Succession Cases 857914

Succession case 857-914
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-27952 February 15, 1982
TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ, MARIA LUISA PALACIOS,
Administratrix, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
MARCELLE D. VDA. DE RAMIREZ, ET AL., oppositors, JORGE and ROBERTO
RAMIREZ, legatees, oppositors- appellants.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:

The main issue in this appeal is the manner of partitioning the testate estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez
among the principal beneficiaries, namely: his widow Marcelle Demoron de Ramirez; his two
grandnephews Roberto and Jorge Ramirez; and his companion Wanda de Wrobleski.
The task is not trouble-free because the widow Marcelle is a French who lives in Paris, while the
companion Wanda is an Austrian who lives in Spain. Moreover, the testator provided for substitutions.
Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on December 11, 1964, with only his widow
as compulsory heir. His will was admitted to probate by the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch
X, on July 27, 1965. Maria Luisa Palacios was appointed administratrix of the estate. In due time she
submitted an inventory of the estate as follows:
INVENTARIO
Una sexta parte (1/6) proindiviso de un te
rreno, con sus mejoras y edificaciones, situadoen
la Escolta, Manila............................................................. P500,000.00
Una sexta parte (1/6) proindiviso de dos
parcelas de terreno situadas en Antipolo, Rizal................... 658.34
Cuatrocientos noventa y uno (491) acciones
de la 'Central Azucarera de la Carlota a P17.00
por accion ................................................................................8,347.00
Diez mil ochocientos seize (10,806) acciones
de la 'Central Luzon Milling Co.', disuelta y en
liquidacion a P0.15 por accion ..............................................1,620.90
Cuenta de Ahorros en el Philippine Trust
Co.............................................................................................. 2,350.73
TOTAL.............................................................. P512,976.97
Credits to james perez
Page
Deuda al Banco de las Islas Filipinas, garan-
MENOS:
tizada con prenda de las acciones de La Carlota ......... P 5,000,00

VALOR LIQUIDO........................................... P507,976.97
The testamentary dispositions are as follows:
A.En nuda propiedad, a D. Roberto y D. Jorge Ramirez, ambas menores de edad,
residentes en Manila, I.F., calle 'Alright, No. 1818, Malate, hijos de su sobrino D. Jose
Ma. Ramirez, con sustitucion vulgar a favor de sus respectivos descendientes, y, en su
defecto, con sustitucion vulgar reciprocal entre ambos.
El precedente legado en nuda propiedad de la participacion indivisa de la finca Santa
Cruz Building, lo ordena el testador a favor de los legatarios nombrados, en atencion a
que dicha propiedad fue creacion del querido padre del otorgante y por ser aquellos
continuadores del apellido Ramirez,
B.Y en usufructo a saber:
a. En cuanto a una tercera parte, a favor de la esposa del testador, Da. Marcelle
Ramirez, domiciliada en IE PECO, calle del General Gallieni No. 33, Seine Francia, con
sustitucion vulgar u fideicomisaria a favor de Da. Wanda de Wrobleski, de Palma de
Mallorca, Son Rapina Avenida de los Reyes 13,
b.Y en cuanto a las dos terceras partes restantes, a favor de la nombrada Da. Wanda
de Nrobleski con sustitucion vulgar v fideicomisaria a saber:
En cuanto a la mitad de dichas dos terceras partes, a favor de D. Juan Pablo
Jankowski, de Son Rapina Palma de Mallorca; y encuanto a la mitad restante, a favor
de su sobrino, D. Horace V. Ramirez, San Luis Building, Florida St. Ermita, Manila, I.F.
A pesar de las sustituciones fideiconiisarias precedentemente ordinadas, las
usufiructuarias nombradas conjuntamente con los nudo propietarios, podran en
cualquier memento vender a tercero los bienes objeto delegado, sin intervencion
alguna de los titulares fideicomisaarios.
On June 23, 1966, the administratrix submitted a project of partition as follows: the property of the
deceased is to be divided into two parts. One part shall go to the widow 'en pleno dominio" in
satisfaction of her legitime; the other part or "free portion" shall go to Jorge and Roberto Ramirez "en
nuda propriedad." Furthermore, one third (1/3) of the free portion is charged with the widow's usufruct
and the remaining two-thirds (2/3) with a usufruct in favor of Wanda.
Jorge and Roberto opposed the project of partition on the grounds: (a) that the provisions for vulgar
substitution in favor of Wanda de Wrobleski with respect to the widow's usufruct and in favor of Juan
Pablo Jankowski and Horacio V. Ramirez, with respect to Wanda's usufruct are invalid because the
first heirs Marcelle and Wanda) survived the testator; (b) that the provisions for fideicommissary
substitutions are also invalid because the first heirs are not related to the second heirs or substitutes
within the first degree, as provided in Article 863 of the Civil Code; (c) that the grant of a usufruct over
real property in the Philippines in favor of Wanda Wrobleski, who is an alien, violates Section 5,
Article III of the Philippine Constitution; and that (d) the proposed partition of the testator's interest in
the Santa Cruz (Escolta) Building between the widow Marcelle and the appellants, violates the
testator's express win to give this property to them Nonetheless, the lower court approved the project
of partition in its order dated May 3, 1967. It is this order which Jorge and Roberto have appealed to
this Court.
Page
The appellant's do not question the legality of giving Marcelle one-half of the estate in full ownership.
They admit that the testator's dispositions impaired his widow's legitime. Indeed, under Art. 900 of the
Civil Code "If the only survivor is the widow or widower, she or he shall be entitled to one-half of the
hereditary estate." And since Marcelle alone survived the deceased, she is entitled to one-half of his
1. The widow's legitime.
estate over which he could impose no burden, encumbrance, condition or substitution of any kind
whatsoever. (Art. 904, par. 2, Civil Code.)
It is the one-third usufruct over the free portion which the appellants question and justifiably so. It
appears that the court a quo approved the usufruct in favor of Marcelle because the testament
provides for a usufruct in her favor of one-third of the estate. The court a quo erred for Marcelle who
is entitled to one-half of the estate "en pleno dominio" as her legitime and which is more than what
she is given under the will is not entitled to have any additional share in the estate. To give Marcelle
more than her legitime will run counter to the testator's intention for as stated above his dispositions
even impaired her legitime and tended to favor Wanda.
2. The substitutions.
It may be useful to recall that "Substitution is the appoint- judgment of another heir so that he may
enter into the inheritance in default of the heir originally instituted." (Art. 857, Civil Code. And that
there are several kinds of substitutions, namely: simple or common, brief or compendious, reciprocal,
and fideicommissary (Art. 858, Civil Code.) According to Tolentino, "Although the Code enumerates
four classes, there are really only two principal classes of substitutions: the simple and
the fideicommissary. The others are merely variations of these two." (111 Civil Code, p. 185 [1973].)
The simple or vulgar is that provided in Art. 859 of the Civil Code which reads:
ART. 859. The testator may designate one or more persons to substitute the heir or
heirs instituted in case such heir or heirs should die before him, or should not wish, or
should be incapacitated to accept the inheritance.
A simple substitution, without a statement of the cases to which it refers, shall comprise
the three mentioned in the preceding paragraph, unless the testator has otherwise
provided.
The fideicommissary substitution is described in the Civil Code as follows:
ART. 863. A fideicommissary substitution by virtue of which the fiduciary or first heir
instituted is entrusted with the obligation to preserve and to transmit to a second heir the
whole or part of inheritance, shall be valid and shall take effect, provided such
substitution does not go beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted, and
provided further that the fiduciary or first heir and the second heir are living at time of
the death of the testator.
It will be noted that the testator provided for a vulgar substitution in respect of the legacies of Roberto
and Jorge Ramirez, the appellants, thus: con sustitucion vulgar a favor de sus respectivos
descendientes, y, en su defecto, con substitution vulgar reciprocal entre ambos.
The appellants do not question the legality of the substitution so provided. The appellants question
the sustitucion vulgar y fideicomisaria a favor de Da. Wanda de Wrobleski" in connection with the
one-third usufruct over the estate given to the widow Marcelle However, this question has become
moot because as We have ruled above, the widow is not entitled to any usufruct.
The appellants also question the sustitucion vulgar y fideicomisaria in connection with Wanda's
usufruct over two thirds of the estate in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace v. Ramirez.
Page
As regards the substitution in its fideicommissary aspect, the appellants are correct in their claim that
it is void for the following reasons:
They allege that the substitution in its vulgar aspect as void because Wanda survived the testator or
stated differently because she did not predecease the testator. But dying before the testator is not the
only case for vulgar substitution for it also includes refusal or incapacity to accept the inheritance as
provided in Art. 859 of the Civil Code, supra. Hence, the vulgar substitution is valid.
(a) The substitutes (Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez) are not related to Wanda, the heir
originally instituted. Art. 863 of the Civil Code validates a fideicommissary substitution "provided such
substitution does not go beyond one degree from the heir originally instituted."
What is meant by "one degree" from the first heir is explained by Tolentino as follows:
Scaevola Maura, and Traviesas construe "degree" as designation, substitution, or
transmission. The Supreme Court of Spain has decidedly adopted this construction.
From this point of view, there can be only one tranmission or substitution, and the
substitute need not be related to the first heir. Manresa, Morell and Sanchez Roman,
however, construe the word "degree" as generation, and the present Code has
obviously followed this interpretation. by providing that the substitution shall not go
beyond one degree "from the heir originally instituted." The Code thus clearly indicates
that the second heir must be related to and be one generation from the first heir.
From this, it follows that the fideicommissary can only be either a child or a parent of the
first heir. These are the only relatives who are one generation or degree from the
fiduciary (Op. cit., pp. 193-194.)
(b) There is no absolute duty imposed on Wanda to transmit the usufruct to the substitutes as
required by Arts. 865 and 867 of the Civil Code. In fact, the appellee admits "that the testator
contradicts the establishment of a fideicommissary substitution when he permits the properties
subject of the usufruct to be sold upon mutual agreement of the usufructuaries and the naked
owners." (Brief, p. 26.)
3. The usufruct of Wanda.
The appellants claim that the usufruct over real properties of the estate in favor of Wanda is void
because it violates the constitutional prohibition against the acquisition of lands by aliens.
The 1935 Constitution which is controlling provides as follows:
SEC. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be
transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines. (Art. XIII.)
The court a quo upheld the validity of the usufruct given to Wanda on the ground that the Constitution
covers not only succession by operation of law but also testamentary succession. We are of the
opinion that the Constitutional provision which enables aliens to acquire private lands does not extend
to testamentary succession for otherwise the prohibition will be for naught and meaningless. Any
alien would be able to circumvent the prohibition by paying money to a Philippine landowner in
exchange for a devise of a piece of land.
This opinion notwithstanding, We uphold the usufruct in favor of Wanda because a usufruct, albeit a
real right, does not vest title to the land in the usufructuary and it is the vesting of title to land in favor
of aliens which is proscribed by the Constitution.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez is hereby ordered distributed as
follows:
One-half (1/2) thereof to his widow as her legitime;
SO ORDERED.
Page
The distribution herein ordered supersedes that of the court a quo. No special pronouncement as to
costs.
One-half (1/2) thereof which is the free portion to Roberto and Jorge Ramirez in naked ownership and
the usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski with a simple substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and
Horace V. Ramirez.
Barredo (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., De Castro, Ericta and Escolin, JJ., concur.
Aquino J., took no part.
PCIB vs. ESCOLIN 56 scra 266

Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank, Administrator of the Testate Estate of
Charles Newton Hodges, vs. Hon. Venicio Escolin (CFI-Iloilo) and Avelina A. Magno;
Testate Estate of the late Linnie Jane Hodges. Testate Estate of the late Charles Newton
Hodges. PCIB, administrator-appellant, vs. Lorenzo Carles, Jose Pablico, Alfredo
Catedral, Salvador Guzman, Belcesar Causing, Florenia Barrido, Purificacion Coronado,
Graciano Lucero, Ariteo Thomas Jamir, Melquiades Batisanan, Pepito Iyulores, Esperidion
Partisala, Winifredo Espada, Rosario Alingasa, Adelfa Premaylon, Santiago Pacaonsis,
and Avelina A. Magno, appellees, Western Institute of Technology, Inc., movant-appellee
March 29, 1974; Barredo, J.
*This case has the length of a PIL case. Court admitted several times that it was clueless
as to some facts so it copied into the decision entire pleadings. (!!!)Plus, PCIB raised 78
assignment of errors! Well probably read the case again in Spec Pro.
Short version: The Hodges lived in the Philippines for almost half a century and died
leaving substantial properties in Iloilo and in the US. The missus died 5 years before the
husband, providing in her will that while her estate would go to him, upon his death, the
remainder should pass to her siblings. (They were childless.) The court held that this
testamentary provision, while probably ineffectual as a substitution under the Civil Code,
is not actually a substitution, but is a valid and simultaneous institution of heirs, though
the passing of title to the inheritance to the others (the siblings) was made to depend on
a resolutory condition (the husbands death). Case was remanded to the trial court for
the determination of the proper application of the renvoi principle (conflict of laws
between Philippines and Texas law), and the proper distribution of Linnies, Charles, and
their conjugal estates.
Page
When Linnie died, Charles took the will to probate court, and was appointed Executor,
then later, Special Administrator. He moved to be allowed to continue administering the
family business, as per Linnie Janes wishes, and to engage in sales, conveyances,
leases, mortgages and other necessary transactions. He also filed the necessary and
Facts:
Charles Newton Hodges and Linnie Jane Hodges were originally from Texas, USA. During
their marriage, they had acquired and accumulated considerable assets and properties in
the Philippines and in Oklahoma and Texas in the US. They both lived, worked and were
domiciled in Iloilo City for around 50 years. Before her death, Linnie Jane executed a will
leaving her estate, less her debts and funeral expenses, to her husband Charles. Should
Charles die, the will provided that the remainder of her estate go to her brothers and
sisters, share and share alike. Should any of the brothers and sisters die before the
husband, Linnie willed that the heirs of the said sibling be substituted in the deceaseds
siblings place.
appurtenant administration/accounting records, and income tax returns for the estate.
Charles named seven brothers and sisters of Linnie Jane as her heirs (Esta, Emma,
Leonard, Aline, David, Sadie, Era and Nimroy), but the order admitting the will to
probate unfortunately omitted one of the heirs, Roy (Nimroy?) Higdon, so Charles filed a
verified motion to have Roys name included.
As an executor, he was bound to file tax returns for the estate he was administering
under American law. He did file such as estate tax return on August 8, 1958. In
Schedule "M" of such return, he answered "Yes" to the question as to whether he was
contemplating "renouncing the will". On the question as to what property interests
passed to him as the surviving spouse, he answered:
None, except for purposes of administering the Estate, paying debts, taxes and
other legal charges. It is the intention of the surviving husband of deceased to
distribute the remaining property and interests of the deceased in their
Community estate to the devisees and legatees named in the will when the debts,
liabilities, taxes and expenses of administration are finally determined and paid.
Charles died in Iloilo in December 1962 without having liquidated Linnies estate, which
includes her share in the conjugal partnership. A longtime employee of the Hodges,
Avelina Magno, was appointed Administratrix (for Linnies estate) and a Special
Administratrix (for Charles). Magno was appointed, but later Harold Davies
(representative of Charles heirs in the US) was designated Co-Special Administrator,
who was then replaced by one Joe Hodges, Charles nephew. One Atty. Mirasol was also
appointed as co-administrator, and an order of probate and letters of administration
were issued to Hodges and Mirasol.
At this point, the SC was already very much confused about the gaps in the facts,
convinced that the parties representing both estates had cooked up a modus operandi to
settle money matters (a settlement with records the Court never saw)which, however,
went awry, with more and more heirs from the US flocking to the Iloilo shores, and
lawyers (Ozaetas! Mabantas! Manglapuses!) filing their respective claims for retainer
fees. Much much later, PCIB became the administrator of Charles estate, asserting a
claim to all of his estate, including those properties/assets that passed to him upon
Linnie Janes death. Avelina naturally opposed this, as Linnie Janes other heirs (the
HIGDONS) would be prejudiced, so she continued acting in her capacity as administrator
(entering into sales and other such conveyances). For these acts, the PCIB dismissed
her as an employee of Charles estate, to which she responded by locking up the
premises being used by PCIB as offices, which were among the estates properties.
PCIBs Claims
Linnie intended Philippine laws to govern her Will.

Article 16, CC, provides that "the national law of the person whose succession is
under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless
Page
Linnie Janes will should be governed by Philippine Law, with respect to the order of
succession, the amount of successional rights, and the intrinsic validity of its
testamentary provisions.
There are generally only two kinds of substitution provided for and authorized by
our Civil Code (Articles 857-870), namely, (1) simple or common substitution,
sometimes referred to as vulgar substitution (Article 859), and (2)
fideicommissary substitution (Article 863). All other substitutions are merely
variations of these. The substitution provided for by paragraph four of the Will of
Linnie Jane Hodges is not fideicommissary substitution, because there is clearly no
obligation on the part of C. N. Hodges as the first heir designated, to preserve the
properties for the substitute heirs. At most, it is a vulgar or simple substitution.
However, in order that a vulgar orsimple substitution can be valid, three
alternative conditions must be present, namely, that the first designated heir (1)
should die before the testator; or (2) should not wish to accept the inheritance; or
(3) should be incapacitated to do so. None of these conditions apply to C. N.
Hodges, and, therefore, the substitution provided for by the above-quoted
Page
of the country wherein said property may be found", shall prevail. However, the
Conflict of Law of Texas, which is the "national law" of the testatrix, Linnie Jane
Hodges, provide that the domiciliary law (Philippine law) should govern the
testamentary dispositions and successional rights over movables, and the law of
the situs of the property (also Philippine law as to properties located in the
Philippines) as regards immovables.
Thus applying the "Renvoi Doctrine", as approved and applied in the Christensen
case (1963), Philippine law should apply.
Under Philippine and Texas law, the conjugal or community estate of spouses
shall, upon dissolution, be divided equally between them. Thus, upon Linnies
death, of the entirety of the assets of the Hodges spouses constituting their
conjugal estate pertained automatically to Charles, not by way of inheritance, but
in his own right as partner in the conjugal partnership.
The other one-half (1/2) portion forming part of Linnies estate, cannot, under a
clear and specific provision of her Will, be enhanced or increased by income,
earnings, rents, or emoluments accruing after her death. All rents, emoluments
and income from said estate shall belong to him (C. N. Hodges) and he is further
authorized to use any part of the principal of said estate as he may need or
desire."
Articles 900, 995 and 1001 provide that the surviving spouse of a deceased
leaving no ascendants or descendants is entitled, as a matter of right and by way
of irrevocable legitime, to at least one-half (1/2) of the estate of the deceased,
and no testamentary disposition by the deceased can legally and validly affect this
right of the surviving spouse. In fact, her husband is entitled to said one-half (1/2)
portion of her estate by way of legitime. (Article 886)
Clearly, therefore, immediately upon the death of Linnie Jane Hodges, C. N.
Hodges was the owner of at least 3/4 or 75% percent of all of the conjugal assets
of the spouses, 50% by way of conjugal partnership share and 1/4 or 25% by way
of inheritance and legitime) plus all "rents, emoluments and income" accruing to
said conjugal estate from the moment of Linnie Jane Hodges' death.
In his capacity as sole heir and successor to Linnies estate, Charles appropriated
to himself the entirety of her estate. He operated all the assets, engaged in
business and performed all acts in connection with the entirety of the conjugal
estate, in his own name alone, just as he had been operating, engaging and doing
while the late Linnie Jane Hodges was still alive. Upon his death on December 25,
1962, therefore, all said conjugal assets were in his sole possession and control,
and registered in his name alone, not as executor, but as exclusive owner of all
said assets.
As the sole and exclusive heir, Charles did not need to liquidate the estate. Neither
was there any asset left to Linnies estate at the time of Charles death, though
Linnies estate may have referred to all of the rest, residue and remainder of my
estate which would go to her siblings in the event of Charles death. The provision
is thus void and invalid at least as to Philippine assets.
provision of the Will is not authorized by the Code, and, therefore, it is

void. Manresa even said, when another heir is designated to inherit upon the
death of a first heir, the second designation can have effect only in case the first
instituted heir dies before the testator, whether or not that was the true intention
of said testator.
The remedy of the Higdons, then, who are claiming dubious rights to of the
conjugal estate of the Hodges, is to file a claim against the estate of Charles.
It also follows that the conveyances executed by Avelina, claiming to be merely in
continuation of the Hodges businesses, and which corresponding deeds of sale
were confirmed by the probate court, are null and void and should be subject to
reconveyance.
Avelinas Claims
(At one point, even Linnies heirs wanted to have Avelina removed from her capacity as
administrator, but the lower court reversed its earlier grant of the motion, on account of
a previous injunction it issued.)
Linnie Jane merely gave Charles a life-estate or a usufruct over all her estate, and
gave a vested remainder-estate or the naked title over the same estate, to her
relatives.
After Linnies death, Charles, as administrator and executor of the will,
unequivocably and clearly through oral and written declarations and sworn public
statements, renounced, disclaimed and repudiated his life-estate and usufruct.
Since there was no separation or segregation of the interests of Linnie and Charles
in the combined conjugal estate, as there has been no such separation or
segregation, and because of Charles repudiation, both interests have continually
earned exactly the same amount of rents, emoluments and income.
Issue:
1. Is Linnies disposition in favor of her siblings void? NO
2. How should the estate be partitioned/liquidated? REMAND!
Reasoning:
Page
The error in PCIB's position lies simply in the fact that it views the said disposition
exclusively in the light of substitutions covered by the Civil Code section on that subject,
(Section 3, Chapter 2, Title IV, Book III) when it is obvious that substitution occurs only
when another heir is appointed in a will "so that he may enter into inheritance in default
of the heir originally instituted," (Article 857) and, in the present case, no such possible
default is contemplated. The brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges are not substitutes for
Hodges because, under her will, they are not to inherit what Hodges cannot, would not
or may not inherit, but what he would not dispose of from his inheritance; rather,
1. To a certain extent, PCIBs contention that Linnies testamentary substitution, when

viewed as a substitution, may not be given effect, is correct. Indeed, legally speaking,
Linnies will provides neither for a simple or vulgar substitution under Article 859 of the
Civil Code nor for a fideicommissary substitution under Article 863 thereof. There is no
vulgar substitution because there is no provision for either (1) predecease of the
testator by the designated heir or (2) refusal or (3) incapacity of the latter to accept the
inheritance, as required by Article 859; and neither is there a fideicommissary
substitution therein because no obligation is imposed thereby upon Hodges to preserve
the estate or any part thereof for anyone else. But from these premises, it is not correct
to jump to the conclusion, as PCIB does, that the testamentary dispositions in question
are therefore inoperative and invalid.
therefore, they are also heirs instituted simultaneously with Hodges, subject, however,
to certain conditions, partially resolutory insofar as Hodges was concerned and
correspondingly suspensive with reference to his brothers and sisters-in-law. It is
partially resolutory, since it bequeaths unto Hodges the whole of her estate to be owned
and enjoyed by him as universal and sole heir with absolute dominion over them only
during his lifetime, which means that while he could completely and absolutely dispose
of any portion thereof inter vivos to anyone other than himself, he was not free to do
so mortis causa, and all his rights to what might remain upon his death would cease
entirely upon the occurrence of that contingency, inasmuch as the right of his brothers
and sisters-in-law to the inheritance, although vested already upon the death of Mrs.
Hodges, would automatically become operative upon the occurrence of the death of
Hodges in the event of actual existence of any remainder of her estate then.
Contrary to Avelinas view, however, it was not the usufruct alone of Linnies estate, as
contemplated in Article 869, that she bequeathed to Charles during his lifetime, but the
full ownership thereof, although the same was to last also during his lifetime only, even
as there was no restriction whatsoever against his disposing or conveying the whole or
any portion thereof to anybody other than himself. The Court saw no legal impediment
to this kind of institution, except that it cannot apply to the legitime of Charles as the
surviving spouse, consisting of one-half of the estate, considering that Linnie had no
surviving ascendants nor descendants. (Arts. 872, 900, and 904.)
Page
Thus, he recognized, in his own way, the separate identity of his wifes estate from his
own share of the conjugal partnership up to the time of his death, more than 5 years
after that of his wife. He never considered the whole estate as a single one belonging
exclusively to himself. The only conclusion one can gather from this is that he could
have been preparing the basis for the eventual transmission of his wife's estate, or, at
least, so much thereof as he would not have been able to dispose of during his lifetime,
to her brothers and sisters in accordance with her expressed desire, as intimated in his
tax return in the US. And assuming that he did pay the corresponding estate and
inheritance taxes in the Philippines on the basis of his being sole heir, such payment is
not necessarily inconsistent with his recognition of the rights of his co-heirs. The Court
thus viewed that under the peculiar provisions of his wife's will, and for purposes of the
applicable inheritance tax laws, Hodges had to be considered as her sole heir, pending
the actual transmission of the remaining portion of her estate to her other heirs, upon
the eventuality of his death, and whatever adjustment might be warranted should there
be any such remainder then is a matter that could well be taken care of by the internal
revenue authorities in due time. The Court also considered as basis of Charles intentions
several questionnaires in solemn forms in filing estate taxes abroad, though they have
not been introduced in evidence (!!!), only referred to several times by the parties.
Hodges acts of administration and accounting strongly negate PCIBs claims that he had
adjudicated to himself all of Linnies estate. While he may have used language like
herein executor (being) the only devisee or legatee of the deceased, in accordance with
the last will and testament already probated there is no other person interested in the
Philippines of the time and place of examining herein account to be given notice, he
wouldve known that doing so would impute bad faith unto him. Also, in his very
motions, Hodges asserted the rights of Linnies named heirs. He even moved to include
Roys name included in the probate courts order, lest Roys heirs think that they had
been omitted.
It is obvious, though, that Charles procrastinating in settling Linnies estate, and his sole
administration of it, commingled his and his co-heirs interests, making it difficult to
properly make an accounting of their shares. PCIB, then, cannot administer the
properties on its own. What would be just and proper is for both administrators of the
two estates to act conjointly until after said estates have been segregated from each
other.
2. The parties were in disagreement as to how Article 16 of the Civil Code should be
applied. On the one hand, PCIB claimed that inasmuch as Linnie was a resident of the
Philippines at the time of her death, under said Article 16, construed in relation to the
pertinent laws of Texas and the principle of renvoi, what should be applied here should
be the rules of succession under the Civil Code, and, therefore, her estate could consist
of no more than one-fourth of the said conjugal properties, the other fourth being, as
already explained, the legitime of her husband (Art. 900) which she could not have
disposed of nor burdened with any condition (Art. 872). On the other hand, Avelina
denied that Linnie died a resident of the Philippines, since allegedly she never changed
nor intended to change her original residence of birth in Texas, United States of
America, and contends that, anyway, regardless of the question of her residence, she
being indisputably a citizen of Texas, under said Article 16 of the Civil Code, the
distribution of her estate is subject to the laws of said State which, according to her, do
not provide for any legitime, hence, Linnies brothers and sisters are entitled to the
remainder of the whole of her share of the conjugal partnership properties consisting of
one-half thereof. Avelina further maintained that, in any event, Charles had renounced
his rights under the will in favor of his co-heirs, as allegedly proven by the documents
touching on the point already mentioned earlier, the genuineness and legal significance
of which PCIB questioned.
The Court cannot decide on the claims, though, for neither the evidence submitted by
the parties appeared to be adequate enough for it to render an intelligent
comprehensive and just resolution. No clear and reliable proof of what in fact the
possibly applicable laws of Texas are, was presented (Remember judicial notice in case
of foreign laws?). Then also, the genuineness of documents relied upon by Avelina is
disputed. In Justice, therefore, to all the parties concerned, these and all other relevant
matters should first be threshed out fully in the trial court in the proceedings thereafter
to be held for the purpose of ascertaining and adjudicating and/or distributing the estate
of Mrs. Hodges to her heirs in accordance with her duly probated will.
Page
The only question that remains to be settled in the remand to the court below are:
(1) whether or not the applicable laws of Texas do provide in effect for more, such as,
when there is no legitime provided therein
(2) whether or not Hodges has validly waived his whole inheritance from Mrs. Hodges.
10
Linnies estate is the remainder of 1/4 of the conjugal partnership properties,

considering that even PCIB did not maintain that the application of the laws of Texas
would result in the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges not inheriting anything under her will. And
since PCIB's representations in regard to the laws of Texas virtually constitute
admissions of fact which the other parties and the Court are being made to rely and act
upon, PCIB is not permitted to contradict them or subsequently take a position
contradictory to or inconsistent with them.
In the course of the deliberations, it was brought out by some members of the Court
that to avoid or, at least, minimize further protracted legal controversies between the
respective heirs of the Hodges spouses, it is imperative to elucidate on the possible
consequences of dispositions made by Charles after Linnies death, from the mass of the
unpartitioned estates without any express indication in the pertinent documents as to
whether his intention is to dispose of part of his inheritance from his wife or part of his
own share of the conjugal estate as well as of those made by PCIB after the death of
Hodges. After a long discussion, the consensus arrived at was as follows:
(1) any such dispositions made gratuitously in favor of third parties, whether these be
individuals, corporations or foundations, shall be considered as intended to be of
properties constituting part of Hodges' inheritance from his wife, it appearing from the
tenor of his motions of May 27 and December 11, 1957 that in asking for general
authority to make sales or other disposals of properties under the jurisdiction of the
court, which include his own share of the conjugal estate, he was not invoking
particularly his right over his own share, but rather his right to dispose of any part of his
inheritance pursuant to the will of his wife;
Page
Disposition
Remand for determination of proper application of Art. 16, CC (renvoi), and of Charles
alleged renunciation of his ineritance under Linnies will. Avelina remains to be the
administrator of Linnies estate. The said estate consists of of the community
properties of the said spouses, as of the time of Linnies death on May 23, 1957, minus
whatever the husband had already gratuitously disposed of in favor of third persons
from said date until his death, provided, first, that with respect to remunerative
dispositions, the proceeds thereof shall continue to be part of the wife's estate, unless
subsequently disposed of gratuitously to third parties by the husband, and second, that
should the purported renunciation be declared legally effective, no deductions
whatsoever are to be made from said estate. PCIB and Avelina should act thenceforth
always conjointly, never independently from each other, as administrators.
11
(2) as regards sales, exchanges or other remunerative transfers, the proceeds of such
sales or the properties taken in by virtue of such exchanges, shall be considered as
merely the products of "physical changes" of the properties of her estate which the will
expressly authorizes Hodges to make, provided that whatever of said products should
remain with the estate at the time of the death of Hodges should go to her brothers and
sisters;
(3) the dispositions made by PCIB after the death of Hodges must naturally be deemed
as covering only the properties belonging to his estate considering that being only the
administrator of the estate of Hodges, PCIB could not have disposed of properties
belonging to the estate of his wife. Neither could such dispositions be considered as
involving conjugal properties, for the simple reason that the conjugal partnership
automatically ceased when Linnie died, and by the peculiar provision of her will, under
discussion, the remainder of her share descended also automatically upon the death of
Hodges to her brothers and sisters, thus outside of the scope of PCIB's administration.
Accordingly, these constructions of Linnies will should be adhered to by the trial court in
its final order of adjudication and distribution and/or partition of the two estates in
question.
CONCURRING OPINIONS
Fernandoconcurred with procedural aspect of the decision.
Teehankeeagreed with most parts but had substantial differences in the reasoning:
C. N. Hodges could not validly make gratuitous dispositions of any part or all of his
wife's estate "completely and absolutely dispose of any portion thereof inter vivos to
anyone other than himself" in the language of the main opinion and thereby render
ineffectual and nugatory her institution of her brothers and sisters as her designated
heirs to succeed to her whole estate "at the death of (her) husband."
If according to the main opinion, Hodges could not make such gratuitous "complete and
absolute dispositions" of his wife Linnie's estate "mortis causa," it would seem that by
the same token and rationale he was likewise proscribed by the will from making such
dispositions of Linnie's estate inter vivos.
I believe that the two questions of renvoi and renunciation should be
resolved preferentially and expeditiously by the probate court ahead of the partition and
segregation of the minimum one-fourth of the conjugal or community properties
constituting Linnie Jane Hodges' separate estate, which task considering that it is now
seventeen (17) years since Linnie Jane Hodges' death and her conjugal estate with C. N.
Hodges has remained unliquidated up to now might take a similar number of years to
unravel with the numerous items, transactions and details of the sizable estates
involved.
Such partition of the minimum one-fourth would not be final, since if the two prejudicial
questions of renvoi and renunciation were resolved favorably to Linnie's estate meaning
to say that if it should be held that C. N. Hodges is not entitled to any legitime of her
estate and at any rate he had totally renounced his inheritance under the will), then
Linnie's estate would consist not only of the minimum one-fourth but one-half of the
conjugal or community properties of the Hodges spouses, which would require again the
partition and segregation of still another one-fourth of said properties
to complete Linnie's separate estate.
Page
Makalintal, CJ.
Regardless of whether or not C. N. Hodges was entitled to a legitime in his deceased
wife's estate which question, still to be decided by the said probate court, may
depend upon what is the law of Texas and upon its applicability in the present case
the said estate consists of one-half, not one-fourth, of the conjugal properties. There is
neither a minimum of one-fourth nor a maximum beyond that. It is important to bear
this in mind because the estate of Linnie Hodges consists of her share in the conjugal
properties, is still under administration and until now has not been distributed by order
of the court.
12
Justice Teehankee also drew up suggested guidelines for application in the probate
court. Please see original case.
The reference in both the main and separate opinions to a one-fourth portion of the
conjugal properties as Linnie Hodges minimum share is a misnomer and is evidently
meant only to indicate that if her husband should eventually be declared entitled to a
legitime, then the disposition made by Linnie Hodges in favor of her collateral relatives
would be valid only as to one-half of her share, or one-fourth of the conjugal properties,
since the remainder, which constitutes such legitime, would necessarily go to her
husband in absolute ownership, unburdened by any substitution, term or condition,
resolutory or otherwise. And until the estate is finally settled and adjudicated to the
heirs who may be found entitled to it, the administration must continue to cover Linnie's
entire conjugal share.
___________________________________-
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 113725. June 29, 2000]
JOHNNY S. RABADILLA,[1] petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND MARIA MARLENA[2]
COSCOLUELLA Y BELLEZA VILLACARLOS, respondents.
DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals,[3] dated December
23, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. CV-35555, which set aside the decision of Branch 52 of the
Regional Trial Court in Bacolod City, and ordered the defendants-appellees (including
herein petitioner), as heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to reconvey title over Lot No. 1392,
together with its fruits and interests, to the estate of Aleja Belleza.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
In a Codicil appended to the Last Will and Testament of testatrix Aleja Belleza, Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, predecessor-in-interest of the herein petitioner, Johnny S. Rabadilla, was
instituted as a devisee of 511, 855 square meters of that parcel of land surveyed as Lot
No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre. The said Codicil, which was duly probated and
admitted in Special Proceedings No. 4046 before the then Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental, contained the following provisions:
"FIRST
Page
(a) Lot No. 1392 of the Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT4002 (10942), which is registered in my name according to the records of the Register
of Deeds of Negros Occidental.
13
I give, leave and bequeath the following property owned by me to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla
resident of 141 P. Villanueva, Pasay City:
(b) That should Jorge Rabadilla die ahead of me, the aforementioned property and the
rights which I shall set forth hereinbelow, shall be inherited and acknowledged by the
children and spouse of Jorge Rabadilla.
xxx
FOURTH
(a)....It is also my command, in this my addition (Codicil), that should I die and Jorge
Rabadilla shall have already received the ownership of the said Lot No. 1392 of the
Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10942), and also
at the time that the lease of Balbinito G. Guanzon of the said lot shall expire, Jorge
Rabadilla shall have the obligation until he dies, every year to give to Maria Marlina
Coscolluela y Belleza, Seventy (75) (sic) piculs of Export sugar and Twenty Five (25)
piculs of Domestic sugar, until the said Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza dies.
FIFTH
(a) Should Jorge Rabadilla die, his heir to whom he shall give Lot No. 1392 of the
Bacolod Cadastre, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-4002 (10492), shall
have the obligation to still give yearly, the sugar as specified in the Fourth paragraph of
his testament, to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza on the month of December of each
year.
SIXTH
I command, in this my addition (Codicil) that the Lot No. 1392, in the event that the one
to whom I have left and bequeathed, and his heir shall later sell, lease, mortgage this
said Lot, the buyer, lessee, mortgagee, shall have also the obligation to respect and
deliver yearly ONE HUNDRED (100) piculs of sugar to Maria Marlina Coscolluela y
Belleza, on each month of December, SEVENTY FIVE (75) piculs of Export and TWENTY
FIVE (25) piculs of Domestic, until Maria Marlina shall die, lastly should the buyer, lessee
or the mortgagee of this lot, not have respected my command in this my addition
(Codicil), Maria Marlina Coscolluela y Belleza, shall immediately seize this Lot No. 1392
from my heir and the latter's heirs, and shall turn it over to my near desendants, (sic)
and the latter shall then have the obligation to give the ONE HUNDRED (100) piculs of
sugar until Maria Marlina shall die. I further command in this my addition (Codicil) that
my heir and his heirs of this Lot No. 1392, that they will obey and follow that should
they decide to sell, lease, mortgage, they cannot negotiate with others than my near
descendants and my sister."[4]
Pursuant to the same Codicil, Lot No. 1392 was transferred to the deceased, Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44498 thereto issued in his name.
Page
On August 21, 1989, Maria Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza Villacarlos brought a complaint,
docketed as Civil Case No. 5588, before Branch 52 of the Regional Trial Court in Bacolod
City, against the above-mentioned heirs of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, to enforce the provisions
14
Dr. Jorge Rabadilla died in 1983 and was survived by his wife Rufina and children Johnny
(petitioner), Aurora, Ofelia and Zenaida, all surnamed Rabadilla.
of subject Codicil. The Complaint alleged that the defendant-heirs violated the conditions
of the Codicil, in that:
1. Lot No. 1392 was mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank and the Republic Planters
Bank in disregard of the testatrix's specific instruction to sell, lease, or mortgage only to
the near descendants and sister of the testatrix.
2. Defendant-heirs failed to comply with their obligation to deliver one hundred (100)
piculs of sugar (75 piculs export sugar and 25 piculs domestic sugar) to plaintiff Maria
Marlena Coscolluela y Belleza from sugar crop years 1985 up to the filing of the
complaint as mandated by the Codicil, despite repeated demands for compliance.
3. The banks failed to comply with the 6th paragraph of the Codicil which provided that
in case of the sale, lease, or mortgage of the property, the buyer, lessee, or mortgagee
shall likewise have the obligation to deliver 100 piculs of sugar per crop year to herein
private respondent.
The plaintiff then prayed that judgment be rendered ordering defendant-heirs to
reconvey/return-Lot No. 1392 to the surviving heirs of the late Aleja Belleza, the
cancellation of TCT No. 44498 in the name of the deceased, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, and the
issuance of a new certificate of title in the names of the surviving heirs of the late Aleja
Belleza.
On February 26, 1990, the defendant-heirs were declared in default but on March 28,
1990 the Order of Default was lifted, with respect to defendant Johnny S. Rabadilla, who
filed his Answer, accordingly.
During the pre-trial, the parties admitted that:
On November 15, 1998, the plaintiff (private respondent) and a certain Alan Azurin,
son-in-law of the herein petitioner who was lessee of the property and acting as
attorney-in-fact of defendant-heirs, arrived at an amicable settlement and entered into a
Memorandum of Agreement on the obligation to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar, to
the following effect:
"That for crop year 1988-89, the annuity mentioned in Entry No. 49074 of TCT No.
44489 will be delivered not later than January of 1989, more specifically, to wit:
Page
That the annuity above stated for crop year 1985-86, 1986-87, and 1987-88, will be
complied in cash equivalent of the number of piculs as mentioned therein and which is
as herein agreed upon, taking into consideration the composite price of sugar during
each sugar crop year, which is in the total amount of ONE HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND
PESOS (P105,000.00).
15
75 piculs of 'A' sugar, and 25 piculs of 'B' sugar, or then existing in any of our names,
Mary Rose Rabadilla y Azurin or Alan Azurin, during December of each sugar crop year,
in Azucar Sugar Central; and, this is considered compliance of the annuity as mentioned,
and in the same manner will compliance of the annuity be in the next succeeding crop
years.
That the above-mentioned amount will be paid or delivered on a staggered cash

installment, payable on or before the end of December of every sugar crop year, to wit:
For 1985-86, TWENTY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED FIFTY (P26,250.00) Pesos,
payable on or before December of crop year 1988-89;
payable on or before December of crop year 1989-90;
payable on or before December of crop year 1990-91; and
payable on or before December of crop year 1991-92."[5]
However, there was no compliance with the aforesaid Memorandum of Agreement
except for a partial delivery of 50.80 piculs of sugar corresponding to sugar crop year
1988 -1989.
On July 22, 1991, the Regional Trial Court came out with a decision, dismissing the
complaint and disposing as follows:
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the aforegoing findings, the Court finds that the action is
prematurely filed as no cause of action against the defendants has as yet arose in favor
of plaintiff. While there maybe the non-performance of the command as mandated
exaction from them simply because they are the children of Jorge Rabadilla, the title
holder/owner of the lot in question, does not warrant the filing of the present complaint.
The remedy at bar must fall. Incidentally, being in the category as creditor of the left
estate, it is opined that plaintiff may initiate the intestate proceedings, if only to
establish the heirs of Jorge Rabadilla and in order to give full meaning and semblance to
her claim under the Codicil.
In the light of the aforegoing findings, the Complaint being prematurely filed is
DISMISSED without prejudice.
SO ORDERED."[6]
Page
"Therefore, the evidence on record having established plaintiff-appellant's right to

receive 100 piculs of sugar annually out of the produce of Lot No. 1392; defendantsappellee's obligation under Aleja Belleza's codicil, as heirs of the modal heir, Jorge
Rabadilla, to deliver such amount of sugar to plaintiff-appellant; defendants-appellee's
admitted non-compliance with said obligation since 1985; and, the punitive
consequences enjoined by both the codicil and the Civil Code, of seizure of Lot No. 1392
and its reversion to the estate of Aleja Belleza in case of such non-compliance, this
Court deems it proper to order the reconveyance of title over Lot No. 1392 from the
estates of Jorge Rabadilla to the estate of Aleja Belleza. However, plaintiff-appellant
must institute separate proceedings to re-open Aleja Belleza's estate, secure the
16
On appeal by plaintiff, the First Division of the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of
the trial court; ratiocinating and ordering thus:
appointment of an administrator, and distribute Lot No. 1392 to Aleja Belleza's legal
heirs in order to enforce her right, reserved to her by the codicil, to receive her legacy of
100 piculs of sugar per year out of the produce of Lot No. 1392 until she dies.
Accordingly, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE and another one entered ordering
defendants-appellees, as heirs of Jorge Rabadilla, to reconvey title over Lot No. 1392,
together with its fruits and interests, to the estate of Aleja Belleza.
SO ORDERED."[7]
Dissatisfied with the aforesaid disposition by the Court of Appeals, petitioner found his
way to this Court via the present petition, contending that the Court of Appeals erred in
ordering the reversion of Lot 1392 to the estate of the testatrix Aleja Belleza on the
basis of paragraph 6 of the Codicil, and in ruling that the testamentary institution of Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla is a modal institution within the purview of Article 882 of the New Civil
Code.
The petition is not impressed with merit.
Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in resolving the appeal in accordance
with Article 882 of the New Civil Code on modal institutions and in deviating from the
sole issue raised which is the absence or prematurity of the cause of action. Petitioner
maintains that Article 882 does not find application as there was no modal institution
and the testatrix intended a mere simple substitution - i.e. the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, was to be substituted by the testatrix's "near descendants" should the
obligation to deliver the fruits to herein private respondent be not complied with. And
since the testatrix died single and without issue, there can be no valid substitution and
such testamentary provision cannot be given any effect.
The petitioner theorizes further that there can be no valid substitution for the reason
that the substituted heirs are not definite, as the substituted heirs are merely referred to
as "near descendants" without a definite identity or reference as to who are the "near
descendants" and therefore, under Articles 843[8] and 845[9] of the New Civil Code, the
substitution should be deemed as not written.
Page
It is a general rule under the law on succession that successional rights are transmitted
from the moment of death of the decedent[10] and compulsory heirs are called to
succeed by operation of law. The legitimate children and descendants, in relation to their
legitimate parents, and the widow or widower, are compulsory heirs.[11] Thus, the
petitioner, his mother and sisters, as compulsory heirs of the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla, succeeded the latter by operation of law, without need of further proceedings,
17
The contentions of petitioner are untenable. Contrary to his supposition that the Court of
Appeals deviated from the issue posed before it, which was the propriety of the
dismissal of the complaint on the ground of prematurity of cause of action, there was no
such deviation. The Court of Appeals found that the private respondent had a cause of
action against the petitioner. The disquisition made on modal institution was, precisely,
to stress that the private respondent had a legally demandable right against the
petitioner pursuant to subject Codicil; on which issue the Court of Appeals ruled in
accordance with law.
and the successional rights were transmitted to them from the moment of death of the
decedent, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
Under Article 776 of the New Civil Code, inheritance includes all the property, rights and
obligations of a person, not extinguished by his death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr.
Jorge Rabadilla had by virtue of subject Codicil were transmitted to his forced heirs, at
the time of his death. And since obligations not extinguished by death also form part of
the estate of the decedent; corollarily, the obligations imposed by the Codicil on the
deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to his compulsory heirs upon his
death.
In the said Codicil, testatrix Aleja Belleza devised Lot No. 1392 to Dr. Jorge Rabadilla,
subject to the condition that the usufruct thereof would be delivered to the herein
private respondent every year. Upon the death of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his compulsory
heirs succeeded to his rights and title over the said property, and they also assumed his
(decedent's) obligation to deliver the fruits of the lot involved to herein private
respondent. Such obligation of the instituted heir reciprocally corresponds to the right of
private respondent over the usufruct, the fulfillment or performance of which is now
being demanded by the latter through the institution of the case at bar. Therefore,
private respondent has a cause of action against petitioner and the trial court erred in
dismissing the complaint below.
Petitioner also theorizes that Article 882 of the New Civil Code on modal institutions is
not applicable because what the testatrix intended was a substitution - Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla was to be substituted by the testatrix's near descendants should there be
noncompliance with the obligation to deliver the piculs of sugar to private respondent.
Again, the contention is without merit.
Substitution is the designation by the testator of a person or persons to take the place of
the heir or heirs first instituted. Under substitutions in general, the testator may either
(1) provide for the designation of another heir to whom the property shall pass in case
the original heir should die before him/her, renounce the inheritance or be incapacitated
to inherit, as in a simple substitution,[12] or (2) leave his/her property to one person
with the express charge that it be transmitted subsequently to another or others, as in a
fideicommissary substitution.[13] The Codicil sued upon contemplates neither of the
two.
Page
Neither is there a fideicommissary substitution here and on this point, petitioner is

correct. In a fideicommissary substitution, the first heir is strictly mandated to preserve
the property and to transmit the same later to the second heir.[15] In the case under
consideration, the instituted heir is in fact allowed under the Codicil to alienate the
18
In simple substitutions, the second heir takes the inheritance in default of the first heir
by reason of incapacity, predecease or renunciation.[14] In the case under
consideration, the provisions of subject Codicil do not provide that should Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla default due to predecease, incapacity or renunciation, the testatrix's near
descendants would substitute him. What the Codicil provides is that, should Dr. Jorge
Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the conditions imposed in the Codicil, the property
referred to shall be seized and turned over to the testatrix's near descendants.
property provided the negotiation is with the near descendants or the sister of the
testatrix. Thus, a very important element of a fideicommissary substitution is lacking;
the obligation clearly imposing upon the first heir the preservation of the property and
its transmission to the second heir. "Without this obligation to preserve clearly imposed
by the testator in his will, there is no fideicommissary substitution."[16] Also, the near
descendants' right to inherit from the testatrix is not definite. The property will only pass
to them should Dr. Jorge Rabadilla or his heirs not fulfill the obligation to deliver part of
the usufruct to private respondent.
Another important element of a fideicommissary substitution is also missing here. Under
Article 863, the second heir or the fideicommissary to whom the property is transmitted
must not be beyond one degree from the first heir or the fiduciary. A fideicommissary
substitution is therefore, void if the first heir is not related by first degree to the second
heir.[17] In the case under scrutiny, the near descendants are not at all related to the
instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla.
The Court of Appeals erred not in ruling that the institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla under
subject Codicil is in the nature of a modal institution and therefore, Article 882 of the
New Civil Code is the provision of law in point. Articles 882 and 883 of the New Civil
Code provide:
Art. 882. The statement of the object of the institution or the application of the property
left by the testator, or the charge imposed on him, shall not be considered as a condition
unless it appears that such was his intention.
That which has been left in this manner may be claimed at once provided that the
instituted heir or his heirs give security for compliance with the wishes of the testator
and for the return of anything he or they may receive, together with its fruits and
interests, if he or they should disregard this obligation.
Art. 883. When without the fault of the heir, an institution referred to in the preceding
article cannot take effect in the exact manner stated by the testator, it shall be complied
with in a manner most analogous to and in conformity with his wishes.
Page
From the provisions of the Codicil litigated upon, it can be gleaned unerringly that the
testatrix intended that subject property be inherited by Dr. Jorge Rabadilla. It is likewise
clearly worded that the testatrix imposed an obligation on the said instituted heir and his
successors-in-interest to deliver one hundred piculs of sugar to the herein private
respondent, Marlena Coscolluela Belleza, during the lifetime of the latter. However, the
19
The institution of an heir in the manner prescribed in Article 882 is what is known in the
law of succession as an institucion sub modo or a modal institution. In a modal
institution, the testator states (1) the object of the institution, (2) the purpose or
application of the property left by the testator, or (3) the charge imposed by the testator
upon the heir.[18] A "mode" imposes an obligation upon the heir or legatee but it does
not affect the efficacy of his rights to the succession.[19] On the other hand, in a
conditional testamentary disposition, the condition must happen or be fulfilled in order
for the heir to be entitled to succeed the testator. The condition suspends but does not
obligate; and the mode obligates but does not suspend.[20] To some extent, it is similar
to a resolutory condition.[21]
testatrix did not make Dr. Jorge Rabadilla's inheritance and the effectivity of his
institution as a devisee, dependent on the performance of the said obligation. It is clear,
though, that should the obligation be not complied with, the property shall be turned
over to the testatrix's near descendants. The manner of institution of Dr. Jorge Rabadilla
under subject Codicil is evidently modal in nature because it imposes a charge upon the
instituted heir without, however, affecting the efficacy of such institution.
Then too, since testamentary dispositions are generally acts of liberality, an obligation
imposed upon the heir should not be considered a condition unless it clearly appears
from the Will itself that such was the intention of the testator. In case of doubt, the
institution should be considered as modal and not conditional.[22]
Neither is there tenability in the other contention of petitioner that the private
respondent has only a right of usufruct but not the right to seize the property itself from
the instituted heir because the right to seize was expressly limited to violations by the
buyer, lessee or mortgagee.
In the interpretation of Wills, when an uncertainty arises on the face of the Will, as to
the application of any of its provisions, the testator's intention is to be ascertained from
the words of the Will, taking into consideration the circumstances under which it was
made.[23] Such construction as will sustain and uphold the Will in all its parts must be
adopted.[24]
Subject Codicil provides that the instituted heir is under obligation to deliver One
Hundred (100) piculs of sugar yearly to Marlena Belleza Coscuella. Such obligation is
imposed on the instituted heir, Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, his heirs, and their buyer, lessee, or
mortgagee should they sell, lease, mortgage or otherwise negotiate the property
involved. The Codicil further provides that in the event that the obligation to deliver the
sugar is not respected, Marlena Belleza Coscuella shall seize the property and turn it
over to the testatrix's near descendants. The non-performance of the said obligation is
thus with the sanction of seizure of the property and reversion thereof to the testatrix's
near descendants. Since the said obligation is clearly imposed by the testatrix, not only
on the instituted heir but also on his successors-in-interest, the sanction imposed by the
testatrix in case of non-fulfillment of said obligation should equally apply to the
instituted heir and his successors-in-interest.
Page
Suffice it to state that a Will is a personal, solemn, revocable and free act by which a
person disposes of his property, to take effect after his death.[25] Since the Will
expresses the manner in which a person intends how his properties be disposed, the
wishes and desires of the testator must be strictly followed. Thus, a Will cannot be the
20
Similarly unsustainable is petitioner's submission that by virtue of the amicable

settlement, the said obligation imposed by the Codicil has been assumed by the lessee,
and whatever obligation petitioner had become the obligation of the lessee; that
petitioner is deemed to have made a substantial and constructive compliance of his
obligation through the consummated settlement between the lessee and the private
respondent, and having consummated a settlement with the petitioner, the recourse of
the private respondent is the fulfillment of the obligation under the amicable settlement
and not the seizure of subject property.
subject of a compromise agreement which would thereby defeat the very purpose of
making a Will.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated December 23, 1993, in CA-G.R. No. CV-35555 AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs
SO ORDERED.
Melo, J., (Chairman), concur in the separate opinion of Justice Vitug.
Vitug, J., see separate opinion.
Panganiban, J., join the separate opinion of Justice Vitug.
Gonzaga-Reyes, J., no part.
_________________________________________________________________--
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-40789 February 27, 1987
INTESTATE ESTATE OF PETRA V. ROSALES, IRENEA C. ROSALES, petitioner,
vs.
FORTUNATO ROSALES, MAGNA ROSALES ACEBES, MACIKEQUEROX ROSALES and
ANTONIO ROSALES, respondents.
Jose B. Echaves for petitioner.
Jose A. Binghay and Paul G. Gorres for respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
In this Petition for Review of two (2) Orders of the Court of First Instance of Cebu the question raised
is whether the widow whose husband predeceased his mother can inherit from the latter, her motherin-law.
It appears from the record of the case that on February 26, 1971, Mrs. Petra V. Rosales, a resident of
Cebu City, died intestate. She was survived by her husband Fortunate T. Rosales and their two (2)
children Magna Rosales Acebes and Antonio Rosales. Another child, Carterio Rosales, predeceased
her, leaving behind a child, Macikequerox Rosales, and his widow Irenea C. Rosales, the herein
petitioner. The estate of the dismissed has an estimated gross value of about Thirty Thousand Pesos
(P30,000.00).
Page
In the course of the intestate proceedings, the trial court issued an Order dated June 16, 1972
declaring the following in individuals the legal heirs of the deceased and prescribing their respective
share of the estate
21
On July 10, 1971, Magna Rosales Acebes instituted the proceedings for the settlement of the estate
of the deceased in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The case was docketed as Special
Proceedings No. 3204-R. Thereafter, the trial court appointed Magna Rosales Acebes administratrix
of the said estate.
Fortunata T. Rosales (husband), 1/4; Magna R. Acebes (daughter), 1/4; Macikequerox

Rosales, 1/4; and Antonio Rosales son, 1/4.
This declaration was reiterated by the trial court in its Order I dated February 4, 1975.
These Orders notwithstanding, Irenea Rosales insisted in getting a share of the estate in her capacity
as the surviving spouse of the late Carterio Rosales, son of the deceased, claiming that she is a
compulsory heir of her mother-in-law together with her son, Macikequerox Rosales.
Thus, Irenea Rosales sought the reconsideration of the aforementioned Orders. The trial court denied
her plea. Hence this petition.
In sum, the petitioner poses two (2) questions for Our resolution petition. First is a widow (surviving
spouse) an intestate heir of her mother-in-law? Second are the Orders of the trial court which
excluded the widow from getting a share of the estate in question final as against the said widow?
Our answer to the first question is in the negative.
Intestate or legal heirs are classified into two (2) groups, namely, those who inherit by their own right,
and those who inherit by the right of representation. 1 Restated, an intestate heir can only inherit either by his
2
own right, as in the order of intestate succession provided for in the Civil Code, or by the right of representation provided
for in Article 981 of the same law. The relevant provisions of the Civil Code are:
Art. 980. The children of the deceased shall always inherit from him in their own right,
dividing the inheritance in equal shares.
Art. 981. Should children of the deceased and descendants of other children who are
dead, survive, the former shall inherit in their own right, and the latter by right of
representation.
Art. 982. The grandchildren and other descendants shag inherit by right of
representation, and if any one of them should have died, leaving several heirs, the
portion pertaining to him shall be divided among the latter in equal portions.
Art. 999. When the widow or widower survives with legitimate children or their
descendants and illegitimate children or their descendants, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, such widow or widower shall be entitled to the same share as that of a
legitimate child.
There is no provision in the Civil Code which states that a widow (surviving spouse) is an intestate
heir of her mother-in-law. The entire Code is devoid of any provision which entitles her to inherit from
her mother-in- law either by her own right or by the right of representation. The provisions of the Code
which relate to the order of intestate succession (Articles 978 to 1014) enumerate with meticulous
exactitude the intestate heirs of a decedent, with the State as the final intestate heir. The conspicuous
absence of a provision which makes a daughter-in-law an intestate heir of the deceased all the more
confirms Our observation. If the legislature intended to make the surviving spouse an intestate heir of
the parent-in-law, it would have so provided in the Code.
Petitioner argues that she is a compulsory heir in accordance with the provisions of Article 887 of the
Civil Code which provides that:
Art. 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
(3) The widow or widower;

Page
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their
legitimate children and descendants;
22
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and
ascendants;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;

(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287;
Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not excluded by those in Nos. 1 and
2; neither do they exclude one another.
In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved.
The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes mentioned, shall inherit
from them in the manner and to the extent established by this Code.
The aforesaid provision of law 3 refers to the estate of the deceased spouse in which case the surviving spouse
(widow or widower) is a compulsory heir. It does not apply to the estate of a parent-in-law.
Indeed, the surviving spouse is considered a third person as regards the estate of the parent-in-law.
We had occasion to make this observation in Lachenal v. Salas, 4 to Wit:
We hold that the title to the fishing boat should be determined in Civil Case No. 3597
(not in the intestate proceeding) because it affects the lessee thereof, Lope L. Leoncio,
the decedent's son-in-law, who, although married to his daughter or compulsory heir, is
nevertheless a third person with respect to his estate. ... (Emphasis supplied).
By the same token, the provision of Article 999 of the Civil Code aforecited does not support
petitioner's claim. A careful examination of the said Article confirms that the estate contemplated
therein is the estate of the deceased spouse. The estate which is the subject matter of the intestate
estate proceedings in this case is that of the deceased Petra V. Rosales, the mother-in-law of the
petitioner. It is from the estate of Petra V. Rosales that Macikequerox Rosales draws a share of the
inheritance by the right of representation as provided by Article 981 of the Code.
The essence and nature of the right of representation is explained by Articles 970 and 971 of the Civil
Code, viz
Art. 970. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by virtue of which the
representative is raised to the place and the degree of the person represented, and
acquires the rights which the latter would have if he were living or if he could have
inherited.
Art. 971. The representative is called to the succession by the law and not by the
person represented. The representative does not succeed the person represented but
the one whom the person represented would have succeeded. (Emphasis supplied.)
Article 971 explicitly declares that Macikequerox Rosales is called to succession by law because of
his blood relationship. He does not succeed his father, Carterio Rosales (the person represented)
who predeceased his grandmother, Petra Rosales, but the latter whom his father would have
succeeded. Petitioner cannot assert the same right of representation as she has no filiation by blood
with her mother-in-law.
Petitioner however contends that at the time of the death of her husband Carterio Rosales he had an
inchoate or contingent right to the properties of Petra Rosales as compulsory heir. Be that as it may,
said right of her husband was extinguished by his death that is why it is their son Macikequerox
Rosales who succeeded from Petra Rosales by right of representation. He did not succeed from his
deceased father, Carterio Rosales.
Page
Accordingly, it is Our considered opinion, and We so hold, that a surviving spouse is not an intestate
heir of his or her parent-in-law.
23
On the basis of the foregoing observations and conclusions, We find it unnecessary to pass upon the
second question posed by the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit, with costs
against the petitioner. Let this case be remanded to the trial-court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Yap (Chairman), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-30977 January 31, 1972
CARMEN LAPUZ SY, represented by her substitute MACARIO LAPUZ, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
EUFEMIO S. EUFEMIO alias EUFEMIO SY UY, respondent-appellee.
Jose W. Diokno for petitioner-appellant.
D. G. Eufemio for respondent-appellee.
REYES J.B.L., J.:p
Petition, filed after the effectivity of Republic Act 5440, for review by certiorari of an order, dated 29
July 1969, of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila, in its Civil Case No. 20387,
dismissing said case for legal separation on the ground that the death of the therein plaintiff, Carmen
O. Lapuz Sy, which occurred during the pendency of the case, abated the cause of action as well as
the action itself. The dismissal order was issued over the objection of Macario Lapuz, the heir of the
deceased plaintiff (and petitioner herein) who sought to substitute the deceased and to have the case
prosecuted to final judgment.
On 18 August 1953, Carmen O. Lapuz Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio S.
Eufemio, alleging, in the main, that they were married civilly on 21 September 1934 and canonically
on 30 September 1934; that they had lived together as husband and wife continuously until 1943
when her husband abandoned her; that they had no child; that they acquired properties during their
marriage; and that she discovered her husband cohabiting with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok at
1319 Sisa Street, Manila, on or about March 1949. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal
separation, which, among others, would order that the defendant Eufemio S. Eufemio should be
deprived of his share of the conjugal partnership profits.
In his second amended answer to the petition, herein respondent Eufemio S. Eufemio alleged
affirmative and special defenses, and, along with several other claims involving money and other
properties, counter-claimed for the declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage with Carmen O.
Lapuz Sy, on the ground of his prior and subsisting marriage, celebrated according to Chinese law
and customs, with one Go Hiok, alias Ngo Hiok.
Issues having been joined, trial proceeded and the parties adduced their respective evidence. But
before the trial could be completed (the respondent was already scheduled to present surrebuttal
evidence on 9 and 18 June 1969), petitioner Carmen O. Lapuz Sy died in a vehicular accident on 31
May 1969. Counsel for petitioner duly notified the court of her death.
On 9 June 1969, respondent Eufemio moved to dismiss the "petition for legal separation" 1 on two (2)
grounds, namely: that the petition for legal separation was filed beyond the one-year period provided for in Article 102 of
the Civil Code; and that the death of Carmen abated the action for legal separation.
On 26 June 1969, counsel for deceased petitioner moved to substitute the deceased Carmen by her
father, Macario Lapuz. Counsel for Eufemio opposed the motion.
On 29 July 1969, the court issued the order under review, dismissing the case. 2 In the body of the order,
Page
After first securing an extension of time to file a petition for review of the order of dismissal issued by
the juvenile and domestic relations court, the petitioner filed the present petition on 14 October 1969.
The same was given due course and answer thereto was filed by respondent, who prayed for the
affirmance of the said order. 3
Although the defendant below, the herein respondent Eufemio S. Eufemio, filed counterclaims, he did
not pursue them after the court below dismissed the case. He acquiesced in the dismissal of said
counterclaims by praying for the affirmance of the order that dismissed not only the petition for legal
24
the court stated that the motion to dismiss and the motion for substitution had to be resolved on the question of whether or
not the plaintiff's cause of action has survived, which the court resolved in the negative. Petitioner's moved to reconsider
but the motion was denied on 15 September 1969.
Page
separation but also his counterclaim to declare the Eufemio-Lapuz marriage to be null and void ab
initio.
But petitioner Carmen O. Lapuz Sy (through her self-assumed substitute for the lower court did not
act on the motion for substitution) stated the principal issue to be as follows:
When an action for legal separation is converted by the counterclaim into one for a
declaration of nullity of a marriage, does the death of a party abate the proceedings?
The issue as framed by petitioner injects into it a supposed conversion of a legal separation suit to
one for declaration of nullity of a marriage, which is without basis, for even petitioner asserted that
"the respondent has acquiesced to the dismissal of his counterclaim" (Petitioner's Brief, page 22). Not
only this. The petition for legal separation and the counterclaim to declare the nullity of the self same
marriage can stand independent and separate adjudication. They are not inseparable nor was the
action for legal separation converted into one for a declaration of nullity by the counterclaim, for legal
separation pre-supposes a valid marriage, while the petition for nullity has a voidable marriage as a
pre-condition.
The first real issue in this case is: Does the death of the plaintiff before final decree, in an action for
legal separation, abate the action? If it does, will abatement also apply if the action involves property
rights? .
An action for legal separation which involves nothing more than the bed-and-board separation of the
spouses (there being no absolute divorce in this jurisdiction) is purely personal. The Civil Code of the
Philippines recognizes this in its Article 100, by allowing only the innocent spouse (and no one else)
to claim legal separation; and in its Article 108, by providing that the spouses can, by their
reconciliation, stop or abate the proceedings and even rescind a decree of legal separation already
rendered. Being personal in character, it follows that the death of one party to the action causes the
death of the action itself actio personalis moritur cum persona.
... When one of the spouses is dead, there is no need for divorce, because the marriage
is dissolved. The heirs cannot even continue the suit, if the death of the spouse takes
place during the course of the suit (Article 244, Section 3). The action is absolutely dead
(Cass., July 27, 1871, D. 71. 1. 81; Cass. req., May 8, 1933, D. H. 1933, 332.") 4 .
Marriage is a personal relation or status, created under the sanction of law, and an
action for divorce is a proceeding brought for the purpose of effecting a dissolution of
that relation. The action is one of a personal nature. In the absence of a statute to the
contrary, the death of one of the parties to such action abates the action, for the reason
that death has settled the question of separation beyond all controversy and deprived
the court of jurisdiction, both over the persons of the parties to the action and of the
subject-matter of the action itself. For this reason the courts are almost unanimous in
holding that the death of either party to a divorce proceeding, before final decree,
abates the action. 1 Corpus Juris, 208; Wren v. Moss, 2 Gilman, 72; Danforth v.
Danforth, 111 Ill. 236; Matter of Grandall, 196 N.Y. 127, 89 N.E. 578; 134 Am St. Rep.
830; 17 Ann. Cas. 874; Wilcon v. Wilson, 73 Mich, 620, 41 N.W. 817; Strickland v.
Strickland, 80 Ark. 452, 97 S. W. 659; McCurley v. McCurley, 60 Md. 185, 45 Am. Rep.
717; Begbie v. Begbie, 128 Cal. 155, 60 Pac. 667, 49 L.R.A. 141. 5
The same rule is true of causes of action and suits for separation and maintenance (Johnson vs.
Bates, Ark. 101 SW 412; 1 Corpus Juris 208).
A review of the resulting changes in property relations between spouses shows that they are solely
the effect of the decree of legal separation; hence, they can not survive the death of the plaintiff if it
occurs prior to the decree. On the point, Article 106 of the Civil Code provides: .
Art. 106. The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects:
(1) The spouses shall be entitled to live separately from each other, but the marriage
bonds shall not be severed; .
(2) The conjugal partnership of gains or the absolute conjugal community of property
shall be dissolved and liquidated, but the offending spouse shall have no right to any
share of the profits earned by the partnership or community, without prejudice to the
provisions of article 176;
(3) The custody of the minor children shall be awarded to the innocent spouse, unless
otherwise directed by the court in the interest of said minors, for whom said court may
appoint a guardian;
(4) The offending spouse shall be disqualified from inheriting from the innocent spouse
by intestate succession. Moreover, provisions in favor of the offending spouse made in
the will of the innocent one shall be revoked by operation of law.
25
From this article it is apparent that the right to the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains (or
of the absolute community of property), the loss of right by the offending spouse to any share of the
profits earned by the partnership or community, or his disqualification to inherit by intestacy from the
innocent spouse as well as the revocation of testamentary provisions in favor of the offending spouse
made by the innocent one, are all rights and disabilities that, by the very terms of the Civil Code
article, are vested exclusively in the persons of the spouses; and by their nature and intent, such
claims and disabilities are difficult to conceive as assignable or transmissible. Hence, a claim to said
rights is not a claim that "is not thereby extinguished" after a party dies, under Section 17, Rule 3, of
the Rules of Court, to warrant continuation of the action through a substitute of the deceased party.
Sec. 17. Death of party. After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the
court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear
and to be substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such
time as may be granted...
The same result flows from a consideration of the enumeration of the actions that survive for or
against administrators in Section 1, Rule 87, of the Revised Rules of Court:
SECTION 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against executor or
administrator. No action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest
thereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator; but actions to
recover real or personal property, or an interest therein, from the estate, or to enforce a
lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or
personal, may be commenced against him.
Neither actions for legal separation or for annulment of marriage can be deemed fairly included in the
enumeration..
A further reason why an action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if
property rights are involved, is that these rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source
being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the
finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes during the
pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive
separation; and the expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn.
As to the petition of respondent-appellee Eufemio for a declaration of nullity ab initio of his marriage
to Carmen Lapuz, it is apparent that such action became moot and academic upon the death of the
latter, and there could be no further interest in continuing the same after her demise, that
automatically dissolved the questioned union. Any property rights acquired by either party as a result
of Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines 6 could be resolved and determined in a proper
action for partition by either the appellee or by the heirs of the appellant.
In fact, even if the bigamous marriage had not been void ab initio but only voidable under Article 83,
paragraph 2, of the Civil Code, because the second marriage had been contracted with the first wife
having been an absentee for seven consecutive years, or when she had been generally believed
dead, still the action for annulment became extinguished as soon as one of the three persons
involved had died, as provided in Article 87, paragraph 2, of the Code, requiring that the action for
annulment should be brought during the lifetime of any one of the parties involved. And furthermore,
the liquidation of any conjugal partnership that might have resulted from such voidable marriage must
be carried out "in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse", as expressly provided
in Section 2 of the Revised Rule 73, and not in the annulment proceeding.
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed judgment of the Manila Court of Juvenile and Domestic Relations is
hereby affirmed. No special pronouncement as to costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor and
Makasiar, JJ., concur.
Page
G.R. No. 82233 March 22, 1990

JOSE BARITUA and EDGAR BITANCOR, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, NICOLAS NACARIO and VICTORIA RONDA
NACARIO, respondents.
Domingo Lucenario for petitioners.
Ernesto A. Atienza for private respondents.
SARMIENTO, J.:
26
SECOND DIVISION
This petition for review on certiorari assails as erroneous and contrary to existing relevant laws and
applicable jurisprudence the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals dated December 11, 1987 which reversed and set
2
aside that of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XXXII, at Pili, Camarines Sur. The challenged decision adjudged the
petitioners liable to the private respondents in the total amount of P20,505.00 and for costs.
The facts are as follows:

In the evening of November 7, 1979, the tricycle then being driven by Bienvenido Nacario along the
national highway at Barangay San Cayetano, in Baao, Camarines Sur, figured in an accident with JB
Bus No. 80 driven by petitioner Edgar Bitancor and owned and operated by petitioner Jose
Baritua. 3 As a result of that accident Bienvenido and his passenger died 4 and the tricycle was damaged. 5 No criminal
case arising from the incident was ever instituted.
Subsequently, on March 27, 1980, as a consequence of the extra-judicial settlement of the matter
negotiated by the petitioners and the bus insurer Philippine First Insurance Company, Incorporated
(PFICI for brevity) Bienvenido Nacario's widow, Alicia Baracena Vda. de Nacario, received
P18,500.00. In consideration of the amount she received, Alicia executed on March 27, 1980 a
"Release of Claim" in favor of the petitioners and PFICI, releasing and forever discharging them from
all actions, claims, and demands arising from the accident which resulted in her husband's death and
the damage to the tricycle which the deceased was then driving. Alicia likewise executed an affidavit
of desistance in which she formally manifested her lack of interest in instituting any case, either civil
or criminal, against the petitioners. 7
On September 2, 1981, or about one year and ten months from the date of the accident on November
7, 1979, the private respondents, who are the parents of Bienvenido Nacario, filed a complaint for
damages against the petitioners with the then Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur. 8 In their
complaint, the private respondents alleged that during the vigil for their deceased son, the petitioners through their
representatives promised them (the private respondents) that as extra-judicial settlement, they shall be indemnified for the
death of their son, for the funeral expenses incurred by reason thereof, and for the damage for the tricycle the purchase
price of which they (the private respondents) only loaned to the victim. The petitioners, however, reneged on their promise
and instead negotiated and settled their obligations with the long-estranged wife of their late son. The Nacario spouses
prayed that the defendants, petitioners herein, be ordered to indemnify them in the amount of P25,000.00 for the death of
their son Bienvenido, P10,000.00 for the damaged tricycle, P25,000.00 for compensatory and exemplary damages,
9
P5,000.00 for attorney's fees, and for moral damages.
After trial, the court a quo dismissed the complaint, holding that the payment by the defendants
(herein petitioners) to the widow and her child, who are the preferred heirs and successors-in-interest
of the deceased Bienvenido to the exclusion of his parents, the plaintiffs (herein private respondents),
extinguished any claim against the defendants (petitioners). 10
The parents appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed the judgment of the trial court. The
appellate court ruled that the release executed by Alicia Baracena Vda. de Nacario did not discharge
the liability of the petitioners because the case was instituted by the private respondents in their own
capacity and not as "heirs, representatives, successors, and assigns" of Alicia; and Alicia could not
have validly waived the damages being prayed for (by the private respondents) since she was not the
one who suffered these damages arising from the death of their son. Furthermore, the appellate court
said that the petitioners "failed to rebut the testimony of the appellants (private respondents) that they
were the ones who bought the tricycle that was damaged in the incident. Appellants had the burden
of proof of such fact, and they did establish such fact in their testimony . . . 11Anent the funeral expenses,
"(T)he expenses for the funeral were likewise shouldered by the appellants (the private respondents). This was never
contradicted by the appellees (petitioners). . . . Payment (for these) were made by the appellants, therefore, the
12
reimbursement must accrue in their favor.
Consequently, the respondent appellate court ordered the petitioners to pay the private respondents
P10,000.00 for the damage of the tricycle, P5,000.00 for "complete" funeral services, P450.00 for
cemetery lot, P55.00 fororacion adulto, and P5,000.00 for attorney's fees. 13 The petitioners moved for
but their motion was denied.
15
Hence, this petition.
The issue here is whether or not the respondent appellate court erred in holding that the petitioners
are still liable to pay the private respondents the aggregate amount of P20,505.00 despite the
agreement of extrajudicial settlement between the petitioners and the victim's compulsory heirs.
The petition is meritorious.
Obligations are extinguished by various modes among them being by payment. Article 1231 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines provides:
Art. 1231. Obligations are extinguished:
(1) By payment or performance;
(2) By the loss of the thing due;
(3) By the condonation or remission of the debt;
(4) By the confusion or merger of the rights of creditor and debtor;
(5) By compensation;
27
14
Page
a reconsideration of the appellate court's decision
(6) By novation.
(Emphasis ours.)
There is no denying that the petitioners had paid their obligation petition arising from the accident that
occurred on November 7, 1979. The only question now is whether or not Alicia, the spouse and the
one who received the petitioners' payment, is entitled to it.
Article 1240 of the Civil Code of the Philippines enumerates the persons to whom payment to
extinguish an obligation should be made.
Art 1240. Payment shall be made to the person in whose favor the obligation has been
constituted, or his successor in interest, or any person authorized to receive it.
Certainly there can be no question that Alicia and her son with the deceased are the successors in
interest referred to in law as the persons authorized to receive payment. The Civil Code states:
Article 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
1. Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and
ascendants;
2. In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants with respect to their
legitimate children and decendants;
3. The widow or widower;
4. Acknowledged natural children and natural children by legal fiction;
5. Other illegitimate children referred to in Article 287.
Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4 and 5 are not excluded by those in Nos. 1 and
2. Neither do they exclude one another. (Emphasis ours.)
Article 985. In default of legitimate children and descendants of the deceased, his
parents and ascendants shall inherit from him, to the exclusion of collateral relatives.
(Emphasis ours.)
It is patently clear that the parents of the deceased succeed only when the latter dies without a
legitimate descendant. On the other hand, the surviving spouse concurs with all classes of heirs. As it
has been established that Bienvenido was married to Alicia and that they begot a child, the private
respondents are not successors-in-interest of Bienvenido; they are not compulsory heirs. The
petitioners therefore acted correctly in settling their obligation with Alicia as the widow of Bienvenido
and as the natural guardian of their lone child. This is so even if Alicia had been estranged from
Bienvenido. Mere estrangement is not a legal ground for the disqualification of a surviving spouse as
an heir of the deceased spouse.
Neither could the private respondents, as alleged creditors of Bienvenido, seek relief and
compensation from the petitioners. While it may be true that the private respondents loaned to
Bienvenido the purchase price of the damaged tricycle and shouldered the expenses for his funeral,
the said purchase price and expenses are but money claims against the estate of their deceased
son. 16 These money claims are not the liabilities of the petitioners who, as we have said, had been released by the
agreement of the extra-judicial settlement they concluded with Alicia Baracena Vda. de Nacario, the victim's widow and
heir, as well as the natural guardian of their child, her co-heir. As a matter of fact, she executed a "Release Of Claim" in
favor of the petitioners.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED; the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE and the decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby REINSTATED. Costs against the
private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Page
G.R. No. 83484 February 12, 1990

CELEDONIA SOLIVIO, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CONCORDIA JAVELLANA
VILLANUEVA, respondents.
Rex Suiza Castillon for petitioner.
Salas & Villareal for private respondent.
MEDIALDEA, J.:
28
FIRST DIVISION
Page
This is a petition for review of the decision dated January 26, 1988 of the Court of Appeals in CA GR
CV No. 09010 (Concordia Villanueva v. Celedonia Solivio) affirming the decision of the trial court in
Civil Case No. 13207 for partition, reconveyance of ownership and possession and damages, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiff and against defendant:
a) Ordering that the estate of the late Esteban Javellana, Jr. be divided into two (2)
shares: one-half for the plaintiff and one-half for defendant. From both shares shall be
equally deducted the expenses for the burial, mausoleum and related expenditures.
Against the share of defendants shall be charged the expenses for scholarship, awards,
donations and the 'Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Memorial Foundation;'
b) Directing the defendant to submit an inventory of the entire estate property, including
but not limited to, specific items already mentioned in this decision and to render an
accounting of the property of the estate, within thirty (30) days from receipt of this
judgment; one-half (1/2) of this produce shall belong to plaintiff;
c) Ordering defendant to pay plaintiff P5,000.00 as expenses of litigation; P10,000.00
for and as attorney's fees plus costs.
SO ORDERED. (pp. 42-43, Rollo)
This case involves the estate of the late novelist, Esteban Javellana, Jr., author of the first post-war
Filipino novel "Without Seeing the Dawn," who died a bachelor, without descendants, ascendants,
brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces. His only surviving relatives are: (1) his maternal aunt, petitioner
Celedonia Solivio, the spinster half-sister of his mother, Salustia Solivio; and (2) the private
respondent, Concordia Javellana-Villanueva, sister of his deceased father, Esteban Javellana, Sr.
He was a posthumous child. His father died barely ten (10) months after his marriage in December,
1916 to Salustia Solivio and four months before Esteban, Jr. was born.
Salustia and her sister, Celedonia (daughter of Engracio Solivio and his second wife Josefa
Fernandez), a teacher in the Iloilo Provincial High School, brought up Esteban, Jr.
Salustia brought to her marriage paraphernal properties (various parcels of land in Calinog, Iloilo
covered by 24 titles) which she had inherited from her mother, Gregoria Celo, Engracio Solivio's first
wife (p. 325, Record), but no conjugal property was acquired during her short-lived marriage to
Esteban, Sr.
On October 11, 1959, Salustia died, leaving all her properties to her only child, Esteban, Jr., including
a house and lot in La Paz, Iloilo City, where she, her son, and her sister lived. In due time, the titles of
all these properties were transferred in the name of Esteban, Jr.
During his lifetime, Esteban, Jr. had, more than once, expressed to his aunt Celedonia and some
close friends his plan to place his estate in a foundation to honor his mother and to help poor but
deserving students obtain a college education. Unfortunately, he died of a heart attack on February
26,1977 without having set up the foundation.
Two weeks after his funeral, Concordia and Celedonia talked about what to do with Esteban's
properties. Celedonia told Concordia about Esteban's desire to place his estate in a foundation to be
named after his mother, from whom his properties came, for the purpose of helping indigent students
in their schooling. Concordia agreed to carry out the plan of the deceased. This fact was admitted by
her in her "Motion to Reopen and/or Reconsider the Order dated April 3, 1978" which she filed on
July 27, 1978 in Special Proceeding No. 2540, where she stated:
4. That petitioner knew all along the narrated facts in the immediately preceding
paragraph [that herein movant is also the relative of the deceased within the third
degree, she being the younger sister of the late Esteban Javellana, father of the
decedent herein], because prior to the filing of the petition they (petitioner Celedonia
Solivio and movant Concordia Javellana) have agreed to make the estate of the
decedent a foundation, besides they have closely known each other due to their filiation
to the decedent and they have been visiting each other's house which are not far away
for (sic) each other. (p. 234, Record; Emphasis supplied.)
Pursuant to their agreement that Celedonia would take care of the proceedings leading to the
formation of the foundation, Celedonia in good faith and upon the advice of her counsel, filed on
March 8, 1977 Spl. Proceeding No. 2540 for her appointment as special administratrix of the estate of
Esteban Javellana, Jr. (Exh. 2). Later, she filed an amended petition (Exh. 5) praying that letters of
administration be issued to her; that she be declared sole heir of the deceased; and that after
payment of all claims and rendition of inventory and accounting, the estate be adjudicated to her (p.
115, Rollo).
After due publication and hearing of her petition, as well as her amended petition, she was declared
sole heir of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. She explained that this was done for three reasons:
29
Page
(1) because the properties of the estate had come from her sister, Salustia Solivio; (2) that she is the
decedent's nearest relative on his mother's side; and (3) with her as sole heir, the disposition of the
properties of the estate to fund the foundation would be facilitated.
On April 3, 1978, the court (Branch II, CFI, now Branch 23, RTC) declared her the sole heir of
Esteban, Jr. Thereafter, she sold properties of the estate to pay the taxes and other obligations of the
deceased and proceeded to set up the "SALUSTIA SOLIVIO VDA. DE JAVELLANA
FOUNDATION" which she caused to be registered in the Securities and Exchange Commission on
July 17,1981 under Reg. No. 0100027 (p. 98, Rollo).
Four months later, or on August 7, 1978, Concordia Javellana Villanueva filed a motion for
reconsideration of the court's order declaring Celedonia as "sole heir" of Esteban, Jr., because she
too was an heir of the deceased. On October 27, 1978, her motion was denied by the court for
tardiness (pp. 80-81, Record). Instead of appealing the denial, Concordia filed on January 7, 1980 (or
one year and two months later), Civil Case No. 13207 in the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 26,
entitled "Concordia Javellana- Villanueva v. Celedonia Solivio" for partition, recovery of possession,
ownership and damages.
On September 3, 1984, the said trial court rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 13207, in favor of
Concordia Javellana-Villanueva.
On Concordia's motion, the trial court ordered the execution of its judgment pending appeal and
required Celedonia to submit an inventory and accounting of the estate. In her motions for
reconsideration of those orders, Celedonia averred that the properties of the deceased had already
been transferred to, and were in the possession of, the 'Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana
Foundation." The trial court denied her motions for reconsideration.
In the meantime, Celedonia perfected an appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA GR CV No. 09010). On
January 26, 1988, the Court of Appeals, Eleventh Division, rendered judgment affirming the decision
of the trial court in toto.Hence, this petition for review wherein she raised the following legal issues:
1. whether Branch 26 of the RTC of Iloilo had jurisdiction to entertain Civil Case No.
13207 for partition and recovery of Concordia Villanueva's share of the estate of
Esteban Javellana, Jr. even while the probate proceedings (Spl. Proc. No. 2540) were
still pending in Branch 23 of the same court;
2. whether Concordia Villanueva was prevented from intervening in Spl. Proc. No. 2540
through extrinsic fraud;
3. whether the decedent's properties were subject to reserva troncal in favor of
Celedonia, his relative within the third degree on his mother's side from whom he had
inherited them; and
4. whether Concordia may recover her share of the estate after she had agreed to place
the same in the Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation, and notwithstanding the
fact that conformably with said agreement, the Foundation has been formed and
properties of the estate have already been transferred to it.
I. The question of jurisdiction
After a careful review of the records, we find merit in the petitioner's contention that the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 26, lacked jurisdiction to entertain Concordia Villanueva's action for partition and
recovery of her share of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. while the probate proceedings (Spl,
Proc. No. 2540) for the settlement of said estate are still pending in Branch 23 of the same court,
there being as yet no orders for the submission and approval of the administratix's inventory and
accounting, distributing the residue of the estate to the heir, and terminating the proceedings (p. 31,
Record).
It is the order of distribution directing the delivery of the residue of the estate to the persons entitled
thereto that brings to a close the intestate proceedings, puts an end to the administration and thus far
relieves the administrator from his duties (Santiesteban v. Santiesteban, 68 Phil. 367, Philippine
Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Escolin, et al., L-27860, March 29, 1974, 56 SCRA 266).
The assailed order of Judge Adil in Spl. Proc. No. 2540 declaring Celedonia as the sole heir of the
estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. did not toll the end of the proceedings. As a matter of fact, the last
paragraph of the order directed the administratrix to "hurry up the settlement of the estate." The
pertinent portions of the order are quoted below:
2. As regards the second incident [Motion for Declaration of Miss Celedonia Solivio as
Sole Heir, dated March 7, 1978], it appears from the record that despite the notices
posted and the publication of these proceedings as required by law, no other heirs
came out to interpose any opposition to the instant proceeding. It further appears that
herein Administratrix is the only claimant-heir to the estate of the late Esteban Javellana
who died on February 26, 1977.
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Page
During the hearing of the motion for declaration as heir on March 17, 1978, it was
established that the late Esteban Javellana died single, without any known issue, and
without any surviving parents. His nearest relative is the herein Administratrix, an elder
[sic] sister of his late mother who reared him and with whom he had always been living
with [sic] during his lifetime.
xxxxxxxxx
2. Miss Celedonia Solivio, Administratrix of this estate, is hereby declared as the sole
and legal heir of the late Esteban S. Javellana, who died intestate on February 26, 1977
at La Paz, Iloilo City.
The Administratrix is hereby instructed to hurry up with the settlement of this estate so
that it can be terminated. (pp, 14-16, Record)
In view of the pendency of the probate proceedings in Branch 11 of the Court of First Instance (now
RTC, Branch 23), Concordia's motion to set aside the order declaring Celedonia as sole heir of
Esteban, and to have herself (Concordia) declared as co-heir and recover her share of the properties
of the deceased, was properly filed by her in Spl. Proc. No. 2540. Her remedy when the court denied
her motion, was to elevate the denial to the Court of Appeals for review on certiorari. However,
instead of availing of that remedy, she filed more than one year later, a separate action for the same
purpose in Branch 26 of the court. We hold that the separate action was improperly filed for it is the
probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the estate.
In the interest of orderly procedure and to avoid confusing and conflicting dispositions of a decedent's
estate, a court should not interfere with probate proceedings pending in a co-equal court. Thus, did
we rule in Guilas v. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, L-26695, January 31, 1972, 43
SCRA 111, 117, where a daughter filed a separate action to annul a project of partition executed
between her and her father in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of her mother:
The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the
payment of all the debts and the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to
receive the same. The finality of the approval of the project of The probate court, in the
exercise of its jurisdiction to make distribution, has power to determine the proportion or
parts to which each distributed is entitled. ... The power to determine the legality or
illegality of the testamentary provision is inherent in the jurisdiction of the court making a
just and legal distribution of the inheritance. ... To hold that a separate and independent
action is necessary to that effect, would be contrary to the general tendency of the
jurisprudence of avoiding multiplicity of suits; and is further, expensive, dilatory, and
impractical. (Marcelino v. Antonio, 70 Phil. 388)
A judicial declaration that a certain person is the only heir of the decedent is exclusively
within the range of the administratrix proceedings and can not properly be made an
independent action. (Litam v. Espiritu, 100 Phil. 364)
A separate action for the declaration of heirs is not proper. (Pimentel v. Palanca, 5 Phil.
436)
partition by itself alone does not terminate the probate proceeding (Timbol v. Cano, 1
SCRA 1271, 1276, L-15445, April 29, 1961; Siguiong v. Tecson, 89 Phil. pp. 28, 30). As
long as the order of the distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the
probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated Siguiong v.
Tecson, supra); because a judicial partition is not final and conclusive and does not
prevent the heirs from bringing an action to obtain his share, provided the prescriptive
period therefore has not elapsed (Mari v. Bonilia, 83 Phil. 137). The better practice,
however, for the heir who has not received his share, is to demand his share through a
proper motion in the same probate or administration proceedings, or for reopening of
the probate or administrative proceedings if it had already been closed, and not through
an independent action,which would be tried by another court or Judge which may thus
reverse a decision or order of the probate or intestate court already final and executed
and re-shuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of. (Ramos v. Ortuzar, 89
Phil. 730, 741-742; Timbol v. Cano, supra; Jingco v. Daluz, L-5107, April 24, 1953, 92
Phil. 1082; Roman Catholic v. Agustines, L-14710, March 29, 1960, 107 Phil. 455, 460461; Emphasis supplied)
In Litam et al., v. Rivera, 100 Phil. 364, where despite the pendency of the special proceedings for the
settlement of the intestate estate of the deceased Rafael Litam the plaintiffs-appellants filed a civil
action in which they claimed that they were the children by a previous marriage of the deceased to a
Chinese woman, hence, entitled to inherit his one-half share of the conjugal properties acquired
during his marriage to Marcosa Rivera, the trial court in the civil case declared that the plaintiffs-
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Page
appellants were not children of the deceased, that the properties in question were paraphernal
properties of his wife, Marcosa Rivera, and that the latter was his only heir. On appeal to this Court,
we ruled that "such declarations (that Marcosa Rivera was the only heir of the decedent) is improper,
in Civil Case No. 2071, it being within the exclusive competence of the court in Special Proceedings
No. 1537, in which it is not as yet, in issue, and, will not be, ordinarily, in issue until the presentation
of the project of partition. (p. 378).
However, in the Guilas case, supra, since the estate proceedings had been closed and terminated for
over three years, the action for annulment of the project of partition was allowed to continue.
Considering that in the instant case, the estate proceedings are still pending, but nonetheless,
Concordia had lost her right to have herself declared as co-heir in said proceedings, We have opted
likewise to proceed to discuss the merits of her claim in the interest of justice.
The orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, in Civil Case No. 13207 setting aside the probate
proceedings in Branch 23 (formerly Branch 11) on the ground of extrinsic fraud, and declaring
Concordia Villanueva to be a co-heir of Celedonia to the estate of Esteban, Jr., ordering the partition
of the estate, and requiring the administratrix, Celedonia, to submit an inventory and accounting of
the estate, were improper and officious, to say the least, for these matters he within the exclusive
competence of the probate court.
II. The question of extrinsic fraud
Was Concordia prevented from intervening in the intestate proceedings by extrinsic fraud employed
by Celedonia? It is noteworthy that extrinsic fraud was not alleged in Concordia's original complaint in
Civil Case No. 13207. It was only in her amended complaint of March 6, 1980, that extrinsic fraud
was alleged for the first time.
Extrinsic fraud, as a ground for annulment of judgment, is any act or conduct of the
prevailing party which prevented a fair submission of the controversy (Francisco v.
David, 38 O.G. 714). A fraud 'which prevents a party from having a trial or presenting all
of his case to the court, or one which operates upon matters pertaining, not to the
judgment itself, but to the manner by which such judgment was procured so much so
that there was no fair submission of the controversy. For instance, if through fraudulent
machination by one [his adversary], a litigant was induced to withdraw his defense or
was prevented from presenting an available defense or cause of action in the case
wherein the judgment was obtained, such that the aggrieved party was deprived of his
day in court through no fault of his own, the equitable relief against such judgment may
be availed of. (Yatco v. Sumagui, 44623-R, July 31, 1971). (cited in Philippine Law
Dictionary, 1972 Ed. by Moreno; Varela v. Villanueva, et al., 96 Phil. 248)
A judgment may be annulled on the ground of extrinsic or collateral fraud, as
distinguished from intrinsic fraud, which connotes any fraudulent scheme executed by a
prevailing litigant 'outside the trial of a case against the defeated party, or his agents,
attorneys or witnesses, whereby said defeated party is prevented from presenting fully
and fairly his side of the case. ... The overriding consideration is that the fraudulent
scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court or from
presenting his case. The fraud, therefore, is one that affects and goes into the
jurisdiction of the court. (Libudan v. Gil, L-21163, May 17, 1972, 45 SCRA 17, 27-29;
Sterling Investment Corp. v. Ruiz, L-30694, October 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 318, 323)
The charge of extrinsic fraud is, however, unwarranted for the following reasons:
1. Concordia was not unaware of the special proceeding intended to be filed by
Celedonia. She admitted in her complaint that she and Celedonia had agreed that the
latter would "initiate the necessary proceeding" and pay the taxes and obligations of the
estate. Thus paragraph 6 of her complaint alleged:
6. ... for the purpose of facilitating the settlement of the estate of the late Esteban
Javellana, Jr. at the lowest possible cost and the least effort, the plaintiff and the
defendant agreed that the defendant shall initiate the necessary proceeding, cause the
payment of taxes and other obligations, and to do everything else required by law, and
thereafter, secure the partition of the estate between her and the plaintiff, [although
Celedonia denied that they agreed to partition the estate, for their agreement was to
place the estate in a foundation.] (p. 2, Record; emphasis supplied)
Evidently, Concordia was not prevented from intervening in the proceedings. She stayed away by
choice.Besides, she knew that the estate came exclusively from Esteban's mother, Salustia Solivio,
and she had agreed with Celedonia to place it in a foundation as the deceased had planned to do.
2. The probate proceedings are proceedings in rem. Notice of the time and place of
hearing of the petition is required to be published (Sec. 3, Rule 76 in relation to Sec. 3,
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Page
Rule 79, Rules of Court). Notice of the hearing of Celedonia's original petition was
published in the "Visayan Tribune" on April 25, May 2 and 9, 1977 (Exh 4, p. 197,
Record). Similarly, notice of the hearing of her amended petition of May 26, 1977 for the
settlement of the estate was, by order of the court, published in "Bagong Kasanag"
(New Light) issues of May 27, June 3 and 10, 1977 (pp. 182-305, Record). The
publication of the notice of the proceedings was constructive notice to the whole world.
Concordia was not deprived of her right to intervene in the proceedings for she had
actual, as well as constructive notice of the same. As pointed out by the probate court in
its order of October 27, 1978:
... . The move of Concordia Javellana, however, was filed about five months after
Celedonia Solivio was declared as the sole heir. ... .
Considering that this proceeding is one in rem and had been duly published as required
by law, despite which the present movant only came to court now, then she is guilty of
laches for sleeping on her alleged right. (p. 22, Record)
The court noted that Concordia's motion did not comply with the requisites of a petition for relief from
judgment nor a motion for new trial.
The rule is stated in 49 Corpus Juris Secundum 8030 as follows:
Where petition was sufficient to invoke statutory jurisdiction of probate court
and proceeding was in rem no subsequent errors or irregularities are available on
collateral attack. (Bedwell v. Dean 132 So. 20)
Celedonia's allegation in her petition that she was the sole heir of Esteban within the third degree on
his mother's side was not false. Moreover, it was made in good faith and in the honest belief that
because the properties of Esteban had come from his mother, not his father, she, as Esteban's
nearest surviving relative on his mother's side, is the rightful heir to them. It would have been selfdefeating and inconsistent with her claim of sole heirshipif she stated in her petition that Concordia
was her co-heir. Her omission to so state did not constitute extrinsic fraud.
Failure to disclose to the adversary, or to the court, matters which would defeat one's
own claim or defense is not such extrinsic fraud as will justify or require vacation of the
judgment. (49 C.J.S. 489, citing Young v. Young, 2 SE 2d 622; First National Bank &
Trust Co. of King City v. Bowman, 15 SW 2d 842; Price v. Smith, 109 SW 2d 1144,
1149)
It should be remembered that a petition for administration of a decedent's estate may be filed by any
"interested person" (Sec. 2, Rule 79, Rules of Court). The filing of Celedonia's petition did not
preclude Concordia from filing her own.
III. On the question of reserva troncal
We find no merit in the petitioner's argument that the estate of the deceased was subject to reserva
troncal and that it pertains to her as his only relative within the third degree on his mother's side.
The reserva troncalprovision of the Civil Code is found in Article 891 which reads as follows:
ART. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the
latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another ascendant, or a brother or
sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by operation of law
for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the line
from which said property came.
The persons involved in reserva troncal are:
1. The person obliged to reserve is the reservor (reservista)the ascendant who
inherits by operation of law property from his descendants.
2. The persons for whom the property is reserved are the reservees (reservatarios)
relatives within the third degree counted from the descendant (propositus), and
belonging to the line from which the property came.
3. The propositusthe descendant who received by gratuitous title and died without
issue, making his other ascendant inherit by operation of law. (p. 692, Civil Law by
Padilla, Vol. II, 1956 Ed.)
Clearly, the property of the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., is not reservable property, for Esteban,
Jr. was not an ascendant, but the descendant of his mother, Salustia Solivio, from whom he inherited
the properties in question. Therefore, he did not hold his inheritance subject to a reservation in favor
of his aunt, Celedonia Solivio, who is his relative within the third degree on his mother's side.
The reserva troncal applies to properties inherited by an ascendant from a descendant who inherited
it from another ascendant or 9 brother or sister. It does not apply to property inherited by a
descendant from his ascendant, the reverse of the situation covered by Article 891.
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Since the deceased, Esteban Javellana, Jr., died without descendants, ascendants, illegitimate
children, surviving spouse, brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces, what should apply in the distribution
of his estate are Articles 1003 and 1009 of the Civil Code which provide:
ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving
spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in
accordance with the following articles.
ART. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sisters, nor children of brothers or
sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate.
The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by reason
of relationship by the whole blood.
Therefore, the Court of Appeals correctly held that:
Both plaintiff-appellee and defendant-appellant being relatives of the decedent within
the third degree in the collateral line, each, therefore, shall succeed to the subject estate
'without distinction of line or preference among them by reason of relationship by the
whole blood,' and is entitled one-half (1/2) share and share alike of the estate. (p. 57,
Rollo)
IV. The question of Concordia's one-half share
However, inasmuch as Concordia had agreed to deliver the estate of the deceased to the foundation
in honor of his mother, Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana (from whom the estate came), an
agreement which she ratified and confirmed in her "Motion to Reopen and/or Reconsider Order dated
April 3, 1978" which she filed in Spl. Proceeding No. 2540:
4. That ... prior to the filing of the petition they (petitioner Celedonia Solivio and movant
Concordia Javellana) have agreed to make the estate of the decedent a
foundation, besides they have closely known each other due to their filiation to the
decedent and they have been visiting each other's house which are not far away for
(sic) each other. (p. 234, Record; Emphasis supplied)
she is bound by that agreement. It is true that by that agreement, she did not waive her inheritance in
favor of Celedonia, but she did agree to place all of Esteban's estate in the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de
Javellana Foundation" which Esteban, Jr., during his lifetime, planned to set up to honor his mother
and to finance the education of indigent but deserving students as well.
Her admission may not be taken lightly as the lower court did. Being a judicial admission, it is
conclusive and no evidence need be presented to prove the agreement (Cunanan v. Amparo, 80 Phil.
227; Granada v. Philippine National Bank, L-20745, Sept. 2, 1966, 18 SCRA 1; Sta. Ana v. Maliwat,
L-23023, Aug. 31, 1968, 24 SCRA 1018; People v. Encipido, G.R.70091, Dec. 29, 1986, 146 SCRA
478; and Rodillas v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. 58652, May 20, 1988, 161 SCRA 347).
The admission was never withdrawn or impugned by Concordia who, significantly, did not even testify
in the case, although she could have done so by deposition if she were supposedly indisposed to
attend the trial. Only her husband, Narciso, and son-in-law, Juanito Domin, actively participated in the
trial. Her husband confirmed the agreement between his wife and Celedonia, but he endeavored to
dilute it by alleging that his wife did not intend to give all, but only one-half, of her share to the
foundation (p. 323, Record).
The records show that the "Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation" was established and duly
registered in the Securities and Exchange Commission under Reg. No. 0100027 for the following
principal purposes:
1. To provide for the establishment and/or setting up of scholarships for such deserving
students as the Board of Trustees of the Foundation may decide of at least one scholar
each to study at West Visayas State College, and the University of the Philippines in the
Visayas both located in Iloilo City.
2. To provide a scholarship for at least one scholar for St. Clements Redemptorist
Community for a deserving student who has the religious vocation to become a priest.
3. To foster, develop, and encourage activities that will promote the advancement and
enrichment of the various fields of educational endeavors, especially in literary arts.
Scholarships provided for by this foundation may be named after its benevolent
benefactors as a token of gratitude for their contributions.
4. To direct or undertake surveys and studies in the community to determine community
needs and be able to alleviate partially or totally said needs.
5. To maintain and provide the necessary activities for the proper care of the SolivioJavellana mausoleum at Christ the King Memorial Park, Jaro, Iloilo City, and the
Javellana Memorial at the West Visayas State College, as a token of appreciation for
the contribution of the estate of the late Esteban S. Javellana which has made this
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DIONISIA PADURA ET AL, PETITIONERS-APPELLEES

V.
MELANIA BALDOVINO, ET AL, OPPOSITORS-APPELLANTS
GR NO L-11960 DECEMBER 27, 1958
REYES, JBL,J.,
SV: Fortunato Padura without any heirs, hence the four parcels of land he received from
his father were transmitted to her mother. After her mother died, Fortunatos nephews
35
foundation possible. Also, in perpetuation of his Roman Catholic beliefs and those of his
mother, Gregorian masses or their equivalents will be offered every February and
October, and Requiem masses every February 25th and October llth, their death
anniversaries, as part of this provision.
6. To receive gifts, legacies, donations, contributions, endowments and financial aids or
loans from whatever source, to invest and reinvest the funds, collect the income thereof
and pay or apply only the income or such part thereof as shall be determined by the
Trustees for such endeavors as may be necessary to carry out the objectives of the
Foundation.
7. To acquire, purchase, own, hold, operate, develop, lease, mortgage, pledge,
exchange, sell, transfer, or otherwise, invest, trade, or deal, in any manner permitted by
law, in real and personal property of every kind and description or any interest herein.
8. To do and perform all acts and things necessary, suitable or proper for the
accomplishments of any of the purposes herein enumerated or which shall at any time
appear conducive to the protection or benefit of the corporation, including the exercise
of the powers, authorities and attributes concerned upon the corporation organized
under the laws of the Philippines in general, and upon domestic corporation of like
nature in particular. (pp. 9-10, Rollo)
As alleged without contradiction in the petition' for review:
The Foundation began to function in June, 1982, and three (3) of its eight Esteban
Javellana scholars graduated in 1986, one (1) from UPV graduated Cum Laude and two
(2) from WVSU graduated with honors; one was a Cum Laude and the other was a
recipient of Lagos Lopez award for teaching for being the most outstanding student
teacher.
The Foundation has four (4) high school scholars in Guiso Barangay High School, the
site of which was donated by the Foundation. The School has been selected as the Pilot
Barangay High School for Region VI.
The Foundation has a special scholar, Fr. Elbert Vasquez, who would be ordained this
year. He studied at St. Francis Xavier Major Regional Seminary at Davao City. The
Foundation likewise is a member of the Redemptorist Association that gives yearly
donations to help poor students who want to become Redemptorist priests or brothers.
It gives yearly awards for Creative writing known as the Esteban Javellana Award.
Further, the Foundation had constructed the Esteban S. Javellana Multi-purpose Center
at the West Visayas State University for teachers' and students' use, and has likewise
contributed to religious civic and cultural fund-raising drives, amongst other's. (p. 10,
Rollo)
Having agreed to contribute her share of the decedent's estate to the Foundation, Concordia is
obligated to honor her commitment as Celedonia has honored hers.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is granted. The decision of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals are hereby SET ASIDE. Concordia J. Villanueva is declared an heir of the late Esteban
Javellana, Jr. entitled to one-half of his estate. However, comformably with the agreement between
her and her co-heir, Celedonia Solivio, the entire estate of the deceased should be conveyed to the
"Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javallana Foundation," of which both the petitioner and the private
respondent shall be trustees, and each shall be entitled to nominate an equal number of trustees to
constitute the Board of Trustees of the Foundation which shall administer the same for the purposes
set forth in its charter. The petitioner, as administratrix of the estate, shall submit to the probate court
an inventory and accounting of the estate of the deceased preparatory to terminating the proceedings
therein.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.
and nieces from his full sister and half-brother took possession of the property. The
court ruled that these nephews and nieces will have equal shares over the property.
SC: Rule on Reserva troncal should be applied, meaning the relatives of Fortunato up to
the third degree will get the reservable property after his mother dies. The children of
such relatives (the reservatarios) can receive the property by way of right of
representation. But after applying the rule, the reservatarios and their relationship will
be considered in determining their shares. The rules on ordinary intestate succession
would be followed after the reservatarios have been determined.
1. Agustin Padura married twice. His first wife was Gervacio Landig with whom he
had one child named Manuel Padura. His second wife was Benita Garing with
whom he had 2 children named Fortunato and Candelaria Padura
2. He died leaving a last will and testament duly probated wherein he bequeathed
his properties among his children, Manuel, CAndelaria and Fortunato, and his
surviving spouse Benita (2nd wife). Fortunato was adjudicated 4 parcels of land
a. Fortunato died unmarried and without having executed a will; and not
having any issue, the 4 parcels of land were inherited exclusively by
Benita. Benita applied for an later was issued a Torrens Certificate of Title
in her name, BUT subject to the condition that the properties were
reservable in favor of relatives within the 3rd degree belonging to the line
from which the property came (Fortunato)
b. Candelaria (Fortunatos full sister) died leaving as her heirs her 4
legitimate children (the appellants) Melania, Anicia and Pablo all
surnamed Baldovino
c. Manuel (Fortunatos half brother) also died. His heirs were his legitimate
children (the appellees) Dionisia, Felisa, Flora, Cornelio, Francisco, Juana
and Severino, all surnamed Padura1
3. Benita Garing (the reservista) died. The children of Candelaria and Fortunato
took possession of the 4 parcels of land (the reservable properties).
a. CFI Laguna issued a resolution declaring the legitimate children of Manuel
and Candelaria are the rightful reserves and as such entitled to the 4
parcels of land
4. The Baldovinos filed this present petition wherein they seek to have the
properties partitioned suh that one-half of the same be adjudicated to them,
the other half to the Paduras on the basis that they inherited by right of
representation from their respective parents, the original reserves.
5. The Paduras opposed, arguing that they should all (all 11 of them) be deemed
inheriting in their own right hence, they should have equal shares.
6. TC rendered judgment declaring them all reservees without distinction and
have equal shares over the properties as co-owners, pro indiviso.
ISSUE: should the properties be apportioned among the nephews 2 of the whole blood
and nephews of the hald-blood equally? Or should the nephews of the whole blood take
a share twice as large as that of the nephews of the half-blood? The nephews of the
whole blood get twice the share.
The Baldovinos contend that notwithstanding the rule on Reservable character of
the property under Art. 891, the reservatarios nephews of the whole blood are
1
2
You will see later, kung bakit lugi talaga yung mga Baldovinos.
or niblings kasi may nieces din na kasama
Page
36
Article 1006. Should brother and sisters of the full blood survive together with brothers and sisters of the half blood, the
former shall be entitled to a share double that of the latter. (949)
4 Article 1008. Children of brothers and sisters of the half blood shall succeed per capita or per stirpes, in accordance with the
rules laid down for brothers and sisters of the full blood. (915)
5 Passage was in Spanish. Google translate was not much help.
3
37
Page
entitled to a share twice as large as that of the others pursuant to Arts. 10063,
10084 on intestate succession.
The reserva troncal is a special rule designed primarily to assure the return of the
reservable property to the third degree relatives belonging to the line from which
the property originally came, and avoid its being dissipated into and by their
relatives of the inheriting ascendant (reservista)
o Article 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property
which the latter may have acquired by gratuitous title from another
ascendant, or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he
may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are
within the third degree and who belong to the line from which said property
came. (871)
o The motives for such rule were explained by D. Manuel Alonso Martinez in
his book El Codigo Civil en sus relaciones con Las Legislaciones Forales 5
Summary of not so good translation: consider this sample case: father
dies leaving his wife and lone son as heirs. Wife remarries and had
children with 2nd husband. Lone son dies and his mother (wife) inherits
whatever he got from the father. In case the wife dies, the relatives of
the lone son are prejudiced since the wifes children from the second
marriage will inherit the properties of the lone son as opposed to his
uncle (fathers brother)
The code commission chose to give more importance to lineal
succession than the presumed affection of the deceased.
The commission settled with the suggestion of Manresa, among others,
to reserve the property in case the ascendants inherit in favor of
relatives up to the third degree. No reason was given why 3rd degree.
Aside from the sample case, another reason why this rule was adopted
was to make it the law more democratic (Democracy was becoming a
trend when the civil code was being made by the Spaniards, so fetch).
The purpose of the reserva is accomplished once the property has devolved to
the specified relatives of the line of origin. After that, Art. 891 has nothing to
do with the relations between one reservatario and another of the same degree.
Their shares should be foverned by the ordinary rules of intestate
succession. Upon the death of the ascendant reservista, the reservable property
should pass, not to all reservatarios as a class, but only to those nearest in degree
to the descendant (prepositus), excluding those reseravatarios more remote in
degree.
o The right of representation cannot be alleged when the one claiming the
same as a reservatario of the property is not among those relatives within
the third degree belonging to the line from which the property came.
Relatives of the fourth and the succeeding degrees can never be considered
as reservatarios, since the law does not recognize them as such
o But there is right of representation on the part of reservatarios who are
within the third degree mentioned by law as in the case of nephews of the
deceased person from whom the reservable property came
Proximity of degree and right of representation are basic principles of intestate
succession so is the rule that whole blood brothers and nephews are entitled to a
share double that of brothers and nephews of half-blood.
o In determining the rights of the reservatarios inter se, proximity of degree
and the right of representation of nephews are made to apply, the rule of
double share for immediate collaterals of the whole blood should likewise be
operative.
Reserva Troncal merely determines the group pof relatives to whom the property
should be returned. Within the group, the individual right to the property should
be decided by applicable rules of ordinary intestate succession (since art. 891 is
silent on the matter).
Reserva Troncal is an exceptional case and its application should be limited to
what is strictly needed to accomplish the purpose of the law
Even during the lifetime of the reservista, the reservatarios could compel the
annotation of their right (over the property) in the registry of property. The
reservable property is no part of the estate of the reservista, who may not dispose
them by will so long as there are reservatarios existing. The reservatarios are in
fact inheriting from the descendant prepositus from whom the reservista inherited
the property.
If the nephews of whole and half-blood inherited the prepositus directly, the whole
bloods would receive a double share compared to those of the half-blood. Why
then should the half-bloods inherit equally just because of the delay in the
transmission of the property (when it was with the reservista)? The hereditary
portions should not change
Philippine (and Spanish Jurisprudence) agrees with this despite the contrary
opinions of authors such as Sanchez Roman and Mucius Scaevola.
Appealed order REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Whole blood nephews will get twice the
share of those who are nephews of Half-blood.
Justin Benedict A. Moreto
November 15, 1919
Page
That Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II married the first time Antonia Faz de Leon; that during the
marriage he begot nine children called, Jose, Juan, Maria, Encarnacion, Isabel, Espirita, Gabriel,
Pedro, and Magdalena of the surname Florentino y de Leon; that on becoming a widower he
married the second time Severina Faz de Leon with whom he had two children, Mercedes and
Apolonio III of the surname Florentino y de Leon; that Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II died on
38
G.R. No. 14856

ENCARNACION FLORENTINO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
MERCEDES FLORENTINO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Ramon Querubin, Simeon Ramos and Orense and Vera for appellants. Vicente Foz, Jose Singsong
Tongson and Angel Encarnacion for appellees.
TORRES, J.:
On January 17, 1918, counsel for Encarnacion (together with her husband Simeon Serrano),
Gabriel, Magdalena, Ramon, Miguel, Victorino, and Antonino of the surname Florentino; for
Miguel Florentino, guardian ad litem of the minor Rosario Florentino; for Eugenio Singson, the
father and guardian ad litem of Emilia, Jesus, Lourdes, Caridad, and Dolores of the surname
Singson y Florentino; and for Eugenio Singson, guardian of the minors Jose and Asuncion
Florentino, filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Sur, against Mercedes
Florentino and her husband, alleging as follows:
February 13, 1890; that he was survived by his second wife Severina Faz de Leon and the ten
children first above mentioned; that his eleventh son, Apolonio III, was born on the following 4th
of March 1890.
That of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo's aforementioned eleven children, Juan, Maria and Isabel
died single, without leaving any ascendants or descendants; that Ramon, Miguel, Victorino,
Antonio, and Rosario are the legitimate children of the deceased Jose Florentino who was one of
the children of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo; that Emilia, Jesus, Lourdes, Caridad, and Dolores
are the legitimate children of Espirita Florentino, now deceased, and her husband Eugenio Singson;
that Jose and Asuncion are the children of Pedro Florentino, another son of the deceased Apolonio
Isabelo Florentino.
That on January 17 and February 13, 1890, Apolonio Isabelo Florentino executed a will before the
notary public of Ilocos Sur, instituting as his universal heirs his aforementioned ten children, the
posthumos Apolonio III and his widow Severina Faz de Leon; that he declared, in one of the
paragraphs of said will, all his property should be divided among all of his children of both
marriages.
That, in the partition of the said testator's estate, there was given to Apolonio Florentino III, his
posthumos son, the property marked with the letters A, B, C, D, E, and F in the complaint, a gold
rosary, pieces of gold, of silver and of table service, livestock, palay, some personal property and
other objects mentioned in the complaint.
Page
That several times the plaintiffs have, in an amicable manner, asked the defendants to deliver their
corresponding part of the reservable property; that without any justifiable motive the defendants
have refused and do refuse to deliver said property or to pay for its value; that for nine years
Mercedes Florentino has been receiving, as rent for the lands mentioned, 360 bundles of palay at
fifty pesos per bundle and 90 bundles of corn at four pesos per bundle; that thereby the plaintiffs
have suffered damages in the sum of fifteen thousand four hundred and twenty-eight pesos and
fifty-eight centavos, in addition to three hundred and eight pesos and fifty-eight centavos for the
39
That Apolonio Florentino III, the posthumos son of the second marriage, died in 1891; that his
mother, Severina Faz de Leon, succeeded to all his property described in the complaint; that the
widow, Severina Faz de Leon died on November 18, 1908, leaving a will instituting as her
universal heiress her only living daughter, Mercedes Florentino; that, as such heir, said daughter
took possession of all the property left at the death of her mother, Severina Faz de Leon; that
among same is included the property, described in the complaint, which the said Severina Faz de
Leon inherited from her deceased son, the posthumos Apolonio, as reservable property; that, as a
reservist, the heir of the said Mercedes Florentino deceased had been gathering for herself alone the
fruits of lands described in the complaint; that each and every one of the parties mentioned in said
complaint is entitled to one-seventh of the fruits of the reservable property described therein, either
by direct participation or by representation, in the manner mentioned in paragraph 9 of the
complaint.
Page
To the preceding complaint counsel for the defendants demurred, alleging that the cause of action is
based on the obligation of the widow Severina Faz de Leon to reserve the property she inherited
from her deceased son Apolonio Florentino y de Leon who, in turn, inherited same from his father
Apolonio Isabelo Florentino; that, there being no allegation to the contrary, it is to be presumed that
the widow Severina Faz de Leon did not remarry after the death of this husband nor have any
natural child; that the right claimed by the plaintiffs is not that mentioned in article 968 and the
following articles, but that established in article 811 of the Civil Code; that the object of the
provisions of the aforementioned articles is to avoid the transfer of said reservable property to those
extraneous to the family of the owner thereof; that if the property inherited by the widow Severina
Faz de Leon from her deceased son Apolonio Florentino y Faz de Leon (property which originated
from his father and her husband) has all passed into the hands of the defendant, Mercedes
Florentino y Encarnacion, a daughter of the common ancestor's second marriage (said Apolonio
Isabelo Florentino with the deceased Severina Faz de Leon) it is evident that the property left at the
death of the posthumos son Apolonio Florentino y Faz de Leon did not pass after the death of his
mother Severina, his legitimate heirs as an ascendant, into the hands of strangers; that said property
having been inherited by Mercedes Florentino y Encarnacion from her mother (Severina), article
811 of the Civil Code is absolutely inapplicable to the present case because, when the defendant
Mercedes, by operation law, entered into and succeeded to, the possession, of the property lawfully
inherited from her mother Severina Faz de Leon, said property had, while in the possession of her
mother, lost the character of reservable property - there being a legitimate daughter of Severina Faz
de Leon with the right to succeed her in all her rights, property and actions; that the restraints of the
law whereby said property may not passed into the possession of strangers are void, inasmuch as
the said widow had no obligation to reserve same, as Mercedes Florentino is a forced heiress of her
mother Severina Faz de Leon; that, in the present case, there is no property reserved for the
plaintiffs since there is a forced heiress, entitled to the property left by the death of the widow
Severina Faz de Leon who never remarried; that the obligation to reserve is secondary to the duty
of respecting the legitime; that in the instant case, the widow Severina Faz de Leon was in duty
bound to respect the legitime of her daughter Mercedes the defendant; that her obligation to reserve
the property could not be fulfilled to the prejudice of the legitime which belongs to her forced
heiress, citing in support of these statements the decision of the supreme court of Spain of January
4, 1911; that, finally, the application of article 811 of the Civil Code in favor of the plaintiffs would
presuppose the exclusion of the defendant from here right to succeed exclusively to all the property,
rights and actions left by her legitimate mother, although the said defendant has a better right than
the plaintiffs; and that there would be injustice if the property claimed be adjudicated to the
40
value of the fruits not gathered, of one thousand pesos (P1,000) for the unjustifiable retention of the
aforementioned reservable property and for the expenses of this suit. Wherefore they pray it be
declared that all the foregoing property is reservable property; that the plaintiffs had and do have a
right to the same, in the quantity and proportion mentioned in the aforementioned paragraph 9 of
the complaint; that the defendants Mercedes Florentino and her husband be ordered to deliver to the
plaintiffs their share of the property in question, of the palay and of the corn above mentioned, or
their value; and that they be condemned to pay the plaintiffs the sum of one thousand pesos
(P1,000) together with the costs of this instance.
plaintiffs, as well as violation of section 5 of the Jones Law which invalidates any law depriving
any person of an equal protection. Wherefore they prayed that the demurrer be sustained, with costs
against the plaintiffs.
After the hearing of the demurrer, on August 22, 1918, the judge absolved the defendants from the
complaint and condemned the plaintiffs to pay the costs.
Counsel for the plaintiffs excepted to this order, moved to vacate it and to grant them a new trial;
said motion was overruled; the plaintiffs expected thereto and filed the corresponding bill of
exceptions which was allowed, certified and forwarded to the clerk of this court.
On appeal the trial judge sustained the demurrer of the defendants to the complaint of the plaintiffs,
but, instead of ordering the latter to amend their complaint within the period prescribed by the rules
- undoubtedly believing that the plaintiffs could not alter nor change the facts constituting the cause
of action, and that, as both parties were agreed as to the facts alleged in the complaint as well as in
the demurrer, every question reduced itself to one of the law, already submitted to the decision of
the court - the said judge, disregarding the ordinary procedure established by law, decided the case
by absolving the defendants from the complaint and by condemning the plaintiffs to pay the costs
of the instance.
There certainly was no real trial, inasmuch as the defendants, instead of answering the complaint of
the plaintiffs, confined themselves to filing a demurrer based on the ground that the facts alleged in
the complaint do not constitute a cause of action. However, the judge preferred to absolve the
defendants, thereby making an end to the cause, instead of dismissing the same, because
undoubtedly he believed, in view of the controversy between the parties, that the arguments
adduced to support the demurrer would be the same which the defendants would allege in their
answer - those dealing with a mere question of law which the courts would have to decide - and
that, the demurrer having been sustained, if the plaintiffs should insist - they could do no less upon alleging the same facts as those set out in their complaint and if another demurrer were
afterwards set up, he would be obliged to dismiss said complaint with costs against the plaintiffs in spite of being undoubtedly convinced in the instant case that the plaintiffs absolutely lack the
right to bring the action stated in their complaint.
Page
In order to decide whether the plaintiffs are or are not entitled to invoke, in their favor, the
provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code, and whether the same article is applicable to the
41
Being of the opinion that the emendation of the indicated defects is not necessary - as in this case
what has been done does not prejudice the parties - the appellate court will now proceed to decide
the suit according to its merits, as found in the record and to the legal provisions applicable to the
question of law in controversy so that unnecessary delay and greater expense may be avoided,
inasmuch as, even if all the ordinary proceedings be followed, the suit would be subsequently
decided in the manner and terms that it is now decided in the opinion thoughtfully and
conscientiously formed for its determination.
question of law presented in this suit, it is necessary to determine whether the property enumerated
in paragraph 5 of the complaint is of the nature of reservable property; and if so, whether in
accordance with the provision of the Civil Code in article 811, Severina Faz de Leon (the widow of
the deceased Apolonio Isabelo Florentino) who inherited said property from her son Apolonio
Florentino III (born after the death of his father Apolonio Isabelo) had the obligation to preserve
and reserve same for the relatives, within the third degree, of her aforementioned deceased son
Apolonio III.
The above mentioned article reads:
Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property acquired by the latter gratuitously
from some other ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such of the property as
he may have acquired by operation of law for the benefit of relatives within the third degree
belonging to the line from which such property came.
During the marriage of Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II and Severina Faz de Leon two children were
born, namely the defendant Mercedes Florentino and Apolonio Florentino III (born after the death
of his father). At the death of Apolonio Isabelo Florentino under a will, his eleven children
succeeded to the inheritance he left, one of whom, the posthumos son Apolonio III, was given, as
his share, the aforementioned property enumerated in the complaint. In 1891 the said posthumos
son Apolonio Florentino III died and was succeeded by his legitimate mother Severina Faz de
Leon, who inherited the property he left and who on dying, November 18, 1908, instituted by will
as her sole heiress her surviving daughter, Mercedes Florentino, the defendant herein, who took
possession of all property left by her father, same constituting the inheritance. Included in said
inheritance is the property, specified in by the posthumos son Apolonio Florentino III from his
father Apolonio Isabelo Florentino, and which, at the death of the said posthumos son, had in turn
been inherited by his mother, Severina Faz de Leon. Even if Severina left in her will said property,
together with her own, to her only daughter and forced heiress, Mercedes Florentino, nevertheless
this property had not lost its reservable nature inasmuch as it originated from the common ancestor
of the litigants, Apolonio Isabelo; was inherited by his son Apolonio III; was transmitted by same
(by operation of law) to his legitimate mother and ascendant, Severina Faz de Leon.
Page
According to the provisions of law, ascendants do not inherit the reservable property, but its
enjoyment, use or trust, merely for the reason that said law imposes the obligation to reserve and
preserve same for certain designated persons who, on the death of the said ascendants reservists,
(taking into consideration the nature of the line from which such property came) acquire the
42
The posthumos son, Apolonio Florentino III, acquired the property, now claimed by his brothers,
by a lucrative title or by inheritance from his aforementioned legitimate father, Apolonio Isabelo
Florentino II. Although said property was inherited by his mother, Severina Faz de Leon,
nevertheless, she was in duty bound, according to article 811 of the Civil Code, to reserve the
property thus acquired for the benefit of the relatives, within the third degree, of the line from
which such property came.
ownership of said property in fact and by operation of law in the same manner as forced heirs
(because they are also such) - said property reverts to said line as long as the aforementioned
persons who, from the death of the ascendant-reservists, acquire in fact the right of reservatarios
(person for whom property is reserved), and are relatives, within the third degree, of the descendant
from whom the reservable property came.
Any ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property, while there are living, within the
third degree, relatives of the latter, is nothing but a life usufructuary or a fiduciary of the reservable
property received. He is, however, the legitimate owner of his own property which is not reservable
property and which constitutes his legitime, according to article 809 of the Civil Code. But if,
afterwards, all of the relatives, within the third degree, of the descendant (from whom came the
reservable property) die or disappear, the said property becomes free property, by operation of law,
and is thereby converted into the legitime of the ascendant heir who can transmit it at his death to
his legitimate successors or testamentary heirs. This property has now lost its nature of reservable
property, pertaining thereto at the death of the relatives, called reservatarios, who belonged within
the third degree to the line from which such property came.
Following the order prescribed by law in legitimate succession, when there are relatives of the
descendant within the third degree, the right of the nearest relative, called reservatario, over the
property which the reservista (person holding it subject to reservation) should return to him,
excludes that of the one more remote. The right of representation cannot be alleged when the one
claiming same as a reservatario of the reservable property is not among the relatives within the
third degree belonging to the line from which such property came, inasmuch as the right granted by
the Civil Code in article 811 is in the highest degree personal and for the exclusive benefit of
designated persons who are the relatives, within the third degree, of the person from whom the
reservable property came. Therefore, relatives of the fourth and the succeeding degrees can never
be considered as reservatarios, since the law does not recognize them as such.
Page
In this case it is conceded without denial by defendants, that the plaintiffs Encarnacion, Gabriel and
Magdalena are the legitimate children of the first marriage of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo
Florentino II; that Ramon, Miguel, Ceferino, Antonio, and Rosario are both grandchildren of
Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II, and children of his deceased son, Jose Florentino; that the same
have the right to represent their aforementioned father, Jose Florentino; that Emilia, Jesus, Lourdes,
Caridad, and Dolores are the legitimate children of the deceased Espirita Florentino, one of the
daughters of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II, and represent the right of their
43
In spite of what has been said relative to the right of representation on the part of one alleging his
right as reservatario who is not within the third degree of relationship, nevertheless there is right of
representation on the part of reservatarios who are within the third degree mentioned by law, as in
the case of nephews of the deceased person from whom the reservable property came. These
reservatarios have the right to represent their ascendants (fathers and mothers) who are the brothers
of the said deceased person and relatives within the third degree in accordance with article 811 of
the Civil Code.
aforementioned mother; and that the other plaintiffs, Jose and Asuncion, have also the right to
represent their legitimate father Pedro Florentino one of the sons of the aforementioned Apolonio
Isabelo Florentino II. It is a fact, admitted by both parties, that the other children of the first
marriage of the deceased Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II died without issue so that this decision
does not deal with them.
There are then seven "reservatarios" who are entitled to the reservable property left at the death of
Apolonio III; the posthumos son of the aforementioned Apolonio Isabelo II, to wit, his three
children of his first marriage - Encarnacion, Gabriel, Magdalena; his three children, Jose, Espirita
and Pedro who are represented by their own twelve children respectively; and Mercedes Florentino,
his daughter by a second marriage. All of the plaintiffs are the relatives of the deceased posthumos
son, Apolonio Florentino III, within the third degree (four of whom being his half-brothers and the
remaining twelve being his nephews as they are the children of his three half-brothers). As the first
four are his relatives within the third degree in their own right and the other twelve are such by
representation, all of them are indisputably entitled as reservatarios to the property which came
from the common ancestor, Apolonio Isabelo, to Apolonio Florentino III by inheritance during his
life-time, and in turn by inheritance to his legitimate mother, Severina Faz de Leon, widow of the
aforementioned Apolonio Isabelo Florentino II.
Page
The judgment appealed from is also founded on the theory that article 811 of the Civil Code does
not destroy the system of legitimate succession and that the pretension of the plaintiffs to apply said
article in the instant case would be permitting the reservable right to reduce and impair the forced
legitimate which exclusively belongs to the defendant Mercedes Florentino, in violation of the
precept of article 813 of the same Code which provides that the testator cannot deprive his heirs of
their legitime, except in the cases expressly determined by law. Neither can he impose upon it any
burden, condition, or substitution of any kind whatsoever, saving the provisions concerning the
usufruct of the surviving spouse, citing the decision of the Supreme Court of Spain of January 4,
1911.
44
In spite of the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code already cited, the trial judge refused to
accept the theory of the plaintiffs and, accepting that of the defendants, absolved the latter from the
complaint on the ground that said article is absolutely inapplicable to the instant case, inasmuch as
the defendant Mercedes Florentino survived her brother, Apolonio III, from whom the reservable
property came and her mother, Severina Faz de Leon, the widow of her father, Apolonio Isabelo
Florentino II; that the defendant Mercedes, being the only daughter of Severina Faz de Leon, is
likewise her forced heiress; that when she inherited the property left at the death of her mother,
together with that which came from her deceased brother Apolonio III, the fundamental object of
article 811 of the Code was thereby complied with, inasmuch as the danger that the property
coming from the same line might fall into the hands of strangers had been avoided; and that the
hope or expectation on the part of the plaintiffs of the right to acquire the property of the deceased
Apolonio III never did come into existence because there is a forced heiress who is entitled to such
property.
The principal question submitted to the court for decision consists mainly in determining whether
they property left at the death of Apolonio III, the posthumos son of Apolonio Isabelo II, was or
was not invested with the character of reservable property when it was received by his mother,
Severina Faz de Leon.
The property enumerated by the plaintiffs in paragraph 5 of their complaint came, without any
doubt whatsoever, from the common ancestor Apolonio Isabelo II, and when, on the death of
Apolonio III without issue the same passed by operation of law into the hands of his legitimate
mother, Severina Faz de Leon, it became reservable property, in accordance with the provision of
article 811 of the Code, with the object that the same should not fall into the possession of persons
other than those comprehended within the order of person other than those comprehended within
the order of succession traced by the law from Apolonio Isabelo II, the source of said property. If
this property was in fact clothed with the character and condition of reservable property when
Severina Faz de Leon inherited same from her son Apolonio III, she did not thereby acquire the
dominion or right of ownership but only the right of usufruct or of fiduciary with the necessary
obligation to preserve and to deliver or return it as such reservable property to her deceased son's
relatives within the third degree, among whom is her daughter, Mercedes Florentino.
Reservable property neither comes, nor falls under, the absolute dominion of the ascendant who
inherits and receives same from his descendant, therefore it does not form part of his own property
nor become the legitimate of his forced heirs. It becomes his own property only in case that all the
relatives of his descendant shall have died (reservista) in which case said reservable property losses
such character.
With full right Severina Faz de Leon could have disposed in her will of all her own property in
favor of her only living daughter, Mercedes Florentino, as forced heiress. But whatever provision
there is in her will concerning the reservable property received from her son Apolonio III, or rather,
whatever provision will reduce the rights of the other reservatarios, the half brothers and nephews
of her daughter Mercedes, is unlawful, null and void, inasmuch as said property is not her own and
she has only the right of usufruct or of fiduciary, with the obligation to preserve and to deliver same
to the reservatarios, one of whom is her own daughter, Mercedes Florentino.
Page
For this reason, in no manner can it be claimed that the legitime of Mercedes Florentino, coming
from the inheritance of her mother Severina Faz de Leon, has been reduced and impaired; and the
application of article 811 of the Code to the instant case in no way prejudices the rights of the
45
It cannot reasonably be affirmed, founded upon an express provision of law, that by operation of
law all of the reservable property, received during lifetime by Severina Faz de Leon from her son,
Apolonio III, constitutes or forms parts of the legitime pertaining to Mercedes Florentino. If said
property did not come to be the legitimate and exclusive property of Severina Faz de Leon, her only
legitimate and forced heiress, the defendant Mercedes, could not inherit all by operation of law and
in accordance with the order of legitimate succession, because the other relatives of the deceased
Apolonio III, within the third degree, as well as herself are entitled to such reservable property.
defendant Mercedes Florentino, inasmuch as she is entitled to a part only of the reservable
property, there being no lawful or just reason which serves as real foundation to disregard the right
to Apolonio III's other relatives, within the third degree, to participate in the reservable property in
question. As these relatives are at present living, claiming for it with an indisputable right, we
cannot find any reasonable and lawful motive why their rights should not be upheld and why they
should not be granted equal participation with the defendant in the litigated property.
The claim that because of Severina Faz de Leon's forced heiress, her daughter Mercedes, the
property received from the deceased son Apolonio III lost the character, previously held, of
reservable property; and that the mother, the said Severina, therefore, had no further obligation to
reserve same for the relatives within the third degree of the deceased Apolonio III, is evidently
erroneous for the reason that, as has been already stated, the reservable property, left in a will by
the aforementioned Severina to her only daughter Mercedes, does not form part of the inheritance
left by her death nor of the legitimate of the heiress Mercedes. Just because she has a forced
heiress, with a right to her inheritance, does not relieve Severina of her obligation to reserve the
property which she received from her deceased son, nor did same lose the character of reservable
property, held before the reservatarios received same.
It is true that when Mercedes Florentino, the heiress of the reservista Severina, took possession of
the property in question, same did not pass into the hands of strangers. But it is likewise true that
the said Mercedes is not the only reservataria. And there is no reason founded upon law and upon
the principle of justice why the other reservatarios, the other brothers and nephews, relatives within
the third degree in accordance with the precept of article 811 of the Civil Code, should be deprived
of portions of the property which, as reservable property, pertain to them.
From the foregoing it has been shown that the doctrine announced by the Supreme Court of Spain
on January 4, 1911, for the violation of articles 811, 968 and consequently of the Civil Code is not
applicable in the instant case.
Following the provisions of article 813, the Supreme Court of Spain held that the legitime of the
forced heirs cannot be reduced or impaired and said article is expressly respected in this decision.
Page
Concerning the prayer in the complaint relative to the indemnity for damages and the delivery of
the fruits collected, it is not proper to grant the first for there is no evidence of any damage which
can give rise to the obligation of refunding same. As to the second, the delivery of the fruits
46
However, in spite of the efforts of the appellee to defend their supposed rights, it has not been
shown, upon any legal foundation, that the reservable property belonged to, and was under the
absolute dominion of, the reservista, there being relatives within the third degree of the person from
whom same came; that said property, upon passing into the hands of the forced heiress of the
deceased reservista, formed part of the legitime of the former; and that the said forced heiress, in
addition to being a reservataria, had an exclusive right to receive all of said property and to deprive
the other reservatarios, her relatives within the third degree of certain portions thereof.
produced by the land forming the principal part of the reservable property, the defendants are
undoubtedly in duty bound to deliver to the plaintiffs six-sevenths of the fruits or rents of the
portions of land claimed in the complaint, in the quantity expressed in paragraph 11 of the same,
from January 17, 1918, the date the complaint was filed; and the remaining seventh part should go
to the defendant Mercedes.
For the foregoing reasons it follows that with the reversal of the order of decision appealed from we
should declare, as we hereby do, that the aforementioned property, inherited by the deceased
Severina Faz de Leon from her son Apolonio Florentino III, is reservable property; that the
plaintiffs, being relatives of the deceased Apolonio III within the third degree, are entitled to sixsevenths of said reservable property; that the defendant Mercedes is entitled to the remaining
seventh part thereof; that the latter, together with her husband Angel Encarnacion, shall deliver to
the plaintiffs, jointly, six-sevenths of the fruits or rents, claimed from said portion of the land and of
the quantity claimed, from January 17, 1918, until fully delivered; and that the indemnity for one
thousand pesos (P1,000) prayed for in the complaint is denied, without special findings as to the
costs of both instances. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Johnson, Araullo, Street, Malcolm and Avancea, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 6878
September 13, 1913
MARCELINA EDROSO, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
PABLO and BASILIO SABLAN, opponents-appellees.
Francisco Dominguez for appellant.
Crispin Oben for appellees.
ARELLANO, C.J.:
The subject matter of this appeal is the registration of certain property classified as required by law to be reserved.
Marcelina Edroso applied for registration and issuance of title to two parcels of land situated in the municipality of
Pagsanjan, Province of Laguna, one of 1 hectare 77 ares and 63 centares, and the other 1 hectare 6 ares and 26
centares. Two applications were filed, one for each parcel, but both were heard and decided in a single judgment.
Marcelina Edroso was married to Victoriano Sablan until his death on September 22, 1882. In this marriage they
had a son named Pedro, who was born on August 1, 1881, and who at his father's death inherited the two said
parcels. Pedro also died on July 15, 1902, unmarried and without issue and by this decease the two parcels of land
passed through inheritance to his mother, Marcelina Edroso. Hence the hereditary title whereupon is based the
application for registration of her ownership.
Two legitimate brothers of Victoriano Sablan that is, two uncles german of Pedro Sablan appeared in the case
to oppose the registration, claiming one of two things: Either that the registration be denied, "or that if granted to her
the right reserved by law to the opponents be recorded in the registration of each parcel." (B. of E., 11, 12.)
The Court of Land Registration denied the registration and the application appealed through a bill of exceptions.
Page
The appellant impugns as erroneous the first idea advanced (second assignment of error), and denies that the land
which are the subject matter of the application are required by law to be reserved a contention we regard as
indefensible.
47
Registration was denied because the trial court held that the parcels of land in question partake of the nature of
property required by law to be reserved and that in such a case application could only be presented jointly in the
names of the mother and the said two uncles of Pedro Sablan.

Facts: (1) The applicant acquired said lands from her descendant Pedro Sablan by inheritance; (2) Pedro Sablan
had acquired them from his ascendant Victoriano Sablan, likewise by inheritance; (3) Victoriano Sablan had likewise
acquired them by inheritance from his ascendants, Mariano Sablan and Maria Rita Fernandez, they having been
adjudicated to him in the partition of hereditary property had between him and his brothers. These are admitted
facts.
A very definite conclusions of law is that the hereditary title is one without a valuable consideration [gratuitous title],
and it is so characterized in article 968 of the Civil Code, for he who acquires by inheritance gives nothing in return
for what he receives; and a very definite conclusion of law also is that the uncles german are within the third degree
of blood relationship.
The ascendant who inherits from his descendant property which the latter acquired without a valuable
consideration from another ascendant, or from a brother or sister, is under obligation to reserve what he has
acquired by operation of law for the relatives who are within the third degree and belong to the line whence
the property proceeded. (Civil Code, art. 811.)
Marcelina Edroso, ascendant of Pedro Sablan, inherited from him these two parcels of land which he had acquired
without a valuable consideration that is, by inheritance from another ascendant, his father Victoriano. Having
acquired them by operation of law, she is obligated to relatives within the third degree and belong to the line of
Mariano Sablan and Maria Rita Fernandez, whence the lands proceeded. The trial court's ruling that they partake of
the nature property required by law to be reserved is therefore in accordance with the law.
But the appellant contends that it is not proven that the two parcels of land in question have been acquired by
operation of law, and that only property acquired without a valuable consideration, which is by operation of law, is
required by law to reserved.
The appellees justly argue that this defense was not alleged or discussed in first instance, but only herein. Certainly,
the allegation in first instance was merely that "Pedro Sablan acquired the property in question in 1882, before the
enforcement of the Civil Code, which establishes the alleged right required by law to be reserved, of which the
opponents speak; hence, prescription of the right of action; and finally, opponents' renunciation of their right,
admitting that it existed and that they had it" (p. 49).
However that be, it is not superflous to say, although it may be unnecessary, that the applicant inherited the two
parcels of land from her son Pedro, who died "unmarried and without issue." The trial court so held as a conclusion
of fact, without any objection on the appellant's part. (B. of E., 17, 20.) When Pedro Sablan died without issue, his
mother became his heir by virtue of her right to her son's legal portion under article 935 of the Civil Code:
In the absence of legitimate children and descendants of the deceased, his ascendants shall from him, to
the exclusion of collaterals.
The contrary could only have occurred if the heiress had demonstrated that any of these lands had passed into her
possession by free disposal in her son's will; but the case presents no testamentary provision that demonstrate any
transfer of property from the son to the mother, not by operation of law, but by her son's wish. The legal presumption
is that the transfer of the two parcels of land was abintestate or by operation of law, and not by will or the wish of the
predecessor in interest. (Act No. 190, sec. 334, No. 26.) All the provision of article 811 of the Civil Code have
therefore been fully complied with.
If Pedro Sablan had instituted his mother in a will as the universal heiress of his property, all he left at death would
not be required by law to be reserved, but only what he would have perforce left her as the legal portion of a
legitimate ascendant.
The legal portion of the parents or ascendants is constituted by one-half of the hereditary estate of the
children and descendants. The latter may unrestrictedly dispose of the other half, with the exception of what
is established in article 836. (Civil Code, art. 809.)
In such case only the half constituting the legal portion would be required by law to be reserved, because it is what
by operation of law could full to the mother from her son's inheritance; the other half at free disposal would not have
to be reserved. This is all that article 811 of the Civil Code says.
Page
Proof testate succession devolves upon the heir or heiress who alleges it. It must be admitted that a half of Pedro
Sablan's inheritance was acquired by his mother by operation of law. The law provides that the other half is also
presumed to be acquired by operation of law that is, by intestate succession. Otherwise, proof to offset this
48
No error has been incurred in holding that the two parcels of land which are the subject matter of the application are
required by law to be reserved, because the interested party has not proved that either of them became her
inheritance through the free disposal of her son.

presumption must be presented by the interested party, that is, that the other half was acquired by the man's wish
and not by operation of law.
Nor is the third assignments of error admissible that the trial court failed to sustain the renunciation of the right
required by law to be reserved, which the applicant attributes to the opponents. Such renunciation does not appear
in the case. The appellant deduces it from the fact that the appellees did not contradict the following statement of
hers at the trial:
The day after my brother-in-law Pablo Sablan dies and was buried, his brother came to my house and said that
those rice lands were mine, because we had already talked about making delivery of them. (p. 91).
The other brother alluded to is Basilio Sablan, as stated on page 92. From the fact that Basilio Sablan said that the
lands belong to the appellant and must be delivered to her it cannot be deduced that he renounced the right
required by law to be reserved in such lands by virtue of the provisions of article 811 of the Civil Code, for they really
belong to her and must be delivered to her.
The fourth assignments of error set up the defense of prescription of the right of action. The appellant alleges
prescription of the opponent's right of action for requiring fulfillment of the obligation they attribute to her recording in
the property registry the right required by law to be reserved, in accordance with the provisions of the Mortgage
Law; and as such obligation is created by law, it prescribed in the time fixed in No. 2 of section 43 of Act No. 190.
She adds: "Prescription of the right alleged to the reserved by force of law has not been invoked." (Eight allegation.)
The appellant does not state in her brief what those provisions of the Mortgage Law are. Nor did she do so in first
instance, where she says only the following, which is quoted from the record: "I do not refer to the prescription of the
right required by law to be reserved in the property; I refer to the prescription of the right of action of those who are
entitled to the guaranty of that right for seeking that guaranty, for those who are entitled to that right the Mortgage
Law grants a period of time for recording it in the property registry, if I remember correctly, ninety days, for seeking
entry in the registry; but as they have not exercised that right of action, such right of action for seeking here that it be
recorded has prescribed. The right of action for requiring that the property be reserved has not prescribed, but the
right of action for guaranteeing in the property registry that this property is required by law to be reserved" (p. 69 of
the record).
The appellees reply: It is true that their right of action has prescribed for requiring the applicant to constitute the
mortgage imposed by the Mortgage Law for guaranteeing the effectiveness of the required by law to be reserved;
but because that right of action has prescribed, that property has not been divested of its character of property
required by law to be reserved; that it has such character by virtue of article 8112 of the Civil Code, which went into
effect in the Philippine in December, 1889, and not by virtue of the Mortgage Law, which only went into effect in the
country by law of July 14, 1893; that from December, 1889, to July, 1893, property which under article 811 of the
Civil Code acquired the character of property reserved by operation of law was such independently of the Mortgage
Law, which did not yet form part of the positive legislation of the country; that although the Mortgage Law has been
in effect in the country since July, 1893, still it has in no way altered the force of article 811 of the Civil Code, but has
operated to reinforce the same merely by granting the right of action to the persons in whose favor the right is
reserved by operation of law to require of the person holding the property a guaranty in the form of a mortgage to
answer for the enforcement, in due time, of the right; that to lose the right of action to the guaranty is not to lose the
right itself; that the right reserved is the principal obligation and the mortgage the accessory obligation, and loss of
the accessory does not mean loss of the principal. (Fifth and sixth allegations.)
The existence of the right required by law to be reserved in the two parcels of land in question being indisputable,
even though it be admitted that the right of action which the Mortgage Law grants as a guaranty of final enforcement
of such right has prescribed, the only thing to be determined by this appeal is the question raised in the first
assignment of error, that is, how said two parcels of land can and ought to be registered, not in the property registry
newly established by the Mortgage Law, but in the registry newly organized by Act No. 496. But as the have slipped
into the allegations quoted some rather inexact ideas that further obscure such an intricate subject as this of the
rights required to be reserved in Spanish-Philippine law, a brief disgression on the most essential points may not be
out of place here.
The Mortgage Law of July 14, 1893, to which the appellees allude, is the amended one of the colonies, not the first
enforced in the colonies and consequently in the Philippines. The preamble of said amended Mortgage Law states:
Two kinds of property required by law to be reserved are distinguished in the Civil Code, as set forth in article 968
thereof, where it says:
Page
The Civil Code went into effect in the Philippines in the same year, 1889, but on the eight day.
49
The Mortgage Law in force in Spain for thirty years went into effect, with the modifications necessary for its
adaptation, in the Antilles on May 1, 1880, and in the Philippines on December 1, 1889, thus commencing in
those regions the renovation of the law on real property, and consequently of agrarian credit.

Besides the reservation imposed by article 811, the widow or widower contracting a seconds marriage shall be
obliged to set apart for the children and descendants of the first marriage the ownership of all the property he or she
may have required from the deceased spouse by will, by intestate succession, by gift, or other transfer without a
valuable consideration."
The Mortgage Law of Spain and the first law that went into effect in the Philippines on December 1, 189, do not
contain any provision that can be applied to the right reserved by article 811 of the Civil Code, for such right is a
creation of the Civil Code. In those laws appear merely the provisions intended to guarantee the effectiveness of the
right in favor of the children of the first marriage when their father or mother contracts a second marriage.
Nevertheless, the holding of the supreme court of Spain, for the first time set forth in the decision on appeal of
November 8, 1894, has been reiterated:
That while the provisions of articles 977 and 978 of the Civil Code that tend to secure the right required to be
reserved in the property refer especially to the spouses who contract second or later marriages, they do not
thereby cease to be applicable to the right establishes in article 811, because, aside from the legal reason,
which is the same in both cases, such must be the construction from the important and conclusive
circumstance that said provisions are set forth in the chapter that deals with inheritances in common, either
testate or intestate, and because article 968, which heads the section that deals in general with property
required by law to be reserved, makes reference to the provisions in article 811; and it would consequently
be contradictory to the principle of the law and of the common nature of said provisions not to hold them
applicable to that right.
Thus it was again stated in a decision on appeal, December 30, 1897, that: "As the supreme court has already
declared, the guaranties that the Code fixes in article 977 and 978 for the rights required by law to the reserved to
which said articles refer, are applicable to the special right dealt with in article 811, because the same principle
exists and because of the general nature of the provisions of the chapter in which they are found."
From this principle of jurisprudence it is inferred that if from December, 1889, to July, 1893, a case had occurred of
a right required to be reserved by article 811, the persons entitled to such right would have been able to institute,
against the ascendant who must make the reservation, proceedings for the assurance and guaranty that article 977
and 978 grant to the children of a first marriage against their father or mother who has married again. The
proceedings for assurance, under article 977; are: Inventory of the property subject to the right reserved, annotation
in the property registry of such right reserved in the real property and appraisal of the personal property; and the
guaranty, under article 978, is the assurance by mortgage, in the case of realty, of the value of what is validly
alienated.
But since the amended Mortgage Law went into effect by law of July 14, 1893, in the Philippines this is not only a
principle of jurisprudence which may be invoked for the applicability to the right reserved in article 811 of the
remedies of assurance and guaranty provided for the right reserved in article 968, but there is a positive provision of
said law, which is an advantage over the law of Spain, to wit, article 199, which read thus:
The special mortgage for guaranteeing the right reserved by article 811 of the Civil Code can only be
required by the relatives in whose favor the property is to be reserved, if they are of age; if minors, it will be
require by the person who should legally represent them. In either case the right of the persons in whose
favor the property must be reserved will be secured by the same requisites as set forth in the preceding
article (relative to the right reserved by article 968 of the Civil Code), applying to the person obligated to
reserve the right the provisions with respect to the father.
In article 168 of the same law the new subsection 2 is added in connection with article 199 quoted, so that said
article 168 reads as thus:
Legal mortgage is established:
1. . . .
Page
This being admitted, and admitted also that both the litigating parties agree that the period of ninety days fixed for
the right of action to the guaranty, that is, to require the mortgage that guarantees the effectiveness of the right
required by law to be reserved, has prescribed, it is necessary to lay down a principle in this matter. Now it should
by noted that such action has not prescribed, because the period of ninety days fixed by the Mortgage Law is not for
the exercise of the right of action of the persons entitled to the right reserved, but for the fulfillment of the obligation
of the person who must make the reservation.
50
2. In favor of the relatives to whom article 811 of the Civil Code refers, for the property required to be
reserved, upon the property of the person obliged to reserve it.

Article 191 of the reads thus: "If ninety days pass without the father's instituting in court the proceeding to which the
foregoing article refers, the relatives themselves may demand fulfillment, etc., . . . applying, according to said article
199, to the person obligated to reserve the right the provisions with respect to the father."
Article 203 of the regulation for the application of the Mortgage Law says: "In the case of article 199 of the law the
proceedings to which article 190 thereof refers will be instituted within the ninety days succeeding the date of the
date of the acceptation of the inheritance by the person obligated to reserve the property; after this period has
elapsed, the interested parties may require the institution of such proceedings, if they are of age; and in any other
case, their legal representatives."
Thus it clearly appears that the lapse of the ninety days is not the expiration by prescription of the period for the right
must be reserved, but really the commencement thereof, enables them to exercise it at any time, since no limits is
set in the law. So, if the annotation of the right required by law to be reserved in the two parcels of land in question
must be made in the property registry of the Mortgage Law, the persons entitled to it may now institute proceedings
to that end, and an allegation of prescription against the exercise of such right of action cannot be sustained.
Since the applicant confesses that she does not allege prescription of the right of action for requiring that the
property be reserved, for she explicitly so stated at the trial, and as the case presents no necessity for the
proceedings that should be instituted in accordance with the provisions of the Mortgage Law, this prescription of the
right of action cannot take place, because such right of action does not exist with reference to instituting
proceedings for annotation in the registry of Act No. 496 of the right to the property required by law to be reserved. It
is sufficient, as was done in the present case, to intervene in the registration proceedings with the claim set up by
the two opponents for recording therein the right reserved in either parcel of land.
Now comes the main point in the appeal. The trial court denied the registration because of this finding set forth in its
decision:
Absolute title to the two parcels of land undoubtedly belongs to the applicant and the two uncles of the
deceased Pedro Sablan, and the application cannot be made except in the name of all of them in common.
(B. of E., p. 20.)
It must be remembered that absolute title consists of the rights to use, enjoy, dispose of, and recover. The person
who has in himself all these rights has the absolute or complete ownership of the thing; otherwise, the person who
has the right to use and enjoy will have the usufruct, and the person who has the rights of disposal and recovery the
direct title. The person who by law, act, or contract is granted the right of usufruct has the first two rights or using an
enjoying, and then he is said not to have the fee simple that is, the rights of disposal and recovery, which pertain
to another who, after the usufruct expires, will come into full ownership.
The question set up in the first assignment of error of the appellant's brief is this:
What are the rights in the property of the person who holds it subject to the reservation of article 811 of the
Civil Code?
There are not lacking writers who say, only those of a usufructuary, the ultimate title belonging to the person in
whose favor the reservation is made. If that were so, the person holding the property could not apply for registration
of title, but the person in whose favor it must be reserved, with the former's consent. This opinion does not seem to
be admissible, although it appears to be supported by decisions of the supreme court of Spain of May 21, 1861, and
June 18, 1880, prior to the Civil Code, and of June 22, 1895, somewhat subsequent to the enforcement thereof.
Another writer says: "This opinion only looks at two salient points the usufruct and the fee simple; the remaining
features of the arrangement are not perceived, but become obscure in the presence of that deceptive emphasis
which only brings out two things: that the person holding the property will enjoy it and that he must keep what he
enjoys for other persons." (Manresa, VII, 189.)
Page
The ascendants who inherits from a descendants, whether by the latter's wish or by operation of law, requires the
inheritance by virtue of a title perfectly transferring absolute ownership. All the attributes of the right of ownership
belong to him exclusively use, enjoyment, disposal and recovery. This absolute ownership, which is inherent in
the hereditary title, is not altered in the least, if there be no relatives within the third degree in the line whence the
property proceeds or they die before the ascendant heir who is the possessor and absolute owner of the property. If
there should be relatives within the third degree who belong to the line whence the property proceeded, then a
limitation to that absolute ownership would arise. The nature and scope of this limitation must be determined with
exactness in order not to vitiate rights that the law wishes to be effective. The opinion which makes this limitation
51
In another place he says: "We do not believe that the third opinion can now be maintained that is, that the
surviving spouse (the person obliged by article 968 to make the reservation) can be regarded as a mere
usufructuary and the descendants immediately as the owner; such theory has no serious foundation in the Code."
(Ibid., 238.)

consist in reducing the ascendant heir to the condition in of a mere usufructuary, depriving him of the right of
disposal and recovery, does not seem to have any support in the law, as it does not have, according to the opinion
that he has been expressed in speaking of the rights of the father or mother who has married again. There is a
marked difference between the case where a man's wish institutes two persons as his heirs, one as usufructuary
and the other as owner of his property, and the case of the ascendant in article 811 or of the father or mother in
article 968. In the first case, there is not the slightest doubt that the title to the hereditary property resides in the
hereditary owner and he can dispose of and recover it, while the usufructuary can in no way perform any act of
disposal of the hereditary property (except that he may dispose of the right of usufruct in accordance with the
provisions of article 480 of the Civil Code), or any act of recovery thereof except the limited one in the form
prescribed in article 486 of the Code itself, because he totally lacks the fee simple. But the ascendants who holds
the property required by article 811 to be reserved, and the father of mother required by article 986 to reserve the
right, can dispose of the property they might itself, the former from his descendant and the latter from his of her child
in first marriage, and recover it from anyone who may unjustly detain it, while the persons in whose favor the right is
required to be reserved in either case cannot perform any act whatsoever of disposal or of recovery.
Article 975 states explicitly that the father or mother required by article 9687 to reserve the right may dispose of the
property itself:
Alienation of the property required by law to be reserved which may be made by the surviving
spouse aftercontracting a second marriage shall be valid only if at his or her death no legitimate children or
descendants of the first marriage survive, without prejudice to the provisions of the Mortgage of Law.
It thus appears that the alienation is valid, although not altogether effective, but under a condition subsequent, to wit:
"If at his or her death no legitimate children or descendants of the first marriage survive."
If the title did not reside in the person holding the property to be reserved, his alienation thereof would necessarily
be null and void, as executed without a right to do so and without a right which he could transmit to the acquirer. The
law says that the alienation subsists (to subject is to continue to exist) "without prejudice to the provisions of the
Mortgage Law." Article 109 of this Law says:
The possessor of property subject to conditions subsequent that are still pending may mortgage or alienate
it, provided always that he preserve the right of the parties interested in said conditions by expressly
reserving that right in the registration.
In such case, the child or legitimate descendants of the first marriage in whose favor the right is reserved cannot
impugn the validity of the alienation so long as the condition subsequent is pending, that is, so long as the remarried
spouse who must reserve the right is alive, because it might easily happen that the person who must reserve the
right should outlive all the person in whose favor the right is reserved and then there would be no reason for the
condition subsequent that they survive him, and, the object of the law having disappeared, the right required to be
reserved would disappear, and the alienation would not only be valid but also in very way absolutely effective.
Consequently, the alienation is valid when the right required by law to be reserved to the children is respected; while
the effects of the alienation depend upon a condition, because it will or will not become definite, it will continue to
exist or cease to exist, according to circumstances. This is what the law establishes with reference to the reservation
of article 968, wherein the legislator expressly directs that the surviving spouse who contracts a second marriage
shall reserve to the children or descendants of the first marriage ownership. Article 811 says nothing more than that
the ascendants must make the reservation.
Manresa, with his recognized ability, summarizes the subject under the heading, "Rights and obligations during the
existence of the right required by law to be reserved," in these words:
During the whole period between the constitution in legal form of the right required by law to be reserved and the
extinction thereof, the relatives within the third degree, after the right that in their turn may pertain to them has
beenassured, have only an expectation, and therefore they do not even have the capacity to transmit that
expectation to their heirs.
Page
But since in addition to being the usufructuary he is, even though conditionally, the owner in fee simple of the
property, he can dispose of it in the manner provided in article 974 and 976 of the same Code. Doubt arose also on
this point, but the Direccion General of the registries, in an opinion of June 25, 1892, declared that articles 974 and
975, which are applicable by analogy, for they refer to property reserved by law, reveal in the clearest manner the
attitude of the legislator on this subject, and the relatives with the third degree ought not to be more privileged in the
right reserved in article 811 than the children in the right reserved by article 975, chiefly for the reason that the right
required to be reserved carries with it a condition subsequent, and the property subject to those conditions can
validly be alienated in accordance with article 109 of the Mortgage Law, such alienation to continue, pending
fulfillment of the condition." (Civil Code, VI, 270.)
52
The ascendant is in the first place a usufructuary who should use and enjoy the things according to their nature, in
the manner and form already set forth in commenting upon the article of the Code referring to use and usufruct.

Another commentator corroborates the foregoing in every way. He says:
The ascendants acquires that property with a condition subsequent, to wit, whether or not there exists at the
time of his death relatives within the third degree of the descendants from whom they inherit in the line
whence the property proceeds. If such relatives exist, they acquire ownership of the property at the death of
the ascendants. If they do not exist, the ascendants can freely dispose thereof. If this is true, since the
possessor of property subject to conditions subsequent can alienate and encumber it, the ascendants may
alienate the property required by law to be reserved, but he will alienate what he has and nothing more
because no one can give what does not belong to him, and the acquirer will therefore receive a limited and
revocable title. The relatives within the third degree will in their turn have an expectation to the property
while the ascendant lives, an expectation that cannot be transmitted to their heirs, unless these are also
within the third degree. After the person who is required by law to reserve the right has died, the relatives
may rescind the alienation of the realty required by law to be reserved and they will complete ownership, in
fee simple, because the condition and the usufruct have been terminated by the death of the usufructuary.
(Morell, Estudios sobre bienes reservable, 304, 305.)
The conclusion is that the person required by article 811 to reserve the right has, beyond any doubt at all, the rights
of use and usufruct. He has, moreover, for the reasons set forth, the legal title and dominion, although under a
condition subsequent. Clearly he has, under an express provision of the law, the right to dispose of the property
reserved, and to dispose of is to alienate, although under a condition. He has the right to recover it, because he is
the one who possesses or should possess it and have title to it, although a limited and revocable one. In a word, the
legal title and dominion, even though under a condition, reside in him while he lives. After the right required by law to
be reserved has been assured, he can do anything that a genuine owner can do.
On the other hand, the relatives within the third degree in whose favor of the right is reserved cannot dispose of the
property, first because it is no way, either actually, constructively or formally, in their possession; and, moreover,
because they have no title of ownership or of the fee simple which they can transmit to another, on the hypothesis
that only when the person who must reserve the right should die before them will they acquire it, thus creating a fee
simple, and only then will they take their place in the succession of the descendants of whom they are relatives
within the third degree, that it to say, a second contingent place in said legitimate succession in the fashion of
aspirants to a possible future legacy. If any of the persons in whose favor the right is reserved should, after their
rights has been assured in the registry, dare to dispose of even nothing more than the fee simple of the property to
be reserved his act would be null and void, for, as was definitely decided in the decision on appeal of December 30,
1897, it is impossible to determine the part "that might pertain therein to the relative at the time he exercised the
right, because in view of the nature and scope of the right required by law to be reserved the extent of his right
cannot be foreseen, for it may disappear by his dying before the person required to reserve it, just as may even
become absolute should that person die."
Careful consideration of the matter forces the conclusion that no act of disposal inter vivos of the person required by
law to reserve the right can be impugned by him in whose favor it is reserved, because such person has all,
absolutely all, the rights inherent in ownership, except that the legal title is burdened with a condition that the third
party acquirer may ascertain from the registry in order to know that he is acquiring a title subject to a condition
subsequent. In conclusion, it seems to us that only an act of disposal mortis causa in favor of persons other than
relatives within the third degree of the descendants from whom he got the property to be reserved must be
prohibited to him, because this alone has been the object of the law: "To prevent persons outside a family from
securing, by some special accident of life, property that would otherwise have remained therein." (Decision of
December 30, 1897.)
Practically, even in the opinion of those who reduce the person reserving the right to the condition of a mere
usufructuary, the person in whose favor it must be reserved cannot attack the alienation that may be absolutely
made of the property the law requires to be reserved, in the present case, that which the appellant has made of the
two parcels of land in question to a third party, because the conditional alienation that is permitted her is equivalent
to an alienation of the usufruct, which is authorized by article 480 of the Civil Code, and, practically, use and
enjoyment of the property required by law to be reserved are all that the person who must reserve it has during his
lifetime, and in alienating the usufruct all the usefulness of the thing would be transmitted in an incontrovertible
manner. The question as to whether or not she transmits the fee simple is purely academic, sine re, for it is not real,
actual positive, as is the case of the institution of two heirs, one a usufructuary and the other the owner, by the
express wish of the predecessor in interest.
Page
Cannot the heir of the property required by law to reserved, merely because a condition subsequent is annexed to
his right of disposal, himself alone register the ownership of the property he has inherited, when the persons in
whose favor the reservation must be made degree thereto, provided that the right reserved to them in the two
parcels of land be recorded, as the law provides?
53
If the person whom article 811 requires to reserve the right has all the rights inherent in ownership, he can use,
enjoy, dispose of and recover it; and if, in addition to usufructuary, he is in fact and in law the real owner and can
alienate it, although under a condition, the whole question is reduced to the following terms:

It is well known that the vendee under pacto de retracto acquires all the rights of the vendor:
The vendee substitutes the vendor in all his rights and actions. (Civil Code, art. 1511.)
If the vendor can register his title, the vendee can also register this same title after he has once acquired it. This title,
however, in its attribute of being disposable, has a condition subsequent annexed that the alienation the
purchaser may make will be terminated, if the vendor should exercise the right granted him by article 1507, which
says:
Conventional redemption shall take place when the vendor reserves to himself the right to recover the thing sold,
with the obligation to comply with article 1518, and whatever more may have been agreed upon," that is, if he
recovers the thing sold by repaying the vendee the price of the sale and other expenses. Notwithstanding this
condition subsequent, it is a point not at all doubtful now that the vendee may register his title in the same way as
the owner of a thing mortgaged that is to say, the latter with the consent of his creditor and the former with the
consent of the vendor. He may alienate the thing bought when the acquirer knows by well from the title entered in
the registry that he acquires a title revocable after a fixed period, a thing much more certain and to be expected than
the purely contingent expectation of the person in whose favor is reserved a right to inherit some day what another
has inherited. The purpose of the law would be defeated in not applying to the person who must make the
reservation the provision therein relative to the vendee under pacto de retracto, since the argument in his favor is
the more power and conclusive; ubi eadem ratio, eadem legis dispositivo.
Therefore, we reverse the judgment appealed from, and in lieu thereof decide and declare that the applicant is
entitled to register in her own name the two parcels of land which are the subject matter of the applicants, recording
in the registration the right required by article 811 to be reserved to either or both of the opponents, Pablo Sablan
and Basilio Sablan, should they survive her; without special findings as to costs.
Torres, Mapa, Johnson, Carson and Trent, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-12957
March 24, 1961
CONSTANCIO SIENES, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
FIDEL ESPARCIA, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Proceso R. Remollo for plaintiffs-appellants.
Leonardo D. Mancao for defendants-appellees.
DIZON, J.:
Page
After trial upon the issues thus joined, the lower court rendered judgment as follows:
54
Appellants commenced this action below to secure judgment (1) declaring null and void the sale
executed by Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso in favor of appellees, the spouses Fidel Esparcia and
Paulina Sienes; (2) ordering the Esparcia spouses to reconvey to appellants Lot 3368 of the
Cadastral Survey of Ayuquitan (now Amlan), Oriental Negros; and (3) ordering all the appellees to
pay, jointly and severally, to appellants the sum of P500.00 as damages, plus the costs of suit. In
their answer appellees disclaimed any knowledge or information regarding the sale allegedly made
on April 20, 1951 by Andrea Gutang in favor of appellants and alleged that, if such sale was made,
the same was void on the ground that Andrea Gutang had no right to dispose of the property subject
matter thereof. They further alleged that said property had never been in possession of appellants,
the truth being that appellees, as owners, had been in continuous possession thereof since the death
of Francisco Yaeso. By way of affirmative defense and counterclaim, they further alleged that on July
30, 1951, Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso, as the only surviving heirs of Francisco Yaeso, executed a
public instrument of sale in favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes, the said sale
having been registered together with an affidavit of adjudication executed by Paulina and Cipriana on
July 18, 1951, as sole surviving heirs of the aforesaid deceased; that since then the Esparcias had
been in possession of the property as owners.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered declaring (1) that the sale
of Lot No. 3368 made by Andrea Gutang to the plaintiff spouses Constancio Sienes and
Genoveva Silay is void, and the reconveyance prayed for by them is denied; (2) that the sale
made by Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso in favor of defendants Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes
involving the same lot is also void, and they have no valid title thereto; and (3) that the
reservable property in question is part of and must be reverted to the estate of Cipriana Yaeso,
the lone surviving relative and heir of Francisco Yaeso at the death of Andrea Gutang as of
December 13, 1951. No pronouncement as to the costs.
From the above decision the Sienes spouse interposed the present appeal, their principal contentions
being, firstly, that the lower court erred in holding that Lot 3368 of the Cadastral Survey of Ayuquitan
was a reservable property; secondly, in annulling the sale of said lot executed by Andrea Gutang in
their favor; and lastly, in holding that Cipriana Yaeso, as reservee, was entitled to inherit said land.
There is no dispute as to the following facts:
Lot 3368 originally belonged to Saturnino Yaeso. With his first wife, Teresa Ruales, he had four
children named Agaton, Fernando, Paulina and Cipriana, while with his second wife, Andrea Gutang,
he had an only son named Francisco. According to the cadastral records of Ayuquitan, the properties
left by Saturnino upon his death the date of which does not clearly appear of record were left to
his children as follows: Lot 3366 to Cipriana, Lot 3367 to Fernando, Lot 3375 to Agaton, Lot 3377
(southern portion) to Paulina, and Lot 3368 (western portion) to Francisco. As a result of the cadastral
proceedings, Original Certificate of Title No. 10275 covering Lot 3368 was issued in the name of
Francisco. Because Francisco was a minor at the time, his mother administered the property for him,
declared it in her name for taxation purposes (Exhs A & A-1), and paid the taxes due thereon (Exhs.
B, C, C-1 & C-2). When Francisco died on May 29, 1932 at the age of 20, single and without any
descendant, his mother, as his sole heir, executed the public instrument Exhibit F entitled
EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT AND SALE whereby, among other things, for and in consideration
of the sum of P800.00 she sold the property in question to appellants. When thereafter said vendees
demanded from Paulina Yaeso and her husband Jose Esparcia, the surrender of Original Certificate
of Title No. 10275 which was in their possession the latter refused, thus giving rise to the filing
of the corresponding motion in the cadastral record No. 507. The same, however, was denied (Exhs.
8 & 9).
Thereafter, or more specifically, on July 30, 1951, Cipriana and Paulina Yaeso, the surviving halfsisters of Francisco, and who as such had declared the property in their name, on January 1, 1951
executed a deed of sale in favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes (Exh. 2) who, in
turn, declared it in their name for tax purposes and thereafter secured the issuance in their name of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-2141 (Exhs. 5 & 5-A).
Page
In connection with reservable property, the weight of opinion is that the reserve creates two resolutory
conditions, namely, (1) the death of the ascendant obliged to reserve and (2) the survival, at the time
of his death, of relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which the property came (6
Manresa 268-269; 6 Sanchez Roman 1934). This Court has held in connection with this matter that
the reservista has the legal title and dominion to the reservable property but subject to a resolutory
condition; that he is like a life usufructuary of the reservable property; that he may alienate the same
but subject to reservation, said alienation transmitting only the revocable and conditional ownership of
the reservists, the rights acquired by the transferee being revoked or resolved by the survival of
reservatarios at the time of the death of the reservista (Edroso vs. Sablan, 25 Phil. 295; Lunsod vs.
Ortega, 46 Phil. 664; Florentino vs. Florentino, 40 Phil. 480; and Director of Lands vs. Aguas, 65 Phil.
279).
55
As held by the trial court, it is clear upon the facts already stated, that the land in question was
reservable property. Francisco Yaeso inherited it by operation of law from his father Saturnino, and
upon Francisco's death, unmarried and without descendants, it was inherited, in turn, by his mother,
Andrea Gutang. The latter was, therefore, under obligation to reserve it for the benefit of relatives
within the third degree belonging to the line from which said property came, if any survived her. The
record discloses in this connection that Andrea Gutang died on December 13, 1951, the lone
reservee surviving her being Cipriana Yaeso who died only on January 13, 1952 (Exh. 10).
The sale made by Andrea Gutang in favor of appellees was, therefore, subject to the condition that
the vendees would definitely acquire ownership, by virtue of the alienation, only if the vendor died
without being survived by any person entitled to the reservable property. Inasmuch much as when
Andrea Gutang died, Cipriana Yaeso was still alive, the conclusion becomes inescapable that the
previous sale made by the former in favor of appellants became of no legal effect and the reservable
property subject matter thereof passed in exclusive ownership to Cipriana.
On the other hand, it is also clear that the sale executed by the sisters Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso in
favor of the spouses Fidel Esparcia and Paulina Sienes was subject to a similar resolutory condition.
The reserve instituted by law in favor of the heirs within the third degree belonging to the line from
which the reservable property came, constitutes a real right which the reservee may alienate and
dispose of, albeit conditionally, the condition being that the alienation shall transfer ownership to the
vendee only if and when the reservee survives the person obliged to reserve. In the present case,
Cipriana Yaeso, one of the reservees, was still alive when Andrea Gutang, the person obliged to
reserve, died. Thus the former became the absolute owner of the reservable property upon Andrea's
death. While it may be true that the sale made by her and her sister prior to this event, became
effective because of the occurrence of the resolutory condition, we are not now in a position to
reverse the appealed decision, in so far as it orders the reversion of the property in question to the
Estate of Cipriana Yaeso, because the vendees the Esparcia spouses did not appeal therefrom.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision as above modified is affirmed, with costs, and without
prejudice to whatever action in equity the Esparcia spouses may have against the Estate of Cipriana
Yaeso for the reconveyance of the property in question.
Bengzon, Actg. C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera and
Paredes, JJ.,concur.
Page
56
THANK YOU JAMES PEREZ!

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ABAD SANTOS, J.:

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Linnie intended Philippine laws to govern her Will.

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provision of the Will is not authorized by the Code, and, therefore, it is

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That the above-mentioned amount will be paid or delivered on a staggered cash

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"Therefore, the evidence on record having established plaintiff-appellant's right to

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Neither is there a fideicommissary substitution here and on this point, petitioner is

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Fortunata T. Rosales (husband), 1/4; Magna R. Acebes (daughter), 1/4; Macikequerox

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