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GULF OIL CORPORATION v.

GILBERT,
(1947)
No. 93
Argued:
Decided: March 10, 1947

The Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed as to


the applicability of New York law, took a
restrictive view of the application of the entire
doctrine in federal courts and, one judge
dissenting, reversed. 2 The case is here on
certiorari. 328 U.S. 830 , 66 S.Ct. 1123
[330 U.S. 501, 504]
I.
It is conceded that the venue statutes of the
United States permitted the plaintiff to
commence his action in the Southern District
of New York and empower that court to
entertain it. 3 But that does not settle the
question whether it must do so. Indeed the
doctrine of forum non conveniens can never
apply if there is absence of jurisdiction or
mistake of venue.
This Court, in one form of words or another,
has repeatedly recognized the existence of
the power to decline jurisdiction in
exceptional circumstances. As formulated by
Mr. Justice Brandeis the rule is: 'Obviously, the
proposition that a court having jurisdiction
must exercise it, is not universally true; else
the admiralty court could never decline
jurisdiction on the ground that the litigation is
between foreigners. Nor is it true of courts
administering other systems of our law.
Courts of equity and of law also occasionally
decline, in the interest of justice, to exercise
jurisdiction, where the suit is between aliens
or nonresidents, or where for kindred reasons
the litigation can more appropriately be
conducted in a foreign tribunal.' Canada
Malting Co., Ltd., v. Paterson Steamships, Ltd.,
285 U.S. 413 422, 423, 52 S.Ct. 413, 415.
We later expressly said that a state court
'may in appropriate cases apply the doctrine
of forum non conveniens.' Broderick v. Rosner,
294 U.S. 629, 643 , 55 S.Ct. 589, 592, 79 l.Ed.
1100, 100 A.L.R. 1133; Williams v. State of
North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 , 294, n. 5, 63
S.Ct. 207, 143 A.L.R. 1273. Even where
federal rights binding on state courts under
the Constitution are sought to be adjudged,
this Court has sustained state courts in a
refusal to entertain a litigation between a
nonresident and a foreign corporation or
between two foreign corporations. Douglas v.
New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 279 U.S. 377 , 49
S.Ct. 355; Anglo- American Provision Co. v.
[330 U.S. 501, 505] Davis Provision Co. No.
1, 191 U.S. 373 , 24 S.Ct. 92. It has held the
use of an inappropriate forum in one case an
unconstitutional burden on interstate
commerce. Davis v. Farmers' Co-operative
Equity Co., 262 U.S. 312 , 43 S.Ct. 556. On
substantially forum non conveniens grounds
we have required federal courts to relinquish

Mr. Justice JACKSON delivered the opinion of


the Court.
The questions are whether the United States
District Court has inherent power to dismiss a
suit pursuant to the doctrine of forum non
conveniens and, if so, whether that power was
abused in this case.
The respondent-plaintiff brought this action in
the Southern District of New York, but resides
at Lynchburg, Virginia, where he operated a
public warehouse. He alleges that the
petitioner-defendant, in violation of the
ordinances of Lynchburg, so carelessly
handled a delivery of gasoline to his
warehouse tanks and pumps as to cause [330
U.S. 501, 503] an explosion and fire which
consumed the warehouse building to his
damage of $41,889.10, destroyed
merchandise and fixtures to his damage of
$3,602. 40, caused injury to his business and
profits of $20,038.27, and burned the
property of customers in his custody under
warehousing agreements to the extent of
$300,000. He asks judgment of $365,529.77
with costs and disbursements, and interest
from the date of fire. The action clearly is one
in tort.
The petitioner-defendant is a corporation
organized under the laws of Pennsylvania,
qualified to do business in both Virginia and
New York, and it has designated officials of
each state as agents to receive service of
process. When sued in New York, the
defendant, invoking the doctrine of forum non
conveniens, claimed that the appropriate
place for trial is Virginia where the plaintiff
lives and defendant does business, where all
events in litigation took place, where most of
the witnesses reside, and where both state
and federal courts are available to plaintiff
and are able to obtain jurisdiction of the
defendant.
The case, on its merits, involves no federal
question and was brought in the United States
District Court solely because of diversity in
citizenship of the parties. Because of the
charact r of its jurisdiction and the holdings of
and under Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64 , 58 S.Ct. 817, 114 A.L.R. 1487, the
District Court considered that the law of New
York as to forum non conveniens applied and
that it required the case to be left to Virginia
courts. 1 It therefore dismissed.

decision of cases within their jurisdiction


where the court would have to participate in
the administrative policy of a state. Railroad
Commission of Texas v. Rowan & Nichols Oil
Co., 311 U.S. 570 , 61 S.Ct. 343; Burford v.
Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 , 63 S.Ct. 1098; but
cf. Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 ,
64 S.Ct. 7. And most recently we decided
Williams v. Green Bay & Western R. Co., 326
U.S. 549 , 66 S.Ct. 284, in which the Court,
without questioning the validity of the
doctrine held it had been applied in that case
without justification. 4
It is true that in cases under the Federal
Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C.A. 51 et
seq., we have held that plaintiff's choice of a
forum cannot be defeated on the basis of
forum non conveniens. But this was because
the special venue act under which those
cases are brought was believed to require it.
Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44
, 62 S.Ct. 6, 136 A.L.R. 1222; Miles v. Illinois
Central R. Co., 315 U.S. 698 , 62 S.Ct. 827,
146 A.L.R. 1104. Those decisions do not
purport to modify the doctrine as to other
cases governed by the general venue
statutes. [330 U.S. 501, 506] But the court
below says that 'The Kepner case ... warned
against refusal of jurisdiction in a particular
case controlled by congressional act; here the
only difference is that congressional act, plus
judicial interpretation (under the Neirbo case),
spells out the result.' 153 F.2d at page 885.
The Federal Employers' Liability Act, however,
which controlled decision in the Kepner case,
specifically provides where venue may be had
in any suit on a cause of action arising under
that statute. What the court below refers to as
'congressional act, plus judicial interpretation,'
is the general statute of venue in diversity
suits, plus our decision that it gives the
defendant 'a personal privilege respecting the
venue, or place of suit, which he may assert,
or may waive, at his election,' Neirbo Co. v.
Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., Ltd., 308 U.S.
165, 168 , 60 S.Ct. 153, 154, 128 A.L.R. 1437.
The Federal Employers' Liability Act, as
interpreted by Kepner, increases the number
of places where the defendant may be sued
and makes him accept the plaintiff's choice.
The Neirbo case is only a declaration that if
the defendant, by filing consent to be sued,
waives its privilege to be sued at its place of
residence, it may be sued in the federal
courts at the place where it has consented to
be sued. But the general venue statute plus
the Neirbo interpretation do not add up to a
declaration that the court must respect the
choice of the plaintiff, no matter what the

type of suit or issues involved. The two taken


together mean only that the defendant may
consent to be sued, and it is proper for the
federal court to take jurisdiction, not that the
plaintiff's choice cannot be questioned. The
defendant's consent to be sued extends only
to give the court jurisdiction of the person; it
assumes that the court, having the parties
before it, will apply all the applicable law,
including, in those cases where it is
appropriate, its discretionary judgment as to
whether the suit should be entertained. In all
cases in which the doctrine of forum non
conveniens comes into [330 U.S. 501, 507]
play, it presupposes at least two forums in
which the defendant is amenable to process;
the doctrine furnishes criteria for choice
between them.
II.
The principle of forum non conveniens is
simply that a court may resist imposition upon
its jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is
authorized by the letter of a general venue
statute. These statutes are drawn with a
necessary generality and usually give a
plaintiff a choice of courts, so that he may be
quite sure of some place in which to pursue
his remedy. But the open door may admit
those who seek not simply justice but perhaps
justice blended with some harassment. A
plaintiff sometimes is under temptation to
resort to a strategy of f rcing the trial at a
most inconvenient place for an adversary,
even at some inconvenience to himself.
Many of the states have met misuse of venue
by investing courts with a discretion to
change the place of trial on various grounds,
such as the convenience of witnesses and the
ends of justice. 5 The federal law contains no
such express criteria to guide the district
court in exercising its power. But the problem
is a very old one affecting the administration
of the courts as well as the rights of litigants,
and both in England and in this country the
common law worked out techniques and
criteria for dealing with it. 6 [330 U.S. 501,
508] Wisely, it has not been attempted to
catalogue the circumstances which will justify
or require either grant or denial of remedy.
The doctrine leaves much to the discretion of
the court to which plaintiff resorts, and
experience has not shown a judicial tendency
to renounce one's own jurisdiction so strong
as to result in many abuses. 7
If the combination and weight of factors
requisite to given results are difficult to
forecast or state, those to be considered are
not difficult to name. An interest to be
considered, and the one likely to be most

pressed, is the private interest of the litigant.


Important considerations are the relative ease
of access to sources of proof; availability of
compulsory process for attendance of
unwilling, and the cost of obtaining
attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of
view of premises, if view would be appropriate
to the action; and all other practical problems
that make trial of a case easy, expeditious
and inexpensive. There may also be questions
as to the enforcibility of a judgment if one is
obtained. The court will weigh relative
advantages and obstacles to fair trial. It is
often said that the plaintiff may not, by choice
of an inconvenient forum, 'vex,' 'harass,' or
'oppress' the defendant by inflicting upon him
expense or trouble not necessary to his own
right to pursue his remedy. 8 But unless the
balance is strongly in favor of the defendant,
the plaintiff's choice of forum should rarely be
disturbed.
Factors of public interest also have place in
applying the doctrine. Administrative
difficulties follow for courts when litigation is
piled up in congested centers instead of being
handled at its origin. Jury duty is a burden
that ought not to be imposed upon the people
of a community [330 U.S. 501, 509] which
has no relation to the litigation. In cases which
touch the affairs of many persons, there is
reason for holding the trial in their view and
reach rather than in remote parts of the
country where they can learn of it by report
only. There is a local interest in having
localized controversies decided at home.
There is an appropriateness, too, in having
the trial of a diversity case in a forum that is
at home with the state law that must govern
the case, rather than having a court in some
other forum untangle problems in conflict of
laws, and in law foreign to itself.
The law of New York as to the discretion of a
court to apply the doctrine of forum non
conveniens, and as to the standards that
guide discretion is, so far as here involved,
the same as the federal rule. Murnan v.
Wabash Ry. Co., 246 N.Y. 244, 158 N.E. 508,
54 A.L.R. 1522; Wedemann v. United States
Trus Co. of New York, 258 N.Y. 315, 179 N.E.
712, 79 A.L.R. 1320; see Gregonis v.
Philadelphia & Reading Coal & Iron Co ., 235
N.Y. 152, 139 N.E. 223, 32 A.L.R. 1. It would
not be profitable, therefore, to pursue inquiry
as to the source from which our rule must
flow.
III.
Turning to the question whether this is one of
those rather rare cases where the doctrine

should be applied, we look first to the


interests of the litigants.
The plaintiff himself is not a resident of New
York, nor did any event connected with the
case take place there, nor does any witness
with the possible exception of experts live
there. No one connected with that side of the
case save counsel for the plaintiff resides
there, and he has candidly told us that he was
retained by insurance companies interested
presumably because of subrogation. His
affidavits and argument are devoted to
controvering claims as to defendant's
inconvenience rather than to showing that the
present forum serves any convenience [330
U.S. 501, 510] of his own, with one
exception. The only justification for trial in
New York advanced here is one rejected by
the district court and is set forth in the brief
as follows: 'This Court can readily realize that
an action of this type, involving as it does a
claim for damages in an amount close to $
400,000, is one which may stagger the
imagination of a local jury which is surely
unaccustomed to dealing with amounts of
such a nature. Furthermore, removed from
Lynchburg, the respondent will have an
opportunity to try this case free from local
influences and preconceived notions which
make it difficult to procure a jury which has no
previous knowledge of any of the facts
herein.'
This unproven premise that jurors of New York
live on terms of intimacy with $400,000
transactions is not an assumption we easily
make. Nor can we assume that a jury from
Lynchburg and vicinity would be 'staggered'
by contemplating the value of a warehouse
building that stood in their region, or of
merchandise and fixtures such as were used
there, nor are they likely to be staggered by
the value of chattels which the people of that
neighborhood put in storage. It is a strange
argument on behalf of a Virginia plaintiff that
the community which gave him patronage to
make his business valuable is not capable of
furnishing jurors who know the value of the
goods they store, the building they are stored
in, or the business their patronage creates.
And there is no specification of any local
influence, other than accurate knowledge of
local conditiions, that would make a fair trial
improbable. The net of this is that we cannot
say the District Court was bound to entertain
a provincial fear of the provincialism of a
Virginia jury. That leaves the Virginia plaintiff
without even a suggested reason for
transporting this suit to New York. [330 U.S.
501, 511] Defendant points out that not only

the plaintiff, but every person who


participated in the acts charged to be
negligent, resides in or near Lynchburg. It also
claims a need to interplead an alleged
independent contractor which made the
delivery of the gasoline and which is a Virginia
corporation domiciled in Lynchburg, that it
cannot interplead in New York. There also are
approximately 350 persons residing in and
around Lynchburg who stored with plaintiff the
goods for the damage to which he seeks to
recover. The extent to which they have left
the community since the fire and the number
of them who will actually be needed is in
dispute. The complaint alleges that
defendant's conduct violated Lynchburg
ordinances. Conditions are said to require
proof by firemen and by many others. The
learned and experienced trial judge was not
unaware that litigants generally manage to
try their cases with fewer witnesses than they
predict in such motions as this. But he was
justified in concluding that this trial is likely to
be long and to involve calling many
witnesses, and that Lynchburg, some 400
miles from New York, is the source of all
proofs for either side with possible exception
of e perts. Certainly to fix the place of trial at
a point where litigants cannot compel
personal attendance and may be forced to try
their cases on deposition, is to create a
condition not satisfactory to court, jury or
most litigants. Nor is it necessarily cured by
the statement of plaintiff's counsel that he will
see to getting many of the witnesses to the
trial and that some of them 'would be
delighted to come to New York to testify.'
There may be circumstances where such a
proposal should be given weight. In others the
offer may not turn out to be as generous as
defendant or court might suppose it to be.
Such matters are for the District Court to
decide in exercise of a sound discretion.
The court likewise could well have concluded
that the task of the trial court would be
simplified by trial in Vir- [330 U.S. 501, 512]
ginia. If trial was in a state court, it could
apply its own law to events occurring there. If
in federal court by reason of diversity of
citizenship, the court would apply the law of
its own state in which it is likely to be
experienced. The course of adjudication in
New York federal court might be beset with
conflict of laws problems all avoided if the
case is litigated in Virginia where it arose.
We are convinced that the District Court did
not exceed its powers or the bounds of its
discretion in dismissing plaintiff's complaint
and remitting him to the courts of his own

community. The Circuit Court of Appeals took


too restrictive a view of the doctrine as
approved by this Court. Its judgment is
reversed.
REVERSED.
Mr. Justice REED and Mr. Justice BURTON
dissent. They do not set out the factual
reasons for their dissent since the Court's
affirmance of Koster v. (American)
Lumbermens Mutual casualty Co., 330 U.S.
518 , 67 S.Ct. 828, would control.
Mr. Justice BLACK (dissenting).
The defendant corporation is organized under
the laws of Pennsylvania, but is qualified to do
business and maintains an office in New York.
Plaintiff is an individual residing and doing
business in Virginia. The accident in which
plaintiff alleges to have been damaged
occurred in Lynchburg, Virginia. Plaintiff
brought this action in the Federal District
Court in New York. Section 11 of the Judiciary
Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 78, carried over into the
Judicial Code, 24, 28 U.S.C. 41(1), 28 U.S.C.A.
41(1), confers jurisdiction upon federal district
courts of all actions at law between citizens of
different states. The Court does not suggest
that the federal district court in New York
lacks jurisdiction under this statute or that the
venue was improper in this case. 28 U.S.C.
112, 28 U. S.C.A. 112. Cf. Neirbo Co. v. [330
U.S. 501, 513] Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp.,
308 U.S. 165 , 60 S.Ct. 153, 128 A.L.R. 1437.
But it holds that a district court may abdicate
its jurisdiction when a defendant shows to the
satisfaction of a district court that it would be
more convenient and less vexatious for the
defendant if the trial were held in another
jurisdiction. Neither the venue statute nor the
statute which has governed jurisdiction since
1789 contains any indication or implication
that a federal district court, once satisfied
that jurisdiction and venue requirements have
been met, may decline to exercise its
jurisdiction. Except in relation to the exercise
of the extraordinary admiralty and equity
powers of district courts, this Court has never
before held contrary to the general principle
that 'the courts of the United States are
bound to proceed to judgment and to afford
redress to suitors before them in every case
to which their jurisdiction extends. They
cannot abdicate their authority or duty in any
case in favor of another jurisdiction.' Hyde v.
Stone, 20 How. 170, 175, quoted with
approval in Chicot County v. Sherwood, 148
U.S. 529, 534 , 13 S. Ct. 695, 697. See also
Dennick v. Railroad Co., 103 U.S. 11 ;
Baltimore & O.R. Co. v. Kepner, 314 U.S. 44 ,
62 S.Ct. 6, 136 A.L.R. 1222; Evey v. Mexican

Cent. R. Co., 5 Cir., 81 F. 294. 1 Never until


today has this Court held, in actions for
money damages for violations of common law
or statutory rights, that a district court can
abdicate its statutory duty to exercise its
jurisdiction for the alleged convenience of the
defendant to a lawsuit. Compare Slater v.
Mexican National R. Co., 194 U.S. 120 , 24
S.Ct. 581.
For reasons peculiar to the special problems
of admiralty and to the extraordinary
remedies of equity, the courts exercising
admiralty and equity powers have been per[330 U.S. 501, 514] mitted at times to
decline to exercise their jurisdiction. Canada
Malting Co. v. Paterson S.S. Co., 285 U.S. 413 ,
52 S.Ct. 413; Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co.,
288 U.S. 123 , 53 S.Ct. 295, 89 A.L.R. 720; cf.
Williams v. Green Bay & W.R. Co., 326 U.S.
549 , 66 S.Ct. 284. This exception is rooted in
the kind of relief which these courts grant and
the kinds of problems which they solve. See
Meredith v. Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 235 ,
64 S.Ct. 7, 11; Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S.
315 , 333 n. 29, 63 S.Ct. 1098, 1107. Courts
of equity developed to afford relief where a
money judgment in the common law courts
provided no adequate remedy for an injured
person. 2 From the beginning of equitable
jurisdiction up to now, the chancery courts
have generally granted or withheld their
special remedies at their discretion; and
'courts of admiralty ... act upon enlarged
principles of equity.' O'Brien v. Miller, 168 U.S.
287, 297 , 18 S.Ct. 140, 144. But this Court
has, on many occasions, severely restricted
the discretion of district courts to decline to
grant even the extraordinary equitable
remedies. Meredith v. Winter Haven, supra,
and cases there cited, 320 U.S. at pages 234,
235, 64 S.Ct. at page 11. Previously federal
courts have not generally been allowed the
broad and indefinite discretion to dispose
even of equity cases solely on a trial court's
judgment of the relative convenience of the
forum for the parties themselves. For a major
factor in these equity decisions has been the
relative ability of the forum to shape and
execute its equitable remedy. Cf. Rogers v.
Guaranty Trust Co., supra. [330 U.S. 501, 515]
No such discretionary authority to decline to
decide a case, however, has, before today,
been vested in federal courts in actions for
money judgments deriving from statutes or
the common law. 3 To engraft the doctrine of
forum non conveniens upon the statutes
fixing jurisdiction and proper venue in the
district courts in such actions, seems to me to

be far more than the mere filling in of the


interstices of those statutes. 4
It may be that a statute should be passed
authorizing the federal district courts to
decline to try so-called common law cases
according to the convenience of the parties.
But whether there should be such a statute,
and determination of its scope and the
safeguards which should surround it, are, in
my judgment, questions of policy which
Congress should decide. There are strong
arguments presented by the Court in its
opinion why federal courts exercising their
common law jurisdiction should have the
discretionary powers which equity courts have
always possessed in dispensing equitable
relief. I think equally strong arguments could
be advanced to show that they should not. For
any individual or corporate defendant who
does part of his business in states other than
the one in which he [330 U.S. 501, 516] is
sued will almost invariably be put to some
inconvenience to defend himself. It will be a
poorly represented multistate defendant who
cannot produce substantial evidence and
good reasons fitting the rule now adopted by
this Court tending to establish that the forum
of action against him is most inconvenient.
The Court's new rule will thus clutter the very
threshold of the federal courts with a
preliminary trial of fact concerning the relative
convenience of forums. The preliminary
disposition of this factual question will, I
believe, produce the very kind of uncertainty,
confusion, and hardship which stalled and
handicapped persons seeking compensation
for maritime injuries following this Court's
decision in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244
U.S. 205 , 37 S.Ct. 524, L.R.A. 1918C, 451,
Ann.Cas. 1917E, 900. The broad and indefinite
discretion left to federal courts to decide the
question of convenience from the welter of
factors which are relevant to such a judgment,
will inevitably produce a complex of close and
indistinguishable decisions from which
accurate prediction of the proper forum will
become difficult, if not impossible. Yet
plaintiffs will be asked 'to determine with
certainty before bringing their actions that
factual question over which courts regularly
divide among themselves and within their
own membership. As penalty for error, the
injured individual may not only suffer serious
financial loss through the delay and expense
of litigation, but discover that his claim has
been barred by the statute of limitations in
the proper forum while he was erroneously
pursuing it elsewhere.' Davis v. Department of

Labor & Industries, 317 U.S. 249, 254 , 63


S.Ct. 225, 228.
This very case illustrates the hazards of delay.
It must be begun anew in another forum after
the District Court, the Circuit Court of Appeals,
and now this Court, have has their timeconsuming say as to the relative convenience
of the forum in which the plaintiff chose to
seek redress. Whether the statute of
limitations has run [330 U.S. 501, 517]
against the plaintiff, we do not know. The
convenience which the individual defendant
will enjoy from the Court's new rule of forum
non conveniens in law actions may be thought
to justify its inherent delays, uncertainties,
administrative complications and hardships.
But in any event, Congress has not yet said
so; and I do not think that this Court should,
150 years after the passage of the Judiciary A
t, fill in what it thinks is a deficiency in the
deliberate policy which Congress adopted. 5
Whether the doctrine of forum non
conveniens is good or bad, I should wait for
Congress to adopt it.

1. The State has power to issue a cease and


desist order to enforce at least the
requirement that the Association consent to
suit against it by service of process on the
Secretary of the Commonwealth. Pp. 646-647.
2. The contacts and ties of appellants with
Virginia residents, together with that State's
interest in faithful observance of the
certificate obligations, justify subjecting
appellants to cease and desist proceedings
under 6. Pp. 647-648.
3. Virginia's subjection of the Association to
the jurisdiction of the State Commission in a 6
proceeding is consistent with fair play and
substantial justice, and is not offensive to the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. P. 649.
4. The power of the State to subject the
Association to the jurisdiction of the State
Commission and to authorize a cease and
[339 U.S. 643, 644] desist order under 6 is
not vitiated by the fact that business activities
carried on outside of the State are affected. P.
650.
5. Service of process on appellants by
registered mail did not violate the
requirements of due process. Pp. 650-651.
188 Va. 877, 51 S. E. 2d 263, affirmed.
An order of the Virginia Corporation
Commission requiring appellants to cease and
desist from offering and issuing, without a
permit, certificates of insurance to residents
of the State, was affirmed by the Supreme
Court of Appeals. 188 Va. 877, 51 S. E. 2d
263. On appeal to this Court, affirmed, p. 651.
Moses G. Hubbard, Jr. argued the cause for
appellants. With him on the brief was Thomas
B. Gay.
Walter E. Rogers, Assistant Attorney General
of Virginia, argued the cause for appellee.
With him on the brief was J. Lindsay Almond,
Jr., Attorney General.
A brief supporting appellee was filed as amici
curiae by Nathaniel L. Goldstein, Attorney
General, Wendell P. Brown, Solicitor General,
and John C. Crary, Jr., Assistant Attorney
General, for the State of New York; William L.
Phinney, Attorney General, for the State of
New Hampshire; and Hall Hammond, Attorney
General, for the State of Maryland.
MR. JUSTICE BLACK delivered the opinion of
the Court.
In an effort to protect its citizens from
"unfairness, imposition or fraud" in sales of
certificates of insurance and other forms of
securities, the Virginia "Blue Sky Law"
requires those selling or offering such
securities to obtain a permit from the State
Corporation Commission. 1 Applicants for

TRAVELERS HEALTH ASSN. v. VIRGINIA,


(1950)
No. 76
Argued: November 15, 1949 Decided:
June 5, 1950
In a proceeding under 6 of the Virginia "Blue
Sky Law," the State Corporation Commission
ordered an Association, located in Nebraska
and engaged in the mail-order health
insurance business, and its treasurer
(appellants here) to cease and desist from
further offerings or sales of certificates of
insurance to Virginia residents until the
Association had complied with the Act by
furnishing information as to its financial
condition, consenting to suit against it by
service of process on the Secretary of the
Commonwealth, and obtaining a permit.
Notice of the proceeding was served on
appellants by registered mail, as authorized
by 6 when other forms of service are
unavailable. They appeared specially,
challenged the jurisdiction of the State, and
moved to quash the service of summons. On
recommendations from Virginia members, the
Association for many years had been issuing
insurance certificates to residents of Virginia,
and it had approximately 800 members there.
It had caused claims for losses to be
investigated, and the Virginia courts were
open to it for the enforcement of obligations
of certificate holders. Held:

permits must meet comprehensive conditions:


they must, for example, provide detailed
information [339 U.S. 643, 645] concerning
their solvency, and must agree that suits can
be filed against them in Virginia by service of
process on the Secretary of the
Commonwealth. 2
While violation of the Act is a misdemeanor
punishable by criminal sanctions, 6 provides
another method for enforcement. After notice
and a hearing "on the merits," the State
Corporation Commission is authorized to issue
a cease and desist order restraining violations
of the Act. The section also provides for
service by registered mail where other types
of service are unavailable "because the
offering is by advertisement and/or
solicitation through periodicals, mail,
telephone, telegraph, radio, or other means of
communication from beyond the limits of the
State . . . ." The highest court of Virginia
rejected contentions that this section violates
constitutional requirements of due process,
and the case is properly here on appeal under
28 U.S.C. 1257 (2).
In this case cease and desist proceedings
under 6 were instituted by the State
Corporation Commission against Travelers
Health Association and against R. E. Pratt, as
treasurer of the Association and in his
personal capacity. Having received notice by
registered mail only, they appeared
"specially" for "the sole purpose of objecting
to the alleged jurisdiction of the
Commonwealth of Virginia and of its State
Corporation Commission, and of moving to set
aside and quash service of summons . . . ."
The agreed stipulation of facts and certain
exhibits offered by the state can be
summarized as follows:
The appellant Travelers Health Association
was incorporated in Nebraska as a nonprofit
membership association in 1904. Since that
time its only office has been located in
Omaha, from which it has conducted a
mailorder health insurance business. New
members pay an initiation fee and obligate
themselves to pay periodic [339 U.S. 643,
646] assessments at the Omaha office. The
funds so collected are used for operating
expenses and sick benefits to members. The
Association has no paid agents; its new
members are usually obtained through the
unpaid activities of those already members,
who are encouraged to recommend the
Association to friends and submit their names
to the home office. The appellant Pratt in
Omaha mails solicitations to these prospects.
He encloses blank applications which, if

signed and returned to the home office with


the required fee, usually result in election of
applicants as members. Certificates are then
mailed, subject to return within 10 days "if not
satisfactory." Travelers has solicited Virginia
members in this manner since 1904, and has
caused many sick benefit claims to be
investigated. When these proceedings were
instituted, it had approximately 800 Virginia
members.
The Commission, holding that the foregoing
facts supported the state's power to act in 6
proceedings, overruled appellants' objection
to jurisdiction and their motion to quash
service. The Association and its treasurer
were ordered to cease and desist from further
solicitations or sales of certificates to Virginia
residents "through medium of any
advertisement from within or from without the
State, and/or through the mails or otherwise,
by intra- or inter-state communication, . . .
unless and until" it obtained authority in
accordance with the "Blue Sky Law." This
order was affirmed by the Virginia Court of
Appeals. 188 Va. 877, 882, 51 S. E. 2d 263,
271.
Appellants do not question the validity of the
Virginia law "to the extent that it provides that
individual and corporate residents of other
states shall not come into the State for the
purpose of doing business there without first
submitting to the regulatory authority of the
State." As to such state power see, e. g., Hall
v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539 . Their basic
contention is that all their activities take place
in Nebraska, and that consequently [339 U.S.
643, 647] Virginia has no power to reach
them in cease and desist proceedings to
enforce any part of its regulatory law. We
cannot agree with this general due process
objection, for we think the state has power to
issue a "cease and desist order" enforcing at
least that regulatory provision requiring the
Association to accept service of process by
Virginia claimants on the Secretary of the
Commonwealth.
Appellants' chief reliance for the due process
contention is on Minnesota Assn. v. Benn, 261
U.S. 140 . There a Minnesota association
obtained members in Montana by the same
mail solicitation process used by Travelers to
get Virginia members. The certificates issued
to Montana members also reserved the right
to investigate claims, although the Court
pointed out that Benn's claim had not been
investigated. This Court held that since the
contracts were "executed and to be
performed" in Minnesota, the Association was
not "doing business" in Montana and therefore

could not be sued in Montana courts unless


"consent" to Montana suits could be implied.
The Court found the circumstances under
which the insurance transactions took place
insufficient to support such an implication.
But where business activities reach out
beyond one state and create continuing
relationships and obligations with citizens of
another state, courts need not resort to a
fictional "consent" in order to sustain the
jurisdiction of regulatory agencies in the latter
state. And in considering what constitutes
"doing business" sufficiently to justify
regulation in the state where the effects of
the "business" are felt, the narrow grounds
relied on by the Court in the Benn case cannot
be deemed controlling.
In Osborn v. Ozlin, 310 U.S. 53, 62 , we
recognized that a state has a legitimate
interest in all insurance policies protecting its
residents against risks, an interest which the
state can protect even though the "state
action may have repercussions beyond state
lines . . . ." And in Hoopeston [339 U.S. 643,
648] Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 313,
316 , we rejected the contention, based on
the Benn case among others, that a state's
power to regulate must be determined by a
"conceptualistic discussion of theories of the
place of contracting or of performance."
Instead we accorded "great weight" to the
"consequences" of the contractual obligations
in the state where the insured resided and the
"degree of interest" that state had in seeing
that those obligations were faithfully carried
out. And in International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 , this Court,
after reviewing past cases, concluded: "due
process requires only that in order to subject
a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he
be not present within the territory of the
forum, he have certain minimum contacts
with it such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend `traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.'"
Measured by the principles of the Osborn,
Hoopeston and International Shoe cases, the
contacts and ties of appellants with Virginia
residents, together with that state's interest in
faithful observance of the certificate
obligations, justify subjecting appellants to
cease and desist proceedings under 6. The
Association did not engage in mere isolated or
short-lived transactions. Its insurance
certificates, systematically and widely
delivered in Virginia following solicitation
based on recommendations of Virginians,
create continuing obligations between the
Association and each of the many certificate

holders in the state. Appellants have caused


claims for losses to be investigated and the
Virginia courts were available to them in
seeking to enforce obligations created by the
group of certificates. See International Shoe
Co. v. Washington, supra, at 320.
Moreover, if Virginia is without power to
require this Association to accept service of
process on the Secretary of the
Commonwealth, the only forum for injured
certificate holders might be Nebraska. Health
benefit [339 U.S. 643, 649] claims are
seldom so large that Virginia policyholders
could afford the expense and trouble of a
Nebraska law suit. In addition, suits on alleged
losses can be more conveniently tried in
Virginia where witnesses would most likely
live and where claims for losses would
presumably be investigated. Such factors
have been given great weight in applying the
doctrine of forum non conveniens. See Gulf
Oil Co. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 . And prior
decisions of this Court have referred to the
unwisdom, unfairness and injustice of
permitting policyholders to seek redress only
in some distant state where the insurer is
incorporated. 3 The Due Process Clause does
not forbid a state to protect its citizens from
such injustice.
There is, of course, one method by which
claimants could recover from appellants in
Virginia courts without the aid of substituted
service of process: certificate holders in
Virginia could all be garnished to the extent of
their obligations to the Association. See Huron
Corp. v. Lincoln Co., 312 U.S. 183, 193 . While
such an indirect procedure would undeniably
be more troublesome to claimants than the
plan adopted by the state in its "Blue Sky
Law," it would clearly be even more harassing
to the Association and its Virginia members.
Metaphysical concepts of "implied consent"
and "presence" in a state should not be
solidified into a constitutional barrier against
Virginia's simple, direct and fair plan for
service of process on the Secretary of the
Commonwealth.
We hold that Virginia's subjection of this
Association to the jurisdiction of that State's
Corporation Commission in a 6 proceeding is
consistent with "fair play and substantial
justice," and is not offensive to the Due
Process Clause. [339 U.S. 643, 650]
Appellants also contend that 6 as here applied
violates due process because the Commission
order attempts to "destroy or impair" their
right to make contracts in Nebraska with
Virginia residents. Insofar as this contention
can be raised in a special appearance merely

to contest jurisdiction, it is essentially the


same as the due process issue discussed
above. For reasons just given, Virginia has
power to subject Travelers to the jurisdiction
of its Corporation Commission, and its cease
and desist provisions designed to accomplish
this purpose "can not be attacked merely
because they affect business activities which
are carried on outside the state." Hoopeston
Canning Co. v. Cullen, supra, 320-321. See
also Osborn v. Ozlin, 310 U.S. 53, 62 . These
two opinions make clear that Allgeyer v.
Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 , requires no different
result.
Appellants concede that in the Osborn and
Hoopeston cases we sustained state laws
providing protective standards for
policyholders in those states, even though
compliance with those standards by the
insurance companies could have
repercussions on similar out-of-state
contracts. It is argued, however, that those
cases are distinguishable because they both
involved companies which were "licensed to
do business in the state of the forum and
were actually doing business within the state .
. . ." But while Hoopeston Canning Co. had
done business in New York under an old law, it
brought the case here to challenge certain
provisions of a new licensing law with which it
had to comply if it was to do business there in
the future. Thus it was seeking the same kind
of relief that appellants seek here, and for the
same general purpose. What we there said as
to New York's power is equally applicable to
Virginia's power here.
It is also suggested that service of process on
appellants by registered mail does not meet
due process requirements. [339 U.S. 643,
651] What we have said answers this
contention insofar as it alleges a lack of state
jurisdiction because appellants were served
outside Virginia. If service by mail is
challenged as not providing adequate and
reasonable notice, the contention has been
answered by International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, supra, 320-321. See also Mullane
v. Central Hanover Bank, 339 U.S. 306 .
The due process questions we have already
discussed are the only alleged errors relied on
in appellants' brief, 4 and appellants' special
appearance only challenged state jurisdiction
and the service of process. We therefore have
no occasion to discuss the scope of the
Commission's order, or the methods by which
the state might attempt to enforce it. 5
Affirmed.

WORLD-WIDE VOLKSWAGEN CORP. v.


WOODSON, (1980)
No. 78-1078
Argued: October 3, 1979 Decided:
January 21, 1980
A products-liability action was instituted in an
Oklahoma state court by respondents
husband and wife to recover for personal
injuries sustained in Oklahoma in an accident
involving an automobile that had been
purchased by them in New York while they
were New York residents and that was being
driven through Oklahoma at the time of the
accident. The defendants included the
automobile retailer and its wholesaler
(petitioners), New York corporations that did
no business in Oklahoma. Petitioners entered
special appearances, claiming that
Oklahoma's exercise of jurisdiction over them
would offend limitations on the State's
jurisdiction imposed by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
trial court rejected petitioners' claims, and
they then sought, but were denied, a writ of
prohibition in the Oklahoma Supreme Court to
restrain respondent trial judge from exercising
in personam jurisdiction over them.
Held:
Consistently with the Due Process Clause, the
Oklahoma trial court may not exercise in
personam jurisdiction over petitioners. Pp.
291-299.
(a) A state court may exercise personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only
so long as there exist "minimum contacts"
between the defendant and the forum State.
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310 . The defendant's contacts with the forum
State must be such that maintenance of the
suit does not offend traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice, id., at 316, and
the relationship between the defendant and
the forum must be such that it is "reasonable .
. . to require the corporation to defend the
particular suit which is brought there," id., at
317. The Due Process Clause "does not
contemplate that a state may make binding a
judgment in personam against an individual
or corporate defendant with which the state
has no contacts, ties, or relations." Id., at 319.
Pp. 291-294.
(b) Here, there is a total absence in the record
of those affiliating circumstances that are a
necessary predicate to any exercise of statecourt jurisdiction. Petitioners carry on no
activity whatsoever in Oklahoma; they close
no sales and perform no services there, avail
[444 U.S. 286, 287] themselves of none of

the benefits of Oklahoma law, and solicit no


business there either through salespersons or
through advertising reasonably calculated to
reach that State. Nor does the record show
that they regularly sell cars to Oklahoma
residents or that they indirectly, through
others, serve or seek to serve the Oklahoma
market. Although it is foreseeable that
automobiles sold by petitioners would travel
to Oklahoma and that the automobile here
might cause injury in Oklahoma,
"foreseeability" alone is not a sufficient
benchmark for personal jurisdiction under the
Due Process Clause. The foreseeability that is
critical to due process analysis is not the mere
likelihood that a product will find its way into
the forum State, but rather is that the
defendant's conduct and connection with the
forum are such that he should reasonably
anticipate being haled into court there. Nor
can jurisdiction be supported on the theory
that petitioners earn substantial revenue from
goods used in Oklahoma. Pp. 295-299.
585 P.2d 351, reversed.

Volkswagen Corp. (World-Wide); and its retail


dealer, petitioner Seaway. Seaway and WorldWide entered special appearances, 3 claiming
that Oklahoma's exercise of jurisdiction over
them would offend the limitations on the
State's jurisdiction imposed by the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
4
The facts presented to the District Court
showed that World-Wide is incorporated and
has its business office in New [444 U.S. 286,
289] York. It distributes vehicles, parts, and
accessories, under contract with Volkswagen,
to retail dealers in New York, New Jersey, and
Connecticut. Seaway, one of these retail
dealers, is incorporated and has its place of
business in New York. Insofar as the record
reveals, Seaway and World-Wide are fully
independent corporations whose relations
with each other and with Volkswagen and
Audi are contractual only. Respondents
adduced no evidence that either World-Wide
or Seaway does any business in Oklahoma,
ships or sells any products to or in that State,
has an agent to receive process there, or
purchases advertisements in any media
calculated to reach Oklahoma. In fact, as
respondents' counsel conceded at oral
argument, Tr. of Oral Arg. 32, there was no
showing that any automobile sold by WorldWide or Seaway has ever entered Oklahoma
with the single exception of the vehicle
involved in the present case.
Despite the apparent paucity of contacts
between petitioners and Oklahoma, the
District Court rejected their constitutional
claim and reaffirmed that ruling in denying
petitioners' motion for reconsideration. 5
Petitioners then sought a writ of prohibition in
the Supreme Court of Oklahoma to restrain
the District Judge, respondent Charles S.
Woodson, from exercising in personam
jurisdiction over them. They renewed their
contention that, because they had no
"minimal contacts," App. 32, with the State of
Oklahoma, the actions of the District Judge
were in violation of their rights under the Due
Process Clause.
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma denied the
writ, 585 P.2d 351 (1978), 6 holding that
personal jurisdiction over petitioners was
authorized by Oklahoma's "long-arm" statute,
[444 U.S. 286, 290] Okla. Stat., Tit. 12,
1701.03 (a) (4) (1971). 7 Although the court
noted that the proper approach was to test
jurisdiction against both statutory and
constitutional standards, its analysis did not
distinguish these questions, probably because
1701.03 (a) (4) has been interpreted as

MR. JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of


the Court.
The issue before us is whether, consistently
with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, an Oklahoma court may exercise
in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident
automobile retailer and its wholesale
distributor in a products-liability action, when
the defendants' only connection with
Oklahoma is the fact that an automobile sold
in New York to New York residents became
involved in an accident in Oklahoma. [444
U.S. 286, 288]
I
Respondents Harry and Kay Robinson
purchased a new Audi automobile from
petitioner Seaway Volkswagen, Inc. (Seaway),
in Massena, N. Y., in 1976. The following year
the Robinson family, who resided in New York,
left that State for a new home in Arizona. As
they passed through the State of Oklahoma,
another car struck their Audi in the rear,
causing a fire which severely burned Kay
Robinson and her two children. 1
The Robinsons 2 subsequently brought a
products-liability action in the District Court
for Creek County, Okla., claiming that their
injuries resulted from defective design and
placement of the Audi's gas tank and fuel
system. They joined as defendants the
automobile's manufacturer, Audi NSU Auto
Union Aktiengesellschaft (Audi); its importer,
Volkswagen of America, Inc. (Volkswagen); its
regional distributor, petitioner World-Wide

10

conferring jurisdiction to the limits permitted


by the United States Constitution. 8 The
court's rationale was contained in the
following paragraph, 585 P.2d, at 354:
"In the case before us, the product being sold
and distributed by the petitioners is by its
very design and purpose so mobile that
petitioners can foresee its possible use in
Oklahoma. This is especially true of the
distributor, who has the exclusive right to
distribute such automobile in New York, New
Jersey and Connecticut. The evidence
presented below demonstrated that goods
sold and distributed by the petitioners were
used in the State of Oklahoma, and under the
facts we believe it reasonable to infer, given
the retail value of the automobile, that the
petitioners derive substantial income from
automobiles which from time to time are used
in the State of Oklahoma. This being the case,
we hold that under the facts presented, the
trial court was justified in concluding [444 U.S.
286, 291] that the petitioners derive
substantial revenue from goods used or
consumed in this State."
We granted certiorari, 440 U.S. 907 (1979), to
consider an important constitutional question
with respect to state-court jurisdiction and to
resolve a conflict between the Supreme Court
of Oklahoma and the highest courts of at least
four other States. 9 We reverse.
II
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment limits the power of a state court
to render a valid personal judgment against a
nonresident defendant. Kulko v. California
Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 91 (1978). A
judgment rendered in violation of due process
is void in the rendering State and is not
entitled to full faith and credit elsewhere.
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 732 -733
(1878). Due process requires that the
defendant be given adequate notice of the
suit, Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339
U.S. 306, 313 -314 (1950), and be subject to
the personal jurisdiction of the court,
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
310 (1945). In the present case, it is not
contended that notice was inadequate; the
only question is whether these particular
petitioners were subject to the jurisdiction of
the Oklahoma courts.
As has long been settled, and as we reaffirm
today, a state court may exercise personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant only
so long as there exist "minimum contacts"
between the defendant and the forum State.
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, supra,
at 316. The concept of minimum contacts, in

turn, can be seen to perform two related, but


[444 U.S. 286, 292] distinguishable,
functions. It protects the defendant against
the burdens of litigating in a distant or
inconvenient forum. And it acts to ensure that
the States, through their courts, do not reach
out beyond the limits imposed on them by
their status as coequal sovereigns in a federal
system.
The protection against inconvenient litigation
is typically described in terms of
"reasonableness" or "fairness." We have said
that the defendant's contacts with the forum
State must be such that maintenance of the
suit "does not offend `traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice.'"
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, supra,
at 316, quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S.
457, 463 (1940). The relationship between the
defendant and the forum must be such that it
is "reasonable . . . to require the corporation
to defend the particular suit which is brought
there." 326 U.S., at 317 . Implicit in this
emphasis on reasonableness is the
understanding that the burden on the
defendant, while always a primary concern,
will in an appropriate case be considered in
light of other relevant factors, including the
forum State's interest in adjudicating the
dispute, see McGee v. International Life Ins.
Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957); the plaintiff's
interest in obtaining convenient and effective
relief, see Kulko v. California Superior Court,
supra, at 92, at least when that interest is not
adequately protected by the plaintiff's power
to choose the forum, cf. Shaffer v. Heitner,
433 U.S. 186, 211 , n. 37 (1977); the
interstate judicial system's interest in
obtaining the most efficient resolution of
controversies; and the shared interest of the
several States in furthering fundamental
substantive social policies, see Kulko v.
California Superior Court, supra, at 93, 98.
The limits imposed on state jurisdiction by the
Due Process Clause, in its role as a guarantor
against inconvenient litigation, have been
substantially relaxed over the years. As we
noted in McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.,
supra, at 222-223 [444 U.S. 286, 293] this
trend is largely attributable to a fundamental
transformation in the American economy:
"Today many commercial transactions touch
two or more States and may involve parties
separated by the full continent. With this
increasing nationalization of commerce has
come a great increase in the amount of
business conducted by mail across state lines.
At the same time modern transportation and
communication have made it much less

11

burdensome for a party sued to defend


himself in a State where he engages in
economic activity."
The historical developments noted in McGee,
of course, have only accelerated in the
generation since that case was decided.
Nevertheless, we have never accepted the
proposition that state lines are irrelevant for
jurisdictional purposes, nor could we, and
remain faithful to the principles of interstate
federalism embodied in the Constitution. The
economic interdependence of the States was
foreseen and desired by the Framers. In the
Commerce Clause, they provided that the
Nation was to be a common market, a "free
trade unit" in which the States are debarred
from acting as separable economic entities. H.
P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525,
538 (1949). But the Framers also intended
that the States retain many essential
attributes of sovereignty, including, in
particular, the sovereign power to try causes
in their courts. The sovereignty of each State,
in turn, implied a limitation on the sovereignty
of all of its sister States - a limitation express
or implicit in both the original scheme of the
Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment.
Hence, even while abandoning the shibboleth
that "[t]he authority of every tribunal is
necessarily restricted by the territorial limits
of the State in which it is established,"
Pennoyer v. Neff, supra, at 720, we
emphasized that the reasonableness of
asserting jurisdiction over the defendant must
be assessed "in the context of our federal
system of government," [444 U.S. 286, 294]
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S., at 317 , and stressed that the Due
Process Clause ensures not only fairness, but
also the "orderly administration of the laws,"
id., at 319. As we noted in Hanson v. Denckla,
357 U.S. 235, 250 -251 (1958):
"As technological progress has increased the
flow of commerce between the States, the
need for jurisdiction over nonresidents has
undergone a similar increase. At the same
time, progress in communications and
transportation has made the defense of a suit
in a foreign tribunal less burdensome. In
response to these changes, the requirements
for personal jurisdiction over nonresidents
have evolved from the rigid rule of Pennoyer
v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 , to the flexible standard
of International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310 . But it is a mistake to assume that
this trend heralds the eventual demise of all
restrictions on the personal jurisdiction of
state courts. [Citation omitted.] Those
restrictions are more than a guarantee of

immunity from inconvenient or distant


litigation. They are a consequence of
territorial limitations on the power of the
respective States."
Thus, the Due Process Clause "does not
contemplate that a state may make binding a
judgment in personam against an individual
or corporate defendant with which the state
has no contacts, ties, or relations."
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, supra,
at 319. Even if the defendant would suffer
minimal or no inconvenience from being
forced to litigate before the tribunals of
another State; even if the forum State has a
strong interest in applying its law to the
controversy; even if the forum State is the
most convenient location for litigation, the
Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument
of interstate federalism, may sometimes act
to divest the State of its power to render a
valid judgment. Hanson v. Denckla, supra, at
251, 254. [444 U.S. 286, 295]
III
Applying these principles to the case at hand,
10 we find in the record before us a total
absence of those affiliating circumstances
that are a necessary predicate to any exercise
of state-court jurisdiction. Petitioners carry on
no activity whatsoever in Oklahoma. They
close no sales and perform no services there.
They avail themselves of none of the
privileges and benefits of Oklahoma law. They
solicit no business there either through
salespersons or through advertising
reasonably calculated to reach the State. Nor
does the record show that they regularly sell
cars at wholesale or retail to Oklahoma
customers or residents or that they indirectly,
through others, serve or seek to serve the
Oklahoma market. In short, respondents seek
to base jurisdiction on one, isolated
occurrence and whatever inferences can be
drawn therefrom: the fortuitous circumstance
that a single Audi automobile, sold in New
York to New York residents, happened to suffer
an accident while passing through Oklahoma.
It is argued, however, that because an
automobile is mobile by its very design and
purpose it was "foreseeable" that the
Robinsons' Audi would cause injury in
Oklahoma. Yet "foreseeability" alone has
never been a sufficient benchmark for
personal jurisdiction under the Due Process
Clause. In Hanson v. Denckla, supra, it was no
doubt foreseeable that the settlor of a
Delaware trust would subsequently move to
Florida and seek to exercise a power of
appointment there; yet we held that Florida
courts could not constitutionally [444 U.S.

12

286, 296] exercise jurisdiction over a


Delaware trustee that had no other contacts
with the forum State. In Kulko v. California
Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978), it was
surely "foreseeable" that a divorced wife
would move to California from New York, the
domicile of the marriage, and that a minor
daughter would live with the mother. Yet we
held that California could not exercise
jurisdiction in a child-support action over the
former husband who had remained in New
York.
If foreseeability were the criterion, a local
California tire retailer could be forced to
defend in Pennsylvania when a blowout
occurs there, see Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes
Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502, 507 (CA4 1956);
a Wisconsin seller of a defective automobile
jack could be haled before a distant court for
damage caused in New Jersey, Reilly v. Phil
Tolkan Pontiac, Inc., 372 F. Supp. 1205 (NJ
1974); or a Florida soft-drink concessionaire
could be summoned to Alaska to account for
injuries happening there, see Uppgren v.
Executive Aviation Services, Inc., 304 F. Supp.
165, 170-171 (Minn. 1969). Every seller of
chattels would in effect appoint the chattel his
agent for service of process. His amenability
to suit would travel with the chattel. We
recently abandoned the outworn rule of Harris
v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905), that the interest
of a creditor in a debt could be extinguished
or otherwise affected by any State having
transitory jurisdiction over the debtor. Shaffer
v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). Having
interred the mechanical rule that a creditor's
amenability to a quasi in rem action travels
with his debtor, we are unwilling to endorse
an analogous principle in the present case. 11
[444 U.S. 286, 297]
This is not to say, of course, that
foreseeability is wholly irrelevant. But the
foreseeability that is critical to due process
analysis is not the mere likelihood that a
product will find its way into the forum State.
Rather, it is that the defendant's conduct and
connection with the forum State are such that
he should reasonably anticipate being haled
into court there. See Kulko v. California
Superior Court, supra, at 97-98; Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U.S., at 216 ; and see id., at 217219 (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment).
The Due Process Clause, by ensuring the
"orderly administration of the laws,"
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S., at 319 , gives a degree of predictability
to the legal system that allows potential
defendants to structure their primary conduct
with some minimum assurance as to where

that conduct will and will not render them


liable to suit.
When a corporation "purposefully avails itself
of the privilege of conducting activities within
the forum State," Hanson v. Denckla, 357
U.S., at 253 , it has clear notice that it is
subject to suit there, and can act to alleviate
the risk of burdensome litigation by procuring
insurance, passing the expected costs on to
customers, or, if the risks are too great,
severing its connection with the State. Hence
if the sale of a product of a manufacturer or
distributor such as Audi or Volkswagen is not
simply an isolated occurrence, but arises from
the efforts of the manufacturer or distributor
to serve, directly or indirectly, the market for
its product in other States, it is not
unreasonable to subject it to suit in one of
those States if its allegedly defective
merchandise has there been the source of
injury to its owner or to others. The forum
State does not [444 U.S. 286, 298] exceed
its powers under the Due Process Clause if it
asserts personal jurisdiction over a
corporation that delivers its products into the
stream of commerce with the expectation that
they will be purchased by consumers in the
forum State. Cf. Gray v. American Radiator &
Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.
E. 2d 761 (1961).
But there is no such or similar basis for
Oklahoma jurisdiction over World-Wide or
Seaway in this case. Seaway's sales are made
in Massena, N. Y. World-Wide's market,
although substantially larger, is limited to
dealers in New York, New Jersey, and
Connecticut. There is no evidence of record
that any automobiles distributed by WorldWide are sold to retail customers outside this
tristate area. It is foreseeable that the
purchasers of automobiles sold by World-Wide
and Seaway may take them to Oklahoma. But
the mere "unilateral activity of those who
claim some relationship with a nonresident
defendant cannot satisfy the requirement of
contact with the forum State." Hanson v.
Denckla, supra, at 253.
In a variant on the previous argument, it is
contended that jurisdiction can be supported
by the fact that petitioners earn substantial
revenue from goods used in Oklahoma. The
Oklahoma Supreme Court so found, 585 P.2d,
at 354-355, drawing the inference that
because one automobile sold by petitioners
had been used in Oklahoma, others might
have been used there also. While this
inference seems less than compelling on the
facts of the instant case, we need not

13

question the court's factual findings in order


to reject its reasoning.
This argument seems to make the point that
the purchase of automobiles in New York, from
which the petitioners earn substantial
revenue, would not occur but for the fact that
the automobiles are capable of use in distant
States like Oklahoma. Respondents observe
that the very purpose of an automobile is to
travel, and that travel of automobiles sold by
petitioners is facilitated by an extensive chain
of Volkswagen service centers throughout the
country, including some in Oklahoma. 12
[444 U.S. 286, 299] However, financial
benefits accruing to the defendant from a
collateral relation to the forum State will not
support jurisdiction if they do not stem from a
constitutionally cognizable contact with that
State. See Kulko v. California Superior Court,
436 U.S., at 94 -95. In our view, whatever
marginal revenues petitioners may receive by
virtue of the fact that their products are
capable of use in Oklahoma is far too
attenuated a contact to justify that State's
exercise of in personam jurisdiction over
them.
Because we find that petitioners have no
"contacts, ties, or relations" with the State of
Oklahoma, International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, supra, at 319, the judgment of
the Supreme Court of Oklahoma is
Reversed.

Defendant denied the material allegations of


the complaint and alleged that it failed to
state a claim against it. Subsequently, it
moved to dismiss the action on the ground
that the pleadings failed to state a claim
against the defendant and that the court
lacked jurisdiction.
On April 28, 1956, the trial court made its
order granting defendant's motion. In the
order granting the same, the trial court
determined that "No penalty by way of
collecting damages arose under M.S.A. 340.95
[Civil Damage Act], unless the injury was
inflicted in the state. No civil action to collect
the penalty arose unless the illegal sale in the
state was followed by an injury in the state. *
* * M.S.A. 340.95 does not provide for
extraterritorial effect, * * *."
This is an appeal from the judgment entered
pursuant to the foregoing order.
*379 1. M.S.A. 340.14, subd. 1, provides: "No
intoxicating liquor shall be sold * * * to any
person obviously intoxicated * * *." M.S.A.
340.95, commonly known as the Civil Damage
Act, provides that: "Every * * * person who is
injured in person or property, * * * by any
intoxicated person, or by the intoxication of
any person, has a right of action, in his own
name, against any person who, by illegally
selling, bartering or giving intoxicating liquors,
caused the intoxication of such person, for all
damages, sustained; * * *." We have recently
held this provision to be essentially remedial
in nature although penal in its characteristics.
Adamson v. Dougherty, 248 Minn. 535, 81
N.W. (2d) 110.

HERBERT G. SCHMIDT, A MINOR, BY HIS


MOTHER AND NATURAL GUARDIAN,
MATIE T. SCHMIDT, v. DRISCOLL HOTEL,
INC., d.b.a. THE HOOK-EM-COW BAR AND
CAFE.
April 12, 1957.
THOMAS GALLAGHER, JUSTICE.
Plaintiff, Herbert G. Schmidt, a minor,
instituted this action by his mother and
natural guardian, Matie T. Schmidt, against
the Driscoll Hotel, Inc., doing business as The
Hook-Em-Cow Bar and Cafe in South St. Paul,
for damages alleged to have resulted from
defendant's illegal sale of intoxicants to one
John Sorrenson.

2. It is defendant's position that the action is


governed by the law of torts and that, since
the last act in the series of events for which
plaintiff instituted his action occurred in
Wisconsin, which has no Civil Damage Act
similar to 340.95,[1] the latter can have no
application in determining plaintiff's rights or
defendant's liability. In support thereof
defendant cites Restatement, Conflict of Laws,
377, which states:

The complaint alleged that defendant illegally


sold intoxicating liquors to Sorrenson to the
extent of causing him to become intoxicated
in defendant's establishment in South St. Paul
so that shortly thereafter, as a proximate
result thereof, plaintiff sustained injuries when
an automobile driven by Sorrenson, in which
plaintiff was a passenger, was caused to turn
over near Prescott, Wisconsin.

"The place of wrong is in the state where the


last event necessary to make an actor liable
for an alleged tort takes place."
And 378, which states:

14

"The law of the place of wrong determines


whether a person has sustained a legal
injury."

5. We feel that the principles in Restatement,


Conflict of Laws, 377 and 378, should not
be held applicable to fact situations such as
the present to bring about the result
described and that a determination to the
opposite effect would be more in conformity
with principles of equity and justice. Here all
parties involved were residents of Minnesota.
Defendant was licensed under its laws and
required to operate its establishment in
compliance therewith. Its violation of the
Minnesota statutes occurred here, and its
wrongful conduct was complete within
Minnesota when, as a result thereof,
Sorrenson became intoxicated before leaving
its establishment. The *381 consequential
harm to plaintiff, a Minnesota citizen,
accordingly should be compensated for under
M.S.A. 340.95 which furnishes him a remedy
against defendant for its wrongful acts. By
this construction, no greater burden is placed
upon defendant than was intended by
340.95.

3. The allegations of the complaint by which


we are bound for the purposes of this appeal
make clear that plaintiff's damages are the
result of two distinct wrongs one committed
by defendant in Minnesota when it sold
Sorrenson intoxicating liquors in violation of
M.S.A. 340.14, subd. 1; and one committed by
Sorrenson in Wisconsin when his negligence
caused the car in which plaintiff was riding to
turn over. It cannot be disputed that, had
plaintiff's action been against Sorrenson for
his negligence, his rights would be governed
by the law of Wisconsin applicable in tort
actions of this kind. Sohm v. Sohm, 212 Minn.
316, 3 N.W. (2d) 496; Hardgrove v. Bade, *380
190 Minn. 523, 252 N.W. 334. But, even if at
the time of the accident there had been in
effect in Wisconsin a statute similar to
340.95, it is doubtful if it could be applied to
ascertain plaintiff's rights against defendant
since there is nothing here to support a claim
that defendant ever consented to be bound
by Wisconsin law. See, Scheer v. Rockne
Motors Corp. (2 Cir.) 68 F. (2d) 942; Young v.
Masci, 289 U.S. 253, 53 S. Ct. 599, 77 L. ed.
1158.

6. In arriving at this conclusion, we have in


mind decisions of a number of jurisdictions
which have reached similar results in
situations, which, though not involving civil
damage acts, presented factual
circumstances comparable to those here.
Gordon v. Parker (D. Mass.) 83 F. Supp. 40;
Levy v. Daniels' U-Drive Auto Renting Co. Inc.
108 Conn. 333, 143 A. 163, 61 A.L.R. 846;
Moore v. Pywell, 29 App. D.C. 312, 9 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 1078; Gratz v. Claughton (2 Cir.) 187 F.
(2d) 46; Caldwell v. Gore, 175 La. 501, 143 So.
387; see, Ehrenzweig, The Place of Acting in
Intentional Multistate Torts: Law and Reason
Versus the Restatement, 36 Minn. L. Rev. 1;
Rheinstein, The Place of Wrong: A Study in the
Method of Case Law, 19 Tulane L. Rev. 4; Id.
165.

4. From the foregoing, it would follow that, if


the principles expressed in Restatement,
Conflict of Laws, 377 and 378, are held
applicable to multistate fact situations like the
present, then neither the laws of the state
where the last event necessary to create tort
liability took place nor the laws of the state
where the liquor dealer's violations of the
liquor statutes occurred would afford an
injured party any remedy against the
offending liquor dealer for the injuries which
resulted from his statutory violations. The
result would be that here both the interest of
Wisconsin in affording whatever remedies it
deems proper for those injured there as the
result of foreign violations of liquor laws
(Watson v. Employers Lia. Assur. Corp. 348
U.S. 66, 75 S. Ct. 166, 99 L. ed. 74), and the
interest of Minnesota in admonishing a liquor
dealer whose violation of its statutes was the
cause of such injuries; and in providing for the
injured party a remedy therefor under the
Civil Damage Act would become ineffective.
See, Levy v. Daniels' U-Drive Auto Renting Co.
Inc. 108 Conn. 333, 143 A. 163, 61 A.L.R. 846;
Gordon v. Parker (D. Mass.) 83 F. Supp. 40.

In Gordon v. Parker, supra, an action for


alienation of affections was instituted in
Massachusetts by plaintiff, who, with his wife,
was domiciled in Pennsylvania. Therein it
appeared that defendant's wrongful acts had
taken place in Massachusetts, and accordingly
plaintiff sought the application of a
Massachusetts statute relating to alienation of
affections. Defendant contended that, since
the matrimonial domicile of the parties was in
Pennsylvania, which accordingly was the
place where the ultimate wrong was done to
plaintiff, only Pennsylvania law could be
applied. In denying this contention and
applying the Massachusetts statute, the court
stated (83 F. Supp. 42):

15

1995 7 that were issued by the trial court in Civil


Case No. Q-93-18394. 8

"This is not a situation in which the interests


of Pennsylvania plainly outweigh those of
Massachusetts. The social order of each is
implicated. As the place of matrimonial
domicil, Pennsylvania has an interest in
whether conduct in any part of the world is
held to affect adversely the marriage
relationship between its domiciliaries. But, as
the place where the alleged * * * wrongdoer
lives, Massachusetts also has an interest. She
is concerned with conduct *382 within her
borders which in her view lowers the
standards of the community where they occur.
She also is concerned when her citizens
intermeddle with other people's marriages."

The pertinent antecedent facts which gave rise to


the instant petition, as stated in the questioned
Decision 9, are as follows:
On January 21, 1988 defendant
SAUDIA hired plaintiff as a Flight
Attendant for its airlines based in
Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. . . .
On April 27, 1990, while on a layover in Jakarta, Indonesia, plaintiff
went to a disco dance with fellow
crew members Thamer Al-Gazzawi
and Allah Al-Gazzawi, both Saudi
nationals. Because it was almost
morning when they returned to
their hotels, they agreed to have
breakfast together at the room of
Thamer. When they were in te (sic)
room, Allah left on some pretext.
Shortly after he did, Thamer
attempted to rape plaintiff.
Fortunately, a roomboy and several
security personnel heard her cries
for help and rescued her. Later, the
Indonesian police came and
arrested Thamer and Allah AlGazzawi, the latter as an
accomplice.

7. We recognize that the courts of Illinois


(Eldridge v. Don Beachcomber, Inc. 342 Ill.
App. 151, 95 N.E. [2d] 512, 22 A.L.R. [2d]
1123) and New York (Goodwin v. Young, 34
Hun 252) have reached opposite conclusions
in construing civil damage acts similar to
340.95. However, we feel that the situations
presented in such cases, as well as that
presented here, do not compel application of
Restatement, Conflict of Laws, 377 and
378, and that our determination that other
principles apply will better afford Minnesota
citizens the protection which the Civil Damage
Act intended for them.

When plaintiff returned to Jeddah a


few days later, several SAUDIA
officials interrogated her about the
Jakarta incident. They then
requested her to go back to Jakarta
to help arrange the release of
Thamer and Allah. In Jakarta,
SAUDIA Legal Officer Sirah Akkad
and base manager Baharini
negotiated with the police for the
immediate release of the detained
crew members but did not succeed
because plaintiff refused to
cooperate. She was afraid that she
might be tricked into something
she did not want because of her
inability to understand the local
dialect. She also declined to sign a
blank paper and a document
written in the local dialect.
Eventually, SAUDIA allowed plaintiff
to return to Jeddah but barred her
from the Jakarta flights.

Reversed.

G.R. No. 122191 October 8, 1998


SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, MILAGROS P. MORADA
and HON. RODOLFO A. ORTIZ, in his capacity
as Presiding Judge of Branch 89, Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, respondents.

QUISUMBING, J.:

Plaintiff learned that, through the


intercession of the Saudi Arabian
government, the Indonesian
authorities agreed to deport
Thamer and Allah after two weeks
of detention. Eventually, they were
again put in service by defendant

This petition for certiorari pursuant to Rule 45 of


the Rules of Court seeks to annul and set aside the
Resolution 1dated September 27, 1995 and the
Decision 2 dated April 10, 1996 of the Court of
Appeals 3 in CA-G.R. SP No. 36533, 4and the
Orders 5 dated August 29, 1994 6 and February 2,

16

SAUDI (sic). In September 1990,


defendant SAUDIA transferred
plaintiff to Manila.

a SAUDIA officer told her that the


airline had forbidden her to take
flight. At the Inflight Service Office
where she was told to go, the
secretary of Mr. Yahya Saddick took
away her passport and told her to
remain in Jeddah, at the crew
quarters, until further orders.

On January 14, 1992, just when


plaintiff thought that the Jakarta
incident was already behind her,
her superiors requested her to see
Mr. Ali Meniewy, Chief Legal Officer
of SAUDIA, in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.
When she saw him, he brought her
to the police station where the
police took her passport and
questioned her about the Jakarta
incident. Miniewy simply stood by
as the police put pressure on her to
make a statement dropping the
case against Thamer and Allah. Not
until she agreed to do so did the
police return her passport and
allowed her to catch the afternoon
flight out of Jeddah.

On July 3, 1993 a SAUDIA legal


officer again escorted plaintiff to
the same court where the judge, to
her astonishment and shock,
rendered a decision, translated to
her in English, sentencing her to
five months imprisonment and to
286 lashes. Only then did she
realize that the Saudi court had
tried her, together with Thamer
and Allah, for what happened in
Jakarta. The court found plaintiff
guilty of (1) adultery; (2) going to a
disco, dancing and listening to the
music in violation of Islamic laws;
and (3) socializing with the male
crew, in contravention of Islamic
tradition. 10

One year and a half later or on lune


16, 1993, in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, a
few minutes before the departure
of her flight to Manila, plaintiff was
not allowed to board the plane and
instead ordered to take a later
flight to Jeddah to see Mr. Miniewy,
the Chief Legal Officer of SAUDIA.
When she did, a certain Khalid of
the SAUDIA office brought her to a
Saudi court where she was asked
to sign a document written in
Arabic. They told her that this was
necessary to close the case against
Thamer and Allah. As it turned out,
plaintiff signed a notice to her to
appear before the court on June 27,
1993. Plaintiff then returned to
Manila.

Facing conviction, private respondent sought the


help of her employer, petitioner SAUDIA.
Unfortunately, she was denied any assistance. She
then asked the Philippine Embassy in Jeddah to
help her while her case is on appeal. Meanwhile, to
pay for her upkeep, she worked on the domestic
flight of SAUDIA, while Thamer and Allah continued
to serve in the international
flights. 11
Because she was wrongfully convicted, the Prince
of Makkah dismissed the case against her and
allowed her to leave Saudi Arabia. Shortly before
her return to Manila, 12 she was terminated from
the service by SAUDIA, without her being informed
of the cause.

Shortly afterwards, defendant


SAUDIA summoned plaintiff to
report to Jeddah once again and
see Miniewy on June 27, 1993 for
further investigation. Plaintiff did so
after receiving assurance from
SAUDIA's Manila manager, Aslam
Saleemi, that the investigation was
routinary and that it posed no
danger to her.

On November 23, 1993, Morada filed a


Complaint 13 for damages against SAUDIA, and
Khaled Al-Balawi ("Al-Balawi"), its country manager.
On January 19, 1994, SAUDIA filed an Omnibus
Motion To Dismiss 14 which raised the following
grounds, to wit: (1) that the Complaint states no
cause of action against Saudia; (2) that defendant
Al-Balawi is not a real party in interest; (3) that the
claim or demand set forth in the Complaint has
been waived, abandoned or otherwise
extinguished; and (4) that the trial court has no
jurisdiction to try the case.

In Jeddah, a SAUDIA legal officer


brought plaintiff to the same Saudi
court on June 27, 1993. Nothing
happened then but on June 28,
1993, a Saudi judge interrogated
plaintiff through an interpreter
about the Jakarta incident. After
one hour of interrogation, they let
her go. At the airport, however, just
as her plane was about to take off,

On February 10, 1994, Morada filed her Opposition


(To Motion to Dismiss) 15. Saudia filed a
reply 16 thereto on March 3, 1994.

17

On June 23, 1994, Morada filed an Amended


Complaint 17 wherein Al-Balawi was dropped as
party defendant. On August 11, 1994, Saudia filed
its Manifestation and Motion to Dismiss Amended
Complaint 18.

Consequently, on February 20, 1995, SAUDIA filed


its Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer
for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or
Temporary Restraining Order 26 with the Court of
Appeals.

The trial court issued an Order 19 dated August 29,


1994 denying the Motion to Dismiss Amended
Complaint filed by Saudia.

Respondent Court of Appeals promulgated a


Resolution with Temporary Restraining
Order 27 dated February 23, 1995, prohibiting the
respondent Judge from further conducting any
proceeding, unless otherwise directed, in the
interim.

From the Order of respondent Judge 20 denying the


Motion to Dismiss, SAUDIA filed on September 20,
1994, its Motion for Reconsideration 21 of the Order
dated August 29, 1994. It alleged that the trial
court has no jurisdiction to hear and try the case
on the basis of Article 21 of the Civil Code, since
the proper law applicable is the law of the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia. On October 14, 1994, Morada filed
her Opposition 22 (To Defendant's Motion for
Reconsideration).

In another Resolution 28 promulgated on September


27, 1995, now assailed, the appellate court denied
SAUDIA's Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction dated February 18, 1995, to
wit:
The Petition for the Issuance of a
Writ of Preliminary Injunction is
hereby DENIED, after considering
the Answer, with Prayer to Deny
Writ of Preliminary Injunction
(Rollo, p. 135) the Reply and
Rejoinder, it appearing that herein
petitioner is not clearly entitled
thereto (Unciano Paramedical
College, et. Al.,v. Court of Appeals,
et. Al., 100335, April 7, 1993,
Second Division).

In the Reply 23 filed with the trial court on October


24, 1994, SAUDIA alleged that since its Motion for
Reconsideration raised lack of jurisdiction as its
cause of action, the Omnibus Motion Rule does not
apply, even if that ground is raised for the first
time on appeal. Additionally, SAUDIA alleged that
the Philippines does not have any substantial
interest in the prosecution of the instant case, and
hence, without jurisdiction to adjudicate the same.
Respondent Judge subsequently issued another
Order 24 dated February 2, 1995, denying SAUDIA's
Motion for Reconsideration. The pertinent portion
of the assailed Order reads as follows:

SO ORDERED.
On October 20, 1995, SAUDIA filed with this
Honorable Court the instant Petition 29 for Review
with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order dated
October 13, 1995.

Acting on the Motion for


Reconsideration of defendant Saudi
Arabian Airlines filed, thru counsel,
on September 20, 1994, and the
Opposition thereto of the plaintiff
filed, thru counsel, on October 14,
1994, as well as the Reply
therewith of defendant Saudi
Arabian Airlines filed, thru counsel,
on October 24, 1994, considering
that a perusal of the plaintiffs
Amended Complaint, which is one
for the recovery of actual, moral
and exemplary damages plus
attorney's fees, upon the basis of
the applicable Philippine law,
Article 21 of the New Civil Code of
the Philippines, is, clearly, within
the jurisdiction of this Court as
regards the subject matter, and
there being nothing new of
substance which might cause the
reversal or modification of the
order sought to be reconsidered,
the motion for reconsideration of
the defendant, is DENIED.

However, during the pendency of the instant


Petition, respondent Court of Appeals rendered the
Decision 30 dated April 10, 1996, now also assailed.
It ruled that the Philippines is an appropriate forum
considering that the Amended Complaint's basis
for recovery of damages is Article 21 of the Civil
Code, and thus, clearly within the jurisdiction of
respondent Court. It further held that certiorari is
not the proper remedy in a denial of a Motion to
Dismiss, inasmuch as the petitioner should have
proceeded to trial, and in case of an adverse ruling,
find recourse in an appeal.
On May 7, 1996, SAUDIA filed its Supplemental
Petition for Review with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order 31dated April 30, 1996, given due
course by this Court. After both parties submitted
their Memoranda, 32 the instant case is now
deemed submitted for decision.
Petitioner SAUDIA raised the following issues:
I

SO ORDERED.

25

18

The trial court has no jurisdiction to


hear and try Civil Case No. Q-9318394 based on Article 21 of the
New Civil Code since the proper
law applicable is the law of the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia inasmuch
as this case involves what is known
in private international law as a
"conflicts problem". Otherwise, the
Republic of the Philippines will sit in
judgment of the acts done by
another sovereign state which is
abhorred.

JURISDICTION TO HEAR AND TRY


CIVIL CASE NO. Q-93-18394
ENTITLED "MILAGROS P. MORADA V.
SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES".
II.
WHETHER RESPONDENT
APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN
RULING THAT IN THIS CASE
PHILIPPINE LAW SHOULD GOVERN.
Petitioner SAUDIA claims that before us is a conflict
of laws that must be settled at the outset. It
maintains that private respondent's claim for
alleged abuse of rights occurred in the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia. It alleges that the existence of a
foreign element qualifies the instant case for the
application of the law of the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia, by virtue of the lex loci delicti
commissi rule. 34

II
Leave of court before filing a
supplemental pleading is not a
jurisdictional requirement. Besides,
the matter as to absence of leave
of court is now moot and academic
when this Honorable Court required
the respondents to comment on
petitioner's April 30, 1996
Supplemental Petition For Review
With Prayer For A Temporary
Restraining Order Within Ten (10)
Days From Notice Thereof. Further,
the Revised Rules of Court should
be construed with liberality
pursuant to Section 2, Rule 1
thereof.

On the other hand, private respondent contends


that since her Amended Complaint is based on
Articles 19 35 and 21 36 of the Civil Code, then the
instant case is properly a matter of domestic law.

37

Under the factual antecedents obtaining in this


case, there is no dispute that the interplay of
events occurred in two states, the Philippines and
Saudi Arabia.

III

As stated by private respondent in her Amended


Complaint 38 dated June 23, 1994:

Petitioner received on April 22,


1996 the April 10, 1996 decision in
CA-G.R. SP NO. 36533 entitled
"Saudi Arabian Airlines v. Hon.
Rodolfo A. Ortiz, et al." and filed its
April 30, 1996 Supplemental
Petition For Review With Prayer For
A Temporary Restraining Order on
May 7, 1996 at 10:29 a.m. or within
the 15-day reglementary period as
provided for under Section 1, Rule
45 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Therefore, the decision in CA-G.R.
SP NO. 36533 has not yet become
final and executory and this
Honorable Court can take
cognizance of this case. 33

2. Defendant SAUDI ARABIAN


AIRLINES or SAUDIA is a foreign
airlines corporation doing business
in the Philippines. It may be served
with summons and other court
processes at Travel Wide
Associated Sales (Phils.). Inc., 3rd
Floor, Cougar Building, 114 Valero
St., Salcedo Village, Makati, Metro
Manila.
xxx xxx xxx
6. Plaintiff learned that, through
the intercession of the Saudi
Arabian government, the
Indonesian authorities agreed to
deport Thamer and Allah after two
weeks of detention. Eventually,
they were again put in service by
defendant SAUDIA. In September
1990, defendant SAUDIA
transferred plaintiff to Manila.

From the foregoing factual and procedural


antecedents, the following issues emerge for our
resolution:
I.
WHETHER RESPONDENT
APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY HAS

7. On January 14, 1992, just when


plaintiff thought that the Jakarta
incident was already behind her,

19

her superiors reauested her to see


MR. Ali Meniewy, Chief Legal
Officer of SAUDIA in Jeddah, Saudi
Arabia. When she saw him, he
brought her to the police station
where the police took her passport
and questioned her about the
Jakarta incident. Miniewy simply
stood by as the police put pressure
on her to make a statement
dropping the case against Thamer
and Allah. Not until she agreed to
do so did the police return her
passport and allowed her to catch
the afternoon flight out of Jeddah.

her to remain in Jeddah, at the


crew quarters, until further orders.
11. On July 3, 1993 a SAUDIA legal
officer again escorted plaintiff to
the same court where the judge, to
her astonishment and shock,
rendered a decision, translated to
her in English, sentencing her to
five months imprisonment and to
286 lashes. Only then did she
realize that the Saudi court had
tried her, together with Thamer
and Allah, for what happened in
Jakarta. The court found plaintiff
guilty of (1) adultery; (2) going to a
disco, dancing, and listening to the
music in violation of Islamic laws;
(3) socializing with the male crew,
in contravention of Islamic
tradition.

8. One year and a half later or on


June 16, 1993, in Riyadh, Saudi
Arabia, a few minutes before the
departure of her flight to Manila,
plaintiff was not allowed to board
the plane and instead ordered to
take a later flight to Jeddah to see
Mr. Meniewy, the Chief Legal
Officer of SAUDIA. When she did, a
certain Khalid of the SAUDIA office
brought her to a Saudi court where
she was asked to sigh a document
written in Arabic. They told her that
this was necessary to close the
case against Thamer and Allah. As
it turned out, plaintiff signed a
notice to her to appear before the
court on June 27, 1993. Plaintiff
then returned to Manila.

12. Because SAUDIA refused to


lend her a hand in the case,
plaintiff sought the help of the
Philippines Embassy in Jeddah. The
latter helped her pursue an appeal
from the decision of the court. To
pay for her upkeep, she worked on
the domestic flights of defendant
SAUDIA while, ironically, Thamer
and Allah freely served the
international flights. 39
Where the factual antecedents satisfactorily
establish the existence of a foreign element, we
agree with petitioner that the problem herein could
present a "conflicts" case.

9. Shortly afterwards, defendant


SAUDIA summoned plaintiff to
report to Jeddah once again and
see Miniewy on June 27, 1993 for
further investigation. Plaintiff did
so after receiving assurance from
SAUDIA's Manila manger, Aslam
Saleemi, that the investigation was
routinary and that it posed no
danger to her.

A factual situation that cuts across territorial lines


and is affected by the diverse laws of two or more
states is said to contain a "foreign element". The
presence of a foreign element is inevitable since
social and economic affairs of individuals and
associations are rarely confined to the geographic
limits of their birth or conception. 40

10. In Jeddah, a SAUDIA legal


officer brought plaintiff to the same
Saudi court on June 27, 1993.
Nothing happened then but on June
28, 1993, a Saudi judge
interrogated plaintiff through an
interpreter about the Jakarta
incident. After one hour of
interrogation, they let her go. At
the airport, however, just as her
plane was about to take off, a
SAUDIA officer told her that the
airline had forbidden her to take
that flight. At the Inflight Service
Office where she was told to go,
the secretary of Mr. Yahya Saddick
took away her passport and told

The forms in which this foreign element may


appear are many. 41 The foreign element may
simply consist in the fact that one of the parties to
a contract is an alien or has a foreign domicile, or
that a contract between nationals of one State
involves properties situated in another State. In
other cases, the foreign element may assume a
complex form. 42
In the instant case, the foreign element consisted
in the fact that private respondent Morada is a
resident Philippine national, and that petitioner
SAUDIA is a resident foreign corporation. Also, by
virtue of the employment of Morada with the
petitioner Saudia as a flight stewardess, events did
transpire during her many occasions of travel
across national borders, particularly from Manila,

20

Philippines to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and vice versa,


that caused a "conflicts" situation to arise.

Reorganization Act of 1980", is


hereby amended to read as follows:

We thus find private respondent's assertion that


the case is purely domestic, imprecise.
A conflicts problem presents itself here, and the
question of jurisdiction 43 confronts the court a quo.

Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases.


Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive jurisdiction:
xxx xxx xxx

After a careful study of the private respondent's


Amended Complaint, 44 and the Comment thereon,
we note that she aptly predicated her cause of
action on Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code.

(8) In all other


cases in which
demand, exclusive
of interest,
damages of
whatever kind,
attorney's fees,
litigation expenses,
and cots or the
value of the
property in
controversy
exceeds One
hundred thousand
pesos
(P100,000.00) or, in
such other cases in
Metro Manila,
where the demand,
exclusive of the
above-mentioned
items exceeds Two
hundred Thousand
pesos
(P200,000.00).
(Emphasis ours)

On one hand, Article 19 of the New Civil Code


provides:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the
exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with
justice give everyone his due and
observe honesty and good faith.
On the other hand, Article 21 of the New Civil Code
provides:
Art. 21. Any person who willfully
causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals,
good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for
damages.
Thus, in Philippine National Bank (PNB) vs. Court of
Appeals, 45 this Court held that:

xxx xxx xxx

The aforecited provisions on human


relations were intended to expand
the concept of torts in this
jurisdiction by granting adequate
legal remedy for the untold number
of moral wrongs which is
impossible for human foresight to
specifically provide in the statutes.

And following Section 2 (b), Rule 4 of the Revised


Rules of Court the venue, Quezon City, is
appropriate:
Sec. 2 Venue in Courts of First
Instance. [Now Regional Trial
Court]

Although Article 19 merely declares a principle of


law, Article 21 gives flesh to its provisions. Thus,
we agree with private respondent's assertion that
violations of Articles 19 and 21 are actionable, with
judicially enforceable remedies in the municipal
forum.

(a) xxx xxx xxx


(b) Personal actions. All other
actions may be commenced and
tried where the defendant or any of
the defendants resides or may be
found, or where the plaintiff or any
of the plaintiff resides, at the
election of the plaintiff.

Based on the allegations 46 in the Amended


Complaint, read in the light of the Rules of Court on
jurisdiction 47 we find that the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City possesses jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the suit. 48 Its authority to try
and hear the case is provided for under Section 1
of Republic Act No. 7691, to wit:

Pragmatic considerations, including the


convenience of the parties, also weigh heavily in
favor of the RTC Quezon City assuming jurisdiction.
Paramount is the private interest of the litigant.
Enforceability of a judgment if one is obtained is
quite obvious. Relative advantages and obstacles
to a fair trial are equally important. Plaintiff may

Sec. 1. Section 19 of Batas


Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise
known as the "Judiciary

21

not, by choice of an inconvenient forum, "vex",


"harass", or "oppress" the defendant, e.g. by
inflicting upon him needless expense or
disturbance. But unless the balance is strongly in
favor of the defendant, the plaintiffs choice of
forum should rarely be disturbed. 49

special appearance and voluntarily


submitted itself to the jurisdiction
of the court.
Similarly, the case of De Midgely vs. Ferandos, held
that;

Weighing the relative claims of the parties, the


court a quo found it best to hear the case in the
Philippines. Had it refused to take cognizance of
the case, it would be forcing plaintiff (private
respondent now) to seek remedial action
elsewhere, i.e. in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
where she no longer maintains substantial
connections. That would have caused a
fundamental unfairness to her.

When the appearance is by motion


for the purpose of objecting to the
jurisdiction of the court over the
person, it must be for the sole and
separate purpose of objecting to
the jurisdiction of the court. If his
motion is for any other purpose
than to object to the jurisdiction of
the court over his person, he
thereby submits himself to the
jurisdiction of the court. A special
appearance by motion made for
the purpose of objecting to the
jurisdiction of the court over the
person will be held to be a general
appearance, if the party in said
motion should, for example, ask for
a dismissal of the action upon the
further ground that the court had
no jurisdiction over the subject
matter. 52

Moreover, by hearing the case in the Philippines no


unnecessary difficulties and inconvenience have
been shown by either of the parties. The choice of
forum of the plaintiff (now private respondent)
should be upheld.
Similarly, the trial court also possesses jurisdiction
over the persons of the parties herein. By filing her
Complaint and Amended Complaint with the trial
court, private respondent has voluntary submitted
herself to the jurisdiction of the court.

Clearly, petitioner had submitted to the jurisdiction


of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Thus, we
find that the trial court has jurisdiction over the
case and that its exercise thereof, justified.

The records show that petitioner SAUDIA has filed


several motions 50 praying for the dismissal of
Morada's Amended Complaint. SAUDIA also filed an
Answer In Ex Abundante Cautelam dated February
20, 1995. What is very patent and explicit from the
motions filed, is that SAUDIA prayed for other
reliefs under the premises. Undeniably, petitioner
SAUDIA has effectively submitted to the trial
court's jurisdiction by praying for the dismissal of
the Amended Complaint on grounds other than
lack of jurisdiction.

As to the choice of applicable law, we note that


choice-of-law problems seek to answer two
important questions: (1) What legal system should
control a given situation where some of the
significant facts occurred in two or more states;
and (2) to what extent should the chosen legal
system regulate the situation. 53

As held by this Court in Republic vs. Ker and


Company, Ltd.: 51

Several theories have been propounded in order to


identify the legal system that should ultimately
control. Although ideally, all choice-of-law theories
should intrinsically advance both notions of justice
and predictability, they do not always do so. The
forum is then faced with the problem of deciding
which of these two important values should be
stressed. 54

We observe that the motion to


dismiss filed on April 14, 1962,
aside from disputing the lower
court's jurisdiction over defendant's
person, prayed for dismissal of the
complaint on the ground that
plaintiff's cause of action has
prescribed. By interposing such
second ground in its motion to
dismiss, Ker and Co., Ltd. availed of
an affirmative defense on the basis
of which it prayed the court to
resolve controversy in its favor. For
the court to validly decide the said
plea of defendant Ker & Co., Ltd., it
necessarily had to acquire
jurisdiction upon the latter's
person, who, being the proponent
of the affirmative defense, should
be deemed to have abandoned its

Before a choice can be made, it is necessary for us


to determine under what category a certain set of
facts or rules fall. This process is known as
"characterization", or the "doctrine of
qualification". It is the "process of deciding whether
or not the facts relate to the kind of question
specified in a conflicts rule." 55 The purpose of
"characterization" is to enable the forum to select
the proper law. 56
Our starting point of analysis here is not a legal
relation, but a factual situation, event, or operative

22

fact. 57 An essential element of conflict rules is the


indication of a "test" or "connecting factor" or
"point of contact". Choice-of-law rules invariably
consist of a factual relationship (such as property
right, contract claim) and a connecting factor or
point of contact, such as the situs of the res, the
place of celebration, the place of performance, or
the place of wrongdoing. 58

exceptions to the applications of


foreign law; and
(8) the flag of a ship, which in
many cases is decisive of
practically all legal relationships of
the ship and of its master or owner
as such. It also covers contractual
relationships particularly contracts
of affreightment. 60 (Emphasis
ours.)

Note that one or more circumstances may be


present to serve as the possible test for the
determination of the applicable law. 59 These "test
factors" or "points of contact" or "connecting
factors" could be any of the following:

After a careful study of the pleadings on record,


including allegations in the Amended Complaint
deemed admitted for purposes of the motion to
dismiss, we are convinced that there is reasonable
basis for private respondent's assertion that
although she was already working in Manila,
petitioner brought her to Jeddah on the pretense
that she would merely testify in an investigation of
the charges she made against the two SAUDIA
crew members for the attack on her person while
they were in Jakarta. As it turned out, she was the
one made to face trial for very serious charges,
including adultery and violation of Islamic laws and
tradition.

(1) The nationality of a person, his


domicile, his residence, his place of
sojourn, or his origin;
(2) the seat of a legal or juridical
person, such as a corporation;
(3) the situs of a thing, that is, the
place where a thing is, or is
deemed to be situated. In
particular, the lex situs is decisive
when real rights are involved;

There is likewise logical basis on record for the


claim that the "handing over" or "turning over" of
the person of private respondent to Jeddah
officials, petitioner may have acted beyond its
duties as employer. Petitioner's purported act
contributed to and amplified or even proximately
caused additional humiliation, misery and suffering
of private respondent. Petitioner thereby allegedly
facilitated the arrest, detention and prosecution of
private respondent under the guise of petitioner's
authority as employer, taking advantage of the
trust, confidence and faith she reposed upon it. As
purportedly found by the Prince of Makkah, the
alleged conviction and imprisonment of private
respondent was wrongful. But these capped the
injury or harm allegedly inflicted upon her person
and reputation, for which petitioner could be liable
as claimed, to provide compensation or redress for
the wrongs done, once duly proven.

(4) the place where an act has


been done, the locus actus, such
as the place where a contract has
been made, a marriage celebrated,
a will signed or a tort committed.
The lex loci actus is particularly
important in contracts and torts;
(5) the place where an act is
intended to come into effect, e.g.,
the place of performance of
contractual duties, or the place
where a power of attorney is to be
exercised;
(6) the intention of the contracting
parties as to the law that should
govern their agreement, the lex
loci intentionis;

Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is


one involving torts, the "connecting factor" or
"point of contact" could be the place or places
where the tortious conduct or lex loci
actus occurred. And applying the torts principle in
a conflicts case, we find that the Philippines could
be said as a situs of the tort (the place where the
alleged tortious conduct took place). This is
because it is in the Philippines where petitioner
allegedly deceived private respondent, a Filipina
residing and working here. According to her, she
had honestly believed that petitioner would, in the
exercise of its rights and in the performance of its
duties, "act with justice, give her due and observe
honesty and good faith." Instead, petitioner failed
to protect her, she claimed. That certain acts or
parts of the injury allegedly occurred in another

(7) the place where judicial or


administrative proceedings are
instituted or done. The lex fori
the law of the forum is
particularly important because, as
we have seen earlier, matters of
"procedure" not going to the
substance of the claim involved are
governed by it; and because
the lex fori applies whenever the
content of the otherwise applicable
foreign law is excluded from
application in a given case for the
reason that it falls under one of the

23

country is of no moment. For in our view what is


important here is the place where the over-all harm
or the totality of the alleged injury to the person,
reputation, social standing and human rights of
complainant, had lodged, according to the plaintiff
below (herein private respondent). All told, it is not
without basis to identify the Philippines as the situs
of the alleged tort.

to plead and prove the law of the Kingdom of Saudi


Arabia since her cause of action is based on
Articles 19 and 21" of the Civil Code of the
Philippines. In her Amended Complaint and
subsequent pleadings, she never alleged that
Saudi law should govern this case. 65 And as
correctly held by the respondent appellate court,
"considering that it was the petitioner who was
invoking the applicability of the law of Saudi
Arabia, then the burden was on it [petitioner] to
plead and to establish what the law of Saudi Arabia
is". 66

Moreover, with the widespread criticism of the


traditional rule of lex loci delicti commissi, modern
theories and rules on tort liability 61 have been
advanced to offer fresh judicial approaches to
arrive at just results. In keeping abreast with the
modern theories on tort liability, we find here an
occasion to apply the "State of the most significant
relationship" rule, which in our view should be
appropriate to apply now, given the factual context
of this case.

Lastly, no error could be imputed to the respondent


appellate court in upholding the trial court's denial
of defendant's (herein petitioner's) motion to
dismiss the case. Not only was jurisdiction in order
and venue properly laid, but appeal after trial was
obviously available, and expeditious trial itself
indicated by the nature of the case at hand.
Indubitably, the Philippines is the state intimately
concerned with the ultimate outcome of the case
below, not just for the benefit of all the litigants,
but also for the vindication of the country's system
of law and justice in a transnational setting. With
these guidelines in mind, the trial court must
proceed to try and adjudge the case in the light of
relevant Philippine law, with due consideration of
the foreign element or elements involved. Nothing
said herein, of course, should be construed as
prejudging the results of the case in any manner
whatsoever.

In applying said principle to determine the State


which has the most significant relationship, the
following contacts are to be taken into account and
evaluated according to their relative importance
with respect to the particular issue: (a) the place
where the injury occurred; (b) the place where the
conduct causing the injury occurred; (c) the
domicile, residence, nationality, place of
incorporation and place of business of the parties,
and (d) the place where the relationship, if any,
between the parties is centered. 62
As already discussed, there is basis for the claim
that over-all injury occurred and lodged in the
Philippines. There is likewise no question that
private respondent is a resident Filipina national,
working with petitioner, a resident foreign
corporation engaged here in the business of
international air carriage. Thus, the "relationship"
between the parties was centered here, although it
should be stressed that this suit is not based on
mere labor law violations. From the record, the
claim that the Philippines has the most significant
contact with the matter in this dispute, 63 raised by
private respondent as plaintiff below against
defendant (herein petitioner), in our view, has been
properly established.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is


hereby DISMISSED. Civil Case No. Q-93-18394
entitled "Milagros P. Morada vs. Saudi Arabia
Airlines" is hereby REMANDED to Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 89 for further
proceedings.
SO ORDERED.

Gulf Oil Corp. vs. Gilbert Digest


Forum Non-Conveniens
Facts:
1. Plaintiff Gilbert filed an action in New York
against the petitioner for negligence due to
the delivery of gasoline to his tanks and
pumps. The venue statutes of the United
States permit this. Gilbert resides in Virginia,
USA.

Prescinding from this premise that the Philippines


is the situs of the tort complained of and the place
"having the most interest in the problem", we find,
by way of recapitulation, that the Philippine law on
tort liability should have paramount application to
and control in the resolution of the legal issues
arising out of this case. Further, we hold that the
respondent Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction
over the parties and the subject matter of the
complaint; the appropriate venue is in Quezon City,
which could properly apply Philippine law.
Moreover, we find untenable petitioner's insistence
that "[s]ince private respondent instituted this suit,
she has the burden of pleading and proving the
applicable Saudi law on the matter." 64 As aptly
said by private respondent, she has "no obligation

2. Petitioner Gulf Oil is a company organized


under the laws of Pennsylvania with authority
to do business in both Virginia and New York.
It designated officials in each state as agents
to receive the process. Gulf Oil invoked the

24

doctrine
of 'forum
non-conveniens' and
claimed that Virginia is the appropriate venue
for the trial becuase it is where the plaintiff
resides, where corporation does business,
where the witness likewise resides and it is
also the place where the events took place.

Brief

Fact

Summary. A

family

that

purchased a car in New York sued the auto


manufacturer and retailer after they became
involved in an accident in Oklahoma while
driving

to

Arizona.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. A consumers


unilateral

3. On one hand, plaintiff contends that the


action filed in New York is justified since the
action involved an amount for claim for
damages close to $400 thousand which may
stagger the imagination of the local jury, the
diversity of the citizenship of the parties and
that plaintiff's counsel resides in New York.

act

of brining

the

defendants

product into the forum state is not a sufficient


basis for exercising personal jurisdiction over
the defendant.
Facts. Harry and Kay Robinson purchased an
Audi automobile from Seaway Volkswagen,
Inc. in New York State in 1976. The following
year they left New York to move to Arizona.
While they were driving through Oklahoma,
another car struck them, causing a fire which
burned Kay Robinson and two of her children.
The Robinsons brought a products liability suit
in Oklahoma claiming that their injuries
resulted from defective design and placement
for the Audis gas tank and fuel system. The
Robinsons joined as defendants the auto
manufacturer, Audi, its importer, Volkswagen
of America, Inc., its regional distributor, World
Wide Volkswagen Corporation, and its retail
dealer, Seaway. The court found that World
Wide was incorporated and had its business
office in New York. It distributed Vehicles,
under Contract with Volkswagen, to retail
dealers in New York, Connecticut, and New
Jersey. Seaway is a retail dealer whose place
of business is in New York. There was no
evidence that either World-Wide or Seaway
did any business in Oklahoma, shipped or sold
any products in that state, had an agent to
receive process there, or advertised in
Oklahoma. Seaway and World-Wide made
special apperances for the purpose of
opposing jurisdiction in Oklahoma. The
Oklahoma court denied their motion and this
appeal followed, whereby the Supreme Court
of the United States granted Seaway and
World-Wide a writ of certiorari.

4. The District Court of New Yorl dismissed the


tort action pursuant to FNC (forum nonconveniens) while the Appeals Court reversed
the decision.

Issue: Whether or not the action was


properly dismissed from NY court under
the doctrine of FNC thought personam
jurisdiction and venue are proper
HELD:
YES. The application of the doctrine lies in the
the discretion of the court. However, tje
interests of the plaintiff, the defendant and
the forum state need to be considered. Here,
there is not interest for any party to have the
litigation in New York. In fact, interests weigh
against it.

Moreover, the plaintiff may not choose an


inconvenient forum to harass the petitioner.
Finally, the state has an interest in avoiding
the overcrowding of its own courts and
subjecting its citizens to jury duty in a case
having no ties to their state.

Issue. Whether an Oklahoma court may


exercise in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident automobile retailer and its wholesale
distributor in a products liability suit, when

World Wide Volkswagen Corp v. Woodson

25

the defendants only connection with


Oklahoma is the fact that an auto sold in New
York to New York residents became involved in
an accident in Oklahoma?

recommendations from Virginia members, the


Association for many years had been issuing
insurance certificates to residents of Virginia,
and it had approximately 800 members there.

Held. No. The Supreme Court reversed the


Oklahoma courts ruling. Forseeability of
being asked to defend a suit in a particular
forum is not a sufficient benchmark for
personal jurisdiction under the Due Process
Clause. Instead, it is the defendants conduct
and connection with the forum state that
determines whether it is reasonable for a
defendant to be haled into court. Because
Seaway and World-Wide had no contacts, ties
or relations with the state of Oklahoma,
jurisdiction would violate the Due Process
Clause.

It had caused claims for losses to be


investigated, and the Virginia courts were
open to it for the enforcement of obligations
of certificate holders.
Held:
1. The State has power to issue a cease and
desist order to enforce at least the
requirement that the Association consent to
suit against it by service of process on the
Secretary of the Commonwealth. Pp. 339 U. S.

Travelers Health Assn. v. Virginia, 339


U.S. 643 (1950)

646-647.
2. The contacts and ties of appellants with

Syllabus

Virginia residents, together with that State's


In a proceeding under 6 of the Virginia "Blue

interest in faithful observance of the

Sky Law," the State Corporation Commission

certificate obligations, justify subjecting

ordered an Association, located in Nebraska

appellants to cease and desist proceedings

and engaged in the mail order health

under 6. Pp. 339 U. S. 647-648.

insurance business, and its treasurer


(appellants here) to cease and desist from

3. Virginia's subjection of the Association to

further offerings or sales of certificates of

the jurisdiction of the State Commission in a

insurance to Virginia residents until the

6 proceeding is consistent with fair play and

Association had complied with the Act by

substantial justice, and is not offensive to the

furnishing information as to its financial

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

condition, consenting to suit against it by

Amendment. P. 339 U. S. 649.

service of process on the Secretary of the

4. The power of the State to subject the

Commonwealth, and obtaining a permit.

Association to the jurisdiction of the State

Notice of the proceeding was served on

Commission and to authorize a cease and

appellants by registered mail, as authorized


by 6 when other forms of service are

Page 339 U. S. 644

unavailable. They appeared specially,


challenged the jurisdiction of the State, and
moved to quash the service of summons. On

26

desist order under 6 is not vitiated by the

their hotels so they agreed to have

fact that business activities carried on outside

breakfast together at the room of

of the State are affected. P. 339 U. S. 650.

Thamer. Shortly after Allah left the


room, Thamer attempted to rape

5. Service of process on appellants by

Morada. Fortunately, a roomboy and

registered mail did not violate the

several security personnel heard her

requirements of due process. Pp. 339 U. S.

cries for help and rescued


her. Indonesian police arrested

650-651.

Thamer and Allah Al-Gazzawi, the


latter as an accomplice.

188 Va. 877, 51 S.E.2d 263, affirmed.

When Morada returned to Jeddah,

An order of the Virginia Corporation

SAUDIA officials interrogated her about

Commission requiring appellants to cease and

the Jakarta incident and requested her

desist from offering and issuing, without a

to go back to Jakarta to help arrange

permit, certificates of insurance to residents

the release of Thamer and Allah. In


Jakarta, SAUDIA Legal Officers

of the State, was affirmed by the Supreme

negotiated with the police for the

Court of Appeals. 188 Va. 877, 51 S.E.2d 263.

immediate release of the detained

On appeal to this Court, affirmed,

crew members but did not


succeed. Afraid that she might be
tricked into something she did not

Saudi Arabian Airlines vs CA

want because of her inability to


Lessons Applicable: Conflict of Laws, factual

understand the local dialect, Morado

situation, connecting factor, characterization,

refused to cooperate and declined to

choice of law, State of the most significant

sign a blank paper and a document

relationship

written in the local dialect. Eventually,


SAUDIA allowed Morada to return to
Jeddah but barred her from the Jakarta

FACTS:

flights.

Saudi Arabian Airlines (SAUDIA),

foreign airlines corporation doing


business in the Philippines and may be

deport Thamer and Allah and they

served summons in agent in Makati,

were again put in service. While,

hired Milagros P. Morada as a flight

Morada was transferred to Manila.

attendant for its airlines based in

Indonesian authorities agreed to

January 14, 1992: Morada was asked to

Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.

see Mr. Ali Meniewy, Chief Legal Officer

April 27, 1990: While on a lay-over in

of SAUDIA, in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. He

Jakarta, Indonesia, Morada went to a

brought her to the police station where

disco dance with fellow crew members

the police took her passport and

Thamer Al-Gazzawi and Allah Al-

questioned her about the Jakarta

Gazzawi, both Saudi nationals. It was

incident. The police pressured her to

almost morning when they returned to

drop the case against Thamer and


Allah. Not until she agreed to do so

27

did the police return her passport and

music in violation of Islamic laws and

allowed her to catch the afternoon

(3) socializing with the male crew, in

flight out of Jeddah.

contravention of Islamic tradition.

June 16, 1993: Morada, while in Riyadh

Saudi Arabia, was not allowed to board

employer, SAUDIA, she asked the

the plane to Manila and instead

Philippine Embassy in Jeddah to help

ordered to take a later flight to Jeddah

her while her case is on appeal. She

to see Mr. Miniewy. Khalid of the

continued to workon

SAUDIA office brought her to a Saudi

the domestic flight of SAUDIA, while

court where she was asked to sign a

Thamer and Allah continued to serve in

document written in Arabic. They told

the international flights.

her that this was necessary to close

the Prince of Makkah dismissed the

it was actually a notice for her to

case against her and allowed her to

appear before the court on June 27,

leave Saudi Arabia. Before her return

1993. Plaintiff then returned to Manila.

to Manila, she was terminated from the

June 27, 1993: SAUDIA's Manila

service by SAUDIA, without her being

manager, Aslam Saleemi, assured

informed of the cause.

November 23, 1993: Morada filed a

routinary and that it posed no danger

Complaint for damages against

to her so she reported to Miniewy in

SAUDIA, and Khaled Al-Balawi, its

Jeddah for further investigation. She

country manager.

was brought to the Saudi court.

Because she was wrongfully convicted,

the case against Thamer and Allah but

Morada that the investigation was

Failing to seek the assistance of her

January 19, 1994: SAUDIA filed an

June 28, 1993: Saudi judge

Omnibus Motion To Dismiss on

interrogated Morada through an

following grounds: (1) that the

interpreter about the Jakarta incident

Complaint states no cause of action

for an hour and let her go. SAUDIA

against SAUDIA (2) that defendant Al-

officers forbidden her to take

Balawi is not a real party in interest (3)

flight. She was told to go the Inflight

that the claim or demand set forth in

Service Office where her passport was

the Complaint has been waived,

taken and they told her to remain in

abandoned or otherwise extinguished

Jeddah, at the crew quarters, until

and (4) that the trial court has no

further orders.

jurisdiction to try the case.

July 3, 1993: She was brought to court

After opposition to the motion to

again and to her astonishment and

dismiss by Morada and reply by

shock, rendered a decision, translated

SAUDIA, Morada filed an Amended

to her in English, sentencing her to five

Complaint dropping Al-Balawi. SAUDIA

months imprisonment and to 286

filed its Manifestation, Motion to

lashes. The court tried her, together

Dismiss Amended Complaint,

with Thamer and Allah, and found her

subsequently motion for

guilty of (1) adultery (2) going to a

reconsideration which were all denied.

disco, dancing and listening to the

28

SAUDIA filed its Petition for Certiorari

and Prohibition with Prayer for

satisfactorily establish the existence of

Issuance of Writ of Preliminary

a foreign element, the problem could

Injunction and/or Temporary

present a "conflicts" case

Restraining Order with the Court of

territorial lines and is affected by the

Preliminary Injunction was denied.

diverse laws of two or more states is

CA: Philippines is an appropriate forum

said to contain a "foreign element".

considering that the Amended

Morada is a resident Philippine national

Complaint's basis for recovery of

SAUDIA is a resident foreign corporation

damages is Article 21 of the Civil Code,

by virtue of the employment of Morada with

and thus, clearly within the jurisdiction

the SAUDIA as a flight stewardess, events did

of respondent Court. It further held

transpire during her many occasions of travel

that certiorari is not the proper remedy

across national borders, particularly from

in a denial of a Motion to Dismiss,

Manila, Philippines to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia,

inasmuch as the petitioner should

and vice versa, that caused a "conflicts"

have proceeded to trial, and in case of

situation to arise

appeal.

A factual situation that cuts across

Appeals. TRO was granted but Writ of

an adverseruling, find recourse in an

Where the factual antecedents

Forms of foreign element:

Simple: one of the parties to a contract is an

SAUDIA filed its Supplemental Petition

alien or has a foreign domicile, or that a

for Review with Prayer for Temporary

contract between nationals of one State

Restraining Order:

involves properties situated in another State

It is a conflict of laws that must be settled at

the outset:

Complex

Violations of Articles 19 and 21 are

Morada's claim for alleged abuse of rights

actionable, with judicially enforceable

occurred in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

remedies in the municipal forum. RTC

Existence of a foreign element qualifies the

of Quezon City possesses jurisdiction

instant case for the application of the law of

over the subject matter of the suit.

the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, by virtue of the

lex loci delicti commissi rule.

Pragmatic considerations, including


the convenience of the parties, also

Morada: Amended Complaint is based

weigh heavily in favor of the RTC

on Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code

Quezon City assuming jurisdiction:

which is a matter ofdomestic law


ISSUE: W/N the RTC of Quezon City has

private interest of the litigant

enforceability of a judgment if one is obtained

relative advantages and obstacles to a fair

jurisdiction over the case and it is the proper


forum for recovery of damages under Art. 21

trial
Plaintiff may not, by choice of an inconvenient

of the Civil Code which should govern.

forum, "vex", "harass", or "oppress" the


defendant, e.g. by inflicting upon him

HELD: YES. petition for certiorari is hereby

needless expense or disturbance. but unless

DISMISSED. REMANDED to RTC of Quezon

thebalance is strongly in favor of the

City, Branch 89 for further proceedings

29

defendant, the plaintiffs choice of forum

should rarely be disturbed.

necessary for us to determine under

Weighing the relative claims of the

what category a certain set of facts or

parties, the court a quo found it best to

rules fall

hear the case in the Philippines. Had it

refused to take cognizance of the case,


it would be forcing plaintiff (private

qualification
process of deciding whether or not the facts
relate to the kind of question specified in a

action elsewhere, i.e. in the Kingdom

conflicts rule
purpose: to enable the forum to select the

maintains substantial connections.

proper law

That would have caused a

fundamental unfairness to
her. Moreover, by hearing the case in

(such as property right, contract claim); and


starting point of analysis

been shown by either of the parties.

(such as the situs of the res, the place of

the persons of the parties

celebration, the place of performance, or the

By filing her Complaint and Amended

the jurisdiction of the court

place of wrongdoing) could be:


(1) The nationality of a person, his domicile, his
residence, his place of sojourn, or his origin
(2) the seat of a legal or juridical person, such

SAUDIA has effectively submitted to the trial


court's jurisdiction by praying for the

as a corporation
(3) the situs of a thing, that is, the place where

dismissal of the Amended Complaint on

a thing is, or is deemed to be situated. In

grounds other than lack of jurisdiction.

particular, the lex situs is decisive when real

As to the choice of applicable law, it


seeks to answer 2 important

rights are involved


(4) the place where an act has been done, the

questions:

test or connecting factor or point of contact

Trial court possesses jurisdiction over

respondent has voluntary submitted herself to

factual situation/relationship or operative fact

difficulties and inconvenience have

Complaint with the trial court, private

Choice-of-law rules invariably consist


of: (essential element of conflict rules)

the Philippines no unnecessary

"characterization" or the "doctrine of

respondent now) to seek remedial


of Saudi Arabia where she no longer

Before a choice can be made, it is

locus actus, such as the place where a

(1) What legal system should control a given

contract has been made, a marriage

situation where some of the significant facts

celebrated, a will signed or a tort committed.

occurred in two or more states

The lex loci actus is particularly important in

(2) to what extent should the chosen legal

contracts and torts

system regulate the situation

(5) the place where an act is intended to come

Although ideally, all choice-of-law

into effect, e.g., the place of performance of

theories should intrinsically advance

contractual duties, or the place where a

both notions of justice and

power of attorney is to be exercised

predictability, they do not always do

(6) the intention of the contracting parties as to

so. The forum is then faced with the

the law that should govern their agreement,

problem of deciding which of these two

the lex loci intentionis;

important values should be stressed.

30

(7) the place where judicial or administrative

tortious conduct or lex loci actus

proceedings are instituted or done. The lex

occurred = Philippines where SAUDIA

fori the law of the forum is particularly

deceived Morada, a Filipina residing

important because, as we have seen earlier,

and working here.

matters of "procedure" not going to the

substance of the claim involved are governed


by it; and because the lex fori applies

relationship" applied
o

to their relative importance with respect to

applicable foreign law is excluded from

the particular issue:

application in a given case for the reason that

(a) the place where the injury occurred

it falls under one of the exceptions to the

(b) the place where the conduct causing the

(8) the flag of a ship, which in many cases is

injury occurred
(c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of

decisive of practically all legal relationships of

incorporation and place of business of the

the ship and of its master or owner as such. It

parties

also covers contractual relationships

(d) the place where the relationship, if any,

particularly contracts of affreightment

Note that one or more circumstances

between the parties is centered


v private respondent is a resident Filipina

may be present to serve as the


possible test for the determination of

national, working here


v a resident foreign corporation engaged here in

the applicable law.

the business of international air carriage

Based on pleadings on record,


including allegations in the Amended
Complaint:

Morada was made to face trial for very


serious charges, including adultery and
violation of Islamic laws and tradition

SAUDIA may have acted beyond its duties as


employer by handing over the person of
Morada to Jeddah officials which contributed
to and amplified or even proximately caused
additional humiliation, misery and
suffering. It also took advantage of the trust,
confidence and faith in the guise of authority
as employer.

taken into account and evaluated according

whenever the content of the otherwise

applications of foreign law; and

"State of the most significant

Conviction and imprisonment was wrongful


but injury or harm was inflicted upon her
person and reputation which must be
compensated or redress for the wrong doing

Complaint involving torts

"connecting factor" or "point of


contact" - place or places where the

31

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