Ilusorio vs.

Bildner
332 SCRA 169
-May a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her
husband to live with her in conjugal bliss?
- Facts: Erlinda and Potenciano were married for 30
years. In 1972, the spouse separated from bed and board.
When Potenciano arrived from the States in 1991 he
stayed with Erlinda. The children alleged that Erlinda
gave Potenciano an overdose of antidepressant drug. On
May 31, 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in
Baguio City, Potenciano did not return to Antipolo City
with Erlinda, but instead stayed with a daughter at
Cleveland Condominium, Makati. The wife then filed a
petition for habeas corpus. Proper?
-No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel
a husband to live with his wife. Coverture cannot be
enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried
out by sheriff or by any other mesne process. That is a
matter beyond judicial authority and is best left to the
man and womans free choice.
ARCABA vs. TABANCURA, et al.
November 22, 2001
Facts: Francisco and his late wife were owners of a parcel
of land. As he was alone, he invited his niece, a cousin of the
niece, and Arcaba to stay with him at his house. Later on, the niece
and the cousin of the niece left Franciscos home leaving only
Francisco and Arcaba. Before his death Francisco donated a 150sq. meter lot to Arcaba. The heirs of Francisco are now questioning
the legality of the donation. Arcaba contended that the property
donated is payment for her past services rendered to the deceased.
She further contends that sexual intercourse is no longer possible
considering that Francisco is already old.
SC: -Cohabitation means more than sexual intercourse,
especially when one of the parties is already old and may
no longer be interested in sex.
At the very least,
cohabitation is the public assumption by a man and a
woman of the marital relation, and dwelling together as
man and wife, thereby holding themselves out to the
public as such.
-Their public conduct indicated that theirs was not just a
relationship of caregiver and patient but that of exclusive
partners akin to husband and wife. Thus, the donation
made by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Article
87 of the Family Code.
Ayala Investments vs. CA
286 SCRA 272
-The benefits must be one directly resulting from the loan.
It cannot merely be a by-product or a spin-off of the loan
itself.
-Benefits such as prospects of longer employment and
probably increase in the value of stocks might have been
already apparent or could be anticipated at the time the
accommodation agreement was entered into are not only
incidental but also speculative and too small to qualify the
transaction as one for the benefit of the suretys family.
-While the husband derives salaries, dividend benefits
from PBM (the debtor corporation), only because said
husband is an employee of said PBM. These salaries and
benefits are not the benefits contemplated by Articles
121 and 122 of the Family Code.
The benefits
contemplated by the exception in Art. 122 (Family Code)
are those benefits derived directly from the use of the
loan. In the case at bar, the loan is a corporate loan
extended to PBM and used by PBM itself, not by
petitioner-appellee-husband or his family.

CHING vs. COURT OF APPEALS

423 SCRA 357
Facts: On September 28, 1978, Philippine Blooming
Mills Company, Inc. (PBMCI) obtained a 9-million peso loan from
Allied Banking Corporation (ABC). As added security for the loan,
Alfredo Ching together with 2 other persons executed a continuing
guaranty with ABC binding themselves to jointly and severally
guarantee the payment of all the PBMCI obligations owing the
ABC to the extent of 38 million pesos. PBMCI defaulted in the
payment of its loans which, exclusive of interests, penalties and
other bank charges amounted to P12,612,972.88. After the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment the sheriff then levied
the 100,000 common shares of CityCorp. stocks registered solely
in the name of Alfredo Ching. The wife of Mr. Ching then moved
to set aside the levy on attachment claiming that the 100,000
shares of stocks were acquired by her and her husband during the
marriage out of conjugal funds after the CityCorp Investment
Philippines was established in 1974. Furthermore, the indebtedness
did not redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
Is the argument of Mrs. Ching tenable?
Ruling: The barefaced fact that the shares of stocks were
registered in the corporate books of CityCorp Investment solely in
the name of Alfredo does not constitute proof that the husband, not
the conjugal partnership, owned the same. It was, thus, the burden
of ABC to prove that the source of the money utilized in the
acquisition of the shares of stocks was that of the husband alone.
ABC failed to adduce evidence to prove this assertion. In AIDC vs.
CA, this Court ruled that the signing as a surety is certainly not an
exercise of an industry or profession. It is not embarking in a
business. No matter how often an executive acted on or was
persuaded to act as surety for his own employer, this should not be
taken to mean that he thereby embarked in the business of
guaranty or suretyship.
For the conjugal partnership to be liable for a liability that
should appertain to the husband alone, there must be a showing
that some advantages accrued to the spouses. No presumption can
be inferred that when a husband entered into an accommodation
agreement or a contract of surety, the conjugal partnership would
thereby be benefited.
It could be argued that Alfredo was a member of the
Board of Directors of PBMCI and was one of the top 20
stockholders, and that his shares of stocks and his family would
appreciate if the PBMCI could be rehabilitated through the loans
obtained; that Alfredos career would be enhanced should PBMCI
survive because of the infusion of fresh capital. However, these are
not the benefits contemplated by Article 161 of the Civil Code
(Article 121 FC). The benefits must be those directly resulting
from the loan. They cannot merely a by-product or a spin-off of the
loan itself (citing AIDC vs. CA).
FRANCISCO vs. GONZALES
565 SCRA 638 (September 17, 2008)
Estranged couple Cleodualdo and Michele, whose
marriage was later on voided, entered into a compromise
agreement involving their property covered by TCT No. T-167907
and located at 410 Taal St., Ayala Alabang Village where they
agreed that said conjugal property shall be transferred by way of a
deed of donation in favor of their 2 minor children when they
reach they reach 19 and 18, respectively. Meanwhile, Michele and
George Matrai were ordered by the court to vacate the premises
leased to them and to pay back rentals, unpaid telephone bills and
attorneys fees. A notice of sale by execution was then issued by
the sheriff covering the property in 410 Taal St., Ayala Alabang
that was still under the name of Cleodualdo and Michele.
SC: It should be noted that the judgment debt for which
the subject property was being made to answer was incurred by
Michele and her partner, Matrai. Gonzales alleged that the lease of
the property in Lanka Drive redounded to the benefit of the family.
By no stretch of ones imagination can it be concluded that the said
debt/obligation was incurred for the benefit of the conjugal

partnership or that some advantage accrued to the welfare to the

family.
A wife may bind the conjugal partnership only when she
purchases things necessary for the support of the family, or when
she borrows money for that purpose upon her husbands failure to
deliver the needed sum; when administration of the conjugal
partnership is transferred to the wife by the courts or by the
husband; or when the wife gives moderate donations for charity.
Failure to establish any of these circumstances means that the
conjugal asset may not be bound to answer for the wifes personal
obligation.
BUADO vs. CA and NICOL 586 SCRA 397 (April 24, 2009)
Erlinda Nicol was found guilty of slander and was also
adjudged to pay the sum of P35,000.00 representing moral and
exemplary damages, attorneys fees and cost. Erlindas property
however, was insufficient to answer for the liability so the sheriff
levied the conjugal property of the Nicol spouses. The husband
questioned the levy and the subsequent sale claiming that he is a
stranger to the suit and hence, levy upon the conjugal property was
improper.
SC: In Spouses Ching vs. CA, this Court that the husband
of the judgment debtor cannot be deemed a stranger to the case
prosecuted and adjudged against his wife for an obligation that has
redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. It must
further be settled whether the obligation of the judgment debtor
redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership or not.
Unlike in the system of absolute community property
where liabilities incurred by either spouse by reason of a crime or
quasi-delict is chargeable to the absolute community of property,
in the absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property of the
debtor-spouse, the same advantage is not accorded in the system of
conjugal partnership of gains. The conjugal partnership of gains
has no duty to make advance payments for the liability of the
debtor-spouse.
Parenthetically, by no stretch of imagination can it be
concluded that the civil obligation arising from the crime of
slander committed by Erlinda redounded to the benefit of the
conjugal partnership.
HEIRS OF REYES vs. MIJARES
410 SCRA 97
If the sale of the conjugal real property is annullable,
should it be annulled in its entirety or only with respect to the
share of the spouse who did not give consent?
-The SC citing Paulino vs. Bucoy (131 Phil 790) held that
the plain meaning attached to the plain language of the law is that
the contract, in its entirety, executed by the husband without the
wifes consent, may be annulled by the wife. Had Congress
intended to limit such annulment in so far as the contract shall
prejudice the wife, such limitation should have been spelled out
in the statute. To be underscored here is that upon the provisions of
Articles 161, 162 and 163 of the Civil Code, the conjugal
partnership is liable for many obligations while the conjugal
partnership exists. Not only that. The conjugal partnership is even
subject to the payment of debts contracted by either spouse before
the marriage, as those for the payment of fines and indemnities
imposed upon them after the responsibilities in Article 161 have
been covered, if it turns out that the spouse who is bound thereby,
should have no exclusive property or if it be insufficient. These
are the considerations that go beyond the mere equitable share of
the wife in the property. These are reasons enough for the husband
to be stopped from disposing of the conjugal property without the
consent of the wife. Even more fundamental is the fact that the
nullity is decreed by the Code not on the basis of prejudice but
lack of consent of an indispensable party to the contract under
Article 166.
A sale or encumbrance of conjugal or (community)
property concluded after the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988, is governed by Article 124 of the same Code that
now treats such a disposition as void if done without the conjoint

consent of the spouses or, in case of a spouses inability, the

authority of the court (footnote).
PELAYO vs. PEREZ
459 SCRA 475
In January 1988, Pelayo, by a deed of absolute sale,
conveyed to Perez 2 parcels of land situated in Panabo. Lorenza,
Pelayos wife, signed only on the 3rd page in the space provided for
witnesses on account of which Perez application for registration
of the deed with the office of the Register of Deeds in Tagum was
denied. Perez thereupon asked Lorenza to sign the 1st and 2nd
pages of the deed but she refused, hence, he instituted an action for
specific performance.
SC: We agree with the CA ruling that Lorenza by affixing
her signature to the Deed of Sale on the space provided for
witnesses, is deemed to have given her implied consent to the
contract of sale.
Sale is a consensual contract that is perfected by mere
consent, which may either be express or implied. A wifes consent
to the husbands disposition of conjugal property does not always
have to be explicit or set forth in any particular document, so long
as it is given. In the present case, although it appears on the face of
the deed of sale that Lorenza signed only as an instrumental
witness, circumstances leading to the execution of said document
point to the fact that Lorenza was fully aware of the sale of their
conjugal property and consented to the sale.
Moreover, under Article 173, in relation to Article 166,
both of the New Civil Code, which was still in effect on January
11, 1988 when the deed in question was executed, the lack of
marital consent to the disposition of conjugal property does not
make the contract void ab initio but merely voidable. Hence, it has
been held that the contract is valid until the court annuls the same
and only upon an action brought by the wife whose consent was
not obtained.
GUIANG vs. CA
291 SCRA 372
-Court applied Art. 124 of the Family Code.
-Any alienation or encumbrance made after August 3,
1988 when the Family Code took effect by the husband of
the conjugal partnership property without the consent of
the wife is null and void. Such contract is void as one of
the essential elements of a contract is absent.
- Neither can the amicable settlement be considered a
continuing offer that was accepted and perfected by the
parties, following the last sentence of Article 124. The
order of events is clear: after the sale, Guiang filed a
complaint for trespassing against Corpuz, after which
the barangay authorities secured an amicable
settlement. The settlement however, does not mention
a continuing offer to sell the property or an acceptance
of such a continuing offer. Its tenor was to the effect
that Corpuz would vacate the property. By no stretch of
the imagination, can the Court interpret this document
as the acceptance mentioned in Article 124.
HEIRS of AYUSTE vs. CA and MALABONGA
313 SCRA 493
-As the alienation was made prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code, the Court applied Art. 173 of the Civil
Code.
-Contract is voidable but spouse must bring the action for
annulment within 10 years from execution of the contract
and during the subsistence of the marriage.
MANALO vs. CAMAISA
374 SCRA 361
-Whether or not the husband may validly dispose a
conjugal property without the wifes written consent?
Facts: Manalo was interested to buy the Taytay and
Makati properties of spouses Camaisa. During the negotiations for

the sale of the parcels of land both spouses were present and that
Manalo and Mr. Camaisa came to an agreement as to the price and
the terms of the payment, and a down payment was made but the
wife of the vendor refused to sign the contracts to sell. Having
been aware of the transactions Manalo argues that Norma Camaisa
had consented to the transaction. And if she unjustly refused to
affix her signature to the contracts to sell, court authorization
under Article 124 of the Family Code is warranted.
Held: The law requires that the disposition of a conjugal property
by the husband as administrator in appropriate cases require the
written consent of the wife; otherwise, the disposition is void. The
properties, subject of the contracts were conjugal; hence, for the
contracts to sell to be effective, the consent of both husband and
wife must concur. Norma may have been aware of the negotiations
for the sale of their conjugal properties but being merely aware of
a transaction is not consent. While Manalo is correct insofar as she
alleges that if the written consent of the other spouse cannot be
obtained or is being withheld, the matter may be brought to court
which will give the same if warranted by the circumstances.
However, it should be stressed that court authorization under Art.
124 is only resorted to in cases where the spouse who does not
give consent is incapacitated. In this case Manalo failed to allege
and prove that Norma was incapacitated to give her consent to the
contracts. In the absence of such showing of the wifes incapacity,
court authorization cannot be sought.
Article 124 Administration of the conjugal partnership
property (00)
HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK vs. MIGUELA
C. DAILO
453 SCRA 283
Spouses Dailo purchased a house and lot situated
at San Pablo City and had it titled in the name of the
husband alone. In 1993, the husband obtained a
P300,000-peso loan from Homeowners secured by the
house and lot. With the loan unpaid, the bank foreclosed
the security. For failure to redeem, Homeowners
consolidated ownership over the property. In 1995, the
husband died and the wife found out about the mortgage,
foreclosure and consolidation. Claiming absence of
knowledge of the loan obligation, the wife filed an action
to annul the mortgage, certificate of sale, etc.
Homeowners moved for the dismissal of the petition on
the ground that the property is the exclusive property of
the husband having been titled in the husbands name
alone. That assuming that the property is conjugal, Article
124 of the FC should be construed in relation to Article
493 of the Civil Code on co-ownership where the coowner may alienate, assign or mortgage and even
substitute another person in its enjoyment but the effect of
the alienation or the mortgage shall be limited to the
portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon
termination of the co-ownership. Moreover, the loan
redounded to the benefit of the family as the proceeds
thereof were used to fund the husbands subdivision
projects.
Held: In Guiang vs. CA, it was held that the sale
of a conjugal property requires the consent of both the
husband and wife. In applying Article 124 of the Family
Code, this Court declared that the absence of the consent
of one renders the entire sale null and void, including the
portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the husband
who contracted the sale. The same principle squarely
applies to the instant case. In the absence of a marriage
settlement, the system of conjugal partnership of gains
governed the property relations between the spouses. The
rules on co-ownership do not even apply to the property
relations of Marcelino and Miguela even in a suppletory
manner. The conjugal partnership of gains is a special
type of partnership, where the husband and wife place in

a common fund the proceeds, products, fruits and income

from their separate properties and those acquired by either
or both spouses their efforts or by chance. Unlike the
absolute community of property wherein the rules on coownership apply in a suppletory manner, the conjugal
partnership shall be governed by the rules on partnership
in all that is not in conflict with what is expressly
determined in the chapter or by the spouses in their
marriage settlements.
The basic and established fact is that during his
lifetime, without the knowledge and consent of his wife,
Marcelino constituted a real estate mortgage on the
subject property, which formed part of their conjugal
partnership. By express provision of Article 124 of the
Family Code, in the absence of court authority or written
consent of the other spouse, any disposition or
encumbrance of the conjugal property is void. The
aforequoted provision does not qualify with respect to the
share of the spouse who makes the disposition or
encumbrance. Where the law does not distinguish, courts
should not distinguish.
The burden of proof that the debt was contracted
for the benefit of the conjugal partnership lies with the
creditor claiming as such. Petitioners sweeping
conclusion that the loan obtained by Marcelino to finance
the construction of housing units without a doubt
redounded to the benefit of his family is without adequate
proof. Other than petitioners bare allegation, there is
nothing from the records to compel a finding that, indeed,
the loan redounded to the benefit of the family.
REIMBURSEMENT RE: CONJUGAL FUNDS:
JOSEFA FERRER vs. SPS. MANUEL & VIRGINIA FERRER
and SPS. ISMAEL & FLORA FERRER
508 SCRA 570 (November 29, 2006)
Before his marriage to Josefa, Alfredo acquired a parcel
of land. Improvements introduced by Alfredo on the property
consisting of a residential house and a 2-door apartment building
were made during the marriage using their conjugal funds to pay
off the loan obtained by Alfredo for the construction of said
improvements. Subsequently, a warehouse was also constructed on
the lot using the spouses conjugal funds. Sometime in 1989, when
Alfredo was already bedridden, spouses Ismael and Flora Ferrer
made the former sign a document purported to be his last will and
testament. It turned out however, that it was a sale covering
Alfredos lot and the improvements thereon to the herein
respondents. Alfredo then instituted an action for the annulment of
the sale but the trial court held that the sale is valid and should be
complied with by the parties in good faith. The appellate court
upheld the decision of the lower court. Alfredo died in 1999 and
relying on the decision rendered in the previous case where the
court held that inasmuch as the lot is of greater value than the
improvements and since Article 120 of the Family Code provides
the rule that the ownership of accessory follows the ownership of
the principal, then the subject lot with all its improvements became
an exclusive and capital property of Alfredo with an obligation to
reimburse the conjugal partnership of the cost of improvements at
the time of the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, Josefa is
now demanding reimbursement for the cost of the improvements
from respondents.
SC: What is incontrovertible is that the respondents,
despite allegations contained in the complaint that they are the
buyers of the subject premises, are not petitioners spouse nor can
they ever be deemed as the owner-spouse upon whom the
obligation to reimburse petitioner for her costs rested. It is the
owner-spouse who has the obligation to reimburse the conjugal
partnership or the spouse who expended the acts or efforts, as the
case may be. Otherwise stated, respondents do not have the
obligation to respect petitioners right to be reimbursed.

ELENA MULLER vs. HELMUT MULLER

August 29, 2006
Elena and Helmut, a German national, were married in
1989 in Hamburg, Germany. They initially lived in Hamburg but
in 1992, the spouses decided to move and permanently reside in
the Philippines. Helmut sold the house he inherited from his
parents in Germany. With the money, he bought a P528,000.00 lot
in Antipolo and constructed a P2.3 million peso house thereon. The
Antipolo property was registered in Elenas name. The marriage
however, did not last due to Helmuts alleged womanizing,
drinking and maltreatment and eventually the spouses separated. In
1994, Helmut filed a petition for separation of properties. He
claims that he is not praying for the transfer of ownership of the
Antipolo property as he is aware of the constitutional prohibition
of aliens acquiring lands of the public domain but merely
reimbursement. That the property is titled in the name of Elena
because of said prohibition. That the funds paid by him for the said
property were in consideration of his marriage to Elena; that funds
were given to her in trust and equity demands that he should be
reimbursed of his personal funds.
Issue: Is respondent entitled to reimbursement of the
funds used for the acquisition of the Antipolo property?
SC: Aliens are disqualified from acquiring private lands.
The primary purpose of the constitutional provision is the
conservation of the national patrimony.
Respondent cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of
equity where it is clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the
property despite the constitutional prohibition. It has been held that
equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be
done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done
directly. He who seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes
into equity must come with clean hands.
Further, the distinctions between transfer of ownership as
opposed to recovery of funds is a futile exercise on respondents
part. To allow reimbursement would in effect permit respondent to
enjoy the fruits of a property that he is not allowed to own. Thus, it
is, likewise proscribed by law.
The CA erred in holding that an implied trust was created
and resulted by operation of law in view of Helmuts marriage to
Elena. Save for the exception provided in cases of hereditary
succession, Helmuts disqualification from owning lands in the
Philippines is absolute. Not even an ownership in trust is allowed.
Besides, where the purchase is made in violation of an existing
statute and in evasion of its express provision, no trust can result in
favor of the party who is guilty of fraud. To hold otherwise would
be to allow circumvention of the constitutional prohibition.
The Court decreed the separation of property between the
spouses and ordering partition of the personal properties located in
the Philippines only.
VIRGILIO MAQUILAN vs. DITA MAQUILAN
524 SCRA 166 (June 8, 2007)
Virgilio and Ditas marriage that was blessed with one
son turned sour when the former discovered that the latter was
having illicit sexual affair with her paramour, which resulted to the
conviction of Dita and her paramour of the crime of adultery.
Thereafter, Virgilio filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage, dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership of
gains. During the pre-trial of said case, they entered into a
Compromise Agreement as partial settlement of their conjugal
partnership property. This was given judicial imprimatur by the
judge hearing the case. In an omnibus motion however, Virgilio
prays for the repudiation of the compromise agreement on the
ground that it is against law and public policy; that the proceedings
where it was approved is null and void, there being no appearance
and participation of the Solicitor General or the Provincial
Prosecutor; that it was timely repudiated; and that respondent,
having been convicted of adultery, is therefore disqualified from
sharing in the conjugal property.
SC: Article 143 of the Family Code, separation of
property may be effected voluntarily or for sufficient cause,

subject to judicial approval. The questioned compromise

agreement that was judicially approved is exactly such a separation
of property allowed under the law. This conclusion holds true even
if the proceedings for the declaration of nullity of marriage was
still pending.
While the appearances of the Solicitor General and/or
Public Prosecutor are mandatory, the failure of the RTC to require
their appearance does not per se nullify the compromise
agreement. There is no exigency for the presence of the Solicitor
General and/or the State Prosecutor because nothing in the subject
compromise touched into the very merit of the case of declaration
of nullity of marriage for the court to be wary of any possible
collusion between the parties. The agreement pertains merely to an
agreement between petitioner and respondent Dita to separate their
conjugal properties partially without prejudice to the outcome of
the pending case.
The conviction of adultery does not carry with it the
penalty of civil interdiction that deprives the person of the rights to
manage to manage her property and to dispose of such property
inter vivos.
Valdes vs. RTC B. 102, Q.C., Gomez-Valdes
July 31, 1996
-Marriage was declared void under Art. 36.
-Property acquired during the union is governed by Art.
147. It applies when a man and a woman so exclusively
live together as husband and wife under a void marriage
or without the benefit of marriage.
-The term capacitated (1st par. of Art. 147) refers to the
legal capacity of a party to contract marriage, i.e. any
male or female of the age of 18 years or upwards not
under any of the impediment mentioned in Art. 37 and 38
of the Code.
-If the common-law spouses suffer from a legal
impediment to marry or when they do not live exclusively
with each other (as husband and wife), only the property
acquired by both of them through their actual joint
contribution of money, property or industry shall be
owned in common and in proportion to their respective
contributions.
-Art. 50 (Family Code) applying pars. (2), (3), (4) and 5
of Art. 43, relates only, by its explicit terms to voidable
marriages and, exceptionally, to void marriages under Art.
40 of the Code i.e. the declaration of nullity of a
subsequent marriage contracted by a spouse of a prior
void marriage before the latter is judicially declared void.
BUENAVENTURA vs. CA
March 31, 2005
Noel and Isabel got married in 1979. The marriage later
on was declared void by reason of Noels psychological incapacity.
The court, among others, ordered for the liquidation of the assets
of the conjugal partnership where the wife was given of Noels
retirement benefits with 12% int. from date of decision, and of
his outstanding shares of stocks with Manila Memorial Park and
the Provident Group of Companies. Noel opposed the sharing
claiming that the retirement benefits he received from Far East
Bank are gratuitous in nature and therefore, his exclusive property.
He likewise acquired the shares of stocks with the mentioned
companies before his marriage and are, again his exclusive
properties.
SC: Since the present case does not involve the
annulment of a bigamous marriage, the provisions of Article 50 in
relation to Articles 41, 42, and 43 of the Family Code, providing
dissolution of the absolute community or conjugal partnership, as
the case may be, do not apply. Rather, the general rules applies,
which is that in case a marriage is declared void ab initio, the
property regime applicable and to be liquidated, partitioned and
distributed is that of co-ownership. The trial court did not commit
a reversible ruling that petitioner and respondent own the family

home and all their common property in equal shares, as well as in

concluding that, in the liquidation and partition of the property
owned in common by them, the provisions on co-ownership under
the Civil Code, not Articles 50, 51 and 52, in relation to Articles
102 and 129, of the Family Code, should aptly prevail. The rules
set up to govern the liquidation of either the absolute community
or the conjugal partnership of gains, the property regimes
recognized for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case until
the contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the liquidation of the coownership that exists between common law spouses.
Unlike the conjugal partnership of gains, the fruits of the
couples separate property are not included in the co-ownership.
Since the properties to be distributed by the court a quo were
found, both by the trial and appellate courts, to have been acquired
during the union of the parties, the same would be covered by the
co-ownership. No fruits of a separate property of one of the parties
appear to have been included or involved in the distribution. The
liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties owned by
the parties herein ordered by the court a quo should, therefore, be
sustained, but on the basis of co-ownership and not the regime of
conjugal partnership of gains.

The law is clear. In the absence, as here, of proofs to the

contrary, any property acquired by common-law spouses during
the period of cohabitation is presumed to have been obtained thru
their joint efforts, work or industry and is owned by them in equal
shares. Their property relationship is governed by the rules in coownership. And under this regime, they owned their properties in
common in equal shares. Being herself a co-owner of the
structure in question, Juliet, as correctly stated by the CA, may not
be ejected therefrom.
True, under Article 487 of the Civil Code, a co-owner
may bring an action for ejectment against a co-owner who takes
exclusive possession and asserts exclusive ownership of a common
property. In this case, evidence is totally wanting to establish
Johns or Juliets exclusive ownership of the property in question.
As borne by the record, Juliet was in possession of the subject
structure by virtue of being a co-owner thereof. As such, she is as
much entitled to enjoy its possession and ownership as John.
Juliets failure however, to pay the balance of Johns
share in their common properties could at best give rise to an
action for a sum of money against Juliet, or for rescission of the
said agreement and not for ejectment.

JOHN ABING vs. JULIET WAEYAN

July 31, 2006
In 1986, Juliet and John decided to live together as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. During the
cohabitation, they purchased a 2-storey house where the tax
declaration was transferred in the name of Juliet. The house was
renovated as annexed to it is a new structure that housed a sarisari store. In 1991, Juliet went to Korea and while there she would
send money to John who would deposit it in their joint bank
account. When she returned from Korea, they continued to live
together, with John working as an employee of Lepanto Mines and
Juliet managing the store.
In 1995, they partitioned their
properties and executed a Memorandum of Agreement that was
unsigned by the parties but signed by their witnesses where it was
agreed that John shall leave the house with Juliet paying him the
amount of P428,870.00 representing Johns share in the properties.
Juliet made a down payment of P232,397.66 with the balance to be
paid in 12 monthly installments. She failed however, to make good
the balance so John demanded that she vacate the annex. When she
refused John filed an ejectment suit against Juliet claiming that he
alone spent for the construction of the annex using his own funds
with the tax declaration for the structure under his name and thru
money he borrowed from his relatives as proofs. The proof of
indebtedness is a 1990 affidavit of one Macaraeg who stated that
John borrowed P30,000.00 from him. The MTC found for John
which decision was affirmed by the RTC. The CA however,
reversed the ruling of lower courts holding that their property
relations cannot be governed by the provisions of the Civil Code
but by the rules on co-ownership. John went to the SC.
Issue: Whether or not the property subject of the suit
pertains to the exclusive ownership of John.
SC: Other than Johns bare allegation that he alone, thru
his own funds and money he borrowed form his relatives, spent for
the construction of the annex, evidence is wanting to support such
naked claim. For sure, John failed to reveal how much he spent
therefore. Neither did he divulge the names of the alleged relatives
from whom he made his borrowings, let alone the amount of
money he borrowed from them. All he could offer by way of
reinforcing his claim is the affidavit of Macaraeg but the affidavit
stated that it was in 1990 when John borrowed P30,000.00 from
him. The annex structure was constructed in 1992 or 2 years after
he borrowed the P30,000 from Macaraeg. There is a paucity of
evidence, testimonial or documentary, to support Johns selfserving allegation that the annex structure was put up thru his own
funds and/or money borrowed by him. Tax declarations do not
prove ownership but at best an indicia of claims of ownership.
In this connection Article 147 of the Family Code is
instructive. (Cite Article 147 in toto).

Agapay vs. Palang

July 28, 1997
-Petitioner failed to prove that she contributed money to
the price of the riceland.
-The lawyer who prepared the deed of conveyance of the
house and lot testified that the money for the purchase
price was provided for by Miguel and he also directed
that Erlindas name alone be placed as the vendee.
-SC also cited Article 87 of the Family Code.
Tumlos vs. Fernandez
330 SCRA 718
-Applicable law is Art. 148 of the Family Code.
-Art. 144 of the Civil Code applies only to a relationship
between a man and a woman who are not incapacitated to
marry each other, or to one in which the marriage of the
parties is void from the beginning. It does not apply to a
cohabitation that amounts to adultery or concubinage.
-Article 148 of the Family Code has filled the hiatus in
Art. 144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the
property relations of couples living in a state of adultery
or concubinage.
-Nothing in Art. 148 of the Family Code provides that the
administration of the property amounts to a contribution
in its acquisition.
Mallilin, Jr. vs. Castillo
333 SCRA 628
Both parties were already married when they cohabited
together. During the relationship they established a business
enterprise and by reason thereof acquired several properties. The
properties however, were all registered in the name of Castillo.
When they decided to end the relationship, Mallilin demanded for
his share in the properties they acquired during the cohabitation.
Castillo countered that Article 144 of the Civil Code cannot be
applied as the same covers only properties acquired by a man and
a woman living together as husband and wife but not married or
under a void marriage. In their case, their union suffered the legal
impediment of a prior subsisting marriage.
SC: Art. 148 of the Family Code now provides for a
limited co-ownership in cases where the parties in union are
incapacitated to marry each other.
- It applies as all but one property were acquired after the
Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. With respect to the
property acquired under the regime of the New Civil Code, then it
should be excluded. The legal relation of the parties is already
specifically covered by Article 148 of the Family Code under
which all properties acquired out of their actual joint contribution
of money, property or industry shall constitute a co-ownership.

-Co-ownership is a form of trust and every co-owner is a

trustee for the other.
-A trust relation already inheres in a co-ownership.
Carino vs. Carino
February 2, 2001
- The nullity of the marriage between Nicdao
(the first wife) and the deceased does not
validate the second marriage of Yee and the
deceased Santiago without the prior judicial
declaration of nullity of the previous marriage.
- Considering that the marriage between Yee and
the deceased is a bigamous marriage, having
been solemnized during the subsistence of
previous marriage then presumed to be valid,
the application of Article 148 is therefore in
order.
- As to the property regime of Nicdao and the
deceased, Article 147 of the Family Code
governs. This Article applies to unions of
parties who are legally capacitated and not
barred by any impediment to contract marriage,
but whose marriage is nonetheless is void for
other reasons, like the absence of marriage
license. Conformably, even if the deceased
alone as a government employee earned the
disputed death benefits, Article 147 creates a
co-ownership in respect thereto entitling
Nicdao to share one-half thereof as there is no
allegation of bad faith.
JACINTO SAGUID vs. CA
June 10, 2003
-Under the property regime governed by Art. 148 x x x x
only the properties acquired by both of the parties through
their actual joint contribution of money, property, or
industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion
to their respective contributions x x x x. Proof of actual
contribution is required.
- In the case at bar, nowhere in Ginas testimony did she
specify
the
extent
of
her
contribution. What appears in the record are receipts in
her name for the purchase of construction materials on
11/17/95 and 12/23/95 in the amount of P11,413.00. With
respect to the disputed personal properties both claimed
that the money used in the purchase thereof came partly
from their joint account. There is however, no sufficient
proof of the exact amount of their respective shares in the
said account. And pursuant to Article 148 of the Family
Code, in the absence of proof of extent of the parties
respective contribution, their share shall be presumed to
be equal. Here, the disputed properties were valued at
P111,375.00, the existence and value of which were not
questioned by Jacinto, hence, their share therein is
equivalent to , P55,687.50 each. And on the basis of the
evidence established, the extent of Ginas co-ownership
over the disputed house is only up to the amount of
P11,413.00 her proven contribution in the construction
thereof.
-In Adriano vs. CA, the SC ruled that the fact that the
controverted property was titled in the name of the parties
to an adulterous relationship is not sufficient proof of coownership absent evidence of actual contribution in the
acquisition of the property.
LUPO ATIENZA vs. YOLANDA DE CASTRO
508 SCRA 593 (November 29, 2006)
Lupo, married and the president and general manager of 2
corporations, hired the services of Yolanda as accountant thereof.
The 2 became intimate and eventually lived together and had 2

children. The relationship turned sour and they parted ways. Lupo
then filed a petition for judicial partition involving a parcel of land
with improvements located in Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati City.
He alleged that the property was acquired during their union and
hence, the property is co-owned by them. He claimed that the
funds used in the acquisition of the said property were his
exclusive funds and that the title was transferred to Yolandas
name alone was done without his knowledge and consent. And
since the property was acquired in 1987, therefore Article 144 of
the Civil Code should be applied. That he is not burdened to prove
that he contributed to the acquisition thereof because with or
without contribution by either partner, he is deemed a co-owner of
the subject property. He added that Article 484 of the Civil Code
states that as long as the property was acquired by either or both of
them during their extramarital union, such property would be
legally owned by them in common and governed by the rules on
co-ownership, which shall apply in default of contracts or special
provisions.
SC: Here although the adulterous relationship
commenced in 1983, Article 148 of the Family Code applies
because this provision is intended to fill up the hiatus/gap in
Article 144 of the Civil Code. Before Article 148 of the FC was
enacted, there was no provision governing property property
relations of couples living in a state of adultery or concubinage.
Hence, even if the cohabitation or the acquisition of the property
occurred before the FC took effect, Article 148 of the FC governs.
Rather than presenting proof of his actual contribution to
the purchase used as consideration for the property, Lupo diverted
the burden upon him to Yolanda as a shrewd and scheming woman
without capacity to purchase any property. Petitioners claim of
ownership is without basis because not only did he fail to
substantiate his allege contribution but likewise the very trail of
documents pertaining to its purchase as evidentiary proof redounds
to the benefit of respondent. In contrast, aside from his mere say so
and voluminous bank records, which sadly finds no relevance in
this case, the petitioner failed to overcome his burden of proof.
Respondent had sufficiently established that she derived
funds used to purchase the property from her earnings, not only as
an accountant but also as a businesswoman engaged in foreign
currency trading, money lending and jewelry retail. She presented
clientele and promissory notes evincing substantial dealings with
her clients, her bank account statements and bank transactions.
BORROMEO vs. DESCALLAR
580 SCRA 175
(February 24, 2009)
Austrian Jambrich met and fell in love with Descallar, a
married but separated woman, who was working as waitress at a
local hotel in Cebu City. She was earning P1,000.00 per month and
another P1,000.00 in the form of tips. Subsequently, they bought 3
parcels of land with a house constructed thereon. The deed of sale
originally included Jambrich as buyer but because of the refusal of
the Register of Deeds to register the property in Jambrichs name
on the ground that a foreigner could not acquire alienable lands of
public domain they erased his name but not his signatures
appearing in all pages of the document. Jambrich and Descallar
however, separated.
Subsequently, Jambrich incurred debts and to pay the
obligation, he sold his rights and interest in the property that is
now registered in Descallars name in favor of his creditor. Is the
sale made by Jambrich valid?
SC: The transfer of land from Agro-Macro Development
Corporation to Jambrich could have been declared invalid if
challenged, had not Jambrich conveyed the property to Borromeo.
Citing United Church of Christ vs. Sebastian, the Court reiterated
the consistent ruling that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien
who subsequently becomes a Filipino citizen or transfers it to a
Filipino, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured
and the title of the transferee is considered valid.