Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-35545 June 18, 1976
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioners,
vs.
HON. AMADO B. REYES, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bataan, Branch II, and Spouses
ALEXANDER V. RUIZ and ELIZABETH E. RUIZ and EVELYN M. EUGENIO, respondents.
Solicitor General, Estelito P. Mendoza and Assistant Solicitor General Bernardo P. Pardo for petitioner.
De Los Santos, De los Santos & De los Santos for Private respondents.
Hon. Amado B. Reyes in his own behalf.
ESGUERRA, J:
Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Bataan, Branch II, dated March 14, 1972,
ordering the registration of three (3) parcels of land containing an area of 106.2887 hectares, more or less, in favor of
the applicants, spouses Alexander V. Ruiz and Elizabeth E. Ruiz, and Evelyn M. Eugenia private respondents herein.
The records of this case show that:
1. On May 24, 1971, private respondents- spouses Alexander V. Ruiz and Elizabeth E. Ruiz, and Evelyn M.
Eugenia filed with the Court of First Instance of Bataan an application for registration (LRC No. N-194, LRC
Rec. No. N-40363) of 3 lots, denominated as Lots Nos. 1, 2, and 3, (Plan (LRC) SWO-13446), situated in
the barrio of Cabcaben Municipality of Mariveles, Province of Bataan, containing an area of 106.2887
hectares, more or less, which applicants claimed they have acquired by purchase from other claimants. their
predecessors-in-interest; 1
2. On June 25, 1971, the Solicitor General, through Assistant Solicitor General Eduardo C. Abaya, requested
the Provincial Fiscal of Bataan, Demetrio Sanchez, to represent him as counsel for the oppositors, the
Director of Lands and the Director of Forestry, in the above mentioned land registration case No. N-194,
pending before the CFI of Bataan; 2
3. Notice of hearing having been published in the Official Gazette, Vol. 67, No. 30, p. 5958, the first hearing
was held on November 25, 1971, at 8:30 A.M. The oppositors, the Director of Lands and the Director of
Forestry, or their counsel, the Provincial Fiscal, did not appear and so, on motion of applicants, the trial court
issued an order of General default and forthwith named the Deputy Clerk of Court, Jose Masigla as
commissioner to receive evidence of the applicants. On account of the absence of the applicants
themselves who were represent at the hearing by their lawyers, the reception of evidence was postponed
until December 1, 1971, on which date the commissioner started receiving applicants' evidence; 3
4. On December 20, 1971, the provincial Fiscal, as the authorized representative of the Solicitor General
and on behalf of the Director of Lands and Director of Forestry, filed a motion for reconsideration of the order
of default which was granted. In an order issued by respondent Judge on December 23, 1971, the order of
general default, insofar as it concerned the Director of Lands and the Director of Forestry, was lifted. It also
gave the Provincial Fiscal five (5) days within which to file formal written opposition under oath for and on
behalf of the two government oppositors, to vacate and set aside the order of default. I however, declared
that the evidence already adduced shall be considered part of the evidence for the applicants; 4

5. On December 27, 1971, the Provincial Fiscal filed the formal written opposition of the Directors of Land and Forestry to
the application and alleged the following as grounds for their opposition:

a) applicants for their predecessors-in-interest failed to establish sufficient title to the land.
b) they have not been in actual possession of the land;
c) the land applied for is part of the public domain;
d) applicants failed to pay all taxes.
e) the land had never been the object of a cadastral proceeding;
f) applicants have not complied with the requisites required by the Act 496. 5
6. A retrial of the case was scheduled and held starting January 19, 1972.

7. On March 14, 1972, respondent Judge Amado B. Reyes rendered the decision ordering the registration of
the three lots applied for by the private respondents, copy of which decision was served on the Provincial
Fiscal on the same day and who in turn, mailed a copy thereof to the Solicitor General also that same day; 6
8. On April 15, 1972, respondent Judge ordered the issuance of a
Decree; On April 25, 1972, the Commissioner of Land Registration issued Decree No. 139479; on April 28, 1972, the
Register of Deeds of Bataan on the Basis of said decree issued Original Certificate of Title No. N-225; 7
9. On the same day, April 28, 1972, the brand-new registered owners, spouses Alexander V. Ruiz and Elizabeth E. Ruiz,
and Evelyn M. Eugenio, sold the three lots to Jose T. Marcelo, Jr. and on August 28, 1972, the latter reconveyed the
property to the same registered owners, the herein private respondents; finally, the three parcels of land were sold and
transferred by the said registered owners to the Farmers Fertilizer Corporation, organized and principally owned by Jose
P. Marcelo and family, a close relative of private respondents, on October 6, 1972; 8
10. On September 1, 1972, at the written request of the Solicitor General, the Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance
of Bataan forwarded the original record of the case, LRC Case No. N-194, to the Office of the Solicitor General; 9
11. On September 25, 1972, this Court received the petition of the Solicitor General for a review on certiorari of the
aforementioned decision of respondent Judge Amado B. Reyes, naming therein a new and additional party, the Republic
of the Philippines, which did not appear in the original proceedings in the lower court.

The petition for review, on certiorari, gives the following reasons why the decision should be reviewed:

10

a) Per decision of the Cadastral Court of Bataan, dated October 11, 1937, portion of Lot No. 626, Mariveles
Cadastre, was declared public land, hence, the trial court was without jurisdiction over the subject matter.
b) The survey plan was not approved by the Director of Lands, therefore, it is inadmissible in evidence;
c) Applicants did not have any kind of registerable title to the land since the property was part of the public
domain.
d) The area of the land was 106.2887 hectares and, hence was far in excess of the maximum of 24 hectares
which may be acquired by free patens under Section 44 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 as amended:
12. In answer, the private respondents stated: 11
a) the petition was filed beyond the reglementary period of 30 days for appeal which expired on April 14, 1972, (Sept. 25,
1972 petition filed thus rendering the decision final and executory from said date; the present appeal, by certiorari, was
filed more than 5 months after the decision had become final and executory, and the corresponding decree had been
issued by the Land Registration Commissioner followed by the issuance of the Original Certificate of Title by the Register
of Deeds of Bataan.

b) the appeal on certiorari to the Supreme Court, in accordance with Section 17 of the Judiciary Act, as
amended by R.A, 5440, can raise only questions of law and no questions of fact may be reviewed;
c) there is no legal basis for the contention that the lower court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter
just because the land had declared public land in a cadastral proceeding; likewise, the certification of the
Land Registration Commissioner, dated Sept 13, 1972, may not be entertained for the first time on appeal
because it was not presented at any stage of the proceedings in the lower court and is deemed admitted
and considered final; as a matter of fact, the oppositors, through their counsel, the Provincial Fiscal, had
declared in their pleadings, "That the parcel of land subject of this petition was and has never been the
object of a cadastral proceeding";
d) the allegation that because the survey plan was not approved by the Director of Lands the same is not
admissible in evidence is without merit. The authority of the Commissioner of Land Registration to verify and
approve plans and survey for the purpose of original registration is given by R.A. 3844 as amended by R.A.
6389;
e) the inclusion of the "Republic of the Philippines" as one of the petitioners in the appeal by certiorari is
improper and unwarranted. The Republic of the Philippines was not one of the oppositors in the land
registration case. The only oppositors were the Director of Lands and the Director of Forestry who were
represented in the proceedings by the Solicitor General through his authorized representative the Provincial
Fiscal of Bataan; the petition being an appeal by certiorari only the original parties in the lower court may be
named and may appear as petitioner therein.
f) the limitation of 24 hectares that the State may grant to any applicant applies only to free patens under
Section 44, C.A. No. 141 and not to those holding imperfect or incomplete title under Section 48 of the same
law;
g) the decision of the lower court had already become final and executory with the appositors, the Directors
of Lands and the Director of Forestry, not having taken the corresponding appeal within the period allowed
by law and consequently, the final decree had been issued on April 25, 1972, while the Original Certificate of
Title was issued on April 28, 1972.
h) the land had already passed into the hands of a third party in good faith and for value;
13 On November 28, 1972, the Solicitor General filed an amended petition with this court, 12 reciting the same
allegations contained in his earlier petition for review by certiorari by naming a new respondent, the Farmers Fertilizer
Corporation, the transferee of the land in question, and making therein a new prayer, i.e., that all persons claiming or
deriving rights from the respondents be restrained from transaction on the property subject of the litigation; subsequently,
respondents filed their answer to the amended petition and repeating therein their old counter-arguments;

14 On July 11, 1973, the Solicitor General filed with this Court a motion for new trial,

13
seeking to set aside the
controversial decision of the lower court and to have the record of the case remanded to the lower court for new trial, on
the following grounds.

a) Fraud committed by applicants with apparent collusion and patent cooperation of respondent Judge thus
preventing petitioners, oppositors in the case below, from fully and fairly presenting their case;
b) ... a clear case of falsification of judicial records was perpetrated.
And prayed:
a) the decision of the lower court be set aside and a new trial be granted:
b) ... that the respondent Judge be disqualified from hearing the new trial ... Without prejudice to whatever
action this Honorable Court may take against him. . .;

15 On August 21, 1973, respondent Judge Amado B. Reyes submitted to this Court his comments on the new motion
for new trial which contained certain allegations imputing the commission of fraud and irregularities against him,
thusly: 14
a) The allegations, insofar as they impute fraud, irregularity and misdemeanor against herein respondent
Judge are specifically denied by him for being completely untrue, malicious and without factual foundation;
and that the claims are false and the accusations are wild and baseless, intended merely to mislead and
deceived the Honorable Court:
b) ... at the back of these machinations, undoubtedly aided and abetted by those who have axes to grind
against the undersigned, is the Clerk of Court of First Instance of Bataan, formerly the deputy clerk of court
of Branch II of said court, namely; Atty. Jose J. Masigla." Because of some acts of the deputy clerk of court,
the respondent Judge berated him and admonished him thusly: "Huwag kang magpakalunod sa isang
tasang nilagaw", which remark said deputy clerk of court resented and led to several incidents further
irritating the relationship between the presiding judge and this deputy clerk of court was exacting exhorbitant
and illegal fees in connection with the publication of notices of hearing. Thus respondent Judge Amado B.
Reyes impugns the motives of his former deputy clerk of court who gave disparaging statements against the
Judge in a sworn statement.
Greately resenting the supervisory acts of the undersigned and finding it difficult to continue with his illicit
and nefarious activities, Atty. Masigla had since then intrigued against the honor of herein respondent and
circulated false and incriminatory statements against him, capped by the malicious imputation against herein
respondent of committing certain allege irregularities in connection with his official actuations in LRC No.
194 ...
The issues raised by both of the parties fall under two categories, namely, those involving questions of fact and those
calling for the application of the law.
Those raising questions of fact are here and now dismissed summarily for the same reasons this Court had said
before: "... a direct appeal from the Court of First Instance to this Court binds appellants to the findings of fact of the
trial court. Because he is deemed to have accepted the facts as found by the lower court. He may only raise
questions of law". Accordingly, the findings of fact of the court below in this case are final. They are not now open to
questions. 15
We may add in this connection that many of the questions of fact now raised by the Solicitor General have been raise
by his authorized representative, the Provincial Fiscal of Bataan, in the latter's motion for reconsideration and formal
written opposition with the trial court. Having been brought up formally and officially during the course of the
proceedings of the registration application in the court below, this Court has a right to assume that these matters have
been fully litigated, discussed and argued in accordance with procedural law and the rules on evidence. There is no
showing that the two government oppositors, the Directors of Lands and Forestry, acting through their counsel, the
Provincial Fiscal of Bataan, had been deprived of the opportunity and chance to present their evidence against the
application for registration. The records do not show that the Solicitor General had called the attention of the
Provincial Fiscal for the latter's negligence in pursuing the cause of the State or that the latter had been remiss in his
duties. On the contrary, the representative of the Solicitor General in this case had been quite assiduous in fighting
the cause of the Director of Lands and Director of Forestry. Upon finding that the government's side had been placed
in jeopardy, by the order of default issued by the herein respondent Judge, the Provincial Fiscal immediately filed a
motion for reconsideration which was granted and this paved the way for the lifting of the general default order and
thereby gave a chance to the State to present its formal written opposition to the application. The formal opposition
was subsequently prepared filed by the Provincial Fiscal, acting as the of the Solicitor General. During these court
proceedings and thereafter, within the period allowed by law, the oppositors and their counsel, either the Solicitor
General or the provincial Fiscal, could have brought up the issues they are now raising either through timely appeal
or a motion for new trial. Within the reglementary 30-day period, the Provincial Fiscal or the Solicitor General could
have filed a notice of appeal. Other than appeal, the Directors of Land and Forestry who felt aggrieved by the
decision may avail themselves of another remedy, by means of a motion for new trial within thirty days from receipt of
notice of such decision. 16 After the lapse of such period, by means of a petition for relief under Rule 38 on the ground of fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence, within 60 days from the time the petitioner learns of the judgment and in no case more
than six months from the date it was entered. 17

Unfortunately, these tile oppositors and the petitioners herein failed to do. This is the other reason why We find it
difficult to accede to the prayer of petitioners to review the findings of fact of the court below.

On the question of law, one sticks out. like a sore thumb demanding prior attention and consideration. To be sure, this
and its resolution transcends all the others. Thus:
May a decision of the trial court, long after the same had become final and executory, be the subject of a
petition for review on certiorari? May a new trial be granted under the same circumstances?
As had previously been declared by this Court, a decision in a land registration case, after entry, is a decree of the
court adjudicating title to the land and directing the entry by the Land Registration Commission of the appropriate
orders and decree leading to the issuance of a certificate of registration. 18 The judgment rendered in a land registration
case becomes final upon the expiration of 30 days to be counted from the date on which the interested party received notice of the
decision. 19 The rules in ordinary civil actions and in land registration proceedings are the same. 20

Applying these rules to the present case, We are constrained to review certain events connected therewith and
related to the proceedings in the court below.
On March 14, 1972, Branch 11, Court of First Instance of Bataan, presided over by respondent Judge Amado B.
Reyes, rendered its decision in Land Registration Case No. LRC No. N-194. On the same day a copy of the decision
was served on the provincial fiscal of Bataan who had appeared before the said court as the counsel of the
oppositors, the Director of Lands and the Director of Forestry, in representation of the Solicitor General. In turn, the
Provincial Fiscal mailed the copy or copy of the questioned decision to the Solicitor General that very day. Thirty days
thereafter, or on April 15, 1972, the respondent Judge gave out an order for the issuance of the Final Decree, on the
basis of which the Commissioner of Land Registration, on April 25, 1972, issued Decree No. 139479. Three days
after, on April 28, 1972, the Register of Deeds of Bataan, likewise based thereon, issued Original Certificate of Title
No. N-225 in the name of the private respondents herein. On September 25, 1972, or more than six (6) months after
rendition of the judgment, this Court received the petition of the herein petitioners seeking to have the
aforementioned decision of Judge Amado B. Reyes reviewed on certiorari On October 6, 1972, the land was sold and
transferred to the Farmers Fertilizer Corporation.
We shall now determine if the petition to review the controversial decision was filed on time. It is the contention of the
Solicitor General that it was only on September 1, 1972, when he requested the Clerk of the Court of First Instance of
Bataan to forward the records of the said land registration case No. LRC N-194 to him, that he learned of the
questioned decision. To him the running of the period for appeal or for new trial started only on that date. The crux of
the matter, therefore, lies on whether the date of the service of the copy of the decision to the Provincial Fiscal on
March 14, 1972, or the date the Solicitor General had allegedly first learned of the decision, September 1, 1972, shall
be used for reckoning the time for filing an appeal or petition for new trial.
The authority granted the Provincial Fiscal per the letter signed by Assistant Solicitor General Eduardo C. Abaya, for
and in behalf of his superior, the Solicitor General, dated June 23, 1971, at first blush, is an authority of indefinite
intent. Note the first paragraph:
This case is set for hearing on November 25, 1971 at 8:30 o'clock in the forenoon In this connection, please
represent this Office of the Solicitor General.
The first inferencre from this is that the authority is indeed limited only to the representation on said scheduled
hearing of November 25, 1971. But then, the last paragraph of the same letter reads as follows:
Kindly advise us from time to time of the progress of this case,
If this last paragraph is seen in the light of later events and circumstances, it would give no other conclusion than that
the Solicitor General intended to keep and retain, as he did keep and retain, the services of the Provincial Fiscal for
an indefinite period of time in order to carry the burden of the court proceedings connected with said land registration
application.
This intention and plan of the Solicitor General to keep the Provincial Fiscal in harness for some time to come, as
reflected in the aforecited last paragraph, could not have been made clearer than by the long posture of silence
adopted by him in all proceedings connected with or arising from the case. When the order of default was issued by
the herein respondent Judge for the non-appearance of the Director of Lands and Director of Forestry or their
counsel, either the Solicitor General or his representative, but the said Provincial Fiscal, presumably acting as the

authorized counsel of the government oppositors, filed a motion for reconsideration of the judgment. When, on
account of this motion, the herein respondent Judge Reyes lifted his earlier order of general default and gave the
counsel of the 5 days within which to file the Government's formal opposition to the registration application, the same
I Fiscal filed the written opposition. In the retrial and other related proceedings, the same Provincial Fiscal had acted
alone and with unhindered freedom of action like one unquestionably clothed with full power and authority.
From the time the applicants, private respondents herein, filed their application on May 24, 1971, presumably with
notice to the Solicitor General, to the date the Provincial Fiscal was prevailed upon and authorized to represent the
Solicitor General on June 25, 1971, and culminating with the rendition of the questioned decision on March 14, 1972,
is a period of time covering roughly 10 months. In all this time, the Solicitor General must have been satisfied with the
manner his representative, the Provincial Fiscal of Bataan, had been managing the court battle of the, Director of
Lands and Director' of Forestry or else he would have sent someone from his office to take over from Fiscal Sanchez.
If this was not the reason, then it could only be that the Solicitor General had neglected his duties and abandoned the
cause of the two government oppositors entirely to its fate. He could not very well hide behind the plea that he was
not aware or did not know of the developments of the case. As Counsel of the State and its instrumentalities and
agencies those in charge of the case in his office were duty-bound to know what was happening in any of the legal
cases formally brought to his attention. He knew of this application for land registration from the very start.
This Court is inclined to believe, and so holds, that despite the protestation of the Solicitor General to the contrary, the
Provincial Fiscal of Bataan had all along been allowed if not authorized directly, to act as his representative in all
stages and aspects of the aforementioned land registration case. The silent acquiescence, if acquiescence there was
no direct authority, of the said office in all the acts and legal measures taken by the Provincial Fiscal to pursue the
cause of the two government agencies, is a classic example of the maxim that silence is consent.
Applying now the time-honored principle of agency that a notice or payment to the agent is a notice or payment to.
the principal, the service of the copy of the questioned decision to the Provincial Fiscal must necessarily be a service
to the Solicitor General. Since the copy of the decision wits served on the Provincial Fiscal of Bataan on March 14,
1972, it is therefore, on that day that the Solicitor General is considered to have been served with a copy of said
decision and the Fiscal in fact mailed a copy of the decision on that same day to the office of the Solicitor- General.
We may add in this connection that technical transgressions relative to filing and service may be brushed aside when
the adverse party, (this time Directors of Lands and Forestry and their counsel, the Solicitor General) is aware of the
matter which his adversary would want the court to act upon. Once it appears that the party is already informed by
one means or another of what he is to be notified, the required service becomes an empty gesture and strict
observance thereof is considered waived. 21
On the basis of the facts and circumstances above set forth, the 30-day period for perfecting an appeal from the
questioned decision of the trial court expired on April 14, 1972. One remedy which the herein petitioners could have
taken, if they felt that the decision of the trial court should be set aside and a new trial held, but which they did not
avail themselves of, is that given' under Rule 37 of the Rules of Court. But again, this remedy could have to be taken
within 30 days after they have notice of the judgment, and the corresponding motion filed with the trial court. Upon
receiving notice of the decision, the aggrieved party who claims to have been deprived of his day in court, or the
opportunity to present his evidence, should file on time a motion for new trial on the grounds mentioned in par. (a) of
Section 1, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court, instead of appealing therefrom. 22
It is to be noted here that Section 38 of Act 496, the Land Registration Law, prescribes four remedies for those
aggrieved after entry of decree. This Section likewise mentions the fact that the decree of registration is conclusive
upon and against all persons, including the Insular Government and all its branches. One of these remedies, which
the herein petitioners may avail of, is a petition for review of a decree obtained by fraud, provided that no innocent
purchaser for value has acquired interest in the property. The petition must be filed within 1 year after entry of the
decree, in the competent court of first instance. As had been declared by this Court before, a decree of registration
obtained through fraud is valid, although annulabe. It may only be annulled upon petition of aggrieved party filed
within one year after entry of the decree, in the absence of an innocent purchaser for value. 23
This Court feels that over and above the one central fact that the present appeal for review by certiorari and the
petition for new trial by reason of fraud under Section 37 of the Rules of Court were filed out of time, is the undeniable
fact that unlimited opportunities were open to the State for it to prove its case in the trial court. Unfortunately, through
inexcusable neglect and laches of those in charge, the Government lost its case.
We are not unmindful of a previous dictum of this Court that a land registration proceeding is in rem and therefore the
decree of registration is binding upon and conclusive against all persons including the government and its branches,

irrespective of whether or not they were personally notified of the filing of the application for registration or have
appeared and filed an answer to said application, because all interested parties are considered as notified by the
publication required by law. 24 Which means to say that the relief sought for by the herein petitioners cannot be granted by this
Court.

There remains only, if applicable, the remedy for the State to recover or seek the reversion of inalienable public lands
if unduly ordered registered.
In the petition for review, petitioners cited, among other grounds, the decision of the Cadastral Court of Bataan dated
October 11, 1937 in Cad. Case No. 19, LRC Cad. Rec. No. 1097, which declared such portion of Lot No. 626 of the
Mariveles Cadastre as had not been awarded to claimants as public land. This area is claimed to be the same land,
subject of the application for registration in the court below.
This allegation of petitioners had not been satisfactorily offended off by the applicants, the private respondents
herein. Unfortunately, neither had the Government Counsel been able to pursue this issue more vigorously.
In such action for reversion as petitioners may institute, they may perhaps be permitted to raise the question
belatedly sought to be raised herein that the private respondents did not have any kind of registerable title to the land
on the strenght of the allegation that Lot No. 626 of the Mariveles Cadastre alleged to cover the same lots finally
awarded by the lower court to respondents-applicants had been part of the Mariveles Military Reservation area
established by Proclamation No. 10 of then Governor General Leonard Wood dated February 16, 1925 and that it
was only on June 10, 1967 with the issuance of Presidential Proclamation No. 210-B that Proclamation No. 10 was
revoked and the area declared as disposable and alienable land of the public domain. Should petitioners duly
establish by competent evidence these allegations vis a vis the lots involved, they may then raise anew the argument
that " ... it is only from June 10, 1967 that the private respondents and their predecessors-in-interest may be deemed
to have validly commenced occupation of the area herein involved. Such being the case, they could not have
occupied the said area for a period of thirty years preceding the filing of the application so as to be entitled to
registration under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act", as well as their question why despite respondentsapplicants' claim that they through their predecessors-interest possessed the property en concepto de dueno for
more than thirty years, their predecessors had not put forwarded their claim before the cadastral court of Bataan
under section 9 of Act No. 2259 which provides:
Any person claiming any interest in any part of the lands, whether named in the notice or not, shall appear
before the Court by himself, or by some person in his behalf and shall file an answer on or before the return
day or within such further time as may be allowed by the Court...
which however is countered by respondents' quoting petitioners' own ground for opposition that "parcel of land
subject of this petition was and has never been the object of a cadastral proceedings".
Complicating the matter further is the sale and conveyance of the land to the Farmers Fertilizer Corporation by the
newly registered owners, solution of which depends upon whether the same was in good or bad faith designed to
place the property beyond the reach of ordinary legal actions.
As already indicated, We cannot resolve these questions or grant any relief here since we are without jurisdiction to
entertain petitioners' appeal that was filed too late and long after the registration decision had become final and
executory. especially where as int this case respondent judge had lifted the order of general default and given the
petitioner the chance to present their formal opposition and their side at a retrial of the case.
Such questions as may be raised by petitioners in a separate case of reversion are of course understood to be
subject to such defenses as respondents may properly raise including the Identity of the land and res judicata where
applicable.
Before closing, it must be stated in fairness to respondent judge that We have found nothing in the record to justify
petitioners' bare allegations in their motion for new trial of "apparent collusion and patent cooperation of respondent
judge" in the fraud allegedly committed by applicants. On the contrary as above shown, unlimited opportunities were
open to the State for it to prove its case in the lower court before respondent judge who had set aside his order of
general default upon the State's motion and conducted a retrial with the evidence for the applicants deemed
reproduced but the Government through unexplained neglect and laches did not avail of the remedies open to it.
Suffice it to state that the casting of such questionable aspersions against respondent judge coming from an

apparently polluted source (deputy clerk Atty. Masigla who, according to respondent judge, greatly presented the
judge's supervisor, acts over him) does not serve the cause of petitioners nor help to cover up petitioners' failure to
duly exercise the right of appeal and other remedies notwithstanding that the Provincial Fiscal had mailed a copy of
the questioned decision to the Solicitor General on the very day that he received it on March 14, 1972. Supra at page
10).
WHEREFORE, the appeal by certiorari for review of the questioned decision and the petition for new trial by reason
of fraud are hereby dismissed without prejudice, however, to any proper action that may be available to the
petitioners for the annulment of the decree of title and cancellation of the certificates of title issued on the basis
thereof, and the reversion of the land covered thereby to the State as part of the public domain and such proper
defenses in turn as private respondents and other interested third parties who claim to have acquired the land in good
faith and for value may have. This is further without prejudice to the Solicitor General's institution of appropriate
proceedings against those whose inexcusable neglect has prejudiced the State and for indemnification of any
consequent loss or damages incurred by the State.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Muoz Palma and Martin, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-18373

August 31, 1963

TEOFILO TALAVERA, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
VICTOR MANGOBA, ET AL., defendants,
VICTOR MANGOBA, defendant-appellant.
Teofilo B. Talavera in his own behalf as plaintiff-appellee.
Amado B. Reyes for defendant-appellant.
PAREDES, J.:
Instant case had been certified by the Court of Appeals, finding that the issue involved is purely legal in nature.
On December 2, 1957, plaintiff instituted before the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Civil Case No. 2693, for
recovery of sum of money against Victor Mangoba and his cousin Nieves Safiru, allegedly representing the costs of
B-Meg Poultry Feeds, which defendants received from plaintiff. Defendants presented separate Answers, wherein
they admitted some and denied other allegations in the complaint. Both also interposed separate counterclaims of
P1,000.00 each.
In the hearing scheduled on March 10, 1958, neither defendants nor their counsel appeared, so that the trial court
received plaintiffs evidence in their absence. On March 18, 1958, a decision was rendered, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
The plaintiff declared that the agreement was made between him on the one hand and the defendant Victor
Mangoba and Mrs. Safiru. Nieves Safiru denied in her answer having entered into such an agreement with
the plaintiff. And it will be noted that not one of the 16 invoices had been signed by Nieves Safiru. They were
all signed either by the defendant Victor Mangoba or his wife C. B. Mangoba. It needs more than the
uncorroborated testimony of the plaintiff to hold the defendant Nieves Safiru liable on the supposed contract
of agency. If it is true that Nieves Safiru had entered into this contract of agency with the plaintiff, at least
one invoice would have been signed by her.
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant Victor Mangoba for
P2,425.73 with interest at the legal rate from the time of the filing of the complaint and one-half of the costs.
The complaint is dismissed as against the defendant Nieves Safiru with 1/2 of the costs against the plaintiff
herein.
Appellant claims that the above decision was received by him on March 25, 1958 and the next day (March 26), a
Motion for New Trial was presented, wherein it was stated that the failure to appear at the hearing was due to
accident or excusable negligence, counsel having been ill of influenza from March 9 to 12. A medical certificate, duly
sworn to, was attached to the Motion (Annex A). Appellant further claimed that he had evidence, mostly documentary,
to counteract plaintiff's claim. Counsel for appellant asked the Court to hear the motion for new trial on April 2, 1958.
On April 1, 1958, however, one day ahead of the date, the trial court denied said motion, even before the presentation
of an opposition thereto, which was only filed on April 7, 1958.
In the appeal brief, appellant contends that in denying the motion for new trial, the court a quo deprive him of his day
in court.
1wph1.t

Generally, courts are given the discretion to grant or not, motions for new trial and appellate courts will not delve into
the reasons for the exercise of such discretion. In this particular case, however, it was shown that the absence of
counsel was explained and immediately upon receipt of the decision, a motion for new trial, accompanied by an
affidavit of merit, and a medical certificate, were presented. Said motion for new trial could well be considered as
motion to set aside judgment or one for relief, since it contained allegations purporting to show the presence of good
defenses. The ends of justice could have been served more appropriately had the lower court given appellant the
chance to present his evidence at least. Furthermore, it appears that payments had been made by appellant to
appellee, which were duly received and receipt for. This particular circumstance merits consideration. After all, court
litigations are primarily for the search of truth, and in this present case, to find out the correct liability of defendantappellant to appellee. A trial, by which both parties are given the chance to adduce proofs, is the best way to find out
such truth. A denial of this chance, would be too technical. The dispensation of justice and the vindication of
legitimate grievances, should not be barred by technicalities (Ronquillo v. Marasigan, L-11621, May 21, 1962;
Santiago, et al. v. Joaquin, L-15237, May 31, 1963). Had not the trial court resolved the motion for new trial, one day
before the date set for its hearing, the defendant-appellant could have presented the documents (receipts of
payments), itemized in his brief, to counteract appellant's claim.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside, and another entered,
remanding the case to the court of origin, for the reception of appellant's evidence and for the rendition of the
corresponding decision. No pronouncement as to costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ.,
concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-38185 September 24, 1986
HILARIO RAMIREZ and VALENTINA BONIFACIO, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, FRANCISCA MEDINA, MATILDE MARTIN, EMILIO MARTIN, DELFIN
GUINTO, TEOFILO GUINTO, PRUDENCIO GUINTO and MARGARITA GUINTO, respondents.
Castro, Makalintal, Mendoza & Associates for petitioner.
Flores, Ocampo, Dizon & Domingo Law Office for respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the decision of the then Court of
First instance of Rizal rendered in the petition for review of the decree of registration issued in Land Registration
Case No. N-2597, L.R.C. Record No. N-17939.
On September 15,1959, petitioners-spouses Hilario Ramirez and Valentina Bonifacio filed an application for
registration of a parcel of riceland in Pamplona, Las Pinas Rizal. After notice and publication nobody appeared to
oppose the application. An order of general default was issued and the court allowed the petitioners to present
evidence in support of their claim. Thereafter, the petitioners presented parol evidence that they acquired the land in
question by purchase from Gregorio Pascual during the early part of the American regime but the corresponding
contract of sale was lost and no copy or record of the same was available.
On January 30, 1960, the court ordered the issuance of the decree of registration and consequently: Original
Certificate of Title No. 2273 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal was issued in the petitioners names.
On March 30, 1960, the private respondents Francisca Medina, Basilio Martin, Matilde Martin, Delfin Guinto, Teofilo
Guinto, Prudencio Guinto and Margarita Guinto, petitioners' nephews and nieces, filed a petition to review the decree
of registration on the ground of fraud. The private respondents based their claim to the land on the following
allegations: that they are the legal heirs of the deceased Agapita Bonifacio who died intestate on March 11, 1936; that
Valentina Bonifacio is a sister of the deceased Agapita Bonifacio, they being the children of one Gregoria Pascual;
that Gregoria Pascual previously owned the land in question as evidenced by Tax Declaration No. 6611 of Las Pinas
Rizal issued on December 8, 1920; that Agapita Bonifacio acquired the property in question by purchase from
Gregoria Pascual for which reason Tax Declaration No. 8777 was issued in her name on May 21, 1928; that Gregoria
Pascual during her lifetime, from 1916, possessed the said property in the concept of owner, publicly and
uninterruptedly, which possession was continued by Agapita Bonifacio in 1928; that in 1938 respondents obtained a
loan of P400.00 from the petitioners which they secured with a mortgage on the land in question by way of
antichresis; that for this reason, Tax Declaration No. 8777 was cancelled and substituted by Tax Declaration Nos.
9522 and 2385 issued in the names of the petitioners; that, thereafter, the petitioners began paying taxes on the land;
that after several attempts to redeem the land were refused by the petitioners, the respondents filed a complaint in
the Court of First Instance of Pasay City docketed as Civil Case No. 272-R for the recovery of the possession and
ownership of the said property; that when they learned of the issuance of the certificate of title to the land in the
petitioners' names, they also filed the instant petition for review. The previous complaint, Civil Case No. 272-R, was
subsequently dismissed on a joint petition filed by the parties after they agreed to have the determination of the
question of ownership resolved in the registration proceedings.

In their answer, the spouses Ramirez denied the material allegations of the petition, they based their claim to the land
on two deeds of sale allegedly executed on April 15, 1937 and April 23, 1937 which they allegedly found accidentally
in March 1960.
After trial, the court found that deeds of sale spurious. It further found that the respondents took possession of the
land as owners after the death of Agapita Bonifacio and in 1938, mortgaged it to the spouses Ramirez to secure the
payment of a loan in the amount of P400.00. It was agreed that the respondents could not redeem the property within
a period of five years and that the petitioners would take possession of the land, enjoy its fruits, and pay the land
taxes thereon. The written agreement was kept by the petitioners as creditors. The trial court appreciated the fact of
the petitioners' failure, despite formal request, to produce the document in court in favor of the respondents. Finding
the claims of the herein respondents sustained by the evidence, it ordered the reconveyance of the property in the
following manner:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of petitioners and against applicants as
follows:
1) Setting aside its decision dated December 28, 1959 insofar as it found and declared applicants
to be the owners of the parcel of land described in Exhibits A, B and C and insofar as it ordered the
registration thereof in their names;
2) Declaring the petitioners, all Filipinos, all of legal age, and all residents of Ligas Bacoor, Cavite,
to be the true and absolute owners pro indiviso of the said parcel of land described in Exhibits A, B
and C in the following proportions:
a. Francisca Medina, married to Tomas de Leon, one-third (1/3) thereof;
b. Emilio Martin, married to Dolores Antonio, and Matilde Martin, married to Federico Torres, onethird (1/3) thereof-,
c. Teofilo Guinto, married to Rocila de la Cruz, Delfin Guinto, married to Gregoria Pamaran,
Prudencio Guinto, married to Ana Guinto, and Margarita Guinto, married to Felix Calacala onethird (1/3) thereof;
3) Ordering the registration of the said parcel of land described in Exhibits A, B and C in the names
of petitioners;
4) Setting aside its order for the issuance of the decree of registration in favor of applicants dated
January 30, 1959, and ordering the issuance of the decree of registration in the names of
petitioners;
5) Cancelling Original Certificate of Title No. 2273 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal in the names of
applicants and the issuance in lieu thereof of another original certificate of title in the names of
petitioners in the proportion of their ownership of the property as stated in paragraph 2 above;
6) Ordering applicants to pay P3,000.00 to petitioners as and for attorney's fees;
7) Ordering applicants to pay the costs of this suit.
The decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. On a motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners, the same
appellate court, but with a new member, promulgated a resolution setting aside the original decision. On a motion for
reconsideration filed by the private respondents, this resolution was set aside and the original decision was
reinstated.
The petitioners went to this Court in a petition for review on certiorari with the following questions:

ONE-HAS THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE, ACTING AS A LAND REGISTRATION COURT,

THE JURISDICTION TO GIVE DUE COURSE TO A PETITION FOR REVIEW OF DECREE
UNDER SEC. 38 OF ACT 496 AND TO RE-OPEN THE ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS WHEN THE
PETITION IS ACTUALLY ONE OF RECONVEYANCE AND NOT BASED ON ACTUAL OR
EXTRINSIC FRAUD?
TWO-DOES SEC. 38 OF ACT NO. 496 APPLY ON ALL FORES (SIC) TO ORIGINAL LAND
REGISTRATION PROCEEDINGS HAD UNDER PARAGRAPH B, SECTION 48 OF COM. ACT NO.
141 AS AMENDED BY REP. ACT NO. 1942 WHEREIN THE LAND INVOLVED IS PUBLIC
AGRICULTURAL LAND?
THREE-HAS THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE, ACTING AS A LAND REGISTRATION COURT,
THE POWER AND AUTHORITY TO VEST TITLE ON THE LAND INVOLVED TO HEREIN
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AND ORDER EVEN ITS PARTITION AMONGST THEM IN THE FACE
OF THE ADMITTED FACT THAT THE LAND IS IN ACTUAL POSSESSION OF PETITIONERS
WHILE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAD NOT POSSESSED THE SAME AT ALL?
FOUR-DO THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAVE THE LEGAL CAPACITY AND QUALIFICATION
TO ACQUIRE AND BE VESTED BY THE COURT WITH TITLE TO THE LAND IN QUESTION?
We find the petition without merit.
The first question does not warrant favorable consideration. The issue was submitted to the appellate court and in our
opinion, correctly resolved therein. The Court of Appeals stated:
... The petition alleged that 'the applicants Hilario Ramirez and Valentina Bonifacio willfully and
fraudulently suppressed the facts that the petitioners are the legal and rightful owners of the
ricefield in question and that they possess the said ricefield merely as antichretic creditors as
security for the loan of P400.00; that the applicants are guilty of fraudulent misrepresentation and
concealment when they declared in their application, in the case at bar, that no other person had
any claim or interest in the said land.' These we believe are sufficient allegations of extrinsic fraud.
In the applicant's application for registration, which followed the form required by the Land
Registration Act, the applicants alleged that 'to the best of our knowledge and belief, there is no
mortgage or incumbrance of any kind whatsoever affecting said land, nor any other person having
any estate or interest therein, legal or equitable, in possession, remainder, reversion or
expectancy.' This allegation is false and made in bad faith, for, as We have found, the applicants
are not the owners of the land sought to be registered and they are in possession thereof only as
antichretic creditors.
The averments in the petition for review of the decree of registration constitute specific and not mere general
allegations of actual and extrinsic fraud. Competent proof to support these allegations was adduced. We find no
compelling reason to disturb the findings of the two courts below.
The petitioners in this case did not merely omit a statement of the respondents' interest in the land. They positively
attested to the absence of any adverse claim therein. This is clear misrepresentation. The omission and concealment,
knowingly and intentionally made, of an act or of a fact which the law requires to be performed or recorded is fraud,
when such omission or concealment secures a benefit to the prejudice of a third person (Estiva v. Alvero, 37 Phil.
497).
In the case of Libundan v. Palma Gil (45 SCRA 17), this Court held:
The purpose of the law in giving aggrieved parties, deprived of land or any interest therein, through
fraud in the registration proceedings, the opportunity to review the decree is to insure fair and
honest dealing in the registration of land. But the action to annul a judgment, upon the ground of

fraud, would be unavailing unless the fraud be extrinsic or collateral and the facts upon which it is
based have not been controverted or resolved in the case where the judgment sought to be
annulled was rendered. Extrinsic or collateral fraud, as distinguished from intrinsic fraud, connotes
any fraudulent scheme executed by a prevailing litigant 'outside the trial of a case against the
defeated party, or his agents, attorneys or witnesses, whereby said defeated party is prevented
from presenting fully and fairly his side of the case.' But intrinsic fraud takes the form of 'acts of a
party in a litigation during the trial, such as the use of forged instruments or perjured testimony,
which did not affect the presentation of the case, but did prevent a fair and just determination of the
case.
Thus, relief is granted to a party deprived of his interest in land where the fraud consists in a
deliberate misrepresentation that the lots are not contested when in fact they are, or in applying for
and obtaining adjudication and registration in the name of a co-owner of land which he knows had
not been alloted to him in the partition, or in intentionally concealing facts, and conniving with the
land inspector to include in the survey plan the bed of a navigable stream, or in willfully
misrepresenting that there are no other claims, or in deliberately failing to notify the party entitled to
notice, or in inducing him not to oppose an application, or in misrepresenting about the indentity of
the lot to the true owner by the applicant causing the former to withdraw his opposition. In all these
examples the overriding consideration is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant
prevented a party from having his day in court or from presenting his case, The fraud, therefore, is
one that affects and goes into the jurisdiction of the court.
The second question assigned as an error must also be resolved against the petitioners.
Section 122 of Act No. 496 otherwise known as the Land Registration Act provides:
SEC. 122. Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands belonging to the Government of the
United States or to the Government of the Philippine Islands are alienated, granted, or conveyed to
persons or the public or private corporations, the same shall be brought forthwith under the
operation of this Act and shall become registered lands. It shall be the duty of the official issuing the
instrument of alienation, grant, or conveyance in behalf of the Government to cause such
instrument before its delivery to the grantee, to be filed with the register of deeds for the province
where the land lies and to be there registered like other deeds and conveyances, whereupon a
certificate shall be entered as in other cases of registered land, and an owner's duplicate certificate
issued to the grantee. The deed, grant, or instrument of conveyance from the Government to the
grantee shall not take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as contract
between the Government and the grantee and as evidence of authority to the clerk or register of
deeds to make registration. The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey and affect
the land, and in all cases under this Act, registration shall be made in the office of the register of
deeds for the province where the land lies. The fees for registration shall be paid by the grantee.
After due registration and issue of the certificate and owner's duplicate, such land shall be
registered land for all purposes under this Act.
The law is clear. We can apply it to the facts without need for judicial interpretation. Once the deed, grant, or
instrument of conveyance of public land is registered with the Register of Deeds and the corresponding certificate
and owner's duplicate title is issued, such land is deemed registered land. It is brought within the scope and operation
of the Land Registration Law. This is the doctrine laid down by this Court in a long line of cases. (See Heirs of
Deogracias Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA 293; Lahora v. Dayanghirang 37 SCRA 346; Ramirez v. Court of
Appeals, 30 SCRA 297; Director of Lands v. Jugado 2 SCRA 32; Nelayan v. Nelayan, 109 Phil. 183; Republic v. Heirs
of Carle 105 Phil. 1227; El Hogar Filipino v. Olviga, 60 Phil. 17; Manolo v. Lukban, 48 Phil. 973). The land in this case
having been registered and covered by an original certificate of title issued by the Register of Deeds of Rizal, it is
within the provisions of the Land Registration Act. Thus, the decree of registration granted by the lower court in favor
of the petitioners may be reviewed on the ground of actual and extrinsic fraud pursuant to Section 38 of the same Act.
There is likewise no merit in the third assigned error. While there was an admission that the petitioners have been in
actual possession of the disputed land since 1938, it was made to show and prove the fact that the petitioners are
only antichretic creditors. The respondents never admitted that they have not possessed the land at all. On the

contrary, they alleged that they and their predecessors-in-interest namely Gregoria Pascual and Agapita Bonifacio
have been in possession of the land since time immemorial and that the petitioners were placed in possession of the
land pursuant to a contract of antichresis.
The court below found that the petitioners are merely antichretic creditors. This finding and its factual bases were
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. On the basis of the evidence supporting this conclusion, this finding is binding on us
as it is not our duty to weigh evidence on this point all over again. This court has on several occasions held that the
antichretic creditor cannot ordinarily acquire by prescription the land surrendered to him by the debtor (Trillana v.
Manansala, et al., 96 Phil. 865; Valencia v. Acala, 42 Phil. 177; Barreto v. Barreto, 3 Phil. 234). The petitioners are not
possessors in the concept of owner but mere holders placed in possession of the land by its owners. Thus, their
possession cannot serve as a title for acquiring dominion (See Art. 540, Civil Code).
The fourth issue raised by the petitioners is answered by a referral to the detailed factual findings and conclusions of
the trial court. Ten pages of the record on appeal (Record on Appeal, CA-G.R. No. 40425-R, pp. 56-66) state in
convincing detail the portion of the trial court's decision which support its conclusion that Hilario Ramirez and
Valentina Bonifacio are not the owners of the disputed land and have no registrable right over it and that the
respondents herein have established their ownership by a strong preponderance of evidence. The respondents were
declared the true and real owners and entitled to registration in their names. The final resolution of the Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision in toto. We see no reversible error in this finding.
The argument of laches is explained and countered by the close relationship of the parties and the nature of a
contract of antichresis. The private respondents are nephews and nieces, with their spouses, of the petitioners.
Moreover, there is evidence to show that long before the filing of the cases, there had been attempts to recover the
property.
In view of the foregoing, we are constrained to affirm the appellate court's decision. We note, however, that in spite of
the finding of an existing contract of antichresis between the parties, the two courts below did not order the payment
of the principal amount of mortgage. Under Article 2136 of the Civil Code, the debtor cannot reacquire the enjoyment
of the immovable without first having totally paid what he owes the creditor.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with a modification that the respondents are
ordered to pay the petitioners the amount of P 400.00 as principal for the contract of antichresis, the fruits obtained
from the possession of the land having been applied to the interests on the loan.
SO ORDERED.
Feria (Chairman), Fernan, Alampay and Paras, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-17951

February 28, 1963

CONRADO C. FULE and LOURDES F. ARAGON, petitioners,

vs.
EMILIA E. DE LEGARE and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Teehankee, Tanada & Carreon for petitioners.
Ignacio M. Orendain for respondents.
REGALA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on November 16, 1960, in
Civil Case No. 15728-R, entitled" Emilia E. Legare, plaintiff-appellant, versus Conrado C. Fule and Lourdes F.
Aragon, defendants-appellants..
The facts of this case as found by the Court of Appeals in its decision are as follows:
This is an action for annulment of certain deeds of sale and conveyance covering a parcel of land, together
with the improvements existing thereon, situated in the municipality of San Juan, province of Rizal, and for
damages.
It appears in evidence that the plaintiff, Emilia E. de Legare, was the owner of a parcel of land, together with
a residential house erected thereon, situated at No. 146 Sta. Mesa Boulevard Extension, San Juan, Rizal,
her ownership being evidenced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 21253, issued by the Office of the
Register of Deeds of the province of Rizal. She was living in that house together with defendant John W.
Legare, her adopted son, and a maid named Purita Tarrosa. On September 26, 1951, the plaintiff, thru a
public deed, constituted on the above mentioned house and lot a first class mortgage in favor of defendant
Tomas Q. Soriano to guarantee the payment of a loan in the amount of P8,000.00. This deed of mortgage
was on the same date recorded in the Office of the Register of Deeds of the province of Rizal and annotated
in the memorandum of encumbrances of transfer certificate of title No. 21253. On account of certain partial
payments made by the plaintiff and the contracting by the latter of additional loans in small amounts from
Tomas Q. Soriano the debt guaranteed by the above mentioned mortgage was reduced to the sum of
P7,000.00 as of February 23, 1953. These transactions, however, were not annotated on the memorandum
of encumbrances of the above mentioned certificate of title.
At about 9:00 o'clock in the evening of March 29, 1953, while the plaintiff, John W. Legare, and Purita
Tarrosa were seated in the drawing room of the house above referred to, an unknown man intruded into the
room, approached the plaintiff, covered her mouth, and, pressing a knife on her side, demanded that she
give him P10,000.00 if she did not like to be killed. The plaintiff replied that she did not have that amount.
Thereupon, the intruder told the plaintiff to raise the necessary amount as he would come back the following
morning and once more threatened to kill her if she would fail to do so. After having made that threat, the
intruder left the house. John W. Legare did not call for help nor made any attempt to defend his mother, and
when Purita Tarrosa stood up to go down the house to call for a policeman, he held the latter by the hand
and slapped her on the face when she persisted in going down, telling her that the man had companions
waiting downstairs.
After the intruder was gone John W. Legare approached the plaintiff, and exhibiting to her a paper told her to
sign it as with the same he could secure from the U.S. Veterans Administration the amount which they
needed to deliver to that intruder. The plaintiff, who did not know how to read nor write, although she could

sign her name, asked John W. Legare what that paper was. The latter answered that it was an application
for payment of compensation. As plaintiff had confidence in John W. Legare and prior to that occasion she
had received from the U.S. Veterans Administration a letter concerning some compensation she was to
receive, she signed that paper. After the paper was signed by the plaintiff, John W. Legare had Purita
Tarrosa sign it as a witness, without however, allowing the latter to read it.
After that paper was thus signed, John W. Legare told the plaintiff and Purita Tarrosa to pack up their things
as they were leaving the house to hide in a hotel, adding that the men who came earlier that evening were
Huks. Early the next morning John W. Legare took the plaintiff and Purita Tarrosa to the Windsor Hotel in the
City of Manila, and after conducting them to a room in the hotel, told them not to leave the room or peep out
of the window as they might be seen by the men who came to their house in the previous evening. This
advise given, John W. Legare left the hotel. The plaintiff and Purita Tarrosa stayed in that hotel for about a
month and a half. John W. Legare occasionally visited them there. In one of said occasional visits the
plaintiff told John that she wanted to go home. The latter told her that it was not yet safe for her to go home.
On May 7, 1953, however, John W. Legare came to the hotel, gave the plaintiff a five-peso bill, and told her
that she could use the amount for transportation expenses if she wanted to leave the hotel. On the following
morning the plaintiff and Purita Tarrosa left the hotel and went direct to her house at Sta. Mesa Boulevard
Extension. When they arrived at the house, however, they found that it was occupied by strangers, and that
all her furniture and personal belongings had disappeared. Inquiring from those strangers how they
happened to occupy the house, the latter told her that John W. Legare had sold the house to them and that it
was no longer hers. The plaintiff thereupon sought the help of her attorney. It was then discovered that the
paper which John W. Legare had the plaintiff and Purita Tarrosa sign in the evening of March 29, 1953 was
a deed of sale of the lot and house in question in favor of John W. Legare for the sum of P12,000.00, and
that it was supposed to have been executed on the 7th day of April, 1953, and acknowledged before a
notary public on that date. Exhibit X.
It further appears that sometime prior to May 9, 1953, John W. Legare approached Elias B. Fermin, the real
estate broker who intervened in the securing of the loan contracted by the plaintiff from Tomas Q. Soriano,
and sought said broker's help to sell the lot and house in question. Elias B. Fermin accepted the commission
and offered the property in sale to defendants spouses Conrado C. Fule and Lourdes F. Aragon. Conrado C.
Fule read the title papers in the hand of John W. Legare and inspected the premises, and satisfied with the
result of his inspection, he agreed to purchase the property for P12,000.00 on condition that the sum of
P7,000, the unpaid balance of plaintiff's indebtedness to Tomas Q. Soriano secured by a mortgage thereon,
would be deducted from the price, and that he would assume said mortgage. The terms offered by Conrado
C. Fule being acceptable to John W. Legare and Tomas Soriano, the parties proceeded to formalize the
contract. Accordingly, on May 9, 1953, defendant Tomas Q. Soriano executed a deed of absolute sale
thereof, free of all liens and encumbrances, in favor of defendant spouses Conrado C. Fule and Lourdes F.
Aragon, Exhibit X-2, and said spouses in turn executed in favor of Tomas Q. Soriano a deed of mortgage
covering the property for the sum of P7,000.00. Exhibit X-3. These three deeds, together with transfer
certificate of Title No. 21253, issued in the name of the plaintiff, were on that same date presented for
registration in the Office of the Register of Deeds of the province of Rizal. The latter, following the usual
procedure, recorded, first, the deed of sale executed by the plaintiff in favor of defendant John W. Legare
(Exhibit 1) and issued in the name of the latter transfer certificate of title No. 30126 which cancelled transfer
certificate of title No. 21253 (Exhibit Y), then the deed of sale executed by John W. Legare in favor of the
spouses Conrado C. Fule and Lourdes F. Aragon (Exhibit X-2) and issued in favor of the latter transfer
certificate of title No. 30127 (Exhibit Y-1), which cancelled transfer certificate of title No. 30126, and then
annotated on the memorandum of encumbrances of transfer certificate of title No. 30127 the deed of
mortgage (Exhibit X-1) executed in favor of Tomas Q. Soriano by said spouses. Once these were
accomplished, Elias B. Fermin and John W. Legare went back to the house of the spouses Conrado C. Fule
and Lourdes P. Aragon and gave the transfer certificate of title No. 30127. Thereupon said spouses
delivered to John W. Legare the balance of the purchase price of the property after deducting therefrom the
amount of the mortgage constituted thereon in favor of Tomas Q. Soriano, the brokerage fees and the
expenses incident to the execution and registration of said deeds and issuance of new certificates of title,
which amounted to a little P4,000.00.
Upon the evidence, the trial court rendered judgment, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, this Court hereby orders:

1) the cancellation of Certificates of Title Nos. 30127 and 10126, thereby leaving valid TCT No. 21253 in the
name of Emilia E. de Legare together with the encumbrance thereon in favor of Tomas Q. Soriano;
2) the delivery of the possession of the premises to the plaintiff and the monthly rental of P150.00 a month
from May 9, 1953, up to and including the date on which the delivery is to be made, this obligation being
understood to be joint and several insofar as the defendants Fule and Aragon are concerned;
3) the award of P5,000.00 as moral damages in favor of the plaintiff and enforceable against John W.
Legare for the fraud perpetrated by the latter on the former;
4) the award of P1,000.00 as attorney's is fees enforceable against the defendants Fule and Aragon;
And on the cross-claim, the court orders
1) John W. Legare to refund to the spouses Fule and Aragon the amount paid by the latter on account of the
sale contained in Exhibit X-2 plus interest thereon at the legal rate from the date of the cross-claim;
2) the award of P5,000.00 as moral damages in favor of the spouses Fule and Aragon and enforceable
against John W. Legare for the misrepresentation made by him;.
3) the reimbursement to the spouses Fule and Aragon by John W. Legare of all amounts which may be paid
by the former to the plaintiff by way of rentals for the premises involved herein, as well as attorney's fees in
the amount of P1,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
The Court of Appeals, in deciding the appeal, entered a judgment the dispositive portion of which follows:.
WHEREFORE, modified as indicated above, i.e., the transfer certificate of title No. 21253 issued in the
name of Emilia E. de Legare is revived with the mortgage in favor of appellee Tomas Q. Soriano annotated
on its memorandum of encumbrances but reduced to the amount of P7,000.00, and that the award of
attorney's fees in the amount of P1,000.00 to be paid by the spouses Conrado C. Fule and Lourdes F.
Aragon, in favor of the plaintiff, is eliminated therefrom, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed in all
other respects, without special pronouncement as to costs in this instance.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
In elevating the judgment of the Court of Appeals to this Tribunal for review, herein petitioners discussed 6
assignments of error. However, this Court is of the view that, in effect and substance, only one issue was raised.We
have always refrained from reviewing factual findings of the Court of Appeals and the first two errors assigned were
but attempts at disputing the same. The other four were simply detailed aspects of the one, sole issue, to wit:
Were the herein petitioners purchasers in good faith and for value of the properties here contested?
Guided by the facts found by the Court of Appeals, We hold the herein petitioners innocent purchasers for value of
the house and lot here disputed. In consequence, they are here adjudged the lawful owners thereof.
A purchaser in good faith is one who buys property of another, without notice that some other persons has a right to,
or interest in, such property and pays a full and fair price for the same, at the time of such purchase, or before he has
notice of the claim or interest of some other persons in the property. Good faith consists in an honest intention to
abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage of another (Cui and Joven v. Henson, 51 Phil. 606). We have
measured the conduct of the petitioner spouses by this yardstick.

These facts were uncontroverted. The negotiation and transaction which eventually caused the certificate of title to be
transferred from the herein respondent to the petitioner spouses were conducted by a real estate broker licensed
since 1938. Nothing in John W. Legare's person or behaviour suggested anything suspicious. He was the adopted
son of the herein respondent, and, to the time that he was contracting with the petitioner spouses, he had not been
known to commit crime or dishonesty. On the contrary, John has had previous dealings with the real estate broker
during which he exhibited the expected degree of trustworthiness.
It should be noted that the deed of sale was regular upon its face, and no one would have questioned its authenticity
since it was duly acknowledged before a notary public. Moreover, even if the petitioners had the opportunity to
compare the signature of the respondent on the deed of conveyance with a specimen of her genuine signature, the
effort, nonetheless, would have been in vain since the respondent's signature on the document was admittedly hers.
Lastly, it should not be overlooked that the respondent, during the whole period of the negotiation, was nowhere
available to confirm or deny the execution of the deed. She was then in hiding, or, hidden, at the Windsor Hotel in
Manila.
The diligence and precaution observed by the petitioners themselves could hardly have been wanting. The records
show that they did not rely solely and fully upon the deed of sale in favor of John W. Legare and the fact that John
had then in his possession the corresponding certificate of title of the registered owner. They demanded more. They
insisted that the sale in favor of John W. Legare be first registered and that the transfer in their favor be thereafter
likewise registered. It was only after all these were complied with that they paid the purchase price. In other words,
the petitioner spouses relied not really on the documents exhibited to them by John W. Legare, but, on the
registerability of those documents. This in Our view, satisfies the measure of good faith contemplated by law.
It is true that at the time the herein petitioners purchased the properties from John W. Legare, he was not yet the
registered owner of the same. This fact alone, however, could not have caused the herein petitioners to lose their
status as innocent purchasers for value. It should be recalled that although the title was in the name of the
respondent Emilia E. de Legare, the certificate of title was in the possession of her adopted son, John. Under Section
55 of Act 496, as amended, John's possession of the certificate and his subsequent production of it to the herein
petitioners operated as a "conclusive authority from the registered owner to the register of deeds to enter a new
certificate."
SEC. 55.

xxx

xxx

xxx

The production of the owner's duplicate certificate whenever any voluntary instrument is presented for
registration shall be conclusive authority from the registered owner to the register of deeds to enter a new
certificate or to make a memorandum or registration in accordance with such instrument, and the new
certificate or memorandum shall be binding upon the registered owner and upon all persons claiming under
him, in favor of every purchaser for value and in good faith. ....
While it was true that the transfer in favor of John was still unregistered when he sought to sell the property to the
herein petitioners, it was not true that the latter observed no precaution whatsoever from the complication of such
non-registration. As already discussed above, the petitioners required that the registration of the previous sale (from
the respondent to John W. Legare) be first attended to and completed. After that was done and the certificate of title
thereof was issued to John by the Register of Deeds, they still withheld payment till the second sale (from John to the
petitioners) has in turn registered and the corresponding certificate of title therefor was issued in their names. It was
only after all these were followed that the entire negotiation was terminated with the payment of the balance of the
purchase price. All these, We hold, were adequate safeguards against the objection interposed. A contrary conclusion
would operate to weaken the reliance of the general public on the indefeasibility of titles registered under the Torrens
System.
We have so far demonstrated the good faith of the petitioner spouses. By the very facts established by the Court of
Appeals, however, there is still another reason why the property herein in question should be adjudged to the
petitioners.
Although the deed of sale in favor of John W. Legare was fraudulent, the fact remains that he was able to secure a
registered title to the house and lot. It was this title which he subsequently conveyed to the herein petitioners. We

have indeed ruled that a forged or fraudulent deed is a nullity and conveys no title (Director of Lands v. Addison, 49
Phil. 19). However, We have also laid down the doctrine that there are instances when such a fraudulent document
may become the root of valid title. One such instance is where the certificate of title was already transferred from the
name of the true owner to the forger, and while it remained that way, the land was subsequently sold to an innocent
purchaser. For then, the vendee had the right to rely upon what appeared in the certificate (Inquimboy vs. Cruz, G.R.
No. L-13953, July 28, 1960).
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this
Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this
stipulation of facts.
1wph1.t

We have been constrained to adopt the conclusion here set forth because under the Torrens system, "registration is
the operative act that gives validity to the transfer or creates a lien upon the land (Secs. 50 and 51, Land Registration
Act). Consequently, where there was nothing in the certificate of title to indicate any cloud or vice in the ownership of
the property, or any encumbrance thereon, the purchaser is not required to explore farther than what the Torrens title
upon its face indicates in quest for any hidden defect or inchoate right that may subsequently defeat his right thereto.
If the rule were otherwise, the efficacy and conclusiveness of the certificate of title which the Torrens system seeks to
insure would entirely be futile and nugatory. (Reynes vs. Barrera, 68 Phil. 656; De Lara and De Guzman vs. Ayroso,
50 O.G. No. 10, 4838). The public shall then be denied of its foremost motivation for respecting and observing the
Land Registration Act. In the end, the business community stands to be inconvenienced and prejudiced
immeasurably.
Furthermore, when the Register of Deeds issued a certificate of title in the name of John W. Legare, and thereafter
registered the same, John W. Legare, insofar as third parties were concerned, acquired a valid title to the house and
lot here disputed. When, therefore, he transferred this title to the herein petitioners, third persons, the entire
transaction fell within the purview of Article 1434 of the Civil Code. The registration in John W. Legare's name
effectively operated to convey the properties to him.
ART. 1434. When a person who is not the owner of a thing sells or alienates and delivers it, and later the
seller or grantor acquires title thereto, such title passes by operation of law to the buyer or grantee.
This Court sympathizes with the respondent. It is aware of the treacherous, painful fraud committed on her by her
adopted son. But positive provisions of law and settled jurisprudence cannot be subordinated to that feeling.
Besides, the records of this case reveal that the herein respondent is herself not entirely free from blame. We note
that when John presented to her the document which turned out to be a bed of conveyance in his favor, she readily
affixed her signature thereto upon the simple representation of John that it was a document pertaining to her claim
with the U.S. Veterans Administration. She could have asked her maid to read the contents of the same for her and
yet she did not. These, We believe, amount to a lack of prudence and precaution on the part of Mrs. Emilia de
Legare.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed and set aside. A new one is
here entered dismissing the respondent's complaint and declaring the petitioners herein the lawful owners of the
properties here involved. Without pronouncement as to costs.
Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes. J.B.L. and Dizon, JJ., concur.
Bengzon, C.J., concurs in the result.
Barrera and Makalintal, JJ., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. Nos. L-62572-73 February 15, 1990

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, (represented by the Director of Lands and Director of Forest
Development), petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE ARQUILLO, PASTOR VALDEZ, NICOLAS MANAYAN, GERMAN MANAYAN,
ROMAN MANAYAN, SANTIAGO MANAYAN, CLEMENTE MANAYAN, SALVACION D. ARQUILLO AND COSME
DAGUIO, respondents.
Arturo A. Romero for private respondents.

MEDIALDEA, J.:
From the consolidated decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. Nos. 56601, entitled "Jose Arquillo, et al.,
applicants-appellees, versus Director of Lands, et al., oppositors-appellants", and 56602-R, entitled "Salvacion D.
Arquillo, et al., applicants-appellees, versus Director of Lands, et al., oppositors-appellants," which affirmed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court (then Court of First Instance) of Ilocos Norte, Branch 1, Laoag City ordering the
registration of the parcels of land applied for in favor of herein appellants-private respondents, this appeal by
certiorari was filed in this Court on February 2, 1983.
This appeal stemmed from two (2) applications for original registration of two (2) different parcels of land situated in
the barrio of Umnas, Municipality of Vintar, Province of Ilocos Norte;
1. LRC Case No. N-125, LRC Record No. 39360: On August 14, 1970, herein private respondents
Jose Arquillo, Pastor Valdez, Nicolas Manayan, German Manayan and Clemente Manayan applied
for the original registration of a parcel of land containing a total area of 972,016 square meters and
more specifically and technically described and bounded according to plan Psu-169308 (Lots 1, 2,
3 and 4) as approved by the Director of Lands on November 7, 1958 (p. 2, Record on Appeal).
2. LRC Case No. 126, LRC Record No. 39361: On a date not appearing in the records, private
respondents Salvacion D. Arquillo and Cosme Daguio also applied for the original registration of a
parcel of land containing 297,348 square meters and covering Lots 1 to 4 of Plan PSU-169307.
The two applications were heard jointly. In both applications, the Director of Lands filed oppositions alleging that
neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest possess sufficient title to said parcels of land; that neither the
applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest can avail of the provisions of Section 48 of the Public Land Act, it
appearing that the application was filed after December 31, 1968; and that the parcels applied for are portions of the
public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines.
It appears that in LRC No. 126, the Director of Forestry opposed the registration of Lots 1, 2, 3 and 4 of plan PSU169307 on the ground that certain portions thereof were within the Northern Ilocos Norte Forest Reserve declared as
such by Executive Proclamation No. 338, dated October 24, 1938, particularly a portion of 12.5801 hectares of lot 1;
an area of 0.25 hectares of lot 2; and an area of 2.1159 hectares of lot 4, (no definite portion of lot 3 was included) (p.
52, Record on Appeal). On the other hand, the Bureau of Lands claimed that said land was intended as a Group
Settlement Subdivision known as Gss366 for award to certain applicants (p. 53, Record on Appeal).

On July 8, 1971, after the jurisdictional facts had been established, the registration court issued an order of general
default (p. 36, Record on Appeal).
On October 6, 1971, the Director of Forestry in Ilocos Norte filed his answer in LRC No. 125; thru a special counsel
Leandor G. Rafales. The answer alleged that as to Lot 1 of Plan PSU-169308, a small portion thereof, consisting of
8.8786 hectares and all of Lots 2, 3 and 4, were within forest land, the same forming part of Lot 1 of the Northern
Ilocos Norte Forest Reserve declared as such per Executive Proclamation No. 338, dated October 24, 1938 (pp. 3637, Record on Appeal).
On December 13, 1972, the registration court rendered a decision in favor of the applicants (pp. 50-59, Record on
Appeal). The dispositive portion of the decision states:
Consequently, the Court, finding in both cases that applicants have shown their adverse,
continuous, notorious possession and in the concept of owners of the lands applied for since time
immemorial, and thus their title thereto is proper to be confirmed, and is hereby confirmed, orders
that after the judgment shall have become final, a decree be issued adjudicating to:
In Land Reg. Case No. N-126, LRC Record No. N-39361: Lots 2 and 3 of Psu-169307, in the name
of Salvacion D. Arquillo, married to Jose Arquillo, Filipino, resident of Pasuquin, Ilocos Norte; and
Lots 1 and 4 to Cosme Daguio, single, Filipino and resident of Pasuquin, Ilocos Norte;
In Land Reg. Case No. N-1 25, LRC Record No. N-39360: Lot 3 of Psu-169308 to Jose Arquillo,
married to Salvacion Daguio, Filipino, resident of Pasuquin, Ilocos Norte; Lot 2 to Pastor Valdez,
single, Filipino, resident of Pasuquin, Ilocos Norte Lot 4, to Nicolas Manayan, married to Maria
Alviar, Filipino, resident of Pasuquin, Ilocos Norte, and German Manayan, married to Florencia
Pagaduan, Filipino, resident of Pasuquin, Ilocos Norte; and Lot 1 to Roman Manayan, married to
Rosita Agpaoa, Filipino, resident of Pasuquin, Ilocos Norte; Santiago Manayan, married to
Cresencia Bumagat, Filipino, resident of Pasuquin, Ilocos Norte; and Clemente Manayan, married
to Enriqueta Maneja, Filipino and resident of Pasuquin, Ilocos Norte.
SO ORDERED.
The trial court summarized the parties' evidence as follows:
In LRC No. N-126, LRC Case No. 39361:
The evidence discloses that the Lots 1 to 4, Psu-169307 are in the possession of the applicants
Salvacion D. Arquillo and Cosme Daguio, the tenants being Silvino Edu on Lot 1; Santiago
Manayan on Lot 2 and Florencio Dalo-dalo on Lots 3 and 4; that these lots have been inherited by
the applicants who are sister and brother from their father Jose Daguio upon his death in 1935; that
the applicants having discovered that this land was not declared by their father Jose, the same was
declared in 1957, when Salvacion who is the older was 22 years old, the four (4) Lots having been
declared under Tax No. 43868, Exh. K, lot 3; Tax No. 13379, Exh. J, lots 1 and 4; and Tax No.
43687, Exh. K-1, for lot 2, and the same were subsequently declared to the present time, Exhs. M,
N, O, P, Q, R and S; that also taxes had been paid since 1954, Exhs. S, S-1 to S-8, T, T-1 to T-4;
that these lots were planted, aside from rice, to mangoes, caimitos, oranges and other fruits by the
applicants and some fifty (50) heads of cattle, as shown in the pictures, Exhs. Z, Z-1, to Z-4; that
applicants, together with their brother Tinio Daguio and Carlomagno Daguio, registered their
possession and claim of ownership in the office of the Register of Deeds of Ilocos Norte on October
21, 1957, Exh. U; that since the death of their father Jose in 1935 and their mother Ines in 1946,
they have been in exclusive possession of these lots peacefully, continuously and adversely and in
the concept of owners.
That evidence likewise shows that these lots which comprised one lot before its survey had been in
the possession of the father of Jose Daguio named Lucio Daguio; that among the tenants during
this time were Rufino Ida, Nicolas Manayan, Roman Manayan and Nenita Manayan; that Rufino Ida
who worked on the land when he was only 10 years old, being now 81 years old, and Nicolas
Manayan, 66 years old, are still tenants of the land; that also at this time rice was planted to about
nine (9) hectares, mangoes and other fruit tress were planted and two mango trees aged less than

100 years old are still existing, Exh. V-1 in lot 3 and Exh. V-2 in lot 4; that also cattle were raised by
Jose Daguio and some of which certificates of ownership dated back to 1923 and 1935, Exhs. Z, Z1, Z-2, Z-3, and Z-4; that upon the death of Lucio Daguio, his son Jose succeeded in the
possession of the same until his death in 1935.
The Director of Forestry opposes the registration of lots 1, 2, 3 and 4 on the ground that certain
portions are within the Northern Ilocos Norte Forest Reserve by Executive Proclamation No. 338,
dated October 24, 1938, particularly a portion of 12. 5801 has. of lot 1; and area of 0.25 has. over
lot 2; an area of 2.1159 has. of lot 4, which are within the forest reserve area aforesaid. The Bureau
of Lands, on the other hand, has premised its opposition on the ground that these lots have not
been acquired by acquisitive title from the Spanish government or possessory information and
further the application was filed after December 31, 1968, hence, the applicants cannot avail
themselves of the provisions of section 48 of the Public Land Act. The overlapping of these claims
is indicated in Exh. 3, the claim of the Bureau of Forestry being enclosed in blue pencil covering
lots 1 and 4 of Psu-169307 and portions of lots 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 26 of plan Gss-366, while lot 2 of
Psu-169307 overlaps lot 11 of plan Gss-366 and lot 3 of Psu-169307 overlaps lot 14 of Gss-366.
The evidence for the oppositor Bureau of Lands shows that a parcel of land comprised within the
municipalities of Vintar, Burgos, and Bangui, Ilocos Norte, was intended as a group settlement
subdivision known as Gss-366, Exh. 3, X; that the parcel of land being agricultural, applications for
homestead were filed for lot 1 by one Isidro Peralta on September 8, 1965; lot 2, Irineo Gaces, on
November 4, 1964; lot 3, Paterna Albano, on September 8, 1965; lot 4, Teodoro Gervacio, on June
1, 1966; lot 5, Pablo Bautista, on October 16, 1964; lot 7, Ricarte Bautista, on October 16, 1964; lot
8, Elmo Adam, new; lot 9, Bernardo Martinez, new; lot 10, Wilfredo Garvida, November 4, 1966,
and others. It appears, however, that the aforesaid group settlement subdivision was protested by
the applicants as shown in Exh. W and which protest was favorably considered by the Director of
Lands; thus, the said plan was disapproved, Exh. Y. And furthermore, from the said disapproval, it
is indubitable that the Bureau of Lands recognizes as alienable and disposable the lands described
in Psu-169307 and Psu-169308; and likewise, by excluding the said land covered by the approved
plan Psu-169307, it recognized them as '(c) Lands which have been acquired and become private
property (Exh. Y). Consequently, with this admission by the Bureau of Lands, the opposition
interposed by the Bureau of Forestry is unavailing; likewise, although the Bureau of Forestry had
indeed claimed that a substantial portion of lot 1, a small portion of lot 2 and the whole of lot 4, of
plan Psu-169307, are within the Northern Ilocos Norte Forest Reserve according to Executive
Proclamation No. 338 of October 24, 1938, yet not only has the Bureau of Lands dispelled this
claim as heretofore alluded to but also the evidence of uninterrupted possession of the applicants
since time immemorial had not been disproved. Furthermore, the evidence adduced by said
oppositor delineating the areas covered by the said proclamation and identifying the areas in plan
Psu-169307 that are within the said forest reserve has not been satisfactorily established. And
added to this, the oppositor Bureau of Lands affirmed at the trial that a verification of the reserved
areas was jointly made by the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Forestry and no area was found
to be within the forest reserve. Indeed, the executive proclamation, Exh. 8, itself provides that it
shall be subject to private rights and having been issued only on October 24, 1938, the same
cannot despoil applicants' vested rights. (p. 63, Rollo; pp. 50-55, Record on Appeal)
In LRC No. N-125; Rec. No. 39361:
xxx xxx xxx
The evidence discloses that lots 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Plan Psu-169308 were originally owned by Mateo
Manayan and passed on to his son Anastacio Manayan who for himself had been in possession of
the same for more than thirty (30) years; that his death before the war or in 1938, his heirs
succeeded him, namely; Nicolas Manayan, German Manayan, Roman Manayan and Clemente
Manayan; that however, the said heirs, having received monetary contributions, labor and working
animals for the development, cultivation and planting of other big parcels of land, had ceded in
1954, but formalized the same only in 1970, Exh. U-1 to Jose Arquillo and Pastor Valdez, lots 2 and
3 of plan Psu-169308, among others; that the entire land was planted to ace, fruit-growing trees
and a big portion of grazing of cattle, Exhs. Z, Z-1 to Z-20, V, W, X, X-1 to X-9, AA, AA-1 to AA-6;
that an irrigation system was built over the area and a communal irrigators association was
established, Exh. Y and duly approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission, Exh. R; that a

group settlement project was executed by the Bureau of Lands under Gss-366, Project No. 7, Block
XV, Exhs. EE & 3, on April 7-16, 1958, Exh. 4-2, but the same was protested by the Manayans,
Exh. T, and consequently was disapproved by the Director of Lands, Exh. CC, in spite of the report
of Marcelo Ines, Exh. 4. Among others, said Exh. CC states:
2. A considerable part of the total area covered by the survey are reported to be
occupied and that the occupants thereof have been paying due taxes therefor.
The foregoing appear strongly to indicate a violation of section 478, subsection
(c) of the Philippine Land Surveyors Manual, to wit:
478. Extensive areas of public land classified as alienable and
disposable shall be delimited and subdivided for disposal,
excluding therefrom the following:
(c) Lands which have been acquired and become private
property.
For purposes of equity, the lots cited in the instances above are construed to fall
in this category and should, therefore, have been excluded from the survey, but
were obviously not.
The Bureau of Lands claim that it has pending application for homestead of lots as delineated in its
group settlement subdivision, Gss-366, Exhs. Y, 1, CC, 3 & EE, which covers the lots in question, of
which fifteen (15) persons filed in the year 1966, Exhs. 2, 2-1 to 2-14, although only a few or only
four (4) lots, Nos. 26,27,28 and 29, were in occupation while the rest have not occupied the same;
neither have they introduced any improvement; that lot 1 of Psu-169308 overlaps lot 17 of plan
Gss-366; lots 2 and 3 of Psu-169308 overlaps lots 21, 22, 23 and 24 of Gss-366; that a party of
land classification, LC for short, in 1957, consisting of ten (10) employees from the Bureau of
Forestry and Bureau of Lands, delineated the alienable and disposable portions and the areas in
Exits. 1 and 3 are outside of the forest zone and are alienable and disposable. (pp. 55-58, Record
on Appeal).
On December 18, 1972, the Director of Lands and the Director of Forestry filed a notice of appeal (p. 60, Rollo). On
January 19, 1973, Assistant Provincial Fiscal Florencio B. Cabanos filed a motion to lift order of general default and
for new trial (p. 61, Record) which motion was granted on February 28, 1973 and the decision in LRC No. 125 was
set aside. The answer of the Bureau of Forestry was admitted and it was allowed to present additional evidence (p.
51, Rollo).
On November 20, 1973, the trial court rendered a new decision in LRC No. 125, adjudicating the land applied for to
the applicants. The dispositive portion of the decision reads (pp. 7374, Record on Appeal):
Consequently, the Court, finding that the applicants have shown their adverse, continuous and
notorious possession and in the concept of owners of the lands applied for since time immemorial,
and thus their title thereto is proper to be confirmed, and is hereby confirmed, orders that after the
judgment shall have become final, a decree be issued adjudicating to:
Lot 1 to Roman Manayan, married to Rosita Agpaoa, Filipino, resident of Pasuquin, Ilocos Norte
Santiago Manayan, married to Cresencia Bumagat, Filipino and resident of Pasuquin, Ilocos Norte
and Clemente Manayan. married to Enriqueta Maneja, Filipino and resident of Pasuquin, Ilocos
Norte; Lot 2 to Pastor Valdez, single, Filipino, resident of Pasuquin, Ilocos Norte; Lot 3 to Jose
Arquillo, married to Salvacion Daguio, Filipino, resident of Pasuquin, Ilocos Norte, and Lot 4 to
Nicolas Manayan, married to Maria Alviar, Filipino, resident of Pasuquin, Ilocos Norte; and German
Manayan, married to Florencia Pagaduan, Filipino, resident of Pasuquin, Ilocos Norte.
SO ORDERED.

The records of the case were elevated to the respondent Court of Appeals on November 25, 1974. On November 22,
1982, the respondent Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming the trial court's decision (pp. 50-62,Rollo). It was
pointed out in the appellate court's decision that oppositor Bureau of Forestry failed to file and perfect its appeal from
the trial court's decision of November 20, 1973, hence, the decision in LRC No. 125 has become final and executory
insofar as it is concerned. The appeal treated in the appellate court was therefore only the appeal of the Bureau of
Lands in both cases and the appeal of the Bureau of Forestry in LRC N-126 (p. 52, Rollo).
Not satisfied with the decision of the Court of Appeals, Republic, through the office of the Solicitor General filed the
instant appeal by certiorari.
Petitioner Republic alleged that:
In rendering the questioned decision, the Court of Appeals decided questions in a manner that is
not in accordance with law and the applicable decisions of this Honorable Court. In particular, the
Court of Appeals:
(a) Allowed the titling of lands which are part of a forest reservation and, therefore, inalienable as
provided by law and declared repeatedly in decisions of this Honorable Court.
(b) Allowed titling of land through confirmation of alleged imperfect title although the conditions laid
down by law and the decisions of this Honorable Court have not been complied with (p. 1011, Rollo)
The instant appeal prays specifically that the private respondents be declared without any registrable title to the
properties p subject to their application in Land Registration Case No. 125 of the then Court of First Instance of Ilocos
Norte and that their application for original registration be dismissed. (p. 147, Rollo).
1. It is petitioner's main contention that the evidence presented by them in the hearings conducted
in the lower court positively proved that the parcels of land in question are with the forest reserve
established under Presidential Proclamation No. 338 dated October 24, 1938.
Private respondents, on the other hand, argue that the decision of the trial court in LRC No. 125 is already final and
executory in view of petitioner counsel's failure to file a notice of appeal (p. 156, Rollo).
The failure of petitioner Bureau of Forestry to file a notice of appeal with the trial court which rendered a new decision
in LRC No. 125 is not fatal. It has been the consistent pronouncement of this Court that estoppel does not lie against
the Republic or its government. In the case of Republic vs. Aquino, L-33983, January 27, 1983,120 SCRA 186, 191192, the Bureau of Lands failed to file an opposition in a land registration case and an order of general default was
rendered therein. A decision decreeing registration was subsequently rendered which the government appealed by
way of a petition for review. We held therein that:
Relative to the allegation that the Director of Lands or that the government did not oppose the
application of herein respondent, as in fact on December 26, 1969 an order of general default was
issued by the court against the whole world, suffice it to say that as stated by this court in Luciano
vs. Estrella, 34 SCRA 769,'it is a well known and settled rule in our jurisdiction that the Republic, or
its government is usually not estopped by mistake or error on the part of its officials or agents.' And,
in an earlier case, Republic vs. Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc., 32 SCRA 21 'there was an
enunciation of such a principle in this wise: 'Thus did the lower court, as pointed out by the then
Solicitor General, conclude that the government was bound by the mistaken interpretation arrived
at by the national treasurer and the auditor general.' It would consider estoppel as applicable. That
is not the law. Estoppel does not lie. Such a principle dates back to Aguinaldo de Romero vs.
Director of Lands, a 1919 decision.
It is settled that forest lands or forest reserves are not capable of private appropriation and possession thereof,
however long, cannot convert them into private property (Republic v. CA, 154 SCRA 476 [1987]). Whether or not the
land involved in a land registration case is a forest land or forest reserve is a matter of proof. In the case at bar,
petitioner's allegation that the parcels sought to be registered are within the Northern Ilocos Norte Forest Reserve
declared under Presidential Proclamation No. 338 has not been clearly established. "The case of a party is

constituted by his own affirmative allegations. Under Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, each party must prove
his own affirmative allegations by the amount of evidence required by law (i.e., preponderance of evidence in civil
cases, or proof beyond reasonable doubt, in criminal cases). The party, whether plaintiff or defendants, who asserts
the affirmative of the issue has the burden of presenting at the trial such amount of evidence required by law to obtain
a favorable judgment." (Tai Tong Chuache and Co. v. Insurance Commission, G.R. No. 55397, February 29, 1988).
The herein petitioner relies much on the report and testimony of Forest Warden Pedro Barreras to prove that some
portions of the parcel sought to be registered in LRC No. 125 are within the Northern Ilocos Norte Forest Reserve.
However, on the same basis, the trial court held and we agree on the failure of petitioner to substantiate its allegation.
The trial court summarized the additional evidence presented by oppositor Bureau of Forestry as follows:
The oppositor Bureau of Forestry claims that certain areas were reserved for forestry purposes
known as the Northern Ilocos Norte Forest Reserve indicated in a map thereof, Exh. 6, with the
municipal boundaries shown therein, Burgos, Pasuquin, Bangui and Vintar as Exhs. 6-A to 6-A-3
and the lots comprehended within the Northern Ilocos Norte Forest Reserve are lots 1, 5, 6, 8 & 10;
that the technical descriptions of the said forest reserve is Exh. 7; that the reservation was in
accordance with Presidential Proclamation No. 338 dated October 24, 1938, Exh. 8; that sometime
on August 2-7, 1971, an investigation and inspection of the lots applied for was conducted by
Forest Warden Pedro Barreras and in his Report dated September 29, 1971, he said:
l. That in Lot 1, on its northern portion, 28.0 hectares more or less, enclosed in blue pencil is within
the Alienable and Disposable, Block XV; project No. 7, Bangui. On its southern portion, 8.8786
hectares more or less, enclosed in red pencil is within lot 1 of the Northern Ilocos Norte Forest
Reserve.
2. In Lot 2, the whole area falls within Lot 1 of the Northern Ilocos Norte Forest Reserve.
3. In Lot 3, the whole area also falls within Lot I of the Northern Ilocos Norte Forest Reserve.
4. In Lot 4, the whole area also falls inside Lot 1 of the Northern Ilocos Norte Forest Reserve.
(Exhs. 9 and 9-A)
In spite of this report, however, the witness testified that he knew only Lot 1.
COURT:
q. But he (Roman Manayan) was not actually in possession of
the properties which you have delineated as disposable and
alienable?
a. Only Lot 1, your Honor.
q. How about Lot 2?
a. I do not know the others, your Honor.
q. You know lot I only?
a. Yes, your Honor.
(p. 393, t.s.11., July 30, 1973)
This same witness moreover admitted his incompetency in relating the lots applied for registration
as within the Presidential Proclamation
ATTY. ROMERO:

q. You mean to say this portion you have just pointed before
this Court labelled in Exh. 6 'portion applied for within the forest
reserve is not covered by the technical descriptions ii) this
presidential proclamation marked Exh. 8?
a. It was not . . .
q. It is a part?
a. It is a part but maybe . . .
COURT:
You speak in Ilocano if you cannot express yourself in English.
a. It is not included here, sir.
(Witness indicating Exh. 8 . . . pointing to the technical
descriptions in Exh. 8)
ATTY. ROMERO:
q. So you mean to say that the technical descriptions in Exh. 8
is not complete insofar as Exh. 6 is concerned?
a. Yes. sir.
q. Why do you say that? What makes you say that the
technical descriptions in Exh. 8 is not complete?
a. Because I do not know if these technical descriptions belong
to lot 1, lot 2, or lot 3 or lot 4. (Witness referring to the technical
descriptions in Exh. 8)
q. So you are not now sure whether or not this portion which
you have just pinpointed before the Court which is labelled as
'portion applied for by the petitioners as within the forest
reserve' is within these technical descriptions Exh. 9? You are
not sure?
a. No, sir.
q. As a matter of fact, after examining these technical
descriptions embodied in the presidential proclamation, as you
stated you do not know whether the portion you have just
pointed out in Exh. 6 and which is labelled as the portion within
the forest reserve is covered by the presidential proclamation
as you have already stated?
a. No, sir.
COURT:
q. What do you mean by no? You mean you do not know
whether the portion you have delineated and labelled 'portion
applied for by the petitioners as within the forest reserve' is

covered by the technical descriptions in the presidential

proclamation Exh. 8?
a. Yes, your Honor.
(pp. 405-407, t.s.n., July 30, 1973)
(pp. 65-69, Record on Appeal)
On the other hand, there is sufficient evidence on record which shows that the parcel of land applied for is alienable
and disposable and has been in the possession of the applicants and their predecessors-in-interest since time
immemorial.
"If in this instance, we give judicial sanction to a private claim, let it be noted that the Government, in the long run of
cases, has its remedy. Forest reserves of public lands can be established as provided by law. When the claim of the
citizen and the claim of the Government as to a particular piece of property collide, if the Government desires to
demonstrate that the land is in reality a forest, the Director of Forestry should submit to the court convincing proof that
the land is not more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes. Great consideration, it may be stated, should
and undoubtedly will be, paid by the courts to the opinion of the technical expert who speaks with authority on forestry
matters. But a mere formal opposition on the part of the Attorney-General for the Director of Forestry, unsupported by
satisfactory evidence, will not stop the courts from giving title to the claimant(Ramos v. Director of Lands, 39 Phil.
175,186-187 (1918); Republic, et al. v. Hon. CA, et al., G. R. L-46048, November 29, 1988; Emphasis supplied).
Finally, it was established during the trial and affirmed by respondent appellate court that the possession of the
subject properties by the applicants and their predecessors-in-interest has commenced since time immemorial while
the alleged Presidential Proclamation No. 338 was issued only on October 24, 1938. Granting in gratia argumenti that
the land sought to be registered in fact lies within in Northern Ilocos Norte Forest Reserve, private respondents' rights
cannot be prejudiced. ... . While the Government has the right to class portions of public land, the primary right of a
private individual who possessed and cultivated the land in good faith much prior to such classification must be
recognized and should not be prejudiced by after-events which could not have been anticipated. Thus, we have held
that the Government, in the first instance may, by reservation, decide for itself what portions of public land shall be
considered forestry land, unless private interests have intervened before such reservation is made (Ankron v.
Government of the Philippine Islands, 40 Phil. 10, 16 (1919); cited in Republic, et al. v. Hon. CA, et al., G.R. L-46048,
November 29, 1988).
ACCORDINGLY, this petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 68319 March 31, 1992

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JESUS DELA CRUZ, DEMEROLD AYADO and ABECIDUEO AJEDO, JR., accused-appellants.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In an information filed with the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Cabarroguis, Quirino, on 28
October 1982, accused-appellants Jesus dela Cruz, Demerold Ayado and Abecidueo Ajedo, Jr. were charged with
the crime of Murder as defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on or about the 21st day of July, 1982, in the municipality of Diffun, Province of Quirino,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused Jesus
dela Cruz, Demerold Ayado and Abecidueo Ajedo, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously by conspiring together and mutually helping one another and by means of treachery and
evident premeditation and with the use of bladed instruments and stones attack, assault, strike and
stab one Felipe Natura by inflicting upon the latter multiple wounds resulting to (sic) the death of
said Felipe Natura therefore.
That the commission of the offense was aggravated by the following circumstances:
1. That accused took advantage of their superiority in numbers (sic);
2. That the crime was committed with insult to or disregard to (sic) the respect due to offended
party by reason of his age;
3. That the crime was committed in the (sic) nighttime to facilitate its commission.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 1
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 380.
Upon arraignment, each of the accused entered a plea of not guilty. 2
At the trial of the case on its merits, the prosecution presented eight (8) witnesses, including eyewitness Antonia
Natura, wife of the victim, Felipe Natura. The other prosecution witnesses were Dr. Luis Bergado, Elpidio Baao,
Rolando Natura, Perla Minia, Judge Jose Guirnela, Archibal Afan and Pat. Bienvenido Gumpal. 3 On the other hand, the
defense presented the following witnesses: Rodolfo Mabanta, Jessie Tubay, Abecidueo Ajedo, Sr. and accused Jesus dela Cruz.

On 28 May 1984, the trial court promulgated its decision 5 convicting the accused-appellants of the crime charged. The
dispositive portion thereof reads as follows:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATION (sic), there is no doubt in the mind of the
Court that the crime of murder has been committed and that the accused Jesus dela Cruz,
Demerold Ayado and ABECIDUEO Ajedo, Jr. are guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby sentences Jesus dela Cruz, Demerold Ayado and Abecidueo
Ajedo, Jr. to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the
amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) jointly and severally following the precedent set
forth in People vs. Dela Fuente, (G.R. Nos. 6351-52) and reiterated in the case of People vs.
Romeo Villanueva, et. al., (G.R. No.
L-32274), without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The detention of the accused
shall be fully credited in their favor.
In rendering its verdict and imposing upon the accused-appellants the penalty of reclusion perpetua, the trial court
made the following pronouncement:
The evidence would show that aggravating circumstances were attendant in the commission of the
offense. Evidence was taken (sic) of superior strength and the accused employed means to
weaken or deprive the victim from a (sic) possible defense. Jesus Dela Cruz with pretense to be
friendly, greeted the victim, approached and accosted him, suddenly grabbed from his waist the
scythe while the accused Demerold Ayado tapped the victim's shoulder. The accused Jesus Dela
Cruz, Demerold Ayado and Abecidueo Ajedo, Jr., acting in concept, mauled and stabbed the
victim mercilessly. The victim is an old man although with his helpless wife, is no match to three
armed, young men who conspired to maul and stab him to death.
The crime was committed at night time to facilitate its commission. The victim with his wife was
(sic) on their way home about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of July 21, 1982. They were surprisingly
accosted along the stony road by the accused. It was dead dark that night although the victim's
wife was holding a lamp. With the lamp (sic), the wife was holding, would place the victim to (sic) a
more vulnerable assault or attack as it has happened.
It was clearly established from the evidence that the accused Jesus Dela Cruz, his co-accused
Demerold Ayado and Abecidueo Ajedo, Jr. would point to an evil purpose and design (sic) that of
mercilessly stabbing and mauling the victim to death.
There is no mitigating circumstance to offset the two aggravating circumstances of taking
advantage of superior strength (sic) and night time to facilitate its commission.
Accused-appellant filed a notice of appeal on 4 June 1984. 6 However, on 5 June 1984, they filed a petition for a new trial
alleging therein excusable neglect on their part in looking for the other eyewitness, Dionisio B. Millo, whose "new address is newly
discovered," and that the testimony of said witness is so vital and important that it could alter the judgment of conviction. 7 On 8 June
1984, they filed a motion to withdraw their appeal as the same was incompatible with their petition for new trial. They also prayed
that their petition for new trial be given due course. 8

On 6 July 1984, the trial court denied 9 the petition for new trial since the statement or affidavit of Dionisio B. Millo could not be
considered newly discovered evidence as it "existed during all the time when the case was heard;" besides, even if it were to be
admitted, it would not alter the judgment of conviction.

Hence, on 20 July 1984, accused-appellants re-filed their notice of appeal.

The antecedent facts, as succinctly stated in the Appellee's Brief, 10 are as follows:
In the evening of July 21, 1982, Antonio (sic) Natura and her husband, Felipe Natura, went to the
house of Councilman Francisco Ponseja located at Barangay Magsaysay, Diffun, Quirino. They
were accompanied by Perla Minia (pp. 5-6, tsn, Dec. 13, 1982).
They arrived at Councilman Ponseja's house, but he was not around so they conversed with
Councilman Ponseja's wife who was there (p. 6, tsn, Ibid).

Afterwards, Antonia Natura, her husband Felipe Natura and Perla Minia left Ponseja's house and
returned to their house (p. 7, tsn, Ibid.).
On their way home, they met the three accused, Jesus dela Cruz, Demerold Ayado and
Abecidueo Ajedo, who were standing by the road (p. 7, tsn, Ibid.). Antonia Natura recognized
them as she was carrying an oil lamp.
Upon meeting them, accused Jesus dela Cruz said, "Good evening (Tatang) father," Felipe Natura
answered, "Good evening my son (Barok)" (p. 7, tsn, Ibid.).
Then, Jesus de la Cruz said to Felipe Natura, "you, after the election, as if you hate me already."
Felipe Natura answered, "No my son, you forget that already." At this juncture, accused Demerold
Ayado tapped the shoulder of Felipe Natura, while Jesus de la Cruz at that same moment shouted,
"Vulva of your mother" and suddenly boxed Felipe Natura. Demerold Ayado, jointed by Abecidueo
Ajedo, likewise, boxed Felipe Natura. While the three accused were boxing and mauling Felipe,
Antonia Natura pleaded for the three accused to stop but the three accused did not listen to her
(pp. 8-9, tsn, Ibid.).
When Antonia's pleas remained unheeded, she shouted for help, but nobody came to their succor.
At that juncture, accused Demerold Ayado took hold of the front dress of Antonia and shouted at
her saying "Vulva of your mother, we are going to kill you now. You ask help from your sons-in-law"
(pp. 11, tsn, Ibid.).
Antonia struggled to free herself and when her front dress was released from the hands of
Demerold Ayado, she ran back to the house of Ponseja for help (p. 11, tsn, Ibid.).
When no one was around the house to help her, Antonia returned to the place where her husband
Felipe Natura was being mauled and maltreated. Demerold Ayado, upon seeing Antonia ran after
her, and so the latter ran away again (p. 12, tsn, Ibid.).
After the lapse of several minutes, when Antonia noticed that everything was quiet, she returned to
the place where her husband was, but the three accused were no longer there. She embraced her
husband and noticed blood on his face and body. She ran again to look for help. This time she went
to the house of her godson, Elpidio Baao, who was at home. She informed him that her husband
was mauled by the three accused. When Elpidio Baao and Antonia Natura returned to the scene
of the crime, her husband was no longer there (pp. 13-14, tsn, Ibid.).
She began to shout. Meanwhile, her godson looked around, and noticed that there was light in the
house of Councilman Ponseja and he learned that Felipe Natura was brought there (p. 15,
tsn, Ibid.).
Elpidio and Antonia went to the house of Ponseja and there she saw her husband prostrate with
blood all over his face and body (p. 15, tsn, Ibid.).
When Elpidio noticed that Felipe Natura was still breathing, he hired a vehicle and brought Felipe to
the Quirino Provincial Hospital (p. 15, tsn, Ibid.).
The next morning, Felipe Natura died (p. 18, tsn, Ibid.).
Accused-appellants Demerold Ayado and Abecidueo Ajedo, Jr. put up the defense of alibi, while accused-appellant
Jesus dela Cruz interposed the justifying circumstance of self-defense. 11
In this appeal, accused-appellants assign the following errors: 12
I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL BECAUSE THE
HEREIN ACCUSED-APPELLANTS WERE PREJUDICED AND PREVENTED FROM FAIRLY
PRESENTING THEIR DEFENSE DUE TO THE SERIOUS ERROR ON THE PART OF THEIR
ATTORNEY WHO FAILED TO EXERT SUFFICIENT EFFORTS TO BRING THE VITAL WITNESS
TO TESTIFY IN COURT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ALL THE HEREIN ACCUSED-APPELLANTS FOR
(sic) MURDER AND IMPOSING A SENTENCE OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT ON THE STRENGTH
OF THE TESTIMONY OF A LONE "WOMAN WITNESS," THE WIFE OF THE DECEASED, AND
THAT NOBODY CORROBORATED HER TESTIMONY OR VERSION OF THE CASE.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION THAT A CONSPIRACY
EXISTED AMONG THE APPELLANTS IN THE COMMISSION OF MURDER BECAUSE THE
PREVAILING DOCTRINE IN OUR JURISDICTION IS THAT CONSPIRACY MUST BE SHOWN TO
EXIST AS CLEARLY AND CONVINCINGLY AS THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE ITSELF.
IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INCLUDING THE HEREIN APPELLANTS; DEMEROLD AYADO
AND ABECEDUEO AJEDO IN THE CONVICTION OF THE CRIME OF MURDER
NOTWITHSTANDING AN INSUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE ADDUCED AND PRESENTED
AGAINST THEM AS IN FACT THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE THEIR GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
1. The first assigned error is without merit. Accused-appellants candidly admit in their Brief that the main objective of
their petition for new trial is "to present either Dionisio Millo or Teofilo Cielo to testify and corroborate the version of
Jesus dela Cruz." The latter is a witness for the defense. 13 In their petition for new trial, however, accused-appellants
mention only the name of Dionisio Millo. Millo appears to have been investigated by police corporal Bienvenido Gumpal on 26 July
1982. He signed a sworn statement on said date before the Municipal Judge of Diffun, Quirino, 14 which the prosecution marked and
offered in evidence as Exhibit "I," 15 They invoke excusable negligence for their failure to present Millo as a witness allegedly
because he could not
be reached by the subpoena issued on March 1984 as he had changed his address. 16 The records disclose, however, that at the
hearing on 11 April 1984 for the continuation of the presentation of evidence for the defense, counsel for the accused-appellants,
upon resting his case, expressly waived the presentation of Millo and any other witness. Thus:

ATTY. RUBEN Z. FLORES

I am intending to present one witness for the defense, your Honor, but I think that he is not yet in
Court so we are constrained to rest this case, your Honor. With the presentation of the witnesses
for the accused, witness No. 1 Rodolfo Mabanta, No. 2 Jessie Tubay, No. 3 Abecidueo
Ajedo, Sr. and the accused Jesus dela Cruz without any documentary evidence, your Honor, we
are resting our case for the defense. 17
The trial court correctly denied the petition for new trial. Under Section 2, Rule 121 of the Rules of Court, a new trial
may be granted based on any of the following grounds:
a) That errors of law or irregularities have been committed during the trial prejudicial to the
substantial rights of the defendant; and
b) That new and material evidence has been discovered which the defendant could not with
reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial, and which if introduce and
admitted, would probably change the judgment.

The second ground, which is invoked by the accused-appellants, has the following requisites: (a) the evidence was
discovered after the trial; (b) such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the
exercise of reasonable diligence; and (c) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching, and is
of such weight that, if admitted, will probably change the judgment. 18
None of these requisites is present in the instant case. Accused-appellants knew all the while that Millo had executed
a sworn statement, Exhibit "I", which was duly attached to the records. This is the best evidence of the nature of his
testimony. Accordingly, if they honestly believed that his testimony was vital for the defense, they should have
presented him. The records do not at all show that diligent efforts were exerted by the accused-appellants to bring the
witness before the court. As an after-thought, they now ascribe to their previous counsel acts of impropriety and
negligence in not presenting Millo. A painstaking review of the records fails to disclose any basis for such an unfair
accusation. More importantly, accused-appellants themselves openly admit that the testimony of Millo would only be
corroborative of the testimony or version of Jesus dela Cruz. Such a statement is fatal to their cause because it
amounts to an admission that the third requisite for a new trial is absent. Being merely corroborative, the testimony of
Millo can be dispensed with.
There is moreover, another insurmountable obstacle which prevented favorable action on the petition for new trial. As
stated earlier, accused-appellants filed their Notice of Appeal on 4 June 1984, a copy of which was received by the
Office of the Provincial Fiscal on that same day. 19 The following day, the accused-appellants filed their petition for new trial. In
criminal cases, an appeal is deemed perfected upon the filing of the notice of appeal. Upon the perfection of the appeal, the trial
court loses its power to modify of set aside the decision, or order a new trial. 20 All it can do is to issue orders for the protection and
preservation of the rights of the parties which do not involve any matter litigated in the appeal. 21 This does not mean, however, that
an accused is thereafter forever barred from filing a petition for new trial. In an appropriate case, he may file it with the appellate
court. 22

While it is true that accused-appellants filed on 8 June 1984 a motion to withdraw their appeal to save their petition
for review, the records do not show that the trial court favorably acted on it. Besides, a notice of appeal, once filed,
cannot be validly withdrawn to give way to a motion for reconsideration or a petition for new trial since, as above
stated, the filing of the notice perfected the appeal and the court thereby lost its jurisdiction over the case; hence, it
can no longer act on either the motion or the petition. The only valid withdrawal of an appeal would be one where an
accused decides to serve the sentence. 23
2. Being interrelated, as they hinge on the issue of credibility of witnesses, the second and fourth assigned errors
shall be discussed jointly. Under these assigned errors, accused-appellants claim that the testimony of Antonia
Natura, the lone eyewitness, should not have been believed because of the bias and prejudice that would result from
her being the victim's wife; moreover, the judge who penned the decision only heard the witnesses for the defense,
while two (2) other judges heard the evidence for the prosecution. Hence, the former could not have observed the
demeanor of the prosecution's lone eyewitness. It is further claimed that accused-appellants Demerold Ayado and
Abecidueo Ajedo, Jr. were not positively identified; thus, their defense of alibi should have been given credence by
the trial court.
There is no merit to these claims.
Antonia Natura's relation to the victim does not necessarily disqualify her on the grounds of bias and undue
interest. 24 There is absolutely nothing in our laws to disqualify a person from testifying in a criminal case in which the said person's
relative was involved, if the former was really at the scene of the crime and was a witness to the execution of the criminal act.

25

Additionally, the testimony of a lone eyewitness, if positive, reasonable and credible, is sufficient to support a
conviction especially if the testimony bears the earmarks of truth and sincerity and had been delivered spontaneously,
naturally and in a straightforward manner. 26 Corroborative evidence is necessary only when there are reasons to warrant the
suspicion that the witness falsified the truth or that his observation had been inaccurate. 27 In the case at bar, the trial court found the
testimony of Antonia Natura convincing and trustworthy enough to warrant a conviction. We find no reason to disturb such finding as
there is no showing that exceptions to the rule on conclusiveness of findings of facts of trial courts exists.

The fact that the judge who penned the decision did not hear the case
in its entirety he only had the chance to hear and observe the defense witnesses is not a compelling reason to
jettison his findings and conclusion considering that the full record was available to him for his perusal. 28 In the case
of People vs. Abaya, 29 We said:

. . . And the mere fact that Judge Alfredo C. Flores did not preside at the trial of this case in its
entirety, having taken over only when the last defense witness was to be presented, did not detract
from the validity, much less the correctness, of his decision. The full record was available to him. It
is evident from the knowledgeable and analytical decision he has written that he thoroughly
examined the testimonial and documentary evidence before him and carefully assessed the
credibility of the witnesses with the seasoned perceptiveness he has developed as a trial judge.
An examination of the trial judge's decision reveals that he meticulously and carefully examined each and every
testimony of all the witnesses. This is readily apparent from his sixty-seven (67) page decision where the testimonies
of all the witnesses were summarized and evaluated.
The defense of alibi of accused-appellants Abecidueo Ajedo, Jr. and Demerold Ayado was dismissed by the trial
court in this wise: 30
The accused Demerold Ayado and Abecidueo Ajedo, Jr. would want the Court to believe that at
the time of the commission of the offense charged in the evening of July 21, 1982 (sic), were at
Campamento, Diffun, Quirino, about five (5) kilometers away from Magsaysay, Diffun, Quirino. It
was established, however, that the distance could be negotiated by hiking in just an hour. The
defense, to bolster the theory, presented Rodolfo Mabanta, stating that Demerold Ayado and
Abecidueo Ajedo, Jr. did not leave the house (house of Abecidueo Ajedo, Jr.) in Campamento,
Diffun, Quirino, on the evening of July 21, 1982, because of an existing barangay curfew ordinance
that nobody could go out at night. However, according to the same witness, this presumption was
just his opinion and belief. Defense presented another witness in the person of Abecidueo Ajedo,
Sr., father of the accused Abecidueo Ajedo, Jr., and incumbent Barangay Captain of
Campamento, Diffun, Quirino, who testified of (sic) the existence of a Barangay curfew ordinanceresolution No. 4-81 marked as Exhibit "1" for the defense, that the accused Demerold Ayado and
Abecidueo Ajedo, Jr. slept and stayed in his house for three (3) days and remembers (sic) that in
the evening of July 21, 1982, he was in his house together with the accused Demerold Ayado and
Abecidueo Ajedo, Jr. Witness further remembers of (sic) two violators of said curfew ordinanceResolution No. 4-81 who were accordingly punished. He further stated that Demerold Ayado and
his son, Abecidueo Ajedo, Jr. never went out of the house at night during their stay for three days
in his house because they were tired. In the evening of July 21, 1982, he presumed that Demerold
Ayado and Abecidueo Ajedo, Jr. to have (sic) slept in their room in his house because he himself
that time was asleep.
The Court took note of the fact that the witness Abecidueo Ajedo, Sr. is the father of the accused
Abecidueo Ajedo, Jr. and the distance between Campamento, Diffun, Quirino and Magsaysay,
Diffun, Quirino, is just 5 kilometers which could be negotiated by hiking for just an hour. This puts to
nought (sic) the defense of alibi.
It is a well-entrenched doctrine that alibi is an inherently weak defense especially when the accused is positively
identified. 31 Furthermore, for the defense of alibi to prosper, it is not enough that the accused-appellants are able to show that they
were somewhere else when the crime was committed; they must likewise demonstrate that it was physically impossible for them to
have been at the scene of the crime. 32 In the instant case, Ajedo and Ayado were positively identified by a witness; furthermore, the
trial court concluded that the place where they supposedly were at the time of the incident is only five (5) kilometers away from the
scene of the crime, a distance which they could easily negotiate in one (1) hour by hiking. It was not, therefore, impossible for the
two to be at the scene of the crime.

This Court cannot likewise accept the plea of self-defense of accused-appellant Jesus dela Cruz. In a long line of
cases, it has been held that where the accused admits to the killing of the victim but invokes self-defense, it is
incumbent upon him to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he indeed acted in defense of himself. 33 As the
burden of proof is shifted to him, he must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the
prosecution. 34

The version of Jesus dela Cruz on what transpired that fateful night is summarized by the trial court as follows:

35

With respect to the accused Jesus Dela Cruz, he invoked self-defense. This is his version. In the
evening of July 21, 1982, coming from the house of one Anikki, followed (sic) the victim Felipe
Natura and his wife, Antonia Natura. Greeting (sic) the victim "good evening" only to be answered
angrily "you are the man whom I have been waiting for a long time". Immediately, the victim

grabbed his waist, boxed his forehead and fell down. He (accused) stood up and tried to run away
but the victim holding a scythe, chased him, hitting him on his left arm. Accused and the victim
grappled for the possession of the scythe and in the course of the grappling, the victim was
stabbed. He did not know, however, how he stabbed the victim. The victim could no longer stand up
because of what he did to him. During the grappling between him and victim Felipe Natura, Antonia
Natura, wife of the victim, held his shirt and boxed him. That Felipe Natura wanted to kill him
because he turned down the request of the victim to kill his political adversary, Rubenciano Ayado
(accused's stepfather), before the barangay election held on May 17, 1982.
For the plea of self-defense to prosper, it is necessary that the following circumstances must concur: (a) unlawful
aggression, (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, and (c) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the person defending himself. 36
In the instant case, the unlawful aggression came not from the victim but from the accused-appellants. The version of
Dela Cruz is simply incredible. If We were to subscribe to it, then the victim would have sustained only one (1) injury
the stab wound. The autopsy report 37 belies this. As indicated therein, the victim suffered the following injuries:
Head
A. External = Generalized Contusion of the Head
= Hematoma around both eyes
= Conjunctival Hemorrhage both eyes
= Lacerated wound of both upper &
lower lips from the root of the teeth to the outside
= Upper Rt. Incissor teeth missing
Upper Rt. Lateral Incisor missing
Upper Left cannine (sic) teeth missing
= Stab wound Rt. cheeck (sic) 4 inches
long
= Stab wound Left anterior digastric triangle 1 cm. long x 2 inches deep.
1 1. Skull opened
= No signs of crack or fracture
= Hematoma parieto-accipital region (R&L)
2. Subdural hemorrhages
xxx xxx xxx
Abdomen
A. External = Stab wound about 1 inch long at the Rt. Hypochondrium
B. Internal
1. Penetrating the lower edge of the right lobe of liver 2 cm. thru & thru & also the left lobe of the
liver.
2. Perforating the hepatic flexure of the colon 2 cm. long
xxx xxx xxx
According to Dr. Luis Bergado, the stab wound could have been caused by a knife or sharp-pointed instruments,
while the other injuries could have been caused by severe blows from blunt instruments such as a piece of wood,
bare fists, or a stone. 38
On the other hand, Dela Cruz claimed that since he merely sustained a wound on his left thumb, he did not bother to
seek medical treatment. 39 This claim of injury, however, does not inspire belief. As correctly held by the trial court:

He merely reported the alleged wound to a Policeman of Diffun, Quirino. He could not remember
the Policeman to whom he reported. There was no medical certificate to prove the wound allegedly
sustained by him. During the trial when he testified, he tried to show to the Court a very insignificant
scar on the left hand between the thumb and the forefinger. The alleged scar, the Court observed,
is very insignificant and almost unnoticeable. It is not improbable that the scar might be the scar of
a self-inflicted wound. Again, the Court hardly believe (sic) this version.
3. The trial court was correct in holding that there existed a conspiracy among the accused-appellants.
Conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence but may be inferred and proven from the acts of the accused
themselves when said
acts point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest. 40 Otherwise stated, it may be
deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated.

41

The following established facts, as correctly summarized by the People in its Brief, establish beyond reasonable
doubt the presence of conspiracy:
1. The crime was committed at night time to facilitate its commission. The victim and his wife were
on their way home at 10:00 o'clock in the evening when they were accosted by the three accused
who were together (p. 7, tsn, Dec. 13, 1982).
2. Jesus dela Cruz, pretended to be friendly with Felipe Natura by greeting him. He then drew out
his scythe (kumpay) from his waist with which he hacked the victim while the other accused
Demerold Ayado tapped the victim's shoulder (pp. 8-9, tsn, Ibid.).
3. Then the three accused, acting in concert, mauled and stabbed the victim mercilessly (pp. 8-9,
tsn,Ibid.).
4. While the victim was being mauled, his wife began to plead for mercy, but instead, one of the
accused, Demerold Ayado, took hold of her dress and told her that he is going to kill her, and
because of this she ran away (p. 11, tsn, Ibid.).
5. While she was running, she was chased by Demerold Ayado, but she was able to evade him (p.
11, tsn, Ibid.).
6. Accused Demerold Ayado returned to the place where the victim was and joined his co-accused
in beating the victim.
7. The three accused then left together leaving behind them the dying victim (p. 12, tsn. Ibid.).
Thus, the convergence of wills of the accused-appellants in carrying out a common unlawful purpose amply justified
the imputation to all of them the act of any one of them. 42
The information alleges evident premeditation and treachery as the qualifying circumstances and superiority,
nighttime and disregard of age as generic aggravating circumstances.
The evidence for the prosecution is insufficient to establish the elements of evident premeditation, to wit: (a) the time
when the accused determined to commit the crime, (b) an act manifestly indicating that the accused had clung to his
felonious determination, and (c) a lapse of time between the determination and execution sufficient to allow the
accused to reflect upon the consequences of his act. 43
Treachery, however, was duly established.
Treachery is present when a crime against a person is committed employing means, methods or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the
defense which the offended party might make. 44 For treachery to be present, two (2) conditions must concur: (a) the
employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate, and (b) that said

means of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted. 45 As adverted to above, accused-appellant Dela Cruz initially
pretended to be friendly with the victim; he then suddenly grabbed the scythe from the victim's waist while accused-appellant Ayado
tapped the victim on his shoulder. Thereupon, they mauled and stabbed the victim. The friendly gesture was a clever ploy to gain
the trust of the victim, remove from his mind any suspicion as to the motive of the accused-appellants or make him feel secure in the
thought that nothing untoward would happen to him, and place him in utter helplessness and complete inability to prepare for any
defense or offer any resistance, thus insuring themselves against the possible risk of harm arising from any defense which the victim
may put up.

While indeed there was abuse of superior strength, this aggravating circumstance, should, however, be deemed
absorbed in treachery. 46 The same goes for the circumstance of nighttime. 47
The aggravating circumstance of disregard of age may not likewise be taken into account. Although at the time of his
death, the victim was 50 years old 48 and the accused-appellants Dela Cruz, Ayado and Ajedo were 29, 18 and 18 years of age,
respectively, 49 there is no sufficient evidence to prove that they deliberately intended to offend or insult the age of the victim. For this
aggravating circumstance to be appreciated, it is necessary that there be such a deliberate intent. 50

It follows, therefore, that no generic aggravating circumstances may be appreciated against the accused-appellants.
Upon the other hand, they failed to prove any mitigating circumstance.
The crime of murder is punished by reclusion temporal maximum to death. 51 There being no mitigating or aggravating
circumstances obtaining in this case, and following the doctrine enunciated in People vs. Muoz, 52 the medium of the penalty, which
is reclusion perpetua, should be imposed upon the accused appellants. 53 The trial court is correct in this regard. Per recent rulings
of this Court, the indemnity should, however, be increased to P50,000.00. 54

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, subject to the modification as to the indemnity
which is hereby increased from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00.
Costs against the accused-appellants.
SO ORDERED.
Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Romero, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.

Footnotes
1 Rollo, 11.
2 Id., 73.
3 Id., 82.
4 Id., 88.
5 Rollo, 12-67.
6 Original Records, 370.
7 Id., 371.
8 Id., 380.
9 Original Records, 389-392.

10 Rollo, 111.
11 Rollo, 59.
12 Id., 92; Appellants' Brief, A-B, 16, 19, 39 and 43.
13 Appellants' Brief, 18. Emphasis supplied.
14 Original Records, 379.
15 Id., 10 to 10-A.
16 Original Records, 373-374.
17 TSN-Magat, 11 April 1984, 2.
18 MORAN, M., Comments on the Rules of Court, vol, 4, 1980 ed., 340-341.
19 Original Records, 370.
20 People vs. Buyson Lampa, 58 Phil. 757 [1933]; Director of Prisons vs. Teodoro, 97 Phil. 391
[1955]; People vs. Villanueva, 17 SCRA 272 [1966]; Alama vs. Abbas, 18 SCRA 836 [1966];
Section 7, Rule 120, Rules of Court.
21 Evaristo vs. Lastrilla, 110 Phil. 181 [1960].
22 Section 2, Rule 125, in relation to Section 14, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court.
23 Section 12, Rule 122, Rules of Court.
24 People vs. Salazar, 58 SCRA 467 [1974]; People vs. Javier, 182 SCRA 830 [1990]; People vs.
Legaspi, 151 SCRA 670 [1987]; People vs. Atencio, 156 SCRA 242 [1987].
25 People vs. Baduya, 182 SCRA 57 [1990].
26 People vs. De la Cruz, 148 SCRA 582 [1987]; People vs. Javier, supra.; People vs. Francia, 154
SCRA 495 [1987], citing People vs. Martinez, 127 SCRA 260 [1984].
27 People vs. Boduso, 60 SCRA 60 [1974].
28 People vs. Umbrero, 196 SCRA 821 [1991].
29 185 SCRA 419 [1990].
30 Rollo, 59-61.
31 People vs. Esmael, 37 SCRA 601 [1971]; People vs. Mercado, 38 SCRA 168 [1971]; People vs.
Bagasala, 39 SCRA 236 [1971]; People vs. Catubig, 195 SCRA 505 [1991]; People vs. Cayago,
158 SCRA 586 [1988]; People vs. Mandapat, 196 SCRA 157 [1991].
32 People vs. Brioso, 37 SCRA 336 [1971]; People vs. Diaz, 55 SCRA 178 [1974]; People vs.
Ybaez, Jr., 56 SCRA 210 [1974]; People vs. Baylon, 57 SCRA 114 [1974]; People vs. Salazar, 58
SCRA 467 [1974]; People vs. Mandapat, supra.; People vs. De Guzman, 194 SCRA 618 [1991];
People vs. Catubig, supra.

33 People vs. Gadiana, 195 SCRA 211 [1991]; People vs. Maceda, 197 SCRA 499 [1991]; People
vs. Bayocot, 174 SCRA 285 [1989]; People vs. Acusar, 82 Phil. 490 [1948].
34 AQUINO, R.C., The Revised Penal Code, Vol. I, 1987 ed., 132, citing several cases.
35 Rollo, 63-65.
36 Article 11(1), Revised Penal Code.
37 Exhibit "D."
38 Decision of the trial court, 11-24; Rollo, 22-24.
39 Id., 64.
40 People vs. Lunar, 45 SCRA 119 [1972]; People vs. Custodio, 47 SCRA 289 [1972]; People vs.
Mori, 55 SCRA 382 [1974]; People vs. Cardenas, 56 SCRA 631 [1974].
41 People vs. Pudpud, 39 SCRA 618 [1971]; People vs. Alviar, 59 SCRA 136 [1974].
42 People vs. Peralta, 25 SCRA 759 [1968].
43 U.S. vs. Gil, 13 Phil. 530 [1909]; U.S. vs. Baagale, 24 Phil. 69 [1913]; People vs. Ardisa, 55
SCRA 245 [1974]; People vs. Obenque, 147 SCRA 488 [1987]; People vs. Manalo, 148 SCRA 98
[1987].
44 Section 16, Article 14, Revised Penal Code.
45 People vs. Mabubay, 185 SCRA 675 [1990].
46 People vs. Develos, 16 SCRA 46 [1966]; People vs. Agustin, 16 SCRA 467 [1966]; People vs.
Layson, 30 SCRA 92 [1969]; People vs. Abletes, 58 SCRA 241 [1974].
47 People vs. Pinca, 4 SCRA 574 [1962]; People vs. Gongora, 8 SCRA 472 [1963]; People vs.
Enot, 6 SCRA 325 [1962].
48 Exhibit "D"; Original Records, 4.
49 Id., 16-18.
50 AQUINO, op cit., 311, citing People vs. Mangsant, 65 Phil. 548 [1938]; People vs. Limaco, 88
Phil. 35 [1951].
51 Article 248, Revised Penal Code.
52 170 SCRA 107 (1989).
53 Article 64(1), Revised Penal Code.
54 People vs. Sison, 189 SCRA 643 [1990]; People vs. Sazon, 189 SCRA 700 [1990]; People vs.
Narit, 197 SCRA 334 [1991]; People vs. Tiozon, 198 SCRA 368 [1991]; People vs. Barba, G.R. No.
L-50433, 13 November 1991; People vs. Lee, G.R. No. 66848, 20 December 1991.