Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
May 5, 2003
requiring petitioner to pay again the docket fees when it has already discharged this
obligation simultaneously with the filing of the complaint for collection of a sum of money.
The procedure for dismissed cases when re-filed is the same as though it was initially lodged,
i.e., the filing of answer, reply, answer to counter-claim, including other foot-dragging
maneuvers, except for the rigmarole of raffling cases which is dispensed with since the refiled complaint is automatically assigned to the branch to which the original case pertained. 25
A complaint that is re-filed leads to the re-enactment of past proceedings with the
concomitant full attention of the same trial court exercising an immaculate slew of
jurisdiction and control over the case that was previously dismissed, 26 which in the context of
the instant case is a waste of judicial time, capital and energy.
The sentence "[f]ailure on the part of plaintiff to submit the said agreement shall cause the
imposition of payment of the required docket fees for re-filing of this case" is not a directive
to pay docket fees but only a statement of the event that may result in its imposition. The
reason for this is that the trial court could not have possibly made such payment obligatory
in the same civil case, i.e., Civil Case No. 99-518, since docket fees are defrayed only after
the dismissal becomes final and executory and when the civil case is re-filed.
On compromise agreement
There is nothing in the Rules that imposes the sanction of dismissal for failing to submit a
compromise agreement, then it is obvious that the dismissal of the complaint on the basis
thereof amounts no less to a gross procedural infirmity assailable by certiorari. For such
submission could at most be directory and could not result in throwing out the case for failure
to effect a compromise. While a compromise is encouraged, very strongly in fact, failure to
consummate one does not warrant any procedural sanction, much less an authority to
jettison a civil complaint worth P4,000,000.00 . . . Plainly, submission of a compromise
agreement is never mandatory, nor is it required by any rule.
As also explained therein, the proper course of action that should have been taken by the
court a quo, upon manifestation of the parties of their willingness to discuss a settlement,
was to suspend the proceedings and allow them reasonable time to come to terms (a) If
willingness to discuss a possible compromise is expressed by one or both parties; or (b) If it
appears that one of the parties, before the commencement of the action or proceeding,
offered to discuss a possible compromise but the other party refused the offer, pursuant to
Art. 2030 of the Civil Code. If despite efforts exerted by the trial court and the parties the
negotiations still fail, only then should the action continue as if no suspension had taken
place.
In fine, petitioner cannot be said to have lost interest in fighting the civil case to the end. A
court may dismiss a case on the ground of non prosequitur but the real test of the judicious
exercise of such power is whether under the circumstances plaintiff is chargeable with want
of fitting assiduousness in not acting on his complaint with reasonable promptitude. Unless a
party's conduct is so indifferent, irresponsible, contumacious or slothful as to provide
substantial grounds for dismissal, i.e., equivalent to default or non-appearance in the case,
the courts should consider lesser sanctions which would still amount to achieving the desired
end.38 In the absence of a pattern or scheme to delay the disposition of the case or of a
wanton failure to observe the mandatory requirement of the rules on the part of the plaintiff,
as in the case at bar, courts should decide to dispense rather than wield their authority to
dismiss
Dismissing the civil case and compelling petitioner to re-file its complaint is a dangerous,
costly and circuitous route that may end up aggravating, not resolving, the disagreement.
This case management strategy is frighteningly deceptive because it does so at the expense
of petitioner whose cause of action, perhaps, may have already been admitted by its adverse
parties as shown by three (3) of four (4) defendants not willing to contest petitioner's
allegations, and more critically, since this approach promotes the useless and thankless
duplication of hard work already undertaken by the trial court. As we have aptly observed,
"[i]nconsiderate dismissals, even if without prejudice, do not constitute a panacea nor a
solution to the congestion of court dockets. While they lend a deceptive aura of efficiency to
records of individual judges, they merely postpone the ultimate reckoning between the
parties. In the absence of clear lack of merit or intention to delay, justice is better served by
a brief continuance, trial on the merits, and final disposition of the cases before the court." 40
Civil Case No. 99-518 is deemed REINSTATED in, as it was never taken out from, the dockets
respondents even allowed their appeal to be dismissed by the CA, and the dismissal to
become final and executory. The petitioners were impelled to spend money for their counsel
and for sheriffs fees for the implementation of the writ of execution and the alias writ of
execution issued by the trial court. In the meantime, the respondents remained in possession
of the property from 1969, when the said deed of absolute sale with partial assumption of
mortgage was executed, up to the present, or for a period of 34 years without paying a single
centavo. For the Court to allow the respondents to benefit from their own wrong would run
counter to the maxim: Ex Dolo Malo Non Oritur Actio (No man can be allowed to found a
claim upon his own wrongdoing).
1998, whereas under the promissory note executed in favor of the bank, the new interest
rate should commence only on March 4, 1993; penalty charges of 26% of the account, and
5% penalty charges on top of the 26% interest per annum, as shown by the banks statement
of account. The spouses Digos also averred that although they pleaded for a restructuring of
their loan account and a moratorium on the payment of their account, they were unaware of
the erroneous computation of the balance of their loan account. They maintained that the
banks consolidation of its title over the property on September 19, 1999 was premature
because they were given until October 8, 1999 to redeem the property.
The bank alleged that the spouses Digos admitted in their complaint that, after the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage and the sale of the property at public
auction, they pleaded to redeem the property but failed to do so and were granted a onemonth extension. The bank averred that, based on the said allegations, the spouses were
estopped from assailing the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage, the sale at
public auction and the Torrens title issued to it; hence, they had no cause of action. It further
alleged that the spouses Digos already assailed the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate
mortgage and the sale of the property at public auction on account of lack of due process
and arbitrary abuse in their first complaint; they again sought to do so in this case, this time
grounded on the invalid foreclosure of the real estate mortgage, and the sale at public
auction of the property for an amount in excess of the balance of the loan account. The bank
argued that, in so doing, the spouses Digos were guilty of splitting a single cause of action
which is proscribed by Rule 2, Section 4 of the Rules of Court; they were, likewise, barred by
res judicata from filing the second complaint for the same causes of action, even if additional
defendants were impleaded. Consequently, the spouses Digos were also guilty of forum
shopping. Perez and Ragua filed a motion to dismiss on similar grounds of res judicata,
splitting of a single cause of action and forum shopping.
The trial court issued an Order 19 denying the motion, ruling that there was no identity of issue
in the two actions. The CA rendered judgment dismissing the petition and affirming the
assailed orders. The appellate court declared that there was no identity of causes of action in
the two cases because the first action was one for injunction and redemption of the property,
whereas the second action was for the nullification of the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real
estate mortgage and the sale at public auction due to the erroneous computation of the
balance on the respondents account with the bank; hence, the spouses Digos were not
estopped from filing their second action.
ISSUE:
Whether the judgment in the redemption of mortgage case (1 st case) is res judicata to the
cacellation and annulment of foreclosure case (2nd case)
Whether the private respondents are guilty of splitting their cause of action
HELD:
Splitting a single cause of action consists in dividing a single or indivisible cause of action
into several parts or claims and instituting two or more actions therein. 25 A single cause of
action or entire claim or demand cannot be split up or divided so as to be made the subject
of two or more different actions. 26
A single act or omission may be violative of various rights at the same time, such as when
the act constitutes a violation of separate and distinct legal obligations. 27 The violation of
each of these rights is a cause of action in itself. However, if only one right may be violated
by several acts or omissions, there would only be one cause of action. Otherwise stated, if
two separate and distinct primary rights are violated by one and the same wrong; or if the
single primary right should be violated by two distinct and separate legal wrongs; or when
the two primary rights are each broken by a separate and distinct wrongs; in either case, two
causes of action would result.28 Causes of action which are distinct and independent,
although arising out of the same contract, transaction or state of fact may be sued
separately, recovery on one being no bar to subsequent actions on the others.
The mere fact that the same relief is sought in the subsequent action will not render the
judgment in the prior action as res judicata. Causes of action are not distinguishable for
purposes of res judicata by difference in the claims for relief.
behind the judgment to ascertain whether the evidence necessary to sustain a judgment in
the second action would have authorized a judgment for the same party in the first action. 39
In the present case, before the private respondents filed their first complaint, they already
knew that the balance of their account with the bank was P4,500,000.00. They even offered
to make a P1,000,000.00 partial payment of their loan to reduce their account to
P3,500,000.00.
More telling is the private respondents failure to object to the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
real estate mortgage and the sale at public auction; they even pleaded to be allowed to
redeem the property after it had already been sold at public auction. Patently then, the
respondents were proscribed from claiming that the foreclosure of the real estate mortgage
was for an amount in excess of the balance of their account and that the sale at public
auction was irregular/illegal.
Redemption is inconsistent with the claim of invalidity of the sale. Redemption is an implied
admission of the regularity of the sale and would estop the respondents from later impugning
its validity on that ground. 43 Thus, the private respondents pleas for extensions of time to
redeem the subject property are of the same genre.
If indeed the bank made an erroneous computation of the balance of their account as
claimed by the private respondents in their second complaint, this should have been alleged
in the first complaint as one of their causes of action. They failed to do so. The private
respondents unequivocably admitted in their first complaint that the balance of their account
with the bank was P4,500,000.00 which was the precise amount for which the bank sought
the foreclosure of the real estate mortgage and the sale of the property at public auction;
they even sought judicial recourse to enable them to redeem the property despite the lapse
of the one-year period therefor.
Relying on these admissions on the part of the private respondents, and the fact that the
bank has already consolidated its title over the property, the Court thus dismissed their first
complaint. The Order of the Court dismissing the first complaint is a judgment of the case on
the merits.
The attempt of the respondents in their second complaint to avoid the application of the
principle of res judicata by claiming the nature of their account on the ground therefor and
their legal theory cannot prosper. Case law has it that where a right, question or fact is
distinctly put in issue and directly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction in a first
case, between the same parties or their privies, the former adjudication of that fact, right or
question is binding on the parties or their privies in a second suit irrespective of whether the
causes of action are the same.45 The ruling of the CA that the action of the private
respondents and their legal theory in their second complaint were different from their causes
of action and legal theory in the first complaint is not correct. A different cause of action is
one that proceeds not only on a sufficiently different legal theory, but also on a different
factual footing as not to require the trial of facts material to the former suit; that is, an action
that can be maintained even if all disputed factual issues raised in the plaintiffs original
complaint are concluded in defendants favor.46
The principle of res judicata applies when the opportunity to raise an issue in the first
complaint exists but the plaintiff failed to do so. Indeed, if the pleading of a different legal
theory would have convinced the trial court to decide a particular issue in the first action
which, with the use of diligence the plaintiffs could have raised therein but failed to do so,
they are barred by res judicata.47 Nor do legal theories operate to constitute a cause of
action. New legal theories do not amount to a new cause of action so as to defeat the
application of the principle of res judicata.48
It bears stressing that a party cannot divide the grounds for recovery. 51 A plaintiff is
mandated to place in issue in his pleading, all the issues existing when the suit began. A
lawsuit cannot be tried piecemeal. 52 The plaintiff is bound to set forth in his first action every
ground for relief which he claims to exist and upon which he relied, and cannot be permitted
to rely upon them by piecemeal in successive action to recover for the same wrong or
injury.53
A party seeking to enforce a claim, legal or equitable, must present to the court, either by the
pleadings or proofs, or both, on the grounds upon which to expect a judgment in his favor. He
is not at liberty to split up his demands, and prosecute it by piecemeal or present only a
portion of the grounds upon which a special relief is sought and leave the rest to the
ruling of the Court of Appeals unduly burdens Stronghold Insurance because the amount
garnished could exceed its liability. It gives the sheriff the discretion to garnish more than
P12,755,139.85 from the accounts of Stronghold Insurance. The amount for garnishment is
no longer ministerial on the part of the sheriff. This is not allowed.
HELD: Yes
FACTS:
As held in Echaus vs. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 381, 386 (1991), execution pending appeal
is allowed when superior circumstances demanding urgency outweigh the damages that may
result from the issuance of the writ. Otherwise, instead of being an instrument of solicitude
and justice, the writ may well become a tool of oppression and inequity.
On September 23, 1996, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 20, decided Civil Case No.
CEB-16765, decreeing among others the legal separation between petitioner Aida Baez and
respondent Gabriel Baez on the ground of the latters sexual infidelity; the dissolution of
their conjugal property relations and the division of the net conjugal assets; the forfeiture of
respondents one-half share in the net conjugal assets in favor of the common children; the
payment to petitioners counsel of the sum of P100,000 as attorneys fees to be taken from
petitioners share in the net assets; and the surrender by respondent of the use and
possession of a Mazda motor vehicle and the smaller residential house located at Maria Luisa
Estate Park Subdivision to petitioner and the common children within 15 days from receipt of
the decision.
In this case, considering the reasons cited by petitioner, we are of the view that there is no
superior or urgent circumstance that outweighs the damage which respondent would suffer if
he were ordered to vacate the house. We note that petitioner did not refute respondents
allegations that she did not intend to use said house, and that she has two (2) other houses
in the United States where she is a permanent resident, while he had none at all. Merely
putting up a bond is not sufficient reason to justify her plea for execution pending appeal. To
do so would make execution routinary, the rule rather than the exception.
In another motion to modify the decision, petitioner Aida Baez sought moral and exemplary
damages, as well as litigation expenses. On October 9, 1996, she filed a motion for
execution pending appeal. Respondent Gabriel Baez filed a consolidated written opposition
to the two motions, and also prayed for the reconsideration of the October 1, 1996 order.
Similarly, we are not persuaded that the P100,000 advance payment to petitioners counsel
was properly granted. We see no justification to pre-empt the judgment by the Court of
Appeals concerning said amount of P100,000 at the time that the trial courts judgment was
already on appeal.
On November 22, 1996, the trial court gave due course to the execution pending appeal. In
turn, in a petition for certiorari, Gabriel Baez elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. On
March 21, 1997, the appellate court rendered its decision setting aside the trial courts
decision.
WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DENIED for lack of merit. The decision and resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 42663 and CA-G.R. No. CV-56265, respectively, are
hereby AFFIRMED, so that the Order dated October 1, 1996, of the Regional Trial Court
authorizing the release of P100,000 to petitioners counsel; the Omnibus Order dated
November 22, 1996 granting the motion pending appeal; the writ of execution dated
December 2, 1996; and the Order dated December 10, 1996 granting the motion by the
sheriff to make symbolic delivery of the house and vehicle are SET ASIDE.
Petitioner avers that the residential house, being conjugal in nature, justice requires that she
and her children be allowed to occupy and enjoy the house considering that during the entire
proceedings before the trial court, she did not have the chance to occupy it. Further, she
posted a bond of P1,500,000 for the damages which respondent may suffer. For these
reasons, she asked for execution pending appeal. The amount of P100,000 as advance
payment to her counsel was a drop in the bucket compared to the bond she posted,
according to her. She also suggested as an alternative that she simply be required to put up
an additional bond. She also agreed to submit to an accounting as regular administratrix and
the advance attorneys fees be charged to her share in the net conjugal assets.
In his comment, respondent denied petitioners allegation that she did not have the chance
to occupy the residential house. He averred that she could have, had she chosen to.
According to him, as the inventory of the couples properties showed, petitioner owned two
houses and lots and two motor vehicles in the United States, where she is a permanent
resident. Respondent contended that there was no compelling reason for petitioner to have
the judgment executed pending appeal.
ISSUE: Whether execution of judgment pending appeal was justified.
EDGAR
Y.
vs.
COMMISSION
ON
ELECTIONS
PANULAYA, respondents.
SANTOS, petitioner,
(FIRST
DIVISION)
and
PEDRO
Q.
FACTS:
Petitioner Edgar Y. Santos and respondent Pedro Q. Panulaya were both candidates for Mayor
of the Municipality of Balingoan, Misamis Oriental in the May 14, 2001 elections. On May 16,
2001, after the votes were counted and canvassed, the Municipal Board of Canvassers
proclaimed respondent Panulaya as the duly elected Mayor.
Petitioner filed an election protest before the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch
26, which was docketed as SPL Election Protest No. 1-M(2001). After trial and revision of the
ballots, the trial court found that petitioner garnered 2,181 votes while respondent received
only 2,105.
Petitioner thereafter filed a motion for execution pending appeal. Meanwhile, before the trial
court could act on petitioners motion, respondent filed on April 22, 2002 with the COMELEC a
petition for certiorari, docketed as SPR No. 20-2002, assailing the decision of the trial court.
The COMELEC, in SPR No. 20-2002, issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, which effectively
enjoined the trial court from acting on petitioners motion for execution pending appeal.
Subsequently, on August 19, 2002, the COMELEC dismissed SPR No. 20-2002 after finding
that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in rendering the assailed
judgment.
After petitioner posted the required bond, the trial court issued the Writ of
Execution,5 thereby installing petitioner as Municipal Mayor of Balingoan, Misamis Oriental.
Accordingly, petitioner took his oath of office and thereafter assumed the duties and
functions of his office.
On August 21, 2002, respondent filed with the COMELEC a motion for reconsideration of the
dismissal of his petition in SPR No. 20-2002.
While his motion for reconsideration and supplemental petition in SPR No. 20-2002 were
pending, respondent filed another petition with the COMELEC, docketed as SPR No. 37-2002.
The petition contained the same prayer as that in the supplemental petition filed in SPR 202002.
On October 14, 2002, the COMELEC issued a Resolution in SPR No. 37-2002, the dispositive
portion of which states: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby GRANTED.
Accordingly, the August 20, 2002 Resolution of the respondent judge granting the Motion for
Execution Pending Appeal as well as his Order also dated August 20, 2002 directing the
issuance of the Writ of Execution and his Writ of Execution dated August 21, 2002 are hereby
set aside. Private Respondent Edgar Y. Santos is enjoined from assuming the function of
mayor of Balingoan, Misamis Oriental until the final determination of the election appeal
case.
ISSUE:
1.
Whether or not there is grave abuse of discretion by the trial court in ordering the
execution pending appeal.
2.
HELD:
1.
No
The petition for certiorari in SPR No. 37-2002 assailed the trial courts orders for the
execution of its decision pending appeal. The grant of execution pending appeal was well
within the discretionary powers of the trial court. In order to obtain the annulment of said
orders in a petition for certiorari, it must first be proved that the trial court gravely abused its
discretion. He should show not merely a reversible error committed by the trial court, but a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
We find that no grave abuse of discretion was committed by the trial court. In its order
granting execution pending appeal, it held: It is of judicial notice that for the public official
elected last May 14, 2001 elections only a short period is left. Relative to this Courts
jurisdiction over the instant case, the settled rule that the mere filing of the notice of appeal
does not divest the trial court of its jurisdiction over the case and to resolve pending
incidents, i.e., motion for execution pending appeal.
2.
Yes
However, the COMELEC set aside the aforesaid order, saying that shortness of term alone is
not a good reason for execution of a judgment pending appeal. WE DISAGREE.
While it was indeed held that shortness of the remaining term of office and posting a bond
are not good reasons, we clearly stated in Fermo v. COMELEC that: A valid exercise of the
discretion to allow execution pending appeal requires that it should be based "upon good
reasons to be stated in a special order." The following constitute "good reasons" and a
combination of two or more of them will suffice to grant execution pending appeal: (1.) public
interest involved or will of the electorate; (2.) the shortness of the remaining portion of the
term of the contested office; and (3.) the length of time that the election contest has been
pending .
The decision of the trial court in Election Protest No. 1-M(2001) was rendered on April 2,
2002, or after almost one year of trial and revision of the questioned ballots. It found
petitioner as the candidate with the plurality of votes. Respondent appealed the said decision
to the COMELEC. In the meantime, the three-year term of the Office of the Mayor continued
to run. The will of the electorate, as determined by the trial court in the election protest, had
to be respected and given meaning. The Municipality of Balingoan, Misamis Oriental, needed
the services of a mayor even while the election protest was pending, and it had to be the
candidate judicially determined to have been chosen by the people.
issued with the discretion of the court, was granted on January 24, 2000 over the opposition
of the City of Iligan, to justify the same, he dispositive portion of which was earlier quoted.
The trial court further stated that: The Court is convinced that there are good reasons to
allow the immediate execution pending appeal. Its adjudication is based on [petitioners] own
admission hence, any appeal would be unmeritorious and would only serve to delay
execution of the final order subject of the instant motion. The fact that an appeal in this case
if taken by [petitioner] will be a merely dilatory tactic has been declared by the Supreme
Court as a good and sufficient reason upon which to issue execution of the order under
Section 2, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not there are good reasons to allow the immediate Order of Execution
pending appeal by the trial court.
HELD: Yes
Executions pending appeal are governed by Section 2 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
There are three requisites for the execution of a judgment pending appeal: a) a motion must
be filed by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party; b) there must be good
reasons for execution pending appeal; and c) the good reasons must be stated in a special
order.
Execution pending appeal is, of course, the exception to the general rule. Normally, execution
cannot be obtained until and unless (a) the judgment has become final and executory; (b) the
right of appeal has been renounced or waived; (c) the period for appeal has lapsed without
an appeal having been filed; or (d) having been filed, the appeal has been resolved and the
records of the case have been returned to the court of origin -- in which case, execution shall
issue as a matter of right.
On the other hand, when the period of appeal has not yet expired, the execution of a
judgment should not be allowed except if, in the courts discretion, there are good reasons
therefor.
Since the execution of a judgment pending appeal is an exception to the general rule, the
existence of "good reasons" is essential. These reasons must be stated in a special order,
because unless these are divulged, it will be difficult to determine on appeal whether judicial
discretion has been properly exercised by the lower court.
Good reasons consist of compelling circumstances that justify the immediate execution of a
judgment, lest it become illusory; or the prevailing party be unable to enjoy it after the lapse
of time, considering the tactics of the adverse party who may have no recourse but to delay.
In the present case, the good reason relied upon by both the trial and the appellate courts
was that the partial adjudication of the case was based on petitioners own admission; hence,
any appeal based on that point would be unmeritorious and merely dilatory. Indeed, both
courts ruled that an appeal by petitioner would only serve as "a good and sufficient reason
upon which to issue execution."
In the present case, the good reason relied upon by both the trial and the appellate courts
was that the partial adjudication of the case was based on petitioners own admission; hence,
any appeal based on that point would be unmeritorious and merely dilatory. Indeed, both
courts ruled that an appeal by petitioner would only serve as "a good and sufficient reason
upon which to issue execution."
Like the CA, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial courts grant of execution pending
appeal. Indeed, this Court has held that a good and sufficient reason upon which to authorize
immediate execution is when an appeal is clearly dilatory.
Spouses
JAIME
and
PURIFICACION
MORTA, Complainants.
vs.
Judge ANTONIO C. BAGAGAN, Municipal Trial Court, Guinobatan, Albay; and
Sheriff DANILO O. MATIAS, Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Ligao,
Albay, Respondents.
Unreasonable delay in resolving motions opens a judge to administrative sanctions. Likewise,
a sheriff is administratively liable for delayed implementation of a writ of execution and
failure to render the required reports thereon. These are necessary lessons from the timehonored principle that "justice delayed is justice denied.
FACTS:
In their Administrative Complaint dated July 26, 2001, Spouses Jaime and Purificacion Morta
Sr. charged Judge Antonio C. Bagagan of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Guinobatan,
Albay with gross ignorance of the law, incompetence, bias and delay. They also indicted
Sheriff Danilo O. Matias of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ligao, Albay (Branch 14) with
gross ignorance of the law, negligence and connivance with the defendants in Civil Case Nos.
481 and 482 (MTC, Guinobatan, Albay).
Complainants, who are the plaintiffs in the aforementioned civil cases, alleged that on March
29, 1994, the Municipal Trial Court of Guinobatan, Albay rendered a decision in their favor.
Thereafter, the First Division of this Court, acting on the petition for review on certiorari filed
by the plaintiffs, rendered its decision dated June 10, 1999 in G.R. No. 123417 affirming the
decision of the Municipal Trial Court.
They now complain that despite the fact that the decision of the Supreme Court in the
aforesaid case had already become final and executory, the respondent Judge still refused to
issue a writ of possession in their favor.
As against the respondent Sheriff, the complainants averred that through his ignorance,
negligence and connivance with the defendants, he failed to execute in full the writ of
execution that had been previously issued by the court in Civil Case Nos. 481 and 482.
Moreover, it took respondent Sheriff a long time before he finally submitted his Sheriff's
Return of Service on the Writ of Execution.
In his Answer/Comment dated April 2, 2002, respondent judge explained that he had denied
complainants Motion for the issuance of a writ of possession because, by the time Civil Case
Nos. 481 and 482 were finally decided by this Court on June 10, 1999, they had already been
ousted from the lots in question pursuant to the Decisions in DARAB Case No. 2413 and Civil
Case No. 1920. In Civil Case No. 1920, respondent judge ordered complainants to vacate the
disputed lots. A Writ of Execution/Demolition was thereafter issued on January 29, 1998. On
the other hand, the DARAB Decision, which became final and executory on October 27, 1998,
directed them to cease and desist from disturbing the peaceful possession of therein
Petitioner Jaime Occidental.
For his part, Respondent Sheriff Matias admitted in his Comment dated April 18, 2002, that
there was delay in the full implementation of the Writ of Execution in Civil Case Nos. 481 and
482. Explaining that the delay was due to his heavy workload and thus unintentional, he
begged for compassion from this Court.
ISSUE:
1.
2.
HELD:
1.
Yes
We agree with the OCA that respondent judge acted correctly in not issuing a writ of
execution/possession. His action was consistent with the Decision of this Court in GR No.
123417 affirming that of the MTC as to damages. Besides, the latters Order directing
defendants not to molest complainants in their peaceful possession was rendered moot when
they were ousted from the disputed lots by virtue of the final and executory judgments in
Civil Case No. 1920 and DARAB Case No. 2413. Indeed, the execution of a final judgment may
be refused, as in this case, when there has been a change in the situation of the parties that
would make its execution inequitable.
2.
No
With respect to the charges against respondent sheriff, we agree with the OCA that he was
remiss in his duty to implement the Writ fully in Civil Case Nos. 481 and 482. Time and time
again, we have impressed upon those tasked to implement court orders and processes to see
to it that the final stage in the litigation process -- the execution of judgment -- be carried out
promptly. They should exert every effort and indeed consider it their bounden duty to do so,
in order to ensure the speedy and efficient administration of justice. A decision that is left
unexecuted or delayed indefinitely because of the sheriffs inefficiency or negligence remains
an empty victory on the part of the prevailing party. For this reason, any inordinate delay in
the execution of judgment is truly deplorable and cannot be countenanced by the Court.
There is no mistaking the mandatory character of the period prescribed under Section 14 of
Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court on the Return of a Writ of Execution, which reads:
"SEC. 14. Return of writ of execution. The writ of execution shall be returnable to the court
issuing it immediately after the judgment has been satisfied in part or in full. If the judgment
cannot be satisfied in full within thirty (30) days after his receipt of the writ, the officer shall
report to the court and state the reason therefor. Such writ shall continue in effect during the
period within which the judgment may be enforced by motion. The officer shall make a report
to the court every thirty (30) days on the proceedings taken thereon until the judgment is
satisfied in full, or its effectivity expires. The returns or periodic reports shall set forth the
whole of the proceedings taken, and shall be filed with the court and copies thereof promptly
furnished the parties..
Per the records of this case, a Writ of Execution was issued on November 22, 1999 in Civil
Case Nos. 481 and 482. Respondent Sheriffs Return of Service of that Writ was filed only on
May 25, 2000, however, or six months thereafter. There is nothing in the records showing
that he submitted before then a periodic report on the actions he had taken on the Writ
"every 30 days from the date of receipt" as required. On the contrary, the Report indicates
that the Writ was partially executed on December 15-28, 1999 and January 11, 2000; and
that the damages adjudged were partly paid in the amount of P3,500 plus one unit of
Karaoke machine. But it was only on May 25, 2000, that this matter was reported to the trial
court.
The excuse proffered by respondent sheriff -- heavy workload -- cannot absolve him from
administrative sanctions. As an officer of the court, he should at all times show a high degree
of professionalism in the performance of his duties. He has failed to observe that degree of
dedication required of him as a sheriff. The charge of connivance is, however, dismissed for
lack of basis.
D'
ARMOURED
SECURITY
AND
INVESTIGATION
AGENCY,
INC., petitioner,
vs.
ARNULFO ORPIA, LODUVICO ABUCEJO, ROWEL AGURO, EFREN ALMOETE, ROMEO
AMISTA,
WARLITO
BALAGOSA,
ROMEO
BALINGBING,
RAMON
BARROA,
MONTECLARO BATAWIL, ARNEL BON, RICARDO CAPENTES, DANILO DADA, JOEL
DELA CRUZ, HERNANO DELOS REYES, FLORENTINO DELOS TRINO, ROGELIO
DUERME, NONITO ESTRELLADO, JOSEPH FALCESO, ISIDRO FLORES, VICTOR
GUNGON, SONNY JULBA, PATRICIO LACANA, JR., FELIX LASCONA, JUANITO LUNA,
RAUL LUZADAS, ROMMEL MAGBANUA, ROGELIO MARIBUNG, NICOLAS MENDOZA,
EZVENER OGANA, RICKY ORANO, REYNALDO OZARAGA, SAMUEL PADILLA, EDWIN
PARRENO, IRENEO PARTOLAN, JUAN PIGTUAN, GUILLERMO PUSING, RODEL SIBAL,
SILVESTRE SOLEDAD, JOVENAR TEVER, VIRGILIO TIMAJO, ERMILIO TOMARONG, JR.,
VIRGILIO VERDEFLOR and JOEREX VICTORINO,respondents.
FACTS:
On February 9, 1995, the above-named respondents, who were employed as security guards
by DArmoured Security and Investigation Agency, Inc., petitioner, and assigned to Fortune
Tobacco, Inc. (Fortune Tobacco), filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal dismissal
and various monetary claims against petitioner and Fortune Tobacco, docketed as NLRC-NCR
Case No. 00-02-01148-95.
On June 11, 1998, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision in favor of the respondents.
From the said Decision, Fortune Tobacco interposed an appeal to the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC). Petitioner did not appeal. On March 26, 1999, the NLRC rendered its
Decision affirming with modification the assailed Arbiters Decision in the sense that the
complaint against Fortune Tobacco was dismissed. This Decision became final and executory.
Thus, the award specified in the Decision of the Arbiter became the sole liability of petitioner.
Upon respondents motion, the Arbiter issued a writ of execution. Eventually, the sheriff
served a writ of garnishment upon the Chief Accountant of Foremost Farms, Inc., a
corporation with whom petitioner has an existing services agreement. Thus, petitioners
receivables with Foremost were garnished.
Petitioner filed with the NLRC a "Motion to Quash/Recall Writ of Execution and Garnishment"
which was opposed by respondents.
On March 10, 2000, the Arbiter issued an Order denying the motion and directing the sheriff
to release the garnished sum of money to respondents pro rata.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied, hence, it interposed an appeal to the
NLRC.
In a Resolution dated July 27, 2000, the NLRC dismissed the appeal for petitioners failure to
post a bond within the reglementary period. Its motion for reconsideration was denied in a
Resolution dated September 25, 2000.
Forthwith, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.
In a Decision dated December 18, 2001, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
1.
2.
HELD:
1.
No
The petition lacks merit. We have ruled that an order of execution of a final and
executory judgment, as in this case, is not appealable, otherwise, there would be
no end to litigation. On this ground alone, the instant petition is dismissible.
2.
No
Section 13 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court is plain and clear on what properties are exempt
from execution. Section 13 (i) of the Rules pertinently reads:
SECTION 13. Property exempt from execution. Except as otherwise expressly provided by
law, the following property, and no other, shall be exempt from execution:
(i) So much of the salaries, wages or earnings of the judgment obligor for his personal
services within the four months preceding the levy as are necessary for the support of his
family.
The exemption under this procedural rule should be read in conjunction with the Civil Code,
the substantive law which proscribes the execution of employees wages, thus:
ART. 1708. The laborers wage shall not be subject to execution or attachment, except for
debts incurred for food, shelter, clothing and medical attendance.
Obviously, the exemption under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court and Article 1708 of the New
Civil Code is meant to favor only laboring men or women whose works are manual. Persons
belonging to this class usually look to the reward of a days labor for immediate or present
support, and such persons are more in need of the exemption than any other [Gaa vs. Court
of Appeals, 140 SCRA 304 (1985)].
In this context, exemptions under this rule are confined only to natural persons and not to
juridical entities such as petitioner. Thus, the rule speaks of salaries, wages and earning
from the personal services rendered by the judgment obligor. The rule further requires that
such earnings be intended for the support of the judgment debtors family.
Necessarily, petitioner which is a corporate entity, does not fall under the exemption. If at all,
the exemption refers to petitioners individual employees and not to petitioner as a
corporation.
Parenthetically, in a parallel case where a security agency claimed that the guns it gives to
its guards are tools and implements exempt from execution, the Supreme Court had the
occasion to rule that the exemption pertains only to natural and not to juridical persons, thus:
However, it would appear that the exemption contemplated by the provision involved is
personal, available only to a natural person, such as a dentists dental chair and electric fan
(Belen v. de Leon, G.R. No. L-15612, 30 Nov. 1962). As pointed out by the Solicitor General, if
properties used in business are exempt from execution, there can hardly be an instance when
a judgment claim can be enforced against the business entity [Pentagon Security and
Investigation Agency vs. Jimenez, 192 SCRA 492 (1990)].
It stands to reason that only natural persons whose salaries, wages and earnings are
indispensable for his own and that of his familys support are exempted under Section 13 (i)
of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Undeniably, a corporate entity such as petitioner security
agency is not covered by the exemption.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
It bears stressing that when CTDC bought Block 40, there was no annotation on PROSECORs
title showing that the property is encumbered. In fact, the NHA Resolution was not annotated
thereon. CTDC is thus a buyer in good faith and for value, and as such, may not be deprived
of the ownership of Block 40. Verily, the NHA Resolution may not be enforced against CTDC.
Clearly, providing an open space within the subdivision remains to be the obligation of
PROSECOR, the owner-developer and the real party-in-interest in the case for revival of
judgment. As aptly held by the Court of Appeals:
Quintessentially, the real party-in-interest in the revival of NHA Case No. 4175 is PROSECOR
and not CTDC. PROSECOR was the lone defendant or respondent in that case against whom
judgment was rendered. To insist that CTDC is a successor-in-interest of PROSECOR may have
some truth if we are talking about the ownership of the lots sold by PROSECOR in favor of
CTDC as a result of a civil action between the two. But then, to hold CTDC as the successorin-interest of PROSECOR as the developer of the subdivision, is far from realty. CTDC is simply
on the same footing as any lot buyer-member of PVHIA.
Furthermore, strangers to a case, like CTDC, are not bound by the judgment rendered by a
court. It will not divest the rights of a party who has not and never been a party to a
litigation. Execution of a judgment can be issued only against a party to the action and not
against one who did not have his day in court.