Chernobyl Accident 1986

(Updated April 2015)

The Chernobyl accident in 1986 was the result of a flawed reactor

design that was operated with inadequately trained personnel.

The resulting steam explosion and fires released at least 5% of the

radioactive reactor core into the atmosphere and downwind some
5200 PBq (I-131 eq).

Two Chernobyl plant workers died on the night of the accident, and
a further 28 people died within a few weeks as a result of acute
radiation poisoning.

UNSCEAR says that apart from increased thyroid cancers, "there is

no evidence of a major public health impact attributable to radiation
exposure 20 years after the accident."

Resettlement of areas from which people were relocated is ongoing.

In 2011 Chernobyl was officially declared a tourist attraction.

The April 1986 disaster at the Chernobyla nuclear power plant in Ukraine was
the product of a flawed Soviet reactor design coupled with serious mistakes
made by the plant operatorsb. It was a direct consequence of Cold War
isolation and the resulting lack of any safety culture.
The accident destroyed the Chernobyl 4 reactor, killing 30 operators and
firemen within three months and several further deaths later. One person
was killed immediately and a second died in hospital soon after as a result of
injuries received. Another person is reported to have died at the time from a
coronary thrombosisc. Acute radiation syndrome (ARS) was originally
diagnosed in 237 people on-site and involved with the clean-up and it was
later confirmed in 134 cases. Of these, 28 people died as a result of ARS
within a few weeks of the accident. Nineteen more subsequently died
between 1987 and 2004 but their deaths cannot necessarily be attributed to
radiation exposured. Nobody off-site suffered from acute radiation effects
although a large proportion of childhood thyroid cancers diagnosed since the
accident is likely to be due to intake of radioactive iodine falloutd.
Furthermore, large areas of Belarus, Ukraine, Russia and beyond were
contaminated in varying degrees. See also sections below and Chernobyl
Accident Appendix 2: Health Impacts.
The Chernobyl disaster was a unique event and the only accident in the
history of commercial nuclear power where radiation-related fatalities

occurrede. However, the design of the reactor is unique and in that respect
the accident is thus of little relevance to the rest of the nuclear industry
outside the then Eastern Bloc. However, it led to major changes in safety
culture and in industry cooperation, particularly between East and West
before the end of the Soviet Union. Former President Gorbachev said that the
Chernobyl accident was a more important factor in the fall of the Soviet
Union than Perestroika his program of liberal reform.
The Chernobyl site and plant
The Chernobyl Power Complex, lying about 130 km north of Kiev, Ukraine,
and about 20 km south of the border with Belarus, consisted of four nuclear
reactors of the RBMK-1000 design (see information page on RBMK Reactors),
units 1 and 2 being constructed between 1970 and 1977, while units 3 and 4
of the same design were completed in 1983. Two more RBMK reactors were
under construction at the site at the time of the accident. To the southeast of
the plant, an artificial lake of some 22 square kilometres, situated beside the
river Pripyat, a tributary of the Dniepr, was constructed to provide cooling
water for the reactors.
This area of Ukraine is described as Belarussian-type woodland with a low
population density. About 3 km away from the reactor, in the new city,
Pripyat, there were 49,000 inhabitants. The old town of Chornobyl, which had
a population of 12,500, is about 15 km to the southeast of the complex.
Within a 30 km radius of the power plant, the total population was between
115,000 and 135,000.

Source: OECD NEA

The RBMK-1000 is a Soviet-designed and built graphite moderated pressure
tube type reactor, using slightly enriched (2% U-235) uranium dioxide fuel. It
is a boiling light water reactor, with two loops feeding steam directly to the
turbines, without an intervening heat exchanger. Water pumped to the
bottom of the fuel channels boils as it progresses up the pressure tubes,
producing steam which feeds two 500 MWe turbines. The water acts as a
coolant and also provides the steam used to drive the turbines. The vertical
pressure tubes contain the zirconium alloy clad uranium dioxide fuel around
which the cooling water flows. The extensions of the fuel channels penetrate
the lower plate and the cover plate of the core and are welded to each. A
specially designed refuelling machine allows fuel bundles to be changed
without shutting down the reactor.
The moderator, whose function is to slow down neutrons to make them more
efficient in producing fission in the fuel, is graphite, surrounding the pressure
tubes. A mixture of nitrogen and helium is circulated between the graphite
blocks to prevent oxidation of the graphite and to improve the transmission
of the heat produced by neutron interactions in the graphite to the fuel
channel. The core itself is about 7 m high and about 12 m in diameter. In

each of the two loops, there are four main coolant circulating pumps, one of
which is always on standby. The reactivity or power of the reactor is
controlled by raising or lowering 211 control rods, which, when lowered into
the moderator, absorb neutrons and reduce the fission rate. The power
output of this reactor is 3200 MW thermal, or 1000 MWe. Various safety
systems, such as an emergency core cooling system, were incorporated into
the reactor design.
One of the most important characteristics of the RBMK reactor is that it it can
possess a 'positive void coefficient', where an increase in steam bubbles
('voids') is accompanied by an increase in core reactivity (see information
page on RBMK Reactors). As steam production in the fuel channels increases,
the neutrons that would have been absorbed by the denser water now
produce increased fission in the fuel. There are other components that
contribute to the overall power coefficient of reactivity, but the void
coefficient is the dominant one in RBMK reactors. The void coefficient
depends on the composition of the core a new RBMK core will have a
negative void coefficient. However, at the time of the accident at Chernobyl
4, the reactor's fuel burn-up, control rod configuration and power level led to
a positive void coefficient large enough to overwhelm all other influences on
the power coefficient.
The 1986 Chernobyl accident
On 25 April, prior to a routine shutdown, the reactor crew at Chernobyl 4
began preparing for a test to determine how long turbines would spin and
supply power to the main circulating pumps following a loss of main
electrical power supply. This test had been carried out at Chernobyl the
previous year, but the power from the turbine ran down too rapidly, so new
voltage regulator designs were to be tested.
A series of operator actions, including the disabling of automatic shutdown
mechanisms, preceded the attempted test early on 26 April. By the time that
the operator moved to shut down the reactor, the reactor was in an
extremely unstable condition. A peculiarity of the design of the control rods
caused a dramatic power surge as they were inserted into the reactor
(see Chernobyl Accident Appendix 1: Sequence of Events).

The interaction of very hot fuel with the cooling water led to fuel
fragmentation along with rapid steam production and an increase in
pressure. The design characteristics of the reactor were such that substantial
damage to even three or four fuel assemblies can and did result in the
destruction of the reactor. The overpressure caused the 1000 t cover plate of
the reactor to become partially detached, rupturing the fuel channels and
jamming all the control rods, which by that time were only halfway down.
Intense steam generation then spread throughout the whole core (fed by
water dumped into the core due to the rupture of the emergency cooling
circuit) causing a steam explosion and releasing fission products to the
atmosphere. About two to three seconds later, a second explosion threw out
fragments from the fuel channels and hot graphite. There is some dispute
among experts about the character of this second explosion, but it is likely to
have been caused by the production of hydrogen from zirconium-steam
reactions.
Two workers died as a result of these explosions. The graphite (about a
quarter of the 1200 tonnes of it was estimated to have been ejected) and
fuel became incandescent and started a number of firesf, causing the main
release of radioactivity into the environment. A total of about 14 EBq (14 x
1018 Bq) of radioactivity was released, over half of it being from biologicallyinert noble gases.*
*The figure of 5.2 EBq is also quoted, this being "iodine-131 equivalent" - 1.8
EBq iodine and 85 PBq Cs-137 multiplied by 40 due its longevity, and
ignoring the 6.5 EBq xenon-33 and some minor or short-lived nuclides.
About 200-300 tonnes of water per hour was injected into the intact half of
the reactor using the auxiliary feedwater pumps but this was stopped after
half a day owing to the danger of it flowing into and flooding units 1 and 2.
From the second to tenth day after the accident, some 5000 tonnes of boron,
dolomite, sand, clay and lead were dropped on to the burning core by
helicopter in an effort to extinguish the blaze and limit the release of
radioactive particles.

The damaged Chernobyl unit 4 reactor building

The 1991 report by the State Committee on the Supervision of Safety in
Industry and Nuclear Power on the root cause of the accident looked past the
operator actions. It said that while it was certainly true the operators placed
their reactor in a dangerously unstable condition (in fact in a condition which
virtually guaranteed an accident) it was also true that in doing so they had
not in fact violated a number of vital operating policies and principles, since
no such policies and principles had been articulated. Additionally, the
operating organisation had not been made aware either of the specific vital
safety significance of maintaining a minimum operating reactivity margin, or
the general reactivity characteristics of the RBMK which made low power
operation extremely hazardous.
Immediate impact of the Chernobyl accident
The accident caused the largest uncontrolled radioactive release into the
environment ever recorded for any civilian operation, and large quantities of
radioactive substances were released into the air for about 10 days. This
caused serious social and economic disruption for large populations in
Belarus, Russia and Ukraine. Two radionuclides, the short-lived iodine-131

and the long-lived caesium-137, were particularly significant for the radiation
dose they delivered to members of the public.
It is estimated that all of the xenon gas, about half of the iodine and
caesium, and at least 5% of the remaining radioactive material in the
Chernobyl 4 reactor core (which had 192 tonnes of fuel) was released in the
accident. Most of the released material was deposited close by as dust and
debris, but the lighter material was carried by wind over Ukraine, Belarus,
Russia and to some extent over Scandinavia and Europe.
The casualties included firefighters who attended the initial fires on the roof
of the turbine building. All these were put out in a few hours, but radiation
doses on the first day were estimated to range up to 20,000 millisieverts
(mSv), causing 28 deaths six of which were firemen by the end of July
1986.
The next task was cleaning up the radioactivity at the site so that the
remaining three reactors could be restarted, and the damaged reactor
shielded more permanently. About 200,000 people ('liquidators') from all
over the Soviet Union were involved in the
The effects of radiation
recovery and clean-up during 1986 and
exposure fall into two main
1987. They received high doses of
classes: deterministic effects,
radiation, averaging around 100
where the effect is certain to
millisieverts. Some 20,000 of them
occur under given conditions
received about 250 mSv and a few
(e.g. individuals exposed to
received 500 mSv. Later, the number of
several grays over a short
liquidators swelled to over 600,000 but
period of time will definitely
most of these received only low radiation
suffer Acute Radiation
doses. The highest doses were received by
Syndrome); and stochastic
about 1000 emergency workers and oneffects, where the effect may or
site personnel during the first day of the
may not occur (e.g. an increase
accident.
in radiation exposure may or
may not induce a cancer in a
Initial radiation exposure in contaminated
particular individual but if a
areas was due to short-lived iodine-131;
sufficiently large population
later caesium-137 was the main hazard.
receive a radiation exposure
(Both are fission products dispersed from
above a certain level, an
the reactor core, with half lives of 8 days
increase in the incidence of
and 30 years, respectively. 1.8 EBq of Icancer may become detectable
in that population). UNSCEAR,
2011.

131 and 0.085 EBq of Cs-137 were released.) About five million people lived
in areas of Belarus, Russia and Ukraine contaminated (above 37 kBq/m2 Cs137 in soil) and about 400,000 lived in more contaminated areas of strict
control by authorities (above 555 kBq/m2 Cs-137).
* supposedly correlating with 1 mSv/yr dose with continuous exposure. About
23% of Belarus was contaminated to this level, with 7% of Ukraine and 1.5%
of European Russia.
The plant operators' town of Pripyat was evacuated on 27 April (45,000
residents). By 14 May, some 116,000 people that had been living within a
30-kilometre radius had been evacuated and later relocated. About 1000 of
these returned unofficially to live within the contaminated zone. Most of
those evacuated received radiation doses of less than 50 mSv, although a
few received 100 mSv or more.
In the years following the accident, a further 220,000 people were resettled
into less contaminated areas, and the initial 30 km radius exclusion zone
(2800 km2) was modified and extended to cover 4300 square kilometres.
This resettlement was due to application of a criterion of 350 mSv projected
lifetime radiation dose, though in fact radiation in most of the affected area
(apart from half a square kilometre) fell rapidly so that average doses were
less than 50% above normal background of 2.5 mSv/yr. See also following
section on Resettlement.
Environmental and health effects of the Chernobyl accident
Several organisations have reported on the impacts of the Chernobyl
accident, but all have had problems assessing the significance of their
observations because of the lack of reliable public health information before
1986.
In 1989, the World Health Organization (WHO) first raised concerns that local
medical scientists had incorrectly attributed various biological and health
effects to radiation exposureg. Following this, the Government of the USSR
requested the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to coordinate an
international experts' assessment of accident's radiological, environmental
and health consequences in selected towns of the most heavily
contaminated areas in Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine. Between March 1990

and June 1991, a total of 50 field missions were conducted by 200 experts
from 25 countries (including the USSR), seven organisations, and 11
laboratories3 . In the absence of pre-1986 data, it compared a control
population with those exposed to radiation. Significant health disorders were
evident in both control and exposed groups, but, at that stage, none was
radiation related.

Paths of radiation exposureh

Subsequent studies in Ukraine, Russia and Belarus were based on national
registers of over one million people possibly affected by radiation. By 2000,
about 4000 cases of thyroid cancer had been diagnosed in exposed children.

However, the rapid increase in thyroid cancers detected suggests that some
of it at least is an artifact of the screening process. Thyroid cancer is usually
not fatal if diagnosed and treated early.
In February 2003, the IAEA established the Chernobyl Forum, in cooperation
with seven other UN organisations as well as the competent authorities of
Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine. In April 2005, the reports
prepared by two expert groups "Environment", coordinated by the IAEA,
and "Health", coordinated by WHO were intensively discussed by the Forum
and eventually approved by consensus. The conclusions of this 2005
Chernobyl Forum study (revised version published 2006i) are in line with
earlier expert studies, notably the UNSCEAR 2000 reportj which said that
"apart from this [thyroid cancer] increase, there is no evidence of a major
public health impact attributable to radiation exposure 14 years after the
accident. There is no scientific evidence of increases in overall cancer
incidence or mortality or in non-malignant disorders that could be related to
radiation exposure." As yet there is little evidence of any increase in
leukaemia, even among clean-up workers where it might be most expected.
However, these workers where high doses may have been received
remain at increased risk of cancer in the long term. Apart from these, the
United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation
(UNSCEAR) says that "the great majority of the population is not likely to
experience serious health consequences as a result of radiation from the
Chernobyl accident. Many other health problems have been noted in the
populations that are not related to radiation exposure."
The Chernobyl Forum report says that people in the area have suffered a
paralysing fatalism due to myths and misperceptions about the threat of
radiation, which has contributed to a culture of chronic dependency. Some
"took on the role of invalids." Mental health coupled with smoking and
alcohol abuse is a very much greater problem than radiation, but worst of all
at the time was the underlying level of health and nutrition. Apart from the
initial 116,000, relocations of people were very traumatic and did little to
reduce radiation exposure, which was low anyway. Psycho-social effects
among those affected by the accident are similar to those arising from other
major disasters such as earthquakes, floods and fires.
According to the most up-to-date estimate of UNSCEAR, the average
radiation dose due to the accident received by inhabitants of 'strict radiation

control' areas (population 216,000) in the years 1986 to 2005 was 31 mSv
(over the 20-year period), and in the 'contaminated' areas (population 6.4
million) it averaged 9 mSv, a minor increase over the dose due to
background radiation over the same period (about 50 mSv)4.
The numbers of deaths resulting from the accident are covered most fully in
the account of health effects is provided by an annex to the UNSCEAR 2008
report, released in 2011.5
Some exaggerated figures have been published regarding the death toll
attributable to the Chernobyl disaster. A publication by the UN Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)6 lent support to these. However,
the Chairman of UNSCEAR made it clear that "this report is full of
unsubstantiated statements that have no support in scientific assessments" k,
and the Chernobyl Forum report also repudiates them.
A particularly sad effect of the accident was that some physicians in Europe
advised pregnant women to undergo abortions on account of radiation
exposure, even though the levels concerned were vastly below those likely to
have teratogenic effects. The foetal death toll from this is likely very much
greater than directly from the accident.
UNSCEAR in 2011 concludes: In summary, the effects of the Chernobyl
accident are many and varied. Early deterministic effects can be attributed
to radiation with a high degree of certainty, while for other medical
conditions, radiation almost certainly was not the cause. In between, there
was a wide spectrum of conditions. It is necessary to evaluate carefully each
specific condition and the surrounding circumstances before attributing a
cause.5
Progressive closure of the Chernobyl plant
In the early 1990s, some US$400 million was spent on improvements to the
remaining reactors at Chernobyl, considerably enhancing their safety. Energy
shortages necessitated the continued operation of one of them (unit 3) until
December 2000. (Unit 2 was shut down after a turbine hall fire in 1991, and
unit 1 at the end of 1997.) Almost 6000 people worked at the plant every
day, and their radiation dose has been within internationally accepted limits.

A small team of scientists works within the wrecked reactor building itself,
inside the shelterl.
Workers and their families now live in a new town, Slavutich, 30 km from the
plant. This was built following the evacuation of Pripyat, which was just 3 km
away.
Ukraine depends upon, and is deeply in debt to, Russia for energy supplies,
particularly oil and gas, but also nuclear fuel. Although this dependence is
gradually being reduced, continued operation of nuclear power stations,
which supply half of total electricity, is now even more important than in
1986.
When it was announced in 1995 that the two operating reactors at Chernobyl
would be closed by 2000, a memorandum of understanding was signed by
Ukraine and G7 nations to progress this, but its implementation was
conspicuously delayed. Alternative generating capacity was needed, either
gas-fired, which has ongoing fuel cost and supply implications, or nuclear, by
completing Khmelnitski unit 2 and Rovno unit 4 ('K2R4') in Ukraine.
Construction of these was halted in 1989 but then resumed, and both
reactors came on line late in 2004, financed by Ukraine rather than
international grants as expected on the basis of Chernobyl's closure.
Chernobyl today
See Chernobyl website for details.
Unit 4 containment
Chernobyl unit 4 is now enclosed in a large concrete shelter which was
erected quickly (by October 1986) to allow continuing operation of the other
reactors at the plant. However, the structure is neither strong nor durable.
The international Shelter Implementation Plan in the 1990s involved raising
money for remedial work including removal of the fuel-containing materials.
Some major work on the shelter was carried out in 1998 and 1999. Some 200
tonnes of highly radioactive material remains deep within it, and this poses
an environmental hazard until it is better contained.

A New Safe Confinement (NSC) structure is due to be completed in 2017,

being built adjacent and then moved into place on rails. It is an arch 110
metres high, 165 metres long and spanning 260 metres, to cover both unit 4
and the hastily-built 1986 structure. The arch frame is a lattice construction
of tubular steel members, equipped with internal cranes. The design and
construction contract for this was signed in 2007 with the Novarka
consortium and preparatory work on site was completed in 2010.
Construction started in April 2012 and was expected to take four years. The
first half, weighing 12,800 tonnes, was moved 112 metres to a holding area
in front of unit 4 in April 2014. The second half was completed by the end of
2014 and will now be joined to the first. Cladding, cranes and remote
handling equipment are being fitted in 2015. The entire 31,000 tonne
structure will then be moved 330 metres into position over the reactor
building early in 2017, and end walls added. Final delivery of the project is
expected in November 2017.
The hermetically sealed building will allow engineers to remotely dismantle
the 1986 structure that has shielded the remains of the reactor from the
weather since the weeks after the accident. It will enable the eventual
removal of materials containing nuclear fuel and accommodate their
characterisation, compaction and packing for disposal. This task represents
the most important step in eliminating nuclear hazard at the site and the
real start of dismantling. The NSC will facilitate remote handling of these
dangerous materials, using as few personnel as possible. During peak
construction of the NSC some 1200 workers were on site. The NSC is largest
moveable land-based structure ever built.
The Chernobyl Shelter Fund, set up in 1997, had received 864 million from
international donors by early 2011 towards this project and previous work. It
and the Nuclear Safety Account, set up in 1993, are managed by the
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). The NSA had
received 321 million by early 2011 for Chernobyl decommissioning and also
for projects in other ex-Soviet countries. The total cost of the new shelter is
estimated to be 1.5 billion. In November 2014 the EBRD said the overall
2.15 billion Shelter Implementation Plan including the NSC had received
contributions from 43 governments but still had a funding shortfall of 615
million. The following month the EBRD made an additional contribution of
350 million in anticipation of a 165 million contribution by the

G7/European Commission, which was confirmed in April 2015. This left a

balance of 100 million to come from non-G7 donors, and 15 million of this
was confirmed in April 2015.

Chernobyl New Safe Confinement (Image: EBRD)

Used fuel and wastes
Used fuel from units 1-3 is stored in each unit's cooling pond, and in a small
interim spent fuel storage facility pond (ISF-1). A few damaged assemblies
remained in units 1&2 in 2013.
In 1999, a contract was signed with Framatome (now Areva) for construction
of a radioactive waste management facility to store 25,000 used fuel
assemblies from units 1-3 and other operational wastes, as well as material
from decommissioning units 1-3 (which are the first RBMK units
decommissioned anywhere). The contract included a processing facility, able
to cut the RBMK fuel assemblies and to put the material in canisters, which
would be filled with inert gas and welded shut. They would then be
transported to dry storage vaults in which the fuel containers would be
enclosed for up to 100 years. This facility, treating 2500 fuel assemblies per
year, would be the first of its kind for RBMK fuel.
However, after a significant part of the ISF-1 dry storage facility had been
built, technical deficiencies in the concept emerged in 2003, and the contract
was terminated amicably in 2007. Some further work on the structure has
taken place since, but EBRD says that the licence for ISF-1 is unlikely to be

renewed after 2016. It currently holds much of the spent fuel from units 1-3,
and was to hold all of it by the end of 2013. Most of the fuel assemblies are
straightforward to handle, but about 50 are damaged and require special
handling.
Holtec International became the contractor in September 2007 for new
interim spent nuclear fuel storage facility (ISF-2 or SNF SF-2) now being built
for the state-owned Chernobyl NPP. Design approval and funding from
EBRD's Nuclear Safety Account was confirmed in October 2010. The facility
will accommodate 21,217 RBMK fuel assemblies in dry storage for a 100-year
service life. It was licensed in March 2013, allowing stage 2 to proceed to
2015, with completion expected in 2018. The works are being carried out by
Ukrainian companies UTEM-Engineering (principal contractor) and
Ukrtransbud.
In April 2009, Nukem handed over a turnkey waste treatment centre for solid
radioactive waste (ICSRM, Industrial Complex for Radwaste Management). In
May 2010, the State Nuclear Regulatory Committee licensed the
commissioning of this facility, where solid low- and intermediate-level wastes
accumulated from the power plant operations and the decommissioning of
reactor blocks 1 to 3 is conditioned. The wastes are processed in three steps.
First, the solid radioactive wastes temporarily stored in bunkers is removed
for treatment. In the next step, these wastes, as well as those from
decommissioning reactor blocks 1-3, are processed into a form suitable for
permanent safe disposal. Low- and intermediate-level wastes are separated
into combustible, compactable, and non-compactable categories. These are
then subject to incineration, high-force compaction, and cementation
respectively. In addition, highly radioactive and long-lived solid waste is
sorted out for temporary separate storage. In the third step, the conditioned
solid waste materials are transferred to containers suitable for permanent
safe storage.
As part of this project, at the end of 2007, Nukem handed over an
Engineered Near Surface Disposal Facility for storage of short-lived
radioactive waste after prior conditioning. It is 17 km away from the power
plant, at the Vektor complex within the 30-km zone. The storage area is
designed to hold 55,000 m3 of treated waste which will be subject to
radiological monitoring for 300 years, by when the radioactivity will have
decayed to such an extent that monitoring is no longer required.

Another contract has been let for a Liquid Radioactive Waste Treatment
Plant, to handle some 35,000 cubic metres of low- and intermediate-level
liquid wastes at the site. This will need to be solidified and eventually buried
along with solid wastes on site.
The Central Spent Fuel Storage Facility (CSFSF) Project for Ukraines VVER
reactors is being built by Holtec International within the Chernobyl exclusion
area, between the resettled villages Staraya Krasnitsa, Buryakovka,
Chistogalovka and Stechanka, southeast of Chernobyl and not far from ISF-2.
This will not take any Chernobyl fuel, though it will become a part of the
common spent nuclear fuel management complex of the state-owned
company Chernobyl NPP.
Decommissioning
In January 2008, the Ukraine government announced a four-stage
decommissioning plan which incorporated the above waste activities and
progresses towards a cleared site.
In February 2014 a new stage of this was approved for units 1-3, involving
dismantling some equipment and putting them into safstor condition by
2028. Then, to 2046, further equipment will be removed, and by 2064 they
will be demolished.
See also official website.
Resettlement of contaminated areas
In the last two decades there has been some resettlement of the areas
evacuated in 1986 and subsequently. Recently the main resettlement project
has been in Belarus.
In July 2010, the Belarus government announced that it had decided to settle
back thousands of people in the 'contaminated areas' covered by the
Chernobyl fallout, from which 24 years ago they and their forbears were
hastily relocated. Compared with the list of contaminated areas in 2005,
some 211 villages and hamlets had been reclassified with fewer restrictions
on resettlement. The decision by the Belarus Council of Ministers resulted in
a new national program over 2011-15 and up to 2020 to alleviate the

Chernobyl impact and return the areas to normal use with minimal
restrictions. The focus of the project is on the development of economic and
industrial potential of the Gomel and Mogilev regions from which 137,000
people were relocated.
The main priority is agriculture and forestry, together with attracting
qualified people and housing them. Initial infrastructure requirements will
mean the refurbishment of gas, potable water and power supplies, while the
use of local wood will be banned. Schools and housing will be provided for
specialist workers and their families ahead of wider socio-economic
development. Overall, some 21,484 dwellings are slated for connection to
gas networks in the period 2011-2015, while about 5600 contaminated or
broken down buildings are demolished. Over 1300 kilometres of road will be
laid, and ten new sewerage works and 15 pumping stations are planned. The
cost of the work was put at BYR 6.6 trillion ($2.2 billion), split fairly evenly
across the years 2011 to 2015 inclusive.
The feasibility of agriculture will be examined in areas where the presence of
caesium-137 and strontium-90 is low, "to acquire new knowledge in the
fields of radiobiology and radioecology in order to clarify the principles of
safe life in the contaminated territories." Land found to have too high a
concentration of radionuclides will be reforested and managed. A suite of
protective measures is to be set up to allow a new forestry industry whose
products would meet national and international safety standards. In April
2009, specialists in Belarus stressed that it is safe to eat all foods cultivated
in the contaminated territories, though intake of some wild food was
restricted.
Protective measures will be put in place for 498 settlements in the
contaminated areas where average radiation dose may exceed 1 mSv per
year. There are also 1904 villages with annual average effective doses from
the pollution between 0.1 mSv and 1 mSv. The goal for these areas is to
allow their re-use with minimal restrictions, although already radiation doses
there from the caesium are lower than background levels anywhere in the
world. The most affected settlements are to be tackled first, around 20112013, with the rest coming back in around 2014-2015.
The Belarus government decision was an important political landmark in an
ongoing process. Studies reviewed by UNSCEAR show that the Chernobyl

disaster caused little risk for the general population. A UN Development

Program report in 2002 said that much of the aid and effort applied to
mitigate the effects of the Chernobyl accident did more harm than good, and
it seems that this, along with the Chernobyl Forum report, finally persuaded
the Belarus authorities. In 2004 President Lukashenko announced a priority
to repopulate much of the Chernobyl-affected regions of Belarus, and then in
2009 he said that he wants to repopulate Chernobyls zone quickly.
In 2011 Chernobyl was officially declared a tourist attraction, with many
visitors.
What has been learned from the Chernobyl disaster?
Leaving aside the verdict of history on its role in melting the Soviet 'Iron
Curtain', some very tangible practical benefits have resulted from the
Chernobyl accident. The main ones concern reactor safety, notably in
eastern Europe. (The US Three Mile Island accident in 1979 had a significant
effect on Western reactor design and operating procedures. While that
reactor was destroyed, all radioactivity was contained as designed and
there were no deaths or injuries.)
While no-one in the West was under any illusion about the safety of early
Soviet reactor designs, some lessons learned have also been applicable to
Western plants. Certainly the safety of all Soviet-designed reactors has
improved vastly. This is due largely to the development of a culture of safety
encouraged by increased collaboration between East and West, and
substantial investment in improving the reactors.
Modifications have been made to overcome deficiencies in all the RBMK
reactors still operating. In these, originally the nuclear chain reaction and
power output could increase if cooling water were lost or turned to steam, in
contrast to most Western designs. It was this effect which led to the
uncontrolled power surge that led to the destruction of Chernobyl 4
(see Positive void coefficient section in the information page on RBMK
Reactors). All of the RBMK reactors have now been modified by changes in
the control rods, adding neutron absorbers and consequently increasing the
fuel enrichment from 1.8 to 2.4% U-235, making them very much more
stable at low power (see Post accident changes to the RBMK section in the
information page on RBMK Reactors). Automatic shut-down mechanisms now

operate faster, and other safety mechanisms have been improved.

Automated inspection equipment has also been installed. A repetition of the
1986 Chernobyl accident is now virtually impossible, according to a German
nuclear safety agency report7.
Since 1989, over 1000 nuclear engineers from the former Soviet Union have
visited Western nuclear power plants and there have been many reciprocal
visits. Over 50 twinning arrangements between East and West nuclear plants
have been put in place. Most of this has been under the auspices of the
World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO), a body formed in 1989
which links 130 operators of nuclear power plants in more than 30 countries
(see also information page on Cooperation in the Nuclear Power Industry).
Many other international programmes were initiated following Chernobyl. The
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safety review projects for each
particular type of Soviet reactor are noteworthy, bringing together operators
and Western engineers to focus on safety improvements. These initiatives
are backed by funding arrangements. The Nuclear Safety Assistance
Coordination Centre database lists Western aid totalling almost US$1 billion
for more than 700 safety-related projects in former Eastern Bloc countries.
The Convention on Nuclear Safety adopted in Vienna in June 1994 is another
outcome.
The Chernobyl Forum report said that some seven million people are now
receiving or eligible for benefits as 'Chernobyl victims', which means that
resources are not targeting the needy few percent of them. Remedying this
presents daunting political problems however.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is an international

organization that seeks to promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and
to inhibit its use for any military purpose, including nuclear weapons. The
IAEA was established as an autonomous organization on 29 July 1957.
Though established independently of the United Nations through its own
international treaty, the IAEA Statute,[1] the IAEA reports to both the United
Nations General Assembly and Security Council.
The IAEA has its headquarters in Vienna, Austria. The IAEA has two "Regional
Safeguards Offices" which are located in Toronto, Canada, and in Tokyo,

Japan. The IAEA also has two liaison offices which are located in New York
City, United States, and in Geneva, Switzerland. In addition, the IAEA has
three laboratories located in Vienna and Seibersdorf, Austria, and in Monaco.
The IAEA serves as an intergovernmental forum for scientific and technical
cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear technology and nuclear
power worldwide. The programs of the IAEA encourage the development of
the peaceful applications of nuclear technology, provide international
safeguards against misuse of nuclear technology and nuclear materials, and
promote nuclear safety (including radiation protection) and nuclear security
standards and their implementation.
The IAEA and its former Director General, Mohamed ElBaradei, were jointly
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize on 7 October 2005. The IAEA's current
Director General is Yukiya Amano.
In 1953, the President of the United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower, proposed
the creation of an international body to both regulate and promote the
peaceful use of atomic power (nuclear power), in his Atoms for
Peace address to the UN General Assembly.[2] [3] In September 1954, the
United States proposed to the General Assembly the creation of an
international agency to take control of fissile material, which could be used
either for nuclear power or for nuclear weapons. This agency would establish
a kind of "nuclear bank."
The United States also called for an international scientific conference on all
of the peaceful aspects of nuclear power. By November 1954, it had become
clear that the Soviet Union would reject any international custody of fissile
material, but that a clearing house for nuclear transactions might be
possible. From 8 to 20 August 1955, the United Nations held the International
Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy in Geneva,Switzerland. In
October 1956, a Conference on the IAEA Statute was held at the
Headquarters of the United Nations to approve the founding document for
the IAEA, which was negotiated in 1955-1956 by a group of twelve countries.
[2]
The Statute of the IAEA was approved on 23 October 1956 and came into
force on 29 July 1957.[4]
Former U.S. Congressman W. Sterling Cole served as the IAEA's first Director
General from 1957 to 1961. Cole served only one term, after which the IAEA
was headed by two Swedes for nearly four decades: the scientistSigvard
Eklund held the job from 1961 to 1981, followed by former Swedish Foreign
Minister Hans Blix, who served from 1981 to 1997. Blix was succeeded as

Director General by Mohamed ElBaradei of Egypt, who served until

November 2009.[5]
Beginning in 1986, in response to the nuclear reactor explosion and
disaster near Chernobyl, Ukraine, the IAEA redoubled its efforts in the field
of nuclear safety.[6] The same happened after the Fukushima disaster in
Fukushima, Japan.[7]
Both the IAEA and its then Director General, ElBaradei, were awarded
the Nobel Peace Prize in 2005. In ElBaradei's acceptance speech in Oslo, he
stated that only one percent of the money spent on developing new weapons
would be enough to feed the entire world, and that, if we hope to escape
self-destruction, then nuclear weapons should have no place in our collective
conscience, and no role in our security.[8]
On 2 July 2009, Yukiya Amano of Japan was elected as the Director General
for the IAEA,[9] defeating Abdul Samad Minty of South Africa and Luis E.
Echvarri of Spain. On 3 July 2009, the Board of Governors voted to appoint
Yukiya Amano "by acclamation," and IAEA General Conference in September
2009 approved. He took office on 1 December 2009.[10][11][12]
Missions[edit]
The IAEA is generally described as having three main missions:

Peaceful uses: Promoting the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by its

member states,

Safeguards: Implementing safeguards to verify that nuclear energy is

not used for military purposes, and

Nuclear safety: Promoting high standards for nuclear safety.[20]

Peaceful uses[edit]
According to Article II of the IAEA Statute, the objective of the IAEA is "to
accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health
and prosperity throughout the world." Its primary functions in this area,
according to Article III, are to encourage research and development, to
secure or provide materials, services, equipment and facilities for Member
States, to foster exchange of scientific and technical information and
training.[1]

Three of the IAEA's six Departments are principally charged with promoting
the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Department of Nuclear Energy
focuses on providing advice and services to Member States on nuclear power
and the nuclear fuel cycle.[21] The Department of Nuclear Sciences and
Applications focuses on the use of non-power nuclear and isotope techniques
to help IAEA Member States in the areas of water, energy, health,
biodiversity, and agriculture.[22] The Department of Technical Cooperation
provides direct assistance to IAEA Member States, through national, regional,
and inter-regional projects through training, expert missions, scientific
exchanges, and provision of equipment.[23]
Safeguards[edit]
Article II of the IAEA Statute defines the Agency's twin objectives as
promoting peaceful uses of atomic energy and "ensur[ing], so far as it is
able, that assistance provided by it or at its request or under its supervision
or control is not used in such a way as to further any military purpose." To do
this, the IAEA is authorized in Article III.A.5 of the Statute "to establish and
administer safeguards designed to ensure that special fissionable and other
materials, services, equipment, facilities, and information made available by
the Agency or at its request or under its supervision or control are not used
in such a way as to further any military purpose; and to apply safeguards, at
the request of the parties, to any bilateral or multilateral arrangement, or at
the request of a State, to any of that State's activities in the field of atomic
energy."[1]
The Department of Safeguards is responsible for carrying out this mission,
through technical measures designed to verify the correctness and
completeness of states' nuclear declarations.[24]
Nuclear safety[edit]

International policy relationships in radiological protection

The IAEA classifies safety as one of its top three priorities. It spends 8.9
percent of its 352 million-euro ($469 million) regular budget in 2011 on
making plants secure from accidents. Its resources are used on the other two
priorities: technical cooperation and preventing nuclear weapons
proliferation.[25]
The IAEA itself says that, beginning in 1986, in response to the nuclear
reactor explosion and disaster near Chernobyl, Ukraine, the IAEA redoubled
its efforts in the field of nuclear safety.[6] The IAEA says that the same
happened after the Fukushima disaster in Fukushima, Japan.[7]
In June 2011, the IAEA chief said he had "broad support for his plan to
strengthen international safety checks on nuclear power plants to help avoid
any repeat of Japan's Fukushima crisis". Peer-reviewed safety checks on
reactors worldwide, organized by the IAEA, have been proposed.[2

Fukushima Accident
(Updated June 2015)

Following a major earthquake, a 15-metre tsunami disabled the

power supply and cooling of three Fukushima Daiichi reactors, causing
a nuclear accident on 11 March 2011. All three cores largely melted in
the first three days.

The accident was rated 7 on the INES scale, due to high radioactive
releases over days 4 to 6, eventually a total of some 940 PBq (I-131
eq).

Four reactors were written off due to damage in the accident 2719
MWe net.

After two weeks, the three reactors (units 1-3) were stable with
water addition and by July they were being cooled with recycled water
from the new treatment plant. Official 'cold shutdown condition' was
announced in mid-December.

Apart from cooling, the basic ongoing task was to prevent release of
radioactive materials, particularly in contaminated water leaked from
the three units. This task became newsworthy in August 2013.

There have been no deaths or cases of radiation sickness from the

nuclear accident, but over 100,000 people had to be evacuated from
their homes to ensure this. Government nervousness delays their
return.

Official figures show that there have been well over 1000 deaths
from maintaining the evacuation, in contrast to little risk from
radiation if early return had been allowed.

The Great East Japan Earthquake of magnitude 9.0 at 2.46 pm on Friday 11

March 2011 did considerable damage in the region, and the large tsunami it
created caused very much more. The earthquake was centred 130 km
offshore the city of Sendai in Miyagi prefecture on the eastern cost of Honshu
Island (the main part of Japan), and was a rare and complex double quake
giving a severe duration of about 3 minutes. An area of the seafloor
extending 650 km north-south moved typically 10-20 metres horizontally.
Japan moved a few metres east and the local coastline subsided half a
metre. The tsunami inundated about 560 sq km and resulted in a human
death toll of over 19,000 and much damage to coastal ports and towns with
over a million buildings destroyed or partly collapsed.
Eleven reactors at four nuclear power plants in the region were operating at
the time and all shut down automatically when the quake hit. Subsequent
inspection showed no significant damage to any from the earthquake. The

operating units which shut down were Tokyo Electric Power Company's
(Tepco) Fukushima Daiichi 1, 2, 3, and Fukushima Daini 1, 2, 3, 4, Tohoku's
Onagawa 1, 2, 3, and Japco's Tokai, total 9377 MWe net. Fukushima Daiichi
units 4, 5 & 6 were not operating at the time, but were affected. The main
problem initially centred on Fukushima Daiichi units 1-3. Unit 4 became a
problem on day five.
The reactors proved robust seismically, but vulnerable to the tsunami. Power,
from grid or backup generators, was available to run the Residual Heat
Removal (RHR) system cooling pumps at eight of the eleven units, and
despite some problems they achieved 'cold shutdown' within about four
days. The other three, at Fukushima Daiichi, lost power at 3.42 pm, almost
an hour after the quake, when the entire site was flooded by the 15-metre
tsunami. This disabled 12 of 13 back-up generators on site and also the heat
exchangers for dumping reactor waste heat and decay heat to the sea. The
three units lost the ability to maintain proper reactor cooling and water
circulation functions. Electrical switchgear was also disabled. Thereafter,
many weeks of focused work centred on restoring heat removal from the
reactors and coping with overheated spent fuel ponds. This was undertaken
by hundreds of Tepco employees as well as some contractors, supported by
firefighting and military personnel. Some of the Tepco staff had lost homes,
and even families, in the tsunami, and were initially living in temporary
accommodation under great difficulties and privation, with some personal
risk. A hardened emergency response centre on site was unable to be used
in grappling with the situation due to radioactive contamination.
Three Tepco employees at the Daiichi and Daini plants were killed directly by
the earthquake and tsunami, but there have been no fatalities from the
nuclear accident.
Among hundreds of aftershocks, an earthquake with magnitude 7.1, closer to
Fukushima than the 11 March one, was experienced on 7 April, but without
further damage to the plant. On 11 April a magnitude 7.1 earthquake and on
12 April a magnitude 6.3 earthquake, both with epicenter at FukushimaHamadori, caused no further problems.

The two Fukushima plants and their siting

The Daiichi (first) and Daini (second) Fukushima plants are sited about 11 km
apart on the coast, Daini to the south.
The recorded seismic data for both plants some 180 km from the epicentre
shows that 550 Gal (0.56 g) was the maximum ground acceleration for
Daiichi, and 254 Gal was maximum for Daini. Daiichi units 2, 3 and 5
exceeded their maximum response acceleration design basis in E-W direction
by about 20%. The recording was over 130-150 seconds. (All nuclear plants
in Japan are built on rock ground acceleration was around 2000 Gal a few
kilometres north, on sediments).
The original design basis tsunami height was 3.1 m for Daiichi based on
assessment of the 1960 Chile tsunami and so the plant had been built about
10 metres above sea level with the seawater pumps 4 m above sea level.
The Daini plant was built 13 metres above sea level. In 2002 the design basis
was revised to 5.7 metres above, and the seawater pumps were sealed.
Tsunami heights coming ashore were about 15 metres, and the Daiichi
turbine halls were under some 5 metres of seawater until levels subsided.
Daini was less affected. The maximum amplitude of this tsunami was 23
metres at point of origin, about 180 km from Fukushima.
In the last century there have been eight tsunamis in the region with
maximum amplitudes at origin above 10 metres (some much more), these
having arisen from earthquakes of magnitude 7.7 to 8.4, on average one
every 12 years. Those in 1983 and in 1993 were the most recent affecting
Japan, with maximum heights at origin of 14.5 metres and 31 metres
respectively, both induced by magnitude 7.7 earthquakes. The June 1896
earthquake of estimated magnitude 8.3 produced a tsunami with run-up
height of 38 metres in Tohoku region, killing more than 27,000 people.
The tsunami countermeasures taken when Fukushima Daiichi was designed
and sited in the 1960s were considered acceptable in relation to the scientific
knowledge then, with low recorded run-up heights for that particular
coastline. But through to the 2011 disaster, new scientific knowledge
emerged about the likelihood of a large earthquake and resulting major
tsunami of some 15.7 metres at the Daiichi site. However, this had not yet
led to any major action by either the plant operator, Tepco, or government

regulators, notably the Nuclear & Industrial Safety Agency (NISA). The
tsunami countermeasures could also have been reviewed in accordance with
IAEA guidelines which required taking into account high tsunami levels, but
NISA continued to allow the Fukushima plant to operate without sufficient
countermeasures such as sealing the lower part of the buildings and having
some back-up for seawater pumps, despite clear warnings.
A report from the Japanese government's Earthquake Research Committee
on earthquakes and tsunamis off the Pacific coastline of northeastern Japan
in February 2011 was due for release in April, and might have brought about
changes. The document includes analysis of a magnitude 8.3 earthquake
that is known to have struck the region more than 1140 years ago, triggering
enormous tsunamis that flooded vast areas of Miyagi and Fukushima
prefectures. The report concludes that the region should be alerted of the
risk of a similar disaster striking again. The 11 March earthquake measured
magnitude 9.0 and involved substantial shifting of multiple sections of
seabed over a source area of 200 x 400 km. Tsunami waves devastated wide
areas of Miyagi, Iwate and Fukushima prefectures.
(See also background on Earthquakes and Seismic Protection for Nuclear
Power Plants in Japan)
Events at Fukushima Daiichi 1-3 & 4
It appears that no serious damage was done to the reactors by the
earthquake, and the operating units 1-3 were automatically shut down in
response to it, as designed. At the same time all six external power supply
sources were lost due to earthquake damage, so the emergency diesel
generators located in the basements of the turbine buildings started up.
Initially cooling would have been maintained through the main steam circuit
bypassing the turbine and going through the condensers.
Then 41 minutes later, at 3:42 pm, the first tsunami wave hit, followed by a
second 8 minutes later. These submerged and damaged the seawater pumps
for both the main condenser circuits and the auxiliary cooling circuits,
notably the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) cooling system. They also drowned
the diesel generators and inundated the electrical switchgear and batteries,
all located in the basements of the turbine buildings (the one surviving aircooled generator was serving units 5 & 6). So there was a station blackout,

and the reactors were isolated from their ultimate heat sink. The tsunamis
also damaged and obstructed roads, making outside access difficult.
All this put those reactors 1-3 in a dire situation and led the authorities to
order, and subsequently extend, an evacuation while engineers worked to
restore power and cooling. The 125-volt DC batteries for units 1 & 2 were
flooded and failed, leaving them without instrumentation, control or lighting.
Unit 3 had battery power for about 30 hours.
At 7.03 pm Friday 11 March a Nuclear Emergency was declared, and at
8.50pm the Fukushima Prefecture issued an evacuation order for people
within 2 km of the plant. At 9.23 pm the Prime Minister extended this to 3
km, and at 5.44 am on 12th he extended it to 10 km. He visited the plant
soon after. On Saturday 12th he extended the evacuation zone to 20 km.
Inside the Fukushima Daiichi reactors
The Fukushima Daiichi reactors are GE boiling water reactors (BWR) of an
early (1960s) design supplied by GE, Toshiba and Hitachi, with what is known
as a Mark I containment. Reactors 1-3 came into commercial operation 197175. Reactor power is 460 MWe for unit 1, 784 MWe for units 2-5, and 1100
MWe for unit 6.

When the power failed at 3.42 pm, about one hour after shutdown of the
fission reactions, the reactor cores would still be producing about 1.5% of
their nominal thermal power, from fission product decay about 22 MW in
unit 1 and 33 MW in units 2 & 3. Without heat removal by circulation to an
outside heat exchanger, this produced a lot of steam in the reactor pressure
vessels housing the cores, and this was released into the dry primary
containment (PCV) through safety valves. Later this was accompanied by
hydrogen, produced by the interaction of the fuel's very hot zirconium
cladding with steam after the water level dropped.
As pressure started to rise here, the steam was directed into the suppression
chamber under the reactor, within the containment, but the internal
temperature and pressure nevertheless rose quite rapidly. Water injection
commenced, using the various systems provide for this and finally the
Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS). These systems progressively failed
over three days, so from early Saturday water injection to the reactor
pressure vessel (RPV) was with fire pumps, but this required the internal
pressures to be relieved initially by venting into the suppression chamber/
wetwell. Seawater injection into unit 1 began at 7pm on Saturday 12th, into

unit 3 on 13th and unit 2 on 14th. Tepco management ignored an instruction

from the prime minister to cease the seawater injection into unit 1, and this
was withdrawn shortly afterwards.
Inside unit 1, it is understood that the water level dropped to the top of the
fuel about three hours after the scram (6 pm) and the bottom of the fuel 1.5
hours later (7.30 pm). The temperature of the exposed fuel rose to some
2800C so that the central part started to melt after a few hours and by 16
hours after the scram (7 am Saturday) most of it had fallen into the water at
the bottom of the RPV. After that, RPV temperatures decreased steadily.
As pressure rose, attempts were made to vent the containment, and when
external power and compressed air sources were harnessed this was
successful, by about 2.30 pm Saturday, though some manual venting was
apparently achieved at about 10.17 am. The venting was designed to be
through an external stack, but in the absence of power much of it apparently
backflowed to the service floor at the top of the reactor building,
representing a serious failure of this system (though another possibility is
leakage from the drywell). The vented steam, noble gases and aerosols were
accompanied by hydrogen. At 3.36 pm on Saturday 12th, there was
a hydrogen explosionon the service floor of the building above unit 1 reactor
containment, blowing off the roof and cladding on the top part of the
building, after the hydrogen mixed with air and ignited. (Oxidation of the
zirconium cladding at high temperatures in the presence of steam produces
hydrogen exothermically, with this exacerbating the fuel decay heat
problem.)
In unit 1 most of the core as corium comprised of melted fuel and control
rods was assumed to be in the bottom of the RPV, but later it appeared that
it had mostly gone through the bottom of the RPV and eroded about 65 cm
into the drywell concrete below (which is 2.6 m thick). This reduced the
intensity of the heat and enabled the mass to solidify.
Much of the fuel in units 2 & 3 also apparently melted to some degree, but to
a lesser extent than in unit 1, and a day or two later. In mid-May 2011 the
unit 1 core would still be producing 1.8 MW of heat, and units 2 & 3 would be
producing about 3.0 MW each.

In mid-2013 the Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) confirmed that the

earthquake itself had caused no damage to unit 1.
In unit 2, water injection using the steam-driven back-up water injection
system failed on Monday 14th, and it was about six hours before a fire pump
started injecting seawater into the RPV. Before the fire pump could be used
RPV pressure had to be relieved via the wetwell, which required power and
nitrogen, hence the delay. Meanwhile the reactor water level dropped rapidly
after back-up cooling was lost, so that core damage started about 8 pm, and
it is now provisionally understood that much of the fuel then melted and
probably fell into the water at the bottom of the RPV about 100 hours after
the scram. Pressure was vented on 13th and again on 15th, and meanwhile
the blowout panel near the top of the building was opened to avoid a
repetition of unit 1 hydrogen explosion. Early on Tuesday 15th, the pressure
suppression chamber under the actual reactor seemed to rupture, possibly
due to a hydrogen explosion there, and the drywell containment pressure
inside dropped. However, subsequent inspection of the suppression chamber
did not support the rupture interpretation. Later analysis suggested that a
leak of the primary containment developed on Tuesday 15th. Most of the
radioactive releases from the site appeared to come from unit 2.
In Unit 3, the main back-up water injection system failed at about 11 am on
Saturday 12th and early on Sunday 13th, water injection using the high
pressure system failedalso and water levels dropped dramatically. RPV
pressure was reduced by venting steam into the wetwell, allowing injection
of seawater using a fire pump from just before noon. Early on Sunday venting
the suppression chamber and containment was successfully undertaken. It is
now understood that core damage started about 5:30 am and much or all of
the fuel melted on the morning of Sunday 13th and fell into the bottom of the
RPV, with some probably going through the bottom of the reactor pressure
vessel and onto the concrete below.
Early on Monday 14th PCV venting was repeated, and this evidently
backflowed to the service floor of the building, so that at 11 am a very large
hydrogen explosion here above unit 3 reactor containment blew off much of
the roof and walls and demolished the top part of the building. This explosion
created a lot of debris, and some of that on the ground near unit 3 was very
radioactive.

In defueled unit 4, at about 6 am on Tuesday 15 March, there was an

explosion which destroyed the top of the building and damaged unit 3's
superstructure further. This was apparently from hydrogen arising in unit 3
and reaching unit 4 by backflow in shared ducts when vented from unit 3.
Water has been injected into each of the three reactor units more or less
continuously, and in the absence of normal heat removal via external heat
exchanger this water was boiling off for some months. In the government
report to IAEA in June it was estimated that to the end of May about 40% of
the injected water boiled off, and 60% leaked out the bottom. In June 2011
this was adding to the contaminated water on site by about 500 m 3 per day.
In January 2013 4.5 to 5.5 m 3 /hr was being added to each RPV via core
spray and feed water systems, hence 370 m 3 per day, and temperatures at
the bottom of RPVs were 19C in unit 1 and 32C in units 2 & 3, at little
above atmospheric pressure.
There was a peak of radioactive release on 15th, apparently mostly from unit
2, but the precise source remains uncertain. Due to volatile and easilyairborne fission products being carried with the hydrogen and steam, the
venting and hydrogen explosions discharged a lot of radioactive material into
the atmosphere, notably iodine and caesium. NISA said in June that it
estimated that 800-1000 kg of hydrogen had been produced in each of the
units.
Nitrogen is being injected into the containment vessels of all three reactors
to remove concerns about further hydrogen explosions, and in December this
was started also for the pressure vessels. Gas control systems which extract
and clean the gas from the PCV to avoid leakage of caesium have been
commissioned for all three units.
Through 2011 injection into the RPVs of water circulated through the new
water treatment plant achieved relatively effective cooling, and
temperatures at the bottom of the RPVs were stable in the range 60-76C at
the end of October, and 27-54C in mid-January. RPV pressures ranged from
atmospheric to slightly above (102-109 kPa) in January, due to water and
nitrogen injection. However, since they are leaking, the normal definition of
"cold shutdown" does not apply, and Tepco waited to bring radioactive
releases under control before declaring "cold shutdown condition" in midDecember, with NISA's approval. This, with the prime minister's

announcement of it, formally brought to a close the 'accident' phase of

events.
The AC electricity supply from external source was connected to all units by
22 March. Power was restored to instrumentation in all units except unit 3 by
25 March. However, radiation levels inside the plant were so high that normal
access was impossible until June.
Event sequence following earthquake (timing from it: 14:46, 11 March)
Unit 1

Unit 2

Unit 3

Loss of AC power

+ 51 min + 54 min

+ 52 min

Loss of cooling

+ 1 hour

+ 70 hours

+ 36
hours

Water level down to top of fuel*

+3
hours

+ 74 hours

+ 42
hours

Core damage starts*

+4
hours

+ 77 hours

+ 44
hours

Reactor pressure vessel damage*

+11
hours

uncertain

uncertain

Fire pumps with fresh water

+ 15
hours

Hydrogen explosion (not confirmed

for unit 2)

+ 25
hours
service
floor

+ 87 hours
suppression
chamber

+ 68
hours
service
floor

Fire pumps with seawater

+ 28
hours

+ 77 hours

+ 46
hours

+ 43
hours

Off-site electrical supply

+ 11-15 days

Fresh water cooling

+ 14-15 days

* according to 2012 MAAP analysis

Tepco has said that the three reactors, with unit 4, are written off and will be
decommissioned.
Summary: Major fuel melting occurred early on in all three units, though the
fuel remains essentially contained except for some volatile fission products
vented early on, or released from unit 2 in mid-March, and some soluble ones
which were leaking with the water, especially from unit 2, where the
containment is evidently breached. Cooling is provided from external
sources, using treated recycled water, with a stable heat removal path from
the actual reactors to external heat sinks. Temperatures at the bottom of the
reactor pressure vessels have decreased to well below boiling point and are
stable. Access has been gained to all three reactor buildings, but dose rates
remain high inside. Nitrogen is being injected into all three containment
vessels and pressure vessels. Tepco declared "cold shutdown condition" in
mid-December when radioactive releases had reduced to minimal levels.
(See also background on nuclear reactors at Fukushima Daiichi)
Fuel ponds: developing problems
Used fuel needs to be cooled and shielded. This is initially by water, in ponds.
After about three years under water, used fuel can be transferred to dry
storage, with air ventilation simply by convection. Used fuel generates heat,
so the water is circulated by electric pumps through external heat
exchangers, so that the heat is dumped and a low temperature maintained.
There are fuel ponds near the top of all six reactor buildings at the Daiichi
plant, adjacent to the top of each reactor so that the fuel can be unloaded
under water when the top is off the reactor pressure vessel and it is flooded.
The ponds hold some fresh fuel and some used fuel, pending its transfer to
the central used/spent fuel storage on site. (There is some dry storage on
site to extend the plant's capacity.)
At the time of the accident, in addition to a large number of used fuel
assemblies, unit 4's pond also held a full core load of 548 fuel assemblies
while the reactor was undergoing maintenance, these having been removed
at the end of November.

A separate set of problems arose as the fuel ponds, holding fresh and used
fuel in the upper part of the reactor structures, were found to be depleted in
water. The primary cause of the low water levels was loss of cooling
circulation to external heat exchangers, leading to elevated temperatures
and probably boiling, especially in heavily-loaded unit 4. Here the fuel would
have been uncovered in about 7 days due to water boiling off. However, the
fact that unit 4 was unloaded meant that there was a large inventory of
water at the top of the structure, and enough of this replenished the fuel
pond to prevent the fuel becoming uncovered the minimum level reached
was about 1.2 m above the fuel on about 22 April.
After the hydrogen explosion in unit 4 early on Tuesday 15 March, Tepco was
told to implement injection of water to unit 4 pond which had a particularly
high heat load (3 MW) from 1331 used fuel assemblies in it, so it was the
main focus of concern. It needed the addition of about 100 m3/day to
replenish it after circulation ceased.
From Tuesday 15 March attention was given to replenishing the water in the
ponds of units 1, 2, 3 as well. Initially this was attempted with fire pumps but
from 22 March a concrete pump with 58-metre boom enabled more precise
targeting of water through the damaged walls of the service floors. There
was some use of built-in plumbing for unit 2. Analysis of radionuclides in
water from the used fuel ponds suggested that some of the fuel assemblies
might be damaged, but the majority were intact.
There was concern about structural strength of unit 4 building, so support for
the pond was reinforced by the end of July.
New cooling circuits with heat exchangers adjacent to the reactor buildings
for all four ponds were commissioned after a few months, and each reduced
the pool temperature from 70C to normal in a few days. Each has a primary
circuit within the reactor and waste treatment buildings and a secondary
circuit dumping heat through a small dry cooling tower outside the building.
The next task was to remove the salt from those ponds which had seawater
added, to reduce the potential for corrosion.
In July 2012 two of the 204 fresh fuel assemblies were removed from the unit
4 pond and transferred to the central spent fuel pool for detailed inspection

to check damage, particularly corrosion. They were found to have no

deformation or corrosion. Unloading the 1331 spent fuel assemblies in pond
4 and transferring them to the central spent fuel storage commenced in midNovember 2013 and was completed 13 months later. These comprised 783
spent fuel plus the full fuel load of 548.
The central spent fuel pool on site in 2011 held about 60% of the Daiichi
used fuel, and is immediately west (inland) of unit 4. It lost circulation with
the power outage, and temperature increased to 73C by the time mains
power and cooling were restored after two weeks. In late 2013 this pond,
with capacity for 6840*, held 6375 fuel assemblies, the same as at the time
of the accident. The older ones will be transferred to 65 casks in dry storage,
with total capacity of at least 2930 assemblies each dry cask holds 50 fuel
assemblies. Eventually these will be shipped to JNFLs Rokkasho reprocessing
plant or to Recyclable Fuel Storage Companys new Mutsu facility. The dry
storage area held 408 fuel assemblies at the time of the accident, and 1004
have been transferred there since (to mid-2014).
* effectively 6750, due to one rack of 90 having some damaged fuel.
Summary: The spent fuel storage pools survived the earthquake, tsunami
and hydrogen explosions without significant damage to the fuel or significant
radiological release, or threat to public safety. The new cooling circuits with
external heat exchangers for the four ponds are working well. Temperatures
are normal. Analysis of water has confirmed that most fuel rods are
intact. Fuel assemblies are now being removed from unit 4 pool.
(See also background on Fukushima Fuel Ponds and Decommissioning
section below.)
Radioactive releases to air
Regarding releases to air and also water leakage from Fukushima, the main
radionuclide from among the many kinds of fission products in the fuel was
volatile iodine-131, which has a half-life of 8 days. The other main
radionuclide is caesium-137, which has a 30-year half-life, is easily carried in
a plume, and when it lands it may contaminate land for some time. It is a
strong gamma-emitter in its decay. Cs-134 is also produced and dispersed, it
has a two-year half-life. Caesium is soluble and can be taken into the body,

but does not concentrate in any particular organs, and has a biological halflife of about 70 days. In assessing the significance of atmospheric releases,
the Cs-137 figure is multiplied by 40 and added to the I-131 number to give
an "iodine-131 equivalent" figure.
As cooling failed on the first day, evacuations were progressively ordered. By
the evening of Saturday 12 March the evacuation zone had been extended to
20 km from the plant. From 20 to 30 km from the plant, the criterion of 20
mSv/yr dose rate was applied to determine evacuation, and is now the
criterion for return being allowed. 20 mSv/yr was also the general limit set
for children's dose rate related to outdoor activities, but there were calls to
reduce this.In areas with 20-50 mSv/yr from April 2012 residency is
restricted, with remediation action to be completed in March 2014. See later
section on Return of Evacuees.
A significant problem in tracking radioactive release was that 23 out of the
24 radiation monitoring stations on the plant site were disabled by the
tsunami.
After the hydrogen explosion in unit 1 on 12 March, some radioactive
caesium and iodine were detected in the vicinity of the plant, having been
released via the venting. Further I-131 and Cs-137 and Cs-134 were
apparently released during the following few days, particularly following the
hydrogen explosion at unit 3 on 14th and in unit 4 on 15th. Considerable
amounts of xenon-133 and iodine-131 were vented, but most of the caesium137 (14 out of 15 PBq total) along with most of the Cs-134 apparently came
from unit 2 on or after the 15th the only one of the four units which did not
suffer a hydrogen explosion demolishing its superstructure. Also ten times
more iodine is attributed to unit 2 than unit 1, while unit 3 produced half as
much as unit 1. However, there remains some uncertainty about the exact
sources and timings of the radioactive releases.
On 16 March, Japans Nuclear Safety Commission recommended local
authorities to instruct evacuees under 40 years of age leaving the 20 km
zone to ingest stable iodine as a precaution against ingestion (eg via milk) of
radioactive iodine-131. The pills and syrup (for children) had been prepositioned at evacuation centers. The order recommended taking a single
dose, with an amount dependent on age. However, it is not clear that this
was implemented. On 11 April the government suggested that those outside

the 20km zone who were likely to accumulate 20 mSv total dose should
move out within a month. Data at the end of May (with most I-131 gone by
decay) showed that about half of the 20 km evacuation zone and a similar
area to the NW, total about 1000 sq km, would give an annual dose of 20
mSv to March 2012.
France's Institute for Radiological Protection & Nuclear Safety (IRSN)
estimated that maximum external doses to people living around the plant
were unlikely to exceed 30 mSv/yr in the first year. This was based on
airborne measurements between 30 March and 4 April, and appears to be
confirmed by the above figures. It compares with natural background levels
mostly 2-3 mSv/yr, but ranging up to 50 mSv/yr elswhere.
The main concentration of radioactive pollution stretches northwest from the
plant, and levels of Cs-137 reached over 3 MBq/m2 in soil here, out to 35km
away. In mid-May about 15,000 residents in a contaminated area 20-40 km
northwest of the plant were evacuated, making a total of over 100,000
displaced persons.
The IAEA reported on 19 March that airborne radiation levels had spiked
three times since the earthquake, notably early on 15th (400 mSv/hr near
unit 3), but had stabilized since 16th at levels significantly higher than the
normal levels, but within the range that allows workers to continue on-site
recovery measures.
NISA estimated that about 130 PBq of iodine-131 was released from the
reactors, mostly around 15 March and the two days following 0.16% of the
total inventory. In 32 days this released iodine would have diminished to one
sixteenth of original activity 8 PBq. NISA's report to IAEA said that this 130
PBq of I-131 together with 6 PBq of caesium-137* released gave an "iodine131 equivalent" figure of 370 PBq, which resulted in the re-rating of the
accident to INES level 7. NISA in June increased this estimate to 770 PBq (I131 eq), being 160 PBq of I-131 and 15 PBq of Cs-137. Japan's Nuclear Safety
Commission (NSC, a policy body) estimated that 12 PBq of Cs-137 had been
released, giving an "iodine-131 equivalent" figure of 630 PBq to 5 April, but
in August lowered this estimate to 570 PBq.
The 770 PBq figure is about 15% of the Chernobyl release of 5200 PBq
iodine-131 equivalent. The NSC said that most radioactive material was

released from the unit 2 suppression chamber during two days from its
apparent rupture early on 15 March. It said that about 154 TBq/day was
being released on 5 April, but that this had dropped to about 24 TBq/d over
three weeks to 26 April and to about 24 GBq/d in mid-July. In mid-August
2011 the estimate from all three reactors together was about 5 GBq/d. In
2014 Fukushima Universitys Institute of Environmental Radioactivity said
that the total amount of Cs-137 released was 20.5 PBq, 17 PBq to the air,
and of the total, 12 to 15 PBq ended up in the Pacific Ocean. The 17 PBq to
air, coupled with the I-131, would give 810 PBq (I-131 eq).
* The Cs-137 figure is multiplied by 40 in arriving at an "iodine-131
equivalent" figure, due to its much longer half-life. Cs-134 is multiplied by 4.
Tepco estimates published in May 2012 showed a total of about 1020 PBq
released to the atmosphere over 12-31 March 2011 (after which very little
was released). Apart from noble gases this comprised 500 PBq iodine-131, 10
PBq Cs-137 and 10 PBq Cs-134. In iodine-131 equivalent terms this comes to
500 + 400 + 40 = 940 PBq iodine-131 eq released to atmosphere. In
addition, 500 PBq noble gases was estimated, mainly xenon-133. This is
normally disregarded since is not biologically active and has only a five-day
half life. Of the total releases, about 20% came from Unit 1, 40% from Unit 2
(peak on 15 March), and 40% from Unit 3 (peak on 16 March). Releases to
the ocean over 26 March to 30 September were about 11 PBq iodine-13, 3.5
PBq Cs-134, 3.6 PBq Cs-137, total 18.1 PBq (or 169 PBq I-131 eq) apart from
atmospheric fallout. Relatively little radioactive material was released by the
active venting of pressure inside the reactor vessels (routing steam through
water and releasing it through the exhaust stacks) or by the hydrogen
explosions.
Tepco sprayed a dust-suppressing polymer resin around the plant to ensure
that fallout from mid-March was not mobilized by wind or rain. In addition it
removed a lot of rubble with remote control front-end loaders, and this
further reduced ambient radiation levels, halving them near unit 1. The
highest radiation levels on site came from debris left on the ground after the
explosions at units 3&4.
Radioactivity, primarily from caesium-137, in the evacuation zone and other
areas beyond it has been reported in terms of kBq/kg (compared with
kBq/m2 around Chernobyl). However the main measure has been presumed

doses in mSv/yr. The government has adopted 20 mSv/yr as its goal for the
evacuation zone and more contaminated areas outside it, and supports
municipal government work to reduce levels below that. The total area under
consideration for attention is 13,000 km2.
In mid-May 2011 work started towards constructing a cover over unit 1 to
reduce airborne radioactive releases from the site, to keep out the rain, and
to enable measurement of radioactive releases within the structure through
its ventilation system. The frame was assembled over the reactor, enclosing
an area 42 x 47 m, and 54 m high. The sections of the steel frame fitted
together remotely without the use of screws and bolts. All the wall panels
have a flameproof coating, and the structure has a filtered ventilation system
capable of handling 40,000 cubic metres of air per hour through six lines,
including two backup lines. The cover structure is fitted with internal
monitoring cameras, radiation and hydrogen detectors, thermometers and a
pipe for water injection. The cover was completed with ventilation systems
working by the end of October 2011. It was expected to be needed for two
years. In May 2013 Tepco announced its more permanent replacement, to be
built over four years. It would start demolishing the current cover at the end
of 2013 and then remove concrete and other rubble on the top floor of the
building. A crane and other equipment for fuel removal will then be installed
in a new cover over the building, similar to that over unit 4. Removal of the
2011 cover was under way in 2014.
More substantial covers were designed to fit around units 3&4 reactor
buildings after the top floors were cleared up in 2012. Work started on the 69
x 31 m cover (53 m high) for unit 4 in April 2012, and the cantilevered
structure was completed in July 2013. It was fully equipped by the end of
2013 to enable unloading of used fuel from the storage pond into containers.
This was accomplished under water, using the new fuel handling machine
(replacing the one destroyed by the hydrogen explosion) so that it could be
transferred to the central storage on site. This was completed in December
2014. Animation video of the process here. A different design of cover is
planned for unit 3, and foundation work had begun in 2012. Large rubble
removal took place late in 2013 and fuel removal from the pool is scheduled
in 2015, and fuel debris retrieval from about 2021, after units 1&2 started.
Spent fuel removal from units 1&2 pools is scheduled in 2018, and fuel
debris retrieval from 2020.

Tests on radioactivity in rice have been made and caesium was found in a
few of them. The highest levels were about one quarter of the allowable limit
of 500 Bq/kg, so shipments to market are permitted.

Maps from MEXT aerial surveys carried out approximately one year apart
show the reduction in contamination from late 2011 to late 2012. Areas with
colour changes in 2012 showed approximately half the contamination as
surveyed in 2011, the difference coming from decay of caesium-134 (two
year half-life) and natural processes like wind and rain. In blue areas,
ambient radiation is very similar to global background levels at <0.5uSv/h
which is equal to <4.38 mSv/y.

Summary: Major releases of radionuclides, including long-lived caesium,

occurred to air, mainly in mid-March. The population within a 20km radius
had been evacuated three days earlier. Considerable work was done to
reduce the amount of radioactive debris on site and to stabilise dust. The
main source of radioactive releases was the apparent hydrogen explosion in
the suppression chamber of unit 2 on 15 March. A cover building for unit 1
reactor has been built and commissioned, a more substantial one for unit 4 is
under construction. Radioactive releases in mid-August 2011 had reduced to
5 GBq/hr, and dose rate from these at the plant boundary was 1.7 mSv/yr,
less than natural background.
Sequence of evacuation orders based on the report by the Independent
Investigation Commission on the Fukushima Nuclear Accident:
11 March
14:46 JST The earthquake occurred.
15:42 TEPCO made the first emergency report to the government.
19:03 The government announced nuclear emergency.
20:50 The Fukushima Prefecture Office ordered 2km evacuation.
21:23 The government ordered 3km evacuation and to keep staying inside
buildings in the area of 3-10km.
12 March
05:44 The government ordered 10km evacuation.
18:25 The government ordered 20km evacuation.
15 March
11:01 The government ordered to keep staying inside buildings in the area of
20-30km.
25 March The government requested voluntary evacuation in the area of 2030km.
21 April The government set the 20km no-go area.
Radiation exposure on the plant site
By 31 December 2011, Tepco had checked the radiation exposure of 19,594
people who had worked on the site since 11 March. For many of these both

external dose and internal doses (measured with whole-body counters) were
considered. It reported that 167 workers had received doses over 100 mSv.
Of these 135 had received 100 to 150 mSv, 23 150-200 mSv, three more
200-250 mSv, and six had received over 250 mSv (309 to 678 mSv)
apparently due to inhaling iodine-131 fume early on. The latter included the
two unit 3-4 control room operators in the first two days who had not been
wearing breathing apparatus. There were up to 200 workers on site each day.
Recovery workers are wearing personal monitors, with breathing apparatus
and protective clothing which protect against alpha and beta radiation. So far
over 3500 of some 3700 workers at the damaged Daiichi plant have received
internal check-ups for radiation exposure, giving whole body count
estimates. The level of 250 mSv was the allowable maximum short-term
dose for Fukushima accident clean-up workers through to December 2011,
500 mSv is the international allowable short-term dose "for emergency
workers taking life-saving actions". Since January 2012 the allowable
maximum has reverted to 50 mSv/yr.
Tepco figures submitted to NRA for the period to end January 2014 showed
173 workers had received more than 100 mSv (six more than two years
earlier) and 1578 had received 50 to 100 mSv. This was among a total of
32,024, 64% more than had worked there two years earlier. Since April 2013
none of the 13,154 who had worked on site had received more than 50 mSv,
and 96% of these had less than 20 mSv dose. Early in 2014 there were about
4000 on site each weekday.
No radiation casualties (acute radiation syndrome) occurred, and few other
injuries, though higher than normal doses were being accumulated by
several hundred workers on site. High radiation levels in the three reactor
buildings hindered access there through into 2012.
Monitoring of seawater, soil and atmosphere is at 25 locations on the plant
site, 12 locations on the boundary, and others further afield. Government
and IAEA monitoring of air and seawater is ongoing, with high but not healththreatening levels of iodine-131 being found in March. With an eight-day halflife, most I-131 had gone by the end of April 2011.
A radiation survey map of the site made in March 2013 revealed substantial
progress: the highest dose rate anywhere on the site was 0.15 mSv/h near
units 3 and 4. (Soon after the accident a similar survey put the highest dose

rate at 300 mSv/h near rubble lying alongside unit 3.) The majority of the
power plant area was at less than 0.01 mSv/h. These reduced levels are
reflected in worker doses: during January 2013, the 5702 workers at the site
received an average of 0.86 mSv, with 75% of workers recorded as receiving
less than 1 mSv. In total, only about 2% of workers received over 5 mSv and
the highest dose in January was 12.65 mSv for one worker.
Media reports have referred to "nuclear gypsies" casual workers employed
by subcontractors on a short-term basis, and allegedly prone to receiving
higher and unsupervised radiation doses. This transient workforce has been
part of the nuclear scene for at least four decades, and at Fukushima their
doses are very rigorously monitored. If they reach certain levels, e.g. 30 mSv
but varying according to circumstance, they are reassigned to lowerexposure areas.
Summary: Six workers received radiation doses apparently over the 250 mSv
level set by NISA, but at levels below those which would cause radiation
sickness.
Radiation exposure and fallout beyond the plant site
On 4 April 2011, radiation levels of 0.06 mSv/day were recorded in
Fukushima city, 65 km northwest of the plant, about 60 times higher than
normal but posing no health risk according to authorities. Monitoring beyond
the 20 km evacuation radius to 13 April showed one location around Iitate
with up to 0.266 mSv/day dose rate, but elsewhere no more than one-tenth
of this. At the end of July the highest level measured within 30km radius was
0.84 mSv/day in Namie town, 24 km away. The safety limit set by the central
government in mid-April for public recreation areas was 3.8 microsieverts per
hour (0.09 mSv/day).
In June 2013, analysis from Japan's Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA)
showed that the most contaminated areas in the Fukushima evacuation zone
had reduced in size by three-quarters over the previous two years. The area
subject to high dose rates (over 166 mSv/yr) diminished from 27% of the
1117 km2 zone to 6% over 15 months to March 2013, and in the no
residence portion (originally 83-166 mSv/yr) no areas remained at this level
and 70% was below 33 mSv/yr. The least-contaminated area is now entirely
below 33 mSv/yr.

In August 2011 The Act on Special Measures Concerning the Handling of

Radioactive Pollution was enacted and it took full effect from January 2012 as
the main legal instrument to deal with all remediation activities in the
affected areas, as well as the management of materials removed as a result
of those activities. It specified two categories of land:
- Special Decontamination Areas consisting of the restricted areas located
within a 20 km radius from the Fukushima Daiichi plant, and deliberate
evacuation areas where the annual cumulative dose for individuals was
anticipated to exceed 20 mSv. The national government promotes
decontamination in these areas. These areas are subdivided into three: dose
1- 20 mSv/yr (green) dose 20-50 mSv/yr (yellow) and dose over 50 mSv/yr
and over 20 mSv/yr average over 5 years (red).
- Intensive Contamination Survey Areas including the so-called
Decontamination Implementation Areas, where an additional annual
cumulative dose between 1mSv and 20mSv was estimated for individuals.
Municipalities implement decontamination activities in these areas.
In May 2013, the UN Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation
(UNSCEAR) reported, following a detailed study by 80 international experts. It
concluded that "Radiation exposure following the nuclear accident at
Fukushima Daiichi did not cause any immediate health effects. It is unlikely
to be able to attribute any health effects in the future among the general
public and the vast majority of workers." The only exception are the 146
emergency workers that received radiation doses of over 100 mSv during the
crisis. They will be monitored closely for "potential late radiation-related
health effects at an individual level."
By contrast, the public was exposed to 10-50 times less radiation. Most
Japanese people were exposed to additional radiation amounting to less than
the typical natural background level of 2.1 mSv per year.
People living in Fukushima prefecture are expected to be exposed to around
10 mSv over their entire lifetimes, while for those living further away the
dose would be 0.2 mSv per year. The UNSCEAR conclusion reinforces the
findings of several international reports to date, including one from the World
Health Organisation (WHO) that considered the health risk to the most
exposed people possible: a postulated girl under one year of age living in
Iitate or Namie that did not evacuate and continued life as normal for four

months after the accident. Such a child's theoretical risk of developing any
cancer would be increased only marginally, according to WHO's analysis.
Eleven municipalities in the former restricted zone or planned evacuation
area, within 20 km of the plant or where annual cumulative radiation dose is
greater than 20 mSv, are designated Special Decontamination Areas, where
decontamination work is being implemented by the government. A further
100 municipalities in eight prefectures, where dose rates are equivalent to
over 1 mSv per year are classed as Intensive Decontamination Survey Areas,
where decontamination is being implemented by each municipality with
funding and technical support from the national government. In the Special
Decontamination Areas, decontamination is proceeding and was complete to
target levels in one municipality by June 2013.
In October 2013 a 16-member IAEA mission reported on remediation and
decontamination in the Special Decontamination Areas. Its preliminary report
said that decontamination efforts were commendable but driven by
unrealistic targets. If annual radiation dose was below 20 mSv, such as
generally in Intensive Decontamination Survey Areas, this level was
acceptable and in line with the international standards and with the
recommendations from the relevant international organisations, e.g. ICRP,
IAEA, UNSCEAR and WHO. The clear implication is that people in such areas
should be allowed to return home. Furthermore the government should
increase efforts to communicate this to the public, and should explain that its
long-term goal of achieving an additional individual dose of 1 mSv/yr is
unrealistic and unnecessary in the short term. Also, there is potential to
produce more food safely in contaminated areas.
Summary: There have been no harmful effects from radiation on local
people, nor any doses approaching harmful levels. However, some 160,000
people were evacuated from their homes and only in 2012 were allowed
limited return. In October 2013, 81,000 evacuees remained displaced due to
government concern about radiological effects from the accident.
Comments on the radiation situation by international experts are posted
on Prime Minister & Cabinet official website.

Public health and return of evacuees

Permanent return remains a high priority, and the evacuation zone is being
decontaminated where required and possible, so that evacuees (81,000 from
this accident according to METI) can return without undue delay. There are
many cases of evacuation stress including transfer trauma among evacuees,
and once the situation had stabilised at the plant these outweighed the
radiological hazards of returning, with over 1000 deaths reported (see
below). There were also 267,000 tsunami survivor refugees remaining
displaced in February 2014.
In December 2011 the government said that where annual radiation dose
would be below 20 mSv/yr, the government would help residents return
home as soon as possible and assist local municipalities with
decontamination and repair of infrastructure. In areas where radiation levels
are over 20 mSv/yr evacuees will be asked to continue living elsewhere for
a few years until the government completes decontamination and recovery
work. The government will consider purchasing land and houses from
residents of these areas if the evacuees wish to sell them.
In November 2013 the NRA decided to change the way radiation exposure
was estimated. Instead of airborne surveys being the basis, personal
dosimeters would be used, giving very much more accurate figures, often
much less than airborne estimates. The same criteria would be used, as
above, with 20 mSv/yr being the threshold of concern to authorities.
In February 2014 the results of a study were published showing that 458
residents of two study areas 20 to 30 km from the plant and a third one 50
km northwest received radiation doses from the contaminated ground similar
to the countrys natural background levels. Measurement was by personal

dosimeters over August-September 2012.

As of October 2012, over 1000 disaster-related deaths that were not due to
radiation-induced damage or to the earthquake or to the tsunami had been
identified by the Reconstruction Agency <
http://www.reconstruction.go.jp/english/>, based on data for areas evacuated
for no other reason than the nuclear accident. About 90% of deaths were for
persons above 66 years of age. Of these, about 70% occurred within the first
three months of the evacuations. (A similar number of deaths occurred
among evacuees from tsunami- and earthquake-affected prefectures. These
figures are additional to the 19,000 that died in the actual tsunami.)
The premature deaths reported in 2012 were mainly related to the following:
(1) somatic effects and spiritual fatigue brought on by having to reside in
shelters; (2) Transfer trauma the mental or physical burden of the forced
move from their homes for fragile individuals; and (3) delays in obtaining
needed medical support because of the enormous destruction caused by the
earthquake and tsunami. However, the radiation levels in most of the
evacuated areas were not greater than the natural radiation levels in high
background areas elsewhere in the world where no adverse health effect is

evident, so maintaining the evacuation beyond a precautionary few days was

evidently the main disaster in relation to human fatalities.
http://www.reconstruction.go.jp/topics/20121102_sinsaikanrensi.pdf
http://www.reconstruction.go.jp/topics/240821_higashinihondaishinsainiokeru
shinsaikanrenshinikansuruhoukoku.pdf
Fukushima prefecture provided a further report early in 2014 which said that
the indirect deaths in the prefecture were greater than the number (1607)
killed in the quake and tsunami. It put the figure at 1656 as determined by
municipal panels that examine links between the disasters aftermath and
death. The figure is greater than for Iwate and Miyagi prefectures, with 434
and 879 respectively, though they had much higher loss of life in the quake
and tsunami about 14,200. The disparity is attributed to the older age
group involved among Fukushimas evacuated quake/tsunami survivors,
about 90% of indirect deaths being of people over 66. Causes of indirect
deaths include physical and mental stress stemming from long stays at
shelters, a lack of initial care as a result of hospitals being disabled by the
disaster, and suicides. The high rate of these deaths continues three years
later as the evacuation is maintained for about 135,000 people apparently
some 75,000 from the nuclear accident and 60,000 from the natural disaster
itself. Evaluation of indirect deaths is according to a model developed by
Niigata prefecture after the 2004 earthquake there. (Japan Times 20/2/14)
Evacuees receive JPY 100,000 ($1,030) per month in psychological suffering
compensation. The money is tax-exempt and paid unconditionally. In October
2013, about 84,000 evacuees received the payments. Statistics indicate that
an average family of four has received about JPY 90 million ($900,000) in
compensation from Tepco. The average compensation for real estate was JPY
49.1 million ($490,000), JPY 10.9 million ($110,000) for lost wages, and JPY
30 million ($300,000) as consolation money for pain and suffering. (Asahi
Shimbun 26/10/13)
The Fukushima prefecture has 17,000 government-financed temporary
housing units for some 29,500 evacuees from the accident. The prefectural
government says residents can continue to use these until March 2015. The
number compares with very few built in Miyagi, Iwate and Aomori
prefectures for the 222,700 tsunami survivor refugees there. (Japan Times
17/11/13) Another reported contrast from the Reconstruction Agency is that

some $30 billion has been paid to 84,000 nuclear accident refugees but only
some $20 billion to 300,000 tsunami survivors in the Tohoku region.
An August 2012 Reconstruction Agency report also considered workers at
Fukushima power plant. Of almost 1500 surveyed, many were stressed, due
to evacuating their homes (70%), believing they had come close to death
(53%), the loss of homes in the tsunami (32%), deaths of colleagues (20%)
and of family members (6%) mostly in the tsunami. The death toll directly
due to the nuclear accident or radiation exposure remained zero, but stress
and disruption due to the continuing evacuation remains high.
Tokyos Board of Audit reported in October 2013 that 23% of recovery
funding about JPY 1.45 trillion ($14.5 billion) had been misappropriated.
Some 326 out of about 1400 projects funded had no direct relevance to the
natural disaster or Fukushima accident. (Mainichi 1/11/13)
Summary: Many evacuated people remain unable to fully return home due to
government-mandated restrictions based on conservative radiation exposure
criteria. However, over 1000 premature deaths have been caused by
maintaining the evacuation beyond a prudent week or so. Decontamination
work is proceeding while radiation levels decline naturally. The October 2013
IAEA report makes it clear that many evacuees should be allowed to return
home.
A journalist article is in line with WNA's understanding of the situation in
2015.
Managing contaminated water
Removing contaminated water from the reactor and turbine buildings had
become the main challenge in week 3, along with contaminated water in
trenches carrying cabling and pipework. This was both from the tsunami
inundation and leakage from reactors. Run-off from the site into the sea was
also carrying radionuclides well in excess of allowable levels. By the end of
March all storages around the four units basically the main condenser units
and condensate tanks were largely full of contaminated water pumped
from the buildings. Some 1000 storage tanks were set up progressively,
including initially 350 steel tanks with rubber seams, each holding 1200 m3.
A few of these developed leaks in 2013.

Accordingly, with government approval, Tepco over 4-10 April released to the
sea about 10,400 cubic metres of slightly contaminated water (0.15 TBq
total) in order to free up storage for more highly-contaminated water from
unit 2 reactor and turbine buildings which needed to be removed to make
safe working conditions. Unit 2 is the main source of contaminated water,
though some of it comes from drainage pits. NISA confirmed that there was
no significant change in radioactivity levels in the sea as a result of the 0.15
TBq discharge.
Tepco then began transferring highly-radioactive water from the basement of
unit 2 turbine hall and cabling trench to the holding tank and waste
treatment plant just south of unit 4. The water contained 3 TBq/m3 of I-131
and 13 TBq/m3 of Cs-137. Some 120 m3/day of fresh water was being
injected into unit 2 reactor core and this replenished the contaminated water
being removed, as in the other units.
Tepco built a new wastewater treatment facility to treat contaminated water.
The company used both US proprietary adsorbtion and French conventional
technologies in the new 1200 m3/day treatment plant. A supplementary and
simpler SARRY plant to remove caesium using Japanese technology and
made by Toshiba and Shaw Group was installed and commissioned in August
2011. These plants reduce caesium from about 55 MBq/L to 5.5 kBq/L
about ten times better than designed. Desalination is necessary on account
of the seawater earlier used for cooling, and the 1200 m3/day desalination
plant produces 480 m3 of clean water while 720 m3 goes to storage. By midMarch 2012, over 250,000 m3 of water had been treated. This, at about 400
m3/d, is then recycled for further cooling in the three reactors, following
which it is treated again. A steady increase in volume of the stored water
(about 400 m3/d net) is due to groundwater finding its way into parts of the
plant and needing removal and treatment. In October 2012 Tepco was
reported to be struggling to store over 200,000 m3 of contaminated water,
while anticipating the start-up of a new Toshiba water treatment plant, in
November, which was to allow discharge of clean water to the sea.
Early in 2013 Tepco started to test and commission this Advanced Liquid
Processing System (ALPS), developed by EnergySolutions and Toshiba. Each
of three trains is capable of processing 250 m3/day to remove 62 remaining
radioisotopes. Initially Tepco planned to run two simultaneously while holding
the third in reserve, but then after an upgrade it planned three-stream

operation from April 2014 with a view to treating all the water by early 2015.
Three further 250 m3/day ALPS trains are expected to be on stream by the
end of 2014, along with an Advanced ALPS of 500 m3/d, making total
capacity 2000 m3/d. NRA approved the extra capacity in August 2014.
The ALPS is a chemical system which will remove radionuclides to below
legal limits for release. However, because tritium is contained in water
molecules, ALPS cannot remove it, which gives rise to questions about the
discharge of treated water to the sea. Tritium is a weak beta-emitter which
does not bio-accumulate (half-life 12 years), and its concentration has
levelled off at about 1 MBq/L in the stored water, with dilution from
groundwater balancing further release from the fuel debris.
The clean tritiated water was the focus of attention in 2014. A September
2013 report from the Atomic Energy Society of Japan recommended diluting
the ALPS-treated water with seawater and releasing it to the sea at the legal
discharge concentration of 0.06 MBq/L, with monitoring to ensure that
normal background tritium levels of 10 Bq/L are not exceeded. (WHO
drinking water guideline is 0.01 MBq/L tritium) The IAEA is reported to
support release of tritiated water to the ocean, as does Dr Dale Klein,
chairman of Tepcos nuclear reform monitoring committee (NRMC) and
former chairman of US Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The government has
an expert Task Force considering the options.
In 2014 a new Kurion strontium removal system was commissioned. This is
mobile and can be moved around the tank groups to further clean up water
which has been treated by ALPS.
About 300 of the 930 storage tanks are built from flanged steel panels with
rubber seals, and one of these leaked significantly in mid-2013.
At the end of May 2015, 108 m3/day of clean water was being circulated
through each reactor (1-3). Collected water from them, with high
radioactivity levels, was being treated and re-used. The cumulative treated
volume was then 1.232 million cubic metres. In storage on site was 442,782
m3 of treated water, and 185,767 m3 of partially-treated water (strontium
removed), these comprising 97% of stored water. Another 9,226 m3 is stored
as concentrated waste liquid, mostly salt. Almost 600 m3 of sludge from the
water treatment was stored in shielded containers.

By the end of June 2011, Tepco had installed 109 concrete panels to seal the
water intakes of units 1-4, preventing contaminated water leaking to the
harbour. From mid-June some treatment with zeolite of seawater at 30 m3/hr
was being undertaken near the water intakes for units 2&3, inside
submerged barriers installed in April. From October, a steel water shield wall
was built on the sea frontage of units 1-4. It extends about one kilometre,
and down to an impermeable layer beneath two permeable strata which
potentially leak contaminated groundwater to the sea. The inner harbour
area which has some contamination is about 30 ha in area. The government
in September 2013 said that At present, statistically-significant increase of
radioactive concentration in the sea outside the port of the TEPCOs
Fukushima Daiichi NPS has not been detected. And also that The results of
monitoring of sea water in Japan are constantly below the standard of 10
Bq/L (the WHO standard for Cs-137 in drinking water). In 2012 the Japanese
standard for caesium in food supply was dropped from 500 to 100 Bq/kg. In
July-August 2014 only 0.6% of fish caught offshore from the plant exceeded
this lower level, compared with 53% in the months immediately following the
accident.
Apart from the above-ground water treatment activity, there is now a
groundwater bypass to reduce the groundwater level above the reactors by
about 1.5 metres, pumping from 12 wells and from May 2014, discharging
the uncontaminated water into the sea. This prevents some of it flowing into
the reactor basements and becoming contaminated. In addition, an
impermeable wall is being constructed on the sea-side of the reactors, and
inside this a frozen soil wall will further block water flow into the reactor
buildings.
In October 2013 guidelines for rainwater release from the site allowed Tepco
to release water to the sea without specific NRA approval as long as it
conformed to activity limits. Tepco has been working to 25 Bq/L caesium and
10 Bq/L strontium-90.
Summary: A large amount of contaminated water had accumulated on site,
but with the commissioning of a new treatment plant in June 2011 this was
progressively being treated and recycled for reactor cooling. In 2013 a
further, more sophisticated plant was commissioned. The persistence of
tritium limits the potential to release treated water to the sea. Some
radioactivity has been released to the sea, but this has mostly been low-level

and it has not had any significant impact beyond the immediate plant
structures. Concentrations outside these structures have been below
regulatory levels since April 2011.
IRID and NDF involvement
The International Research Institute for Nuclear Decommissioning (IRID) was
set up in August 2013 Japan by JAEA, Japanese utilities and reactor vendors,
with a focus on Fukushima 1-4.
In September 2013 IRID called for submissions on the management of
contaminated water at Fukushima. In particular, proposals were sought for
dealing with: the accumulation of contaminated water (in storage tanks, etc);
the treatment of contaminated water including tritium removal; the removal
of radioactive materials from the seawater in the plant's 30 ha harbour; the
management of contaminated water inside the buildings; measures to block
groundwater from flowing into the site; and, understanding the flow of
groundwater. Responses were submitted to the government in November.
In December 2013 IRID called for innovative proposals for removing fuel
debris from units 1-3 about 2020.
In August 2014 the Nuclear Damage Compensation and Decommissioning
Facilitation Corporation (NDF) was set up by government as a planning body
with management support for R&D projects, taking over IRIDs planning role.
It will work closely with IRID, whose focus now is on developing mid- and
long-term decommissioning technologies. NDF will also work closely with
Tepco Fukushima Daiichi D&D Engineering Co. which has responsibility for
operating the actual decommissioning work there. The NDF will be the main
body interacting with government (METI) to implement policy.
Fukushima Daiichi 5&6
Units 5 & 6, in a separate building, also lost power on 11 March due to the
tsunami. They were in 'cold shutdown' at the time, but still requiring pumped
cooling. One air-cooled diesel generator at Daiichi 6 was located higher and
so survived the tsunami and enabled repairs on Saturday 19th, allowing full
restoration of cooling for units 5 and 6. While the power was off their core
temperature had risen to over 100C (128C in unit 5) under pressure, and

they had been cooled with normal water injection. They were restored to cold
shutdown by the normal recirculating system on 20th, and mains power was
restored on 21-22nd.
In September 2013 Tepco commenced work to remove the fuel from unit 6.
Prime Minister Abe then called for Tepco to decommission both units. Tepco
announced in December 2013 that it would decommission both units from
the end of january 2014. Unit 5 is a 760 MWe BWR the same as units 2-4,
and unit 6 is larger 1067 MWe. They entered commercial operation in 1978
and 1979 respectively. It is proposed that they will be used for training.
Meanwhile Tepco and Mitsubishi plan to build and operate two new 500 MWe
coal-burning power plants near Fukushima Daiichi at Hirono Town and Iwaki
City. This will partly compensate for the decommissioning of the Fukushima
Daiichi units, especially if 5&6 are included. The investment is expected to
be JPY 300 billion ($3 billion). The plants will be state-of-the-art integrated
combined gasification cycle with less atmospheric pollution than the coal
plants now operating in Japan. The companies plan to apply for a
government subsidy to help defray costs. (Mainichi 23/11/13)
Remediation on site and decommissioning units 1-4
Tepco published a six- to nine-month plan in April 2011 for dealing with the
disabled Fukushima reactors, and updated this several times subsequently.
Remediation over the next couple of years proceeded approximately as
planned. in August 2011 Tepco announced its general plan for proceeding
with removing fuel from the four units, initially from the spent fuel ponds and
then from the actual reactors. At the end of 2013 Tepco announced the
establishment of an internal entity to focus on measures for
decommissioning units 1-6 and dealing with contaminated water. The name
of the new company is Fukushima Daiichi Decontamination &
Decommissioning Engineering Company, and it commenced operations in
April 2014.
In June 2015 the government revised the decommissioning plan for the
second time, though without major change. It clarifies milestones to
accomplish preventive and multilayered measures, involving the three
principles of removing the source of the contamination, isolating
groundwater from the contamination source, and preventing leakage of the

contaminated water. It includes a new goal of cutting the amount of

groundwater flowing into the buildings to less than 100 m3 per day by April
2016. The schedule for fuel removal at unit 1 was postponed from late FY17
to FY20, while that for unit 2 was delayed from early FY20 to later the same
fiscal year, and that at unit 3 from early FY15 to FY17. Fuel debris removal is
to begin in 2021, as before. Tepco affirmed the revised plan.
Tepco has a website giving updates on decommissioning work and
environmental monitoring.
Storage ponds: First, debris has been removed from the upper parts of the
reactor buildings using large cranes and heavy machinery. Covers will be
built as required, and overhead cranes and fuel handling machines necessary
to remove the spent fuel assemblies will be reinstalled, as already at unit 4.
That for unit 3 is likely to be completed by March 2015. Casks to transfer the
removed fuel to the central spent fuel facility have been designed and
manufactured using existing cask technology. For unit 4, each cask held 22
fuel assemblies.
In July 2012 two unused fuel assemblies were removed from unit 4 pond, and
were found to be in good shape, with no deformation or corrosion. Tepco
started removal of both fresh and used fuel from the pond in November
2013, 22 assemblies at a time in each cask, with 1331 used and 202 new
ones to be moved. This has been uneventful, and the task is expected to
continue through 2014, with 70 cask shuttles. By 22 December 2014, all
1331 used as well as all 202 new fuel assemblies had been moved in 71
cask shuttles without incident, with weekly updates having been
published. All of the radioactive used fuel was removed by early November,
eliminating a significant radiological hazard on the site. Transfers were
suspended July to September 2014 to allow work on the crane involved. The
used fuel goes to the central storage pond, from which older assemblies are
transferred to dry cask storage 1004 moved since the accident by 30 June
to make way for new inputs from unit 4. The fresh fuel assemblies are stored
in the pool of the undamaged unit 6.
In 2015 Tepco expects to move 514 used fuel assemblies and 52 new ones
from unit 3 to the central pool, and then 292 used fuel assemblies and 100
new ones from unit 1. Finally unit 2 will have its 587 used assemblies and 28
fresh ones moved.

Reactors 1-3: First it is necessary to identify the locations of leaks from the
primary containment vessels (PCVs) and reactor buildings using manual and
remotely controlled dosimeters, cameras, etc., and indirectly analyse
conditions inside the PCVs from the outside via measurements of gamma
rays, echo soundings, etc. Any leakage points will be repaired and both
reactor vessels (RPVs) and PCVs filled with water sufficient to achieve
shielding. Then the vessel heads will be removed. The location of melted fuel
and corium will then be established. In particular, the distribution of
damaged fuel believed to have flowed out from the reactor pressure vessels
(RPVs) into PCVs will be ascertained, and it will be sampled and analysed.
After examination of the inside of the reactors, states of the damaged fuel
rods and reactor core internals, sampling will be done and the damaged core
material will be removed from the RPVs as well as from the PCVs. The whole
process will be complex and slow, since safety remains paramount. In
December Tepco estimates that the fuel will be removed from the reactors
within 25 years in line with US experience at Three Mile Island, though
other estimates suggest ten years. Updated plans are on IRID website.
The four reactors will be completely demolished in 30-40 years much the
same timeframe as for any nuclear plant. As noted above units 5-6 are to be
decommissioned in 2014 and will be used for training.
Earlier, consortia led by both Hitachi-GE and Toshiba submitted proposals to
Tepco for decommissioning units 1-4. This would generally involve removing
the fuel and then sealing them for a further decade or two while the
activation products in the steel of the reactor pressure vessels decay. They
can then be demolished. As noted above, removal of the very degraded fuel
will be a long process in units 1-3, but will draw on experience at Three Mile
Island in USA. In January 2012 it was reported that an industry consortium
(Hitachi GE Nuclear Energy, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Toshiba) would
determine how to locate fuel debris inside units 1-3 and how to fill the
pressure vessels with water.
Tepco has allocated 207 billion ($2.53 billion) in its accounts for
decommissioning units 1-4. The government has allocated 1150 billion ($15
billion) for decontamination in the region, with the promise of more if
needed.

The new International Research Institute for Nuclear Decommissioning (IRID)

has a focus on Fukushima 1-4. See section above. Its schedule for units 1-4
is:
Removal of fuel from spent fuel pools

Fuel debris retrieval

Unit 1

FY 2017

FY 2020 to 2022

Unit 2

FY 2017 to FY 2023

FY 2020 to 2024

Unit 3

2015

FY 2021 to 2023

Unit 4

2014 (completed)

not applicable

FY 20XX ends the following March

A 12-member international expert team assembled by the IAEA at the
request of the Japanese government has reported on remediation strategies
for contaminated land. The mission focused on the remediation of the
affected areas outside of the 20 km restricted area. The team said that it
agreed with the prioritization and the general strategy being implemented,
but advised the government to focus on actual dose reduction. They should
"avoid over-conservatism" which "could not effectively contribute to the
reduction of exposure doses" to people. It warned the government against
being preoccupied with "contamination concentrations rather than dose
levels," since this "does not automatically lead to reduction of doses for the
public." The team's report calls on the Japanese authorities to "maintain their
focus on remediation activities that bring best results in reducing the doses
to the public."
Fukushima Daini plant
Units 1-4 were shut down automatically due to the earthquake. The tsunami here only 9 m high - affected the generators and there was major
interruption to cooling due to damaged heat exchangers, so the reactors
were almost completely isolated from their ultimate heat sink. Damage to
the diesel generators was limited and also the earthquake left one of the
external power lines intact, avoiding a station blackout as at Daiichi 1-4. Staff

laid and energised 8.8km of heavy-duty electric cables in 30 hours to

supplement power.
In units 1, 2 & 4 there were cooling problems still evident on Tuesday 15th.
Unit 3 was undamaged and continued to 'cold shutdown' status on 12th, but
the other units suffered flooding to pump rooms where the equipment
transfers heat from the reactor heat removal circuit to the sea. Pump motors
were replaced in less than 30 hours. All units achieved 'cold shutdown' by16
March, meaning core temperature less than 100C at atmospheric pressure
(101 kPa), but still requiring some water circulation. The almost complete
loss of ultimate heat sink for a day proved a major challenge, but the cores
were kept fully covered.
Radiation monitoring figures remained at low levels, little above background.
There is no technical reason for the Fukushima Daini plant not to restart.
restart. However, Tepco in October 2012 said it planned to transfer the fuel
from the four reactors to used fuel ponds by March 2015. In February 2015
the prime minister said that restarting the four units was essentially a matter
for Tepco to decide.
International Nuclear Event Scale assessment
Japan's Nuclear & Industrial Safety Agency originally declared the Fukushima
Daiichi 1-3 accident as Level 5 on the International Nuclear Events Scale
(INES) an accident with wider consequences, the same level as Three Mile
Island in 1979. The sequence of events relating to the fuel pond at unit 4 was
rated INES Level 3 a serious incident.
However, a month after the tsunami the NSC raised the rating to 7 for units
1-3 together, 'a major accident', saying that a re-evaluation of early
radioactive releases suggested that some 630 PBq of I-131 equivalent had
been discharged, mostly in the first week. This then matched the criterion for
level 7. In early June NISA increased its estimate of releases to 770 PBq, from
about half that, though in August the NSC lowered this estimate to 570 PBq
For Fukushima Daini, NISA declared INES Level 3 for units 1, 2, 4 each a
serious incident.

Accident liability and compensation

Beyond whatever insurance Tepco might carry for its reactors is the question
of third party liability for the accident. Japan is not party to any international
liability convention but its law generally conforms to them, notably strict and
exclusive liability for the operator. Two laws governing them are revised
about every ten years: the Law on Compensation for Nuclear Damage and
Law on Contract for Liability Insurance for Nuclear Damage. Plant operator
liability is exclusive and absolute (regardless of fault), and power plant
operators must provide a financial security amount of JPY 120 billion (US$
1.46 billion) it was half that to 2010. The government may relieve the
operator of liability if it determines that damage results from a grave
natural disaster of an exceptional character (which it did not do here), and
in any case total liability is unlimited.
In mid-April 2011, the first meeting was held of a panel to address
compensation for nuclear-related damage. The panel established guidelines
for determining the scope of compensation for damage caused by the
accident, and to act as an intermediary. It was established within the Ministry
of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT), and is led by
Law Professor Yoshihisa Nomi of Gakushuin, University in Tokyo.
On 11 May 2011, Tepco accepted terms established by the Japanese
government for state support to compensate those affected by the accident
at the Fukushima Daiichi plant. The scheme includes a new state-backed
institution to expedite payments to those affected by the Fukushima
accident. The body would receive financial contributions from electric power
companies with nuclear power plants in Japan, and from the government
through special bonds that can be cashed whenever necessary. The
government bonds total JPY 5 trillion ($62 billion). Tepco accepted the
conditions imposed on the company as part of the package. That included
not setting an upper limit on compensation payments to those affected,
making maximum efforts to reduce costs, and an agreement to cooperate
with an independent panel set up to investigate its management.
This Nuclear Damage Compensation Facilitation Corporation, established by
government and nuclear plant operators, includes representatives from other
nuclear generators and will also operate as an insurer for the industry, being
responsible to have plans in place for any future nuclear accidents. The

provision for contributions from other nuclear operators is similar to that in

the USA. The government estimates that Tepco will be able to complete its
repayments in 10 to 13 years, after which it will revert to a fully private
company with no government involvement. Meanwhile it will pay an annual
fee for the government support, maintain adequate power supplies and
ensure plant safety. Tepco estimated its extra costs for fossil fuels in 2011-12
(April-March) would be about JPY 830 billion ($10.7 billion).
On 14 June, Japan's cabinet passed the Nuclear Disaster Compensation Bill,
and a related budget to fund post-tsunami reconstruction was also passed
subsequently.
In September 2011 the Nuclear Damage Compensation Facilitation
Corporation started by working with Tepco to compile a business plan for the
next decade. This was approved by the Ministry of Economy, Trade and
Industry (METI) so that some JPY 900 billion ($11.5 billion) could be released
to the company through bonds issued to the Nuclear Damage Facilitation
Fund to cover compensation payments to March 2012. The plan also involved
Tepco reducing its own costs by JPY 2545 billion ($32.6 billion) over the next
ten years, including shedding 7400 jobs. This special business plan was
superseded by a more comprehensive business plan in March 2012, involving
compensation payments of JPY 910 billion ($11.6 billion) annually. Tepco
wanted to include an electricity rate increase of 17% in the plan, to cover the
additional annual fuel costs for thermal power generation to make up for lost
capacity at idled nuclear power plants.
In February 2012 METI approved a further JPY 690 billion ($8.9 billion) in
compensation support from the Nuclear Damage Liability Facilitation Fund,
subject to Tepco's business plan giving the government voting rights. In June
2012 shareholders voted to sell the Japanese government 50.11% of Tepco's
voting shares and an additional 25.73% with no voting rights, for JPY 1 trillion
(about $12.5 billion), paid through the Nuclear Damage Liability Facilitation
Fund. This was effected at the end of July, so that Tepco then became
government-controlled, at least temporarily. Tepco said it appreciated the
chance to 'transform to New Tepco'.
The government and 12 utilities are contributing funds into the new
institution to pay compensation to individuals and businesses claiming
damages caused by the accident. It received JPY 7 billion ($91 million) in

public funds as well as a total of JPY 7 billion from 12 nuclear plant operators,
the Tepco share of JPY 2379 million ($30 million) being largest. The
percentage of utility contributions was fixed in proportion to the power
output of their plants, so Kansai Electric Power Co. provided JPY 1229 million,
followed by JPY 660 million by Kyushu Electric Power Co. and JPY 622 million
by Chubu Electric Power Co. Japan Nuclear Fuel Ltd., which owns a used
nuclear fuel reprocessing plant in Aomori Prefecture, provided JPY 117 million
to the entity. The utility companies also pay annual contributions to the body.
Tepco is required to make extra contributions, with the specific amount to be
decided later.
In June 2013 Tepco requested a further JPY 666 billion ($6.7 billion) in
government support through the Nuclear Damage Liability Facilitation Fund,
bringing the total amount requested by Tepco to JPY 3.79 trillion ($38 billion).
The company said that more than half of the latest request some JPY 370
billion ($3.7 billion) resulted from the re-evaluation of the evacuation zone
around the damaged plant and a re-examination of the estimated amount
"regarding compensation for mental damages, loss or depreciation of
valuables such as housing lands and buildings." About JPY 43 billion ($431
million) was due to a higher estimate of compensation coming from damages
to the agriculture, forestry and fisheries industries, as well as the food
processing and distribution industries. This, it said, also resulted from
"harmful rumours" about the possible health effects of consuming food
products from the region near the damaged power plant. As restrictions on
the transport of foodstuffs from the Fukushima area seemed set to continue,
an additional JPY 240 billion ($2.4 billion) was included to cover for the
further compensation claims resulting from this.
By mid-May 2014, Tepco had paid JPY 3808 billion ($38 billion) in
compensation, fairly evenly split between businesses and individuals, based
on decisions of the Nuclear Damage Compensation Facilitation Corporation,
and covered by loans from the NDLF Fund. Some $16 billion of this was
distributed evenly among 85,000 evacuees $188,200 each person including
children, as directed early in 2011. (See Tepco link.)
In December 2013 the government raised the upper limit of its financial
assistance to Tepco from JPY 5 trillion to JPY 9 trillion ($86 billion). Early in
2014 the government estimated it would take JPY11 trillion and 40 years to

clean up the Fukushima site. The 2013 Japan trade deficit was JPY 11.5
trillion.
Inquiries and reports: the accident itself and decommissioning
In October 2014 the NRA published its Analysis of the TEPCO Fukushima
Daiichi NPS Accident, Interim Report. A provisional translation in English was
published in February 2015. This focuses on a number of questions which
remained unexplained in the 2012 National Diet Investigation Commission
report.
A number of earlier reports were published in 2011-12:
In May 2011 a team of 18 experts from 12 countries spent a week at the
plant on behalf of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and its
final report was presented to the IAEA Ministerial Conference in Vienna in
June.
Early in June 2011 the independent Investigation Committee on the Accident
at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations (ICANPS), a panel of ten experts,
mostly academics and appointed by the Japanese cabinet, began meeting. It
has two technological advisers. An initial report was published in December
2011 and a final report in July 2012. The panel set up four teams to
undertake investigations on the causes of the accident and ensuing damage
and on measures to prevent the further spread of damage caused by the
accident, but not to pursue the question of responsibility for the accident.
The national Diet later set up a legally-constituted Nuclear Accident
Independent Investigation Commission (NAIIC, or National Diet Investigation
Commission) of ten members which started its work in December 2011. One
of the purposes of NAIIC is to provide suggestions including the reexamination of an optimal administrative organization for nuclear safety
regulation based on its investigation of the accident. NAIIC reported in July
2012, harshly criticizing the government, the plant operator and the
countrys national culture. After conducting 900 hours of public hearings and
interviews with more than 1,100 people and visiting several nuclear power
plants, the commissions report concluded that the accident was a
manmade disaster, the result of collusion between the government, the
regulators and Tokyo Electric Power Co. It said the root causes were the

organizational and regulatory systems that supported faulty rationales for

decisions and actions. The NAIIC criticized the regulator for insufficiently
maintaining independence from the industry in developing and enforcing
safety regulations, the government for inadequate emergency preparedness
and management, and Tepco for its poor governance and lack of safety
culture. The report called for fundamental changes across the industry,
including the government and regulators, to increase openness,
trustworthiness and focus on protecting public health and safety.
The NAIIC Chairman wrote: "What must be admitted very painfully is that
this was a disaster 'Made in Japan.' Its fundamental causes are to be found in
the ingrained conventions of Japanese culture: our reflexive obedience; our
reluctance to question authority; our devotion to 'sticking with the program';
our groupism; and our insularity. The mindset of government and industry
led the country to avoid learning the lessons of the previous major nuclear
accidents at Three Mile Island and Chernobyl. "The consequences of
negligence at Fukushima stand out as catastrophic, but the mindset that
supported it can be found across Japan. In recognizing that fact, each of us
(every Japanese citizen) should reflect on our responsibility as individuals in
a democratic society."
NAIIC reported that Tepco had been aware since 2006 that Fukushuima
Daiichi could face a station blackout if flooded, as well as the potential loss of
ultimate heat sink in the event of a major tsunami. However, the regulator,
NISA, gave no instruction to the company to prepare for severe flooding, and
even told all nuclear operators that it was not necessary to plan for station
blackout. During the initial response to the tsunami, this lack of readiness for
station blackout was compounded by a lack of planning and training for
severe accident mitigation. Plans and procedures for venting and manual
operation of emergency cooling were incomplete and their implementation in
emergency circumstances proved very difficult as a result. NISA was also
criticised for its "negligence and failure over the years" to prepare for a
nuclear accident in terms of public information and evacuation, with previous
governments equally culpable. Then Tepcos difficulty in mitigation was
compounded by government interference which undermined NISA.
On 7 June 2011 the government submitted a 750-page report to IAEA
compiled by the nuclear emergency taskforce, acknowledging reactor design
inadequacies and systemic shortcomings. It said that "In light of the lessons

learned from the accident, Japan has recognized that a fundamental revision
of its nuclear safety preparedness and response is inevitable."
On 11 September 2011 a second report was issued by the government and
submitted to the IAEA, summarising both on-site work and progress and offsite responses. It contained further analysis of the earthquake and tsunami,
the initial responses to manage and cool the reactors, the state of spent fuel
ponds and the state of reactor pressure vessels. It also summarised
radioactive releases and their effects.
Meanwhile a July 2011 report from MIT's Centre for Advanced Nuclear Energy
Systems provided a useful series of observations, questions raised, and
suggestions. Its Appendix has some constructive comment on radiation
exposure and balancing the costs of dose avoidance in circumstances of
environmental contamination.
In November 2011 the US Institute of Nuclear Power Operators (INPO)
released its Special Report on the Nuclear Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi
Nuclear Power Station, with timeline. This 97-page report gives a valuable
and detailed account of events.
Also in November 2011 the Japan Nuclear Technology Institute published a
280-page report on the accident, with proposals to be addressed in the
future.
On 2 December 2011 Tepco released its interim investigation report on the
accident (in Japanese).
The United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation
(UNSCEAR) is undertaking a 12-month study on the magnitude of radioactive
releases to the atmosphere and ocean, and the range of radiation doses
received by the public and workers.
An analysis by the Carnegie Endowment in March 2012 said that if best
practices from other countries had been adopted by Tepco and NISA at
Fukushima, the serious accident would not have happened, underlining the
need for greater international regulatory collaboration.

In April 2012 the US Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI)

published Fukushima Daiichi Accident Technical Causal Factor Analysis,
which identified the root cause beyond the flooding and its effects as a
failure to consider the possibility of the rupture of combinations of geological
fault segments in the vicinity of the plant.
In February 2015 the IAEA completed its third review mission (as follow-up to
that of late 2013, and involving some 180 experts from 42 IAEA member
states and other organizations over two years) and reported on
decommissioning to METI. In May 2015 its final report was delivered to
member states, to be published in September. It was broadly positive
regarding progress since 2013, but said that some challenging issues remain.
It contained advisory points on topics such as long-term radioactive waste
management, measures concerning contaminated water, and issues related
to the removal of used fuel and fuel debris.
Inquiries and reports: radiation effects
A preliminary report from the World Health Organisation (WHO) in May 2012
estimated the radiation doses that residents of Japan outside the evacuated
areas received in the year following the accident. The report's headline
conclusion is that most people in Fukushima prefecture would have received
a radiation dose of between 1 and 10 mSv during the first year after the
accident. This compares with levels of about 2.4 mSv they would have
received from unavoidable natural sources. In two places the doses were
higher between 10 and 50 mSv, still below any harmful level. Almost all
were below the internationally-agreed reference level for the public
exposure due to radon in dwellings (about 10 mSv/yr).
The UN Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation (UNSCEAR) in
May 2012 reported that despite skin contamination of several workers, no
clinically-observable effects have been reported and there is no evidence of
acute radiation injury in any of the 20,115 workers who participated in
Tepcos efforts to mitigate the accident at the plant. Eighteen UNSCEAR
member states provided 72 experts for the assessment. UNSCEAR also
surveyed Fukushima prefecture tol compare its data with Japanese
measurements of exposures of some 2 million people living there at the time
of the accident.

The results of UNSCEARs 12-month study on the magnitude of radioactive

releases to the atmosphere and ocean, and the range of radiation doses
received by the public and workers were announced in May 2013 are
reported above in the subsection on Radiation Exposure.
UNSCEARs final report of radiation effects was released in April 2014. This
concluded that the rates of cancer or hereditary diseases were unlikely to
show any discernible rise in affected areas because the radiation doses
people received were too low. People were promptly evacuated from the
vicinity of the nuclear power plant, and later from a neighbouring area where
radionuclides had accumulated. This action reduced their radiation exposure
by a factor of ten, to levels that were "low or very low." Overall, people in
Fukushima are expected on average to receive less than 10 mSv due to the
accident over their whole lifetime, compared with the 170 mSv lifetime dose
from natural background radiation that people in Japan typically receive.
"The most important health effect is on mental and social well-being, related
to the enormous impact of the earthquake, tsunami and nuclear accident,
and the fear and stigma related to the perceived risk of exposure to
radiation."
In October 2013 a 16-member IAEA mission visited at government request
and reported on remediation and decontamination in particular. Its
preliminary report said that decontamination efforts were commendable but
driven by unrealistic targets.
"Stress Tests" on Japanese reactors and new regulatory authority
The government ordered nuclear risk and safety reassessments so-called
"stress tests" based on those in the EU for all Japan's nuclear reactors
except Fukushima's before they restart following any shutdown, including for
routine checks. These were in two stages, and are described in the Japan
paper.
The government then created a separate Nuclear Regulatory Agency (NRA)
under the authority of the Environment Ministry and combining the roles of
NISA and NSC, commissioned in September 2012. A new Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC) replaced the NSC and will review the effectiveness of the
NRA and be responsible for the investigation of nuclear accidents