PINOTE vs AYCO

Facts: Judge Ayco allowed the defense in People vs Vice Mayor Salvador to present
evidence consisting of the testimony of two witnesses even in the absence of State
Prosecutor Pinote who was prosecuting the case.
Pinote was undergoing medical treatment at the Philippine Heart Center hence his
absence. On the subsequent hearings, he refused to cross-examine the two defense
witnesses despite being ordered by the judge, he maintaining that the bbproceedings
conducted in his absence were void.
Judge considered the prosecution to have waived it right to cross examine. Hence, an
administrative complaint was lodged by Pinote against Ayco.
R: considering the prosecution to have waived presenting evidence, respondent
justifies the same on complainants failure to formally offer the evidence for the
prosecution despite several extensions of time granted for the purpose. No
substantial prejudice was suffered by the prosecution for complainant was permitted
to cross examine the two defense witnesses but he refused to do so.
Office of the Court Administrator: finds respondent to have breached Section 5,
Rule 110 of the Revised Rule on Criminal Procedure and accordingly recommends
that he be reprimanded therefor, with warning that a repetition of the same or similar
act shall be dealt with more severely.
Thus, as a general rule, all criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the control and
direction of the public prosecutor.
Violation of criminal laws is an affront to the People of the Philippines as a whole and
not merely to the person directly prejudiced, he being merely the complaining witness.
It is on this account that the presence of a public prosecutor in the trial of criminal
cases is necessary to protect vital state interests, foremost of which is its interest to
vindicate the rule of law, the bedrock of peace of the people.
Respondents act of allowing the presentation of the defense witnesses in the
absence of complainant public prosecutor or a private prosecutor designated for the
purpose is thus a clear transgression of the Rules which could not be rectified by
subsequently giving the prosecution a chance to cross-examine the witnesses.
Respondents intention to uphold the right of the accused to a speedy disposition of
the case, no matter how noble it may be, cannot justify a breach of the Rules. If the
accused is entitled to due process, so is the State.

BRILLANTE vs. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts: Roberto Brillante, then a candidate for the position of councillor in Makati City
held a pres conference where he accused Jejomar Binay, a candidate for mayoralty in
Makati, and Nemesio Prudente of plotting an assassination plot against Augusto
Syjuco, another mayoral candidate in Makati. Several journalists wrote articles
regarding the same and an open letter was published as well. Later, Binay and
Prudente both filed libel charges against Brillante. The trial court found Brillante guilty
of four counts of libel, which decision the CA affirmed.
Issue: Whether or not the act of libel charged against petitioner has prescribed when
the Information was filed before the trial court
Ruling: No. Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the crime of libel shall
prescribe within one year. In determining when the one year prescriptive period
should be reckoned, reference must be made to Article 91 of the same code which
sets forth the rule on the computation of prescriptive periods of offenses which states
that period of prescription shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or
information. In the case, a proceeding in the Fiscal's Office may terminate without
conviction or acquittal.
Luz M. Zaldivia v. Hon. Andres B. Reyes, Jr.
Facts: Petitioner Zaldivia is charged with quarrying for commercial purposes without a
mayor's permit in the municipality of Rodriguez, Province of Rizal.
She moved to quash the information on the ground that the crime had prescribed but
it was denied. She appealed to the RTC and denial was sustained by the respondent
judge.
Petitioner filed for a petition for review on certiorari arguing that the case filed against
her is govern by the provisions on the Rules of Summary Procedure. She contends
that criminal cases like violations of municipal or city ordinances does not require
preliminary investigation and shall be filed directly to the court and not in the
Prosecutor's office. She also invoked Act No. 3226 An Act to Establish Periods of
Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to
Provide when Prescription Shall Begin to Run. Concluding that the case should have
been dismissed since the case against her was being filed in court way beyond the 2
month statutory period.
The prosecution contends that when the case was filed on the Prosecutor's office it
suspends the prescriptive period.
Issue: Whether or not the prescription of period ceased to run when the case was
filed on the prosecutor's office?
Decision: Petition granted. Case dismissed on the ground of prescription.
Ruling: As a general rule, the filing of the case in the prosecutor's office is sufficient to
interrupt the running of the prescriptive period except when the case is covered by the
Rules on Summary Procedure. If it is any crime, you file it in the fiscal's office; the
running of the prescriptive period is interrupted. But in the case at bar having only a
penalty of arresto menor it therefore falls under the provisions of the Rules on
Summary Procedure. If it is covered by the Summary Rules, the period continues. It
must be the filing of the case in court which will interrupt the period from running.

***
Facts:

Petitioner Zaldivia is charged with quarrying for commercial purposes without

a mayor's permit in the municipality of Rodriguez, Province of Rizal.
She moved to quash the information on the ground that the crime had
prescribed but it was denied. She appealed to the RTC and denial was sustained by
the respondent judge.
Petitioner filed for a petition for review on certiorari arguing that the case filed
against her is govern by the provisions on the Rules of Summary Procedure. She
contends that criminal cases like violations of municipal or city ordinances does not
require preliminary investigation and shall be filed directly to the court and not in the
Prosecutors office. She also invoked Act No. 3226 An Act to Establish Periods of
Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to
Provide when Prescription Shall Begin to Run. Concluding that the case should have
been dismissed since the case against her was being filed in court way beyond the 2
month statutory period.
The prosecution contends that when the case was filed on the Prosecutors
office it suspends the prescriptive period.
Issue: Whether or not the prescription of period ceased to run when the case was
filed on the prosecutors office?
Decision: Petition granted. Case dismissed on the ground of prescription.

Facts: Isabelita Reodica was allegedly recklessly driving a van and hit Bonsol
causing him physical injuries and damage to property amounting to P 8,542.00. Three
days after the accident a complaint was filed before the fiscals office against the
petitioner. She was charged of"Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to
Property with Slight Physical Injury." After pleading not guilty trial ensued. RTC of
Makati rendered the decision convicting petitioner of "quasi offense of reckless
imprudence, resulting in damage to property with slight physical injuries"
with arresto mayor of 6 months imprisonment and a fine of P 13,542.00. Petitioner
made an appeal before the CA which re-affirmed the lower courts decision. In its
motion for reconsideration, petitioner now assails that
1. the court erred in giving its penalty on complex damage to property and
slight physical injuries both being light offenses over which the RTC has no
jurisdiction and it cant impose penalty in excess to what the law authorizes.
2. reversal of decision is still possible on ground of prescription or lack of
jurisdiction.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the penalty imposed is correct.
2. Whether or not reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property and
reckless imprudence resulting to slight physical injuries are light felonies.
3. Whether or not there is a complex crime applying Article 48 of the RPC.
4. Whether or not the duplicity of the information may be questioned for the first
time on appeal.
5. Whether or not the RTC of Makati has jurisdiction over the case.
6. Whether the quasi offenses already prescribed.
Held:

Ruling:As a general rule, the filing of the case in the prosecutors office is sufficient to
interrupt the running of the prescriptive period except when the case is covered by the
Rules on Summary Procedure. If it is any crime, you file it in the fiscals office; the
running of the prescriptive period is interrupted. But in the case at bar having only a
penalty of arresto menor it therefore falls under the provisions of the Rules on
Summary Procedure. If it is covered by the Summary Rules, the period continues. It
must be the filing of the case in court which will interrupt the period from running.
Issue: Whether or not the filing of information/complaint before the fiscal office
constituting a violation against a special law/ordinanceinterrupts prescription.
Held: The mere filing of complaint to the fiscals office does not interrupt the running
of prescription on offenses punishable by a special law. The complaint should have
been filed within a reasonable time before the court. It is only then that the running of
the prescriptiveperiod is interrupted.
**Act 3326 is the governing law on prescription of crimes punishable by a special law
which states that prescription is only interrupted upon judicial proceeding.

1. On penalty imposed
The proper penalty for reckless imprudence resulting to slight physical injury
is public censure (being the penalty next lower in degree to arresto menor see the
exception in the sixth paragraph of Article 365 applies).
The proper penalty
property amounting to
and medium periods.

for reckless imprudence resulting to damage to

8,542.00 would be arresto mayor in minimum

2. Classification of each felony involved

Reckless imprudence resulting to slight physical injuries is a light
felony. Public censure is classified under article 25 of RPC as a light penalty and it
belongs on the graduated scale in Article 71 of the RPC as a penalty next lower to
arresto menor.
Reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property is punishable by a correctional
penalty of arresto mayor and thus belongs to less grave felony and not as a light
felony as claimed by petitioner.

Reodica v CA
3. Rule on complex crime

Art. 48 on penalty for complex crime provides that when a single act constitutes two
or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is necessary a means for
committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the
same to be applied in its maximum period. Both offenses cannot constitute a complex
crime because reckless imprudence resulting to slight physical injuries is not either a
grave or less grave felony. Therefore each felony should be filed as a separate
complaint subject to distinct penalties.

IVLER vs. SAN PEDRO

The petition seeks the review of the Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City
affirming sub-silencio a lower courts ruling finding inapplicable the Double Jeopardy
Clause to bar a second prosecution for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide
and Damage to Property. This, despite the accuseds previous conviction for
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries arising from the same
incident grounding the second prosecution.

4. Right to assail duplicity of information

Facts:

Rule 120, section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that when two or more offenses are
charged in a single complaint and the accused fails to object against it before the trial,
the court may convict the accuse to as many offenses as charged and impose a
penalty for each of them. Complainant failed to make the objection before the trial
therefore the right to object has been waived.

Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler (petitioner) was
charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City (MeTC), with two separate
offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries
sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and (2) Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for the death of
respondent Ponces husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponces
vehicle.

5. Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction of the court is determined by the duration of the penalty and the fine
imposed as prescribed by law to the offense charged. Reckless imprudence resulting
to slight physical injuries and reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property is
within the jurisdiction of the MTC.
The case was dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction of the RTC of Makati and the
decision of the CA was set aside.
Court Ruling on Zaldivia v Reyes and Reodica v CA on Prescription:
1. Zaldivia v Reyes involves a violation of an ordinance while in Reodica v CA the
violation was against the RPC.
2. Filing of a complaint in the fiscals office involving a felony under the RPC is
sufficient to interrupt the running of prescription. But filing a complaint under the
fiscals office involving offenses punished by a special law (i.e. ordinance) does not
interrupt the running of prescription. Act 3326 is the governing law on prescriptions of
crimes punishable by a special law which states that prescription is only interrupted
upon judicial proceeding.

Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases.

On 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge on the first delict and was meted out
the penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the
Information for the second delict for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for
the same offense of reckless imprudence.
The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.
The petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (RTC), in a
petition for certiorari while Ivler sought from the MeTC the suspension of proceedings
in criminal case, including the arraignment his arraignment as a prejudicial question.
Without acting on petitioners motion, the MeTC proceeded with the arraignment and,
because of petitioners absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest.
Seven days later, the MeTC issued a resolution denying petitioners motion to
suspend proceedings and postponing his arraignment until after his arrest.Petitioner
sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the motion remained
unresolved.
Issues:
(1) Whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief from his petition for
certiorari when the MeTC ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the
arraignment in Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries
sustained by respondent; and
(2) Whether petitioners constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars
further proceedings in Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to
Property for the death of respondent Ponces husband.

Ruling:
On Petition for Certiorari
The RTC dismissed Ivlers petition for certiorari, narrowly grounding its ruling on
petitioners forfeiture of standing to maintain said petition arising from the MeTCs
order to arrest petitioner for his non-appearance at the arraignment in the second
offense. Thus, without reaching the merits of the said petition, the RTC effectively
affirmed the MeTC. Petitioner sought reconsideration but this proved unavailing.
Respondent Ponce finds no reason for the Court to disturb the RTCs decision
forfeiting petitioners standing to maintain his petition in S.C.A. 2803. On the merits,
respondent Ponce calls the Courts attention to jurisprudence holding that light
offenses (e.g. slight physical injuries) cannot be complexed under Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code with grave or less grave felonies (e.g. homicide). Hence, the
prosecution was obliged to separate the charge in Criminal Case No. 82366 for the
slight physical injuries from Criminal Case No. 82367 for the homicide and damage to
property.
In the Resolution of 6 June 2007, the Court granted the Office of the Solicitor
Generals motion not to file a comment to the petition as the public respondent judge
is merely a nominal party and private respondent is represented by counsel.
Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellants escape from custody or violation of
the terms of his bail bond are governed by the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule
124, in relation to Section 1, Rule 125, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
authorizing this Court or the Court of Appeals to "also, upon motion of the appellee or
motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or confinement,
jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal." The
"appeal" contemplated in Section 8 of Rule 124 is a suit to review judgments of
convictions.
On Double Jeopardy
The accuseds negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense" protects him from, among others, post-conviction
prosecution for the same offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction upon a valid information.
Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern the same
offense of reckless imprudence. The MeTC ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate offense from
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property "as the [latter]
requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not."
The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted
under the same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article
365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable. Indeed, the notion that
quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime, separately
defined and penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing new.

The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by
itself and not merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal
of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense,
regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded this Courts unbroken chain of
jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to Article 365.
These cases uniformly barred the second prosecutions as constitutionally
impermissible under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and
simpler protection of their constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
True, they are thereby denied the beneficent effect of the favorable sentencing
formula under Article 48, but any disadvantage thus caused is more than
compensated by the certainty of non-prosecution for quasi-crime effects qualifying as
"light offenses" (or, as here, for the more serious consequence prosecuted belatedly).
If it is so minded, Congress can re-craft Article 365 by extending to quasi-crimes the
sentencing formula of Article 48 so that only the most severe penalty shall be
imposed under a single prosecution of all resulting acts, whether penalized as grave,
less grave or light offenses. This will still keep intact the distinct concept of quasioffenses. Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties under Article 365, befitting
crimes occupying a lower rung of culpability, should cushion the effect of this ruling.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the Orders dated 2 February
2006 and 2 May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157. We
DISMISS the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 against petitioner Jason Ivler y
Aguilar pending with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 on the
ground of double jeopardy.

***
FACTS:
Following a vehicular collision in August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler
(petitioner) was charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City (MTC), with
two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries
for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and
(2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for the
death of respondent Ponces husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses
Ponces vehicle.
Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases. On 2004,
petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge on the first delict and was meted out the
penalty of public censure. Invoking this conviction, petitioner moved to quash the
Information for the second delict for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for
the same offense of reckless imprudence.
The MTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases.

The petitioner elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City
(RTC), in a petition for certiorari while Ivler sought from the MTC the suspension of
proceedings in criminal case, including the arraignment his arraignment as a
prejudicial question.
Without acting on petitioners motion, the MTC proceeded with the
arraignment and, because of petitioners absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his
arrest.
Seven days later, the MTC issued a resolution denying petitioners motion to
suspend proceedings and postponing his arraignment until after his arrest. Petitioner
sought reconsideration but as of the filing of this petition, the motion remained
unresolved.
ISSUES:
1. Whether petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief from his petition for
certiorari when the MTC ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the
arraignment in Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries for injuries
sustained by respondent; and
2. Whether petitioners constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy
Clause bars further proceedings in Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and
Damage to Property for the death of respondent Ponces husband.
RULING:
The accused negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense" protects him from, among others, post-conviction
prosecution for the same offense, with the prior verdict rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction upon a valid information.
Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern
the same offense of reckless imprudence. The MTC ruled otherwise, finding that
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate
offense from Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property
"as the [latter] requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not."

The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were
prosecuted under the same provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses.
The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable. Indeed, the
notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime,
separately defined and penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing
new.
The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasioffense by itself and not merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction
or acquittal of such quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasioffense, regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded this Courts unbroken
chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to Article 365.
These cases uniformly barred the second prosecutions as constitutionally
impermissible under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a
stronger and simpler protection of their constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy
Clause. True, they are thereby denied the beneficent effect of the favorable
sentencing formula under Article 48, but any disadvantage thus caused is more than
compensated by the certainty of non-prosecution for quasi-crime effects qualifying as
"light offenses" (or, as here, for the more serious consequence prosecuted belatedly).
If it is so minded, Congress can re-craft Article 365 by extending to quasi-crimes the
sentencing formula of Article 48 so that only the most severe penalty shall be
imposed under a single prosecution of all resulting acts, whether penalized as grave,
less grave or light offenses. This will still keep intact the distinct concept of quasioffenses. Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties under Article 365, befitting
crimes occupying a lower rung of culpability, should cushion the effect of this ruling.
Petition granted.