
broughtbeforethisCourtacaseofsuchtranscendentalimportancethatitbecomesadutytoourlegal
institutions,toourpeople,andtoposteritytodecideit.Wemustnotleavetheresolutionofsuchgraveissuestoa
futureday.
Furthermore,amongthepresentcasesnowbeforethisCourt,thebestforumforOurdecisionwouldhavebeen
theDioknocasefor,beforehisrelease,hewastheonlypetitionerwhowasactuallydetainedbutwithoutcharges,
whiletherearealreadychargesfiledagainstAquino,andwithrespecttotheotherswhosecasesarestillpending
beforeUs,theyareonlyunderdetentionwithintheGreaterManilaareaorareundercommunityarrest.
habeascorpus
Thepetitionerseekstodistinguishhiscasefrom,79Phil.461.Inthatcase,thisCourtruled
Krivenkovs.RegisterofDeeds
AccordingtoRule52,section4,oftheRulesofCourt,itisdiscretionaryuponthisCourttograntawithdrawalof
appealafterthebriefshavebeenpresented.Atthetimethemotionforwithdrawalwasfiledinthiscase,notonly
hadthebriefsbeenpresented,butthecasehadalreadybeenvotedandthemajoritydecisionwasbeing
prepared.Themotionforwithdrawalstatednoreasonwhatsoever,andtheSolicitorGeneralwasagreeabletoit.
WhilethemotionwaspendinginthisCourt,camethenewcircularoftheDepartmentofJustice,instructingall
registerofdeedstoacceptforregistrationalltransfersofresidentiallotstoaliens.Thehereinrespondent
appelleewasnaturallyoneoftheregistersofdeedstoobeythenewcircular,asagainsthisownstandinthis
casewhichhadbeenmaintainedbythetrialcourtandfirmlydefendedinthisCourtbytheSolicitorGeneral.Ifwe
grantthewithdrawal,theresultwouldbethatpetitionerappellantAlexanderA.Krivenkowinshiscase,notbya
decisionofthisCourt,butbythedecisionorcircularoftheDepartmentofJustice,issuedwhilethiscasewas
pendingbeforethisCourt.Whetherornotthisisthereasonwhyappellantseeksthewithdrawalofhisappealwhy
theSolicitorGeneralreadilyagreestothatwithdrawal,isnowimmaterial.Whatismaterialandindeedvery
important,iswhetherornotweshouldallowinterferencewiththeregularandcompleteexercisebythisCourtof
itsconstitutionalfunctions,andwhetherornotafterhavingheldlongdeliberationsandafterhavingreacheda
clearandpositiveconvictionastowhattheconstitutionalmandateis,wemaystillallowourconvictiontobe
silenced,andtheconstitutionalmandatetobeignoredormisconceived,withalltheharmfulconsequencesthat
mightbebroughtuponthenationalpatrimony.Foritisbutnaturalthatthenewcircularbetakenfulladvantageof
bymany,withthecircumstancethatperhapstheconstitutionalquestionmaynevercomeupagainbeforethis
court,becausebothvendorsandthevendeeswillhavenointerestbuttoupholdthevalidityoftheirtransactions,
andveryunlikelywilltheregisterofdeedsventuretodisobeytheordersoftheirsuperior.Thusthepossibilityfor
thiscourttovoiceitsconvictioninafuturecasemayberemote,withtheresultthatourindifferenceoftodaymight
signifyapermanentoffensetotheConstitution.(pp.466467)
Thereareindeedcertaindifferencesbetweenthefactsofthecaseandthefactsofthecurrentpetitions.Ifthe
factualsituationswerecompletelysimilar,formerSenatorLorenzoM.Taadawouldhavebeenthelastpersonto
insistontheDioknomotionforwithdrawal.HewastheSolicitorGeneralin1947.Heiscompletelyfamiliarwiththe
ramificationsofthecase.
KrivenkoKrivenko
Icannot,however,agreewithcounselTaadathatthedeviationsfromthefactscallforadifferentrulinginthe
instantpetitions.TheSupremeCourthasgrappledatlengthandindepthwiththevalidityoftheproclamationof
martiallaw.Ithascloselyexaminedtheresultantcurtailmentsofmelibertiesastherighttoawritofortofreedom
ofexpression.Whenitisonthevergeofissuingadecision,itissuddenlyaskedtodropthecaseandtheissues
raisedsimplybecausethepetitionerisnolongerinterestedinthedecision.Tomymind,agrantingofthemotion
wouldberecreancyandunfaithfulnesstotheCourtssworndutiesandobligations.
Krivenkohabeascorpus
Asinthecase,thereasonsforthewithdrawalarenolongersignificant.ItisthenonsilencingofthisCourton
issuesofutmostpublicimportancewhichreallymatters.ItistruethatpetitionerDioknoisaloneinseeking
withdrawalatthisstageofthecase.Thefactthatadecisioncouldpossiblystillberenderedonremainingcases
is,however,nojustificationtograntthemotion.Theissueiswhetheroneortwoorallofthepetitionersmayask
forawithdrawalofhisortheirpetitionsandhopetobringaboutanondecisionontheissuesbecauseofthe
renderingmootandacademicofthecase.Myansweriscategoricallyinthenegative.Infact,evenitthecaseis
mootedatthisstagebythereleaseofthepetitioners,Iwouldstillvoteforadecisiononthequestionsraised.
Krivenko
Thismaybeasimplemotionforwithdrawal.Yet,Iseenodifferenceintheneedtoanswervitalquestionsthat
havebeenpresented.Thepublicinterestthatisaffectedisequallypressingandseriousifthepetitionsare
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6/20/2015comparedtoinstancesinthepastwhentheCourtinsistedonrenderingadecision.Infact,thereisaneven
G.R.No.L35546
strongerneedtointerpretthemeaningoftheconstitutionalprovisioninspiteofurgingsthatitshouldrefrainfrom
doingso.
Asearlyas1937,thisCourt,speakingthroughJusticeLaurelin(65Phil,56,94)emphaticallystatedthatwhen
thecountryawaitsadecisiononanimportantconstitutionalquestion,arelaxationofgeneralrulesiscalledfor.A
decisionmustissue.
PeopleofthePhilippineIslandsv.Vera
...AllawaitthedecisionofthisCourtontheconstitutionalquestion.Considering,therefore,theimportancewhich
theinstantcasehasassumedandtopreventmultiplicityofsuits,strongreasonsofpublicpolicydemandthatthe
constitutionalityofActNo.4221benowresolved....In,,ananalogoussituationconfrontedus.Wesaid:
"Inasmuchasthepropertyandpersonalrightsofnearlytwelvethousandmerchantsareaffectedbythese
proceedingsandinasmuchasActNo.2972isanewlawnotyetinterpretedbythecourts,intheinterestofthe
publicwelfareandfortheadvancementofpublicpolicy,wehavedeterminedtooverrulethedefenseofwantof
jurisdictioninorderthatwemaydecidethemainissue.Wehavehereanextraordinarysituationwhichcallsfora
relaxationofthegeneralrule."OurrulingonthispointwassustainedbytheSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStates.
Amorebindingauthorityinsupportoftheviewwehavetakencannotbefound.
YuCongEngvs.Trinidadsupra
Inthecaseof(93Phil.17),theSupremeCourthadverysoundreasonstoresolveonMarch4,1949notto
decidewhetherornotSenatorCuencohadvalidlybeenelectedSenatePresident.TheCourtruledthatthe
subjectmatteroftheproceedingtodeclarethepetitionertherightfulPresidentofthePhilippineSenateandto
ousttherespondentwasnotamatterfortheSupremeCourtinviewoftheseparationofpowersdoctrine,the
politicalnatureofthecontroversy,andtheconstitutionalgranttotheSenateofthepowertoelectitsown
President.ThepowertoelectitsPresidentshouldnotbeinterferedwithnortakenoverbythejudiciary.
Avelinovs.Cuencoquowarranto
OnMarch14,1949oronlyten(10)dayslater,theCourt,byamajorityofseven,decidedtoresolvethequestions
presentedtoit.TheCourtcouldverywellhaveinsistedonitsearlierstandthatitshouldrendernodecision.
ElectionoftheSenatePresidentwasstillamatterwhichonlytheSenateshoulddecide.Andyet,inthelightof
subsequenteventswhichjustifieditsintervention,partlyforthereasonsstatedintheMarch4,1949resolutionof
theCourt,andpartlybecauseofthegroundsstatedinthevariousindividualopinions,theCourtwasconstrained
todeclarepositivelythattherewasaquoruminthesessionwhereCuencowaselectedActingSenatePresident.
TheCourtdecidedtoreverseacategoricalpositiontakenonlyten(10)daysearlier.Itisclearfromthe
circumstancesofthecasethattheCourtwasimpelledbystrongpolicyconsiderationstomakeadefinite
pronouncementinthecaseinordertoconformtosubstantialjusticeandcomplywiththerequirementsofpublic
interest.AspointedoutbyJusticePerfectoinhisconcurringopinion,"Thiscaseraisesvitalconstitutional
questionswhichnoonecansettleordecideifthisCourtshouldrefusetodecidethem."
In,(27SCRA853),thewordsofJusticeLaurelwererecalledinordertoovercomeobjectionstoanextended
decisiononacasewhichhadbecomemootandacademic.
Gonzalesvs.CommissiononElections
Inthecourseofthedeliberations,aseriousproceduralobjectionwasraisedbyfivemembersoftheCourt(Chief
JusticeConcepcionandJusticesReyes,Makalintal,TeehankeeandBarredo.)Itistheirviewthatrespondent
CommissiononElectionsnotbeingsoughttoberestrainedfromperforminganyspecificact,thissuitcannotbe
characterizedasotherthanamererequestforanadvisoryopinion.Suchaview,fromtheremediallaw
standpoint,hasmuchtorecommendit.Nonetheless,amajoritywouldaffirmtheoriginalstandthatunderthe
circumstances,itcouldstillrightfullybetreatedasapetitionforprohibition.
ThelanguageofJusticeLaurelfitsthecase:'AllawaitthedecisionofthisCourtontheconstitutionalquestion.
Considering,therefore,theimportancewhichtheinstantmmhasassumedandtopreventmultiplicityofsuits,
strongreasonsofpublicpolicydemandthat[its]constitutionality...benowresolved.'(65Phil.56,94(1937).,47
Phil.385(1926),271US50070Lawed.,1059).Itmaylikewisebeaddedthattheexceptionalcharacterofthe
situationthatconfrontsus,theparamountpublicinterest,andtheundeniablenecessityforaruling,thenational
electionsbeingbarelysixmonthsaway,reinforceourstand.
CfYuCongEngv.Trinidad
Itwouldappearundeniable,therefore,thatbeforeusisanappropriateinvocationofourjurisdictiontopreventthe
enforcementofanallegedunconstitutionalstatute.Weareleftwithnochoicethenwemustactonthematter.
In(41SCRA1),thisCourtwassimilarlyimpelledtomakeadecisionbecauseofstrongpolicyconsiderations.A
petitiontoreducetheP1,195,200.00bailimposedbythetrialcourthadbecomemootandacademic.The
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6/20/2015petitionerhadescapedfromtheprovincialjail.TheCourtcouldnolongergrantanyrelief.It,however,decidedthe
G.R.No.L35546
case"tosetforthanewthecontrollingandauthoritativedoctrinesthatshouldbeobservedinfixingtheamountof
thebailsoughtinorderthatfullrespectbeaccordedtosuchaconstitutionalright."(atpage4).Education,
especiallyoftrialjudges,wasthereasonforansweringtheissuessquarely.
DelaCamarav.Enage
Iwouldliketoreiterate,however,thatinviewofthefactthatpetitionerDioknohasbeenreleasedontheoccasion
ofPresidentMarcos'birthday(September11),InowvotetogranttheDioknomotiontowithdrawhispetitionfora
writof,thesamehavingbecomemootandacademic.
habeascorpus
VII
COURTSDUTYTODECIDEALLIMPORTANTISSUESONTHEPETITIONSOFTHEPETITIONERS
ButasalreadystatedunderthetopicIV(b)"PresentStatusofthePetitioners",manyofthem,notablyAquinoand
Rodrigo,stillinsistonadecision.Thiswemustnowdo,fortheresolutionofthecontroversyinfavorofthe
petitionersorfortherespondentsisnotthecompellingconsideration.Whatisimportantandessentialisthatthe
CourtdeclareinamannerthatcannotbemisunderstoodwhattheConstitutioncommandsandwhatthe
Constitutionrequires.
ItistruethattheCourtshouldnotformulatearuleofconstitutionallawbroaderthanisrequiredbytheprecise
factstowhichitisapplied.Itistruethatadecisiononaquestionofaconstitutionalnatureshouldonlybeas
broadanddetailedasisnecessarytodecideit.
Thereare,therefore,thosewhowouldlimitadecisionsolelyontheTransitoryProvisionsofthe1973Constitution.
TheexerciseofmartiallawpowersunderArticleVII,Section10,paragraph2oftheformerConstitutionorArticle
VII,Section12ofthe1973Constitutionhavebeensubjectedtointensive,searching,andwellpublished
challenges.
1IfWedecidethecasesolelyonthetransitoryprovision,uncertaintyandconfusionaboutmartiallawwouldremain.The
provisionsonmartiallawwouldstillbeunexplainedandunresolvedbythisCourt.Itiseasytoseethepatentundesirability
ofsuchasituation.
Inthesepetitions,ourpeopleawaitthedecisionofthisCourtontheconstitutionalquestion.Considering,
therefore,theimportancewhichtheinstantpetitionshaveassumed,Wemustsetforththecontrollingand
authoritativedoctrines.
VII
THETHREEPRINCIPALISSUES
TheSolicitorGeneralstatedtherespondents'positionasanarrowonewhetherthearrestanddetentionofthe
petitionerswerelegal.
Itistruethatisintendedforcasesofillegalconfinementordetentionbywhichapersonisdeprivedofhisliberty
(Section1,Rule102,RulesofCourt).Itsessentialobjectistoinquireintoallmannerofinvoluntaryrestraintand
torelieveapersontherefrom,ifsuchrestraintisillegal(Villavicenciovs.Lukban,39Phil.778Culauagvs.
DirectorofPrisons,17SCRA429).Whiletheissuemaybepresentedinseeminglynarrowterms,itsscopeand
implicationsarenotthatsimple.TherespondentsarguethatthisCourtisprecludedbytheConstitutionfrom
inquiringintothelegalityofthedetentions.Theyarguethatsuchaninquiryispossibleonlywheretheprivilegeof
thewritofisavailableandinasmuchastheprivilegeofthewrithasbeensuspendedbythePresidentuponthe
proclamationofmartiallaw,itfollowsthatWeshouldinhibitOurselvesfromaskingforthereasonswhythe
petitionerswerearrestedanddetained.ItisarguedthattheConstitutionhasvestedthedeterminationofthe
necessityforandlegalityofdetentionsundermartiallawexclusivelyinthePresidencyacoequaldepartment
ofgovernment.
Theprincipalissues,therefore,revolvearoundfirst,thevalidityofProclamationNo.1081.Second,assumingits
originalvalidity,mayWeinquireintothevalidityofitscontinuation?Andthird,hastheprivilegeofthewritofalso
beensuspendedupontheproclamationofmartiallaw?TheextentofOurinquiryintothelegalityofthedetentions
andtheireffectsisdependentontheanswerstotheforegoingissues.
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G.R.No.L35546
IX
PROCLAMATIONNO.1081ADEVIATIONFROMTHETRADITIONALCONCEPTOFMARTIALLAW
ARGUMENTSONITSVALIDITY
InProclamationNo.1081,dateSeptember21,1972,PresidentFerdinandE.MarcosplacedtheentirePhilippines
asdefinedinArticle1,Section1oftheConstitutionundermartiallawbyvirtueofthepowervestedinthe
PresidentoftheRepublicofthePhilippinesbyArticleVII,Section10,par.(2)oftheConstitutionwhichreads
ThePresidentshallbethecommanderinchiefofallarmedforcesofthePhilippinesand,wheneveritbecomes
necessary,bemaycalloutsucharmedforcestopreventorsuppresslawlessviolence,invasion,insurrection,or
rebellion.Incaseofinvasion,insurrection,rebellionorimminentdangerthereof,whenthepublicsafetyrequires
it,hemaysuspendtheprivilegesofthewritof,orplacethePhilippinesoranypartthereofundermartiallaw.
habeascorpus
(a)
Whatismartiallaw?
AstheSolicitorGeneralpointedoutwhenaskedtosubmitdefinitionsofmartiallaw,thereareasmanydefinitions
astherearecourtrulingsandwritersonthesubject.Theresponseofthepetitionersgivesthesameimpression.
Asgoodasanythatmayhavebeenarethefollowing:
definitionsmadeinthepast
Generallyspeaking,martiallawor,moreproperly,martialrule,isthetemporarygovernmentandcontrolby
militaryforceandauthorityofterritoryinwhich,byreasonoftheexistenceofwarorpubliccommotion,thecivil
governmentisinadequatetothepreservationoforderandtheenforcementoflaw.Instrictnessitisnotlawatall,
butratheracessationofallmunicipallaw,asanincidentofthejusbelliandbecauseofparamountnecessity,and
depends,foritsexistence,operationandextent,ontheimminenceofpublicperilandtheobligationtoprovidefor
thegeneralsafety.Itisessentiallyalaworruleofforce,apurelymilitarymeasure,andinthefinalanalysisis
merelythewilloftheofficercommandingthemilitaryforces.Astheoffspringofnecessity,ittranscendsand
displacestheordinarylawsoftheland,anditappliesaliketomilitaryandnonmilitarypersons,andisexercisable
alikeoverfriendsandenemies,citizensandaliens.(C.J.S.,Vol.93,pp.115116,citingcases).
Martiallawistheexerciseofthepowerwhichresidesintheexecutivebranchofthegovernmenttopreserve
orderandinsurethepublicsafetyintimesofemergencywhenotherbranchesofthegovernmentareunableto
function,ortheirfunctioningwoulditselfthreatenthepublicsafety".(Luthervs.Borden,7Hos.(US)1,45,12Led
581,600)."Itisalawofnecessitytobeprescribedandadministeredbytheexecutivepower.Itsobject,the
preservationofthepublicsafetyandgoodorder,definesitsscope,whichwillvarywiththecircumstancesand
necessitiesofthecase.Theexerciseofthepowermaynotextendbeyondwhatisrequiredbytheexigencywhich
callsitforth."(Mitchellvs.Harmony,13How(US)115,133,14Led75,83UnitedStatesvs.Russell,13Wall.
(US)623,628,20Led474,475Raymondvs.Thomas,91US712,716,23Led434,435Sterlingvs.
Constantin,190.)(Concurringopinion,Duncanvs.Kahanamoku327U.S.334,335,90Led706(19451946)).
Ithasbeenheld,therefore,thatmartiallawisa"lawofactualmilitarynecessityinactualpresenceofwar,andis
administeredbythegeneralofthearmy,whosewillitis,subjecttoslightlimitations."(Constantinovs.Smith,D.C.
Text,57F.2d239).Underthissameruling,martiallawisstrictlynolawatall.Itisacessationofallmunicipallaw.
Inanotherdecision,ithasbeenheldthat
Allrespectablewritersandpublicistsagreeinthedefinitionofmartiallawthatitisneithermorenorlessthan
thewillofthegeneralwhocommandsthearmy.Itoverridesandsuppressesallexistinglaws,civilofficersand
civilauthorities,bythearbitraryexerciseofmilitarpowerandeverycitizenorsubject,inotherwords,theentire
populationofthecountry,withintheconfinesofitspower,issubjectedtothemerewillorcapriceofthe
commander.Heholdsthelives,libertyandpropertyofallinthepalmofhishands.Martiallawisregulatedbyno
knownorestablishedsystemorcodeoflaws,asitisoverandaboveallofthem.Thecommanderisthelegislator,
judgeandexecutioner.(Inre:Egan8Fed.Cas.p.367).
Otherdefinitionsmaybecited:
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6/20/2015Martiallaw...isnotstatutoryincharacterandalwaysarisesoutofstrictmilitarynecessity.Itsproclamationor
G.R.No.L35546
establishmentisnotexpresslyauthorizedanyoftheprovisionsoftheConstitutionitcomesintobeingonlyinthe
territoryofanenemyorinapartoftheterritoryoftheUnitedStatesintimeofwarorintimeofpeaceinwhichthe
propercivilauthorityis,forsomecontrollingreason,unabletoexerciseitsproperfunction.(CharlesWarren,
"Spies,andthePowerofCongresstoSubjectCertainClassesofCiviliantoTrialbyMilitaryTribunal",The
AmericanLawReviewLIII(MarchApril,1919),201292).
Thetermmartiallawreferstotheexceptionalmeasuresadoptedwhetherbythemilitaryorthecivilauthorities,in
timesofwarofdomesticdisturbance,forthepreservationoforderandthemaintenanceofthepublicauthority.
Totheoperationofmartiallawalltheinhabitantsofthecountryorofthedisturbeddistrict,aliensaswellas
citizens,aresubject.(Moore,Int.LawDigestII,186.AstothesubjectionofalienstoMartialLaw,SeeMoore,II,
196).
civilauthorities,stateorfederalasthecasemaybe,havebeenrenderedinoperativeorpowerlessbythe
insurrectionaryorinvadingforces.Itispartofourdomesticormunicipallaw.(ArnoldF.,"TheRationaleofMartial
Law",15ABAJ551).
APhilippineauthorhastriedtoreconcilethemanydefinitions.
WhateverthepreviousobscuritywhichhasenvelopedmartiallawinboththeBritishEmpireandtheUnited
States,itissettledtodaythatmartiallawis(1)theexerciseofmilitaryjurisdiction(2)bythemilitaryoverthe
civilianpopulation(3)inadomesticterritory(4)onoccasionofseriouspublicemergenciessuchasinsurrection,
rebellion,invasionorimminentdangerthereof(5)accordingtoanunwrittenlawand(6)asnecessityrequires.
(Santos,MartialLaw,p.81).
Theexistingdefinitionsareallbasedonthetraditionalconcepts.Theyweremadeatatimewheninvasionswere
precededby48hourultimatumsfollowedbyaformaldeclarationofwar,andwheninsurrectionsandrebellions
involvedfrontalclashesbetweenopposingandwelldefinedforces.Ifonegroupwasovercomebytheother,the
loserswouldsurrendertheirswordsandguns.Thewinners,inturn,mightmagnanimouslyoffertoreturnthe
swordsandallowtheloserstoretaintheirsidearms,rifles,andhorsesforhomeuse.Inshort,therewereclear
andsportingrulesofthegamewhichweregenerallyfollows.
(b).
ModernMartialLaw
MartiallawpursuanttoProclamationNo.1081,however,doesnotcompletelyfollowthetraditionalformsand
featureswhichmartiallawhasassumedinthepast.Itismoderninconcept,inthelightofrelevantnew
conditions,particularlypresentdayrapidmeansoftransportation,sophisticatedmeansofcommunications,
unconventionalweaponry,andsuchadvancedconceptsassubversion,fifthcolumns,theunwittinguseof
innocentpersons,andtheweaponsofideologicalwarfare.
Thecontingencieswhichrequireastateofmartiallawaretimehonored.Theyareinvasion,insurrectionand
rebellion.OurConstitutionalsoallowsaproclamationofmartiallawinthefaceofimminentdangerfromanyof
thesethreecontingencies.TheConstitutionveststhepowertodeclaremartiallawinthePresidentunderthe
1935ConstitutionorthePrimeMinisterunderthe1973Constitution.Astotheform,extent,andappearanceof
martiallaw,theConstitutionandourjurisprudencearesilent.
MartiallawpursuanttoProclamationNo.1081has,however,deviatedfromthetraditionalpictureofrigidmilitary
rulesuperimposedasaresultofactualandtotalorneartotalbreakdownofgovernment.
Martiallawwasproclaimedbeforethenormaladministrationoflawandordercouldbreakdown.Courtsofjustice
werestillopenandhaveremainedopenthroughoutthestateofmartiallaw.Thenationwideanarchy,overthrow
ofgovernment,andconvulsivedisorderswhichclassicalauthorsmentionasessentialfactorsfortheproclamation
andcontinuationofmartiallawwerenotpresent.
Moreimportant,martiallawunderProclamationNo.1081hasnotresultedintheruleofthemilitary.Thewillof
thegeneralswhocommandthearmedforceshasdefinitelynotreplacedthelawsoftheland.Ithasnot
supersededcivilianauthority.Insteadoftherulebymilitaryofficials,wehavetheruleofthehighestcivilianand
electiveofficialoftheland,assistedbycivilianheadsofexecutivedepartments,civilianelectivelocalofficialsand
othercivilianofficials.MartiallawunderProclamationNo.1081hasmadeextensiveuseofmilitaryforces,notto
takeoverCivilianauthoritybuttoinsurethatcivilianauthorityiseffectivethroughoutthecountry.ThisCourtcan
verywellnotethatithassummonedandcontinuestosummonmilitaryofficerstocomebeforeit,sometimes
personallyandatothertimesthroughcounsel.Thesemilitarycommandershavebeenrequiredtojustifytheiracts
accordingtoourConstitutionandthelawsoftheland.Thesemilitaryofficersareawarethatitisnottheirwill
muchlesstheircapricebutthesovereignwillofthepeopleunderaruleoflaw,whichgovernsundermartiallaw
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6/20/2015pursuanttoProclamationNo.1081.
G.R.No.L35546
ItisthisparadoxicalnatureofmartiallawinthePhilippinesthatleadstothevariousquestionsraisedintheinstant
petitions.Itisalsothisapparentlyvariantformanditsoccasionallydivergentscopeandeffectswhichrequirethis
CourttoexplainjustwhatthemartiallawprovisionoftheConstitutionmeans.
Wemust,perforce,examinetheargumentsofthepartiesonthismatter.
(c)
Respondents'Arguments
TherespondentscontendthatwhenmartiallawwasproclaimedonSeptember21,1972,therebellionandarmed
actionundertakenbythelawlesselementsofthecommunistandotherarmedaggrupationsorganizedto
overthrowtheRepublicofthePhilippinesbyarmedviolenceandforcehadassumedthemagnitudeofanactual
stateofwaragainstourpeopleandtheRepublicofthePhilippines.Thisdeclarationisfoundinthelast"whereas"
ofProclamationNo.1081.ThefollowingassertionsofthefactualsituationonSeptember21,1972arealsofound
inProclamationNo.1081.
1.Thereisagroupoflawlesselementswhoaremovedbyacommonorsimilarideologicalconviction,design,
strategy,andgoal.Theirprimepurposeistostage,undertake,andwageanarmedinsurrectionandrebellion
againstthegovernmentoftheRepublicofthePhilippinesinordertoforciblyseizepoliticalandstatepowerinthis
country.Theyhaveinfactactuallystaged,undertaken,andwagedthisinsurrectionandrebellion.Theywantto
overthrowthedulyconstitutedgovernmentandsupplantourexistingpolitical,social,economic,andlegalorder
withanentirelynewone.Thisnewformofgovernment,itssystemoflaws,itsconceptionofGodandreligion,its
notionofindividualrightsandfamilyrelations,anditspolitical,social,economic,legalandmoralpreceptsare
basedontheMarxist,Leninist,Maoistteachingsandbeliefs.
2.Theselawlesselementshaveenteredintoaconspiracyandhavejoinedandbandedtheirresourcesand
forces.Theyuseseeminglyinnocentandharmlessalthoughactuallydestructivefrontorganization.These
organizationshavebeeninfiltratedordeliberatelyformedbythemthroughsustainedandcarefulrecruitment
amongthepeasantry,laborers,professionals,intellectuals,students,andmassmediapersonnel.Their
membershiphasbeenstrengthenedandbroadened.Theircontrolandinfluencehasspreadoveralmostevery
segmentandlevelofoursocietythroughouttheland.
3.Theforegoinggroupoflawlesselementsenjoytheactive,moral,andmaterialsupportofaforeignpower.In
themonthsofMay,JuneandJuly,1972,theybroughtintothecountryatDigoyoPoint,Palanan,Isabelaand
otherpointsalongthePacificcoastofLuzon,substantialquantitiesofwarmaterialsconsistingofaround3,500M
14rifles,severaldozensof40mmrocketlaunchers,largequantitiesof80mmrocketsandammunitionsand
othercombatparaphernalia.
4.Thelawlesselementshaveanoverallrevolutionaryplan.Theyhavedistributedtheirregionalprogramof
actionfor1972totheirvariousfieldcommandersandpartyworkers.Theimplementationoftheprogramofaction
fromtheintensificationofrecruitmenttotheassassinationofhighgovernmentofficialsandtheestablishmentofa
provisionalrevolutionarygovernmentinvarioustownsandcitieshasactuallycommenced.Variousincidentsof
bombings,strikes,robberies,sabotage,anddemonstrationsareactuallyinimplementationoftheprogramof
action.Liquidationmissionsaimedatrankinggovernmentofficialswereabouttobeimplementedbythefieldingof
socalledSparrowUnits.
5.ThereisanequallyseriousdisorderinMindanaoandSuluresultinginactualwaramongChristians,Muslims,
Ilagas,Barracudas,theMindanaoIndependenceMovementandgovernmenttroops.Violentdisorderin
MindanaoandSuluresultedinover3,000casualtiesandmorethan500,000injured,displacedandhomeless
persons.TheeconomyofMindanaoandSuluisparalyzed.
6.Thereisthroughoutthelandastateofanarchy,lawlesschaos,disorder,turmoilanddestructionofa
magnitudeequivalenttoanactualwarbetweengovernmentforcesontheonehandandtheNewPeople'sArmy
andthesatelliteorganizationsontheother.
7.TheSupremeCourtinthe1971caseshasfoundthatintruthandinfactthereexistsanactualinsurrectionand
rebellioninthecountry.PortionsoftheSupremeCourtdecisionarecited.ItwasconcludedbytheSupremeCourt
thattheunlawfulactivitiesoftheaforesaidelementsposeaclear,present,andgravedangertopublicsafetyand
thesecurityofthenationisalsocited.
habeascorpus
(d)
Petitioners'Arguments:
305/374
6/20/2015Ontheotherhand,thepetitionersstatethatinthePhilippines"therehasbeennodisruptionatallallgovernment
G.R.No.L35546
officeswereperformingtheirusualfunctionsallcourtswereopenandintheunobstructedexerciseoftheir
jurisdictionatthetimemartiallawwasdeclared."ThepetitionersstatethatwehavenoCivilWarinthePhilippines
andthatnoprovince,nocity,notownthroughoutthePhilippineshassecededfromtheRepublic.Theystatethat
thereisnostatusofbelligerency.Thereisnoarmedstrugglecarriedonbetweentwopoliticalbodies,eachof
whichexercisesdefactosovereigntyoverpersonswithinadeterminateterritory,andcommandsanarmywhichis
preparedtoobservetheordinarylawsofwar.
Onrebellion,thepetitionerspointoutthattherebelshavenotestablishedanorganizedcivilgovernmentnor
occupiedasubstantialportionofthenationalterritoryand,infact,aredescribedasmere"lawlesselements."
Thepetitionersstatethat"thethrustofmartiallawcasesisthisthatfortherequirementofpublicsafetytobe
satisfied,civilauthoritymusthaveeitherfallenawayorprovedinadequatefortheemergency,thecourtsare
actuallyclosed,anditisimpossibletoadministercriminaljusticeaccordingtolaw,andthatwhererebellionreally
exists,thereisanecessitytofurnishasubstituteforthecivilauthority,thusoverthrown,andasnopowerisleft
butthemilitary,itisallowedtogovernuntilthelawscanhavetheirfreecourse.Formartialrulecanneverexist
wherethecourtsareopenandintheunobstructedexerciseoftheirjurisdiction."ThepetitionersciteArnold,inhis
article,"TheRationaleofMartialLaw"(15ABAJ551).
civilauthorities...HAVEBEENRENDEREDINOPERATIVEORPOWERLESSbytheinsurrectionaryorinvading
forces.
Aftercitingtheforegoing,petitionersaskedthisCourttotakejudicialnoticeofthefollowing:
1.Congresswasinsessionandwasintheunobstructedexerciseofitsfunctionswhenmartialwasproclaimed
2.TheSupremeCourt,theCourtofAppeals,theCourtsofFirstInstanceintheGreaterManilaAreawhere
petitionershadbeenarrestedindeed,eventhemunicipalandcitycourtswere,atthetimemartiallawwas
publiclyannounced,openandarestillopenandfunctioningthroughoutthelengthandbreadthofthelandno
proofhasbeenshownthatanycourthasbeenrendered"unabletoadministerjustice,"duetotheactivitiesofthe
rebels.Ironically,itisGeneralOrderNo.3,asamendedby,GeneralOrderNo.3A,issuedpursuantto
ProclamationNo.1081,thatseekstorenderthempowerless,inmanycases,toadministerjustice,accordingto
theConstitutionandthelawsoftheland
3.TheConstitutionalConventionthesocalled"fourthbranch"hadbeenholdingitssessionswhenmartiallaw
wasproclaimed.Despitemartiallaw,orprobablybecauseofit,itdecidedtoworkwithgreaterefficiency,ithas
justfinisheditswork.A"plebiscite"undermartiallawisbeingcalledonJanuary15,1973,sothepeoplecan
"ratify"theproposedConstitution
4.IntheGreaterManilaArea,contrarytothespeechofSeptember23,1972,nouniversity,college,orschool
wasclosedduetotheactivitiesoftherebels
5.AllinstrumentsofmasscommunicationswereinoperationuptoSeptember22,1972.Thenextday,free
speechandfreepresstheveryheartoffreeinquiryandthesearchfortruthbecamenothingbutempty
memories.Onlythe"safenewspapersandradiotvstations"wereallowedtoopen.Politicaldissentwas
suppressed
6.Allagenciesandinstrumentalitiesofgovernment,nationalaswellaslocal,werefunctioningwhenmartiallaw
wasproclaimed.ByGeneralOrderNo.3,theywereordered"tocontinuetofunctionundertheirpresentofficers
andemployeesandinaccordancewithexistinglaws..."
ThepetitionersstatewhyProclamationNo.1081isunconstitutional:
Theseindisputablefactswhichrequirenointroductionofproofbecausetheyallfallwithinthescopeofjudicial
notice,underRule129oftheRulesofCourtshowthatatthetimemartiallawwasdeclaredtherewas
absolutelynojustificationforit,infactandinlaw.Hence,ProclamationNo.1081isunconstitutionalandvoid,
because:
1.Itispredicatedontheexistenceof"themagnitudeofanactualwar"oran"actualstatusofwar"thatdoesnot
exist
2.Itisallegedlybasedonthe"statusofbelligerency"whichnoStateintheworld,noteventhePhilippines,has
extendedtotherebelsorthelawlesselementsdescribedintheProclamation
3.Althoughtheremayberebellioninsomeremoteplaces,asinIsabela,thereisnojustificationforthe
declarationofmartiallawthroughoutthePhilippines,since
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6/20/2015a)nolargescale,nationwiderebellionorinsurrectionexistsinthePhilippines
G.R.No.L35546
b)publicsafetydoesnotrequireit,inasmuchasnodepartmentofgovernment,nogovernmentagencyor
instrumentality,andevenmoreimportant,nocivilcourtofappellateororiginaljurisdictionwas,atthetimemartial
lawwasproclaimed,unabletoopenorfunction,orhasbeen,atanytimesincetheincumbentPresidentcame
intopower"renderedpowerlessorinoperative"duetotheactivitiesoftherebelsorthelawlesselements
describedintheProclamation
c)ThePresidenthimselfdeclaredthatthearmedforcescanhandlethesituationwithout"utilizingthe
extraordinarypowersofthePresident"(January1,1972),thatlongbeforemartiallawwasproclaimed,the
Governmenthadthesaidrebellion"andthe"rebelsandtheirsupporters"undercontrol,astheArmyknewthe
stepbystepplotoftheCommunistsandhadanhourbyhourmonitoringofthemovementsofthesubversive
leaders.
d)TheproblemintheGreaterManilaAreawherepetitionerswereseizedandarrestedwas,atthetime
martiallawwasproclaimed,plainlawlessnessandcriminality.
AsthePresidentdescribedthesituationinhisspeechofSeptember23,1972:
Lawlessnessandcriminalitylikekidnapping,smuggling,extortion,blackmail,gunrunning,hoardingand
manipulationofprices,corruptioningovernment,taxevasionperpetratedbysyndicatedcriminals,have
increasinglyescalated...
Thepetitionerspointedoutthatneitheranyoftheseoracombinationofall,constituteeithertheoccasionorthe
justificationfortheimpositionofmartialrule.Otherwise,sincethesecrimeshavealwaysbeenwithusformany
years,wewouldneverseetheendofmartiallawinthiscountry.
ItisarguedthatsinceProclamationNo.1081isunconstitutionalandvoid,theGeneralOrders,issuedin
pursuancetheretoandbywayofitsimplementation,mustinevitablysufferfromthesamecongenitalinfirmity.
(e)
AuthoritiescitedbytheParties
PetitionersandrespondentsalikepremisetheirargumentsonthemartiallawprovisionoftheConstitution.Both
citedecisionsofforeigncourtsandtreatisesofforeignwritersexpoundingonmartiallaw.Andyet,completely
divergentopinionsonthemeaningoftheprovisionistheresult.
Martiallawisbasedonalawofnecessityandisutilizedasameasureofgovernmentalselfdefense.Itis,
therefore,aninherentpower.Itneedsnoconstitutionalorstatutorygrantbeforeitmaybewielded.Asthe
petitionersstate(Addendum,pages8081),itisarecognizedinstitutionintheconstitutionalsystemsofboth
EnglandandAmerica,notwithstandinglackofexpressprovisionsonmartiallawinwrittenconstitutions.
Weacceptjudicialdecisionsofthesecountriesashighlypersuasive,ifnotasprecedents.Theabsenceof
expressrecognitionintheconstitutionsorstatuteofthesecountrieshelpsexplainwhythereisdisagreementona
precisedefinition.Moreimportant,itexplainswhythenecessity,scope,andextentofmartiallawproclamations
havetobedeterminedbytheregularcourtsandwhythedecisionsare,themselves,conflicting.TheConstitutions
andstatutesaresilentordifferentfromeachother.TheCourtshavebeenforcedtogotothecommonlawandto
generalprinciplesofConstitutionalLawtolookforbasesofpowerandtoresolveproblemsarisingoutofstatesof
martiallaw.Thevariousauthoritiescitedbybothpetitionersandrespondentsintheirpleadingsandoral
argumentsundoubtedlyhavevaluableworthandapplicability.Theyareveryhelpfulinresolvingthemomentous
issuesraisedbythepetitions.Thefactremains,however,thattheydealwithanexerciseofpowerwhichis
undefined.FortheUnitedStatesSupremeCourt,thepowerisnotspecificallyprescribedinthefederal
Constitution.Thishasledforeigncourtstonaturallyandlogicallylookfortheconfininglimitsandrestrictionsof
ambiguous,cryptic,andperplexingboundaries.Sincethepowerisnotdefined,thenaturaltendencyisnotto
describeitbuttolookforitslimits.AngloAmericanauthoritiesmayassistbutshouldnotcontrolbecause,here,
thelimitsarepresentanddeterminedbynolessthanthefundamentallaw.
InthePhilippines,thereisanubiquitousandmandatoryguide.TheConstitutionspeaksinclearandpositive
terms.Givencertainconditions,thePhilippinesoranypartthereofmaybeplacedundermartiallaw.Toresolve
theinstantpetitions,itisnecessarytofindoutwhattheConstitutioncommandsandwhattheexpresswordsofits
positiveprovisionmean.ItistheConstitutionthatshouldspeakonthecircumstancesandqualificationsofthe
initiationanduseofanawesomeemergencypower.
(b):
MoreargumentsoftheRespondents
307/374
6/20/2015Accordingtotherespondents,theConstitutionplainlyprovidesthatthecircumstanceswhenmartiallawmaybe
G.R.No.L35546
declared,itsscopeanditseffectsarebeyondjudicialexamination.TherespondentscontendthatthisCourtlacks
jurisdictiontotakecognizanceoftheinstantpetitionsfor.TheSolicitorGeneralhasconsistentlypleaded
throughouttheseproceedingsthatthequestionsinvolvedarepoliticalandnonjusticiable.Hestatesthatthe
President,sworntodefendtheConstitutionandtheRepublic,proclaimedmartiallawpursuanttoauthority
expresslyconferredbytheConstitution.Itisarguedthathisdecisionisbeyondcontroversionbecausethe
ConstitutionhasmadeitsoandthatonlyhistoryandtheFilipinopeoplemaypassjudgmentonwhetherthe
Presidenthascorrectlyactedinatimeofsupremecrisis.
habeascorpus
(a)
Moreargumentsofthepetitioners:
Petitioners,ontheotherhand,contendthatthisTribunalistheultimateinterpreteroftheConstitution.Assuch,it
hasthepoweranddutytodeclareProclamationNo.1081unconstitutionalandvoidbecausethePresidenthas
exceededhispowers.Itisarguedthatwherebasicindividualrightsareinvolved,judicialinquiryisnotprecluded.
OntheargumentthatmartiallawistextuallyandexclusivelycommittedtothePresident,thepetitionersanswer
thatunderthesameConstitution,thePresidentmaynotdisabletheCourtsandoustthem,particularlythe
SupremeCourt,oftheirjurisdictiontohearcasesassignedtothembytheConstitutionandthelaws.Petitioners
stressthattheCourtshouldactnoworthetimewillcomewhenitcannolongeract,however,muchitmaywish
to,foritshallhavecompletelylostthenthemoralforceandauthorityitstillpossessesandthevalidclaimitmay
stillhaveofbeingindependent,fearless,andjust.
X
POLITICALQUESTIONSANDCOURTSJURISDICTIONOVERTHEM
Therespondents'assertionthatthequestionsraisedinthesepetitionsarepoliticalandnonjusticiableraisesa
pointwhichiseasilymisunderstood.
Whatisapoliticalquestion?
In(78Phil.1,4),thisCourtrecognizedtheproblemsintryingtomakeadefinition:
Mabanagvs.Lopez
Itisadoctrinetoowellestablishedtoneedcitationofauthorities,thatpoliticalquestionsarenotwithinthe
provinceofthejudiciary,excepttotheextentthatpowertodealwithsuchquestionshasbeenconferreduponthe
courtsbyexpressconstitutionalorstatutoryprovision.(16C.J.S.,431).Thisdoctrineispredicatedontheprinciple
oftheseparationofpowers,aprinciplealsotoowellknowntorequireelucidationorcitationofauthorities.The
difficultyliesindeterminingwhatmatterstallwithinthemeaningofpoliticalquestion.Thetermisnotsusceptible
ofexactdefinition,andprecedentsandauthoritiesarenotalwaysinfullharmonyastothescopeofthe
restrictions,onthisground,onthecourtstomeddlewiththeactionsofthepoliticaldepartmentsofthe
government.
IthinkitistimeforthisCourttodistinguishbetweenjurisdictionoveracaseandjurisdictionovertheissueraised
inthatcase.Itiserroneoustostatethatwhenapetitionraisesanissuewhichispoliticalinnature,thisCourtis
withoutjurisdictionoverthecase..
Ithasjurisdiction
TheSupremeCourthasjurisdictiontoreceivethepetitionandtofindoutwhethertheissuesareindeedpolitical
ornot.AfindingofpoliticalquestionistheprovinceoftheCourtinallcases.Amereallegationofpoliticalquestion
doesnotautomaticallydivesttheCourtofitsjurisdiction.TheCourtmay,therefore,requirethepartiestothecase
toproveorrefutetheexistenceofapoliticalquestion.TheCourthasjurisdictiontoreceivethepleadings,tolisten
totheargumentsandtomakeupitsmind.
OncetheCourt,however,findsthattheissueispoliticalinnature,itshouldrulethatithasnojurisdictiontodecide
theissueonewayoranother.Itstillrendersadecision.Itmuststillstatethat,accordingtotheConstitution,this
matterisnotforthejudiciarybutforthepoliticaldepartmentstodecide.ThisisthetaskWemustperforminthese
petitions.Whenwedecidewhetherornottheissuesarepoliticalinnature,Weexercisejurisdiction.IfWefinda
politicalquestion,Westillhavejurisdictionoverthecasebutnotoverthespecificissue.
AlotofemotionalismisdirectedagainsttheCourtwhenitrulesthataquestionispolitical.Itisallegedthatthe
308/374
6/20/2015Courthassurrendereditspowers.Thepoliticalquestion,itissaid,"appliestoallthosequestionsofwhichthe
G.R.No.L35546
Court,atagiventime,willbeoftheopinionthatitisimpoliticorinexpedienttotakejurisdiction.Sometimesthis
ideaofinexpediencywillresultfromthefearofthevastnessoftheconsequencesthatadecisiononthemerits
mightentail.Sometimes,itwillresultfromthefeelingthattheCourtisincompetenttodealwiththetypeof
questioninvolved.Sometimes,itwillbeinducedbythefeelingthatthematteristoohighfortheCourts"
(Finkelstein,"JudicialSelfLimitation",38HarvardLawReview328,344)Thepoliticalquestiondoctrineis,
therefore,describedasadoctrineofjudicialopportunism.LikePontiusPilate,theCourtisaccusedoftossingthe
hotissueforotherstodetermine.Itischargedwithwashingitshandsoffadifficultorexplosivesituation.A
politicalquestion,itisalleged,isnothingmorethananyquestionwhichtheCourtdoesnotwanttodecide.Itis
understandablewhycourtsshouldhaveaseeminglynaturalorspontaneoustendencytorejectapolitical
questionargument.ThechargethattheCourtisabdicatingafunctionorrunningawayfromresponsibilitycan
striketotheverymarrowofanyjudge'sfeelings.
Idonotsharethesemisgivings.Ipositivelyrejectthemaswrongimpressions.ThisCourtisdischarginga
constitutionaldutywhenitdeterminesthatanissueisapoliticalquestion.Becauseofitsimplications,however,
thisisafactwhichtheCourtmustalsoexplaininthesimplesttermspossible.
TheConstitutiondefinesandlimitsthepowersentrustedbythesovereignpeopletotheirgovernment.First,it
declarestheboundarieswherethepowersofgovernmentcannotgofurtherbecauseindividualrightswouldbe
impaired.Second,itdividesthepowersgiventotheentiregovernmentamongthevariousdepartmentsand
constitutionalbodies.Itsprovisionsare,therefore,bothagrantandalimitationofpower.
Inotherwords,theConstitutionmaybelikenedtoamap.Thismapshowshowthepowersofsovereigntyhave
beendistributedamongthedepartmentsofgovernment.Itshowswherethereisasharingofpowersorwhere
checksandbalancesmaybefound.Italsoshowswherethereisadividinglinebetweengovernmentpowerand
individualliberty.Inplainerlanguage,theconstitutionalmap,likeanyothermap,carriesdifferentboundaries.The
boundariesarethedelimitation'sofpower.
ThefunctionoftheCourtistofixthoseboundarieswheneverencroachmentsarealleged.Indoingso,theCourt
interpretstheconstitutionalmap.Itdeclaresthatthispowerisexecutive,thatpowerislegislative,andthatother
powerisjudicial.Itmaysometimesstatethatacertainpower,likeimpeachment,isjudicialinnature.Nonetheless,
theconstitutionalmaphasincludedimpeachmentwithintheboundariesoflegislativefunctions.TheCourthasto
declarethatthejudicialpowerofimpeachmentisexclusivelyforthelegislaturetoexercise.
Thistaskofallocatingconstitutionalboundaries,Imustrepeat,isgiventothisCourt.Itcannotbedivestedofthis
jurisdiction.Itcannotyieldthispower.
However,whentheCourtfindsthatacertainpowerisgivenbytheConstitutiontoacoequaldepartment,itmust
defertothedecisionofthatdepartmentevenifitappearstobeseeminglyjudicial.Itshoulddeclarethatthe
Constitutionhasvestedthisdeterminationintheexecutiveorthelegislature.TheCourtmust,therefore,statethat
itcannotgoanyfurther.ThesovereignpeoplethroughtheConstitutionhavedrawnaboundarywhichthisCourt
hasascertainedandwhichitmustrespect.WhentheCourtfindsapoliticalquestion,itisnot,therefore,shirking
oravoidingaduty.Itis,infact,complyingwithitsduty.Muchasitwantstogointotheissuesanddecidethe
questions,ithastodecline.TheConstitutionhasgiventhepowerofdeterminationtoanotherdepartment.As
interpreteroftheConstitution,theCourthastoleadinrespectingitsboundaries.
IfweexaminethisCourt'sdefinitionofapoliticalquestionin(G.R.No.L10520,February28,1957),Wefindthat
itconformstotheforegoingexplanation.
Taadavs.Cuenco
Inshort,theterm"politicalquestion"connotes,inlegalparlance,whatitmeansinordinaryparlance,namely,a
questionofpolicy.Inotherwords,inthelanguageofCorpusJurisSecundum(),itrefersto"thosequestions
which,,aretobeintheirsovereigncapacity,orinregardtowhichfulldiscretionaryauthorityhasbeendelegated
tothebranchoftheGovernment."Itisconcernedwithissuesdependentuponthe,notlegality,ofaparticular
measure.(Emphasissupplied)
supraundertheConstitutiondecidedbythepeoplelegislatureorexecutivewisdom
Thisisadeterminationofconstitutionalboundaries.TheCourthasfoundthattheConstitutionhasassigneda
politicalquestiontothepeoplethroughareferendumoreitheroneorbothofthepoliticaldepartments.
Amorecompletedefinitionisfoundin(369U.S.186,7LEd.2d663,1962),towit:
Bakervs.Carr
Itisapparentthatseveralformulationswhichvaryslightlyaccordingtothesettingsinwhichthequestionsarise
maydescribeapoliticalquestion,whichidentifiesitasessentiallyafunctionoftheseparationofpowers.
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6/20/2015Prominentonthesurfaceofanycaseheldtoinvolveapoliticalquestionisfoundatextuallydemonstrable
G.R.No.L35546
constitutionalcommitmentoftheissuetoacoordinatepoliticaldepartmentoralackofjudiciallydiscoverableand
manageablestandardsforresolvingitortheimpossibilityofdecidingwithoutaninitialpolicydeterminationofa
kindclearlyfornonjudicialdiscretionortheimpossibilityofacourt'sundertakingindependentresolutionwithout
expressinglackoftherespectduecoordinatebranchesofgovernmentoranunusualneedforunquestioning
adherencetoapoliticaldecisionalreadymadeorthepotentialityofembarrassmentfrommultifarious
pronouncementsbyvariousdepartmentsononequestion.
Again,theCourtmakesadeterminationthattheConstitutionhasvestedthemakingofafinaldecisioninabody
otherthantheCourt.
XI
PROCLAMATIONNO.1081ISVALIDITISPOLITICALINNATUREANDTHEREFORENOTJUSTICIABLE
HowdoestheCourtdeterminewhetheramartiallawproclamationisapoliticalquestionornot?Therespondents
arguethatonlythePresidentisauthorizedtodeterminewhenmartiallawmaybeproclaimed.Thepetitioners
insistthatthisCourtmayexamineandnullifythePresidentialdeterminationasbeyondhisconstitutionalpowers.
HastheConstitutionvestedthepowerexclusivelyinthePresident?Arethepetitionerscorrectorisittheclaimof
respondentswhichisvalid?
Theruleinconstitutionalconstructionistogiveeffecttotheintentoftheauthors.Theauthorsare,first,the
framerswhowereorderedbythesovereignpeopletorepresenttheminthespecificassignmentofdraftingthe
fundamentallawandsecond,thepeople,themselves,whobytheirratificationconfirmwhattheirdelegateshave
wroughtandmanifestedasexpressionsofthesovereignwill.
How,then,doweascertaintheintentoftheauthorsonthegrantofmartiallawpowers?
Asearchforintentmustnecessarilystartwithinthefourcornersofthedocumentitself.
...Thequestionisonethenofconstitutionalconstruction.Itiswelltorecallfundamentals.Theprimarytaskisone
ofascertainingandthereafterassuringtherealizationofthepurposeoftheframersandofthepeopleinthe
adoptionoftheConstitution.
Welooktothelanguageofthedocumentitselfinoursearchforitsmeaning.Wedonotofcoursestopthere,but
thatiswherewebegin....(Tuazon&Co.vs.LandTenureAdministration,31SCRA413,422)
TheConstitutionissufficientlyexplicitinlocatingthepowertoproclaimmartiallaw.Itissimilarlyexplicitin
specifyingtheoccasionsforitsexercise."Incaseofinvasion,insurrection,orrebellion,orimminentdanger
thereof,whenthepublicsafetyrequiresit,he(thePresidentasCommanderinChiefofallarmedforcesofthe
Philippines)maysuspendtheprivilegesofthewritoforplacethePhilippinesoranypartthereofundermartial
law."
habeascorpus
ThisprovisiononmartiallawisfoundinArticleVIIofthe1935Constitution.ThisArticlereferstothePresidency.
Section10,wheretheprovisionappearsasthesecondparagraph,isexclusivelydevotedtopowersconferredby
theConstitutiononthePresident.ThisisinsharpcontrasttotheConstitutionoftheUnitedStateswherethe
suspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritofappears,notasagrantofpowerunderArticleIIontheExecutivenorin
thefirsttenamendmentsconstitutingtheirBillofRights,butinArticleIontheLegislature.Itisgivennotasagrant
ofpowerbutasalimitationonthepowersoftheFederalCongress.
habeascorpus
Itissignificantthat,asregardsthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritof,thePhilippineConstitutiontreatsit
bothasagrantofpowerinthearticleonthePresidencyandasalimitationtogovernmentactioninthearticleon
theBillofRights.Ontheotherhand,thereisnodualtreatmentofmartiallaw.Thereisonlyagrantofpowerin
ArticleVIItomeetcertaingravedangerstotheRepublic.NowhereintheConstitutionisittreatedintermsof
limitation.
habeascorpus
In,31SCRAp.413,423,thisCourtruled:
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G.R.No.L35546
ReferencetothehistoricalbasisofthisprovisionasreflectedintheproceedingsoftheConstitutionalConvention,
twooftheextrinsicaidstoconstructionalongwithcontemporaneousunderstandingandtheconsiderationofthe
consequencesthatflowfromtheinterpretationunderconsideration,yieldsadditionallightonthematter.
Letus,therefore,lookatthehistoryoftheprovision.ItisimportanttobeguidedbytheauthorsoftheConstitution
morethanbycitationsfromforeigncourtdecisionsandquotationsfromconstitutionallawwriterswhichpetitioners
andrespondentscanseemtounendinglyculltosustaintheirdiametricallyopposedpositions.
ThePhilippineBillof1902hasnoprovisiononmartiallaw,althoughitprovided:
SECTION5....
Governor,withtheapprovalofthePhilippineCommission,wheneverduringsuchperiodthenecessityforsuch
suspensionshallexist.
habeascorpus
Bothexecutiveandlegislativesharedindecidingwhentheprivilegeofthewritmaybesuspended.
TheJonesLaworPhilippineAutonomyActof1916requiredasimilarsharingofpowerasthePhilippineBillof
1902.InsteadofapprovalofthePhilippineCommission,howeveritprovidedthatthePresidentoftheUnited
Statesmustbenotifiedwhenevertheprivilegeofthewritofhasbeensuspendedormartiallawhasbeen
proclaimed.
habeascorpus
SECTION21...HeshallberesponsibleforthefaithfulexecutionofthelawsofthePhilippineIslandsandofthe
UnitedStatesoperativewithinthePhilippineIslands,andwheneveritbecomesnecessaryhemaycallupon
commandersofthemilitaryandnavalforcesoftheUnitedStatesintheIslands,orsummonthe,orcalloutthe
Militia,orotherlocallycreatedarmedforces,topreventorsuppresslawlessviolence,invasion,insurrection,or
rebellionandwiththeattendingfacts,andcircumstances,thePresidentshallhavepowertomodifyorvacatethe
actionoftheGovernorGeneral.(Emphasissupplied)
possecomitatushemay,incaseofrebellionorinorinvasionorimminentdangerthereof,whenthepublicsafetyrequiresit,
suspendtheprivilegesofthewritofhabeascorpus,orplacetheislands,oranypartthereof,undermartiallawProvided,
ThatwhenevertheGovernorGeneralshallexercisethisauthority,heshallatoncenotifythePresidentoftheUnitedStates
thereof,together
ThetreatmentofbothmartiallawandaspartofthelimitationsintheBillofRightsandaspartofthegrantof
powersoftheChiefExecutivestartedwiththeJonesLaw.Thisorganicactalsoadded"imminentdanger"asa
groundforsuspension.
habeascorpus
Thiswasthestatusofourconstitutionallawonandonmartiallawwhenthe1935PhilippineConstitutionwas
drafted.ThemostlearnedPhilippinelawyerswereamongthedelegatestothe1934ConstitutionalConvention.
ThedelegateshadbeforethemthePhilippineBillof1902requiringapprovalofthelegislaturebeforetheChief
Executivemayexercisehispower.TheyhadbeforethemtheprovisionoftheJonesLawqualifyingtheGovernor
General'spowerwithsupervisionandcontrolbythePresidentoftheUnitedStateswhomaymodifyorvacatethe
former'saction.TheychosetovestthepowerexclusivelyinthePresidentofthePhilippines.Theyexpandedthe
widescopeofhisauthoritybyincluding"imminentdanger"asanoccasionforitsexercise,thusdeliberately
adoptingtheJonesLawprovisionminusthelimitation.Theirproposalonmartiallawwasoverwhelminglyratified
bythepeople.
habeascorpus
Thechoicewasnoperfunctoryorcasualone.Itwastheproductofthoroughstudyanddeliberation.Whilethe
debatesinthe1935ConstitutionalConventioncenteredon,theynecessarilyapplytomartiallawbecausethetwo
areinextricablylinkedinoneandthesameprovision.TheSolicitorGeneralhassummarizedthesedeliberations
onandmartiallaw.
Asamatteroffact,intheConstitutionalConvention,DelegateAranetaproposedthefollowingprovisions:
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G.R.No.L35546
suspendtheprivilegeofthewritof.IncasetheNationalAssemblyisnotinsessionthePresidentmaysuspend
theprivilegeofthewritofwiththeconsentofthemajorityoftheSupremeCourt,butthissuspensionofthe
privilegeofthewritofwillberevokedifthePresidentdoesnotcallaspecialsessionoftheNationalAssembly
withinfifteendaysfromthedecreesuspendingthewritoforiftheNationalAssemblyfailstoconfirmtheactionof
thePresidentwithin30days.(5J.Laurel,ProceedingsofthePhilippineConstitutionalConvention,259,(S.Laurel
ed.1966)
Insupportofhisproposal,Aranetaargued,first,thatthepowertosuspendtheprivilegeofthewritofshouldbe
vestedintheNationalAssemblybecausethatpowerwas"essentially"legislative.(.24950)andsecond,thatin
casetheNationalAssemblywasnotinsession,thusmakingitnecessarytovestthepowerinthePresident,that
theexerciseofthepowerbesubjecttotheconcurrenceoftheSupremeCourtandevenwhentheCourthas
concurredinthedecisionofthePresidentthatthesuspensionwouldbeeffectiveonlyforacertainperiodunless
theNationalAssemblywasconvenedanditsratificationwassecured.(.,at255)
habeascorpusIdId
HewasinterpellatedbyvariousdelegatesDelegatePerezandGrageda,especially,wereconcerned,lestthe
requirementofsecuringtheconcurrenceofotherbranchesofgovernmentinthedecisionofthePresident
depriveshimofeffectivemeansofmeetinganemergency.(.,at25556).TheCommitteeonSponsorshipheaded
byDelegateSottoopposedtheamendment.Whenfinallyputtovote,theamendmentwasrejected.(.,at259).
IdId
Thereareanumberofpointsweshouldnoteregardingtheproposal.First,theproposalrefersonlytothe
suspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritof.Itdidnotapparentlycontemplatetheproclamationofmartiallaw.,the
proposalwouldvestthepowerofsuspensionintheNationalAssemblyandinthePresidentonlywhenthe
NationalAssemblyisnotinsession.,exerciseofthepowerbythePresident,issubjecttotheconcurrenceofthe
SupremeCourtandtheconfirmationoftheNationalAssembly.
habeascorpusSecondThird
TheConstitutionalConventionmusthavebeenawareoftheexperienceofPresidentLincolnduringtheAmerican
CivilWar.TheymusthavebeenawareoftheviewsexpressthenthatitwasthelegislatureandnotthePresident
whomaysuspendtheprivilegeofthewritoforproclaimmartiallaw.Surely,theywerecognizantofthevast
implicationsincidenttoasuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritofandmoresototheproclamationofmartiallaw.
Thisisreflectedinthefollowingrecordsoftheproceedings:
Duringthedebatesonthefirstdraft,DelegateFranciscoproposedanamendmentinserting,asafourthcausefor
thesuspensionofthewritof,imminentdangerofthethreecausesincludedherein.Whensubmittedtoavotefor
thefirsttime,theamendmentwascarried.
habeascorpus
AfterhisMotionforareconsiderationoftheamendmentwasapproved,DelegateOrensespokeagainstthe
amendmentallegingthatitwouldbedangeroustomakeimminentdangeragroundforthesuspensionofthewrit
of.Inpart,hesaid:
habeascorpus
Gentlemen,thisphraseistooambiguous,andinthehandsofaPresident,whobelieveshimselfmoreorlessa
dictator,itisextremelydangerousitwouldbeaswordwithwhichhewouldbeheadus.
Indefenseoftheamendment,DelegateFranciscopointedoutthatitwasintendedtomakethispartofthebillof
rightsconformtothatpartofthedraftgivingthePresidentthepowertosuspendthewritofalsointhecaseofan
imminentdangerofinvasionorrebellion.WhenaskedbyDelegateRafolsifthephrase,imminentdanger,might
notbestruckoutfromthecorrespondingprovisionundertheexecutivepowerinstead,DelegateFrancisco
answered:
habeascorpus
Outright,itispossibletoeliminatethephrase,imminentdangerthereof,inthepageIhavementioned.ButIsay,
goingtotheessenceandreferringexclusivelytothenecessityofincludingthewords,ofimminentdangerorone
ortheother,Iwishtosaythefollowing:thatitshouldnotbenecessarythatthereexistarebellion,insurrection,or
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6/20/2015invasioninorderthatmaybesuspended.Itshouldbesufficientthatthereexistsnotadangerbutanimminent
G.R.No.L35546
danger,andtheword,imminentshouldbemaintained.Whenthereexistsanimminentdanger,theStaterequires
foritsprotection,andforthatofallthecitizensthesuspensionofthe.
Whenputtoavoteforthesecondtime,theamendmentwasdefeatedwith72votesagainstand56votesinfavor
ofthesame.(IAruego'sFramingofthePhilippineConstitution,180181)
ButtheConventionvotedforastrongexecutive,andwroteArticleVII,Section10(2)intotheConstitution.
TheconfermentofthepowerinthePresidentisclearanddefinite.Thattheauthoritytosuspendtheprivilegeof
thewritofandtoproclaimmartiallawwas,intendedtobeexclusivelyvestedinthePresident,therecanbeno
doubt.(MemorandumforRespondentsdatedNovember17,1972,pp.1114)
habeascorpus
TheonlyconclusionIcanmakeafterascertainingtheintentoftheauthorsoftheConstitutionisthatthepowerto
proclaimmartiallawisexclusivelyvestedinthePresident.Theproclamationanditsattendantcircumstances
thereforeformapoliticalquestion.
UnlessthisCourtdecidesthateveryactoftheexecutiveandofthelegislatureisjusticiabletherecanbeno
clearerexampleofapoliticalquestionthanProclamationNo.1081.Itistheexercisebythehighestelectiveofficial
ofthelandofasupremepoliticaldutyexclusivelyentrustedtohimbytheConstitution.Ourpeoplehaveentrusted
tothePresidentthroughaspecificprovisionofthefundamentallawtheawesomeresponsibilitytowielda
powerfulweapon.Thepeoplehaveentrustedtohimtheestimationthattheperilsaresoominousandthreatening
thatthisultimateweaponofourdulyconstitutedgovernmentmustbeused.
TheSupremeCourtwasnotgiventhejurisdictiontosharethedeterminationoftheoccasionsforitsexercise.Itis
notgiventheauthoritybytheConstitutiontoexpandorlimitthescopeofitsusedependingontheallegationsof
litigants.ItisnotauthorizedbytheConstitutiontosaythatmartiallawmaybeproclaimedinIsabelaandSulubut
notinGreaterManila.Muchlessdoesithavethepowernorshoulditevenexercisethepower,assumingits
existence,tonullifyaproclamationofthePresidentonamatterexclusivelyvestedinhimbytheConstitutionand
onissuessopoliticallyandemotionallycharged.TheCourt'sfunctioninsuchcasesistoassumejurisdictionfor
thepurposeoffindingoutwhethertheissuesconstituteapoliticalquestionornot.Itsfunctionistodetermine
whetherornotaquestionisindeedjusticiable.
PetitionerswantthisCourttoexaminethebasesgivenbythePresidentinissuingProclamationNo.1081.They
wanttheCourttofindortotakejudicialnoticeoftheabsenceofaninsurrectionorrebellionoftheabsenceof
animminentdangerthereof.PetitionerswouldhavethisCourtdisputeandnullifythefindingsoffactsofthe
Presidenthimselfinamatterthatispeculiarlyexecutiveinnature.
WhyshouldWehonorthePresident'sfindings?
Incaseswheretheissuesareindisputablyjudicialinnature,thefindingsofthePresidentarestillgivenutmost
respectanddeference.Inthematterofthedeclarationofmartiallaw,apowerthatisexclusivelyvestedinthe
President,maytheCourtdifferwiththefindings?No,becauseasWehavealreadystated,
thevalidreasonforthisexclusivegrantofpoweristhatthePresidentpossessesallthefacilitiestogathertherequireddata
andinformationandhasabroaderperspectivetoproperlyevaluatethem,betterthananyfacilityandperspectivethatthe
Courtcanhave.
AtwhatstateinaninsurrectionorhowseriousandmanifestshouldsubversiveactivitiesbecomebeforetheCourt
decidestheparticularpointwhenmartiallawmaybeproclaimed?Thepetitioners,relyingontheclassicstagesof
governmentaloverthrowasexperiencedbypreWorldWarIIexamples,wouldwaituntilallcivilcourtsareclosed
andthecountryisincompletechaos.Petitionersdonotrealizethatlongbeforethecourtsareclosed,the
Presidentwouldhavebeenkilledorcapturedandtheenemyirrevocablyentrenchedinpower.Theauthorsofthe
Constitutionneverenvisionedthatthemartiallawpowersocarefullyanddeliberatelyincludedamongthepowers
ofthePresidentwouldbewithhelduntilsuchtimeasitmaynotbeusedatall.
Itismyfirmview,thatthedecisiontoproclaimmartiallawisanexclusivefunctionofthePresident.Ifhefindsthat
invasion,insurrection,orrebellionorimminentdangerofanyofthethreeispresent,suchfindingisconclusiveon
theCourt.Ifhefindsthatpublicsafetyrequirestheentirecountryshouldbeplacedundermartiallaw,thatfinding
isconclusiveontheCourt.Intheexerciseofsuchanemergencypowerintendedforthesupremeandinherent
rightofselfdefenseandselfpreservation,theConstitutioncannotbereadtomeanotherwise.
In(42SCRA448,480)thisCourtstatedthat"intheexerciseofsuchauthority(tosuspendtheprivilegeofthewrit
of),thefunctionoftheCourtismerelytonottothebeyondtheconstitutionallimitsofhisjurisdiction,vested
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6/20/2015inhimortodeterminethewisdomofhisact."
G.R.No.L35546
Lansangvs.GarciahabeascorpuschecksupplantExecutive,ortoascertainmerelywhetherhehasgonenottoexercise
thepower
Idonotseehow,bothfromthelegalandpracticalpointsofview,theCourtcancheckthePresident'sdecisionto
proclaimmartiallaw.Thesamemay,perhaps,bedoneasregardsasuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritof
althoughIreserveamoredefinitivestatementonthatissuewhenacasesquarelyinpointonthematterisraised
beforeUs.However,martiallawposesentirelydifferentproblems.Aproclamationofmartiallawgoesbeyondthe
suspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritof,whoseeffectsarelargelyremediedwiththereleaseofdetainees.
Uponproclaimingmartiallaw,thePresidentdidnotlimithimselftoorderingthearrestanddetentionofthe
participantsandothershavingahandintheconspiracytoseizepoliticalandstatepower.Undermartiallaw,the
Presidentorderedthetakeoverorcontrolofcommunicationsmedia,publicutilities,andprivatelyownedaircraft
andwatercraft.Foreigntravelwasrestricted.Curfewwasimposedalloverthecountry.Apurgeofundesirable
governmentofficials,throughresignationsorsummaryinvestigations,waseffected.Theentireexecutivebranch
ofgovernmentwasreorganized.Acleanlinessandbeautificationcampaign,withmartiallawsanctionstoenforce
it,wasordered.Thiswasonlythebeginning.
ConsequencesofProclamationNo.1081aremanyandfarreaching.Theypermeateeveryaspectandevery
activityinthelifeofthepeople.Acourtdecisionisnotneedednorisittheproperplacetoenumeratethem.Most
obvious,ofcourse,arethePresident'sactsoflegislationontheverybroadrangeofsubjectsthatCongressused
tocover.AsearlyasNovember8,1972,thepetitionerspreparedaMemorandumstressingthispoint.
Itmaybepointedoutthatsincemartiallawwasdeclared,thePresidenthasbeenexercisinglegislativepowerthat
islodgedbytheConstitutioninCongress.Agoodnumberofthedecreespromulgatedhavenodirectrelationto
thequellingofthedisorderscausedbythelawlesselements.TheyareaimedatbuildingaNewSociety,butthey
cannotbejustifiedasavalidexerciseofmartialrule.(atpage94)
TheseimplicationsandconsequencesofmartiallawservetobolstermyviewthattheConstitutionneverintended
thatthisCourtcouldexamineanddeclareinvalidthePresident'sinitialdetermination.TheConstitutiondidnot
intendthattheCourtcould,inthedetachedandpeacefulaftermathofsuccessfulmartiallaw,reachbackand
invalidateeverythingdonefromthestart.Thatwouldresultinchaos.
Iam,ofcourse,awareofthe(308U.S.371,374)doctrinewhichthisCourtadoptedin(27SCRA533,540):ChicotCounty
DrainageDistrictvs.BaxterStateBankMunicipalityofMalabangvs.PangandapunBenito,etal.
TheCourtsbelowhaveproceededonthetheorythattheActofCongress,havingbeenfoundtobe
unconstitutional,wasnotalawthatitwasinoperative,conferringnorightsandimposingnoduties,andhence
affordingnobasisforthechallengeddecree.(Nortonvs.ShelbyCounty,118U.S.425,442Chicago,I&L.Ry.
Co.vs.Hackett,228U.S.559,566).Itisquiteclear,however,thatsuchbroadstatementsastotheeffectofa
determinationofunconstitutionalitymustbetakenwithqualifications.Theactualexistenceofastatute,priorto
suchadetermination,isanoperativefactandmayhaveconsequenceswhichcannotjustlybeignored.Thepast
cannotalwaysbeerasedbyanewjudicialdeclaration.Theeffectofthesubsequentrulingastoinvaliditymay
havetobeconsideredinvariousaspectswithrespecttoparticularrelations,individualandcorporate,and
particularconduct,privateandofficial.Questionsofrightsclaimedtohavebecomevested,ofstatus,ofprior
determinationsdeemedtohavefinalityandacteduponaccordingly,ofpublicpolicyinthelightofthenatureboth
ofthestatuteandofitspreviousapplication,demandexamination.Thesequestionsareamongthemostdifficult
ofthosewhichhaveengagedtheattentionofcourts,stateandfederal,anditismanifestfromnumerous
decisionsthatanallinclusivestatementofaprincipleofabsoluteretroactiveinvaliditycannotbejustified.
Andforustoventureintoajudicialinquiryonthefactualbasisoftheconstitutionalityofthemartiallaw
proclamationwouldbetoignorethewellestablishedprincipleofpresidentialprivilegewhichexemptsthe
Presidentfromdivulgingeventothehighestcourtofthelandfactswhichifdivulgedwouldendangernational
security.Asamatteroffact,inthelatestcaseonthismatterwhichwasthatfiledagainstPresidentRichardM.
Nixon,althoughtheSupremeCourtoftheUnitedStatesorderedthePresidenttoproducethetapesofhis
conversationwithsomeofhisaidespursuanttoasubpoenaforuseinacriminalprosecutionagainstoneofhis
aides,becausetheclaimthat"disclosuresofconfidentialconversationbetweenthePresidentandhisclose
advisors...wouldbeinconsistentwiththepublicinterest...cannotoutweigh...thelegitimateneedsofthejudicial
process"inacriminalprosecution,theCourt,however,madethestatementfromwhichwecaninferthatif
PresidentNixonhadonlyclaimedthatthetapescontain"military,diplomaticorsensitivenationalsecuritysecrets",
itwouldhavesustainedtherefusalofNixontoproducethem.
ItmaybearguedthattheactualexistenceofProclamationNo.1081isanoperativefactandthatits
consequencesshouldnotbeignored.
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G.R.No.L35546
rebellion,thePresidentproclaimsmartiallaw.EvenassumingthateverysinglememberofthisCourtdoubtsthe
President'sfindings,WehavetoconsiderthattheConstitutionveststhedeterminationinhim.Thestakesinvolved
aresupremeandthedeterminationmustbemadeimmediatelyanddecisively.
ThereisthepossibilitythatthePresidenthasanexaggeratedappreciationofthedangersandhasoveracted
withtheuseoftheawesomemeasureofmartiallaw.Thefactremains,however,thattheauthorsofthe
Constitutionwereawareofthispossibilityandstillprovidedthatthepowerexclusivelybelongstohim.Itwouldbe
stretchingtheplainwordsoftheConstitutionifweweighourpersonalfindingsagainsttheofficialfindingsofthe
President.Hepossessesallthefacilitiestogatherdataandinformationandhasamuchbroaderperspectiveto
properlyevaluatethem.Heisperformingafunctionwhichis,ofcourse,requiredbytheConstitutiontobe
dischargedbythePresident.
...However,whentheprivilegedependssolelyonthebroad,undifferentiatedclaimofpublicinterestinthe
confidentialityofsuchconversations,aconfrontationwithothervaluesarises.thateventheveryimportant
interestinconfidentialityofpresidentialcommunicationsissignificantlydiminishedbyproductionofsuchmaterial
forincamerainspectionwithalltheprotectionthatadistrictcourtwillbeobligedtoprovide.
Absentaclaimofneedtoprotectmilitary,diplomatic,orsensitivenationalsecuritysecrets,wefinditdifficulttoacceptthe
argument
InthiscasethePresidentchallengesasubpoenaservedonhimasathirdpartyrequiringtheproductionof
materialsforuseinacriminalprosecutionontheclaimthathehasaprivilegeagainstdisclosureofconfidential
communications.Hedoesnotplacehisclaimofprivilegeonthegroundtheyare.militaryordiplomaticsecrets.As
totheseareasofArt.IIdutiesthecourtshavetraditionallyshowntheutmostdeferencetopresidential
responsibilities.In.,333U.S.103,111(1948),dealingwithpresidentialauthorityinvolvingforeignpolicy
considerations,theCourtsaid:
C.&S.AirLinesvs.WatermanSteamshipCorp
ThePresident,bothasCommanderinchiefandastheNation'sorganforforeignaffairs,hasavailable
intelligenceserviceswhosereportsarenotandoughtnottobepublishedtotheworld.Itwouldbeintolerablethat
courts,withoutrelevantinformation,shouldreviewandperhapsnullifyactionsoftheExecutivetakenon
informationproperlyheldsecret..at111.
Id
Inthe,345U.S.1(1952),dealingwithaclaimant'sdemandforevidenceinadamagecase,againstthe
Government,theCourtsaid:
UnitedStatesvs.Reynolds
Itmaybepossibletosatisfythecourt,fromallthecircumstancesofthecase,thatthereisareasonabledanger
thatcompulsionoftheevidencewillexposemilitarymatterswhich,intheinterestofnationalsecurity,shouldnot
bedivulged.Whenthisisthecase,theoccasionfortheprivilegeisappropriate,andthecourtshouldnot
jeopardizethesecuritywhichtheprivilegeismeanttoprotectbyinsistinguponanexaminationoftheevidence,
evenbythejudgealone,inchambers.
NocaseoftheCourt,however,hasextendedthishighdegreeofdeferencetoaPresident'sgeneralizedinterest
inconfidentiality.NowhereintheConstitution,aswehavenotedearlier,isthereanyexplicitreferencetoa
privilegeofconfidentiality,yettotheextentthisinterestrelatestotheeffectivedischargeofaPresident'spowers,
itisconstitutionallybased.(UnitedStates,Petitioner,vs.RichardM.Nixon,PresidentoftheunitedStateetal.
RichardM.Nixon,PresidentoftheUnitedStates,Petitioner,vs.UnitedStatesJuly24,1974Nos.731766and
731834SupremeCourtoftheUnitedStates)
Itisfortheabovereasonsthat,asfarastheproclamationisconcerned,theCourtshouldreverttotherulein(5
Phil.87)and(91Phil.886).Theonlyquestionswhichthejudiciaryshouldlookintoare(1)DidtheConstitution
confertheauthoritytosuspendtheprivilegeofthewritofandproclaimmartiallawonthePresident?and(2)Did
thePresidentdeclarethatheisactingundersuchauthorityandinconformancewithit?Theauthoritybeing
exclusivelyvestedinthePresident,hisdecisionisfinalandconclusiveupontheCourt.
Barcelonvs.BakerMontenegrovs.Castaedahabeascorpus
InsofarasthePresident'sdecisiontoproclaimmartiallawisconcerned,itis,therefore,myviewthatunderthe
Constitution,theSupremeCourthasnoauthoritytoinquireintotheexistenceofafactualbasisforits
proclamation.TheconstitutionalsufficiencyfortheproclamationisproperlyforthePresidentalonetodetermine.
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GRANTINGTHATPROCLAMATIONNO.1081ISNOTPOLITICALBUTJUSTICIABLE,ITISSTILLVALID
BECAUSETHEPRESIDENTHASNOTACTEDARBITRARILYINISSUINGIT
ItshouldbenotedthatProclamationNo.1081isnotamereconclusionthatthereisinsurrectionandrebellionin
thecountry.ThePresidentdidnotlimithimselftoacurtandlaconicdeclarationthatonthebasisofhisfindings,
thereisinsurrectionorarebellionandthathehasproclaimedmartiallaw..
ProclamationNo.1081specifiesintwentysix(26)printedpagesthevariousfindingswhichledtoits
promulgation.Theconspiracytooverthrowthegovernment,therapidlyexpandingranksoftheconspirators,the
raisingoffundsandmaterialsundercentralizeddirection,themaintenanceofarebelarmythemassive
propagandacampaign,theactsofsabotageandarmedinsurrectionorrebellion,thepreviousdecisionofthis
Court,thelawlessnessanddisorderinthecountry,theviolentdemonstrationsledbyCommunistfronts,the
armedclashesbetweenrebelsandgovernmenttroops,theactivemoralandmaterialsupportofaforeignpower,
theimportationoffirearmsandwarmaterialbyrebels,thepresenceofawellscheduledprogramofrevolutionary
action,theorganizationofliquidationsquads,theseriousdisorderinMindanaoandSulu,theactivitiesofthe
MindanaoIndependenceMovement,thethousandskilledandhundredsofthousandsofinjuredordisplaced
persons,theinadequacyofsimplycallingouttheaimedforcesorsuspendingtheprivilegeofthewritof,the
alarminglyrapidescalationofrebelorsubversiveactivities,andotherevidenceofinsurrectionorrebellionare
specifiedindetailedmanner.
habeascorpus
ThefindingsofthePresidentaregiveninapositive,detailed,andcategoricalform.Asamatteroffact,
subsequentevents,relatedtotheCourtinaseriesofclassifiedbriefingsmadetoitbytheArmythelastonebeing
onAugust15,1974,confirmtheoverallvalidityofthePresident'sbasis.Thereisconstitutionalsufficiencyforhis
conclusionthatmartiallawbeproclaimed.ProclamationNo.1081doesnot,therefore,sufferanyconstitutional
infirmityofarbitrariness,grantingthatthistestcanbeappliedtoit.
Itappearsproper,atthispoint,toelucidatefurtheronthetestofarbitrariness.
TheCourt'sdecisionin(42SCRA448)hasbeeninterpretedand,tomymind,misunderstoodbymanypeopleto
meanthattheCourthadcompletelyreversedand.Thereare,ofcourse,certainstatementsinthedecisionthat
giverisetothisconclusion.Forinstance,theCourtstatedthattheweightof,asprecedent,isdilutedbytwo
factors,namely,(a)itreliedheavilyupon(6L.ed.537)involvingtheU.S.President'spowertocalloutthemilitia
and(b)thefactthatsuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritofwasbytheAmericanGovernorGeneral,the
representativeoftheforeignsovereign.TheCourtstatedthatinthecaseitwentintothequestionDidthe
GovernorGeneralactinconformancewiththeauthorityvestedinhimbytheCongressoftheUnitedStates?In
otherwords,theCourtstatedthatitmadeanactualdeterminationwhetherornottheChiefExecutivehadacted
inaccordancewithlaw.TheCourtalsoaddedthatintheMontenegrocase,itconsideredthequestionwhetheror
nottherereallywasarebellion.TheCourtreviewedAmericanjurisprudenceonsuspensionoftheprivilege.It
statedthatthetenoroftheopinions,consideredasawhole,stronglysuggeststheCourt'sconvictionthatthe
conditionsessentialforthevalidityofproclamationsororderswereinfactpresent.Itstatedthatwheneverthe
Americancourtstooktheoppositeviewithadabackdroppermeatedorcharacterizedbythebeliefthatsaid
conditionswereabsent.
Lansangvs.GarciaBarcelonvs.BakerMontenegrovs.CastaedaBarcelonvs.BakerMartinvs.Motthabeas
corpusBarcelon
Intruth,however,thedecisionindoesnotstatethattheCourtmayconductafullexaminationintothefactswhich
ledthePresidenttoissuetheproclamation.TheCourt'sdecisioncategoricallyassertsthattheexaminationof
presidentialactsbytheCourtislimitedtoarbitrariness.TheCourtacceptedtheview
Lansangvs.Garcia
...thatjudicialinquiryintothebasisofthequestionedproclamationcangonofurtherthantosatisfytheCourtnot
thattilePresident'sdecisioniscorrectandthatpublicsafetywasendangeredbytherebellionandjustifiedthe
suspensionofthewrit,butthatinsuspendingthewrit,thePresidentdidnotactarbitrarily.
TheCourtadopted,asthetestofvalidity,thedoctrinein,291U.S.502
Nebbiavs.NewYork
316/374
6/20/2015...Ifthelawspassedareseentohaveareasonablerelationtoaproperlegislativepurpose,andareneither
G.R.No.L35546
arbitrarynordiscriminatory,therequirementsofdueprocessaresatisfied,andjudicialdeterminationtothateffect
rendersacourt...Withthewisdomofthepolicyadopted,withtheadequacyorpracticalityofthelawenactedto
forwardit,thecourtsarebothincompetentandunauthorizedtodeal....
functusoficio
Forpurposesofcomparisonandemphasis,theCourt,in,wentintothejudicialauthoritytoreviewdecisionsof
administrativebodiesoragencies.Itstatedthatthereviewingcourtdeterminesonlywhetherthereissome
evidentiarybasisforthecontestedadministrativefindingsanddoesnotundertakequantitativeexaminationof
supportingevidence.Therefore,theCourtstatedthatitinterfereswithanadministrativefindingonlyifthereisno
evidencewhatsoeverinsupportthereofandsaidfindingisactuallyarbitrary,capricious,andobviously
unauthorized.TheCourtruledthatthisapproachofdeferringtothefindingsofadministrativebodiescannoteven
beappliedinitsaforesaidformtotestthevalidityofanactofCongressoroftheExecutive.Thepresumptionof
validityisofamuchhighercategory.TheCourtemphasizedthatthecoequalityofcoordinatebranchesofthe
governmentunderourconstitutionalsystemdemandsthatthetestofvalidityofactsofCongressandofthoseof
theExecutiveshouldbefundamentallythesame.Andthistestisnotcorrectnessbutarbitrariness.
Lansangvs.Garcia
Itfollows,therefore,thatevenifIweretosubscribetotheviewthatshouldnotbecategoricallyreversedas
erroneousdoctrine,mydecisionwouldbethesame.Evenunder,martiallawisvalid.
Lansangvs.GarciaLansangvs.Garcia
ThereisnothingarbitraryinthedecisiontopromulgateProclamationNo.1081.Itisnotunconstitutional.
XIII
THECONTINUATION(ANDEVENTUALLIFTING)OFTHESTATEOFMARTIALLAWISAPOLITICAL
QUESTION
Thecontinuationofthestateofmartiallawandtheresultingcontinuedrestrictionsonindividuallibertiesare,of
course,seriousaspectsofthemainissuewithwhichthisCourtisconcerned.
Infact,thisisthemoredifficultquestionThePresidenthavingacteduponaninitialandpositivefindingthat
martiallawisnecessary,maytheCourtinquireintothebasesforitsdurationortheneedforitscontinued
imposition?
Towardstheendofthisseparateopinion,Ianswertheargumentsofthepetitionersquestioningtheeffectivityand
legalityofthenewConstitution.Itismyunqualifiedview,asexplainedlater,thatthisCourtintheRatification
CasesdeclaredthenewConstitutiontobelegallyinforceandeffect.
Ihavetomentionthisview,atthisjuncture,becausemartiallawwasproclaimedundertheoldConstitution.
However,itscontinuationandeventualliftingarenowgovernedbythenewConstitution.
Theexerciseofmartiallawpowermaybelikenedtothejurisdictionofacourt.Acourtmayhavejurisdictionunder
anoldlawbutthejurisdictionmayberemovedormodifiedbyanewstatute.Inotherwords,isthecontinuing
stateofmartiallawvalidunderthenewConstitution?IsitalsoapoliticalquestionunderthepresentCharter?
ArticleIXofthenewConstitutiononthePrimeMinisterandtheCabinetprovides:
SEC.12.ThePrimeMinistershallbecommanderinchiefofallarmedforcesofthePhilippinesand,wheneverit
becomesnecessary,hemaycalloutsucharmedforcestopreventorsuppresslawlessviolence,invasion,
insurrection,orrebellion.Incaseofinvasion,insurrection,orrebellion,orimminentdangerthereof,whenthe
publicsafetyrequiresit,hemaysuspendtheprivilegeofthewritof,orplacethePhilippinesoranypartthereof
undermartiallaw.
habeascorpus
ItshouldbenotedthattheaboveprovisionisaverbatimreiterationofArticleVII,Section10,Paragraph(2)ofthe
oldConstitution.
WhatwastheintentoftheframersinadoptingverbatimtheprovisionfoundintheoldConstitution?
Atthispoint,modestyandprudenceshouldinhibitmefromadvancingmyownviewsastheonlymemberofthis
317/374
6/20/2015Tribunalwhowasadelegatetothe1971ConstitutionalConvention.In(77Phil.192),thisCourtstated"The
G.R.No.L35546
theoryhasbeenproposedmodestyasidethatthedissentingmembersofthisCourtwhoweredelegatesto
theConstitutionalConventionandwere"coauthorsoftheConstitution""areinabetterpositiontointerpret"that
sameConstitutioninthisparticularlitigation.
Veravs.Avelino
ThereisnodoubtthattheirproperlyrecordedutterancesduringthedebatesandproceedingsoftheConvention
deserveweight,likethoseofanyotherdelegatetherein.Note,however,thattheproceedingsoftheConvention
"arelessconclusiveoftheproperconstructionoftheinstrumentthanarelegislativeproceedingsoftheproper
constructionofastatutesinceinthelattercaseitistheintentofthelegislatureweseek,whileintheformerwe
areendeavoringtoarriveattheintentofthepeoplethroughthediscussionsanddeliberationsoftheir
representatives."(WilloughbyontheConstitution,Vol.I,pp.54,55.)
Theirwritings(ofthedelegates)commentingorexplainingthatinstrument,publishedshortlythereafter,may,like
thoseofHamilton,MadisonandJayinTheFederalisthereinthePhilippines,thebookofDelegateAruego,,
andofothershavepersuasiveforce.(Op.cit.,p.55.)
supra
Buttheirpersonalopiniononthematteratissueexpressedduringourdeliberationsstandonadifferentfooting:If
basedona"fact"knowntothem,butnotdulyestablishedorjudiciallycognizable,itisimmaterial,andtheir
brethrenarenotexpectedtotaketheirwordforit,totheprejudiceofthepartyadverselyaffected,whohadno
chanceofrebuttal.Ifonamatteroflegalhermeneutics,theirconclusionsmaynot,simplyonaccountof
membershipintheConvention,beashadebetter,intheeyesofthelaw.Thereistheword"deference"tobe
sure.Butdeferenceisacomplimentspontaneouslytobepaidneveratributetobedemanded.
Andifweshould(withoutintendinganydesparagement)comparetheConstitution'senactmenttoadramaonthe
stageorinactuallife,wewouldrealizethattheintelligentspectatorsorreadersoftenknowasmuch,ifnotmore,
abouttherealmeaning,effectsortendenciesoftheevent,orincidentsthereof,assomeoftheactors
themselves,whosometimesbecomesoabsorbedinfulfillingtheiremotionalrolesthatthefailtowatchtheother
scenesortomeditateonthelargeraspectsofthewholeperformance,orwhatisworse,becomesoinfatuated
withtheirlinesastoconstruetheentirestoryaccordingtotheirprejudicesorfrustrations.Perspectiveand
disinterestednesshelpcertainlyalotinexaminingactionsandoccurrences."Cometothinkofit,underthetheory
thusproposed,MarshallandHolmes(namesveneratedbythosewhohavedevotedasizeableportionoftheir
professionallivestoanalyzingorsolvingconstitutionalproblemsanddevelopments)werenotsoauthoritative
afterallinexpoundingtheUnitedStatesConstitutionbecausetheywerenotmembersoftheFederal
Conventionthatframedit!(pp.215216)"
Iwishtofollowtheexample,however,ofmydistinguishedcolleague,(18SCRA300)where,withcharacteristic
humility,hestatedinaconcurringopinion
Mr.JusticeCalixtoO.ZaldivarinPhilippineConstitutionAssociationvs.Mathay
Myopinioninthisregardisbaseduponapersonalknowledgeofhowtheconstitutionalproviso,ArticleVI,Section
14oftheConstitution,whichisnowinquestion,becameapartofourpresentConstitution.ItwastheSecond
NationalAssemblywhichamendedouroriginalConstitution.IwasahumbleMemberoftheSecondNational
Assembly,representingtheprovinceofAntique.
xxxxxxxxx
4.
Delegate
Castillo
Guest:
JusticeEnriqueFernando
OPENINGOFTHEMEETING
1.At9:50a.m.ChairmanVictorDelaSernacalledthemeetingtoorder.
2.UponcertificationoftheSecretary,the,Chairannouncedtheexistenceofa.
quorum
318/374
6/20/20153.TheChairthenannouncedthattheCommitteehasfurnishedthebodyresolutionsregardingthesuspensionof
G.R.No.L35546
theprivilegeoftheof.TheChairmentionedsixResolutionsNumbered176,260,531,1415,239and2394.
habeascorpus
4.TheChairfurthersaidthattheresolutionscanbegroupedintothreeschoolsofthoughtthefirst,refersto
theabsoluteprohibitionagainstsuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritofbyanyauthorityinanyandalleventsthe
secondsupportsthetheorythatitmaybesuspendedbythePresidentwiththeconcurrenceofCongressorthe
SupremeCourtandthethird,referstotheremovalofthepowertosuspendfromthePresidentandtransferthe
sametotheSupremeCourt.
habeascorpus
5.TheChairthenintroducedtothememberstheguestspeaker,JusticeEnriqueFernandooftheSupremeCourt
ofthePhilippines.HeexpressedfewwordsofwelcometotheJusticeinbehalfofthetwoCommitteesconducting
thepublichearing.
6.JusticeFernandostartedhisremarksbyclarifyingthathewouldonlyanswerquestionsthatwillnotconflictwith
hisroleasJusticeoftheSupremeCourt,sincetherewasapendingcasebeforethesaidCourtwherethePower
ofthePresidenttosuspendthewritofisplacedatissue.Hesaidthatheconsideredtheprivilegeofthewritofas
themostimportanthumanright.HeisoftheviewthatitmightbepreferrableiftheBillofRightsmakeitclearand
explicitthatatnotimeandundernocircumstancesshouldtheprivilegeofthewritbesuspended.Heclarifiedthat
evenifthispowertosuspendtheprivilegeofthewritwereremovedfromthePresident,hestillhasenough
powerstopreventrebellion,sedition,insurrectionorimminentdangerthereofbecauseofhispowertocallthe
armedforcesincasetheneedforitarises.
7.TheChairaskedthefirstquestiontoJusticeFernando.BecausetheJusticesendthatitwasnotnecessaryto
grantthePresidentthepowertosuspendthewritsinceCongresscanalwayspassalawthatwouldlengthenthe
periodofdetentionofprisoners,theChairaskedifitwouldnotbeverycumbersomeforCongresstoenactsucha
lawintimesofnationalemergency.
7.
Delegate
Yancha
3.
Delegate
Caliwara
6.
Delegate
Rosales
2.Delegate
CalderonC.
1.
5.
DelegateDelegate
Benzon Mastura
2.
Delegate
GarciaL.
M.
4.DelegateZafra
NonMembers:
Members:
1.
3.
DelegateDelegate
Corpus Santillan
8.
Delegate
Opinion
319/374
6/20/2015
COMMITTEE0NEXECUTIVEPOWER
G.R.No.L35546
PRESENT
DelegateEspinaDelegdateExmundo
15.
Delegate
Zafra
7.
Delegate
Mendiola
14.
Delegate
VelosoI.
6.
Delegate
Laggui
13.
Delegate
Sumulong
5.Delegate
GuzmanV.
12.
Delegate
Sevilia
4.Delegate
Gunigundo
11.
Delegate
Santillan
3.Delegate
GarciaL.P.
10.
Delegate
ReyesC.
2.
Delegate
Badelles
1.
9.
DelegateDelegate
Abad
Pepito
Istillhavevividrecollectionsoftheimportantpointsbroughtupduringthedeliberationsincaucusoverproposed
amendmentsandoftheagreementsarrivedat.Iremembertootheinfluencesthatworked,andthepressures
thatwerebroughttobearupontheAssemblymen,intheeffortstobringaboutagreementsonverycontroversial
mattersandthussecuretheinsertionofthedesiredamendmentstotheConstitution.Thediscussionsonthe
proposedamendmentsaffectingthelegislativebranchofthegovernmentwerespeciallyofinteresttousthen
becausewewereinsomewaypersonallyaffected,asmostofuswereinterestedinrunningforreelection.
Itisnotmypurposeheretoimposeonanyonemyrecollectionsofmattersthatwerebroughtupduringour
caucusesthen,butIonlywishtoemphasizethefactthatmyconcurringopinioninthedecisionofthecasenow
beforeUshasforitsbasismyhonestandbestrecollectionsofwhathadtranspiredorwhathadbeenexpressed,
duringthecaucusesheldbytheMembersoftheSecondNationalAssemblyinthedeliberationswhichlater
broughtaboutthe1940amendments.
xxxxxxxxx
IhaveendeavoredtomakeadiscourseoffactsasIknowthem,becauseIsincerelybelievethatthe
interpretation,embodiedintheopinionpennedbymyesteemedcolleague,Mr.JusticeJ.B.L.Reyes,ofthe
pertinentprovisionofArticleVI,Section14ofourConstitutionisinconsonancewiththefactsandcircumstances
asIrememberthem,andasIknowthem.AsIhavestatedattheearlypartofthisconcurringopinion,itisnotmy
purposetoimposeonanyonemyrecollectionofwhattranspired,orofwhathadbeendiscussedabout,orofwhat
hadbeenagreedupon,bytheMembersoftheSecondNationalAssemblyduringthedeliberationswhichbrought
aboutthe1940amendmentstoourConstitution.Myperceptionandmymemoryareasfrailasthoseofanyother
320/374
6/20/2015humanbeing,andImayhaveincurredmyselfinerror.ItjusthappenedthatthefactsandthecircumstancesthatI
G.R.No.L35546
havehereinnarrated,asIrememberthem,haveengenderedinmymindanopinion,nayaconviction,which
dovetailswiththeopinionofmyillustriouscolleaguethathaspennedtheopinionforthemajorityoftheCourtin
thiscase.(atpp.316,317and327328)
ChairmanViceChairman:
JusticeZaldivar'srecollectionsontheintentoftheSecondNationalAssemblymeetingasaconstituentbodyin
1940aremosthelpful.TherearenoexistingrecordsofthedeliberationsontheArticleVI,Section14amendment
tothe1935Constitution.Theamendmentdiscussionsanddebateswhichtookplaceduringlegislativecaucuses
areunrecordedandthisCourthasJusticeZaldivartothankforhisrecollections.
ItisinthisspiritthatIventuremyownrecollections.Iamalsofairlycertainthatwhentheproceedingsofthe1971
ConstitutionalConventionarepublished,myobservationswillbesustained.WhenthelastConstitutional
ConventionapprovedtheNewConstitutiononNovember29,1972,thedelegateswereawareofpreconvention
proposalstosubjecttheexerciseofthepowerbytheExecutivetojudicialinquiry.Studiesonthewisdomof
havingajointexerciseofthepowerbytheExecutiveandtheLegislaturewerebeforethedelegates.(UPLaw
CenterConstitutionRevisionProject,1970,pp.104108)Therewereeverconstitutionallawscholarswho
questionedthepoweraltogetherandwanteditremoved.Theyclaimedthatwhetherornotmartiallawisinthe
Constitution,itwillbedeclaredwhenabsolutelynecessaryandtherefore,anticipatingitsusethrougha
constitutionalprovisionservesnousefulpurpose.
ThedelegateswerefullyawareoftheGovernmentstandontheandmartiallawprovision.Thedecisionwasfairly
recent.ThepowersoftheChiefExecutivewereextensivelydebated.Thedelegationknewthatinthe,
proceedings,theSolicitorGeneralhadconsistentlyandforcefullyarguedthatandwerecorrectinterpretationsof
thePresident'spowertosuspendtheprivilegeofthewritoforplacethePhilippinesoranypartthereofunder
martiallaw.
habeascorpusLansangvs.GarciaLansangvs.GarciaBarcelonvs.BakerMontenegrovs.Castaedahabeascorpus
MoresignificantisthefactthatwhenthenewConstitutionwasfinalizedandthedraftcorrectedandapproved
priortosubmissiontothepeople,wewerealreadyunderastateofmartiallaw.Thepetitionershadbeenarrested
andvariouspetitionsfiled.Infact,petitionerE.VoltaireGarciaIIincludedinhispetitiontheargumentthathis
detentionpursuanttoProclamationNo.1081deprivedhisconstituencyoftheirrepresentationinthe
ConstitutionalConvention.ThedelegateswereawarethatProclamationNo.1081waschallengedbeforethis
CourtandthattheSolicitorGeneralsanswertoallthepetitionswasinvariablythedoctrineofpoliticalquestion.
IfitwastheintentoftheConstitutionalConventiontosubjectthePrimeMinister'sexerciseofthepowertojudicial
inquiryand/orcontrol,theprovisiononmartiallawwouldhavebeenaccordinglyamended.Infact,duringthe
deliberationsoftheCommitteesonCivilandPoliticalRightsandExecutivePower,therewereproposalsthatthe
powertoproclaimmartiallawbesubjectedtocontrol,confirmation,orreversalbyCongressortheSupreme
Court,buttheConventiondidnotacceptanyoftheseproposalsanddecidedtosimplyreiteratetheearlier
provision.
ItwouldbeenlighteningforustoperusethepertinentportionsoftheproceedingsoftheCommitteeonCiviland
PoliticalRightsandExecutivePower,andIquote:
MINUTESOFTHEMEETING(JointPublicHearing)
WEDNESDAY,SEPTEMBER8,1971SessionHall,ManilaHotel
COMMITTEEONCIVILANDPOLITICALRIGHTS
PRESENT
321/374
6/20/2015DelegateDelaSernaDelegateAbueg
G.R.No.L35546
Members:
7.
Delegate
Marino
14.DelegateZosa
OPENINGOFMEETING
1.At9:30a.m.,ChairmanVictorDelaSernacalledthemeetingtoorderanddeclaredtheexistenceofaworking
quorum.
2.ChairmanGerardoS.EspinastatedthatitwasajointhearingoftheCommitteeonCivilandPoliticalRightsand
theCommitteeonExecutivePowers.
3.TheChairconfirmedthestatementofChairmanEspinaandfurtherstatedthatitwasthesecondjointhearing
ofthetwoCommittees,andintroducedSenatorJoseW.Diokno,guestspeakerforthehearing.
4.SenatorDioknothankedthejointBodyforgivinghimanopportunitytodiscusswiththemthepowertosuspend
theprivilegeofthewritofandthepowertodeclaremartiallaw.Tobeabletoresolvetheproblem,hepropounded
thequestions:(1)shouldthePresidenthavethepowertosuspendtheprivilegeofthewritof,(2)assuminghe
wasgiventhepower,underwhatcircumstancesshouldhebeallowedtoexerciseit,and(3)whatsafeguards
shouldbeplacedupontheexerciseofthatpower.Hesurmisedthatinhisopinion,iftheonlylegalbasisforthe
grantofthepoweristobidetimetobeabletobringpersonstocourtforittodecideonthematter,assuchtimeis
alwaysavailabletothegovernment,hesawnoreasoninsuspendingtheprivilegeofthewritof,sincethesame
objectivecanbeattainedbytheimpositionofmartiallaw,whichisnotagraverstepandisnotgravelyabusedin
thepracticalpointofviewthatnoPresidentwilldeclaremartiallawunlesshecanhavethearmedforcesagree
withhimthatthereisactualinvasion,rebellionorinsurrection.HestatedthatthepresentConstitutiononlyallowed
thesuspensionoftheprivilegeincasesofextremeemergencyaffectingtheverysovereigntyoftheState,which
inhisbelief,isonlyincagesofinvasion,rebellionorinsurrection.Hedidnotagreethatthereshouldbea
safeguardprovidedpriortotheissuanceoftheproclamationsuspendingtheprivilegeofthewrit,butratherafter
thewrithasbeensuspended,byrequiringeitherthecourtsorCongresstopassuponthenecessityofthe
suspensionofthewrit.Hedissentedwiththeideathatwhereshouldbeadefinitetimeperiodforitsvalidity,
becauseitisdifficulttodeterminewhatshouldbeanadequateperiod,however,theSupremecourtorCongress
couldalwaysberequiredtoactwithinadefiniteperiodonthevalidityofthesuspensionwhichheconsidered,
alreadyapropersafeguard.
Headdedfurtherthatthepowertoplaceanypartofthenationalterritoryundermartiallawshouldbe,limitedto
casesonlyofactualinvasion,rebellionorinsurrection.However,hestronglyfavoredthedeletionoftheprovision
"onimminentdanger",whichhestressed,isanexcuseforadictatorialPresidenttodeclaremartiallawonthethat
thereisimminentdangerwhenthereisnone.Thereisapossibility,hesaid,thatthearmedforceswillbebroken
up,inthesensethatonegroupmayfavorthePresidentandtheothermayrefusetoallowthemselvestobeused
whenthereisactuallyno"imminentdanger",sothatinsteadoftheirhelpingpreservepeaceandorder,itwould
provideanoccasionforbringingaboutrevolutions.
5.TheChairaskedtheSenatorifthePresidentshoulddeclaremartiallawwhereimminentdangeractuallyexists
andthecivilauthoritiesarestillfunctioning.HefurtherqualifiedthatisitnottheoftheConstitutioninthephrase
"martiallaw"thatthecivilauthoritiescalluponthemilitaryauthoritiestohelpthemorisitacompleteandarbitrary
substitutionofauthoritybythemilitary.
5.1SenatorDioknorepliedthatthePresident'sactioninhispersonalopinion,isarbitraryandillegal,butwho
couldstophimfromdoingthat.EventheSupremeCourtisreluctanttoactbecauseithasthearmytoreckon
with.Heconstruedthatmartiallawcouldbelegallyexercisedonlyinplaceswhereactualfightingexistsandthe
civilauthoritiesarenolongerexercisingauthority,inwhichcasethemilitarycansupplantthecivilauthorities.He
addedthatitisalsopossibletodeclarealimitedmartiallawincertainareaswherethemilitarymayimposecurfew
andtemporarydetentionofpersonschargedofcausingandparticipatinginchaoticsituations.
6.ChairmanEspinarecognizedDelegateBritanicowhohadthefirstoptiontointerpellatetheSenator.
6.1DelegateBritanicowantedtoknowfromtheSenatorwhether,inhisopinion,thepowertosuspendthewritbe
altogetherremovedfromthePresident,andthatintheeventthispowerisretained,howshoulditbeexercisedby
thePresident?.
322/374
6/20/20156.2SenatorDioknorepliedthatifthispowerisretaineditshouldheexercisedbythePresidentalonebutsubject
G.R.No.L35546
toreviewbyeitherCongressortheParliamentaryBodythatmayeventuallybeadopted.
6.3DelegateBritanicowantedtheviewoftheSenatorifhewasagreeabletohavethePresidentsharethepower
withtheVicePresident,Senatemajorityandminorityfloorleaders,SenatePresident,JusticesoftheSupreme
Court,theComelecChairmanandotherheadsoftheconstitutionalorganizations
6.4SenatorDioknorepliedthatheisaversetosharingpowersbecauseitcouldnotbedoneexpediently.The
Senatorremindedthegroupthatasageneralrule,thePresidentandthePresidentoftheSenatebelongtothe
samepartyandeventhejusticesoftheSupremeCourtfallunderthesamesituation,anditwouldthenstillbethe
Presidentwhowilldecide.
7.TheChaircalledonDelegateOlmedoonhisreservationtoaskthenextquestion.
7.1DelegateOlmedowantedtoclarifyifthereisanytechnicaldistinctionbetweensuspensionoftheprivilegeof
thewritofandthewrititself.
habeascorpus
7.2SenatorDioknorepliedthatthewrititselfistheorderofthecourttothepersonhavingcustodyofthesubject
toproducehimincourt,andthatthesubjecthastheprivilegetopostbailpendingthefilingofthecaseagainst
him,ifheistobeheardforanoffense.HecitedthedecisionoftheConfederateAuthoritywhichsaysthatthe
privilegeofthewritreferstocriminalarrestsinwhichthepersonsarrestedhavetheprivilegetobereleasedon
bail,whichistheprivilegethatissuspended.
7.3DelegateOlmedoaskedwhethertheSenator'sstandontheabolitionofthepowertosuspendtheprivilegeof
thewritorasanalternative,thesuspensionbeexercisedwiththeparticipationofotheragencies,isbecauseof
theantiadministrationgroupclamoringforitsabolitionfromtheconstitutionalprovisions?.
7.4SenatorDioknoreiteratedhisstatementthatitishispersonalbeliefthatmartiallawisabettermeasurethan
thesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewrit,whichthePresidentclaimstohaveexercisedtodismantlethe
communistapparatusinthecountry.Whetherthisisjustifiedornotremainsanissue.Assumingthatthe
Communistsarearrestednow,newleaderswillcomeupandtakeovercommand,andthesenewonesarenot
yetknowntothemilitaryauthoritiesandsothesamecommunisticsituationcontinuestoexistandthecyclegoes
onunresolved.
13.
Delegate
Yap
6.
Delegate
Luna
12.
Delegate
Trillana
5.
Delegate
Liwag
11.
Delegate
Sinco
4.
Delegate
Gaudiel
10.
Delegate
Serrano
3.
Delegate
Duavit
9.
Delegate
Santillan
2.
Delegate
Davide
Members:
323/374
6/20/2015
G.R.No.L35546
1.
8.Delegate
DelegateNepomuceno
Araneta
S.
11.
Delegate
Mutuc
22.DelegateYiguez
ABSENT
ViceChairman:
DelegateExmundo
21.
Delegate
Velez
10.
Delegate
Juaban
20.
Delegate
Tocao
9.
Delegate
Gonzales
19.
Delegate
Sanchez
8.Delegate
GarciaL.M.
18.Delegate
Sambolawan
7.
Delegate
FloresA.
17.
Delegate
Saguin
6.
Delegate
Corpus
16.
Delegate
Sagadal
5.
Delegate
Cabal
15.
Delegate
Ramos
4.
Delegate
Britanico
14.
Delegate
Piit
3.
Delegate
Barrera
13.
Delegate
Olmedo
324/374
6/20/20152.
G.R.No.L35546
Delegate
Astilla
Members:
1.
12.
DelegateDelegate
Alano Nuguid
7.Delegate
Fernandez
14.DelegateVelosoI.
EXECUTIVEPOWER
PRESENT
Chairman:
DelegateEspina
13.
Delegate
Sumulong
6.
Delegate
Falgui
12.
Delegate
Sevilia
5.
Delegate
DelaPaz
11.
Delegate
Santillan
4.
Delegate
Ceniza
10.
Delegate
Purisima
3.
Delegate
Catubig
9.
Delegate
Mastura
2.
Delegate
Badelles
ABSENT
Members:
1.
8.
DelegateDelegate
AldeguerGuiao
5.Delegate
GarciaE.
10.DelegateTupazD.
Guest:
325/374
6/20/2015SenatorJoseW.Diokno
9.
Delegate
Seares.
4.
Delegate
DePio
8.
Delegate
Rama.
3.
Delegate
Claver
7.
Delegate
Molina
2.
Delegate
Azcua
G.R.No.L35546
1.
6.
DelegateDelegate
Adil
Garcia
L.
8.
Delegate
Mendiola
NonMembers:
15.
Delegate
Zafra
7.
Delegate
Laggui
14.Delegate
Siguion
Reyna
6.
Delegate
Guzman
13.
Delegate
SantosO.
5.Delegate
Gunigundo
12.
Delegate
ReyesC.
4.Delegate
CalderonJ.
11.
Delegate
Pepito
3.
Delegate,
Aruego
10.
Delegate
Padua
2.
Delegate
Abad
Members:
326/374
6/20/2015
G.R.No.L35546
1.
9.
DelegateDelgate
Abalos Opinion
E.
8.JusticeFernando,inanswertotheChair'squery,saidthatCongresscanpassalawtothateffectwithouta
nationalemergency.
9.InanswertoquestionpropoundedbyDelegateCeniza,JusticeFernandosaidin1951intheHernandezcase
heexpressedtheopinionthateveniftheprivilegeofthewritweresuspended,therighttobailcouldstillbe
availedof.Headmitted,however,thatuptonowthereisnoclearcutrulingonthematter.Healsosaidthatthe
President,shouldnothavethesolepowertodeclareMartialLaw.
10.DelegateMendiolaalsoaskedJusticeFernandowhowoulddeterminethecircumstancesthatwouldwarrant
thedetentionofprisonersforalongerperiodthanwhatisnowprovidedundertheRevisedPenalCode.The
Justiceansweredthatiftheprisonerisheldforcrimesagainstpublicorder,thentheordinaryrulesofcriminallaw
willgovern.Thearrestingauthorities,incollaborationwiththeFiscal,willdeterminesaidcircumstances.
11.DelegateLagguiaskedJusticeFernandowhetherhewouldstilldenythepowertosuspendthewrittothe
PresidentiftheConventionwritesintotheConstitutionsafeguardsagainstabuseofsaidpower.TheJusticesaid
hewouldstillsaythatthepowerbedeniedthePresidentbecauseheconsiderstheprivilegeofthewritofasthe
mostimportanthumanright.
habeascorpus
12.DelegateGunigundointerpellatedtheJusticeandaskedwhetherthelatterwouldfavorpreventivedetentionof
politicalprisonersorpoliticaloffenders.TheJusticesaidweshouldfollowtheConstitutionalProvisionsregarding
probablecause,andtherightsoftheaccusedshouldalwaysberespected.
13.DelegateSantillanaskedJusticeFernandowhetherhewouldfavortheproposaltodeletethephrase
"imminentdangerthereof"andtolimitthesuspensionofthewritfrom10to15daysunlessCongressorthe
SupremeCourtwouldextendthesame.JusticeFernandosaid,sincehewasforthedenialofthepowerto
suspendthewrit,anythinglessthanthatwouldnotbeinconsonancewithhisstand.
14.DelegateZafraaskedJusticeFernandoifitwouldnotbedangerousforaPresidenttodeclareMartialLaw
becauseifhedid,themilitarymighttakeoverthegovernmentandtoppledownthePresidentandevenCongress,
therebyestablishingmilitarydictatorship.JusticeFernandosaidthatthedangerexists.
15.DelegateExmundointerpellatedJusticeFernandoandaskedthelatterwhatthePresidentofthePhilippines
shouldhavedoneinsteadofsuspendingtheprivilegeofthewritof,consideringthechaosandturmoilthat
prevailedpriortothesuspension.TheJusticesaidthatsinceitisthedutyofthePresidenttofaithfullyexecutethe
laws,heshouldandhecouldhavecalledoutthearmedforcestosuppressinsurrection,invasion,andrebellion.
habeascorpus
16.OtherslikeDelegatesMastura,Adil,Guzman,Pepito,Veloso,Bengzon,Leviste(O.),andCenizainterpellated
JusticeFernando.TheChairthenthankedtheJusticeforhisenlighteningspeech.Heexpressedthehopethatat
somefuturetimetheJusticewouldagainfavortheCommitteewithhisappearancesothatthememberscould
propoundmorequestions.
17.Themeetingwasadjournedat12noon.
PREPAREDBY:HONORABLEMACARIOCAMELLO
Typedby:CynthiaB.ArrazolaProofreadby:E.deOcampo/V.M.Umil
327/374
6/20/2015
G.R.No.L35546
MINUTESOFTHEJOINTMEETINGNo.WEDNESDAY,SEPTEMBER15,1971
CIVILANDPOLITICALRIGHTS
PRESENT
7.5Asalastquestion,DelegateOlmedosoughttobeclarifiedonthealternativeviewoftheSenatorthatof
retainingthepowerbutitsexercisebewiththeconcurrenceofCongressandtheSupremeCourt.
7.6TheSenatorreiteratedthatheisfortheabolitionofthepower,butiftheConstitutionalConventionbelievesit
necessarytoretainit,thenitsexercisebytheexecutivemustbesubjecttoreviewandreversal,ifneedbe,by
CongressandtheSupremeCourt.Hemaintainedthattheexerciseofthepowertosuspendtheprivilegeofthe
writisdeterminedbytwofactors:(1)legalityand,(2)wisdom.TheSupremeCourtshalldeterminethelegalityand
CongressdeterminesthewisdomofthePresident'sexerciseofthepower,anditistheConventionthatcan
resolvethisproblem.
8.ChairmanEspinacalledonDelegateBarrera,however,requestedtheMemberstolimittheirquestionstoonly
twotoalloweverybodytheopportunitytoquestiontheguest.
8.1DelegateBarrerastatedthattheSenatorisforthediscardingoftheconstitutionalprovisiononthepowerto
suspendtheprivilegeofthewritofbutisfortherightofanorganofgovernmenttodeclaremartiallawbutlimited
toanactualexistenceofinvasion,rebellionorinsurrection,ThiswasconfirmedbytheSenator.DelegateBarrera
inquiredwhethertheSenatoragreesornottothefactthatinplaceswhereactualfightingoractualinvasion,
rebellionorinsurrectionexists,declarationofmartiallawisunnecessarysincethecommanderinchiefhasthefull
responsibilityofexercisingeverystepnecessarytoprotectandpreservethewelfareofthenation.
habeascorpus
8.2SenatorDioknorepliedthatwhileitistruethatthepowertotakeallthenstepstopreservepeaceandorder
andprotectthepeople,isinherentpowerofsovereignty,yetitwouldcertainlybesafertoprovidethispowerof
formaldeclarationtopreventindividualarbitraryexerciseofpowerbymilitarycommandersinthefield.He
stressedtheneedforaspecificconstitutionalprovisionwhichmustbeclearlystatedanddefinedastotheextent
oftheexerciseofsuchpowers.
9.DelegatePadua(C.)disclosedthatheisanauthorofaresolutionremovingpowersofthePresidentto
suspendtheprivilegeofthewritofaswellastodeclaremartiallaw,andhispointofconcernliesinthe
subsequentgrantofemergencypowersthatarecomplimentarytoexerciseofmartiallawbythePresidentnow
giveninthepresentConstitution.HeaskedtheSenatorwhetherthecriterionintheexerciseofmartiallawto
actualinvasiononlythatis,removetheterms"rebellionandinsurrection"aspartofthecriteria,woulddiminish
thepresidentialpowerexcessesandabuses.DelegatePaduacitedtheviewofJusticeFernandothatpeople
havetherighttorebel,andthiswouldtendtojustifyexclusionofrebellionandinsurrectionasprerequisitesto
imposemartiallaw.
habeascorpus
9.1SenatorDioknoopinedthatthecomplimentaryemergencypowersofthePresidentwasintendedbythe
ConstitutiontoallowthePresidenttolegislateintheabsenceofCongressbutqualifiedthisstatementbyrevealing
thathehasnotmadedeeperstudiesalongthisparticularpoint.Healsostatedthatthestatehastohavepowerto
protectitselffromanyformofchangeotherthanthroughconstitutionalprocessesandthisconceptissharednot
onlybydemocraticbutbyanyformofgovernmentinexistence.InanswertoDelegatePadua,hesuggestedto
definewhatthewordrebellionintheprovisionmean,andtheterm"insurrection"shouldberemovedsince
insurrectionisasmallrebellion,whichdoesnotmeritdeclarationofmartiallaw.Thisprovisioncouldwellfitinthe
BillofRightsinsteadas"theStateoranyportionthereof,maybeplacedundermartiallawonlyincaseofactual
invasionorrebellion,whenthepublicsafetysorequires."Theneliminatetheprovisiongrantingpowertosuspend
theprivilegeofthewritofandplacethepowertodeclaremartiallawamongthepowersofthePresidentin
Section10,ArticleVII,perhaps.
habeascorpus
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6/20/201510.DelegatePatsoughtclarificationastothestandoftheSenatoronthePresidentbeingalreadyCommander
G.R.No.L35546
InChiefoftheArmedForces,andisthencapableofquellingrebellion,thereforethepowerofmartiallawneed
notbespecifiedintheConstitutionorthatifithastobe,thenithastobeinaidtocivilianauthoritiesonly.He
furthersoughttheSenator'sopinionuponwhomtolodgethepowertosuspendtheprivilegeofthewritofaswell
aspowertodeclaremartiallaw,sinceheisaproponentofaformofgovernmentthatwouldhavebotha
Presidentasheadofstateandprimeministerasheadofgovernment.
habeascorpus
10.1TheSenatorclarifiedhisstatementtoDelegateBarrerathattodeclaremartiallawisarecognizedpower
inherenttothesovereigntyofthestateandso,neednotbementionedintheConstitution,acaseinpointisthe
UnitedStatesConstitution.Inreplytothesecondquery,hestressedthat,tohim,thereshouldnotbesuch
powerslodgedonanyoneanywhere.Butiftherehastobe,thePrimeMinister,sincethePresidentisgenerallya
ceremonialofficer,andwouldnotbekeptabreastofficiallyoneverycircumstanceandhappeningofthedayinthe
country.
11.DelegateSiguionReynapointedoutthatfromthediscussions,itwouldbesafetoassumethattheonlything
thatmatterstoanexecutivewhenheisallowedtosuspendtheprivilegeofthewritornot,inhisequivalentrightto
arrestanddetainpeoplebeyondthestatutoryrequirement.HeinquiredwhethertheSenatorentertainsthesame
thinkingthattheprovisionhasoutliveditsusefulnesssincethisprovisionwasestablishedduringthedayswhen
thirddegreewasacceptedasameansofgettingatthetruthandconfessionsfrompeople.Intheabsenceofthird
degreemethods,thereisnothingtobegainedindetainingpeopleunlessbythepsychologicalideathata
detaineewouldsoftentoconfession,whichisunlikely.
11.1TheSenatorexplainedthattheobjectiveofsuspendingtheprivilegeofthewritistoholdpeople
incommunicadocitingasanexample,thePhilippines,ifitisthreatenedbyaRedChineseinvasionandthe
authoritiessuspectedMr.Chan,Mr.Tan,etc.tobespies,thensuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritwould
enablethegovernmenttotakeimmediateholdofMr.Chan,Mr.Tanandcompanyandkeepthemunder
detentionwithoutrighttobail.Thiswouldputthemoutofcirculationanddisabletheiroperations.Thejustifying
reasontherefore,liesintheneedoftheArmedForcesforessentialtimetodevoteonthefightagainstthe
invadersorrebelsinsteadofconsumingtimetoformulatechargesagainstthesedetaineesandthefilingof
chargesagainstthesedetaineescanbeputasideuntilsuchtimewhentheinvasionorrebellionisundercontrol.
Inshort,itistoenabletheArmedForcestobuyessentialtime.Hereiteratedthatpowertosuspendtheprivilege
ofthewritofandpowertodeclaremartiallawarejustifiedonlyonactualinvasionorrebellion,andhestill
maintainedthattheformercaseisunnecessary.
habeascorpus
11.2DelegateSiguionReynafurtherqueriedtheSenatorhowtheStatecanmeetthesecurityprobleminacase
ofimminentinvasionandthepowertosuspendtheprivilegeofthewritisnolongerprovidedfor,takingasacase
inpoint,thePhilippinesituationduringtheperiodpriortotheJapanesewarwhenJapanesespieswereallover
thecountrypreparingthegroundsforitsinvasioninJapan.HowcanthePresidentorthePrimeMinistermeetthe
problemifhehasnoPowertosuspendtheprivilegeofthewrit.
11.3TheSenatorrepliedthatinsituationslikethis,theSenateshouldundertakesurveillanceworkasisdonein
theU.S.Thesuspectsarekeptundersurveillanceandwhenenoughevidenceisacquiredtheauthoritiesspring
thetraponthemandbringthemtocourtorincasethesuspectisfoundoperatingwithinanareawhereanactual
fightingison,thenthecommanderoftheArmedForcesinthearea,byvirtueofhisinherentmilitarypowerto
restrictmovementofciviliansintheareacanapprehendandtakethemtocustodyuntilthefightisoverwithout
theneedforsuspendingtheprivilegeofthewrit.Itispartofmilitarypower.Hesuggestedasanalternativethata
degreeofflexibilityinthemanneroflegislationcanberesortedto.Citingasanexamplethelegislationonmatters
ofcrimesagainstthesecurityofthestate,detentionperiodpriortofilingthecaseincourtcanbeenlarged.There
arelawsatpresentfailingunderthiscategory.Wiretappingisunlawfulundernormalconditionsbutitisallowedin
casesinvolvingsecurityandrebellion.
12.InthefollowupclarificationbyChairmanDelaSerna,theattentionoftheSenatorwasdirectedbacktohis
formerstatementthatpendingtheprivilegeofthewritonlyallowsthegovernmenttoholdthedetainee
incommunicadobutthedetaineehasotherrightsastherighttocommunicatewithrelatives.
12.1SenatorDioknoagreedthatthedetaineeisstillentitledtootherrightsastherighttoberepresentedby
counsel,butoncedetained,heissubjecttorestrictionsandcontrolbythejailer.
12.2DelegateDelaSernaaskedifthereisadifferenceinthetreatmentofdetaineeswhentheprivilegeofthe
writissuspendedanddetaineesarrestedwhentheprivilegeisnotsuspended:Whethertoholdaperson
incommunicado,ajailerisunderinstructiontoimposecertaindegreeofrestrictionstothispersonwhichisnot
truewiththeordinaryprisoners.
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6/20/201512.3SenatorDioknorepliedthattherewasreallynodistinctionordifferencewritteninthelawbutthejailer,inthe
G.R.No.L35546
exerciseofhisduty,hasacertaindegreeofunwrittenpoweroverhisdetainees.TheSenatorhoweverdisclosed
whathappenedrecentlytopeopledetainedwhichheexperiencedastheircounsel.Thelawyerswereallowedto
talktothedetaineesafteranumberofdayshadlapsed,andinfactaftertheirstatementswerealreadytaken,
aftertheprocessofinterrogationswereterminated.Herevealedthathewasinformedthatthedetaineeswere
neverharmednorsubjecttophysicalpressurebuttheprocessofinterrogationcontinuedforhoursandhours,
andevenatanunholyhourofmidnighttheywereawakenedforfurtherinterrogation.Methodsdesignedtoinflict
mentalandphysicaltorturetotireoutthedetainees.
13.TheChairrecognizedDelegatesMolinaandMendiolawhojointlyengagedtheSenatorintoaseriesof
interpellationsregardingtheSenator'spersonalopinionsandviewsontheincumbentPresidentialexerciseofhis
powers(Proclamation889and889A)suspendingtheprivilegeofthewritof.
habeascorpus
14.DelegateMutucaskedtheSenatorifthereisnodifferencebetweentheandthecases.
Barcelonvs.theBakerMontenegrovs.Castaeda
14.1TheSenatorrepliedthattherewasadifferenceandexplained:(1)Intheformercase,thesuspensionofthe
privilegeofthewritshouldnothavebeendonebutitwasdoneonlyuponjointhearingbythePhilippine
CommissionandtheGovernorGeneraltograntaction.Whileinthelattercase,thesuspensionwastheexclusive
actionofthePresidentofthePhilippines.(2)Thesituationintheformercaseweresuchthatattheverybeginning
ourcourtsweremannedbyAmericanJuristsintendedtobelateronmannedbyFilipinoJurists.Thisbeingso,the
courtsfoundithardtoruleandmakeadoctrine.Suchactioncouldbeinterpretedastantamounttoallowing
FilipinoJuriststooverruleanAmericanGovernorGeneralandbyimplication,overrulethePresidentoftheU.S.
sinceundertheJonesLaw,theprivilegeofthewritcanbesuspendedbythePresidentoftheU.S.Thiscanbe
heldlateron(today)thattheFilipinoSupremeCourtcouldreviewthefindingsofthePresidentoftheU.S.,which
isimpossibleundertherelationbetweenacolonyanditscolonizer,and(3)thatthestandardofmoralityandtruth
wereobservedwithgreaterfidelityatthattimethantheyaretoday.
14.2DelegateMutucsoughtclarificationintheeventthattheSupremeCourtrulesthattheantisubversionlawis
notaBillofAttaindertheSenatorbeggedoff.Hestatedthathepreferrednottodiscussthedetailsandmeritsof
hispositioninthiscase,butstronglyurgedtheConventiontoconsiderrewritingtheprovisionsonthefreedomof
association.
15.TheChairwantedtoknowwhethersuspensionofthewritandtherighttobailisnotsuspended.
15.1TheSenatorstatedthatinhisopiniontherighttobailpriortofilingthecaseincourtissuspended.Whenthe
caseisfiledincourt,thecustodyofthepersonaccusedgoesfromtheexecutivetothejudiciary.Onafollowup
questionbytheChairmanseekingclarificationforthedistinctionpointedoutbytheSenatorthatrighttobailprior
tofilingthecaseincourtissuspended,theSenatorexplainedthattheprovisionoftheprivilegedofthewrit
consistsoftherightofapersontobereleasedifthearrestisfoundillegalbycourt,orthedetentionisarbitraryor
inabsenceofaprimafacieevidenceagainsttheperson,soiftheprivilegeofthewritissuspended,itfollowsthat
alltheotherrightsarealsosuspended.
15.2TheChairsoughttheviewoftheSenatorontheopinionofbothSecretaryAbadSantosandSolicitorAntonio
thatduringsuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewrit,anorderofwarrantofarrestisnecessary.SenatorDiokno
agreedwiththisopinion.TheChairpointedoutthatif,astheSenatorsaid,thepurposeoftheprivilegeofthewrit
istoquestionthelegalityofarrestanddetention,itcouldbeso,evenifthereisavalidwarrantofarrest.This
wouldseemtopointoutthattheissuanceofthewarrantofarrestisunnecessary.TheSenatorreplied,NO,and
pointedoutthatifnocasecanbeproducedagainstapersondetained,thearrestisunlawfulandthearresting
officerissubjecttoprosecution.Thesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritmerelymakesitimpossibleforthe
courtstoorderthereleaseofthedetainee.TheSenatoragreedsubstantiallywiththeobservationoftheChair
thatthislonglegalprocessrequiredtobefolloweddefeatstheverypurposeofthesuspensionoftheprivilegeof
thewrit,andstatedthatthisisthereasontheexecutiveandthemilitaryauthoritiesresorttoillegalshortcutsin
takingpeopleintocustody.Manyofthedetaineestodaywerenotissuedlegalwarrants,butwerejustinvitedto
themilitaryheadquarters.Becauseoftheseobservationscited,theSenatorurgedthejointBodytoreviewand
rewritetheprovisionsontheissuanceofwarrantsofarrest.
16.DelegateTupaz(D.)engagedtheSenatorinaseriesofclarificatoryquestionswhichdelvedonpointsalready
discussedbytheSenatorinpreviousinterpellationsbyDelegatesMutuc,Barrera,Reyes,LagguiandSiguion
Reyna.TheSenatorhoweverreiteratedhisstatementthatheisfortheretentionoftheexerciseofmartiallaw,not
thatitislessharmful,butthatitislesssubjecttoabusethanthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewrit.
17.DelegateGunigundo'sinterpellationswereonthesubjectofeffectivityandvalidityofPresidential
ProclamationsasProclamationNo.889and889A.TheSenatoremphasizedthattheeffectivityofproclamations
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6/20/2015hingesonthetimeitwasmadepublic,notnecessarilythough,thatitbepublishedintheOfficialGazette,nor
G.R.No.L35546
copiesofthecontentsbefurnishedthemetropolitannewspapersforpublication.
18.SenatorDioknocategoricallyansweredDelegateSanchezthathewassuggestingaproposaltototally
removethepowertosuspendthewritofintheproposedConstitution,sincebeingsilentaboutitwillallow
CongressorthePresidenttoexerciseitspowerofsuchprocedure.InanswertoDelegateCalderon(J.),he
reiteratedthatthesuspensionofthewritofcanbeexercisedwithorwithoutbeingprovidedforintheConstitution.
19.DelegateAruegowasinformedbySenatorDioknothatthosedetainedcanonlyapplyforbailifacaseisfiled
againstadetaineeincourt,sowhatisdoneistofileapetitionfor,whichincludestherighttobail,itthecaseis
bailable.
habeascorpus
20.DelegateVelezexplainedthathewasrecommendingtwoalternativeproposalstotheExecutivePower
Committee:1)topreventforeverthesuspensionoftheprivilege,or2)toputsafeguards,meaningthePresident
maysuspenditbutonlyinactualcasesofinvasionorrebellionforaspecificperiodoftimeinspecificareaswhere
publicsafetyrequiresit,withtheconcurrenceoftwothirdsvoteofthemembersofCongress,ifinsession,andif
not,itwillbesubjecttotheautomaticreviewbytheSupremeCourt.
20.1SenatorDioknowasinfavorofDelegateVelez'firstproposal,however,intheeventthethinkingofthe
Conventiondoesnotagree,theSenatordidnotwanttolimitthePresident,orwhoeverexercisesthepowerto
suspend,foraspecificperiod,becauseitwillbeinflexibleandmeaningless.Hewasnotagreeabletoa
concurrencebyCongressbecausehedoesnotwanttotiethehandsofthePresidentinofemergency,sinceitis
veryhardtomusteraquoruminbothhousesofCongress.However,hewasforitsreviewbytheSupremeCourt.
Hewasfortheimmediateproclamation,butalimitoftimeshouldbesetwithinwhich,thereviewshouldbemade.
20.2DelegateBarrerainsistedthattherighttoprotectitselfisaninherentsovereignrightofanyState,sothatfor
anyorganizationofgovernmenttoexercisethosemeansofprotection(declarationofmartiallawandsuspension
oftheprivilegeofthewrit)shouldbesostatedintheConstitution,andthenecessarysafeguardsprovidedfor.
21.DelegatesBarreraandSiguionReynaengagedtheSenatorinadiscussioncriticizingtheactuationsofthe
incumbentPresidentinconnectionwiththesuspensionofthewritof.
habeascorpus
22.TheChairthankedSenatorDioknoforhiselucidationandparticipationinthediscussionsofthetopicsforthe
day,andadjournedthejointpublichearingat12:10p.m.
PREPAREDANDEDITEDBY:(Sgd.)HON.CELSOP.TABUENA
ATTESTEDBY:
(Sgd.)VICTORDELASERNAChairmanCommitteeonCivilandPoliticalRights
Typedby:AliceG.Aquino
Proofreadby:SalomeOrtiz/VivencioGopole
KnowingtheGovernment'sstandandthePresident'saction,theConstitutionalConventiondecidedtoretainthe
martiallawpowerverbatiminthenewConstitution.Theframersnotonlyratifiedthevalidityoftheexistingstateof
martiallawbutreaffirmedthePresident'sinterpretationasthecorrectmeaningoftheconstitutionalprovisionfor
futureoccasionrequiringitsexercise.Thepoliticalcharacterofamartiallawproclamationwithitscontinuation
wasthenconfirmedbytheConstitutionConvention.
ThepoliticalcharacterofcontinuedmartiallawisalsosustainedbytheparliamentarysystemunderthenewCharter.The
powertodeclaremartiallawisvestedexclusivelyinthePrimeMinisterbyArticleIX,Section12.Followingestablished
precedents,suchavestingofpowerissupposedtomeanthatitsexerciseistotheexclusionofallotherswhomaywantto
shareinthepower.Inpractice,however,thiswillnolongerbetrue.
The1973ConstitutionjoinedtogethertheExecutiveandtheLegislativedepartmentsofthegovernment,which
weredistinctlyseparatefromeachotherunderthe1935Constitution.TheNewCharterprovides:"Thelegislative
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6/20/2015powershallbevestedinaNationalAssembly."(ArticleVIII,Sec.1)"TheExecutivepowershallbeexercisedby
G.R.No.L35546
thePrimeMinisterwiththeassistanceoftheCabinet."(ArticleIX,Sec.1)"ThePrimeMinistershallbeelectedby
amajorityfromamongthemselves.""(ArticleIX,Sec.3)"ThePrimeMinistershallappointtheMembersofthe
CabinetwhoshallbetheheadsofministriesatleastamajorityofwhomshallcomefromtheNationalAssembly.
MembersoftheCabinetmayberemovedatthediscretionofthePrimeMinister."(ArticleIX,Sec.4).
Thus,wenowhaveaParliamentarysystemofgovernmentundertheNewCharter.Anessentialfeaturethereofis
thedirectresponsibilityofthePrimeMinisterandthemembersofhisCabinettotheNationalAssembly,forthey
holdtheirpositionsonlyforaslongastheyenjoytheconfidenceoftheAssembly.Moreaccurately,ArticleVIII,
Sec.13(1)providesforthewithdrawalofconfidencethroughtheelectionofasuccessororanewPrimeMinister
byamajorityvoteofallmembersoftheNationalAssembly.
APrimeMinisterunderthenewChartermustalwaystakeintoaccountthedesiresoftheNationalAssemblywhen
hemakesimportantdecisions.Asamatteroffact,heandthemajorityofhiscabinetarealsomembersofthe
NationalAssembly.Infact,theyaretheleadersofthepredominantpartyinthelegislature.Theycontrollegislative
policy.ThePrimeMinisterisresponsibletotheNationalAssemblyandmustexecuteitswillontheonehandand
heisitspoliticalleaderandhelpsshapethatwillontheother.Gravepublicissueswillbehandledbythe
ExecutiveandtheLegislatureactingtogether.
UnderthenewConstitution,martiallawwillbeajointresponsibilityofthetwopoliticaldepartments(executiveand
legislative)evenifitsformalproclamationisvestedsolelyinthePrimeMinister.
BeforeIcouldreleasethisopinion,Iwasabletogetthe"TranscriptoftheProceedingsofthe166manSpecial
Committee1MeetingNo.1,October24,1972"whichfullysustainsmyview,andIquote:
TRANSCRIPTOFTHEPROCEEDINGSOFTHE166MANSPECIALCOMMITTEEMEETINGNO.1
OCTOBER24,1972
PAGE88VOL.XVIDELEGATETUPAZ(A.):Section4
NO.8
THEPRIMEMINISTERSHALLBETHECOMMANDERINCHIEFOFALLARMEDFORCESOFTHE
PHILIPPINESAND,WHENEVERITBECOMESNECESSARY,HEMAYCALLOUTSUCHARMEDFORCESTO
PREVENTORSUPPRESSLAWLESSVIOLENCE,INVASION,INSURRECTION,ORREBELLION.INCASEOF
INVASION,INSURRECTION,ORREBELLION,ORIMMINENTDANGERTHEREOF,WHENTHEPUBLIC
SAFELYREQUIRESIT,HEMAYSUSPENDTHEPRIVILEGEOFTHEWRITOF,ORPLACETHEPHILIPPINES
ORANYPARTTHEREOFUNDERMARTIALLAW.
HABEASCORPUS
ThisprovisionisanexactcopyofaprovisioninthepresentConstitution.ThisprovisioncomplementsSection15,
ArticleIVontheBillofRightsofthisdraft.MayI,therefore,moveforitsapproval,Mr.Chairman?
CHAIRMANDEGUZMAN(A):Anyobservationorcomment?Yes,GentlemanfromBatangas?
DELEGATELEVISTE(O.):Thankyou,Mr.Chairman.Wenotice,YourHonor,thatinthesetwosections,Section
15oftheBillofRightsandSection12ofArticleIX,weare,inawayofspeaking,remedyingtheseeming
discrepancybetweensimilarprovisionsinthepresentConstitution.Bothprovisionswillnowcontainthephrase"or
incaseofimminentdangerthereof".Withsuchachange,Ibelievethatnoconflictastothetrueintentwillarisein
thefuture.Butallowme,YourHonor,torecall,briefly,ourrecentjurisprudenceonthematterofthedeclarationof
martiallawandofthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritof.YourHonorwillrecallthatundertheJonesAct,
theGovernorGeneralofthePhilippineswasgiventhepowertosuspendtheprivilegeofthewritofandtodeclare
martiallaw.Whensuchpowerwasquestionedincourt,theSupremeCourtcameoutwiththedecision,inthe
caseof,thatthefindingsoftheChiefExecutiveontheexistenceofthegroundsforthedeclarationofmartiallaw
orthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritofareconclusiveandmaynotbeinquiredintobythecourts.When
thePhilippineCommonwealthwasestablishedunderthe1935Constitution,thePresidentthereofwaslikewise
giventhepowertosuspendtheprivilegeofthewritofandtoproclaimordeclaremartiallawforanyofthecauses
enumeratedinthepertinentprovisions.Sometimeinthe1950's,thenPresidentQuirinosuspendedtheprivilege
ofthewritof.Whenacasearose,thatoftheSupremeCourtaffirmeditsstandin,thattheassessmentbythe
ChiefExecutiveoftheexistenceofthecauseorcausesgivingrisetotheproclamationofmartiallaworthe
suspensionofthewritofisconclusiveandmaynotbecontestedinthecourts.Recently,however,onlyalittleless
thanayearago,whenPresidentMarcossuspendedtheprivilegeofthewritof,theSupremeCourtruled,inthe
caseofandothercompanioncases,thattheexistenceofinsurrection,rebellion,invasion,orimminentdanger
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6/20/2015thereof,maybeproperlyinquiredintobythecourts.Now,Iwouldliketoposebeforethisbody,whetherthis
G.R.No.L35546
Conventionshouldnowaffirmthelatestdoctrineorwhetherweshouldreverttotheoldtheoryanddoctrineinthe
twocasesofand.
habeascorpushabeascorpusBarcelonvs.BakerhabeascorpushabeascorpushabeascorpusMontenegrovs.Castaeda,
Barcelonvs.BakerhabeascorpushabeascorpusLansangvs.GarciaBarcelonvs.BakerMontenegrovs.Castaeda
DELEGATETUPAZ(A.):InviewofthefactthatChairmandeGuzmanisalsotheChairmanofSubcouncilIIon
Citizens'Rightswhichconductedanexhaustivestudyonthismatterofmartiallaw,mayIrequestthathebethe
onetoanswerqueriesonthispoint?
CHAIRMANDEGUZMAN(A.):Inthatcase,mayIrequestDelegateTupaztoactasChairmaninthemeantime?
(Atthispoint,ChairmanDeGuzmanyieldedtheChairtoDelegateAntonioTupaz)
DELEGATEDEGUZMAN(A.):Iampersonallyinfavorofabandoningthedoctrinelaiddowninthecaseof,andI
wouldrecommendsuchaviewtothisCommittee,andtotheConventionasawhole.Atthisverymoment,the
SolicitorGeneral,inrepresentationofPresidentMarcosisurgingtheSupremeCourtthatsuchadoctrinebe
abandonedandthatwereverttotheoldtheorylaiddowninthecasesmentionedbyYourHonor.Indeed,our
courts,especiallytheSupremeCourt,wherethesecasesareinvariablytakenup,areillequippedtomake
findingsontheexistenceofrebellion,insurrection,orlawlessness.
Lansangvs.Garcia
DELEGATELEVISTE(O.):ButisnotYourHonorawarethatthereareanumberofresolutionsfiledinthe
ConventionthattheChiefExecutivemaysuspendtheprivilegeofthewritoforproclaimanddeclaremartiallaw
onlyforalimitedperiodand/orwiththeconcurrenceoftheLegislature?
habeascorpus
DELEGATEDEGUZMAN(A.):Yes,YourHonor,butwearenotbound.ThisCommitteeisnotboundbythose
resolutions.Asalreadyagreeduponwhenthe166ManSpecialCommitteewascreated,thatCommitteeofwhich
weareapartwasmerelyadvisedtotakeintoconsiderationsuchresolutions.Weshouldbearinmindalsothat
weareadoptingtheparliamentarysystemwherethereismore,ratherthanless,fusionoflegislativeand
executivepowers.Weareadopting,YourHonor,theconceptandprincipleofanexecutivemoredirectlyand
immediatelyresponsibletotheLegislaturesothattheexercisebytheChiefExecutiveofanyofhispowerswillbe
subjecttotheeverpresentscrutinyoftheLegislature.
DELEGATELEVISTE(O.):Butmypoint,YourHonor,istoemphasizethefactthatthefilingofthoseresolutions
requiringeventheconcurrenceoftheNationalAssemblyforthevalidexercisebythePrimeMinisterofthese
extraordinaryconstitutionalprerogativeindicatesthatthereisasentimentamongtheDelegatestofurtherrestrict,
ratherthanexpand,thepowers.AndIwouldsaythatthedecisionoftheSupremeCourtinwhichrepudiatedthe
doctrineearlierlaiddowninBakerandCastaedalendssupporttothatsentiment..Ifwearetointerpretthe
provisionunderconsiderationinthewayYourHonorwouldwantitinterpreted,inthesensethatthefactual
findingsoftheChiefExecutiveforthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritoforthedeclarationofmartiallaw
wouldbeconclusiveinsofarastheJudicialDepartmentisconcerned,thenweareretrogressingand,ineffect,
goingagainstthesentimenttofurtherrestricttheexerciseofthesegreatconstitutionalpowers.
DELEGATEDEGUZMAN(A.):IcangoalongwithYourHonor'sargumentsif,asIhavealreadystated,this
Conventionoptedforthepresidentialformofgovernment.Butaswehavealreadyoptedandchosenthe
parliamentarysystem,IthinkfurtherrestrictionsonthepowersoftheChiefExecutivewillnolongerbejustified.It
maybetritetorepeathere,butIrepeatthemnevertheless,theargumentsinfavorofaparliamentaryformof
government:thatthissystemisforastrongexecutive,butonewhoisimmediatelyandinstantlyanswerabletohis
peersatalltimes.Thus,shouldaPrimeMinistersuspendtheprivilegeofthewritofordeclaremartiallaw
arbitrarilyor,evenperhaps,irrationally,Idon'tthinkthattherecanbeanybetterormoreimmediatecheckon
sucharbitraryandirrationalexerciseofpowerthantheParliamentitself.Thecourtscannotpretendtobeina
betterpositionthantheParliamentinthisregard.FortheParliamentontheveryday,orperhapsevenonthevery
hour,thatthePrimeMinisterproclaimsmartiallaworsuspendstheprivilegeofthewritofmayfileamotionto
deposehimandshouldthismotionbesuccessful,thentheprevailingpartywithitsPrimeMinisterwilljustissue
anotherproclamationrestoringnormalcyandorder.
DELEGATELEVISTE(O.):Thankyou,YourHonor.Forthemoment,Mr.Chairman,Ihavenomorequestionsto
ask.
PRESIDINGOFFICERTUPAZ(A.):Arethereanyfurthercommentsorinterpellations?
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6/20/2015DELEGATEQUIRINO:Justonequestion,Mr.Chairman,inconnectionwiththepointraisedbyDelegateLeviste.
G.R.No.L35546
PRESIDINGOFFICERTUPAZ(A.):Youmayproceed.
DELEGATEQUIRINO:BeforeIaskmyquestion,YourHonor,letmestatemypositionclearlylestIbe
misunderstood.IamaskingthisquestionnotbecauseIdisagreewithYourHonor'spositionbutonlyforthe
purposeofenrichingthisdebatewithexchangesofviewsforfutureresearchersandscholars.Now,if,asYour
Honorputsit,thedecisionofthePrimeMinisterontheexistenceofgroundsjustifyingthedeclarationofmartial
laworthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritofwouldnolongerbeopenedtojudicialscrutiny,wouldthatnot
enablethePrimeMinistertoabusehispowers?
habeascorpus
DELEGATEDEGUZMAN(A.):YourHonorwasnotlistening.Ijuststatedthatthereisamoreimmediatecheckon
thepartoftheParliament,andasidefromthispracticalcheck,itmustbeunderstoodthatanactoftheChief
Executivesuspendingtheprivilegeofthewritoforproclaimingmartiallawispoliticalact,theremedymustalsobe
political,inapoliticalforum,beinParliamentordirectlybeforeourpeople.Anditmustbestatedthatthereisno
powerwhichmaynotbeabused.Ithink,YourHonor,weshouldonceandforallagreeastothenatureofthis
powerweareinvestingintheChiefExecutive.Onceandforall,weshouldagreethatthispoweriseminently
politicalandexecutiveinnature.TheJudiciary,Isubmit,isnotthebest,muchlessisitthemostpracticalagency,
topossess,toexercise,ortolimitthispower,theneedforwhichcannotbedenied.
habeascorpus
DELEGATEQUIRINO:Well,YourHonor,Iamnotalawyer,soIhopeyouwillpardonmeifcannotfullyappreciate
whatyouaretalkingabout.Because,tome,anactispoliticalifitisdonebyapolitician.That'sall,Mr.Chairman.
PRESIDINGOFFICERTUPAZ(A.):Let'sbeserious,please.Allright,aretherefurtherinterpretationsor
comments?Yes,DelegateOrtiz,whatisitthatyouwanttoask?
DELEGATEORTIZ(R.):Well,Mr.Chairman,thisisnotaquestionbutjustadditionalobservations.Itis
unfortunatereallythatthedoctrinefirstlaiddowninandaffirmedmorethanhalfacenturylaterinwasreversed
bytheSupremeCourtin.Isayitisunfortunatebecausemorethananyoneelse,onlythePresidentisinthebest
positiontoevaluateandtheexistenceofthecauseswhichwouldwarranttheexerciseofthisconstitutionalpower.
Asitwere,thePrimeMinisteristheheadoftheExecutiveDepartment.Morethanthat,heistheCommanderin
ChiefofallthearmedforcesofthePhilippines.Hehas,therefore,alltheresourcesandfacilitiesnotavailableto
anyotherofficialofthegovernment,muchlesstotheSupremeCourt,tomakeauthoritativefindingsand
assessmentsofthethreatstonationalsecurity.ButevenintheLansangcase,IwouldsaythattheCourthadto
relyonthefindingsoftheExecutiveDepartment.IhavehereacopyofthedecisionoftheSupremeCourtinthat
case,andIwouldsaythattheCourthadtorelyonthefindingsoftheExecutiveDepartment.Ihavehereacopy
ofthedecisionoftheSupremeCourtinthatcase,andIwouldliketoquoteaportionthereof.Inthisdecision,the
SupremeCourtstated,andIquote:
Barcelonvs.BakerMontenegrovs.CastaedaLansangvs.Garcia
raids,resortedtokidnappingandtakenpartinotherviolentincidents,summingover230,inwhichitinflicted404
casualtiesand,inturn,suffered243losses.In1970,itsrecordofviolentincidentswasaboutthesamebutthe
IwishtocalltheattentionoftheMembersofthisCommitteetothephraseappearinginthisportionofcourt's
decision,namely,"accordingtotherecordsoftheDepartmentofNationalDefense".Thisphraseis,tome,
significantinthesensethateventheSupremeCourtitselfhadtorelyontherecordsofanagencyofthe
ExecutiveDepartment,whichonlyprovesor,atleastindicatesanadmissiononthepartoftheCourtthatbyitself,
itisnotinapositiontomakeitsownfactualfindingsonthegroundsjustifyingthesuspensionoftheprivilegeof
thewritofintheLansangcase.Inshort,evenintheLansangcasewheretheSupremeCourtrepudiatedthe
conclusivenessofexecutivefindingsonfactstojustifytheexerciseofthepower,thesamecourt,nonetheless,
hadtoresorttosuchfindingsmadebyanarmoftheExecutiveDepartment.IfImayfurtheradd,Iwouldliketo
saythat,tomyrecollection,duringthathearingwhentheSupremecourtreceivedthisevidence,orperhapswe
maycallthempiecesofinformation,fromthemilitary,whichinformationwasclassified,therewereobjectionson
thepartofsomecounselwhowereexcludedfromthehearing,totheeffectthattheyshouldalsobeaffordedthe
opportunityofhearingsuchinformation.Allofthese,ofcourse,merelyshowtheimpracticabilityonthepartofany
court,beittheSupremeCourtoralowercourt,toreceiveevidencewhichis,perhaps,notevenacceptableunder
theRulesofCourtand,thereafter,todetermineforitselfwhethersuchevidenceorinformationislegallysufficient
forthePresidentorthePrimeMinistertoactupon.WearethereforehereabandoningtheLansangdoctrine.
habeascorpus
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6/20/2015SOMEDELEGATES:Noobjection!Noobjection!
G.R.No.L35546
DELEGATEADIL:So,itisthentheunderstandingofthisCommittee,andItakeittobeitsposition,thatwhenthe
PrimeMinistersuspendstheprivilegeofthewritofordeclaresmartiallaw,thefindingsbythePrimeMinisteron
thecausesthatjustifysuchsuspensionorproclamationareconclusiveandmaynot,therefore,beinquiredintoby
thecourts.
habeascorpus
DELEGATEDEGUZMAN(A.):Maynotbeinquiredintobythecourtsorbyanyone,andtheChiefExecutiveis
fullyresponsibleforhisacts.Thecourts,ofcourse,arepowerlesstotakeremediesagainstanyarbitraryactsof
theChiefExecutive,butsucharbitraryact,iftherebeany,mayhecheckedbythepoliticalbranchordepartment
ofthegovernmentand,ultimately,bythepeoplethemselves.
DELEGATELEVISTE(O.):Ifthatisourunderstanding,YourHonor,whydon'tweputithere,inblackandwhite,
thatthefindingsofthePrimeMinisterontheexistenceofthegroundsforthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthe
writofortheproclamationofmartiallawareconclusiveuponthecourts?
habeascorpus
PRESIDINGOFFICERTUPAZ(A.):YourHonor,IsupposeyouareawarethatweareheredraftingaConstitution
andnotannotatinganexistingone.Ifwearetoincludeinthisdocumenteveryintentandinterpretationwehave
oneachprovision,IcannotimaginethekindofbulkofsuchConstitutionwhichweshallsubmittoourpeople.
DELEGATELEVISTE(O.):Imadethatsuggestion,YourHonor,becauseIwanttoleavenodoubtonourposition
regardingthispoint.
PRESIDINGOFFICERTUPAZ(A.):Well,Ithinktherecordsofourdeliberationsheresufficetoerasethatdoubt.
DELEGATELEVISTE(O.):Now,Mr.Chairman,ifImaygotoanotherpoint,Iwouldliketoinquirewhetherthis
provisiononthepowersoftheChiefExecutiveorthePrimeMinisterconcerningthedeclarationofmartiallawis
limitedtothequellingofthesuppressionofrebellion,insurrection,invasionorlawlessness,orwhethersucha
powerincludesinittheestablishmentofaneworderofthings,anewsociety.Isaythis,YourHonor,becauseon
theeveningPresidentMarcosannouncedtheproclamationofmartiallaw,heunderscoredhisactionbysaying
thatheproclaimedmartiallawinorderaccordingtohim,"tosavetheRepublicandformaNewSociety".
PRESIDINGOFFICERTUPAZ(A.):DelegateDeGuzmanwillpleaseanswerthat.
Asitisunderstoodbyrecognizedauthoritiesonthesubject,martiallawrestsuponthedoctrineofparamount
thenatureofmartiallaw,thepoweristobeexercisednotonlyforthemoreimmediateobjectofquellingthe
disturbanceormeetingapublicperilwhich,inthefirstplace,causedthedeclarationofmartiallaw,butalsoto
ordertoachieveitsrationalend.BecauseintheparticularcaseofthePhilippinesituation,Iagreewiththe
andthelawlessness.
commonlyunderstoodasaweapontocombatlawlessnessandrebellionthroughtheuseofthemilitary
forcivilianauthoritiesinareaswheresuchcivilianauthoritiesareunabletodischargetheirfunctionsduetothe
DELEGATEDEGUZMAN(A.):HisHonoriscorrectwhenhesaidthatweareabandoningthenarrow,traditional
andclassicconceptofmartiallaw.Butweareabandoningthesameonlytohumanizeit.ForYourHonorwill
toaccept,andPresidentMarcos,aware,asheis,thattheFilipinopeoplewillnotcountenanceanysuppressive
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G.R.No.L35546
aNewSociety,tocreateanewatmosphere,whichwillnotbeanaturalhabitatofdiscontent.Statedotherwise,
theconceptofmartiallaw,asnowbeingpracticed,isnotonlytorestorepeaceandorderinthestreetsandinthe
townsbuttoremedythesocialandpoliticalenvironmentsinsuchawaythatdiscontentwillnotoncemorebe
renewed.
DELEGATEORTIZ(R.):Icanfeelfromthediscussion,Mr.Chairman,thatwearehavingdifficultyintryingto
bythisprovisionandtheinterpretationsbeinggiventoit,departingfromthetraditionalconceptofmartiallaw.
theexerciseofthispowerbyPresidentMarcos,doubtshavebeenexpressedinsomequarters,whetherin
declaringmartiallawhecouldexerciselegislativeandjudicialpowers.Iwouldwanttoemphasizethatthe
circumstanceswhichprovokedthePresidentindeclaringmartiallawmaybequantified.Infact,itiscompletely
differentfromacaseofinvasionwherethethreattonationalsecuritycomesfromtheoutside.Themartiallaw
declaredbythePresidentwasoccasionedbytheactsofrebellion,subversion,lawlessnessandchaosthatare
widespreadinthecountry.Theirorigin,therefore,isinternal.Therewasnothreatfromwithout,butonlyfrom
within.Buttheseactsoflawlessness,rebellion,andsubversionaremeremanifestationsofmoreserious
civilfunctionariesarenotinapositiontoperformtheirnormaldutiesor,betterstill,toquelllawlessnessand
justifiesitsexistence,andnecessitymeasurestheextentanddegreestowhichitmaybeemployed.Mypoint
merelytakingamilitarymeasuretoquelltherebellionandeliminatinglawlessnessinthecountryandleavehim
withnomeanstocreateanenduringconditionofpeaceandorder,thenweshallhavefailedinprovidinginthis
Constitutionthebasicphilosophyofmartiallawwhich,Iamsure,weareembodyinginitforthegreatpurposeof
preservingtheState.IsaythatthepreservationoftheStateisnotlimitedmerelytoeliminatingthethreatsthat
immediatelyconfrontit.Morethanthat,themeasuretopreservetheStatemustgodeeperintotherootcausesof
thesocialdisorderthatendangerthegeneralsafety.
DELEGATEDEGUZMAN(A.):Ineednotaddmore,Mr.Chairman,totheveryconvincingremarksofmygood
friendandcolleague,RelegateOrtiz.AndItakeit,Mr.Chairman,thatisalsothepositionofthisCommittee.
PRESIDINGOFFICERTUPAZ(A.):Yes,alsoofthisCommittee.
DELEGATEADIL:Justonemorequestion,Mr.Chairman,ifthedistinguishedDelegatefromLaUnionwould
oblige.
authorizessuchproclamation,issetasideorthatatleastsomeprovisionsoftheConstitutionaresuspended?
DELEGATEDEGUZMAN(A.):TheConstitutionisnotsetaside,buttheoperationofsameofitsprovisionsmust,
ofnecessity,berestricted,ifnotsuspended,becausetheircontinuanceisinconsistentwiththeproclamationof
withtheeffectiveandsuccessfulexerciseandimplementationofmartialpowers.Therearecertainindividual
rightswhichmustberestrictedandcurtailedbecausetheirexerciseandenjoymentwouldnegatethe
implementationofmartialauthority.ThepreservationoftheStateanditsConstitutionstandsparamountover
andwhentheoccasionariseswhensuchisatstake,prudencerequiresthatcertainindividualrightsmusthaveto
besacrificedtemporarily.Forindeed,thedestructionoftheConstitutionwouldmeanthedestructionofallthe
detainedbythemilitaryauthorities,Icannotavailofthenormaljudicialprocessestoobtainmylibertyand
DELEGATEDEGUZMAN(A.):IfIamnotmistaken,YourHonor,youarereferringtotheprivilegeofthewritof.
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ofthewritofisipsofactosuspendedand,therefore,ifyouareapprehendedanddetainedbythemilitary
thenyoucannotinvoketheprivilegeofthewritofandaskthecourtstoorderyourtemporaryrelease.The
said,individualrightsassumemeaningandimportanceonlywhentheirexercisecouldbeguaranteedbythe
State,andsuchguarantycannotdefinitelybehadunlesstheStateisinapositiontoassertandenforceits
authority.
onSeptember23,1972,thePresidenthasbeenissuingdecreeswhichareinthenatureofstatutes,regulating,
astheydo,variousandnumerousnormsofconductofboththeprivateandthepublicsectors.Wouldyousay,
YourHonor,thatsuchexerciseoflegislativepowersbythePresidentiswithinhismartiallawauthority?
DELEGATEDEGUZMAN(A.):Certainly,andthatisthepositionofthisCommittee.Asmartiallawadministrator
and,ifImayadd,somejudicialpowerstomeetthemartialsituation.TheChiefExecutivemustnotbeharmstrung
exercisecertainjudicialandlegislativepowerswhichareessentialtoorwhichhavetodowiththequellingof
rebellion,insurrection,imminentdangerthereof,ormeetinganinvasion.Whatappearsdisturbingtome,and
Ministerofpowers,eitherlegislativeorjudicialincharacter,whichhavenothingtodowiththeconditionsof
similardecreeforthatmatter,hasnothingtodowiththeinvasion,insurrection,rebellionorimminentdanger
thereof.Mypoint,YourHonor,isthatthismeasurebasicallyhasnothingtodowiththerestorationofpeaceand
orderorthequellingofrebellionorinsurrection.HowcouldwevalidlysaythatthePresident'sassumptionofsuch
powersisjustifiedbytheproclamationofmartiallaw?
DELEGATEDEGUZMAN(A.):AsIhaverepeatedlystated,YourHonor,wehavenowtoabandonthetraditional
conceptofmartiallawasitisunderstoodinsomeforeigntextbooks.Wehavetolookatmartiallawnotasan
immutableprinciple,Rather,wemustviewitinthelightofourcontemporaryexperienceandnotinisolation
thereof.Thequellingofrebellionorlawlessnessor,inotherwords,therestorationofpeaceandordermay
admittedlybesaidtobetheimmediateobjectiveofmartiallaw,butthatistobegthequestion.Forhowcould
theexerciseofmartialpowersarenotremedied?Youciteasanexamplethedecreeonlandreform.YourHonor
willhavetoadmitthatoneofthemajorcausesofsocialunrestamongpeasantryinoursocietyisthedeplorable
treatmentsocietyhasgiventoourpeasants.Asearlyasthe1930's,thepeasantshavebeenagitatingfor
agrarianreformstotheextentthatduringthetimeofPresidentQuirinotheyalmostsucceededinoverthrowing
puttingdownonepeasantuprisingafteranother,leavingunsolvedthemaladiesthatinthemainbroughtforth
thoseuprisings.Ifwearereallytoestablishanenduringconditionofpeaceandorderandassurethroughthe
providedforintheConstitution,mustpenetratedeeperandseektoalleviateandcuretheillsandtheseething
betweentheexercisebythemartiallawadministratoroflegislativeandjudicialpowersandtheultimateobjective
ofmartiallaw.AndImayaddthatintheultimateanalysis,theonlyknownlimitationtomartiallawpowersisthe
convenienceofthemartiallawadministratorandthejudgmentandverdictofthepeopleand,ofcourse,the
verdictofhistoryitself.
DELEGATELEVISTE(O.):YourHonor,justforpurposeofdiscussion,mayIknowfromyouwhethertherehas
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6/20/2015DELEGATEDEGUZMAN(A.):Iamgladthatyouaskedthatquestion,YourHonor,becauseitseemsthatweare
G.R.No.L35546
oftheimpressionthatsinceitsincorporationintothe1935Constitution,themartiallawprovisionhasneverbeen
availedofbythePresident.Irecall,YourHonor,thatduringtheJapaneseoccupation,PresidentLaurelhad
occasiontodeclaremartiallaw,andIrecallthatwhenPresidentLaureldeclaredmartiallaw,healsoassumed
legislativeandjudicialpowers.Wemust,ofcourse,realizethatduringthetimeofPresidentLaurel,thethreatsto
nationalsecuritywhichprecipitatedthedeclarationcamefromtheoutside.Thethreatstherefore,werenot
internalinoriginandcharacterasthosewhichpromptedPresidentMarcostoissuehishistoricproclamation.If,in
caseaswhathappenedduringthetimeofPresidentLaurelthedeclarationofmartiallawnecessitatedthe
exerciseoflegislativepowersbythemartiallawadministrator,Isaythatgreaternecessitycallsforththeexercise
ofthatpowerwhenthethreatstonationalsecurityareposednotbyinvadersbutbytherebelliousandseditious
elements,bothoftheleftandright,fromwithin.Isaythatbecauseeveryrebellion,whetherinthiscountryorin
otherforeigncountries,isusuallytheproductofsocialunrestanddissatisfactionwiththeestablishedorder.
armsagainstthegovernment.Arebellionisnotbornovernight.Itistheresultofanaccumulationofsocial
itmustsoonererupt.Inthiscontext,thestampingoutofrebellionmustnotbethemainandonlyobjectiveof
capturingtherebelleadersandtheirfollowers,imprisonthemforlifeor,betterstill,killinthefield,butsomeday
newleaderswillpickupthetorchandthetatteredbannersandleadanothermovement.Greatcausesofevery
humanundertakingdonotusuallydiewiththemenbehindthosecauses.Unlesstherootcausesarethemselves
eliminated,therewillbearesurgenceofanotherrebellionand,logicaltheendlessandviciousexerciseofmartial
lawauthority.Thisremindsmeofthewisewordsofanoldmaninourtown:Thatifyouaregoingtoclearyour
fieldofweedsandgrasses,youshouldnotmerelycutthem,butdigthemout.
PRESIDINGOFFICERTUPAZ(A.):WiththeindulgenceoftheGentlemanfromLaUnion,theChairwouldwantto
DELEGATEDEGUZMAN(A.):Thankyou,Mr.Chairman.Infact,Iwasabouttomoveforitafterthegrueling
ItisfortheforegoingreasonsthatIfindcontinuedmartiallawtobeapoliticalquestionunderthenewCharter.
ThepresentConstitutiondoesnotgivetheSupremeCourtanypowerto'cheektheexerciseofasupremely
politicalprerogative.Ifthereisanycheckingorreviewofmartiallaw,theConstitutiongivesit,nottotheSupreme
Court,buttotheNationalAssembly.Ultimately,thecheckingfunctionisvestedinthepeople.Whetherthe
NationalAssemblyexpressesdispleasureandwithdrawsitsconfidencefromthePrimeMinisterthroughelection
ofasuccessororthePrimeMinisterasksthePresidenttodissolvetheNationalAssemblyunderArticleVIII,
Section13,theissueofmartiallawultimatelyrestswiththepeople.Anythingdependentuponthepopularwillis,
ofcourse,political.AlthoughtheinterimNationalAssemblyhasnotyetbeenconvened,theintentofthe
ConstitutionalConventiontomakethequestionpoliticalisclear.
ExclusiveoftheTransitoryProvisions,otherprovisionsofthepresentChartermaybecited.TheBillofRights,
ArticleIV,Section15hadadded"orimminentdangerthereof"tothe1935provision.Itnowreads
SEC.15.Theprivilegeofthewritofshallnotbesuspendedexceptincasesofinvasion,insurrection,rebellion,,
whenthepublicsafetyrequiresit.
habeascorpusorimminentdangerthereof
ArticleIX,Section16,anothernewprovisionreads
SEC.16.AllpowersvestedinthePresidentofthePhilippinesunderthenineteenhundredandthirtyfive
Constitutionandthelawsofthelandwhicharenothereinprovidedfororconferreduponanyofficialshallbe
deemed,andarehereby,vestedinthePrimeMinister,unlesstheNationalAssemblyprovidesotherwise.
AlltheforegoingfeaturesofthenewConstitutionstrengthenanddonotdecreasetheexclusivityandpolitical
natureofthepowertoproclaimmartiallawandtoliftit.
XIV
GRANTINGTHATTHECONTINUATIONOFMARTIALLAWISNOTPOLITICALBUTJUSTICIABLE,ITISSTILL
VALIDUNDERTHETESTOFARBITRARINESS
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Evenifwegrantthatthecontinuationofmartiallawandthedeterminationwhentoliftitarejusticiablein
character,Ourdecisionisstillthesame.CorrectnessofthePresident'sacts,Imustrepeat,isnotthetest.
AssumingthattheCourthasjurisdictiontodeterminewhenmartiallawshouldhelifted,thetestisstill
arbitrariness.
Asidefromassertingthattherewasnobasisfortheinitialproclamationofmartiallaw,thepetitionersinsistthere
isnorealemergencyinthecountrytoday.PetitionerDioknocitesvariousnewspaperitemsreportingstatements
ofthePresidentanddefenseofficials.AmongthemareassurancesofthePresidentthatreservistswon'tundergo
combatduty,statementsofDefenseSecretaryPonceEnrilecitinggainsinpeaceandorder,disclosuresof
commandinggeneralsthattheMindanaorebellioniscrushedandTarlacisnowpeaceful,andreportsfromNueva
Ecijathattherebelbackboneisbroken.(SupplementalPetitionandMotionforImmediateReleasedatedJune29,
1973.)
Thepetitionersassertthatthe"actualstateofwaraspectwasdroppedfromgeneralordersasearlyas
September30,1972andthatthetransformationofaNewSocietyhasbecomethenewtheme.
ItisthesecondpurposethebuildingofaNewSocietythatisnowbeingemphasizedeverywhere.The
instrumentsofmasscommunicationthathavebeenallowedtooftendrumthisthemewithoutceasing.Verylittle
spaceandtimeisdevotednowtotheideaofsavingtheRepublic.Onecan,ofcourse,handlethisdifficultybya
semanticmanipulation,namely,thatthebuildingofaNewSocietyistheonlywayofsavingtheRepublic.
InaManifestationdatedJuly6,1974,petitionerDioknocitesothercircumstancesshowingthatpeaceandorder
conditionsinthecountryarenormal.
1.ThePresidentleftthecountryafewweeksagoforameetingatMenadowithPresidentSuhartoofIndonesia,
somethingheobviouslywouldnothavedoneiftherereallywasanemergency.
2.Touristsandforeigninvestorsarecomingtoourshoresinhordes,notjusttoManilabutalsoitsenvironsand
outlayingprovinces,whichtheywouldcertainlynotdoiftheywerenotassuredofsecurityandstability.
3.Basketball,chess,swimmingandevenkarateinternationaltournamentsarebeingheldinthePhilippines.The
Presidentevenattendedthelatterevent.
4.The1974MissUniversecontestisscheduledtobeheldinManilathismonthwithexpensesinpreparation
thereforamountingtomillionsofpesos.TheGovernmentwouldnothavebeensothoughtlessastospendso
muchmoneyforsuchanunnecessaryaffair,ifthereisreallyan"actualandimminentdangerofinsurrectionand
rebellion."
5.Sincetheproclamationofmartiallaw,thePhilippineshashostedseveralinternationalconferences,thelatest
beingtheUnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramsessionswhichwereattendedbydelegatesandobserversfrom
sixtysix(66)countries,twentysix(26)UnitedNationsAgencies,andtheU.N.D.P.Secretariat.Theeventlast
mentionedbroughtinsomanyvisitorsthatfacilitiesofnolessthanfourteen(14)hotelshadtobeutilized.This
canonlyhappeninacountrywherepeaceandtranquilityprevail.
Thesecircumstances,someborderingonthefrivolous,(TimeMagazine,April15,1974)allconfirmthatthe
conditionsunderwhich"personsmaybedetainedwithoutwarrantbutwithdueprocess"(tousethequotation
frompetitioner'scitedbyrespondents),nolongerexist,ifindeedtheyeverexisted,andthat,therefore,thepower
ofindefinitedetentionclaimedbytheSolicitorGeneralandtherespondentsforthePresidentintheirlasttwo
pleadings,isactuallyandpatently"beyondthepaleofthelawbecauseitisviolativeofthehumanrights
guaranteedbytheConstitution."
coupledwiththePresidentclearandrepeatedassurancesthatthereis"norealemergencytoday"(DailyExpress,June22,
1973)andthat"actuallyWehaveremoved"martiallaw
WhileIbelievethatthecontinuationofastateofmartiallawisapoliticalquestionunderthenewConstitution,
theseargumentsdeserveanswerforthesakeofourpeoplewhowillreadtheCourt'sdecision.
Iamnotconvinced,atthisstageofmartiallawthatthePresidentisactingarbitrarilyinnotliftingtheproclamation.
AManifestationdatedMay13,1974fromtherespondentsstates:
a.PursuanttothePresident'sconstitutionalpowers,functions,andresponsibilitiesinastateofmartiallaw,he
periodicallyrequirestobeconductedacontinuingassessmentofthefactualsituationwhichnecessitatedthe
promulgationofProclamationNo.1081onSeptember21,1972andthecontinuationofmartiallawthrough
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G.R.No.L35546
b.TheGovernment'scurrentandlatestassessmentofthesituation,includingevidenceofthesubversive
theRepublicanditsdulyconstitutedGovernmenthasbeenovercomeandeffectivestepshavebeenandare
beingtakentoredressthecenturiesoldanddeepseatedcausesuponwhichthefiresofinsurrectionand
ofthesituation,thecontinuedthreattopeace,order,andsecurity,thedangerstostablegovernmentandto
arenowengagedintheirnormalpursuits.However,thePresidenthasdeemedthat,consideringtheoverall
situationdescribedaboveandinviewofadequateevidencewhichcannotnowbedeclassified,thecontinued
necessaryintheinterestofnationalsecurityanddefensetoenabletheGovernmenttosuccessfullymeetthe
gravethreatsofrebellionandinsurrection.Inthisregard,theSecretaryofNationalDefenseandhisauthorized
representativeshaveactedinaccordancewithguidelinesrelatingtonationalsecuritywhichthePresidenthas
prescribed.
ThePresidentbelievesthatthecontinuedthreattopeaceandorder,thedangerstostablegovernmentand
democraticinstitutionsandtheactualandimminentdangerofinsurrectionandrebellionrequirecontinuationof
martiallaw.Thisfindingisbasedonacontinuingassessmentofthefactualsituationwhichresultedin
ProclamationNo.1081.Ontheotherhand,petitionersbelieveotherwise.
Intheexerciseofjudicialreview,onereasonablemindassessingthefactualsituationnowobtainingcould
probablyagreewiththepetitioners.Anotherreasonablemind,however,viewingthesamefactualsituationcould
veryunderstandablyarriveatanoppositeconclusion.AssumingWehavethePower,Weshouldnottrytoweigh
evidenceoneithersideanddeterminewhoiscorrectandwhoiswrong.Asstatedearlier,thetestofvalidityis
arbitrarinessandnotcorrectnessIdonotdoubtthePresident'ssincerityandgoodfaithinmakingthe
determinationoutlinedintherespondent'sManifestation.Therecan,therefore,benofindingthatheisacting
arbitrarilyinnotliftingmartiallaw.
The"evidence"presentbypetitionerDioknoweakenshisarguments.If,asheclaims,themassmediaare
controlled,thenewsitemsonrebellionthathecitesshouldnotbeaccordedstrongprobativevalue.Itispossible
thatthenewsaboutrebelsandinsurrectionistactivitiesisdeliberatelyplayeddownaspartofthepeaceandorder
campaignundermartiallaw.Thenewscouldbeintendedtoconvincethosewhomaywaverbetweenseeking
amnestyorprolongingtherebelliontotakethefirstcourseofaction.
Infact,thereisoverwhelminglyagreaternumberofreasonablemenandwomenwhoagree,withthePresident's
findingsthanwiththepetitioners'convictions.OnJuly27,1973andJuly28,1973,votersinanationalreferendum
wereaskedDoyouwantPresidentMarcostocontinuebeyond1973andfinishthereformshehasinitiated
undermartiallaw?TheCommissiononElectionshasreportedthat18,505,216votersanswered"Yes"and
1,856,744voted"No".Thevoteofthe18,505,216peoplefromallpartsofthecountrywhoanswered"Yes"can
clearlybeinterpretedassustainingthefindingthatthePresidentisnotactingarbitrarily.Infact,itcanbereadin
nootherwaybuttoconfirmeventhecorrectnessofthePresident'sdeterminationonthecontinuingneedfor
martiallaw.Andsinceotherreferendaareforthcoming,amorereliablegaugeofarbitrarinessandcorrectness
thanpressclippingsisavailabletoourpeopleastheyjudgethePresident.
Thepetitioners,inurgingthisCourttodecidethepetitionsandtodecidethemintheirfavor,raisethealarmthat
unlessWedoso,Wemayneverheabletodecideatall.Wearewarnedthat"inthefaceofanassaultonthe
Judiciary,itwouldberidiculous,ifitwerenottragic,ifthisCourtdidnotevensomuchasdefenditself....Inthe
faceofadismantlingoftheentireconstitutionalorderofwhichtheJudiciaryisavital,indispensablepart,howcan
itevenaffordtheluxuryofacquiescenceinitsownruin?Andhowcanitcontinuetoinspirethehighrespectofthe
people,ifitmerelyindulgesinsculpturedrhetoricandfailstoprotecttheircivillibertiesinlive,concretepetitions
suchasthis?"(ReplyMemorandumforPetitionersdatedNovember30,1972,page40).Thepetitionersspeakof
"constitutionalsuicide"(,p.60)andallegethat"thegloomdeepensandisencircling,andonlyafewlightsremain.
OneremaininglightisthatprovidedbythisSupremeTribunal.Theentirenationnowlooksinitsdirectionand
prayerfullyhopesitwillcontinueburning"(,p.81).
Ibidibid
Idonotsharethesamedoomsdayimpressionsaboutmartiallaw.Mydecisionisbasednotaloneonmysincere
convictionaboutwhattheConstitutioncommandsandwhattherelevantconstitutionalprovisionsmean.Happily,
myreadingoftheConstitutionasalegaldocumentcoincideswithwhatIfeelisright,morallyandconscience
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6/20/2015wise,forourcountryandpeople.Itconfirmsmylifelongconvictionthatthereisindeedwisdom,profundityand
G.R.No.L35546
evengeniusintheseeminglyshortanduncomplicatedprovisionsofourfundamentallaw.
XV
MARTIALLAWANDTHESUSPENSIONOFTHEWRITOFHABEASCORPUS
Anotherissueintheinstantpetitionsiswhethertheprivilegeofthewritofissuspendeduponaproclamationof
martiallaw.Theanswerisobviouslyintheaffirmative.
habeascorpus
Theproclamationofmartiallawisconditionedontheoccurrenceofthegravestcontingencies.Theexerciseofa
moreabsolutepowernecessarilyincludesthelesserpowerespeciallywhereitisneededtomakethefirstpower
effective."Thesuspensionenablestheexecutive,withoutinterferencefromthecourtsorthelawtoarrestand
imprisonpersonsagainstwhomnolegalcrimecanbeprovedbutwhomay,nevertheless,beeffectivelyengaged
inmorningtherebellionorinvitingtheinvasion,totheimminentdangerofthepublicsafety."(Barcelonv.Baker,5
Phil.87,112).Itwouldnegatetheeffectivityofmartiallawifdetaineescouldgotothecourtsandaskforrelease
underthesamegroundsandfollowingthesameproceduresobtaininginnormaltimes.ThePresidentinthe
dispositiveparagraphofProclamationNo.1081orderedthatallpersonspresentlydetainedorotherswhomay
thereafterbesimilarlydetainedforthecrimesofinsurrectionandrebellionandallothercrimesandoffenses
committedinfurtheranceorontheoccasionorinconnectiontherewithshallbekeptunderdetentionuntil
otherwiseorderedreleasedbyhimorhisdulydesignatedrepresentative.UnderGeneralOrderNo.2A,the
Presidentorderedthearrestandtakingintocustodyofcertainindividuals.GeneralOrderNo.2Adirectsthat
thesearrestedindividualswillbeheldincustodyuntilotherwiseorderedbythePresidentorhisdulydesignated
representative.ThesegeneralordersclearlyshowthatthePresidentwasprecludingcourtexaminationintothese
specifiedarrestsandcourtordersdirectingreleaseofdetainedindividuals.
Martiallawisintendedtoovercomethedangersfromrebellionorinsurrection.Thepurposewouldbesubvertedif
martiallawisdeclaredandyetindividualscommittingactsofdirectrebellionandinsurrectionoractswhichfurther
thegoalsoftherebelscannotbedetainedwithoutfilingcharges.IfthePresidentdecidestoproclaimmartiallaw
andtouseallthemilitaryforcesofthePhilippinestopreservetheRepublicandsafeguardtheinterestsofthe
people,itissophistrytostatethatthelesserpowerofsuspendingtheprivilegeofthewritofisnotincluded.This
isespeciallytruewhere,asinthesecases,thePresidenthasspecificallyorderedthedetentionwithoutfilingof
chargesofindividualswhofurtherormightfurthertherebellion.ThisappearsclearfromProclamationNo.1081
itselfandfrompertinentgeneralordersissuedpursuanttoit.
habeascorpus
XVI
THEEFFECTOFARTICLEXVII,SEC3(2)OFTHENEWCONSTITUTION
Thereisanotherreasonfordenyingtheinstantpetitions.
ArticleXIISection3,Subsection(2)ofthepresentConstitution(ratifiedonJanuary17,1973)hasatransitory
provisionwhichreads:
(2)Allproclamations,orders,decrees,instructions,andactspromulgated,issued,ordonebytheincumbent
ofmartiallawortheratificationofthisConstitution,unlessmodified,revoked,orsupersededbysubsequent
proclamations,orotheractsoftheincumbentPresident,orunlessexpresslyandexplicitlymodifiedorrepealedby
theregularNationalAssembly.
TRANSCRIPTOFTHEPROCEEDINGSOFTHE166MANSPECIALCOMMITTEE
MEETINGNo.33NOVEMBER26,1972
ItisnotedfromtheforegoingthatallproclamationsandordersofthePresident,specificallyProclamationNo.
1081andtherelevantordersanddecreesaffectingthehereinpetitionersandotherssimilarlysituated,arebythe
expresswordsoftheConstitution,partofthelawoftheland.Infact,thetransitoryprovisionconsidersthemvalid,
legal,bindingandeffectiveevenafterliftingofmartiallawortheratificationofthisConstitution.Theyarevalidnot
onlyattheinceptionofbutalsoduringmartiallaw.Onlyanexpressandexplicitmodificationorrepealbythe
regularNationalAssemblymaymodify,revoke,andsupersedetheproclamations,orders,decrees,instructionsor
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6/20/2015otheractsoftheincumbentPresidentundermartiallaw.Thistransitoryprovisiondoesnot,asmanypeople
G.R.No.L35546
believe,merelyvalidateProclamationNo.1081.Thissectionconfirmsthevalidityoftheproclamationunderthe
oldConstitutionanditscontinuingvalidityundertheNewConstitution.TheConstitutionalConventionconcurred
withthePresidentanddeclaredthattheproclamationwasvalidlyissuedundertheoldCharterandcontinuesto
beconstitutionalunderthenewConstitution.Onthebasisoftheconstitutionalprovisionalone,thedeclarationof
martiallawunderProclamationNo.1081may,therefore,bejustifiedandvalidated.Similarly,theordersofthe
Presidentonthecontinueddetentionofthepetitionersand,ineffect,thesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritof
havebeendefinitelydeclaredvalidandconstitutional.
habeascorpus
IwishtoaddthatwiththeabovecitedportionoftheTransitoryProvision,theConstitutionalConventionwantedto
forecloseanyconstitutionalattackonthevalidityof"allproclamations,orders,decrees,instructions,andacts
promulgated,issued,ordonebytheincumbentPresident"mentionedtherein.Asamatteroffact,duringthe
discussionsofthisportionoftheTransitoryProvisionbeforethe166manspecialcommittee,formedtofinally
drafttheConstitutionofwhichIwasamember,(beingtheViceChairmanofthepaneloffloorleaders),answering
aqueryfromDelegateLeviste,DelegatePacificadorsaid:
BytheprovisionsofSubsection2,wearerenderingthedecreesoftheincumbentPresidentasmorethan
merestatutes.Weareconstitutingthemashighlypoliticalacts,thevalidityofwhichcannotbeinquiredinto
evenbyourcourts,butareappealableonlytothepeoplethemselves.Therewillbenootherwayof
revokingorrepealingsuchdecreesexceptbythetwowaysmentionedinSubsection2ofSection3.
Justifyingmartiallawandthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritofbycitingthetransitoryprovisionsofthe
presentConstitutionleadstoanotherargumentinthepetitions.AccordingtopetitionerDiokno,thestatementsin
thedispositiveportionofthedecisionintheratificationcasesthat"thereisnofurtherjudicialobstacletothenew
Constitutionbeingconsideredinforceandeffect"isclearlynotarulingthattheNewConstitutionislegallyinforce
andeffect.PetitionerDioknostresseshowcarefullytheCourthaschosenitslanguage.Accordingtohim,the
Courtdoesnotsaythatthereisnofurtherobstacleandthatitsaysmerelythatthereisnofurtherobstacle.
Petitionerfindsaworldofdifferencebetweenalegalandajudicialobstacle.Everyillegalact,accordingtohim,is
barredbyalegalobstaclebutnotnecessarilybyajudicialobstacle.ThepetitionerpointsoutthattheCourtdoes
notstatethatthenewConstitutionisinforceandeffect.ItmerelyspeaksofthenewConstitutioninforceandin
effect.Heallegesthatbetween"being"and"beingconsidered",thereisagainaworldofdifference.Fromthe
decisionoftheSupremeCourtintheratificationcases,thepetitionerbelievesthattheCourtwastryingtomakeit
asplainascircumstancespermittedthatithadnotdecidedthatthenewConstitutionislegallyandfactuallyin
force.
habeascorpuslegaljudicialpersebeingconsidered
Otherpleadingssubmittedinthesecaseshaveraisedbasicallythesamemajorissuesthatwereraisedinthe
ratificationcasesalreadydecidedbytheCourt.
Tomymind,thedispositiveportionoftheSupremeCourt'sdecisionisbestinterpretedbytheSupremeCourt
itself.Noamountofargumentation,submissionofpleadings,playofwords,andsemanticnicetiescanovercome
orignorethefactthattheSupremeCourtisinterpretingandapplyingthenewConstitution.Themembershave
takenanoathtodefendthisnewConstitution.Bybothactionandwords,allthemembersofthisCourthavemade
itplainbeyondanyshadowofdoubtthatthenewConstitutionislegallyandfactuallyinforce.Thejusticesofthis
Courtwouldbethelastpersonstointerpretandenforcesomethingtheydonotconsidervalid,legitimate,and
effective.ItisnotalonethetakingofanoathtosupportanddefendthenewConstitutionthatindicatesclearly
whattheCourtmeantwhenitrenderedthe(L36142)decision.Themeaningofthedecisionisquiteclearfrom
thefactthattheCourthasbeenenlargedbeyonditsearliercomposition.Ithasreorganizeditselfintotwo
divisions.EachdivisionisnowtryingcasespursuanttotheNewConstitution.Allcourtsareunderthe
administrativesupervisionoftheSupremeCourt.AnexaminationofdecisionsrenderedbytheCourtsincethe
decisionwillshowthatthereisconstantreferencetothe1973Constitution.Itsprovisionsformthebasisforits
authoritytointerpretandexpoundonthelaws.WheneveraprovisionoftheConstitutionisinvoked,theCourt
turnstothe1973ConstitutionasthepresentConstitution.Icanseenoclearerinterpretationofadecisionofthis
CourtthanthesevariousactsoftheCourtitself.
Javellanavs.ExecutiveSecretaryJavellanavs.ExecutiveSecretary
XVII
AFEWOTHERPOINTS
ThereareafewotherpointswhichIwouldliketoanswerbriefly.PetitionerFrancisco'Soc'Rodrigostatesthat
whilehewasreleasedfromdetentiononDecember5,1972,hisreleaseisconditionalandsubjecttosome
restrictions.HeisnotallowedtoleavetheconfinesoftheGreaterManilaareaunlessspecificallyauthorizedby
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6/20/2015themilitary.Hestatesthathispetitionforisnotmootandacademiccauseofhisrelease.
G.R.No.L35546
habeascorpus
ConsideringmyopinionontheconstitutionalityofProclamationNo.1081,itfollowsthatthereleaseofpetitioners
JoseW.DioknoandBenignoS.Aquinomaynotbeordered.Thepetitionsfortheirrelease,asinthecaseof
detaineesalreadyreleased,mustbedirectedtothePresident.
*Ifsuchisthecasewithpetitionerswhoareactuallydetainedandconfined,withmorereasonshouldtheprincipleshereinenunciatedapplytothoseno
longerconfinedordetained.
2.InG.R.L35539,CarmenI.Diokno,inbehalfofherhusband,JoseW.Diokno,petitioner:
InthecaseofformerSenatorBenignoS.Aquino,criminalchargeshavebeenfiledagainsthim.Asarule,a
petitionforthewritofissatisfactorilyansweredbyashowingthataprisonerisdetainedonthebasisofvalid
criminalcharges.However,petitionerAquinochallengesthejurisdictionofthemilitarytribunalandthevalidityof
thechargesfiledagainsthim.
habeascorpus
Therefore,insofarasallissuesinthecaseofNo.2,L37364,whicharecommontotheissuesintheseinstant
petitionsareconcerned,thisdecisionapplies.OnanyotherissuenotcommontotheissuesinthesePetitions,I
amreservingmyopinionforL37364.
BenignoS.Aquinovs.MilitaryCommission
XVIII
THEREMEDIESAGAINSTCLEARABUSEOFPOWER
Thegeneralremedyagainstanarbitrary,whimsical,orcapriciousexerciseofthemartiallawpowerofthe
President,asitistheremedyonallpoliticalquestions,isthevoiceofthepeopleinanelectionwhenoneisheld,
orthroughtheBarangayswhichthePresidenthimselfhasconsultedintheJuly27and28,1973referendumon
whetherthepeoplewantedPresidentMarcostocontinuebeyond1973andfinishthereformshehasinitiated
undermartiallaw.ThePresidenthasofficiallyannouncedanumberoftimesthathewouldconsultwiththe
Barangaysperiodically.Underthisremedy,thepeople,intheexerciseoftheirsovereignpower,canbasetheir
decision,notonlyonwhethertheactsofthePresidenthasbeenarbitrary,whimsical,orcapricioustheycanbase
theirdecisiononabroaderbasisandthatiswhether,intheirownopinion,thePresidentactedcorrectlyornot.
Orifandwhentheinterimassemblyisconvened,amajorityofthemembersthereof,asrepresentativesofthe
people,canalsoremedyanarbitrary,whimsical,capricious,orevenanunwiseexerciseofthepower,byso
advisingthePrimeMinistertoliftmartiallawunderpainofbeingdeposedasPrimeMinister.
Aswedeclaretheproclamationandthecontinuationofmartiallawpoliticalandthereforenonjusticiableinnature,
Weareonlyacknowledgingtheconstitutionallimitationofthatpowertojusticiablequestionsonly,justaswehad
definedtheconstitutionallimitationsofthepowersofCongressandoftheExecutive.Astheinterpreterofthe
Constitution,theCourthastoleadinrespectingitsboundaries.
OurjurisprudenceisrepletewithexampleswherethisCourtexerciseditsjudicialpowerinappropriatecases
(Avelinovs.Cuenco,83Phil.17Aranetavs.Dinglasan,84Phil.368NationalistsPartyvs.Bautista,85Phil.101
Rodriguezvs.Gella,92Phil.603Ruttervs.Esteban,93Phil.68Aytonavs.Castillo,4SCRA533,tonameonly
thefew),whichshouldmorethanprovethatnomatterhowgraveorurgent,delicateorformidableandnovelor
uncommonalegalproblemis,theCourtwillknowwhenandhowtoresolveit.Specifically,itwillknowwhattodo
if,aspetitionersfear,aPresidentmaysomedaywakeupandoutoftheblueproclaimmartiallaw.Ofcourse,this
isalreadyalmostanimpossibilityundertheparliamentarysystemestablishedbytheNewConstitution.
XIX
CONCLUSION
Thevoluminouspleadingsandthelengthyargumentssupportingthepetitionsaregenerallycouchedinerudite
andeloquentlanguage.Itisregrettablethattheyhavebeentaintedinanumberofinstanceswithfrenziedand
bitingstatementsindicativeofasenseofexasperation.Iamcertain,however,thatthesestatementscannotaffect
thehighsenseofimpartialityofthemembersoftheCourtastheygivetheiropinioninthesecases.
ThePresidentisthehighestelectiveofficialinthecountry.Itwasnocasualorperfunctorychoicewhichelevated
himtotheposition.Itishisduty,nolessthanthatofthisCourt,tosavetheRepublicfromtheperilsofrebellion
andinsurrection.Inordertopreservepublicsafetyandgoodorder,hehasbeenforcedtoproclaimastateof
martiallaw.Toinsurethecontinuationofcivilianauthorityanddemocraticinstitutions,hehasutilizedthearmed
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6/20/2015forcestoquellthearmedchallengeandtoremedytheancientevilsuponwhichrebellionandinsurrectionflourish.
G.R.No.L35546
ThepetitionersdisputethePresident'sdeterminationandquestionhismotives.Tothemtheexerciseofhis
constitutionalpowersisanabuseofexecutivepowersandassumptionofadictatorship.Inasmuchasthereal
reasonfortheimpositionofmartiallaw,accordingtopetitionerDiokno,isnottopreservethenationbuttokeep
thePresidentinpower,thereisonlyonedecisiontheCourtshouldmake.ItshouldinvalidateProclamationNo.
1081.Thedireconsequencesaregivenbythepetitionereventualresorttoarms,sheddingofblood.
destructionofpropertyandirreparablelossofinvaluableliveswhich,ofcourse,arethesameconsequence
soughttobeavoidedwhenmartiallawwasproclaimed.
TheSupremeCourtmaybethehighestcourtoftheland.Itisnot,however,asuperBeingoverandabovethe
Executive,theLegislatureandtheConstitution,decidingcasesonaninfalliblesenseofTruthandafacultyof
divination.Principlesofliberty,right,andjusticearenotinterpretedinanabstractanddogmaticform.Theyare
appliedinthemannerthesovereignpeopleadoptedourinstitutionsofgovernmentandformulatedourwritten
Constitution.
TheSupremeCourtcanruleontheproclamationofmartiallawonlyinsofarasitsvalidityundertheConstitutionis
raisedasanissue.IftheConstitution,astheexpressionofsovereignwill,veststhedeterminationofthenecessity
formartiallawinthePresident,theCourtshallsodeclareandrespectit.
However,thedeterminationofthewisdomortheproprietyoftheproclamationmustrestwiththepeople.Wisdom
andproprietyinthemakingofsupremelypoliticaldecisionsandintheexerciseofpoliticalfunctionsareforthe
peopletoassessanddetermine.Underourconstitutionalformofgovernment,noofficialordepartmentcan
effectivelyexerciseapowerunlessthepeoplesupportit.Reviewbythepeoplemaynotbeasclearcutand
frequentasjudicialreviewbutitisactual,present,andmostaffective.
TheconstitutionalprocessandtheruleoflawareinterpretedandenforcedbytheSupremeCourtbuttheir
viabilityandstrengthdependonthesupportandfaithofthepeople.Consequently,ifourpeopleallowthesystem
ofgovernmenttobechanged,nopronouncementsofthisCourtcanreversethechangeortoppleanalleged
dictatorfrompower.Onlythepeoplecandoit.
Fortunately,thetrendofpresenteventsclearlyshowsthatmartiallaw,insteadofdestroyingconstitutional
governmentasadvancedbythepetitioners,is,infact,savingandstrengtheningit.
WHEREFORE,Ivotetorenderjudgment:(1)TogranttheDioknomotiontowithdrawhispetitionfor
habeascorpus
(2)DeclaringthatthedecisiontoproclaimmartiallawisapoliticalquestionandtheCourtmaynotexaminethe
groundsuponwhichProclamationNo.1081isbasedgrantingthattheCourtmaydoso,thereissufficient
constitutionalfactualbasisforthesameandcertainlythePresidenthasnotactedarbitrarily,whimsicallyor
capriciouslyinissuingtheProclamationthatonbothgrounds,saidProclamationNo.1081isconstitutional
(3)Declaringthattheprivilegeofthewritofisipsofactosuspendeduponaproclamationofmartiallawandin
effect,GeneralOrderNo.2Asuspendedsaidprivilege
habeascorpus
(4)Declaringthatthecontinuationofthestateofmartiallawissimilarlyapoliticalquestionandthatitisforthe
PresidentorthePrimeMinister,undertheNewConstitution,todeterminewhenitmaybeliftedandgrantingthat
thisCourtmayexaminethefactualbasisforthecontinuationofmartiallaw,Wefindsufficientbasisforthesame
and
(5)Dismissingthevariouspetitionsforthewritofofpetitionersstilldetained,orunder"communityarrest,"within
theGreaterManilaarea,withoutcosts.
habeascorpus
MUOZPALMA,
J.:
Re"MotiontoWithdrawPetition"datedDecember29,1973:
IshallexplainwhyIvotedto.Ibelievethatapetitionforbasicallyinvolvesthelifeandlibertyofthepetitioner,and,ifforreasonsofhisownthewisdom
and/orcorrectnessofwhicharebestlefttohimtodeterminehedesirestowithdrawthesameandleavehispresentconditionofindefinitedetentionasit
is,suchishisrightwhichIasafellowhumanbeingandasamagistrateofthelawshouldnotdenyhim.Mydistinguishedcolleagueswhooptedtodeny
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said"MotiontoWithdraw"arguemainlythattograntthemotionofpetitionerDioknoisfortheCourttoacceptthetruthofhisallegationsanddenyitselfthe
6/20/2015opportunitytoactonandresolvethebasicissuesraisedinthePetitionforwhichissuesareof"utmostpublicimportance"andinvolve"theverylifeand
G.R.No.L35546
existenceofthepresentGovernmentunderthenewConstitution."WhatIcansayisthattheotherPetitionsfornowbeingdecidedjointlyinthisDecision
affordaforumwherethelegalandconstitutionalquestionspresentedinDiokno'spetitioncanverywellhediscussed,dissectedtotheirminutesdetails,and
decidedbytheCourt.WhatconcernsthiswritermostisthatthethrustofDiokno'smotiontowithdrawishisbeliefthathe"cannotreasonablyexpecteither
rightorreason,laworjustice"fromthisCourtitbeinganewCourtunderthenewConstitution,adifferentCourtfromtheSupremeCourttowhichhe
originallyappliedforhisrelease.grantthemotionhabeascorpushabeascorpushabeascorpus 1 Inplainandsimplelanguage,petitionerDiokno
isbereftoffaithinthisCourtandprefersthathisfatebeleftundecidedwhoarewethentoimposeourwillonhimandforce
himtolitigateunderacloudofdistrustwherehislifeandlibertyareinextricablyinvolved?Justasloveisanemotionwhich
springsspontaneouslyfromtheheartandnevercoercedintoexistence,soalsoisfaith,trust,bornandnurturedinfreedom
andneverundercompulsion.Thus,todenypetitionerDiokno'smotionistocompelhimtohavefaithinthisCourtcanwe
dosowhenfaithhastobeearned,andcannotbeforcedintobeing?Hence,myvote.
OntheMeritsofthePetition
BecausepetitionerDiokno's"MotiontoWithdrawPetition"wasconsidereddeniedasonlysevenJusticesvotedto
grantit,
2andhisPetitionforwastobedecidedonitsmerits,andatthetimeofthewritingofthisOpinionDioknowasincustodyfor
almosttwoyearswithoutchargeshavingbeenfiledagainsthim,IresolvedtotreathisPetitiondifferentlyfromthatofthe
otherpetitionerswho,duringthependencyofthesecases,wereconditionallyreleasedfromtheprisoncampsof
respondents.However,aftercompletionofmyOpinionbutbeforetheDecisioninthesecasescouldbepromulgatedon
September12,1974,asscheduled,PresidentFerdinandE.Marcosorderedthereleaseofpetitioner,JoseW.Diokno,on
September11,1974.habeascorpus *ThisdevelopmentledtheCourttodismissthePetitionofJoseW.Dioknoforhavingbecomemootand
academic,andforcedmetorevisemyOpinionasitbecameunnecessarytodiscusstheissueofDiokno'scontinueddetention.
THEFACTS
OnSeptember21,1972,PresidentFerdinandE.MarcossignedwhatisnowknownasProclamationNo.1081
proclaimingastateofmartiallawinthePhilippines,basedinteraliaonthefollowingconsideration:
...therebellionandarmedactionundertakenbytheselawlesselementsofthecommunistandotherarmed
aggrupationsorganizedtooverthrowtheRepublicofthePhilippinesbyarmedviolenceandforcehaveassumed
themagnitudeofanactualstateofwaragainstourpeopleandtheRepublicofthePhilippines
TheProclamationthusconcluded:
uponmebyArticleVII,Section10,Paragraph(2)oftheConstitution,doand,inmycapacityastheircommander
inchief,doherebycommandthearmedforcesofthePhilippines,tomaintainlawandorderthroughoutthe
direction.
herebyplacetheentirePhilippinesasdefinedinArticleI,Section1oftheConstitutionundermartiallaw
Inaddition,,aswellthecrimesofinsurrectionorrebellion,andallothercrimesandoffensescommittedin
furtheranceorontheoccasionthereof,orincidentthereto,orin,connectiontherewith,forcrimesagainstnational
willbeenumeratedinOrdersthatIshallsubsequentlypromulgate,aswellascrimesasaconsequenceofany
violationofanydecree,orderorregulationpromulgatedbymepersonallyorpromulgateduponmydirectionuntil
otherwiseorderedreleasedbymeorbymydulydesignatedrepresentative.(emphasissupplied)
Idoherebyorderthatallpersonpresentlydetainedasallotherswhomayhereafterbesimilarlydetainedforshallbekeptunderdetention
OnSeptember22,GeneralOrderNo.1wasissuedfromwhichwequote:
WHEREAS,martiallawhasbeendeclaredunderProclamationNo.1081datedSept.21,1972andisnowineffect
throughouttheland
xxxxxxxxx
NOW,THEREFORE,I,FerdinandE.Marcos,PresidentofthePhilippines,byvirtueofthepowersvestedinmeby
theConstitutionasCommanderinChiefoftheArmedForcesofthePhilippines,doherebyproclaimthatIshall
governthenationanddirecttheoperationoftheentireGovernment,includingallitsagenciesand
instrumentalities,inmycapacityandshallexerciseallthepowersandprerogativesappurtenantandincidentto
mypositionassuchCommanderinChiefofallthearmedforcesofthePhilippines.
AlsoonSeptember22,GeneralOrderNo.2wassignedbythePresidentwhichprovided:
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G.R.No.L35546
PursuanttoProclamationOrderNo.1081,datedSeptember21,1972,andinmycapacityasCommander
inChiefofalltheArmedForcesofthePhilippines,IasSecretaryofNationalDefensetoandtheindividuals
namedintheattachedlistsforbeingintheconspiracytoseizepoliticalandstatepowerinthecountryand
totakeoverthegovernmentbyforce,theextentofwhichhasnowassumedtheproportionofanactualwar
againstourpeopleandourlegitimategovernmentandinordertopreventthemfromfurthercommitting
actsthatareinimicalorinjurioustoourpeople,thegovernmentandournationalinterest,andtoholdsaid
individualsuntilotherwisesoorderedbymeorbymydulydesignatedrepresentative.(emphasissupplied).
herebyorderyouforthwitharresttakeintoyourcustodyparticipantsorhavinggivenaidandcomfort
ImplementingGeneralOrderNo.2,respondentSecretaryofNationalDefense,Hon.JuanPonceEnrile,
immediatelyeffectedthearrestofagoodnumberofindividualsamongwhomwerethehereinpetitionerswho,by
reasonoftheirarrestwithoutchargeshavingbeenfiledagainstthem,cametothisCourttoseekreliefthrough
theirrespectivePetitionsfor,theearliestofwhich,L35538,wasfiledinthemorningofSeptember23,1972.
habeascorpus 4 TheCourtintherespectivePetitionspromptlyissuedtheWritreturnabletoit,andrequiredrespondentsto
answer.Withequaldispatchrespondentsfiledtheir"ReturntoWritandAnswertothePetition"inallthecaseswhich
containedacommon"SpecialandAffirmativeDefenses"readingasfollows:
4.OnSeptember21,1972,thePresidentofthePhilippines,intheexerciseofthepowersvestedinhimbyArticle
VII,section10,paragraph2oftheConstitution,issuedProclamationNo.1081placingtheentirePhilippinesunder
martiallaw
5.Pursuanttosaidproclamation,thePresidentissuedGeneralOrdersNos.1,2,3,3A,4,5,6,and7andLetters
ofInstructionsNos.1,2and3.Truecopiesofthesedocumentsareheretoattachedandmadeintegralparts
hereofasAnnexes2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,and11.AcopyofthePresident'sstatementtothecountryon
September23,1972isalsoattachedasAnnex12
6.Finally,thepetitionstatesnocauseofaction.(p.21,rolloL35546)
TheAnswerprayedthatthepetitionbedismissed.
PendingresolutionofthesePetitions,petitioners,exceptfortwo,werereleasedfromcustodyondifferentdates
undera"ConditionalRelease"Orderofthesametenorasthefollowing:
*
5December1972
1.AfterhavingbeenarrestedanddetainedforsubversionpursuanttoProclamationNo.1081ofthe
PresidentofthePhilippinesinhiscapacityasCommanderinChiefoftheArmedForcesofthePhilippines,
dated21September1972,youareherebyconditionallyreleased.
2.YouareadvisedtoabidestrictlywiththeprovisionsofProclamationNo.1081andtheensuingLOIs.Any
violationoftheseprovisionswouldsubjectyoutoimmediate(ly)arrestandconfinement.
3.Yourinvestigationwillcontinuefollowingaschedulewhichyouwilllateronbeinformed.Youareadvised
tofollowthisschedulestrictly.
4.YouarenotallowedtoleavetheconfinesofGreaterManilaAreaunlessspecificallyauthorizedbythis
Officeindicatingtheprovincialaddressandexpecteddurationofstaythereat.Contactthisofficethrough
telephoneNo.971756whennecessary.
5.Youareprohibitedfromgivingorparticipatinginanyinterviewconductedbyanylocalorforeignmass
mediarepresentativeforpurposeofpublicationand/orradio/TVbroadcast.
PLEDGE
346/374
6/20/2015
IHEREBYPLEDGEtoconductmyselfaccordinglyandwillnotengageinanysubversiveactivity.Iwill
G.R.No.L35546
immediatelyreportanysubversiveactivitythatwillcometomyknowledge.
(SGD.)F.RODRIGO
Address:60JuanaRodriguezQuezonCity
Tel.No.702566704920702755
(p.621,rolloL35546)
Notwithstandingtheirreleasefromdetention,petitionersconcerneddidnotwithdrawtheirrespectivePetitionsfor,
whilepetitionerFranciscoRodrigofiledaManifestationdatedNovember27,1973statingthathisreleasedidnot
renderhisPetitionmootandacademic.(p.620,rolloL35546)Thetwopetitionerswhohavenotbeenreleased
uptothepresentareSenatorBenignoS.Aquino,Jr.againstwhominthemeantimecertaincriminalchargeshave
beenfiledwithMilitaryCommissionNo.2andSenatorJoseW.Dioknowhohasnotbeenchargedneitherbefore
acivilcourtnoramilitarytribunalorcommission.
habeascorpus *
THEISSUES
Thesepetitionsbeingessentiallyfortheissuanceofthewritoftheistheofthedetentionofpetitioners,andwhenwesay
detention,thatincludesthestateofthosepetitionerswhohavebeenconditionallyreleasedfromtheprisoncampsof
respondentforitisclaimedthattheirconditionalreleasestillconstitutesarestraintontheirpersonalliberty.habeas
corpusfundamentalissuelegality
Thepurposeofthewritofistoinquireintothecauseorreasonwhyapersonisbeingrestrainedofhisliberty
againsthiswill,andifthereisnolegaland/orvalidjustificationshownforsuchrestraintthewritwillforthwithissue
torestoretothatpersonhislibertyorfreedom.It"existsasaspeedyandeffectualremedytorelievepersons
fromunlawfulrestraint,andasthebestandonlysufficientdefenseofpersonalfreedom...whoseprincipal
purposeistosettheindividualatliberty."
habeascorpus5Notedauthorshaveeloquentlydescribedthewritas"thewritofliberty",6as"themostimportantandmost
immediatelyavailablesafeguardofthatliberty",7as"thegreatestofthesafeguardserectedbythecivillawagainstarbitrary
andillegalimprisonmentbywhomsoeverdetentionmaybeexercisedorordered",8andas"thegreatbulwarkofpersonal
liberty."9Theseconceptsofthewritofbringouttheblessedsacredtruththatpersonallibertyisoneofthebasicfreedoms
ofmanjealouslyprotectedbyanycivilizedsocietybyafundamentallaw,writtenorunwritten,andanydeprivationor
curtailmentofthatpersonallibertymustfindabasisinlaw,substantiveorprocedural.habeascorpus10Inthepetitions
underconsiderationrespondentsjustifythearrestanddetentionofpetitionersbyvirtueoftheproclamationofmartiallawin
thecountry.Respondentsaver(1)thattheexerciseofthepowergrantedtothePresidentoftheRepublicbySee.10(2),
Art.VIIofthe1935PhilippineConstitution,toplacethecountryoranypartthereofundermartiallaw,isnotsubjectto
judicialreview(2)thatevenifsaidexecutivepowermaybeinquiredinto,thereisfactualbasesforthePresident'saction
and(3)thattheproclamationofmartiallawcarrieswithittheautomaticsuspensionofthewritofandconsequentlythese
petitionsshouldbedismissed.habeascorpus11WiththenewConstitutionhavingbeenadoptedinthemeantime,
respondentsposeinsubsequentpleadingsadditionalgroundsfordismissal,andtheseare:(1)thatArt.IX,Sec.12,ofthe
1973ConstitutionadoptedintototheCommanderinChiefclauseofthe1935Constitution,and(2)thatArt.XVII,section3
(2)expresslyandcategoricallydeclaresthat"",andthatmeansthepresentmartiallawregimeandallthemeasurestaken
underit,particularlyProclamationNo.1081andGeneralOrders1and2,asamended.theproclamations,orders,and
decrees,InstructionsandactsissuedordonebytheincumbentPresidentaretoform"partofthelawoftheland"andareto
"remainvalidlegal,binding,andeffectiveevenaftertheliftingofmartiallawortheratificationofthisConstitution12
Ontheotherhand,petitionersvigorouslyassert(1)amartiallawproclamationisjusticiable(2)conditionsinthe
countryasofSeptember21,1972,didnotjustifyaproclamationofmartiallaw(3)assumingthatProclamation
No.1081isvalid,GeneralOrdersNos.1,2,3,and3AareviolativeoftheConstitutionandarevoidand(4)the
returnispalpablyinsufficienttojustifycontinueddetentionofpetitioners.
13ForpetitionerDiokno,additionalargumentsweresubmitted,:(a)existingconditionstodaydonotwarrantthecontinuance
ofmartiallaw,assumingthattheproclamationwasinitiallyjustifiedand(b)theuncertaintyofpetitioner'sfaterendershis
executiveimprisonmentoppressiveandlawless.viz14
I
WeshallfirstdisposeoftheissueoftheallegedinsufficiencyoftheReturn..
Petitionerscontendthatrespondents'"ReturntoWrit"whichisquotedinpage6ofthisOpinionisfatally
insufficientbecauseareturnmustassertfactsandnotconclusionsastothebasisofthedetention,andmustbe
347/374
6/20/2015supplementedbyaffidavitsorwithevidenceatthehearing,citing,186F.2d.183.
G.R.No.L35546
habeascorpusCarlsonvs.Landon
ThepertinentprovisionofSec.10,Rule102,RulesofCourt,onthecontentsofthereturnrequiresthatitmust
stateplainlyandunequivocablywhethertheofficertowhomthewritisaddressedhasorhasnotthepartyinhis
custodyorpowerorunderrestraint,andifhehasthepartyinhiscustodyorpowerorunderrestraint,the
authorityandthetrueandwholecausethereof,setforthatlarge,withacopyofthewrit,order,execution,or
otherprocess,ifany,uponwhichthepartyisheld.(pars.aandb)AllthatthisprovisionoftheRulesofCourt
requiresthereforeisthatthereturnmuststateifthesubjectofthewritisincustodyorunderrestraintandifso,
theauthorityforsuchrestraintandthecausethereof.Itisnotnecessaryfororindispensabletothevalidityofthe
returnthattheevidentiaryfactssupportingthecausefortherestraintbegivenorenumeratedtherein.Inthe
petitionsatbarthereturnsufficientlycomplieswiththerequirementsoftheaforementionedprovisionoftheRules
ofCourtbecauseitstatestheauthorityandthecauseforthedetentionofpetitionerswhichafterallisthepurpose
orobjectofareturn.TheauthorityforthedetentionliesinthestatementinthereturnthatthePresident
exercisinghispowersunderArt.VII,Sec.10(2)ofthePhilippineConstitution
15proclaimedmartiallawinthecountryandpursuanttosuchproclamationissuedGeneralOrdersIto7inclusiveand
LettersofInstruction1to3,copiesofwhichareallattachedtothereturnasannexes1to11,whilethecauseforthearrest
ofpetitionersisgiveninGeneralOrderNo.2(Annex3)whereinitisstatedthatsaidpetitionersareparticipantsorhave
givenaidandcomfortintheconspiracytoseizepoliticalandstatepowerinthecountry,etc.Atanyrate,anydeficiencyin
theaforesaidreturnconstitutesameretechnicalviolationwhichistobedisregardedinviewofthesubstantialissues
involvedinthecasesunderconsideration.Imperfectionsofformandtechnicalitiesofprocedurearetobedisregarded
unlesssubstantialrightswouldotherwisebeprejudiced,16andintheinstantcasesthereisnosuchprejudiceaspetitioners
aresufficientlyinformedoftheauthorityandcauseoftheirdetention.
II
ThenextissueisisthisCourtwithjurisdictiontoinquireintotheconstitutionalsufficiencyoftheproclamationof
martiallaw?
PetitionersasserttheauthorityofthisCourttoinquireintothenecessityofplacingthecountryundermartiallawin
thesamemannerthatitinquiredintotheconstitutionalsufficiencyofthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritof
in.
habeascorpusLansangvs.Garcia*16Respondentsaffirm,however,thatthedeterminationoftheexistenceofinvasion,
insurrection,rebellion,orimminentdangerthereof,whenthepublicsafetyrequiresitislodgedwiththePresidentunderArt.
VII,Sec.10(2),1935Constitution,andthePresident'sdeterminationisconclusiveonallpersons,includingthecourts
hence,thisCourtiswithoutjurisdictiontoresolveontheconstitutionalsufficiency,ofthebasisfortheexerciseofthat
presidentialpower,itbeingapurelypoliticalquestion.
TheConstitutionalprovisionreferredtoreads:
ThePresidentshallbetheCommanderinChiefofallarmedforcesofthePhilippinesand,wheneveritbecomes
necessary,hemaycalloutsucharmedforcestopreventorsuppresslawlessviolence,invasion,insurrectionor
requiresit,hemaysuspendtheprivilegeofthewritof,orplacethePhilippinesoranypartthereofundermartial
law.
habeascorpus17
RespondentsciteahostofAmericanauthoritiesandprincipallyfallbackontherulingsofthisCourtin,5Phil.87,
(1905)and,91Phil.882,(1952)
Barcelonvs.BakerMontenegrovs.Castaeda18whichheldthatwhethertheexigencyhasarisenrequiringthesuspension
ofthewritofbelongstothePresidentandhisdeclarationisfinalandconclusiveuponthecourtsanduponallother
persons.theauthoritytodecidehabeascorpus
Theopinionsofmycolleagueslengthilydiscussthisissueofjusticiabilityornonjusticiabilityoftheexerciseof
executivepowertoproclaimmartiallawandIwillnotrepeattheargumentsforoneortheother.Iadoptby
referencetheirdissertationontheleadingAmericanjurisprudenceandConstitutionalLawauthoritiesonthe
matter,butIconcludeformypartthatthedecisionofthisCourtinisthebetterruletoadopt.InLansang,the
CourtheldthatithastheauthorityundertheConstitutiontoinquireintotheexistenceofafactualbasisforthe
issuanceofapresidentialproclamationsuspendingtheprivilegeofthewritofforthepurposeofdeterminingthe
constitutionalsufficiencythereof.
Lansangvs.Garciahabeascorpus19IfthisCourtcanmakethatinquiryintheeventofsuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewrit
348/374
6/20/2015of,a,theCourtcaninquireintothefactualbasisfortheproclamationofmartiallawconsideringthemoreextensiveeffects
G.R.No.L35546
ofthelatterontheindividualrightsofthecitizenry,foritcannotbedeniedthatmartiallawcarrieswithitcurtailmentand
infringementnotonlyofone'slibertybutalsoofpropertyrights,rightsoffreeexpressionandassembly,protectionagainst
unreasonablesearchesandseizures,privacyofcommunicationandcorrespondence,libertyofabodeandoftravel,etc.,
whichjustifyjudicialinterventiontoprotectandupholdtheselibertiesguaranteedundertheConstitution.habeas
corpusfortiori*19
In,theCourtsaidinthewordsofChiefJusticeRobertoConcepcion:
Lansang
Indeed,thegrantofpowertosuspendtheprivilegeisneitherabsolutenorunqualified.Theauthorityconferredby
theConstitution,bothundertheBillofRightsandundertheExecutiveDepartment,islimitedandconditional.The
preceptintheBillofRightsestablishesageneralrule,aswellasanexceptionthereto.Whatismore,itpostulates
theformerinthe,evidentlytostressitsimportance,byprovidingthat'(t)heprivilegeofthewritofshallbe
suspended....'Itisonlybywayofthatitpermitsthesuspensionoftheprivilegeincasesofinvasion,insurrection,
orrebellion'or,underArt.VIIoftheConstitution,'imminentdangerthereof''whenthepublicsafetyrequires
it,inanyofwhicheventsthesamemaybesuspendedwhereverduringsuchperiodthenecessityforsuch
suspensionshallexist.'
negativehabeascorpusnotexception'13Forfrombeingfullandplenary,theauthoritytosuspendtheprivilegeofthewritisthuscircumscribed,
confinedandrestricted,notonlybytheprescribedsettingortheconditionsessentialtoitsexistence,but,also,asregardsthetimewhenandtheplace
whereitmaybeexercised.Thesefactorsandtheaforementionedsettingorconditionsmark,establishanddefinetheextent,theconfinesandthelimitsof
saidpower,beyondwhichitdoesnotexist.And,likethelimitationsandrestrictionsimposedbytheFundamentalLawuponthelegislativedepartment,.
Otherwise,theexplicitconstitutionalprovisionsthereonwouldbemeaningless.Surely,theframersofourConstitutioncouldnothaveintendedtoengagein
suchawastefulexerciseinfutility.....adherencetheretoandcompliancetherewithmay,withinproperbounds,beinquiredintoby
courtsofjustice
xxxxxxxxx
ArticleVIIoftheConstitutionvestsintheExecutivethepowertosuspendtheprivilegeofthewritofunder
specifiedconditions.Pursuanttotheprincipleofseparationofpowersunderlyingthesystemofgovernment,the
Executive'ssupremewithinhisownsphere.HOWEVER,THESEPARATIONOFPOWERS,UNDERTHE
CONSTITUTION,ISNOTABSOLUTE,WHATISMORE,ITGOESHANDINHANDWITHTHESYSTEMOF
CHECKSANDBALANCES,UNDERWHICHTHEEXECUTIVEISSUPREME,ASREGARDSTHESUSPENSION
OFTHEPRIVILEGE,BUTONLYANDHEACTSTHESPHEREALLOTTEDTOHIMBYTHEBASICLAW,AND
THEAUTHORITYTODETERMINEWHETHERORNOTHEHASSOACTEDISVESTEDINTHEJUDICIAL
DEPARTMENT,WHICH,,IS,INTURN,CONSTITUTIONALLY.(42SCRA,pp.473474,479480,capitalization
Ours)
habeascorpusIFWHENWITHININTHISRESPECTSUPREME
Wearenowcalleduponbyrespondentstoreexaminetheabovequotedruling,abandonit,andreturntothe
principlelaiddowninand.
BakerMontenegro20Todothat,however,wouldbetoretrogress,tosurrenderamomentousgainachievedinjudicialhistory
inthiscountry.WithLansang,thehighestCourtofthelandtakesuponitselfthegraveresponsibilityofcheckingexecutive
actionandsavingthenationfromanarbitraryanddespoticexerciseofthepresidentialpowergrantedundertheConstitution
tosuspendtheprivilegeofthewritofand/orproclaimmartiallawthatresponsibilityanddutyoftheCourtmustbe
preservedandfulfilledatallcostsifWewanttomaintainitsroleasthelastbulwarkofdemocracyinthiscountry.Tosome,
theCourtcouldhavegonefurtherindelineatingitsfunctioninthedeterminationoftheconstitutionalsufficiencyofa
proclamationsuspendingtheprivilegeofthewritofwhilethatmaybetrue,asitis,theLansangdecisionisa"giantleap"
intheinterestofjudicialsupremacyinupholdingfundamentalrightsguaranteedbytheConstitution,andforthatreasonI
cannotagreethatWediscardsaiddecisionoremasculateitsoastorenderitsrulingafarce.Thetestofarbitrarinessof
executiveactionadoptedinthedecisionisasufficientsafeguardwhatisvitaltothepeopleisthemannerbywhichthetest
isappliedbytheCourtinbothinstances,i.e.,suspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritofand/orproclamationofmartial
law.habeascorpushabeascorpushabeascorpus
III
WecometothethirdissuethevalidityofProclamation1081.Respondentscontendthatthereisfactualbasis
forthePresidenttoproclaimmartiallawinthecountry,whilepetitionersassertotherwise.
Onthispoint,IagreewithrespondentsthattheextrememeasuretakenbythePresidenttoplacetheentire
countryundermartiallawwasnecessary.ThePresident'sactionwasneithercapriciousnorarbitrary.Anarbitrary
actisonethatarisesfromanunrestrainedexerciseofthewill,caprice,orpersonalpreferenceoftheactor
(Webster's3rdNewInternationalDictionary,p.110),onewhichisnotfoundedonafairorsubstantialreason
(BedfordInv.Co.vs.Folb,180P.2d361,362,citedinWords&Phrases,PermanentEd.,Vol.3A,p.573),is
withoutadequatedeterminingprinciple,nonrational,andsolelydependentontheactor'swill.(Sweigvs.U.S.,
349/374
6/20/2015D.C.Tex.,60F.Supp.785,Words&Phrases,,p.562)SuchisnotthecasewiththeactofthePresident,
G.R.No.L35546
becausetheproclamationofmartiallawwastheresultofconditionsandevents,notofhisownmaking,which
undoubtedlyendangeredthepublicsafetyandledhimtoconcludethatthesituationwascriticalenoughto
warranttheexerciseofhispowerundertheConstitutiontoproclaimmartiallaw.
supra
AsfoundbythisCourtin:thecommunistactivitiesinthecountryaimedprincipallyatincitementtoseditionor
rebellionbecamequiteevidentinthelatetwentiestotheearlythirtieswiththefirstconvictionsdatingOctober26,
1932,in.57Phil.375,and.57Phil.364whiletherewasalullinsuchcommunistactivitiesuponthe
establishmentoftheCommonwealthofthePhilippinestherewasaresurgenceofthecommunistthreatinthelate
fortiesandonJune20,1957,CongressapprovedRepublicAct1700otherwiseknownastheAntiSubversionAct
whichineffectoutlawedthesocalledCommunistPartyofthePhilippines(CPP)in1969,theCommunistParty
wasreorganizedandsplitintotwogroups,oneofwhich,composedmainlyofyoungradicalsconstitutingthe
Maoistfaction,establishedaNewPeople'sArmytheCPPmanagedtoinfiltrateorcontrolninemajorlabor
organizations,exploitedtheyouthmovementandsucceededinmakingcommunistfrontsofelevenmajorstudent
oryouthorganizations,sothatthereareaboutthirtymassorganizationsactivelyadvancingtheCPPinterests,
amongwhicharetheMalayangSamahanngMagsasaka(MASAKA),theKabataangMakabayan(KM),the
MovementfortheAdvancementofNationalism(MAN),theSamahangDemokratikongKabataan(SDK),the
SamahangMolave(SM),andtheMalayangPagkakaisangKabataangPilipino(MPKP).
Lansangvs.GarciaPeoplevs.Evangelista,etalPeoplevs.GuillermoCapadocia,etal21
January3,EveningNews:HuksambushedfivepersonsincludingaformermayorofBagac,Bataan,alongthe
nationalroadintheprovinceandinvestigationofthePhilippineConstabularyrevealedthattheambusherswere
membersofaHukliquidationsquad.
22January4,ibid:ArmyIntelligencesourcesdisclosedthattheHukswereregroupingandsteadilybuildingupstrength
throughavigorousrecruitmentandtrainingprogram.:AnencounteroccurredinSitioBilaong,Sibul,OraniBataan,which
wasconsideredthebiggestencounterbetweentheArmedForcesandHuksinrecentyearsresultinginthekillingofa
numberofdissidents.:IntheCityofManilaschoolcampuseswerenotsparedfromclashesduringriotousdemonstrations
heldbymorethan1,500studentsoftheFarEasternUniversity,thenumberincreasingtoabout10,000ofthem,andatthe
LyceumofthePhilippinesclassesweresuspendedbecauseofabloodystudents'demonstrationresultinginthewounding
ofatleastonestudent.:Thenightbefore,scoresofstudentswereinjuredduringademonstrationattheMapuaInstituteof
Technologyinitiatedbyradicalelements.:HukscontinuedtostrikeatgovernmentforcesinSanFernando,Pampanga,and
Tarlac,Tarlac.:Ademonstrationofabout5,000farmersfromTarlacreinforcedbyKabataangMakabayanmembersclashed
withriotpolicemenaftertheyhadstonedtheUSEmbassyonRoxasBoulevard,Manila,shatteredglasswindowsofthe
building,andputtotorchanAmericanflag.:Thechurchwasnotsparedfromtheonslaughtofstudentactivismwhena
marchofactivistswasheldtoManila'sprominentCatholicchurches.,ManilaChronicle:Assaultswereintensifiedby
governmenttroopsonHukliarsintheprovincesofPampangaandTarlac.,PhilippinesHerald:TheHukspracticallywerein
controlofsixtownsintheprovinceofTarlac.:TheKabataangMakabayanwhichaccordingtotheArmedForces
IntelligencesourceshadatieupwiththeHuksstagedatumultuousdemonstrationduringastatedinneratMalacaangin
honorofUSPresidentRichardNixonwhichresultedinafreeforallfightandinjuriestoseveraldemonstrators.:Violent
studentdemonstrationswerestagedincludingaonedaynoisysiegeofMalacaangPalace.:Bloodydemonstrations
continuednearthegatesoftheUSEmbassyonRoxasBoulevardduringwhichatleast20personsincluding6policemen,3
newsmenandseveralbystanderswereinjured.:3jeeploadsofHuksraidedthepoblacionofPorac,Pampanga,killing
sevenandwoundingsixteen.:MorepersonswerekilledinthecontinuingcarnageinPampanga.:Hukskilledtwomore
personsinPampangaandTarlacevenafterconstabularysoldierssaturatedtheprovincesonordersofPresidentMarcos.:
FivepersonsweremassacredbyHuksinPampanga.January10,ibidJanuary24,25,29,and31,ibidFebruary1,
ibidFebruary24and28,ibidApril19,ManilaChronicleMay19,PhilippinesHeraldJune12,and14July4July27,
ibidSeptember2,9,and10,Manila,DailyBulletinOctober7,and11,ManilaChronicleNovember18,ManilaDaily
BulletinNovember20,ibidNovember25,ibidDecember5,ibid
Arecitalofcontemporaryeventsfrom1969to1972takenfromreportsofleadingnewspapersinthecountrywill
givethefactualbackgroundoftheproclamationofmartiallawand,withtheindulgenceofthereader,Iamgiving
ithereunder:
1969
January19,PhilippinesHerald:400studentsdemonstratedatMalacaangPalaceagainstpowergroupsinthe
country.:AbombexplodedattheJointUSMilitaryAdvisoryGroupHeadquartersinQuezonCityinjuringa
PhilippineArmyenlistedman.:Studentdemonstratorsmauledapalaceguard.:Some3,000students
demonstratedatMalacaangfortheseconddayandtheNationalStudentsLeagueannouncedanationwide
boycottofclasses.:OpeningsessionoftheSeventhCongresswasmarredbyriotousdemonstrationsby
thousandsofstudentsandworkersinfrontoftheLegislativebuildingduringwhichPresidentandMrs.Marcos
werethetargetofstonesandmissilesastheywalkedtotheircarand72personswereinjuredinthat
demonstration.:MobattackedMalacaangPalacewithignitedbottlesandfoughtwithmilitaryandpolicetroops
untilearlymorning.:NiloTayag,ChairmanoftheKabataangMakabayanwasarrestedforsubversionanda
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6/20/2015submachinegunanddocumentsconcerningCommunismwereconfiscatedfromhim.:Continueddemonstrations
G.R.No.L35546
wereheldinfrontoftheUSembassybuilding,inthecampusoftheFarEasternUniversityandtheUniversityof
theEast,whileviolentbetweenthearmyandtheHuksinCentralLuzonccontinuedunabated.:Violentstrikes
andstudentdemonstrationswerereported.:Demonstrationscontinuedwithexplosionsofpillboxesinatleasttwo
schools.TheUniversityofthePhilippineswasnotsparedwhenits18,000studentsboycottedtheirclassesto
demandacademicandnonacademicreformsintheStateUniversityresultinginthe"occupation"oftheofficeof
thePresidentoftheUniversitybystudentleaders.Otherschoolswhichwerescenesofviolentdemonstrations
wereSanSebastianCollege,UniversityoftheEast,LetranCollege,MapuaInstituteofTechnology,Universityof
Sto.Tomas,andFeatiUniversity.Studentdemonstratorsevensucceededin"occupyingtheofficeofthe
SecretaryofJusticeVicenteAbadSantosforatleastsevenhours".TheArmedForcescontinueditsencounters
withtheHuksinCentralLuzonandwiththeleadersoftheNewPeople'sArmy.:Moreinstancesofviolentstudent
demonstrationsintheCitywere,reported,themostviolentofwhichoccurredafteranindignationrallyatPlaza
Lawtonwherepillboxesandotherexplosiveswerethrownresultinginthewoundingofseveralstudents,
policemenandbystanders.TwoCatholicschoolsandtwogovernmentbuildingsinCalbayogCitywereblasted
withdynamite.:FightingwasreportedintheprovinceofCotabatobetweenwellarmedtribesmenandthelocal
policeforces,aswellasinIlocosSur,whileinCavitethePoliceChiefandtwoofhismenwereshottodeathin
frontoftheHallofJusticebuilding.:InBaguioCity,Lt.VictorN.CorpusjoinedtheNewPeople'sArmyand
effectedaraidonthePhilippineMilitaryAcademyandfledwith35highpoweredgunswithammunition.
January22,ibidJanuary23,ibidJanuary24,ibidJanuary27,ibidJanuary31,ibidJune12and14,ManilaTimesJuly5,6,7,
13,19,21,23,25,26,27,and31,ibidSeptember15,18,20,25,26,27and29,ibidOctober1,3,4,6,8,13,23and24,
ibidNovember6,7,8and18,ibidDecember5,9and10,ibidDecember14,15,18,23and28,ibidDecember31,ibid
January14,ManilaTimes:FourstudentsdiedduringarallyatPlazaMirandaofthiscity.:Studentspicketedthe
PhilippineConstabularyCampatCampCrametoexpresstheirprotestontheuseofthemilitaryforcesagainst
students,andtodemandtheimpeachmentofPresidentMarcos.:Oilfirmsinthecityweretheobjectofbombings
resultingindeathtoatleasttwopersonsandinjuriestoothers.:Ahandgrenadewashurledatthetowerofthe
ABSCBNBroadcastingCorporationinQuezonCity.:AfreshmanstudentoftheUniversityofthePhilippineswas
shotandcriticallywounded,35injured,26werearrestedinviolentincidentsatthecampuswhichatthattimewas
inbarricades,whileindowntownManilamorethan2.000studentsoccupiedandbarricadedClaroM.Recto
Avenueand16personswereinjuredinseparateclashesbetweenthepoliceandstudents.:Aseniorengineering
studentwasshotwhengovernmentforcesdroveintotheheartoftheUniversityofthePhilippinescampusto
dispersestudentswhohadsetupbarricadesinthearea,andatleast30womenstudentswerewoundedinthe
climaxofthedaylongpitchbattleintheUniversitybetweenstudentsandthelocalpoliceandsoldiers.:In
downtownManila,fightingcontinuedbetweenthepoliceandstudentdemonstratorsresultinginthedeathofat
leasttwostudentsandwoundingofscoresofdemonstratorsandpolicemen.:TheU.P.LosBaosArmorywas
blastedbyanexplosion.:TheUnitedStatesEmbassywasagainbombed.:IntheprovinceofDavaostudentriots
eruptedintheUniversityofMindanaokillingatleastonestudent.:Atleast18personswerekilledinCotabato
duringencountersbetweengovernmentforcesandthesocalledrebels.:Violentdemonstrationsandindignation
rallieswereheldinManilaaswellasintheprovinceofTarlac.:TwoConstabularytrooperswereambushedby
HuksunderCommanderDanteinthepoblacionofCapas,Tarlac.:AbombexplodedinQuezonCitydestroying
thestatuesymbolizingfriendshipbetweentheFilipinosandtheAmericans.:ThemonthofMaywasabloodyone.
LaborDay,May1,wascelebratedbytheworkersandstudentactivistswithademonstrationbeforeCongress,
andaclashbetweenthedemonstratorsandthePoliceandMetrocomforcesresultedindeathtoseveral
demonstratorsandinjuriestomany.:Twoarmytroopersandatleast8HuksincludingaCommanderwerekilled
duringmilitaryoperationsagainstthecommunistNewPeople'sArmyinIsabela.:Peaceandordersituationin
Mindanaoworsened.Continuedclashesbetweengovernmentforcesandrebelsresultedintheevacuationof
thousandsofMuslimsandChristiansalikefromseveraltownsinCotabatoandabandof50gunmenattackeda
partyoftopgovernmentofficialsledbyDefenseSecretaryJuanEnrilewhileinspectingaMosquewhere56
MuslimswerereportedlymassacredinBarrioManalili,Carmen,Cotabato.:Violencecontinuedtobeunabatedin
ManilawithaQuezonCityactivistshotdeadand3driversinvolvedinthejeepneystrikebombedandinjured.:A
publicmeetingbeingheldatPlazaMiranda,Manila,bytheLiberalPartyforthepresentationofitscandidatesin
thegeneralelectionsscheduledforNovember8,1971wasmarredbywhatisnowknownasthebrutalPlaza
Mirandaincidentwhere8personswerekilledandscoreswereinjuredincludingthecandidatesoftheparty,
causedbythethrowingoftwohandgrenadesattheplatform.:PresidentMarcosissuedaproclamation
suspendingtheprivilegeofthewritof.
January21,ibidJanuary23,ibidJanuary27,IbidFebruary2,ibidFebruary3,ibidFebruary4,5,6and7,ibidFebruary11,
ibidFebruary13,ibidFebruary17,ibidFebruary27,ibidMarch17,18,19and25,ibidApril23,EveningNewsApril30,ibidMay
2and3,PhilippinesHeraldMay7,ibidJune24,25and26,ManilatimesJune22,EveningNewsAugust21,ibidAugust23,
ibidhabeascorpus
January12,ManilaTimes:PresidentMarcosrestoredtheprivilegeofthewritofintheentirecountry.:Inthe
meantime,inCongressabillwasintroducedtorepealtheantisubversionlaw.:Violentdemonstrationsinthe
schoolbeltresumed.:IntheprovinceofZambalesanencounterbetweenPCtroopersandtheNewPeople's
Armywasreported.March1,:TheprovinceofCavitewasplacedunderPhilippineConstabularycontrolbecause
oftherashofkillingsinwhichlocalofficialswerethevictims,oneofwhomwasCaviteCityMayorRoxas.:Araid
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6/20/2015wasconductedbythePhilippineConstabularyinahouseinQuezonCityresultingintheseizureof36high
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poweredfirearms,2handgrenadesandadismantledmachinegunwhileintheprovinceofIsabela6persons
includinganoncommissionedofficerofthe10thInfantryBattalionwerekilledinagunbattlebetween
governmentsoldiersandtheNewPeople'sArmy.:TheNewPeople'sArmyraidedCapas,Tarlac,destroyinga
portionofthetownhall.:MorepersondiedinCotabatoandLanaoduetocontinuedviolence.:Thestudent
demonstrationonitswaytoCongresstoagitatefortherepealoftheantisubversionlawresultedininjuriestoa
goodnumberofstudentdemonstratorswhentheyclashedwithsecurityguardsinfrontoftheUniversityofSto.
Tomas.InanotherviolentdemonstrationinfrontofArellanoUniversityatleastonestudentwaskilledandothers
werewoundedinanencounterbetweenthedemonstratorsandsecurityguards.Pillboxexplosiveswerehurledat
thegateofMalacaangPalaceandamysteriousexplosionsparkedafirethatguttedthenorthernwindofthe
GreaterManilaTerminalFoodMarketinTaguig,Rizal,whichhadbeenprecededbyothermysteriousexplosions
whichshatteredportionsoftheArcabuildingonTaftAvenue,Pasay,duringwhichpropagandaleafletswere
foundshowingthatradicalelementswerebehindthebombings,while9sticksofdynamitewerefounddumpedin
frontoftheSecurityBankandTrustCompanybranchofficeinEspaaStreet.:Anotherpublicofficial,Mayor
RodolfoGanzonofIloiloCitywaswoundedinanambushand4ofhiscompanionswerekilled.:Sixmorepersons
werekilledasgovernmenttroopersclashedwiththeNewPeople'sArmyintheprovinceofIsabela.:Clashes
continuedbetweentheArmytroopsandtheNewPeople'sArmyinIsabelawhichledthegovernmenttosend
moretroopstothatprovince.:TheUSEmbassywasagainbombedwhilestrikesinfactorieswerejoinedbyso
calledactivists.:HandgrenadesinthetownofCabugao,IlocosSurwerethrownresultinginthedeathof13.:
ClashescontinuedbetweengovernmenttroopersandtheNewPeople'sArmyintheIlocosprovincesaswellasin
theprovincesofLanaoandZambales.:TheNewPeople'sArmyinvadedtheprovincesofSamarandLeyte.:
Twobigshipmentsofdynamitesticksestimatedat10,000pieceshadalreadybeenshippedtoIlocosSurbeforea
thirdshipmentwasinterceptedonabusboundforCabugao.:MorepillboxexplosionsoccurredintheUS
Embassyduringwhichatleast5personswerehurtwhilethepicketsattheembassyledbytheKabataang
Makabayancontinued.:Atleast30personswerewoundedwhenradicalvanguardsofabout5,000
demonstratorsclashedwithabout200MetrocomtroopersinthevicinityoftheUSEmbassy.:ThePhilippine
IndependenceDaywasmarredbyralliesofyouthandworkergroupswhichdenouncedUSimperialism,with
demonstratorsnumberingabout10,000fromSouthernLuzon,CentralLuzonandtheGreaterManilaarea
convergingatPlazaMirandaandduringthedemonstrationexplosionsofpillboxbombsoccurred.:Thesituation
inMindanaowascriticalandhadworsened.:Atimebombexplodedinoneoftheroomsinthesecondfloorofthe
CourtofIndustrialRelationsbuildinginManila.:AnexplosionshatteredthewesternsectionofthePhilamlife
buildinginErmita,Manila.:Thirtyfivepersonswerewoundedinpillboxexplosionswhen2groupsof
demonstratorsclashedwitheachotheratLiwasangBonifacio,thenwithpolicemenneartheUSEmbassy,asthe
protestralliesagainstUSimperialismheldinconjunctionwiththeJuly4thcelebrationcametoabloodyend.
DeputyPoliceChiefCol.JamesBarberswhosuffered40pelletwoundsontheleftsideofthebodywasamong
thevictims.:Raiderskilled53inZamboangafightingwasalsogoingoninLanaodelNorte.DefenseSecretary
JuanPonceEnrileyesterdaydescribedtheMindanaodevelopmentsas"grave".:PresidentMarcosordered
ZamboangadriveArmedForcesofthePhilippineslandseaairoperationswerelaunchedwhileMayor
DiograciasCarmonaofDimataling,ZamboangadelSur,waskilledinanewclash.:Apaneloflawyershave
advisedPresidentMarcosthatitwouldbeperfectlylegalforhimtodeclaremartiallaw,suspendelections,and
continueinofficebeyond1973,ifthe"proper"situationdevelopsnextyear.:PresidentMarcossaidthatthe
CommunistinfiltrationoffeudingMuslimandChristiangroupsinMindanaocouldbejustaploytodrawaway
governmenttroopsfromCentralLuzonandthusleaveManilaopentoaRedattack.PresidentMarcosordered
thePCandthearmytocounterattackandrecaptureDigoyoPoint,Palanan,Isabelauponreceiptofreportsthat
outnumberedgovernmenttroopersbattlingNewPeople'sArmyguerrillasinPalananwereforcedtowithdraw.He
saidthattheprimarytargetshouldbethesuspectedammunitiondumpandsupplydepotoftheNewPeople's
ArmyonDigoyoPoint.SixteenPCofficersandenlistedmenwererescuedfrom100NewPeople'sArmyguerrillas
whohadpinnedthemdownonboardashipduringaseaandairoperations.Theoccupiedtheshipnamed"Kuya
MaruKaragatan"reportedtobeofNorthKoreanorigin.Whileinspectingtheship,some100NewPeople'sArmy
guerrillasmassedonthebeachandfiredatthem.:PresidentMarcossaidthatthevesselwhichlandedoff
Palanan,Isabela,allegedlywithmilitarysuppliesandequipmentfortheNewPeople'sArmyisownedbyFilipinos
andisregisteredunderPhilippinelaws.ThePresidentalsosawinthelandingincidentevidenceofatieup
betweenlocalCommunistsandforeignsuppliersofweapons.:CampCrame,NationalPCheadquarters,
announcedareportfromTaskForceSaranaythatgovernmenttroopershadfoundhundredsofweaponsof
Americanmake,including467M14rifles,in2abandonedcampsinDigoyoPoint,Palanan,Isabela.August19,:
RallieswereheldtomarkthefirstyearofthePlazaMirandabombingandsuspensionofthewritofbythe
MovementofConcernedCitizensforCivilLibertieswhichdeclaredAugust21asanationaldayofprotestagainst
militarization.:TheDepartmentofNationalDefenseataconferenceofdefenseandmilitaryofficialsexposeda
planoftheNewPeople'sArmytosowterroranddisorderinthemajorcitiesofthecountrybeforetheendofthe
year1972,andbecauseofseveralbombingincidentsattheDepartmentofForeignAffairs,Philamlifebuilding,
"TheDailyStarOffice"anewspaperpublication,theIPIbuildingandanarmoredcarofthePhilippineBanking
Corporation,thePhilippineConstabularydeclaredaredalertinthemetropolitanarea.:Sixarmysoldierswere
killedwhentheywereambushedbytheNewPeople'sArmyinCawayan,Isabela.September6,:Onewoman
waskilledand60otherswereinjuredwhenatimebombexplodedinadepartmentstoreinCariedoStreet,
Quiapo,Manila,atabout8:30intheeveningofSeptember5whichincidentwasthemostseriousintheseriesof
bombingswhichtookplaceingreaterManilaandwhichaccordingtoArmyIntelligencesourceswastheworkof
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struckagainthenightbeforedestroyingthreevitalofficesinthegroundflooroftheCityhallofManilaand
wounding2telephoneoperators.:AgunbattleensuedbetweentheNewPeople'sArmyandMetrocomsoldiers
atPandacan,Manila,neartheOilrefinerieswhichledtothesendingofArmytroopstoguardoildepots.:
PresidentMarcoswarnedthathehasunderconsiderationthenecessityforexercisinghisemergencypowers
undertheConstitutionindealingwithintensifiedactivitiesoflocalMaoists.:Asifinanswertothiswarningofthe
President,twotimebombsexplodedintheQuezonCityHallwhichdisruptedtheplenarysessionofthe
constitutionalConventionandasubversioncaseCourtofFirstInstanceJudgeJulianLustre.
habeascorpusJanuary29,IbidFebruary2,3,5and10,IbidFebruary4,ibidibidMarch2,ibidMarch5,ibidMarch9,ibidMarch
14,16,18,21and27,ibidMarch23,ibidMarch26,ibidApril16and17,ibidApril20and25,ibidApril26,ibidApril27,ibidApril
30,ibidMay4,ibidMay12and16,ibidMay21,ibidJune13,ibidJune18,ibidJune24,ibidJuly4,ibidJuly5,ibidJuly6,
ibidJuly7,ibidJuly8,ibidJuly9,ibidJuly10,ibidJuly15,ibidibidhabeascorpusAugust31,ibidSeptember3,
ibidibidSeptember10,ibidSeptember12,ibidSeptember13,ibidSeptember19,ibid
1970
1971
1972
TheforegoingeventstogetherwithotherdatainthepossessionofthePresidentasCommanderinChiefofthe
ArmedForcesledhimtoconcludethat"thereisthroughoutthelandastateofanarchyandlawlessness,chaos
anddisorder,turmoilanddestructionofamagnitudeequivalenttoanactualwarbetweentheforceofourduly
constitutedgovernmentandtheNewPeople'sArmyandtheirsatelliteorganizations...inadditiontotheabove
describedsocialdisorder,thereisalsotheequallyseriousdisorderinMindanaoandSuluresultingfromthe
unsettledconflictbetweencertainelementsoftheChristianandMuslimpopulationofMindanaoandSulu,
betweentheChristian'Ilaga'andtheMuslim'Barracudas',andbetweenourgovernmenttroops,andcertain
lawlessorganizationssuchastheMindanaoIndependenceMovement...",thatthisstateof"rebellionandarmed
action"caused"seriousdemoralizationamongourpeopleandhavemadethepublicapprehensiveandfearful"
andthat"publicorderandsafetyandthesecurityofthenationdemandthatimmediate,swift,decisiveand
effectiveactionbetakentoprotectandinsurethepeace,orderandsecurityofthecountryanditspopulationand
tomaintaintheauthorityofthegovernment."(seeProclamation1081)
PetitionersvigorouslydisputealltheaboveconclusionsofthePresidentandmaintainthatthesituationinthe
countryasofSeptember21,1972,didnotwarrantaproclamationofmartiallawthus,Congresswasinsession,
thecourtswereopen,theConstitutionalConventionof1971wasinprogress,etc.Petitionersinvokeintheirfavor
the"opencourtrule"espousedintheAmericancasesof,4Wallace2,1866,and,327U.S.304,1945,90L.Ed.
688.InMilliganthemajorityoffiveJusticesoftheSupremeCourtheldamongothersthat"(M)artialrulecannever
existwherethecourtsareopenandintheproperandunobstructedexerciseoftheirjurisdiction",whichruling
wasreaffirmedin.
ExParteMilliganDuncanvs.KahanamokuDuncan
MuchhasbeensaidandwrittenbymyColleaguesonthemeritsanddemeritsoftheandjurisprudence.Formy
partIshallsimplystatethatIdonotviewthesetwocasesascontrollingauthorityonwhatisthetestofan"actual
andrealnecessity"formartiallawtoexistbecausethesetwocasesweremainlyconcernedwiththejurisdictionof
amilitarycommission(Milligancase)andamilitarytribunal(Duncancase)totryciviliansforoffensesgenerally
cognizablebycivilcourts,andthedecisioninthesetwocasessimplyupholdstheprinciplethatwherecourtsare
opentoexercisetheirjurisdiction,theseciviliansmustnotbedeniedtheirrightsguaranteedundertheBillof
Rightsoneofwhichistrialbyjuryinacivilcourt."Inotherwords,thecivilcourtsmustbeutterlyincapableof
tryingcriminalsordispensingjusticeintheirusualmannerbeforetheBillofRightsmaybetemporarily
suspended."(Duncanvs.Kahanamoku,p.703)Furthermore,Iwouldanswertheargumentsofpetitionerswith
thefollowingcriticalobservationofProfessorWilloughbyontherulingbasedonthedissentoffourJusticesinthe
case,andIquote:
MilliganDuncansupraMilligan
...Thestatementistooabsolutelymadethat'martiallawcannotarisefromathreatenedinvasion.Thenecessity
mustbeactualandpresenttheinvasionreal,suchaseffectuallyclosesthecourtsanddeposesthecivil
administration.'Itiscorrecttosaythat'thenecessitymustbeactualandpresent,'butitisnot,,astheminority
justicescorrectlypointedout,.Thebetterdoctrine,then,is,notforthecourttoattempttodetermineinadvance
withrespecttoanyoneelement,whatdoes,andwhatdoesnotcreateanecessityformartiallaw,but,asinall
othercasesoftheexerciseofofficialauthority,totestthelegalityofanactbyitsspecialcircumstances.Certainly
thefactthatthecourtsareopenandundisturbedwillinallcasesfurnishapowerfulpresumptionthatthereisno
necessityforaresorttomartiallaw,butitshouldnotfurnishanirrebuttablepresumption.(Willoughby,
ConstitutionoftheUnitedStates,Vol.3,2Ed.,p.1602,emphasissupplied)
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administrationfortheremaybeurgentnecessityformartialruleevenwhenthecourtsareopen
Tostresshispoint,ProfessorWilloughbygavethefollowingexample:
TheEnglishdoctrineofmartiallawissubstantiallysimilartothis,andanexcellentillustrationofthepointunder
discussionisgivenbycertaineventsgrowingoutofthelateBritishBoerwar.
DuringthatstrugglemartiallawwasproclaimedbytheBritishGovernmentthroughouttheentireextentofCape
Colony,thatis,indistrictswherenoactivemilitaryoperationswerebeingconductedandwherethecourtswere
openandundisturbed,butwhereconsiderablesympathywiththeBoersanddisaffectionwiththeEnglishrule
existed.SirFrederickPollock,discussingtheproperlawofthesubjectwithreferencetothearrestofoneMarais,
upholdsthejudgmentoftheJudicialCommitteeofthePrivyCouncil(A.C.109,1902)inwhichthatcourtdeclined
toholdthattheabsenceofopendisorder,andtheundisturbedoperationofthecourtsfurnishedconclusive
evidencethatmartiallawwasunjustified.(,pp.16021603)
ibid
Comingbacktoourpresentsituation,itcanbesaid,thatthefactthatourcourtswereopenonSeptember21,
1972,didnotprecludetheexistenceofan"actualandpresentnecessity"fortheproclamationofmartiallaw.As
indicatedearlier,thestateofcommunistactivitiesaswellasofotherdissidentmovementsinthiscountry
summarizedbythisCourtinandmanifestedintherecitalofeventsgiveninthisOpinionconstitutedthe"actual
andpresentnecessity"whichledthePresidenttoplacetheentirecountryundermartiallaw.
Lansangvs.Garcia
IV
Contrarytorespondent'sclaim,theproclamationofmartiallawinthecountrydidnotcarrywithittheautomatic
suspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritofforthesereasons:,fromtheverynatureofthewritofwhichasstressed
intheearlyportionofthisOpinionisa"writofliberty"andthe"mostimportantandmostimmediatelyavailable
safeguardofthatliberty",theprivilegeofthewritbesuspended.TheBillofRights(Art.111,Sec.1(14),1935
Constitution,Art.IV,Sec.15,1973Constitution)categoricallystatesthattheprivilegeofthewritofshallnotbe
suspendedforcausesthereinspecified,andtheproclamationofmartiallawisoneofthoseenumerated.
habeascorpusFirsthabeascorpuscannotbymereimplicationhabeascorpusexceptnot23Second,thesocalledCommander
inChiefclause,eitherunderArt.VII,Sec.10(2),1935Constitution,orArt.IX,Sec.12,1973Constitution,provides
specificallyforthreedifferentmodesofexecutiveactionintimesofemergency,andonemodedoesnotnecessarily
encompasstheother,,(a)callingoutthearmedforcestopreventorsuppresslawlessness,etc.,(b)suspensionofthe
privilegeofthewritof,and(e)placingthecountryorapartthereofundermartiallaw.Inthelattertwoinstancesevenifthe
causesfortheexecutiveactionarethesame,stilltheexigenciesofthesituationmaywarrantthesuspensionofthe
privilegeofthewritbutnotaproclamationofmartiallawandviceversa.Third,therecanbeanautomaticsuspensionofthe
privilegeofthewritwhen,withthedeclarationofmartiallaw,thereisatotalcollapseofthecivilauthorities,thecivilcourts
areclosed,andamilitarygovernmenttakesover,inwhicheventtheprivilegeofthewritisnecessarilysuspendedforthe
simplereasonthatthereisnocourttoissuethewritthat,however,isnotthecasewithusatpresentbecausethemartial
lawproclaimedbythePresidentupholdsthesupremacyoftheciviloverthemilitaryauthority,vizhabeascorpus24andthe
courtsareopentoissuethewrit.
V
Respondentsarguethatwithavalidproclamationofmartiallaw,allorders,decrees,andotheractsofthe
Presidentpursuanttosaidproclamationarelikewisevalid:thattheseactswereexpresslydeclaredlegaland
bindinginArt.XVII,Sec.3(2),ofthe1973Constitutionwhichisnowinfullforceandeffect,andconsequentlythe
arrestofpetitionersislegal,ithavingbeenmadeinaccordancewithGeneralOrderNo.2ofthePresident.
Icannotgivemyunqualifiedassenttorespondents'sweepingstatementwhichineffectupholdstheviewthat
whateverdefects,substantiveorprocedural,mayhavetaintedtheorders,decrees,orotheractsofthePresident
havebeencuredbytheconfirmatoryvoteofthesovereignpeoplemanifestedthroughtheirratificationofthe
1973Constitution.Icannotdoso,becauseIrefusetobelievethatapeoplethathaveembracedtheprinciplesof
democracyin"blood,sweat,andtears"wouldthusthrowawayalltheirpreciousliberties,thesacredinstitutions
enshrinedintheirConstitution,forthatwouldbetheresultifwesaythatthepeoplehavestampedtheirapproval
onalltheactsofthePresidentexecutedaftertheproclamationofmartiallawirrespectiveofanytaintofinjustice,
arbitrariness,oppression,orculpableviolationoftheConstitutionthatmaycharacterizesuchacts.Surelythe
peopleactingthroughtheirconstitutionaldelegatescouldnothavewrittenafundamentallawwhichguarantees
theirrightstolife,liberty,andproperty,andatthesametimeinthesameinstrumentprovidedforaweaponthat
couldspelldeathtotheserights.Nolessthanthemanconcerned,PresidentFerdinandE.Marcos,hastimeand
againemphasizedthefactthatnotwithstandingtheexistenceofmartiallawoursisagovernmentrununderthe
Constitutionandthattheproclamationofmartiallawis.
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G.R.No.L35546
mandatesoftheConstitution.
ThatthisviewthatwetakeisthecorrectonecanbeseenfromtheverytextofSee.3(2),Art.XVIIofthe1973
Constitutionwhichprovides:
President,andshallremainvalid,legal,binding,andeffectiveevenafterliftingofmartiallawortheratificationof
thisConstitution,unlessmodified,revoked,orsupersededbysubsequentproclamations,orders,decrees,
instructions,orotheractsoftheincumbentPresident,orunlessexpresslyandexplicitlymodifiedorrepealedby
theregularNationalAssembly.(emphasissupplied)
shallbepartofthelawoftheland
Asstatedintheabovequotedprovision,alltheproclamations,orders,decrees,instructions,andacts
promulgated,issued,ordonebytheincumbentPresidentshallbethetextdidnotsaythattheyshallbepartof
thefundamentalorbasiclawtheConstitution.Indeed,theframersofthenewConstitutionwerecarefulintheir
choiceofphraseologyforimplicitthereinistheCourt'spowerofjudicialreviewovertheactsoftheincumbent
PresidentintheexerciseofhismartiallawpowersduringtheperiodoftransitionfromthePresidentialtothe
Parliamentaryregime.Fortheeffectoftheaforementionedtransitoryprovisionistoinvestuponsaid
proclamations,orders,decrees,andactsofthePresidenttheimprimaturofalawbutnotaconstitutional
mandate.Likeanyotherlaworstatuteenactedbythelegislativebranchofthegovernment,suchorders,
decrees,etc.aresubjecttojudicialreviewwhenproperundertheConstitutiontoclaimthecontrarywouldbe
incongruoustosaytheleastforwhiletheactsoftheregularNationalAssemblywhichisthepermanentrepository
oflegislativepowerunderthenewConstitutionaresubjecttojudicialreview,theactsofitstemporarysubstitute,
thatis,theincumbentPresident,performedduringthetransitoryperiodarenot.
partofthelawoftheland
ItiscontendedhoweverthatthetrueintentionoftheConstitutionalDelegatesinprovidingforSection3(2),Article
XVII,inthe1973ConstitutionwastoforecloseanyjudicialinquiryonthevaliditynotonlyofProclamation1081but
alsoofallsubsequentorders,decreesissuedandactsperformedbytheincumbentPresident.Ifthatwasthe
intent,thenwhydidthatparticularprovisionnotstatesoinclearandunequivocalterms,especiallysincethe
effectwouldbetorestrictifnottodeprivethejudicialbranchofthegovernmentofitspowerofjudicialreviewin
theseinstances?Asitis,thatis,aspresentlyworded,thisparticularprovisionwasratifiedbythepeoplebelieving
thatalthoughtheactsoftheincumbentPresidentwerebeingtheystillhadarecoursetothejudicialbranchof
theirgovernmentforprotectionorredressshouldsuchactsturnouttobearbitrary,unjust,oroppressive.
madepartofthelawoftheland
GoingbacktoGeneralOrderNo.2,itsvalidityisassailedbypetitionersonthegroundthatitorderedtheirarrest
anddetentionwithoutchargeshavingbeenfiledagainstthembeforethecompetentcourtnorwarrantsfortheir
arrestissuedbythelatter,allinviolationoftheirconstitutionalrighttodueprocessoflaw.
AstateofmartiallawvestsuponthePresidentnotonlythepowertocallthemilitaryorarmedforcestorepelan
invasion,preventorsuppressaninsurrectionorrebellion,wheneverpublicsafetyrequiresit,butalsothe
authoritytotakesuchmeasuresasmaybenecessarytoaccomplishthepurposesoftheproclamationofmartial
law.Onesuchmeasureisthearrestanddetentionofpersonswhoareclaimedtobeparticipantsorsuspectedon
reasonablegroundstobesuch,inthecommissionofinsurrectionorrebellion,orinthecaseofaninvasion,who
giveaidandcomforttotheenemy,thearrestbeingnecessarytoinsurepublicsafety.Itisthiselementof
necessitypresentinthecasewhichjustifiesacurtailmentoftherightsofpetitionersandsolongasthereisno
showingofarbitrarinessoroppressionintheactcomplainedof,theCourtisdutyboundtosustainitasavalid
exerciseofthemartiallawpowersofthePresident.Withtheforegoingqualification,Iagreewiththefollowing
statement:
WhenitcomestoadecisionbytheheadoftheStateuponamatterinvolvingitslife,theordinaryrightsof
individualsmustyieldtowhathedeemsthenecessitiesofthemoment.Publicdangerwarrantsthesubstitutionof
executiveprocessforjudicialprocess.(Moyervs.Peabody,212U.S.78,53L.Ed.,pp.411,417)
*1SheisthewifeofthedetaineeJoseW.Dioknowho,inlaterpleadings,alreadyconsideredhimself
directlyasthePetitioner.
*2ENBANC.ThepetitionsinthiscaseswerewithdrawnwithleaveofCourt,asstatedinthebodyofthe
opinion,exceptthatinG.R.No.L35547whichisdeemedabatedbythedeathofthepetitioner.
*3ENBANC.ThepetitionsinthesecaseswerewithdrawnwithleaveofCourt,asstatedinthebodyofthe
opinion,exceptthatinG.R.No.L35547whichisdeemedabatedbythedeathofthepetitioner.
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1Zaldivar,Fernando,Teehankee,Barredo,MuozPalmaandAquino,JJ.,Castro,Makasiar,Antonio,
G.R.No.L35546
Esguerra,andFernandez,JJ.,votedfordenialofthemotiontowithdraw.
2JusticeZaldivarturned70onSeptember13.
3Thefollowingindividuals,ontheirownmotions,wereallowedtowithdrawtheirpetitions:VeronicaL.
Yuyitung(SupremeCourtRes.Oct.6,1972)andTanChinHian(Res.Oct.11,1972)inL35556Amando
Doronila,HernandoJ.Abaya,ErnestoGranada,LuisD.Beltran,BrenGuiao,RubenCusipagandWillie
Baun(Res.Oct.3,1972Res.Oct.11,1972)inL35567TeresitaM.Guiao,inbehalfofBrenGuiao(who
wasalsoapetitionerinL35567)(Res.Oct.9,1972)inL35571.
Thefollowingindividualshavesincebeenreleasedfromcustody:JoaquinP.Roces,TeodoroM.Locsin,
Sr.,RolandoFadul,RosalindGalang,GoEngGuan,RenatoConstantinoandLuisR.Mauricio,allofwhom
werepetitionersinL35538MaximoV.Soliven,NapoleonG.RamaandJoseMariVelezin
L35540RamonMitra,Jr.,FranciscoRodrigoandNapoleonRamainL35546EnriqueVoltaireGarciaII
(deceased)inL35547TanChinHianandVeronicaYuyitunginL35556AmandoDoronila,JuanL.
Mercado,HernandoJ.Abaya,ErnestoGranada,LuisD.Beltran,RubenCusipag,RobertoOrdoez,
ManuelAlmarioandWillieBauninL35567ErnestoRondoninL35573andBrenGuiaoinL35571.
4Makalintal,C.J.,Castro,Barredo,Makasiar,Antonio,Esguerra,FernandezandAquino,JJ.,Zaldivar,
Fernando,TeehankeeandMuozPalma,JJ.votedfordismissal.
5Francisco"Soc"Rodrigo,JoaquinP.Roces,TeodoroM.Locsin,RolandoFadul,RosalindGalang,Go
EngGuan,MaximoV.Soliven,RenatoConstantino,LuisR.Mauricio,NapoleonG.Rama,JoseMariVelez,
RamonV.Mitra,JuanL.Mercado,RobertoOrdoez,ManuelAlmarioandErnestoRondon.
CASTRO,J.:
1Thefollowingindividuals,ontheirownmotions,wereallowedtowithdrawtheirpetitions:VeronicaL.
Yuyitung(SupremeCourtRes.Oct.6,1972)andTanChinHian(Res.Oct.11,1972)inL35556Amando
Doronila,HernandoJ.Abaya,ErnestoGranada,LuisD.Beltran,BrenGuiao,RubenCusipagandWillie
Baun(Res.Oct.3,1972Res.Oct.11,1972)inL35567TeresitaM.GuiaoinbehalfofBrenGuiao(who
wasalsoapetitionerinL35567)(Res.Oct.9,1972)inL35571.
2Thefollowingindividualshavesincebeenreleasedfromcustody:JoaquinP.Roces,TeodoroM.Locsin,
Sr.,RolandoFadul,RosalindGalang,GoEngGuan,RenatoConstantinoandLuisR.Mauricio,allofwhom
werepetitionersinL35538MaximoV.Soliven,NapoleonG.RamaandJoseMariVelezinL35540
RamonMitra,Jr.,FranciscoRodrigoandNapoleonRamainL35546EnriqueVoltaireGarciaII(deceased)
inL35547TanChinHianandVeronicaYuyitunginL35556AmandoDoronila,JuanL.Mercado,
HernandoJ.Abaya,ErnestoGranada,LuisD.Beltran,RubenCusipag,RobertoOrdoez,ManuelAlmario
andWillieBauninL35567ErnestoRondoninL35573:andBrenZ.GuiaoinL35571.
3Javellanavs.ExecutiveSecretary,L36142,March31,1973,50SCRA30.
4ChiefJusticeMakalintalandAssociateJusticesZaldivarCastro,Fernando,Teehankee,Barredo,
Makasiar,AntonioandEsguerra.
5SeeAnno.,PublicInterestasGroundforRefusaltoDismissanAppealwhereQuestionhasBecomeMoot
orDismissalisSoughtbyOneorBothParties.132A.L.R.1185to1200Willisvs.Buchman,132A.L.R.
1179Stateexrel.Traubvs.Brown(1938),197A478Melsonvs.Shetterley(1933),95Ind.App.538,183
NE802.
6L27833,April18,1969,27SCRA835.
779Phil.461(1947).
8Cranch137,2L.ed.60(1803).
9Personally,Iviewthismotionasaheretoforeunheardofcuriosity.IcannotcomprehendDiokno'sreal
motivation,sincegrantinghismotioncouldconceivablyresultinhisindefinitedetention.
1017Fed.Cas.144,CaseNo.94878(C.C.D.Md.1861).
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114Wall.2,18L.ed.281(1866).
G.R.No.L35546
1235Colo.159,85Pac.l90(1904).
13Moyervs.Peabody,212U.S.78,53L.ed.410(1909).
14327U.S.304,90L.ed.688(1946).
15146F.2d576(C.C.A.9th,1944).
16324U.S.833,89L.ed.1398(1945).
17,note10.
Supra
18Schubert,ThePresidencyinthecourts,n.54,p.185(1957).
19,note3.
Supra
20See14EncyclopediaBritannica,pp.984985(1945).
21Englandhasanunwrittenconstitution,thereisnotevenabarementionofmartiallawintheFederaland
inmostoftheStateconstitutionsoftheUnitedStates(seeAppendixtothisseparateopinion),andthereis
apaucityorcompleteabsenceofstatutesorcodesgoverningitinthevariouscommonlawjurisdictions
whereithasbeeninstituted.
22Fairman,TheLawofMartialRule(2nded.,1943),pp.2,52and145.
23Fairman,.,pp.94,103,108109Walker,MilitaryLaw,(1954ed.),p.475.
Id
24Mental,MilitaryOccupationandtheRuleofLaw(1944ed.),pp.9,24,27,31,4244.
25Winthrop,MilitaryLaw&Precedents(2nded.,1920),p.799.
264Wallace2,18L.ed.281(1866).
27Winthrop,id.,p.817.
28CommonwealthActNo.408recognizestheeventualityofthedeclarationofmartiallawinitsArticlesof
War2,37,82and83.TheAFPManualforCourtsMartialdefinesmartiallawas"theexerciseofmilitary
jurisdictionbyagovernmenttemporarilygoverningthecivilpopulationofalocalitythroughitsmilitary
forces,withoutauthorityofwrittenlaw,asnecessitymayrequire."Martiallaw,asthusexercisable,isin
manyrespectscomparabletothestateofsiegeofthecontinentalnationsofEurope.
29SeeManualforCourtsMartial(AFP),p.1.Willoughbyobservesthat"Wheremartiallawisinvokedinthe
faceofinvasion,itiswarpureandsimple,anditisinthissensethatFielddefinesmartiallawas'simply
militaryauthority,exercisedinaccordancewiththelawsandusagesofwar,'andthattheU.S.Supreme
Courtdefinesitas'thelawofnecessityintheactualpresenceofwar'Upontheactualsceneofwar,martial
lawbecomesindistinguishablefrommilitarygovernment."(Willoughby,TheConstitutionalLawoftheUnited
States,2nded.,1939,vol.3,pp.15951597).
30See45Mich.LawReview87.
31Winthrop,.,p.820.
id
32Luthervs.Borden,7How.1,12L.ed.581,600(1849).
33PresidentMarcoswrites:"Thecompellingnecessity[oftheimpositionofmartiallawinthePhilippines]
arisesoutofthesevengravethreatstotheexistenceoftheRepublic:thecommunistrebellion,therightist
conspiracy,theMuslimsecessionistmovement,therampantcorruptiononalllevelsofsocietythecriminal
andcriminalpoliticalsyndicatesincludingtheprivatearmiesdeterioratingeconomyandtheincreasing
socialjustice."(FerdinandE.Marcos,NotesontheNewSocietyofthePhilippines,98(1973)).
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34L33964,Dec.11,1971.42SCRA448.
G.R.No.L35546
35Peoplevs.FerrerL3261314,Dec.27,1972,48SCRA382,405:
InthePhilippinesthecharacteroftheCommunistPartyhasbeentheobjectofcontinuingscrutinybythis
Court.In1932wefoundtheCommunistPartyofthePhilippinestobeanillegalassociation.In1969we
againfoundthattheobjectiveofthePartywasthe'overthrowofthePhilippinesGovernmentarmed
struggleandtoestablishinthePhilippinesacommunistformofgovernmentsimilartothatofSovietRussia
andRedChina.'Morerecently,in,wenotedthegrowthoftheCommunistPartyofthePhilippinesandthe
organizationofCommunistfrontsamongorganizationssuchastheKabataangMakabayan(KM)andthe
emergenceoftheNewPeople'sArmy.Aftermeticulouslyreviewingtheevidence,wesaid:'Weentertain,
therefore,nodoubtsabouttheexistenceofasizeablegroupofmenwhohavepubliclyriseninarmsto
overthrowthegovernmentandhavethusbeenandstillareengagedinrebellionagainsttheGovernmentof
thePhilippines.'
Lansangvs.Garcia
36Peoplevs.Evangelista,57Phil.375(1932)(illegalassociation)Peoplevs,Evangelista,57Phil.354
(1932)(rebellionandsedition):Peoplevs.Capadocia57Phil.364(1932)(rebellionandsedition)People
vs.Evangelista,57Phil.372(1932)(rebellionandsedition)Peoplevs.Feleo,57Phil.451(1932)(inciting
tosedition)Peoplevs.Nabong,57Phil.455(1932)(incitingtosedition).
37Peoplevs.Lava,L4974,May16,1969,28SCRA72(rebellion):Peoplevs.Hernandez,L6025,May
30,1964,11SCRA223(rebellion)Lavavs.Gonzales,L23048,July31,1964,11SCRA650(rebellion)
Peoplevs.CapadociaL4907,June29,1963,8SCRA301(rebellion).
38Montenegrovs.Castaeda,91Phil.882(1952).
39L31687,Feb.26,1970,31SCRA730(withCastroandFernando,JJ.dissenting).
40.note19.
Supra
41.at485486.
Id
42.,at48487.
Id
43TheTimesJournal,BulletinTodayandDailyExpress,onWednesday,August28,1974,carriednewsof
anationwidearmssmugglingnetworkbeingoperatedbytheCommunistPartyofthePhilippinesin
collaborationwithaforeignbasedsource.TheDepartmentofNationalDefensereportedthatseveralarms
smugglingvesselshadbeenseized,thatthenetworkhadacquiredseveraltruckingservicesforitsillegal
purposes,andthataboutP2millionhadnotsofarbeenexpendedforthisoperationbyaforeignsource.
TheDepartmentstressedthat"theclandestinenetworkisstilloperatingwithstrongindicationsthatseveral
armslandingshavealreadybeenmade."TheDepartmentalsorevealedthatthemilitaryhaslaunched
necessarycountermeasuresinordertodismantleinduetimethisextensiveantigovernmentoperation."
TheDepartmentfinallyconfirmedthearrestof38subversives,includingthefollowing13personswho
occupyimportantpositionsinthehierarchyoftheCommunistmovementinthePhilippines:Manuel
ChiongsonFidelV.Agcaoili,DaniloVizmanos,DanteSimbulan,AndyPerez,NormanQuimpo,Fernando
Tayag,BonifacioP.Ilagan,JoseF.Lacaba,DomingoM.Luneta,MilaGarcia,RicardoFerrerandDolores
Feria.
TheTimesJournal,BulletinTodayandDailyExpress,onThursday,August29,1974,carriedthenewsthat
asecretarmoftheCommunistPartyofthePhilippinesengagedexclusivelyinthemanufactureof
explosivesforsabotageandotherantigovernmentoperationshavebeenuncoveredbythemilitary,
followingaseriesofraidsbygovernmentsecurityagentsonundergroundhouses,twoofwhichare
businessestablishmentsprovidingfundsforthepurchaseofchemicalsandotherrawmaterialsforthe
manufactureofexplosives.Thedocumentsseizedintheraidsindicatedthatthe"explosivesmovement"
wasaseparatesubversivegrouporganizedinearly1972underthedirectsupervisionoftheCPPmilitary
armandwascomposedofelitemembersknowledgeableinexplosivesandchemicalresearch.
TheTimesJournal,BulletinTodayandDailyExpress,onSunday,September1,1974,carriednewsofa
nationwide"communistinsurgentconspiracy"to"uniteallgroupsopposingtheNewSociety,armthemand
urgethemtofightandoverthrowthegovernment,andestablishacoalitiongovernmentunderthe
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leadershipoftheCommunistPartyofthePhilippines."Accordingtodocumentsseizedbythemilitary,"local
G.R.No.L35546
communistsandotherinsurgentssteppedupeffortsinmid1973tosetupasocalledNationalDemocratic
Front."TheDepartmentofNationalDefenserevealedthatthearmedforcesarecontinuingmilitary
operationsinCotabato,Lanao,SuluandZamboanga.
4435Colo.154,91Pac.738,740(1905).
45WHOvs.Aquino,L35131,Nov.29,1972,48SCRA242.
46Willoughbycallsthissituation"martiallawinsensustrictiore."(Willoughby,TheConstitutionalLawofthe
UnitedStates,2nded.,1939,Vol.3,pp.1586and1595).
47Thecorrespondingprovisioninthe1973Constitutionisart.IX,sec.12.
48See5LaurelProceedingsofthePhilippineConstitutionalConvention,249259(1966).49PresidentJose
P.Laurel,inaspeechonthedraftofthe1935constitution,gaveasreasonsfortheadoptionofthe
CommanderinChiefClause(a)thedesireofthemembersofthe1934ConstitutionalConventiontoafford
thestatewithaneffectivemeansforselfdefense(theexperienceoftheLatinAmericancountrieswasan
objectlessonfortheConvention),and(b)thesenseoftheConventionthattheexecutivepowershouldbe
madestronger(MalcolmandLaurel,PhilippineconstitutionalLaw,p.200,footnoteno.4).
50Barcelonvs.Baker,5Phil.87(1905).
5191Phil.982(1952).
52L33964,Dec.11,1971,42SCRA448.
53Sterlingvs.Constantin287U.S.378,77L.ed.375(1932)Martinvs.Mott,12Wheat,19,6L.ed.537
(1827)Luthervs,Borden,7How.1,12L.ed.581(1849)Moyervs.Peabody,212U.S.7.8,53L.ed.410
(1809).
544Wall.2,18L.ed.281(1866).
55327U.S.304,90L.ed.688(1946).
56Whitewasconvictedofembezzlement,whileDuncanwasconvictedofbrawling.
57King,TheLegalityofMartialLawinHawaii,30CaliforniaL.Rev.599,627(1942).
58Montenegrovs.Castaeda,91Phil.882(1952).
59Fairman,TheLawofMartialRuleandtheNationalEmergency,55Harv.L.Rev.12531254(1942).
60Rossiter,ThesupremeCourtandCommanderinChief,36(1951).
61Winthrop,id.,p.817seealsoElphinstonevs.Bedreechund,IKnap.P.C.316D.F.Maraisvs.The
GeneralOfficerCommandingtheLinesofCommunicationoftheColony(i.e.,theCapeofGoodHope),
1902AppealCases10914EncyclopediaBritannica,p.977(1969):14EncyclopediaBritannica,p.985
(1955).
6217Sup.Ct.Rep.,CapeofGoodHope,340(1900),citedbyCharlesFairmaninTheLawofMartialRule,
Chapter10.
63Luthervs.Borden,7How.1,12L.ed.581,600(1849).
64212U.S.78,53L.ed.410(1909).
65287U.S.378,77L.ed.375(1932).
6635Colo.159,85Pac.190(1904).
67"Theproclamation[ofmartiallaw]isadeclarationofanexistentfactandawarningbytheauthorities
thattheyhavebeenforcedagainsttheirwilltohaverecoursetostrongmeanstosuppressdisorderand
restorepeace.Ithas,asThurmanArnoldhaswritten,merely'emotionaleffect'andcannotitselfmakeup
fortheabsenceoftheconditionsnecessaryfortheinitiationofmartiallaw."(ClintonL.Rossiter,
ConstitutionalDictatorship(CrisisGovernmentintheModernDemocracies),p.146(1948).
681973Const.Art.IV,sec.15.
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69.,Art.XVII,sec.3(2).
G.R.No.L35546
Id
70Javellanavs.ExecutiveSecretary,L36142,March31,1973,50SCRA30.
71ClintonL.Rossiter,ConstitutionalDictatorship(CrisiGovernmentintheModernDemocracies),pp.145
146(1948).
72FrederickB.WienerAPracticalManualofMartialLaw,p.8.(1940).(SeealsoTheSuspensionofthe
privilegeoftheWritofHabeasCorpus:ItsJustificationandDurationbyFleridaRuthPinedaandAugusto
CeasarEspiritu,22PhilippineLawJournal,No.1,February1952,pp.19,37).
73ByGeneralOrderNo.3datedSeptember22,1972,asamendedbyGeneralOrderNo.3Aofthesame
date,thePresidentordered,interalia,that"theJudiciaryshallcontinuetofunctioninaccordancewithits
presentorganizationandpersonnel,andshalltryanddecideinaccordancewithexistinglawsallcriminal
andcivilcases,exceptthefollowingcases:1.Thoseinvolvingthevalidity,legality,orconstitutionalityof
ProclamationNo.1081,datedSeptember21,1972,orofanydecree,orderoractsissued,promulgatedor
performedbymeorbymydulydesignatedrepresentativepursuantthereto."
74FerdinandE.Marcos,NotesontheNewSocietyofthePhilippines,99,100(1973).
FERNANDO,J.,concurringanddissenting:
1ChinYowv.UnitedStates,208US8,13(1908).
2SecretaryofStateofHomeAffairsv.O'Brien,A.C.603,609(1923).AsthewritoriginatedinEngland,it
maybeofsomeinteresttonotethatasearlyas1220thewordshabeatcorporaappearedinanorder
directinganEnglishsherifftoproducepartiestoatrespassactionbeforetheCourtofCommonPleas.In
succeedingcenturies,thewritwasmadeuseofbywayofproceduralorderstoensurethatpartiesbe
presentatcourtproceedings.
3Cf.Finnickv.Peterson,6Phil.172(1906)Jonesv.Harding,9Phil.279(1907)Villaflorv.Summers,41
Phil.62(1920)Caragv.Warden,53Phil.85(1929)Lopezv.DelosReyes,55Phil.170(1930)Estaciov.
ProvincialWarden,69Phil.150(1939)Arnaultv.Nazareno,87Phil,29(1950)Arnaultv.Balagtas,97
Phil.358(1955).
4Cf.Rubiv.ProvincialBoard,39Phil.660(1919).
5Cf.Lorenzov.DirectorofHealth,50Phil.595(1927).
6Cf.InreCarr,IPhil.513(1902)Mekinv.Wolfe,2Phil.74(1903)Cabantagv.Wolfe,6Phil.273(1906)
InreSmith,14Phil.112(1909)Cabilingv.PrisonOfficer,75Phil.1(1945)Raquizav.Bradford,75Phil.
50(1945)Reyesv.Crisologo,75Phil.225(1945)Yamashitav.Styer,75Phil.563(1945)Cantosv.
Styer,76Phil.748(1946)TubbandTedrowv.Griess78Phil.249(1947)Miquiabasv.Phil.Ryukyus
Command,80Phil.262(1948)Dizonv.Phil.RyukyusCommand,81Phil.286(1948).
7Cf.LoPov.McCoy,8Phil,343(1907)Lorenzov.McCoy,15Phil.559(1910)Edwardsv.McCoy,22
Phil.598(1912)QueQuayv.CollectorofCustoms,33Phil.128(1916)TanMeNiov.Collectorof
Customs,34Phil.944(1916)Bayaniv.CollectorofCustoms,37Phil.468(1918)InreMcCullochDick,38
Phil.41(1918)Mateov.CollectorofCustoms,63Phil.470(1936)Chuav.SecretaryofLabor,68Phil.
649(1939)Villahermosav.CommissionerofImmigration,80Phil.541(1948)Mejoffv.Directorof
Prisons,90Phil.70(1951)Borovskyv.CommissionerofImmigration,90Phil.107(1951).
8Cf.Reyesv.Alvarez,8Phil.723(1907)Lozanov.Martinez,36Phil,976(1917)Pelayov.LavinAedo,
40Phil.501(1919)Bancostav.Doe,46Phil.843(1923)SanchezdeStrongv.Beishir53Phil.331
(1929)Makapagalv.Santamaria,55Phil.418(1930)Salvanav.Gaela,55Phil.680(1931)Ortizv.Del
Villar,57Phil.19(1932)Floresv.Cruz,99Phil.720(1956)Murdockv.Chuidian99Phil.821(1956).
9AswassoaptlyputinanarticlewrittenbythethenProfessor,nowSolicitorGeneral,EstelitoMendoza:"It
isawellknownfactthattheprivilegeofthewritoftheisanindispensableremedyfortheeffective
protectionofindividualliberty.Thisismoresowhentheinfringementarisesfromgovernmentaction.When
libertyisthreatenedorcurtailedbyprivateindividuals,onlyaloudcry(infact,itneednotevenbeloud)
needbemade,andthegovernmentstepsintopreventthethreatenedinfringementortovindicatethe
consummatedcurtailment.Theactionisoftenswiftandeffectivetheresultsgenerallysatisfactoryand
gratifying.Butwhenthegovernmentitselfisthe'culprit',thecryneedbelouder,fortheactionisinvariable
madeundercoloroflaworcloakedwiththemantleofauthority.Theprivilegeofthewrit,however,because
itmaybemadetobearupongovernmentalofficers,assuresthattheindividual'scryshallnot,atleast,be
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futileandvain."Mendoza,TheSuspensionoftheWritof:SuggestedAmendments,33PhilippineLaw
G.R.No.L35546
Journal,630,635(1958).
habeascorpusHabeascorpus
10Lansangv.Garcia,L33964.December11,1971,42SCRA448.
11Peoplev.Hernandez,99Phil.515,551552(1956).Thereferencewastothe1935Constitution.It
appliesaswelltothepresentConstitution.
12Navav.Gatmaitan,90Phil.172,194195(1951).
13ThefiveaffirmativevotescamefromthethenChiefJusticeParasandJusticesBengzon,Tuason,Reyes
andJugo.ThenegativevoteswerecastbyJusticesFeria,Pablo,Padilla,andBautistaAngelo.
14Laurel,S.,ed.,IllProceedingsofthePhilippineConstitutionalConvention334(1966).
15Marcos,Today'sRevolution:Democracy29(1971).
16Alzona,ed.,QuotationsfromRizal'sWritings72(1962).
17Mabini,ThePhilippineRevolution10(1969).
18Cf.PreambleofthepresentConstitutionaswellasthatofthe1935Constitution.
19Cf.Laski,LibertyintheModernState34(1949).
20ProclamationNo.1081,September21,1972.
21Cf.Taadav.Cuenco,103Phil.1051(1957).
22Cf.Alejandrinov.Quezon,46Phil.83(1924)Verav.Avelino,77Phil.192(1946)Avelinov.Cuenco,
83Phil.17,ResolutionofMarch1949.
23Cf.Morrerov.Bocar,66Phil.429(1938)Aytonav.Castillo,L19313,January19,1962,4SCRA1
Rodriguezv.Quirino,L19800,October28,1963,9SCRA284.
24Cf.Lansangv.Garcia,L33964,December11,1971,42SCRA448.
25Cf.AccordingtoArticleVII,Section10,par.(2)ofthe1935Constitution:"ThePresidentshallbe
commanderinchiefofallarmedforcesofthePhilippinesand,wheneveritbecomesnecessary,hemay
calloutsucharmedforcestopreventorsuppresslawlessviolence,invasion,insurrection,orrebellion.In
caseofinvasion,insurrection,orrebellionorimminentdangerthereof,whenthepublicsafetyrequiresit,he
maysuspendtheprivilegesofthewritof,orplacethePhilippinesoranypartthereofundermartiallaw."
TherelevantprovisionofthepresentConstitutionisfoundinArticleIX,Section12.Itreadsthus:"The
PrimeMinistershallbecommanderinchiefofallarmedforcesofthePhilippinesand,wheneveritbecomes
necessary,hemaycalloutsucharmedforcestopreventorsuppresslawlessviolence,invasion,
insurrection,orrebellion.Incaseofinvasion,insurrection,orrebellion,orimminentdangerthereof,when
thepublicsafetyrequiresit,hemaysuspendtheprivilegeofthewritof,orplacethePhilippinesoranypart
thereofundermartiallaw."
26ProclamationNo.1081,September21,1972.
27Lansangv.Garcia,L33964,December11,1971,42SCRA448,473474.
28,474475.
Ibid
29,505506.
Ibid
30,479480.
Ibid
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31,507508.
G.R.No.L35546
Ibid
32ArticleXVII,Section3,par.(2)oftheConstitution.
33.
Ibid
3493Phil.68(1953).
35RepublicActNo.342(1948).
3693Phil.68,82.
37Bridgesv.California,314US252,304305.
38Villavicenciov.Lukban,39Phil.778,790(1919).
393WilloughbyontheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates,1591(1929).
40Story,CommentariesontheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates,3rded.(1858).
41ExparteMilligan,4Wall.2.
42Sterlingv.Constantin,287US378.
43Duncanv.Kahanamoku327US304.
44Cf.Dodd,CasesonConstitutionalLaw,520528(1949)Dowling,CasesonConstitutionalLaws,446
456(1950)SholleyCasesonConstitutionalLaw,285295(1951)Frank,CasesonConstitutionalLaw,
257261,270(1952)FreundSutherland,HoweBrown,ConstitutionalLaw,16461651,16791693(1954)
Barrett,BrutonHonnoldConstitutionalLaw,13021308(1963)KauperConstitutionalLaw276284(1966)
LockhartKamisarChoperConstitutionalLaw,14111418(1970).
451CooleyConstitutionalLimitations,8thed.,637,758(1926).
46WatsonontheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates(1910).
47Burdick,TheLawoftheAmericanConstitution,261(1922).
48WilloughbyontheConstitutionoftheUnitedStates,2nded.,1591(1929).
49WillisonConstitutionalLaw,449(1936).
50Schwartz,IIThePowersofGovernment,244(1963).
51,246.
Ibid
52287US378,402403(1932).
53327US304,322(1946).TheconcurringopinionofJusticeMurphywassimilarlygenerousinits
referencetoMilligan.ItisnottobelostsightofthatthestatutoryprovisioninquestionwasSection67ofthe
OrganicActofHawaiiwhenitwasstillaterritory.Nonetheless,sinceaccordingtoJusticeBlack,its
languageaswellasitslegislativehistoryfailedtoindicatethescopeofmartiallaw,itsinterpretationwasin
accordancewiththeAmericanconstitutionaltraditionasembodiedinMilligan.
54Dicey,TheLawoftheConstitution,287288(1962).
55,288.
Ibid
56Rossiter,Constitutionaldictatorship,9(1948).
57212US78(1909).
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58,85.
G.R.No.L35546
Ibid
59.
Ibid
60264US543(1924).
61,547548.
Ibid
62Rostow,TheSovereignPrerogative,235(1963).TheworkofFairmanquotedistheLawofMartialRule,
217218(1943).
63Lasswell,NationalSecurityandIndividualFreedom,151(1950).
644Wall.123(1866).
TEEHANKEE,J.:
1Petitioner'sReplytoSolicitorGeneral'sCommentdatedMarch7,1974,pp.4041.
2,pp.3940:seeL35556,L35567andL35571wherepetitionswerewithdrawnwithleaveoftheCourt.
Idem
3Makalintal,C.J.andZaldivar,Fernando,Teehankee,Barredo,MuozPalmaandAquino,JJ.votedfor
grantingthewithdrawalmotion.Castro,Makasiar,Antonio,EsguerraandFernandez,votedfordenialofthe
motion.
4ArticleX,section2,whichfurtherrequirestheconcurrenceofitleastten(10)memberstodeclare
unconstitutionalatreaty,executiveagreementorlaw.
5Respondents'commentofJan.17,1974onmotiontowithdrawpetition,p.6.
6,p.5.
Idem
7Respondents'memorandumofNov.17,1972,pp.4147.
8Respondents'commentofJan.17,1974,pp.3,5and16.TheSolicitorGeneral'slineofjudgment:"(T)he
chargeinthecaseatbargoestotheveryfoundationsofoursystemofjusticeandtherespectthatisdue
toit.Itissubversiveofpublicconfidenceintheimpartialityandindependenceofcourtsandtendsto
embarrasstheadministrationofjustice.Ashasbeenaptlysaid,'TheCourt'sauthoritypossessedof
neitherthepursenorthesworduntimatelyrestsonsustainedpublicconfidenceinitsmoralsanction.
SuchfeelingmustbenourishedbytheCourt'scompletedetachment,infactandinappearance,from
politicalentanglementsandbyabstentionfrominjectingitselfintotheclashofpoliticalforcesinpolitical
settlements.'(Bakerv.Carr,369U.S.186,266,267,Frankfurter,J.dissenting[1962].)
"Unless,therefore,thechargeisrectifiedanythingthisCourtwilldointhecaseatbarislikelytobe
misconstruedinthepublicmind.IfthisCourtdecidesthiscaseandrendersjudgmentagainstpetitioner,its
decisionislikelytobemisinterpretedeitherasavindictiveactiontakenagainstthepetitionerorasproving
hischarge.IfitgrantstheMotiontoWithdrawitwillbeconfessingtheveryjudgmentexpressedbythe
petitionerthatthisCourtcannotdojusticeinthiscase.Perhapstheonlywayopenforitwouldbeto
renderjudgmentforthepetitioner,althoughthenotherswilllikelythinkthattheCourtisreactingtothe
charge.'Itisthisharmfulobstructionandhindrancethatthejudiciarystrivestoavoid,underpenaltyof
contempt,'asthisCourtexplainedinanothercase.(HerrasTeehankeevs.DirectorofPrisons,reAntonio
Quirino,76Phil.630[1946].)"
9SolicitorGeneral'sReplytopetitioner'scomment(reManifestation)datedJune10,1974,pp.24.
10Respondents'ReplytoPetitioner'sSurRejoinder(remotiontowithdraw)datedJune10,1974,pp.56,
citingJames,WhatPragmatismMeansinHumanExperienceanditsProblems:IntroductoryReadingsin
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Philosophy,23,25(ATsambassised.1967).
G.R.No.L35546
11FiledonAugust23,1973.
12Respondents'commentofJan.17,1914,p.17emphasissupplied.
13SolicitorGeneral'sReplytopetitioner'scomment,datedJune10,1974,p.13.
14Javellanavs.ExecutiveSecretary,L36142,etal.,March31,1973.
15Petitioner'swithdrawalmotiononDec.29,1973,pp.3,4and7.
16Thus,onApril7,1973,afteritsdecisionofMarch31,1973dismissingtheratificationcases,actingupon
theurgentpetitionofthewivesofpetitionersDioknoandAquinothattheirvisitationprivilegeshadbeen
suspendedandthattheyhadlostallcontactforoveramonthwiththedetaineeswhosepersonaleffects
werereturnedtotheirhomes,theCourtinCaseL36315"uponhumanitarianconsiderations....resolved
unanimouslytograntpendingfurtheractionbythiscourt,thatportionoftheprayerinpetitioner'sactionby
thisCourt,thatportionoftheprayerinpetitioner's"Supplementand/oramendmenttopetition"filedonApril
6,1973thatthewivesandminorchildrenofpetitionersDioknoandAquinobeallowedtovisitthem,subject
tosuchprecautionsasrespondentsmaydeemnecessary."
17Petitioner'swithdrawalmotion,pp.67.
18SubjecttothetransistorprovisionsofArticleXII.
19CongressnolongerconvenedonJanuary22,1973asordainedbythe1935Constitution:seeRoxasvs.
ExecutiveSecretaryL36165,March31,1973,withamajorityofitsmembersoptingtoserveintheabortive
InterimNationalAssemblyunderArt.XVII,see.2ofthe1973Constitution.
20Javellanavs.Exec.Secretary,50SCRA30,141.
21JusticesZaldivar,Fernandoandthewriter,withChiefJusticeConcepcion,retired,andnowChiefJustice
MakalintalandJusticeCastro.
22ArticleXII,sec.8,1973Constitution.
23SEC.9.AllofficialsandemployeesintheexistingGovernmentoftheRepublicofthePhilippinesshall
continueinofficeuntilotherwiseprovidedbylawordecreedbytheincumbentPresidentofthePhilippines,
butallofficialswhoseappointmentsarebythisConstitutionvestedinthePrimeMinistershallvacatetheir
respectiveofficesupontheappointmentandqualificationoftheirsuccessors."
24"napinapagpatuloysapanunungkulan"asstatedintheoriginaloathinPilipino.
25Fernandez,MuozPalmaandAquino,JJ.
26SEC4.Allpublicofficersandemployeesandmembersofthearmedforcesshalltakeanoathtosupport
anddefendtheConstitution."
27SeePhil.Express,TimesJournalandBulletinTodayissuesofOct.30,1973.TheCourtandthe
IntegratedBarhavesincethenpetitionedthePresidenttoextendlikewisethesamesecurityoftenuretoall
otherjudgesofinferiorcourtsfromtheCourtofAppealsdownbysettingatimelimittotheexerciseofhis
powerofsummaryreplacement.
2842SCRA448,462,492.
29ExceptJusticeFernandowhoopinedthat"(B)ythesametoken,ifandwhenformalcomplaintis
presented,thecourtstepsinandtheexecutivestepsout.Thedetentionceasestobeanexecutiveand
becomesajudicialconcern.Thereuponthecorrespondingcourtassumesitsroleandthejudicialprocess
takesitscoursetotheexclusionoftheexecutiveorthelegislativedepartments.Henceforward,theaccused
isentitledtodemandalltheconstitutionalsafeguardsandprivilegesessentialtodueprocess."citingJustice
Tuason'sopinioninNavavs.Gatmaitan,90Phil.172(1951).
30SinceSeptember23,1972.
31287U.S.375,385emphasiscopiedfromLansang,42SCRAatp.473.
32ReferringtotherequirementsofArt.III,sec.1,par.14andArt.VII,see.11,par.2ofthe1935
Constitution,nowArt.IV,sec.15reads:
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SEC.12.ThePrimeMinister[President]shallbecommanderinchiefofallarmedforcesofthePhilippines
G.R.No.L35546
and,wheneveritbecomesnecessary,hemaycalloutsucharmedforcestopreventorsuppresslawless
violence,invasion,insurrection,orrebellion.Incaseofinvasion,insurrection,orrebellion,orimminent
dangerthereof,whenthepublicsafetyrequiresit,hemaysuspendtheprivilegeofthewritoforplacethe
Philippinesoranypartthereofundermartiallaw.(Art.IX,sec.12,1973ConstitutionandArt.VII,sec.11(2)
1935Constitution).
habeascorpus
3342SCRAatpp.473474emphasiscopied.
34SEC.3.(2)Allproclamations,orders,decrees,instructions,andactspromulgated,issued,ordoneby
theincumbentPresidentshallbepartofthelawoftheland,andshallremainvalid,legal,binding,and
effectiveevenafterliftingofmartiallawortheratificationofthisConstitution,unlessmodified,revoked,or
supersededbysubsequentproclamations,orders,decrees,instructionsorotheractsoftheincumbent
President,orunlessexpresslyandexplicitlymodifiedorrepealedbyregularNationalAssembly.
35Art.IV,sec.Iand19,BillofRights,1973Constitution.
36SalvadorP.Lopez,U.P.president'skeynoteaddress,Dec.3,1973attheU.P.LawCenterSeriesonthe
1973Constitution.
37PresidentMarcos:"Democracy:alivingideologydeliveredMay25,1973beforetheU.P.LawAlumni
AssociationTimesJournalissueofMay28,1973.
38PresidentMarcos:Foreword,NotesontheNewSocietyp.vi.
39U.S.NewsandWorldReport,interviewwithPresidentMarcos,reportedinPhil.SundayExpressissueof
August18,1974.
40Gonzalesvs.Viola,61Phil.824SeealsoZagalavs.Ilustre48Phil.282andTanvs.Collectorof
Customs34Phil.944.
BARREDO,J.,concurring:
*50SCRA30.
1ThecourttooknoactionontheprohibitionaspectofG.R.No.L35540andlaterofG.R.No.L35573.
Anyway,withtheoutcomeofthepetitionsandinthelightofthegroundsofhisdecision,itwouldbe
academictoprosecutethesamefurther.
habeascorpus
2PetitionerdiedatABMSisonHospitalonMarch2,1973ofcausesunrelatedtohisdetention.
3Actuallythereareonly28petitioners,as4ofthemappeartohavefileddoublepetitions.
4ExcludingEnriqueVoltaireGarciaIIwho,asmentionedearlier,haddied.
5Thewriter'sreasonsinfavorofgrantingthemotiontowithdrawarediscussedintheaddendumofthis
decision.SincetheCourtasabodyhasdeniedsaidmotion,petitionerDiokno'scasehastoberesolvedon
itsmerits.Accordingly,adiscussionofsomeofthegroundsallegedinthesaidmotionwhichmayhavea
bearinginonewayoranotherwiththefundamentalissueshereininvolvedisinorder.Inview,however,of
thereleaseofSenatorDioknoonSeptember11,1974,thecourthasdecidedtodismisshispetitionfor
beingmootandacademic.Butthisdevelopmentdoesnotnecessarilyrenderthediscussionofhis
contentionsirrelevantbecausetheycanalsosupportthecasesoftheotherpetitioners,henceitseems
bettertoretainsaiddiscussioninthisopinion.
6Atbest,suchaposecouldbetrueonlyasregardshisarrestanddetentionuptoJanuary17,1973,but
notwithrespecttohiscontinueddetentionaftertheNewConstitutionbecameeffective.
6*Villavicenciov.Lukban,39Phil.778,atp.790.
7ItisamatterofcontemporarythatinaunanimousdecisionpromulgatedonJanuary8,1973,inthecase
ofSergioOsmea,Jr.vs.FerdinandMarcos,thePresidentialElectoralTribunalupheldtheelectionof
PresidentMarcosinNovember,1969anddismissedtheprotestofOsmea,rulingasfollows:.
Inthelightoftheforegoing,Weareoftheopinionandsoholdthattheresultoftherevisionand
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appreciationoftheballotsinthepilotprovinces,congressionaldistrictsandcitiesdesignatedbythe
G.R.No.L35546
Protestantasbestexemplifyingtherampantterrorismandmassivevotebuying,aswellasthefraudand
otherirregularitiesallegedlycommittedbytheProtestee,hasshown,beyonddoubt,thatthelatterhad
obtainedaverysubstancialpluralityand/ormajorityofvotesovertheformer,regardlessofwhetherWe
considerthattheProtestislimitedtotheelectionsintheprovinces,congressionaldistrictsandcities
specifiedinparagraphVIIIoftheProtestorincludes,also,theresultoftheelectionsintheprovincesand
municipalitiesmentionedinparagraphVIIoftheProtest,oreveniftheaveragereductionssufferedbyboth
partiesinsaidpilotprovinces,congressionaldistrictsandcitieswereappliedtotheentirePhilippinesthatit
isnecessary,therefore,tocontinuethepresentproceedingsandrevisetheballotscastintheprovinces
andcitiesspecifiedinparagraphVIIIoftheProtestmuchlessthosenamedinparagraphVIIthereof
otherthanthepilotprovincesandcongressionaldistrictsdesignatedbytheProtestant,asabovestated
thatneitherwoulditserveanyusefulpurposetorevisetheballotscastintheprovincesandcitiescounter
protestedbytheProtesteehereinthat,infilinghiscertificateofcandidacyforMayorofCebuCity,inthe
generalelectionsheldin1971,and,particularly,inassumingsaidofficeonJanuary1,1972,(asattestedto
byhisoathofoffice,copyofwhichisappendedtothisdecisionasAnnexH)afterhisproclamationasthe
candidateelectedtosaidoffice,theProtestanthadabandonedhisProtesthereinthattheProtestanthas
failedtomakeouthiscase,thattheProtesteehasobtainedthepluralityandmajorityofthevotescastfor
theofficeofthePresidentofthePhilippines,inthegeneralelectionsheldin1969andthat,accordingly,he
wasdulyelectedtosaidofficeintheaforementionedelectionsandproperlyproclaimedassuch.
8Excludingweekendsuspensionofsessions.
9Unlessexpresslystatedotherwise,allreferencestotheConstitutioninthisdiscussionaretoboththe
1935and1973charters,since,afterall,thepertinentprovisionsarepracticallyidenticalinboth.
10SeeprovisionsofboththeOldandtheNewConstitutioninfra,quotedonpage386.
ThetermExecutiveisusedtohaveacommonreferencetothePresidentundertheOldConstitutionandto
thePrimeMinisterunderthenewone.
11Art.III,sec.1,Old(1935)ConstitutionArt.IV,sec.1,New(1973)Constitution.
12Art.III,sec.14.IntheNewConstitution,thecorrespondingprovisionreadsasfollows:"Theprivilegeof
thewritofshallnotbesuspendedexceptincasesofinvasion,insurrection,rebellion,orimminentdanger
thereof,whenthepublicsafetyrequiresit."(Art.IV,sec.15.)
habeascorpus
13Barcelonvs.Baker,5Phil.87Severinovs.GovernorGeneral,16Phil.366Abuevavs.Wood,45Phil.
612Alejandrinovs.Quezon,46Phil.85Veravs.Avelino,77Phil.192Mabanagvs.LopezVito,78Phil.1
Cabilivs.Francisco,88Phil.654Montenegrovs.Castaeda,91Phil.882Santosvs.Yatco,55O.G.
8641(MinuteResolutionofNov.6,1959)Osmeavs.Pendatun,Oct.28,1960.
14Duncanv.KahanamokuandWhitevs.Steer,327U.S.304358.
15Aytonavs.Castillo,4SCRA1.
16InthereferendumofJanuary1015,1973,thepeopleexpressedthemselvesagainsttheholdingof
electionsandtheimmediateconveningofthelegislature.Thiswasvirtuallyreaffirmedinthereferendumof
July2728,1973.
17Itisinterestingtonotethattheotherpetitionershavenotdiscussedthisissueanddonotseeminglyjoin
himinhispose.
18Whichmaynotbesurprising,consideringthatCounselTaadaofpetitionerDioknowhosignedthe
motiontowithdrawwasoneoftheleadingcounselsofthepetitionersintheRatificationCases.
19InG.R.No.L36142,Javellanavs.ExecutiveSecretaryandtheotherRatificationCases,thewriter,
joinedbyJusticesAntonioandEsguerra,wasoftheviewthatbeforeallowingtheentryoffinaljudgment
anddespitetheabsenceofanyprayerforreliefintheConstanciaandManifestationmentionedabove,it
wasbestfortheCourttocorrecttherepresentationsofcounselregardingthetruejuridicalimportofthe
decision,butthemajoritywereoftheopinionthatmisconstructionsbytheinterestedpartiesofthe
judgmentoftheCourtcannotaltertheeffectthereofintendedbytheCourtandevidentinitsdispositive
portion.Thewriterwasafraidthatfutureoccasionsmightarise,asithashappenednow,whenOursilence
maybetakenadvantageof,evenforthesakeofpropagandaalone.Ontheotherhand,JusticeZaldivar
statedthat"IfindmeritintheConstancia'andmanifestationofcounselforthepetitionerswheretheyassert
thatthesentence,'Thisbeingthevoteofthemajority,thereisnofurtherjudicialobstacletotheNew
Constitutionbeingconsideredinforceandeffect'inthedispositiveportionoftheresolutionisnotwarranted
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..."andthat"Thislastsentenceofthedispositiveportionoftheresolutionshouldhavebeendeleted."
G.R.No.L35546
20Theaboveexpositionofthejointopinionismadeinordertoexplainwhytherestofthemembersofthe
Court(exceptJusticeZaldivar)evidentlyfeltthattheviewthusexpressedbyChiefJusticeMakalintaland
JusticeCastrojustifiednotonlythejudgmentofdismissalbutalsothestatementthat"thereisnomore
judicialobstacletotheNewConstitutionbeingconsideredinforceandeffect."
21Section16ofArticleXVIIofthe1973Constitutionprovides:"ThisConstitutionshalltakeeffect
immediatelyuponitsratificationbyamajorityofthevotescastinaplebiscitecalledforthepurposeand,
exceptashereinprovided,shallsupersedetheConstitutionofnineteenhundredandthirtyfiveandall
amendmentsthereto."EventhisexpresseddesireoftheConventionwasdisregardedbythepeople,andit
isdifficulttoseewhatvalidprinciplethereisthatcancurtailthemfromexercisingtheirultimatesovereign
authorityinthemannerthen,deembestunderthecircumstances.
ANTONIO,J.:
1SomeofthosewhoarguedforthepetitionerswereAttys.LorenzoTaada,JovitoSalonga,RamonA.
Gonzales,JokerD.Arroyo,SedfreyOrdoez,PedroYap,andFrancisGarchitorena,whileSolicitorGeneral
EstelitoMendozaarguedfortherespondents.
2L35556VeronicaL.YuyitungandTanChinHianL35569AmandoDoronila,HernandoJ.Abaya,
ErnestoGranada,LuisD.Beltran,BrenGuiao,RubenCusipagandWillieBaunL35571TeresitaM.
GuiaoinbehalfofBrenGuiao,alsopetitionerinL35569...
3JoaquinP.Roces,TeodoroM.Locsin,Sr.,RolandoFadul,RosalindGalang,GoEngGuan,Renato
Constantino,andLuisR.MauricioinL35538MaximoSoliven,NapoleonG.Rama,andJoseMariVelezin
L35540RamonMitra,Jr.,FranciscoRodrigo,andNapoleonRamainL35546EnriqueVoltaireGarciaII
(deceased)inL35547:thepetitionersinL35556,L35567,L35571,andErnestoRondoninL35573.
4Art.VII,See.10(2),1935Constitution.
5Sec.21,JonesLawof1916.
6Art.II,Sec.2,par.1,U.S.Constitution.
7Fairmanat2325seealsoDowellat23132.
8Corwin,ThePresident:OfficeandPowers,p.280.
9,p.318.
Ibid
10CorwinandKoenig,ThePresidencyToday.
11Cortes,ThePhilippinePresidency,p.155.
12Art.VII,Sec.10(2),1935PhilippineConstitution.
13InhisreporttotheConstitutionalConvention,DelegateMarianoJesusCuenco,Chairmanofthe
CommitteeonExecutivePower,stated:
SeorPresident:nosotros,losmiembrosdelcomiteEjecutivo,teniendoencuentaporunladola
fragmentaciondenuestroterritorioenmilesdeislas,y,porotro,lasgrandescrisisqueagitanla
humanidad,hemosprocuradoformarunejeccutivofuertequemantengalaunidaddelanacion,con
suficientespoderesyproregativasparasalvaralpaisenlosmomentosdegrandespeligros.Para
conseguiresteobjetivo,nosotroshemosprovistoqueeljefedelpoderejecutivoseaeligidoporelsufragio
directodetodosloselectorescualificadosdelpaisreconocemossufacultaddesupervisorlos
departamentosejecutivos,todoslosnegociadosadministrativoslasprovinciasylosmunicipiosle
nombramoscentralenjefedelejercitoymiliciasfilipinosreconocemossuderechodevetarleyesyde
proponerelnobramientodelosaltosfuncionarios,desdelossecretariosdepartamentaleshastalos
embajadoresyconsules,yenlosmomentosdegrandescrisis,cuandolanacionseveaconfrontadade
algunospeligroscomoencasosdeguerra,etc.sereconoceenesteproyectoelderechodeljefedelpoder
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ejecutivodepromulgarreglas,confuerzadeley,parallevaracabounapoliticanacional.....(Proceedings
G.R.No.L35546
ofthePhilippineConstitutionalConvention,Laurel,Vol.III,p.216,SessionofNov.10,1934).(Emphasis
supplied.)
AsDelegateMiguelCuadernoobserved:
...notonlyamongthemembersoftheSubcommitteeofSeven,butalsowithamajorityofthedelegates
wasthefeelingquiteprevalentthattherewasneedofprovidingforastrongexecutive.Andinthisthe
lessonsofcontemporaryhistorywereapowerfulinfluence.Intimeswhenrulersexercisingtheprerogatives
ofadictatorappeartogivethelastrayofhopetopeoplessufferingfromchaos,onecouldnotbutentertain
thefeelingthatthesafetyandwellbeingofouryoungnationrequireaPresidentwhowouldbe
unhamperedbylackofauthority,orvexatiousprocrastinationofothergovernmentalunitsincaseof
emergency.(Cuaderno,TheFramingoftheConstitutionofthePhilippines,p.90).
14ThePhilippineConstitution,publishedbythePhil.LawyersAssociation,Vol.I,1969Ed.,p.183.
15FederalistNo.23.
16ExParteJones,45LRA(N.S.)1044.
17320US92,94(1943),87L.ed.1782.
1811Wallace493,506(1870).
19PerMr.JusticeFrankfurter,Bakerv.Carr,369U.S.186,7L.ed.2d.723.
20Mr.JusticeJackson,dissenting,Korematsuv.U.S.,323U.S.245,89L.ed.214.
21"Nocourtwillreviewtheevidenceuponwhichtheexecutiveactednorsetupitsopinionagainsthis."
(Vanderheydenv.Young[1814]11Johns[N.Y.]150Martinv.Mott[1827]12Wheat.[U.S.]19Lutherv.
Borden[1848]7How.[U.S.]1ExParteMoore[1870]64N.C.802AppealofHartranft[1877]85Pa.St.
433InreBoyle[1899]6Idaho609Sweeneyv.Commonwealth[1904]118Ky.912Barcelonv.Baker
[1905]5Phil.,87,100InreMoyer[1905]35Colo.159Franksv.Smith[1911]142Ky.232ExParte
McDonald,supra,Note11.
22Aruego,TheFramingofthePhilippineConstitution,Vol.I,p.431,1949Ed.
23278U.S.37840477L.ed.375DecidedDecember12,1932.
24GohKengSwee,theNatureandAppealsofCommunisminNonCommunistAsianCountries,p.43.
25JamesAmmeH.Garvey,MaxistLeninistChina:MilitaryandSocialDoctrine,1960,p.29.
26"Finally,LinPiaointhesamearticle,providesuswithadefinitionofMao'sstrategyofwaging
revolutionarywarfare,thestrategyofpeople'swar,whichcomprisesthefollowingsixmajorelements:
(1)LeadershipbyarevolutionarycommunistpartywhichwillproperlyapplyMarxismLeninisminanalyzing
theclascharacterofacolonialorsemicolonialcountry,andwhichamformulatecorrectpolicytowagea
protractedwaragainstimperialism,feudalsism,andbureaucraticcapitalism.
(2)Correctutilizationoftheunitedfrontpolicytobuild'thebroadestpossible'nationalunitedfrontto
'ensurethefullestmobilizationofthebasicmassesaswellastheunityofalltheforcesthancanbeunited,'
inanefforttotakeovertheleadershipofthenationalrevolutionandestablishtherevolutiononanalliance
of,first,theworkersandpeasantsand,second,anallianceoftheworkingpeopleswiththebourgeoisieand
othernonworkingpeople.'
(3)Relianceonthepeasantryandtheestablishmentofruralbases,becauseinagrarianand'semifeudal'
societiesthepeasantsarethegreatmajorityofthepopulation'subjectedtothreefoldoppressionand
exploitationbyimperialism,feudalism,andbureaucratcapitalism,'theywillprovideofthehumanand
materialresourcesfortherevolution.Inessence,therevolutionisapeasantrevolutionledbythe
communistpar:'torelyonthepeasants,buildruralbaseareasandusethecountrysidetoencircleand
finallycapturethecitiessuchwasthewaytovictoryintheChineserevolution.'
(4)Creationofacommunistpartyledarmyofanewtype,fora'universaltruthofMarxismLeninism'isthat
'withoutapeople'sarmythepeoplehavenothing.'Anewtypeofcommunistpartyledarmyinwhich
'politicsisthecommander'mustbeformed,onewhichfocusesoninstillinginthemindsofthepopulationa
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'proletarianrevolutionaryconsciousnessandcourageandwhichactivelyseeksthesupportandbackingof
G.R.No.L35546
themasses.'
(5)Useofthestrategyandtacticsofpeople'swarasinterpretedbyMaoTsetunginaprotractedarmed
struggletoannihilatetheenemyandtakeoverstatepower,basedonthesupportofamobilizedmass
populationandtheuseofguerrillawarfare,andultimatelymobileandevenpositionalwarfareasthe
revolutionprogresses.
(6)Adherencetoapolicyofselfreliance,because'revolutionorpeople'sinanycountryisthebusinessof
themassesinthatcountryandshouldbecarriedoutprimarilybytheirowneffectandthereisnoother
way.'"(PeterVanNess,RevolutionandChineseForeignPolicy,pp.7072.)
27"Areportofthe'PalananIncident'submittedbydefenseandmilitaryauthoritiestotheHousecommittee
onnationaldefensesaidthatnosingleincidenthaddonesomuchtofocusthedangersposedbythe
'reestablished'CommunistPartyofthePhilippinesandtheNPAthanthediscoveryofanabandonedship
andthesubsequentrecoveryofmilitaryhardwareanddocumentsininnocentlookingDigoyoBay.The
discoveryofthese'instrumentsofwar'whichwereintendedfortheinsurgentswasacauseofdeep
concernbecauseofitsdirectbearingonthenationalsecurity,thereportstated.
Underwraps.BeforetheKaragatanenteredthepicture,therehadbeenintelligencereportsofincreased
NPAactivitiesinthemountainareasandshorelinesofPalananandnearbyDilasagCasiguraninQuezon
Province.Militaryauthorities,forwellplacedreasons,hadkeptthesereportsunderwraps.Butafewof
themleakedout.Forinstance,acodeddispatchfromTaskForceSaranaymentionedasubmarine
unloadedsome200menandwhileoffDinapiquePoint,northofPalanan.
Whileskepticalnewsmenskimmedthroughthereports,theycameacrossrecordedinstancesofactual
operations:lastMay19,abignumberofNPA'sarrivedandencampedinthevicinityoftheDivinisaRiver.
OnMay26,ashipunloadedabout200sacksofrice,firearmsandammunitionatthevicinityofDigollorin.
Shipsideunloadingwaseffectedandcargoferriedaboardsmallboatsandbancas.
Twodayslater,onMay28,apowerboatpaintedred,whiteandbluewithaPhilippineflagflyingastern,
reconnoiteredfromDinatadmotoDivinisaPoint.FishermenfrombarrioMaligaya,Palanan,wereamong
thoseforcedtounloadfoodandmilitarysupplies.AboutthesecondweekofJune,anotherlandingof
suppliestookplacethere.
Programsofaction.Bythistime,Brig.Gen.TranquilinoParanis,Saranaycommander,startedtomove
someofhismenfromtaskforceheadquartersinEchague,Isabela,tothePalananarea.OnJune18,a
patrolofthetaskforceencounteredagroupofNPA'sinbarrioTaringsing,Cordontown.Heregovernment
troopsrecoveredCCPdocumentsoutliningprogramsofactionfor1972.Thedocumentsaccordingto
militaryanalysts,containedtimetablescallingfortheintensificationofsabotage,violenceandattackson
militarycampandothergovernmentinstallationdfromJulytoDecember.OnJuly3,informationwas
receivedthatanunidentifiedvesselhadbeenseenoffDigoyopoint.ParanisrelayedthemessagetoBrig.
Gen.TomasDiazatFirstPCZoneheadquartersinCampOlivas,Pampanga.Fromthenonuntilarmy
intellegenceraidedthehomeofasisterofoneoftheKaragatanFishingCo.,inCainta,Rizalandstumbled
onstacksofcommunistpropagandamaterials,theKaragatanhadexplodedonthepublicfaceinbold
glaringheadlines.
Whatbotheredarmyauthoritiesmostwasnotonlytheactuallandingofabout3,000riflesoftheM14type
ofwhich737hadalreadybeenrecoveredbytroopswhostormedHill225inPalananandalsoseized
60,000roundsofammunitionandanother30boxesofammunitionofrocketlaunchers.Itwasthepresence
oftherocketsthemselves.The40mmrocketsarehighexplosiveantitankweapons.Theyappeartobe
copiesoftheSovietRPG2whiletherocketlaunchersareprototypesoftheSovietRPG2antitank
launchersusedbytheVietcong.
ThelandingofmilitaryhardwareinenormousquantitieshavemultipliedthedangersoftheCCPMaoist
faction,themilitarysaid.Armedhighpoweredweaponsandwithsufficientammunition,theinsurgentshave
becomeamorepotentforcetocontendwith.Thishasemboldenedthemtointensifyoperationswiththe
useofnewrecruits.Thenewrecruitshavebeentrainedintheuseofhighexplosivesandweretohe
unleashedonthepopulationcentersofGreaterManilaaspartofthecontinuingSeptemberOctoberplan
thatincludesthebombingofCongress,theConstitutionalConvention,CityHall,publicutilities,department
storesandmoviehouses.TherecruitsweretoseeksanctuaryinsafehousesinstalledforthembytheNPA
inCaloocanCitythearmyasserted."(TimetableforTerror,PACE,Vol.1,No.52,September,1972).
28"TheCommunistshavenoscruplesagainstsabotage,terrorism,assassination,ormobdisorder....The
Communistrecognizesthatanestablishedgovernmentincontrolofmoderntechnologycannotbe
overthrownbyforceuntilitisaboutreadytofallofitsownweight."Revolutionis,therefore."notasudden
episodebutastheconsummationofalongprocess."(PerMr.JusticeJackson,Dennisv.UnitedStates,
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341U.S.564,565,95L.ed1181.)
G.R.No.L35546
29TheSupremeCourtandtheCommanderinChief,1`951,CornellUniversityPress,p.36.
30"NoteventheaerialattackuponPearlHarborclosethecourtsorofitsownforcedeposedthecivil
administration,yetitwouldbecommonunderstandingofmenthatthoseagencieswhicharechargedwith
thenationaldefensesurelymusthaveauthoritytotakeonthespotsomemeasureswhichinnormaltimes
wouldbeultravires."
xxxxxxxxx
Whenoneconsiderscertaincharacteristicsofmodernwar,mobilityonland,surprisefromtheair,
sabotage,andthepreparationoffifthcolumnsitmustbeapparentthatthedictumthat'martialrule
cannotarisefromathreatenedinvasion'isnotanadequatedefinitionoftheextentofthewarpowerofthe
UnitedStates.AnArmytodayhasadispersionindepthquiteunknowninourCivilWar.ThusUnder
SecretaryofWarPatterson,instressingtheneedforastateguardtoprotectinstallationsintherear,
pointedto'thefactthatthewarsoftodayknownofrontlinethatatinyvillagehundredsofmilesbehindthe
theoreticalfrontmaysuddenlybecomethesceneofdesperateandblazingaction.'Iftheproblemwereto
arisetodayitseemsfairtoassumethattheSupremeCourtwouldnotholdtotheletterofJusticeDavis'
opinion.JustasintheconstructionofthecommerceandothergrantsofnationalpowertheCourtoflate
hasnotablysoughttomakethemadequatetotheconditionswhichweface,almostcertainlyitwouldso
construethewarpowerastoincludeallthatisrequisite'towagewarsuccessfully.'"(CharlesFairman,Law
ofMartialRule,55HarvardLawReview,1287.)
31NotesontheNewSociety,pp.2930.
32Dr.AbelardoSamonte,InauguralAddress,U.P.LosBaos,Jan.11,1974.
33Stewartv.Kahn,11Wallace493,506.
34Pollockvs.Farmer'sLoan&T.Co.(1895)157U.S.429,39L.ed.759SeealsoLegalTendercases
(1884)110U.S.421,28L.ed.204,70A.L.R.30.
35Stateexrel.Millervs.Taylor(1911)22N.D.362,133N.W.1046.
36DuringtheCivilWarintheUnitedStates,thewritofhabeascorpuswassuspendedandmany
thousandsofpersonssuspectedofdisloyaltytotheUnionwereinterned.(J.Randall&D.Donald,TheCivil
WarandReconstruction,301[1961]).ItmustbenotedthattheActof1863oftheUnitedStatesrequired
thatlistsofpoliticalprisonersbefurnishedtothejudgesofthefederalcourtslimitedthedurationof
detentiontoonesessionofthegrandjury,attheendofwhichcourtsweretoorderthereleaseofthose
prisonerswhohadnotbeenindictedforacrime.However,duringtheCivilWartheHabeasCorpusActwas
virtuallyignoredbyPresidentLincoln,andthearrest,confinement,andreleaseofprisonerscontinuedasif
ithadnotbeenpassed.(LeeJ.Randall&D.Donald,,p.306).
HabeasCorpussupra
37Therearethreereasonsadvancedwhythiswasfoundnecessary."First,theevidencetosatisfythe
requirementsoflegalprocedurewillblowthecoverofpoliceagentswhohavepenetratedCommunist
openfrontorganizations.Further,thepossibilityofprosecutionassumesthatparticipationinCommunist
conspiratorialactivitiesisalegaloffense,whichitisnotinmostcountries.Third,towaitfortheCommunist
activiststoengageinovertlyillegalaction,forexample,riotsandothersortsofviolencebeforeprosecution,
willgivethemapoliticaladvantagewhichfewgovernmentsofthenewstatesofAsiacanafford.Forbythen
thepoliticalsituationwouldhavedeterioratedtoastateofacuteinstability,whichinturnwouldprobably
havecausedeconomicdeclineduetolossofconfidence.Shouldpoliticalinstabilitybecomeendemic
seriousdoubtswillcreepintomen'smindsastowhowouldmergethewinner.Thiscanmaketheproblem
ofcontrolofsubversion,forwhichpublicconfidenceandcooperationareimportant,averyacuteone.
Thepowerofarrestanddetentionwithouttrialis,therefore,anecessaryweaponinthefightagainst
CommunistsinthenewlyestablishedAsianstates.Itis,however,oftheutmostimportancethatthehighest
standardsofconductonthepartofthesecretpolicearemaintained.Thereshouldbechecks,intheform
ofreviewcommitteesconsistingoflawyersandprofessionalmen,ontheactionsofthepolice.These
checksshouldberealandnotperfunctorymeasures.Nothingwouldbemorefavorabletothegrowthof
Communistinfluencethanextensiveandindiscriminateuseofthepowersofdetention.Forthiswill
generallycausewidespreadresentmentagainsttheauthorities,whichtheCommunistundergroundcan
usetostokethefiresofrevolution.Further,itisimportantthatpoliceactionislimitedtoreallyworthwhile
targetsthethinkersandtheplanners,theablepropagandistsandtheorganizationmen.Ninetynineper
centofthosewhoengageinCommunistopenfrontactivitiesarenotworthdetaining,noteventhesecond
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echelonactivistsandthemusclemenonwhomtheCommunistsdependtodisciplinetheirfollowers.They
G.R.No.L35546
aretheexpendablesandcanbereplacedwithoutmuchdifficulty,unlikethethinkerandtheplotter,and
theirdetentionservesnopurposebeyondcreatingunnecessarydisaffectionamongtheirfamilies."(Goh
KengSwee:MinisterofDefenseoftheInteriorinSingapore,TheNatureandAppealofCommunismin
NonCommunistAsiaCountries.)
38DevelopmentsNationalSecurity,Vol.85,HarvardLawReview,March1972,No.5,p.1313.
39Zemelv.Rusk,381U.S.1[1965]upheldtheconstitutionalityoftheCubaarearestriction.
40CharlesFairman,MartialRuleandtheSuppressionofInsurrection.
41MiguelCuaderno,Sr.,MartialLawandtheNationalEconomy,1974Ed.Delegatetothe1934and1971
ConstitutionalConventions,memberoftheSubCommitteeofSeventhatfinalizedthedraftofthe1935
Constitution.
42ModernPoliticalConstitutions,p.55.
43Vol.I,ThePhilippineConstitution,DebatesontheFirstDraftoftheConstitution,p.157.
FERNANDEZ,J.:
1GeneralOrderNo.2readsasfollows:
PursuanttoProclamationNo.1081,datedSeptember21,1972,andinmycapacityasCommanderin
ChiefofalltheArmedForcesofthePhilippinesandforbeingactiveparticipantsintheconspiracytoseize
politicalandstatepowerinthecountryandtotakeovertheGovernmentbyforce,theextentofwhichhas
nowassumedtheproportionofanactualwaragainstourpeopleandtheirlegitimateGovernmentandin
ordertopreventthemfromfurthercommittingactsthatareinimicalorinjurioustoourpeople,the
Governmentandournationalinterest,IherebyorderyouasSecretaryofNationalDefensetoforthwith
arrestorcausethearrestandtakeintocustodytheindividualsnamedintheattachedlistandtoholdthem
untilotherwisesoorderedbymeorbymydesignatedrepresentative.
"Likewise,Idoherebyorderyoutoarrestorcausethearrestandtakeintocustodyandtoholdthemuntil
otherwiseorderedreleasedbymeorbymydulyauthorizedrepresentative,suchpersonsasmayhave
committedcrimesandoffensesinfurtheranceontheoccasionoforincidenttoorinconnectionwiththe
crimesofinsurrectionorrebellion,aswellaspersonswhohavecommittedcrimesagainstnationalsecurity
andthelawofnations,crimesagainstthefundamentallawsofthestate,crimesagainstpublicorder,
crimesinvolvingusurpationofauthority,title,improperuseofname,uniformandinsignia,includingpersons
guiltyofcrimesaspublicofficers,aswellasthosepeoplewhomayhaveviolatedanydecreeororder
promotedbymepersonallyorpromulgateduponmydirection."
*Ontheissueofwithdrawal,"petitioner"referstoformerSenatorJoseW.Dioknoandnotanyoftheother
petitioners.
**AlthoughthisRule17fallsunder"ProcedureinCourtsofFirstInstance,"itmayalsoserveasaguideto
thisCourtinresolvingaquestionofthisnature.IntheCourtofAppeals,andintheSupremeCourt,"An
appealwaybewithdrawnasofrightatanytimebeforefilingofappellee'sbrief.Afterthatbriefisfiledthe
withdrawalmaybeallowedbytheCourtinitsdiscretion...."(Section4,Rule50Section1,Rule56).
1(2)ThePresidentshallbecommanderinchiefofallarmedforcesofthePhilippinesand,wheneverit
becomesnecessary,hemaycalloutsucharmedforcestopreventorsuppresslawlessviolence,invasion,
insurrection,orrebellion,orimminentdangerthereof,whenthepublicsafetyrequiresit,hemaysuspend
theprivelegeofthewritoforplacethePhilippinesoranypartthereofundermartial.(Par.2,Sec.10,Art.
VII,1935Constitution).
habeascorpus,
Sec.12.ThePrimeMinistershallbecommanderinchieforthePhilippinesand,wheneveritbecomes
necessary,hemaycalloutsucharmedforcestopreventorsuppresslawlessviolence,invasion,
insurrection,orrebellion.Incaseofinvasion,insurrection,orrebellion,orimminentdangerthereof,when
thepublicsafetyrequiresit,hemaysuspendtheprivelegeofthewritoforplacethePhilippinesoranypart
thereofundermartiallaw.(Sec.12,Art.IX,NewConstitution.)
habeascorpus,
MUOZPALMA,J.:
371/374
6/20/2015
1Diokno'spetitionforwasfiledonSeptember23,1972,thethirddayafterthesigningofProclamationNo.
G.R.No.L35546
1081.InJavellanavs.TheExecutiveSecretary,L36142,March31,1973,andalliedcases,calledthe
RatificationCases,thisCourtinitsdispositiveportionstated:"thereisnofurtherjudicialobstacletotheNew
Constitutionbeingconsideredinforceandeffect".OnOctober24,1973,PresidentFerdinandE.Marcos
sworeintoofficetheHon.QuerubeC.MakalintalasChiefJustice,andOctober29,AssociateJustices:
CalixtoO.Zaldivar,FredRuizCastro.EnriqueM.Fernando,ClaudioTeehankee,AntonioP.Barredo,Felix
V.Makasiar,FelixQ.Antonio,andSalvadorV.EsguerratooktheirOathunderthenewConstitution
togetherwithnewappointees,JusticesEstanislaoFernandez,CeciliaMuozPalmaandRamonAquino.
habeascorpus
2EightvoteswereconsideredbytheCourtnecessarytograntthemotion,andofthetwelveJustices,only
sevenfinallyvotedtograntthewithdrawalofthepetition,namely:ChiefJusticeMakalintal,Associate
JusticesZaldivar,Fernando,Teehankee,Barredo,MuozPalma,andAquinotherestvotedtodenythe
motion.
3GeneralOrderNo.2wasamendedasGeneralOrderNo.2AdatedSeptember26,1972.
4TherewerenineseparatePetitionsfiled,towit,inchronologicalorder:G.R.Nos.L35538,35539,35540,
35546,35547,35556,35567,35571,and35573,thelasthavingbeendocketedonOctober3,1972.Ofthe
ninepetitions,onlysixarenowbeingdecidedbecauseL35547,VoltaireGarciaII,petitioner,becamemoot
uponthedeathofthepetitioneronMarch2,1973,whileonconditionalreleaseTanChinHianand
VeronicaL.Yuyitungpetitioners,waswithdrawnwiththeapprovaloftheCourtonthegroundthat
petitionershadbeenreleasedfromcustodyandL35571,BrenGuiao,petitioner,waslikewisewithdrawn
withtheapprovaloftheCourt.Althoughtherewereoriginally32petitionersonly18remainandtheyareas
enumeratedinthecaptionofthesesixcasesunderconsideration.Ofthese18petitioners,threewere
membersofthePhilippineSenateatthetimeoftheirarrest,namely:JoseW.Diokno,BenignoS.Aquino,
Jr.,andRamonV.Mitra,Jr.twoweredelegatestotheConstitutionalConventionof1971,namely:Jose
MariVelezandNapoleonG.Ramawhiletherestarewellknownjournalistsandmenofthemassmedia.
5Villavicenciovs.Lukban,39Phil.778,790,citedinJ.G.Bernas,S.J.,ConstitutionalRightsandDuties,
Vol.1,1974Ed.,p.262..
6JusticeE.Fernando,TheBillofRights,1972Ed.,p.296.
7Bernas,,p.262.
supra
8WilloughbyontheConstitution,Vol.3,p.1612(1929)quotedinFernando,.
supra
92Story,Const.quotedinBlack'sConstitutionalLaw,2Ed.p.599.
10Art.III,Sec.1par.1,PhilippineConstitutionof1935provides:
"Nopersonshallbedeprivedoflife,liberty,orpropertywithoutdueprocessoflaw,norshallanypersonbe
deniedtheequalprotectionofthelaws."ThisprovisionisadoptedverbatiminArt.IV,Sec.1,Constitutionof
1973.
ThePreambleoftheFrenchConstitutionof1958,Art.1provides:"Menarebornandremainfreeand
equalinrespectofrights..."andArt.7states:"Nooneshallbeaccused,arrested,orimprisoned,savein
thecasesdeterminedbylaw,andaccordingtotheformswhichithasprescribed(TakenfromHowardand
Summers,Lawitsnature,functions,andlimits,p.257).
TheConstitutionoftheUnionofSovietSocialistRepublics1936,Art.127provides:"CitizensoftheUSSR
areguaranteedinviolabilityoftheperson.Nopersonmaybeplacedunderarrestexceptbydecisionofa
courtorwiththesanctionofaprocurator(ibid,p.259).
Sec.1,Art.XIV,UnitedStatesConstitutionreads"Nostateshallmakeorenforceanylawwhichshall
abridgetheprivilegesorimmunitiesofcitizensoftheUnitedStatesnorshallanyStatedepriveanyperson
oflife,liberty,orproperty,withoutdueprocessoflawnordenytoanypersonwithinitsjurisdictionthe
equalprotectionofthelaws."(Black's,,XXIV)
supra
11seeMemorandumofRespondentsdatedNovember17,1972,pp.45.
372/374
6/20/2015
12AnswertoSupplementalPetitionandMotionforImmediateRelease,datedJuly26,1973,p.23,L
G.R.No.L35546
35539.
13MemorandumforPetitionersdatedNovember9,1972,pp.6,23,71,97.
14SupplementalPetitionandMotionforImmediateReleasedatedJune29,1973,pp.4551,6394.
15Referenceismadetothe1935constitution.
16Moran,RulesofCourt,Vol.3.1970Ed.p.615CloroxCo.vs.DirectorofPatents,etal.,L19531,
August10,1967,20SCRA965,970,Palmavs.Hon.Oreta,etal.,34SCRA.
16*L33964,December11,1971,42SCRA448.
17SameasSec.12,Art.IXConstitutionof1973,excepttheterm"President"isnow"PrimeMinister".
18TheBakercaseinvolvedthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewritofintheprovincesofBatangasand
CavitebytheGovernorGeneralpursuanttoaResolutionofthePhilippineCommissiondatedJanuary31,
1906,whiletheMontenegrocaseinvolvedProclamation210byPres.ElpidioQuirinoonOctober22,1950,
suspendingtheprivilegeofthewritofPursuanttoArt.VII,Section10,paragraph2oftheConstitution.
habeascorpus
19p.473,.
supra
19*seeBillofRights,Art.III,1935ConstitutionBillofRights,Art.IV,1973Constitution..
"13Whenwere,seemingly,takenfromtheseventhparagraphofSection3,andSection21oftheJones
Law(ActofCongressoftheU.S.ofAugust29,1916).TheonlyprovisionthereonintheU.S.Constitutionis
foundinSection9(2)ofArt.1thereonontheLegislativePowerwhichprovidesthat'theprivilegeof
thewritofhabeasshallnotbesuspended,unlessincasesofrebellionorinvasionthepublicsafetymay
requireit.'"(footnoteinsidequotation)
20MemorandumofRespondents,pp.3640.
supra
21Supra,pp.476477,484.
22Theterm'Huks'referstoanarmyorgroupofmenorganizedandoperatinginCentralLuzonfor
communisticactivities.(Footnote22insidequotation)
LawQuarterlyReview,XVIII,152.Foranoppositiveview,seeEdinburghReview,January,1902.
23Art.III,Sec.1(4),1935Constitution:
Theprivilegeofthewritofshallnotbesuspendedexceptincasesofinvasion,insurrection,orrebellion,
whenthepublicsafetyrequiresit,inanyofwhicheventsthesamemaybesuspendedwhereverduring
suchperiodthenecessityforsuchsuppressionshallexist.
habeascorpus
Art.IV,Sec.15,1973Constitution:
Theprivilegeofthewritofshallnotbesuspendedincasesofinvasion,insurrection,rebellion,orimminent
dangerthereof,whenthepublicsafetyrequiresit.
habeascorpus
24PresidentFerdinandE.Marcos,NotesontheNewSocietyofthePhilippines,1973.p.37.
25
Ibid.
TheissuanceofGeneralOrderNo.2thereforewasavalidinitialsteptakenbythePresidenttorendereffective
373/374
6/20/2015thesuppressionofarmedresistancetoourdulyconstitutedgovernment.
G.R.No.L35546
Thus,Ivoteforthedismissalofthepetitionsforofthosewhohavebeenconditionallyreleased,because:(1)The
arrestofsaidpetitionerswaseffectedbyrespondentsunderavalidOrderofthePresident.(2)Thepetitioners
concernedhavebeenorderedreleasedfromdetention.Theprimeobjectofawritofistorelieveapersonfrom
physicalrestraintandthishasbeenaccomplishedonrespondentSecretary'sinitiative,(3)Whileitistruethatthe
releaseofpetitionersissubjecttocertainconditionssuchasrestrictionsonpetitioners'freedomofmovement,
suchrestrictionsarereasonableprecautionarymeasuresinthefaceofpublicdanger,andIdonotseeany
arbitrarinessintheimpositionofsaidrestrictions.
WithrespecttothecaseofpetitionerAquino,Iconcurinthedismissalofhispetitionforreasonsthat:(1)criminal
chargeshavebeenfiledagainsthimbeforeamilitarycommissionand(2)thelegalissuesposedbyhimwhichare
germanetothisproceedingaredisposedofandresolvedinthemannerindicatedinthisOpinion.Asregardsthe
otherissuessubmittedbyAquino,IagreewithmyColleaguesthatthesamearetoberesolvedintheprohibition
andcertioraricasefiledbyhimwhichisnowpendingbeforetheCourt.
habeascorpus
CONCLUSION
Inclosing,mayIstatethatitwasnecessaryformetowritethisseparateOpinionbecauseIfoundmyselfat
variancewithmyColleaguesoncertainissuesposedbythesePetitionsfor.Torecapitulate:(1)Isthe
constitutionalsufficiencyofaproclamationofmartiallawbythePresidentapoliticalquestion?Iholdthatitis
notapolitical,butisajusticiableone.(2)Didtheproclamationofmartialautomaticallysuspendtheprivilegeof
thewritof?No,ismyanswer.(3)DidSec.3(2),Art.XVIIoftheTransitoryProvisionsofthe1973Constitution
foreclosejudicialinquiryintothevalidityofalldecrees,ordersandactsoftheincumbentPresidentexecutedafter
theproclamationofmartiallawandduringtheTransitoryPeriod?Isay:NO,becausethoseactsarestillsubjectto
thepowerofjudicialreviewifandwhentheyareshowntobearbitrary,oppressive,orunjust,inviolationofthe
Constitutionand/orthegenerallyacceptedprinciplesofInternationalLaw,usage'sandcustoms.
Myconclusionsmaynotbesupportedbyexistingjurisprudenceormayevenbecontrarytothemultiple
authoritiescitedbymyseniorColleaguesintheCourtnonetheless,Ihumblyofferandsubmitthemasthe
spontaneousreactionsofmyconsciencetotheissueswhichinthewordsofmydistinguishedColleague,Mr.
JusticeAntonioP.Barredo,affectnotthepetitionersalonebutthewholecountryandallourpeople.
Footnotes
TheLawphilProjectArellanoLawFoundation
Respondentsstatebywayof
SPECIALANDAFFIRMATIVEDEFENSES
PRAYER
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Manyoftheotherpetitionersinthehabeascorpus cases at bar were granted leave to withdraw their petitions.

mayhavesomeotherjudicialrecoursefortheremovalofsuchrestraintsbuttheiractionforhabeas corpus cannot survive

offenses committed in furtherance or on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection

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