Existentialism by Georg Lukács 1949

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ExistentialismbyGeorgLukcs1949
GeorgLukcs1949
Existentialism
Written:1949
Translator:HenryF.Mins
Source:Marxism and Human Liberation: Essays on History, Culture and
Revolution by Georg Lukacs,DellPublishingCo.,1973
Transcribed:HarrisonFlussformarxists.org,February2008.
Toutsepassecommesilemonde,
lhommeetlhommedanslemonde
narrivaientaraliserquunDieu
manqu.
Sartre,LEtre et le nant
There is no reasonable doubt that existentialism will soon become the

predominant philosophical current among bourgeois intellectuals. This state of
affairshasbeenlonginthemaking.EversincethepublicationofHeideggersSein
und Zeittheavantgardeintellectualshaveseeninexistentialismthephilosophyof
ourtimes.InGermany,Jaspersundertooktocommunicatetheprinciplesofthenew
philosophytobroadersectionsoftheeducatedpublic.Duringthewarandsinceits
end,thetideofexistentialismrolledovertheentireWesternculturalfield,andthe
leading German existentialists and their precursor, Husserl, have made great
conquests in France and in America not only in the United States but in Latin
Americaaswell.In1943thebasicworkofwesternexistentialismappeared,Sartres
big book cited above and since then existentialism has been pressing forward
irresistibly, through philosophical debates, special periodicals (Les Temps
modernes),novels,anddramas.
1.MethodasAttitude
Isallthisapassingfadperhapsonewhichmaylastafewyears?Orisitreallyan
epochmaking new philosophy? The answer depends on how accurately the new
philosophy reflects reality, and how adequately it deals with the crucial human
questionwithwhichtheageisfaced.
https://www.marxists.org/archive/lukacs/works/1949/existentialism.htm
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An epochmaking philosophy has never yet arisen without a really original

method. This was so for all the great philosophers of the past, Plato and Aristotle,
Descartes and Spinoza, Kant and Hegel. What is the originality of existentialisms
method?Thequestionisnotsettledbyreferringtothefactthatexistentialismisan
offshoot of Husserls philosophy. It is important to note that modern
phenomenology is one of the numerous philosophical methods which seek to rise
abovebothidealismandmaterialismbydiscoveringaphilosophicalthirdway,by
makingintuitionthetruesourceofknowledge.FromNietzschethroughMachand
AvenariustoBergsonandbeyond,themassofbourgeoisphilosophygoesthisway.
Husserlsintuitionofessence(Wesensschau)isbutonestrandofthedevelopment.
This would not in itself be a decisive argument against the phenomenological
method. If we are to arrive at a correct judgment, we must first understand the
philosophical and topical significance of the third way, as well as the place and
functionofintuitionintheknowingprocess.
Is there any room for a third way besides idealism and materialism? If we
consider this question seriously, as the great philosophers of the past did, and not
withfashionablephrases,therecanbeonlyoneanswer,No.Forwhenwelookat
the relations which can exist between being and consciousness we see clearly that
only two positions are possible: either being is primary (materialism), or
consciousness is primary (idealism). Or, to put it another way, the fundamental
principle of materialism is the independence of being from consciousness of
idealism,thedependenceofbeingonconsciousness.Thefashionablephilosophers
oftodayestablishacorrelationbetweenbeingandconsciousnessasabasisfortheir
thirdway:thereisnobeingwithoutconsciousnessandnoconsciousnesswithout
being. But the first assertion produces only a variant of idealism: the
acknowledgmentofthedependenceofbeingonconsciousness.
It was the grim reality of the imperialist period that forced the philosophical
thirdwayonbourgeoisthinking:foronlyinbecalmed,untroubledtimescanmen
holdthemselvestobethoroughgoingidealists.WhensomestudentsbrokeFichtes
windows over a college quarrel Goethe said, smiling: This is a very disagreeable
way to take cognizance of the reality of the external world. The imperialist epoch
gave us such windowbreaking on a worldwide scale. Downright philosophical
idealismgentlyfadedout.Apartfromsomeminorprofessorialphilosophers,anyone
whodeclareshimselfanidealisttodayfeelshopelessaboutapplyinghisphilosophy
toreality(Valery,Benda,etc.).
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Theabandonmentoftheolddownrightidealismhadbeenanticipatedeveninthe
middle of the last century by pettybourgeois asceticism. Ever since Nietzsche, the
body(Leib)hasplayedaleadingroleinbourgeoisphilosophy.Thenewphilosophy
needs formulas which recognize the primary reality of the body and the joys and
dangers of bodily existence, without, however, making any concessions to
materialism.Foratthesametimematerialismwasbecomingtheworldviewofthe
revolutionaryproletariat.ThatmadeapositionsuchasGassendiandHobbeslook
impossible for bourgeois thinkers. Although the method of idealism had been
discreditedbytherealitiesofthetime,itsconclusionswereheldindispensable.This
explains the need for the third way in the bourgeois world of the imperialist
period.
Thephenomenologicalmethod,especiallyafterHusserl,believesithasdiscovered
a way of knowing which exhibits the essence of objective reality without going
beyondthehumanoreventheindividualconsciousness.Theintuitionofessenceis
a sort of intuitive introspection, but is not psychologically oriented. It inquires
ratherwhatsortofobjectsthethoughtprocessposits,andwhatkindofintentional
acts are involved. It was still relatively easy for Husserl to operate with these
concepts, because he was concerned exclusively with questions of pure logic, i.e.,
pure acts and objects of thought. The question became more complex as Scheler
took up problems of ethics and sociology, and Heidegger and Sartre broached the
ultimate questions of philosophy. The need of the times which drove them in this
direction was so compelling that it silenced all gnosiological doubts as to whether
themethodwasadequatetoobjectivereality.
Evenwhenthephenomenologistsdealtwithcrucialquestionsofsocialactuality,
they put off the theory of knowledge and asserted that the phenomenological
methodsuspendsorbracketsthequestionwhethertheintentionalobjectsarereal.
The method was thus freed from any knowledge of reality. Once during the First
WorldWarSchelervisitedmeinHeidelberg,andwehadaninformingconversation
on this subject. Scheler maintained that phenomenology was a universal method
which could have anything for its intentional object. For example, he explained,
phenomenological researches could be made about the devil only the question of
the devils reality would first have to be bracketed. Certainly, I answered. and
when when you are finished with the phenomenological picture of the devil, you
openthebracketsandthedevilinpersonisstandingbeforeyou.Schelerlaughed,
shruggedhisshoulders,andmadenoreply.
Thearbitrarinessofthemethodisseenespeciallywhenthequestionisraised:Is
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whatphenomenologicalintuitionfindsactuallyreal?Whatrightdoesthatintuition
havetospeakoftherealityofitsobject?ForDiltheysintuition,thecolorfulnessand
the uniqueness of historical situations are the reality for Bergsons, it is the flow
itself,theduration(dure),thatdissolvesthepetrifiedformsofordinarylifewhile
for Husserls, the acts in which individual objects are meant constitute reality
objectswhichhetreatsasisolatedunits,withhardcontourslikestatuary.Although
mutuallyexclusive,theseintuitionswereabletodwelltogetherinrelativepeace.
These interpretations of reality stem from factors even more concrete than the
social need for a third way. It is a general tendency of the imperialist period to
regard social relationships as secondary circumstances which do not concern the
essence of man. The intuition of essence takes the immediate givenness of inner
experience as its starting point, which it regards as unconditioned and primary,
neverlookingintoitscharacterandpreconditions,andproceedsthencetoitsfinal
abstractvision,divorcedfromreality.Suchintuitions,underthesocialconditions
of the time, could easily abstract from all social actuality while keeping the
appearanceofutterobjectivityandrigor.Inthiswaytherearosethelogicalmythof
aworld(insplendidaccordwiththeattitudeofbourgeoisintellectuals)independent
of consciousness, although its structure and characteristics are said to be
determinedbytheindividualconsciousness.
ltisimpossibleheretogiveadetailedcritiqueofthephenomenologicalmethod.
Weshallthereforemerelyanalyzeinsummaryfashionanexampleofthewayitis
applied.WehavechosenthebookofSzilasi,thewellknownstudentofHusserland
Heidegger,[1] partly because Szilasi is an earnest thinker who aims at scientific
objectivity, not a cynical fabricator of myths like Scheler and partly because the
elementaryformoftheexampleiswellsuitedtoabrieftreatment.Szilasitakesas
his instance the copresence (Miteinandersein) at his lecture of his hearers and
himself. Describing the essence of the situation, he finds that the hall lies before
him, the benches, in a word, the external world: This space with its variously
worked boards is a lecture hall only because we understand this mass of wooden
objectsassuch,andwedounderstanditsobecausefromtheoutsetwemeanitas
something presupposed in our common task namely, lecturing and listening.
Fromwhichheconcludes,Itisthewayofbeingtogetherthatdetermineswhatthe
thingis.
Let us consider the result of this intuition of essence from the methodological
point of view. First, it is a primitive abstraction when Szilasi speaks of variously
worked boards, and not of desks, benches, etc. But this is methodologically
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essential,forifheshouldconcedethatthelecturehallisequallyadaptedtoholding
philological,legal,andotherlectures,whatwouldbeleftofthemagicalpotencyof
theintentionalexperience,whichissupposedtomaketheobjectwhatitis?
However, what the analysis omits is still more important. The hall is in Zurich,
and the time is the 1940s. The fact that Szilasi could deliver a lecture precisely in
Zurich has the most diverse social preconditions. For instance, before Hitlers
seizureofpowerSzilasigavehislecturesinFreiburgafter1933theywerenolonger
permitted,infactthelecturerhadtoleaveGermanybecausehispersonalsafetywas
threatened. Why is all this missing from the intuition of copresence? It belongs
thereatleastasmuchasdotheworkedboards.
Butletusreturntotheboards.Thefactthatboardsareusedinacertainwayto
makedesksandbenchespresupposesacertainstageofdevelopmentofindustryand
of society. Again, the fact that the boards and the ball as a whole are in a certain
condition (is there coal for heating, or glass in the windows?) is inseparably
connected with other social events and structures. But phenomenological method,
excludingallsocialelementsfromitsanalysis,confrontsconsciousnesswithachaos
ofthings(andmen)whichonlyindividualsubjectivitycanarticulateandobjectify.
Here we have the wellpublicized phenomenological objectivity, the third way,
whichturnsouttobeonlyarevivalofneoKantianism.
Phenomenology and the ontology deriving from it only seem to go beyond the
gnosiological solipsism of subjective idealism. A formally new formulation of the
questionreinstatesontologicalidealism.Itisnoaccidentthat(justasfortyyearsago
theMachistsreproachedoneanotherforidealism,eachrecognizingonlyhimselfas
the discoverer of the philosophical third way) today the existentialists make
similar accusations against one another. So Sartre complains of Husserl and
Heidegger, two men he otherwise prizes highly. Husserl, in his opinion, has not
gone beyond Kant and he criticizes Heidegger as follows: The character being
together [copresence, Mitsein] introduced by Heidegger is a character of the
isolated ego. Hence it does not lead beyond solipsism. Therefore we shall search
Sein und Zeit in vain for a position beyond both idealism and realism [meaning
materialism].AnanalysisofSartresphilosophywillshowusthathecanbetaxed
with the offense for which he condemns Husserl and Heidegger. Heideggers
philosophy existence (Dasein) does not mean objective being (Sein) proper, but
human existence, i.e., a being aware of existence. In some places Sartre, who has
moreinterestthanhispredecessorsintheemotionalandpracticalrelationofman
to nature, spells out the complete dependence of nature on man s consciousness.
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Whenspeakingofdevastation,hedeniesthatitexistsinnatureitself,inwhichonly
changes take place. And even this expression is inadequate, for in order that this
changingtosomethingelse may be posited, a witness is needed who somehow or
otherpreservesthepastwithinhimselfandisabletocompareitwiththepresentin
itsnolongerform.Andinanotherplacehesays:Thefullmoondoesnotdenote
the future, except when we observe the waxing moon in the world which reveals
itself in human actuality: the future comes into the world by way of human
existence.
ThispurelyidealistictendencyisheightenedinSartrebythefactthathiswayof
handling problems compels him to study concrete questions of coexistence
(Mitsein) even more frequently than Heidegger. He meets the difficulty partly by
choosinglooselyconnectedmanifestationsofcopresencethatcanbereferredwith
someplausibilitytotheinnerexperiencesoftheego(arendezvousatacaf,atripin
thesubway).Butwhenactualsocialactivityisinvolved(labor,classconsciousness),
hemakesamethodologicalsalto mortale and declares that the experiences of the
relevantintuitionsofessenceareofpsychologicalandnotofontologicalcharacter.
The reason for this is the secret of the initiate, those to whom the intuition of
essenceisgranted.ItisthereforenoaccidentthatwhenSartreteststherelationof
man to his fellow man he recognizes only the following relations as ontologically
essential, that is, as elements of reality in itself: love, speech, masochism,
indifference,longing,hate,andsadism.(EventheorderofthecategoriesisSartres.)
AnythingbeyondthisinMiteinandersein,thecategoriesofcollectivelifetogether,of
working together, of fighting in a common cause, is for Sartre, as we have seen, a
category of consciousness (psychological) and not a really existent category
(ontological).
When all this is applied to actual cases, the result is banal Philistine
commonplaces.InhispopularbookSartretakesupthequestionofhowfarhecan
haveconfidenceinhisfreelyactingcomrades.Answer:AsfarasIhaveimmediate
personalknowledgeofthem,tocountontheunityandwillofthepartyisjustlike
countingonthestreetcartocomeontime,andonthetrainnottojumpthetracks.
But I cannot count on men that I do not know, banking on human goodness or
mans interest in the common good, for it is a given datum that man is free and
there is no such thing as a human nature on which I can count. Apart from the
involvedterminology,anypettybourgeois,shrinkingfrompublicaffairs,could,and
does,sayasmuch.
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2.TheMythofNothingness
Ilestabsurdequenoussommesns,
ilestabsurdequenousmourrons.
Sartre,LEtreetlenant
Itwouldbeanerrortoassumethatsuchanabstractnarrowingofreality,suchan
idealist distortion of the problem of reality, by intelligent and experienced men is
intentional deceit. On the contrary, those inner experiences which constitute the
attituderevealedintheintuitionoftheWesensschau,anditscontent,areassincere
and spontaneous as possible. But that does not make them objectively correct.
Indeed this spontaneity, by betraying its immediate uncritical attitude toward the
basicphenomenon,createsthefalseconsciousness:fetishism.Fetishismsignifies,in
brief, that the relations among human beings which function by means of objects
are reflected in human consciousness immediately as things, because of the
structure of capitalist economy. They become objects or things, fetishes in which
mencrystallizetheirsocialrelationships,assavagesdotheirrelationshipstonature
andforsavagesthelawsofnaturalrelationsarejustasimpenetrableasthelawsof
thecapitalistsystemofeconomyaretothemenoftheworldoftoday.Likesavages,
modern men pray to the fetishes they themselves have made, bow down to them,
and sacrifice to them (e.g., the fetish of money). Human relations, as Marx says,
acquireaspectralobjectivity.Thesocialexistenceofmanbecomesariddleinhis
immediate experience, even though objectively he is a social being first and
foremost,despiteallimmediateappearancestothecontrary.
It is not our aim nor our task to treat of the problem of fetish making: to do so
wouldrequireasystematicdevelopmentofthewholestructureofcapitalistsociety
and the forms of false consciousness arising out of it. I shall merely point out the
mostimportantquestionswhichhavehaddecisiveinfluenceonthedevelopmentof
existentialism.
The first is lifes losing its meaning. Man loses the center, weight, and
connectedness of his own life, a fact life itself compels him to realize. The
phenomenon has been known for a long time. Ibsen, in Peer Gynt, puts it into a
striking little scene. The aging Peer Gynt is peeling off the layers of an onion, and
playfullycomparesthesinglelayerswiththeperiodsofhislife,hopingattheendto
cometothecoreoftheonionandthecoreofhisownpersonality.Butlayerfollows
layer,periodafterperiodoflifeandnocoreisfound.
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Everyonewhomthisexperiencehastouchedfacesthequestion:Howcanmylife
becomemeaningful?Themanwholivesinthefetishmakingworlddoesnotseethat
every life is rich, full, and meaningful to the extent that it is consciously linked in
human relations with other lives. The isolated egoistic man who lives only for
himself lives in an impoverished world. His experiences approach threateningly
close to the unessential and begin to merge into nothingness the more exclusively
theyarehisalone,andturnedsolelyinward.
Themanofthefetishizedworld,whocancurehisdisgustwiththeworldonlyin
intoxication, seeks, like the morphine addict, to find a way out by heightening the
intensity of the intoxicant rather than by a way of life that has no need of
intoxication. He is not aware that the loss of communal life, the degradation and
dehumanizationofcollectiveworkasaresultofcapitalistdivisionoflabor,andthe
severance of human relations from social activity have stupefied him. He does not
seethis,andgoesfurtherandfurtheralongthefatalpath,whichtendstobecomea
subjectiveneed.Forincapitalistsocietypubliclife,work,andthesystemofhuman
relationsareunderthespelloffetishmaking,reificationanddehumanization.Only
revolt against the actual foundations, as we can see in many authors of the time,
leads to a clearer appreciation of these foundations, and thence to a new social
perspective.Escapeintoinwardnessisatragiccomicalblindalley.
Aslongasthepillarsofcapitalistsocietyseemedunshakable,sayuptothefirst
world war, the socalled avantgarde danced with the fetishes of their inner life.
Some writers, it is true, saw the approach of the inevitable catastrophe (Ibsen,
Tolstoy, Thomas Mann, etc.). The gaudy carnival, often with a ghastly tone from
tragic incidental music, went on uninterrupted. The philosophy of Simmel and
Bergson and much of the literature of the time show exactly where things were
heading.
Manyagoodwriterandkeenthinkersawthroughtheintoxicationofcarnivalto
thefactthatthefetishizedegohadlostitsessence.Buttheywentnofurtherthanto
sketch tragic or tragicomic perspectives behind the garish whirl. The fetishized
basesoflifeseemedsobeyondquestionthattheyescapedstudy,letalonecriticism.
If there were doubts, they were like the doubt of the Hindu who questioned the
accepted doctrine that the world rests on a huge elephant he asked modestly on
whattheelephantrestedandwhentolditrestedonahugetortoise,hewenthisway
contented.Mindwassoformedbyfetishthinkingthatwhenthefirstworldwarand
the subsequent series of crises called the very possibility of human existence into
question, giving a new tinge to every idea, and when the carnival of isolated
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individualismgavewaytoitsAshWednesday,therewasstillvirtuallynochangein
thewaythatphilosophicalquestionswereasked.
Yettheaimanddirectionofthequestforessencedidchange.Theexistentialism
ofHeideggerandJaspersisproof.Theexperiencewhichunderliesthisphilosophyis
easily stated: man stands face to face with nothingness or nonbeing. The
fundamental relation of man to the world is the situation of visvis de rien.
There is nothing particularly original in this. Ever since Poe, perhaps the first to
describe the situation and the corresponding attitude, modern literaturehasdwelt
upon the tragic fate which drives a man to the edge of the abyss. As examples we
maymentionthesituationofRaskolnikovafterthemurder,andtheroadtosuicide
of Svidrigailov or Stavrogin. What is involved here? A characteristic tragic form of
development, arising out of presentday life. A great writer weaves these tragic
destinies, which are as vivid and positive as were the tragedies of Oedipus and
Hamletintheirday.
The originality of Heidegger is that he takes just such situations as typical and
makes them his starting point. With the help of the complicated method of
phenomenology, he lodges the entire problem in the fetishized structure of the
bourgeoismind,inthedrearyhopelessnihilismandpessimismoftheintellectuals
of the interval between the two world wars. The first fetish is the concept of
nothingness. In Heidegger as in Sartre, this is the central problem of reality, of
ontology. In Heidegger nothingness is an ontological datum on a level with
existenceinSartreitisonlyonefactorinexistence,whichneverthelessentersinto
allthemanifestationsofbeing.
Averyspecializedphilosophicaldissertationwouldberequiredtoshowthechains
ofthought,sometimesquitefalse,sometimesobviouslysophistical,bywhichSartre
seekstojustifyhistheoryofnegativejudgment.Itistruethat,foreveryNowhich
expressesaparticularjudgment,thereisapositivelyexistingsituation.Butitisonly
idolizing of subjective attitudes that gives nothingness the semblance of reality.
When I inquire, for instance, what the laws of the solar system are, I have not
positedanynegativebeing,suchasSartreenvisages.Themeaningofmyquestionis
simplythatIlackknowledge.Theanswermaybeputineitherpositiveornegative
form,butthesamepositiverealityisindicatedineithercase.Onlysophistrycould
infer the existence of nonbeing. The nothingness which fascinates recent
philosophers is a myth of declining capitalist society. While previously it was
individuals(thoughsociallytypicalones)likeStavroginandSvidrigailovthathadto
face nothingness, today it is a whole system that has reached this chimerical
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outlook. For Heidegger and Sartre life itself is the state of being cast into
nothingness.
Existentialismconsistentlyproclaimsthatnothingcanbeknownbyman.Itdoes
notchallengescienceingeneralitdoesnotraiseskepticalobjectionstoitspractical
ortechnicaluses.Itmerelydeniesthatthereisasciencewhichhastherighttosay
anythingabouttheoneessentialquestion:therelationoftheindividualtolife.This
is the alleged superiority of existentialism to the old philosophy. Existential
philosophy, Jaspers says, would be lost immediately if it started believing
again that it knew what man is. This radical ignorance on principle, which is
stressedbyHeideggerandSartre,isoneofthemainreasonsfortheoverwhelming
influenceofexistentialism.Menwhohavenoprospectsthemselvesfindconsolation
inthedoctrinethatlifeingeneralhasnoprospectstooffer.
Here existentialism flows into the modern current of irrationalism. The
phenomenologicalandontologicalmethodseems,itistrue,tostandinboldcontrast
to the ordinary irrationalist tendencies. Are not the former rigorously scientific,
and was not Husserl a supporter of the most fanatical of logicians, Bolzano and
Brentano?Butevenasuperficialstudyofthemethodatoncedisclosesitslinkswith
the masters of irrationalism, Dilthey and Bergson. And when Heidegger renewed
Kierkegaardsefforts,thetiebecameevencloser.
This connection is more than an accidental convergence of two methods. The
more phenomenology is transformed into the method of existentialism, the more
the underlying irrationality of the individual and of being becomes the central
object,andthecloserbecomesitsaffinitytoirrationalcurrentsofthetime.Beingis
meaningless, uncaused, unnecessary. Being is by definition the originally
fortuitous, says Sartre. If nothingness comes to exist by the magic of
existentialism,existenceismadenegative.Existenceiswhatmanlacks.Thehuman
being, says Heidegger, knows what he is only from existence, i.e., from his own
potentialities, whether he becomes the one he is, or not. Is mans becoming
authenticornot?Wehaveseenthatintheleadingtrendsofmodernphilosophythis
questionhasanantisocialcharacter.Usingthefamiliarmethod,Heideggersubjects
manseverydaylifetophenomenologicalanalysis.Thelifeofmanisacoexistence
and at the same time a beingintheworld. This being also has its fetish namely,
one. In German, subjectless sentences begin with man (one): One writes,
Onedoes.Heidegger,makingmyths,erectsthiswordintoanontologicalexistent
inordertoexpressphilosophicallywhatseemstohimtobethefunctionofsociety
and social life viz., to turn man away from himself, to make him unauthentic, to
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preventhimfrombeinghimself.Themanifestationofoneindailylifeischatter,
curiosity,ambiguity,falling.Tofollowthepathofonesownexistence,according
toHeidegger,onemusttaketheroadtodeath,hisowndeathonemustliveinsuch
a way that his death does not come upon him as a brute fact breaking in on him
from without, but as his own. Actual existence can find its crowning achievement
onlyinsuchapersonaldemise.Thecompletecapriciousnessandsubjectivismofthe
ontology, concealed behind a show of objectivity, come to light once more. As a
confession of a citizen of the 1920s, Heideggers way of thinking is not without
interest.Sein und Zeit isatleastasabsorbingreadingasClinesnovel, Journey
to the End of the Night. Buttheformer,likethelatter,ismerelyadocumentof
thedayshowinghowaclassfeltandthought,andnotanontologicaldisclosureof
ultimatetruth.Itisonlybecausethisbookissowellsuitedtotheemotionalworldof
todays intellectuals that the arbitrariness of its pseudoargumentation is not
exposed.Thecontrastofabstractdeathtomeaninglesslifeisformanymentodayan
implicitaxiom.Butitsufficestoglanceatthemodeofthoughtofoldertimes,before
collapse started, to realize that this attitude toward death is not the ontological
character of being but a transitory phenomenon. Spinoza said: The free man
thinksofanythingbuthisdeathhiswisdomisnotdeathbutponderingonlife.
JaspersandSartrearelessradicalthanHeideggerinthisrespect,althoughtheir
thoughtisnotthelessconditionedbytimeandclass.Sartreflatlyrejectstheconcept
ofspecificorpersonaldeathasacategoryofexistentialism.InJaspers,thephantom
ofonedoesnotappearformallyinsucharadicallymystifyingform,butonlyasthe
totalityofthenamelesspowersrulinglife(thatis,essentially,sociallifeoncemore
objectivized in a fetish). He contents himself with assigning man, once he has
acquiredhisessenceandbeguntolivehisownprivateexistence,strictlytothepaths
ofprivatelife.InGenevarecentlyJaspersdevelopedthethesisthatnothinggoodor
essentialcancomeofpoliticalorsocialactivity:thesalvationofmanispossibleonly
when every one passionately concerns himself exclusively with his own existence
andinrelationswithotherindividualsoflikepersuasion.
Here the labors of the philosophical mountain have only produced a dreary
Philistine mouse. Ernst Bloch, the well known German antifascist writer (whose
book appeared in 1935), said of Heideggers death theory (from which Jaspers
personalmoralityisobtainedsimplybytheadditionofwater):Takingeternaldeath
as goal makes mans existing social situation a matter of such indifference that it
might as well remain capitalistic. The assertion of death as absolute fate and sole
destinationhasthesamesignificancefortodayscounterrevolutionasformerlythe
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consolationofthehereafterhad.Thiskeenobservationcastslighttooonthereason
why the popularity of existentialism is growing not only among snobs but also
amongreactionarywriters.
3.FreedominaFetishizedWorldandtheFetishofFreedom
Jeconstruisluniverselenmechoisissant.
Sartre:LExistentialismeestunhurnanisme.
Existentialism is the philosophy not only of death but also of abstract freedom.
This is the most important reason for the popularity of Sartres forms of
existentialism andalthough it may sound paradoxicalthe reactionary side of
existentialismspresentinfluenceishereconcealed.Heidegger,asweknow,sawthe
waytoexistencesbecomingessentialandrealonlyinalifedirectedtowarddeath
SartresshrewdcommentsputanendtothespeciousprobativenessofHeideggers
exposition. This contradiction between Sartre and Heidegger is an expression not
merely of the divergent attitudes of French and German intellectuals toward the
central problems of life, but also of the changed times. Heideggers basic book
appeared in 1927, on the eve of the new world crisis, in the oppressed murky
atmospherebeforethefasciststormandtheeffectBlochdescribedwasthegeneral
state of intellectuals. We do not know when Sartres book appeared the nominal
dateis1943thatis,whenliberationfromfascismwasalreadyinsightandwhen,
just because of the decadelong rule of fascism, the longing for freedom was the
deepestfeelingoftheintellectualsofallEurope,especiallyofcountrieswherethey
had grown up in democratic traditions. The inner experience above all, in the
Westerncountrieswasoneoffreedomingeneral,abstractly,withoutanalysisor
differentiation,inbrieffreedomasmyth,whichpreciselybecauseofitsformlessness
wasabletouniteunderitsflagallenemiesoffascism,who(whatevertheirpointof
view)hatedtheiroriginortheirgoal.Onlyonethingmatteredtothesemen,tosay
Notofascism.ThelessspecifictheNowas,thebetteritexpressedthefeelingof
actuality. The abstract No and its pendant, abstract freedom, were to many men
theexactexpressionofthemythoftheresistance.WeshallseethatSartresnotion
offreedomismostabstract.Thisenablesustounderstandwhythesenseofthetime
exaltedexistentialismandyieldedtoitasadequatephilosophyoftheday.
However, fascism collapsed, and the construction and reenforcement of
democracy and free life engaged the public opinion of every country as its first
concern. Every serious argument, from politics to Weltanschauung, revolves now
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aroundthequestionofwhatthedemocracyandfreedomshouldbewhichmankind
isbuildingontheruinsoffascistdestruction.
Existentialismhaskeptitspopularityunderthesechangedcircumstancesindeed,
itwouldseemthatitisnowforthefirsttimetobesure,inSartresformulation,
notHeideggersontheroadtoworldconquest.Onedecisivefactorhereisthefact
thatexistentialismgivesthenotionoffreedomacentralplaceinitsphilosophy.But
todayfreedomisnolongeramyth.Thestrivingsforfreedomhavebecomeconcrete,
more and more concrete every day. Violent disputes over the interpretation of
freedom and democracy have split the supporters of the various schools into
antagonisticcamps.Undersuchcircumstanceshowisitpossiblethatexistentialism,
withitsrigid,abstractconceptionoffreedom,shouldbecomeaworldwidetrend?Or
more precisely, whom, and how, does existentialism carry conviction as a
philosophy of freedom? To answer this central question, we must come to closer
gripswithSartresconceptoffreedom.
Accordingtohim,freedomisabasicfactofhumanexistence.Werepresent,says
Sartre,freedomwhichchooses,butwecouldnotchoosetobefree.Wearedoomed
tofreedom.Wearethrownintofreedom(HeideggersGeworfenheit).
Not choosing, however, is just as much choice as choosing is avoiding action is
actiontoo.EverywhereSartrestressesthisroleoffreedom,fromthemostprimitive
factsofeverydaylifetotheultimatequestionsofmetaphysics.WhenItakepartina
groupexcursion,gettired,amweigheddownbymypack,andsoforth,Iamfaced
with the fact of free choice, and must decide whether I will go on with my
companions or throw off my burden and sit down by the roadside. From this
problemthewayleadstothefinal,mostabstractproblemsofhumanexistencein
the plans or projects in which man concretizes his free decision and free choice
(projet, projeter isoneofthemostimportantnotionsofSartrestheoryoffreedom)
thereliesthecontentoftheultimateideal,thelastproject:God.InSartreswords:
Thebasicplanofhumanrealityisbestillustratedbythefactthatmanisthebeing
whoseplanitistobecomeGod....Beingamanisequivalenttobeingengagedin
becomingGod.AndthephilosophicalcontentofthisidealofGodistheattainment
ofthatstageofexistencewhichtheoldphilosophydenotedascausa sui.
Sartresnotionoffreedomisextremelybroadandindeterminate,lackingspecific
criteria. Choice, the essence of freedom, consists for him in the act of choosing
oneself. The constant danger lurking here is that we could become other than we
are. And here there is no moral compass or plumb line. For instance, cowardice
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stemsfromfreechoicejustasmuchascouragedoes.Myfearisfreeandattestsmy
freedomIhavecastallmyfreedomintomyfearandchosenmyselfascowardlyin
such and such circumstances in other circumstances I might exist as courageous
and put my freedom into courage. With respect to freedom, no ideal has any
precedence.
SinceforSartreallhumanexistenceisfreebydefinition,hisnotionoffreedomis
evenmoreindefinitethanthatofHeidegger.Heideggercoulddifferentiatebetween
the free and the unfree. For him, that man is free who programmatically lives
toward his own death unfree and unauthentic, he who, forgetting his own death,
livesnotasaselfbutinthecrowd.Sartrerejectsthiscriterion,aswehaveseen.He
alsorejectssuchahierarchyofmoralvaluesasSchelerhadconceived,aswellasany
connection of free choice with mans past, viz., the principle of continuity and
consistencyofpersonality.Finally,hedeniestheKantianformaldistinctionbetween
freeandunfreeacts.
Heseems,itistrue,tobesomewhatfrightenedbythisindeterminateness.Inhis
popular pamphlet he says, Nothing can be good for us which is not good for
everyone,andinanotherplace:Atthe sametimethatIwillmyownfreedomitis
mydutytowillthefreedomofothers.IcannotsetmyownfreedomasgoalunlessI
alsosetthatofothersasmygoal.Thissoundsveryfine.ButinSartreitisonlyan
eclectic insertion into existentialism, of the moral principles of the Enlightenment
andtheKantianphilosophy.Kantdidnotsucceedinestablishingobjectivemorality
by generalizing subjectivity. The young Hegel, in a sharp critique, showed this
failure.However,Kantsgeneralizationstillstandsinintimateconnectionwiththe
first principles of his social philosophy in Sartre, this generalization is an eclectic
compromise with traditional philosophical opinion, contradicting his ontological
position.
Inhiscapitalworkhedoesnotmaketheseconcessions.Truetohisbasicthought,
ontological solipsism, the content and goal of the free act are meaningful and
explicableonlyfromthepointofviewofthesubject.HereSartrestillstatesaview
opposite to that of his popular brochure: Respect for the freedom of ones fellow
manisidlechatter:evenifwecouldsoplanthatwehonoredthisfreedom,suchan
attitudewouldbeaviolationofthefreedomwhichweweresobusyrespecting.In
the same place he illustrates this conception by a very concrete example: When I
bring about tolerance among my fellow men I have forcibly hurled them into a
tolerant world. In so doing I have in principle taken away their free capacity for
courageousresistance,forperseverance,forselftesting,whichtheywouldhavehad
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theopportunityofdevelopinginsomeworldofintolerance.
Thiscynicalviewthattherearenounfreeactshassignificantresemblancetothe
viewthattherearenofreeacts.WhileevenHeideggerknewthatwecanspeakofa
freeactonlyifmaniscapableofbeingcoercedaswell,Sartredoesnotknowthis.
Like the determinist, Sartre reduces human phenomena to one level. But
determinismisatleastasystem,verifiableinpart,whereasSartresfreeactsarea
disconnected,fortuitousconglomeration.
What is the legitimate factor in Sartre? Without question, the emphasis on the
individuals decision, whose importance was undervalued alike by bourgeois
determinismandbyvulgarMarxism.Allsocialactivityismadeupoftheactionsof
individuals, and no matter how decisive the economic basis may be in these
decisions,itseffectsarefeltonlyinthelongrun,asEngelssooftenstresses.This
means that there is always a concrete area of free choice for the individual, which
does not conflict with the feet that history has its general and necessary trends of
development.Themereexistenceofpoliticalpartiesprovestherealityofthisarea.
The main directions of development can be foreseen but, as Engels stressed, it
would be idle pedantry to try to foretell from the laws of evolution whether in a
givencasePeterorPaulwillindividuallydecidethiswayorthat,voteforthisparty
ortheother,andsoforth.Thenecessityofevolutionisalwayseffectedbymeansof
internal and external contingencies. It would be a service to science to show their
significanceandstudytheirplaceandrole,ifatthesametimetheirmethodological
meaning in the whole dialectical process were more precisely determined than
formerly.Inthissensearolewhichshouldnotbeunderestimatedattachestomoral
problems and questions of freedom and individual decision in the total dialectical
knowledgeofsocialdevelopment.
Sartre, to be sure, does exactly the opposite. We have seen that, as has been
fashionable for decades, he denies necessary development and even development
itself.Eveninthecaseofindividualshedivorcesdecisionsituationsfromthepast.
Hedeniesanygenuineconnectionoftheindividualwithsociety.Heconstruesthe
individualsworldascompletelydifferentfromthatofhisfellowmen.Thenotionof
freedomthusobtainedisfatalisticandstrainedinamechanicalwayitthuslosesall
meaning.Ifwelookatitalittlemoreclosely,ithasvirtuallynoconnectionwiththe
actual moral concept of freedom. It says no more than what Engels said in an
occasional remark namely, that there is no human activity in which individual
consciousnesscouldnotplayapart.
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Obviously Sartre himself sees the difficulty of his notion of freedom. But he
remainsfaithfultohismethod,andbusieshimselfwithbalancingoneoverstrained
and meaningless conception against another: freedom against responsibility, the
latterbeingforSartrejustasuniversalandunconditionallyvalidastheconceptof
freedom. If I choose to join the army instead of to die or suffer dishonor, that is
equivalenttotakingtheentireresponsibilityforthiswar.
Hereagaintheformallogicaloverstrainingofarelativetruthfactorleadstothe
theoretical and practical annihilation of the concept in question. For so rigid a
formulationofresponsibilityisidenticalwithcompleteirresponsibility.Wedidnot
need to be politicians or Marxists to see that. A master of the psychology of
depths, Dostoevsky, often said that extreme rigid forcing of moral principles and
moraldecisionsgenerallyhasnoinfluenceonmensactions.Theysweepoverhead,
andthemenwhoactonthemhaveweakermoralguidancethanwouldbethecaseif
they had no principles at all. In the shadow of the rigorous pitiless feeling of
responsibility, extending to the point of suicide, it is easy to commit one villainy
afteranotherwithfrivolouscynicism.
Sartreseessomethingofallthis,butwithoutdrawinganyconclusionsfromit.So
he weaves fetishes and myths around the problem he vaguely discerns, and
concludes with the trivial phrase: Any one who in anguish (angoisse has been a
decisive category of existentialism since the Kierkegaardian Reception) realizes
thathisconditionoflifeisthatofbeingthrownintoaresponsibilitywhichleadsto
completeisolation:thatmanknowsnomoreremorse,regret,orselfjustification.
Just as the sublime is but a step from the ridiculous, so a certain kind of moral
sublimityisonlyastepfromfrivolityandcynicism.
ItwasnecessaryforustoelaboratethussharplyonthebankruptcyoftheSartrean
conceptoffreedombecausethisispreciselythekeytothewidespreadeffectiveness
of the doctrine in certain circles. Such an abstract, forced, totally vacuous and
irrationalizedconceptionoffreedomandresponsibility,thehaughtyscornforsocial
viewpointsandpubliclifeusedtodefendtheontologicalintegrityoftheindividual
alladequatelyroundsoutthemythofnothingness,especiallyfortherequirements
ofsnobs:fortheymustbeparticularlyimpressedwiththemixtureofcruellystrict
principle with cynical looseness of action and moral nihilism. But in addition this
conceptionoffreedomgivesacertainsectionofintellectuals,alwaysinclinedtoward
extreme individualism, an ideological support and justification for refusing the
unfolding and building of democracy. There have been writers who, calling
themselves democrats, under took to defend the rights of the black market and of
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thesabotagingandswindlingcapitalist,allinthenameofindividualfreedom,and
whocarriedtheprinciplesofarthatroomisfoundforthefreedomofreactionand
fascism responsibility has been the slogan in whose name the attempt was first
made to block the registration of the new owners land and later to call for their
return.Sartresabstractandstrainedconceptionoffreedomandresponsibilitywas
justwhattheseforcescoulduse.
Sartres hooks do not give us the impression that he exactly desires to be the
ideologist of these groups and certainly there are genuine and sincere democrats
amonghisFrenchsupporters.Butlargescalefashionspaylittleheedtotheinternal
intentions of their authors. The various currents of society have their own
ideological requirements, and say with Moliere, je prends mon bien o je le
trouve.So,notonlysnobbishnessbutreactiontoomanagestocookitsbrothatthe
fireofexistentialism.Thisisonemorereasonforustopointoutthattheacquisition
of existentialism is no Promethean deed, no theft of celestial fire, but rather the
commonplace action of using the lighted cigarette of a chance passerby to light
onesown.
This is no accident, but follows from the very nature of the phenomenological
methodandfromtheontologywhichgrowsoutofit.Themethodisfarfrombeing
as original as its apostles would like to believe. For, no matter how arbitrary the
transitionmaybefrombracketedrealitytoallegedlygenuineobjectivereality,the
merepossibilityofthetransitionstillhasitsphilosophicalroots,thoughthispoint
never is consciously formulated by the ontologists. This basis is essentially that of
thedominanttheoryofknowledgeinthenineteenthcenturynamely,theKantian.
Kantsclearformulationhadthecogencyworthyofaseriousphilosopher:existence
does not signify enrichment of the content of objectivity, and hence not formal
enrichmenteitherthecontentofthethoughtofdollarisexactlythesameasthatof
the real dollar. The existence of the object means neither novelty nor enrichment,
whether with respect to content or to structure of the concept. Clearly, therefore,
whentheontologistsbracketthethoughtofobjectandthenclearthebrackets,
theytacitlyassumethisKantianconception.
The notion appears quite obvious the only thing wrong with it is that it is not
true. The Kantian idealism unconsciously borrowed from mechanical materialism
theidentityofthestructureandcontentofthethoughtofandtheactualobject.The
real dialectic of objective reality, however, shows at every step that existence
enriches the thoughtof object with elements which are conceptually new with
respecttocontentandstructure.Thisconsequencefollowsnotonlyfromthevirtual
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infinityofeveryactualobject,asaresultofwhichthemostcompletethoughtisonly
an approximation, i.e. the object of ontology is even in principle richer in content
and therefore of richer, more complicated structure than the phenomenological
objectofmereconsciousness.Andthisisaconsequenceaswelloftheextensionally
andintensionallyinfiniteVerflochtenheit (interrelatedness)ofrealobjects,inwhich
thereciprocalactionoftheirrelationschangestheobjectsfunctionsandthenreacts
on their objectivity. In this context mere existence, the brute fact, becomes under
certaincircumstancesoneofthecharactersandchangestheconceptofobjectivity,
with respect to content and structure. Let us consider the theory of money, to
continue with Kants example. So long as we speak of money as a medium of
circulation, we might still assume that thoughtof money is identical with real
money(althoughweshouldbewrongevenhere).Buttheveryconceptofmoneyasa
medium of payment implies existence there is present in this case a conceptual
difference between the thoughtof dollar and the real one, a difference which
constitutes a new category. Only the actual dollar, in ones possession, can be a
meansofpayment.Moneyinitselfisnotenoughwemusthave ittoo.
Modern ontology bypasses these considerations, not unintentionally. The
isolating intuition of the isolated individual in this connection it is immaterial
whetherhisinterestisdirectedtowardtheobject,fixedinitsrigidity,ortowardthe
changefulnessofthoughtliftseveryobjectoutofthecomplexandlivingfabricof
its existence, functions, relations, interactions, etc., dissolving it out of the real,
living,movingtotality.Theoriginalachievementofphenomenologyandontology
inthisfieldconsistsmerelyinthefactthatitdogmaticallyidentifiesrealitywiththe
objectivityithasthusobtained.Forthem,objectivityandobjectiverealitymeanone
andthesamething.
1.Wissenschaft als Philosophie,Zurich,1945.
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There is no reasonable doubt that existentialism will soon become the

An epochmaking philosophy has never yet arisen without a really original

1.Wissenschaft als Philosophie,Zurich,1945.

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