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GENERAL PRINCIPLES
BERNABE vs. ALEJO
A VESTED RIGHT is defined as one which is absolute,
complete and unconditional, to the exercise of which no
obstacle exists, and which is immediate and perfect in
itself and not dependent upon a contingency.
Respondent however contends that the filing of an action
for recognition is procedural in nature and that as a
general rule, no vested right may attach to [or] arise from
procedural laws.
SUBSTANTIVE LAW creates SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS
and the two terms in this respect may be said to be
synonymous. SUBSTANTIVE RIGHTS is a term which
includes those rights which one enjoys under the legal
system prior to the disturbance of normal relations.
SUBSTANTIVE LAW is that part of the law which
creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates
the rights and duties which give rise to a cause of action;
that part of the law which courts are established to
administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law,
which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or
obtains redress for their invasion.
In determining whether a rule prescribed by the
Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of the
lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any
substantive right, the test is whether the rule really
regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for
enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive
law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a
disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes away a
vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a
right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a
substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of
implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely
with procedure.
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GO vs. UCPB
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The amount of judgment obtained by the defendantappellee on appeal cannot exceed the jurisdiction of the
court in which the action began. Since the trial court did
not acquire jurisdiction over the defendant's counterclaim
in excess of the jurisdictional amount, the appellate
court, likewise, acquired no jurisdiction over the same by
its decisions or otherwise. Appellate jurisdiction being
not only a continuation of the exercise of the same
judicial power which has been executed in the court of
original jurisdiction, also presupposes that the original
and appellate courts are capable of participating in the
exercise of the same judicial power.
When court transcends the limits prescribed for it by law
and assumes to act where it has no jurisdiction, its
adjudications will be utterly void and of no effect either
as an estoppel or otherwise.
FLORES vs. MALLARE-PHILLIPS
In cases where a plaintiff sues a defendant on two or
more separate causes of action, the amount of the
demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the
causes of action irrespective of whether the causes of
action arose out of the same or different transactions. If
the total demand exceeds P20,000, then the RTC has
jurisdiction. If the causes of action are separate and
independent, their joinder in one complaint is
permissive and not mandatory, and any cause of action
where the amount of the demand is P20,000 or less may
be the subject of a separate complaint filed with a MTC.
Where two or more plaintiffs having separate causes of
action against a defendant join in a single complaint, the
TOTALITY RULE is applicable, as well as to cases
where a plaintiff has separate causes of action against
two or more defendants joined in a single complaint.
However, the causes of action in favor of the two or
more plaintiffs or against the two or more defendants
should arise out of the same transaction or series of
transactions and there should be a common question of
law or fact, as provided in 6 of Rule 3 [Compliance with
Rules of Joinder].
In cases of permissive joinder of parties, whether as
plaintiffs or as defendants, under 6 of Rule 3, the total
of all the claims shall now furnish the jurisdictional test.
Needless to state also, if instead of joining or being
joined in one complaint separate actions are filed by or
against the parties, the amount demanded in each
complaint shall furnish the jurisdictional test.
PANTRANCO vs. BUNCAN
Permissive joinder of parties requires that: (a) the right to
relief arises out of the same transaction or series of
transactions; (b) there is a question of law or fact
common to all the plaintiffs or defendants; and (c) such
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Not all government entities, whether corporate or noncorporate, are immune from suits. Immunity from suits is
determined by the character of the objects for which the
entity was organized. Suits against State agencies with
relation to matters in which they have assumed to act in
private or non-governmental capacity, and various suits
against certain corporations created by the state for
public purposes, but to engage in matters partaking
more of the nature of ordinary business rather than
functions of a governmental or political character, are not
regarded as suits against the state.
ATO, as an agency of the Government not performing a
purely governmental or sovereign function, but was
instead involved in the management and maintenance of
the Loakan Airport, an activity that was not the exclusive
prerogative of the State in its sovereign capacity. Hence,
the ATO had no claim to the State's immunity from suit.
AMERICAN EXPRESS vs. SANTIAGO
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be presumed that the signatory knew that his copetitioners had the same or similar actions filed or
pending.
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While the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the res, its
jurisdiction is limited to a rendition of judgment on
the res. It cannot extend its jurisdiction beyond
the res and issue a judgment enforcing petitioners
personal liability. In doing so without first having
acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner, as it
did, the trial court violated her constitutional right to due
process, warranting the annulment of the judgment
rendered in the case.
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MACASAET VS. CO
To warrant the substituted service of the summons and
copy of the complaint, the serving officer must first
attempt to effect the same upon the defendant in person.
Only after the attempt at personal service has become
futile or impossible within a reasonable time may the
officer resort to substituted service.
Nonetheless, the requisite showing of the impossibility of
prompt personal service as basis for resorting to
substituted service may be waived by the defendant
either expressly or impliedly.
HSBC LTD. vs. CATALAN
For purposes of the rule on summons, the fact of doing
business must first be "established by appropriate
allegations in the complaint" and the court in determining
such fact need not go beyond the allegations therein.
NM ROTHSCHILD vs. LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED
Breaking down Section 15, Rule 14, it is apparent that
there are only four instances wherein a defendant
who is a non-resident and is not found in the
country may be served with summons by
extraterritorial service, to wit: (1) when the action
affects the personal status of the plaintiffs; (2) when the
action relates to, or the subject of which is property,
within the Philippines, in which the defendant claims a
lien or an interest, actual or contingent; (3) when the
relief demanded in such action consists, wholly or in
part, in excluding the defendant from any interest in
property located in the Philippines; and (4) when the
defendant non-resident's property has been attached
within the Philippines. In these instances, service of
summons may be effected by (a) personal service out of
the country, with leave of court; (b) publication, also with
leave of court; or (c) any other manner the court may
deem sufficient.
MONTEFALCON vs. VASQUEZ
As an overseas seafarer, Vasquez was a Filipino
resident temporarily out of the country. Hence, service of
summons on him is governed by 16 of Rule 14. Since
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Under 15 of Rule 14, a defendant who is a NONRESIDENT and is not found in the country may be
served with summons by extraterritorial service in four
instances: (1) when the action affects the personal
status of the plaintiff; (2) when the action relates to, or
the subject of which is property within the Philippines, in
which the defendant has or claims a lien or interest,
actual or contingent; (3) when the relief demanded
consists, wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant
from any interest in property located in the Philippines;
or (4) when the property of the defendant has been
attached within the Philippines.
In these instances, extraterritorial service of summons
may be effected under any of three modes: (1) by
personal service out of the country, with leave of court;
(2) by publication and sending a copy of the summons
and order of the court by registered mail to the
defendants last known address, also with leave of court;
or (3) by any other means the judge may consider
sufficient.
BUSUEGO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
Specification in the sheriff's return is essential for
enforcement of the rule under the Revised Rules of
Court that substituted service may be resorted to only
where it is not possible to serve the defendant or
defendants promptly in person.
PINLAC vs. COURT OF APPEALS
While the service of summons by publication may have
been done with the approval of the trial court, it does not
cure the fatal defect that the "Metropolitan Newsweek" is
not a newspaper of general circulation in Quezon City
.The Rules strictly require that publication must be "in a
newspaper of general circulation and in such places and
for such time as the court may order." The court orders
relied upon by petitioners did not specify the place and
the length of time that the summons was to be
published. In the absence of such specification,
publication in just any periodical does not satisfy
the strict requirements of the rules. The incomplete
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Hawaiian
Sugar
Company
v.
Pioneer
Insurance,9 wherein the Court noted that while 6
disallowed a preliminary hearing of affirmative
defenses once a motion to dismiss has been filed,
such hearing could nonetheless be had if the trial
court had NOT categorically resolved the motion to
dismiss.
The
DOCTRINE
OF RES
JUDICATA has
two
aspects.15 The first, known as "bar by prior judgment,"
or "estoppel by verdict," is the effect of a judgment as
a bar to the prosecution of a second action upon the
same claim, demand or cause of action. The second,
known as "conclusiveness of judgment" or otherwise
known as the rule of auter action pendant, ordains that
issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit
cannot again be raised in any future case between the
same parties involving a different cause of action. 16 It
has the effect of preclusion of issues only.
TAN vs. TAN
As for the applicability to petitioners motion to dismiss of
7 of the Rule on the Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages,
petitioner is correct. 7 of the Rule on the Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages provides: 7. Motion to dismiss.
No motion to dismiss the petition shall be allowed except
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter or over the parties; provided, however, that any
other ground that might warrant a dismissal of the case
may be raised as an affirmative defense in an answer.
The clear intent of the provision is to allow the
respondent to ventilate all possible defenses in an
answer, instead of a mere motion to dismiss, so that
judgment may be made on the merits. In construing a
statute, the purpose or object of the law is an important
factor to be considered. Further, the letter of the law
admits of no other interpretation but that the
provision applies only to a respondent, not a
petitioner. Only a respondent in a petition for the
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage or the
annulment of voidable marriage files an answer where
any ground that may warrant a dismissal may be raised
as an affirmative defense pursuant to the provision. The
only logical conclusion is that 7 of the Rule does not
apply to a motion to dismiss filed by the party who
initiated the petition for the declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage or the annulment of voidable
marriage.
Since petitioner is not the respondent in the
petition for the annulment of the marriage, 7 of the Rule
does not apply to the motion to dismiss filed by her.
ALDERSGATE COLLEGE vs. GAUUAN
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when the 7 July 1971 suit for injunction was filed, the
latter was correctly dismissed. Accordingly, there could
be no prior judgment on the merits to speak of that
resulted in res judicata, from such dismissal of the
injunction suit.
A dismissal order is generally deemed to be without
prejudice to the filing of another action. The only
instance when dismissal of an action is with
prejudice is, when the order itself so states. Stated
differently, when the court issues, upon the plaintiff's
instance, a dismissal order that is silent as to
whether it is with or without prejudice, such as in the
case at bar, the presumption is, that it is without
prejudice. Dismissals of actions (under 3) which do
not expressly state whether they are with or without
prejudice are held to be with prejudice or on the
merits.
SAMSON vs. FIEL-MACARAIG
After the last pleading has been served and filed, it shall
be the duty of the plaintiff to promptly move ex
parte that the case be set for pre-trial.
If, for no justifiable cause, the plaintiff fails to appear
on the date of the presentation of his evidence in chief
on the complaint, or to prosecute his action for an
unreasonable length of time, or to comply with these
Rules or any order of the court, the complaint may
be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon
the courts own motion, without prejudice to the right of
the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same
or in a separate action. This dismissal shall have the
effect of an adjudication upon the merits, unless
otherwise declared by the court.
ELOISA MERCHANDISING vs. TREBEL INTL
Under 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
as amended, the failure on the part of the plaintiff,
without any justifiable cause, to comply with any order of
the court or the Rules, or to prosecute his action for an
unreasonable length of time, may result in the dismissal
of the complaint either motu proprio or on motion by the
defendant. The failure of a plaintiff to prosecute the
action without any justifiable cause within a reasonable
period of time will give rise to the presumption that he is
no longer interested to obtain from the court the relief
prayed for in his complaint; hence, the court is
authorized to order the dismissal of the complaint on its
own motion or on motion of the defendants. The
presumption is not, by any means, conclusive because
the plaintiff, on a motion for reconsideration of the order
of dismissal, may allege and establish a justifiable cause
for such failure. The burden to show that there are
compelling reasons that would make a dismissal of the
case unjustified is on the petitioners.
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