20150820-ADDRESS To The COURT-In The Matter Buloke Shire Council V Schorel-Hlavka

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ADDRESS TO THE COURT

Magistrates Court of Victoria
AT: St Arnaud ( or alternative court location)
IN THE MATTER:
Buloke Shire Council v Schorel-Hlavka
Hearing date 20-8-2015
Sir/Madam,
I object to the jurisdiction of this court, as I indicated to Buloke Shire Council.
As I have encountered in the past judicial officers who failed to understand/comprehend the legal
processes involved in an OBJECTION TO JURISDICTIONI I will attempt to explain this.
.
In 1988 I relied upon a Supreme Court of Victoria decision that my then 2 year old daughter had
been wrongly arrested by Warrant, which the court held was in violation to the existing Supreme
Court of Victoria orders, as to sue the State of Victoria. At the hearing however counsel for the
State of Victoria suddenly stated to object to the jurisdiction of the court. His Honour explained I
had to prove jurisdiction failing this the case would go no further. I outlined the Courts previous
findings, the relevant State laws I relied upon, etc. His Honour however held that I failed to prove
the legislation was validly gazette, etc, and as such dismissed my case for want of jurisdiction. His
Honour did make known that he could understand I would not be too pleased with this, but counsel
didnt have to disprove jurisdiction as merely to object to the jurisdiction was placing the onus upon
me to prove jurisdiction. Until that time I had been researching the Commonwealth of Australia
Constitution Act 1900 (UK) but now found myself confronted with what is referred to as the
Victorian Constitution Act 1975.
I accepted that His Honour facing an OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION was bound by law to
deal with this matter first as to determine if the court had jurisdiction before it could consider any
other matter.
I decided to research the Victorian Constitution Act 1975 and to my horror discovered it was named
Victorian Constitution Act 1975 was not a constitution at all. It is merely an act of Parliament.
And this is where my knowledge regarding the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900
(UK) is so important. This because the Framers of the constitution having provided for that the
Colonies upon federation would become States embedded the legal principle:
HANSARD 10-03-1891 Constitution Convention Debates
QUOTE
Dr. COCKBURN: All our experience hitherto has been under the condition of parliamentary
sovereignty. Parliament has been the supreme body. But when we embark on federation we throw
parliamentary sovereignty overboard. Parliament is no longer supreme. Our parliaments at present are
not only legislative, but constituent bodies. They have not only the power of legislation, but the power of
amending their constitutions. That must disappear at once on the abolition of parliamentary sovereignty.
No parliament under a federation can be a constituent body; it will cease to have the power of changing its
constitution at its own will. Again, instead of parliament being supreme, the parliaments of a federation
are coordinate bodies-the main power is split up, instead of being vested in one body. More than all that,
there is this difference: When parliamentary sovereignty is dispensed with, instead of there being a high
court of parliament, you bring into existence a powerful judiciary which towers above all powers,
legislative and executive, and which is the sole arbiter and interpreter of the constitution.
END QUOTE
Hansard 1-3-1898 Constitution Convention Debates (Official Record of the Debates of the National Australasian
Convention)
QUOTE
Mr. GORDON.-Well, I think not. I am sure that if the honorable member applies his mind to the subject he
will see it is not abstruse. If a statute of either the Federal or the states Parliament be taken into court the
court is bound to give an interpretation according to the strict hyper-refinements of the law. It may be a
good law passed by "the sovereign will of the people," although that latter phrase is a common one which I do
not care much about. The court may say-"It is a good law, but as it technically infringes on the Constitution
we will have to wipe it out." As I have said, the proposal I support retains some remnant of parliamentary
sovereignty, leaving it to the will of Parliament on either side to attack each other's laws.
Deponent: Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.
107 Graham Road, Viewbank 3084, Victoria
admin@inspector-rikati.com
(Buloke Shire Council) Prosecutors legal representatives ES&a Lawyers
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END QUOTE
As I understand it the so called Victorian Constitution Act 1975 is not a constitution or

amendment of a constitution approved by the State electors, and therefore it cannot be relied upon
as a valid constitution.
As the Framers of the Constitution made clear that the sovereign Parliaments of the colonies
would become constitutional Parliaments upon federation.
Hansard 2-2-1898 Constitution Convention Debates
QUOTE Mr. DEAKIN (Victoria).The record of these debates may fairly be expected to be widely read, and the observations to which I
allude might otherwise lead to a certain amount of misconception.
END QUOTE
.

QUOTE
Mr. HOLDER.-I hope that the time which was spent in Adelaide was as pleasant to the visiting
representatives as the time which we have spent under the care and hospitality of the Government of Victoria has
been to us. I think that a word is due to those who have laboured, not merely to make our stay pleasant, but to
assist us in accomplishing that which we have had in view. Speaking for myself, I consider that the reporting
of our debates has been remarkably good. There has hardly been the need of even trifling verbal alterations,
and the way in which the speeches have been reported, transcribed, and committed to print has [start page 2494]
left nothing to be desired. I am quite sure that in the permanent record of our proceedings we have a document
entirely worthy of the purpose we have in view.
END QUOTE
Convention)
QUOTE Mr. ISAACS.We want a people's Constitution, not a lawyers' Constitution.
END QUOTE
.
QUOTE
Mr. CARRUTHERS:
This is a Constitution which the unlettered people of the community ought to be able to understand.
END QUOTE
.
Convention)
QUOTE
The Right Hon. C.C. KINGSTON (South Australia)[9.21]: I trust the Drafting Committee will not fail to
exercise a liberal discretion in striking out words which they do not understand, and that they will put in
words which can be understood by persons commonly acquainted with the English language.
END QUOTE
KING v. JONES ; McEWEN v. HACKERT ; JONES v. JONES. (1972) 128 CLR 221
Barwick C.J.(1), McTiernan(2), Menzies(3), Walsh(4), Gibbs(5) and Stephen(6)JJ.
QUOTE Barwick C.J.(1)
10. There are some basic propositions of constitutional construction which are beyond controversy. The words
of the Constitution are to be read in that natural sense they bore in the circumstances of their enactment by the
Imperial Parliament in 1900. That meaning remains, beyond the reach of any Australian Parliament, subject only
to alteration by the means provided by s. 128 of the Constitution. The connotation of words employed in the
Constitution does not change though changing events and attitudes may in some circumstances extend the
denotation or reach of those words. These propositions are fully documented in the reported decisions of this
Court which has the task of finally and authoritatively deciding both the connotation and the denotation of the
language of the Constitution. (at p229)
END QUOTE
":.. The starting point for a principled interpretation of the Constitution is the search for the intention of its
makers"
Gaudron J (Wakim, HCA27\99)
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"... But in the interpretation of the Constitution the connotation or connotations of its words should remain
constant. We are not to give words a meaning different from any meaning which they could have borne in
1900. Law is to be accommodated to changing facts. It is not to be changed as language changes. "
Windeyer J (Ex parte Professional Engineers' Association)
Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally; Re Wakim; Ex parte Darvall; Re Brown; Ex parte Amann; Spi [1999] HCA 27
(17 June 1999)
QUOTE
Constitutional interpretation
1.
The starting point for a principled interpretation of the Constitution is the search for the intention of its
makers[51]. That does not mean a search for their subjective beliefs, hopes or expectations. Constitutional
interpretation is not a search for the mental states of those who made, or for that matter approved or enacted,
the Constitution. The intention of its makers can only be deduced from the words that they used in the
historical context in which they used them[52]. In a paper on constitutional interpretation, presented at
Fordham University in 1996, Professor Ronald Dworkin argued, correctly in my opinion[53]:
"We must begin, in my view, by asking what - on the best evidence available - the authors of
the text in question intended to say. That is an exercise in what I have called constructive
interpretation[54]. It does not mean peeking inside the skulls of people dead for centuries. It
means trying to make the best sense we can of an historical event - someone, or a social
group with particular responsibilities, speaking or writing in a particular way on a particular
occasion."
END QUOTE
Therefore, any legislation must be in plain English that can be understood by the unlettered
person, and not requiring some lawyer to explain in in his/her opinion which could be wrong
anyhow.
If therefore the so called Victorian Constitution Act 1975 is not a valid constitution then the
prosecutor may have to fall back upon the previous valid constitution act. But due to federation the
original constitution act of the Colony of Victoria cannot be as such applied because within s106 of
the constitution (Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK)) the State of Victoria
was created subject to this constitution, and as such all legal principles implied in this constitution
would override any Victorian constitution.
Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK)
QUOTE
106 Saving of Constitutions
The Constitution of each State of the Commonwealth shall, subject to this Constitution, continue as at the
establishment of the Commonwealth, or as at the admission or establishment of the State, as the case may be,
until altered in accordance with the Constitution of the State.
107 Saving of Power of State Parliaments
Every power of the Parliament of a Colony which has become or becomes a State, shall, unless it is by this
Constitution exclusively vested in the Parliament of the Commonwealth or withdrawn from the Parliament of the
State, continue as at the establishment of the Commonwealth, or as at the admission or establishment of the
State, as the case may be.
108 Saving of State laws
Every law in force in a Colony which has become or becomes a State, and relating to any matter within the
powers of the Parliament of the Commonwealth, shall, subject to this Constitution, continue in force in the State;
and, until provision is made in that behalf by the Parliament of the Commonwealth, the Parliament of the State
shall have such powers of alteration and of repeal in respect of any such law as the Parliament of the Colony had
until the Colony became a State.
109 Inconsistency of laws
When a law of a State is inconsistent with a law of the Commonwealth, the latter shall prevail, and the former
shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be invalid.
END QUOTE
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When I appeared as a CONSTITUTIONALIST and Professional Advocate (now retired) before

Her Honour Harbison J in the matter of CONTEMPT OF COURT against Mr Francis James
Colosimo the following is recorded in the transcript:
QUOTE Transcript 16 March 2009 before Her Honour Habrison J.
Transcript 16 March 2009 Harbison J
QUOTE Her Honour at page 21 line 30
Now, having heard that you can take a seat and I can have Mr Shorel-Hlavkia speak on your behalf.
Mr Shorel-Hlavkia, what were the matters that you wanted to put?
MR SHOREL-HLAVKIA : First of all, Im not a lawyer. Ive no legal training. Im a constitutionalist. That
means I deal with matters on constitutional matters mainly.
HER HONOUR : All right. Do you have some you dont have any legal training?
.
MR SHOREL-HLAVKIA : Absolutely not.
HER HONOUR : Do you have any qualification in what you say you are?
MR SHOREL-H;LAVKIA : No, I have no I am a constitutionalist, so I do assist with parties with barristers
and everything else to assist them with legal work, you know, constitutional matters and everything else,
or the Government. You know, thats ongoing. I publish books about it under the Inspector (indistinct) at
Trademark, they are published and (indistinct).
END QUOTE Transcript 16 March 2009 Harbison J
END QUOTE
It may be stated that I did notify Buloke Shire Council in various correspondences, including in my
2-5-2015 correspondence that I objected to the jurisdiction of any court to hear and determine
matters. As such Buloke Shire Council was well advised in advance that I would object to the
jurisdiction of any court it would pursue to litigate in!
http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgibin/sinodisp/au/cases/cth/HCA/1991/9.html?stem=0&synonyms=0&query="otherwise%20fell%20
outside%20its%20jurisdiction%20"
Harris v Caladine [1991] HCA 9; (1991) 172 CLR 84 (17 April 1991)
QUOTE
The Full Court on appeal from Maxwell J. held that the review of the Deputy Registrar's decision was confined
to an inquiry whether the parties did in fact consent to the terms of the order and whether the terms agreed upon
were in a form appropriate to the type of order sought and were enforceable. But the order made by the Deputy
Registrar must have been made pursuant to s.79 - the section which confers power upon the Court to order a
settlement of or an alteration in the property interests of the parties. The Court could not make an order
which otherwise fell outside its jurisdiction merely because the parties consented to it and it follows, a
fortiori, that a Registrar, exercising a delegated power, could not do so. Thus, for instance, under s.80(1)(j) of the
Act the Court may make an order by consent, but only in exercising its powers under Pt VIII. Section 37A(1)(g)
allows the delegation to the Registrar of the power to make an order by consent, but only where it is a power of
the Court. And O.36A, r.2(1)(n) delegates to the Registrar the power referred to in s.37A(1)(g).
END QUOTE
I will now also quote other parts of the transcript to indicate that in my submission once an
OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION has been made it cannot be withdrawn (as like the
CONTEMPT application), and the court must deal with it. As such neither could the Prosecutor
(Buloke Shire Council) withdraw the Summons as unless the court can invoke jurisdiction first it
cannot deal with the issue of the summons.
Transcript 16 March 2009 page 8 line 3 (Ms Morris solicitor of Maddocks Lawyers)
QUOTE
MS MORRIS: Your Honour, the application that Im making on behalf of the Council today is actually to
withdraw this application pursuant to s.74 (1) of the VCAT Act. If I can hand up a submission to you.
END QUOTE
.
Transcript 16 March 2009 page 12 line 22 (MS MORRIS)

QUOTE
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On 2 March 2009, Your Honours Associate, Mr Harbison, contacted Councils lawyers and indicated that the
tribunal couldnt grant leave to withdraw the application without the consent of all parties, and Mr
Harbsion indicated that the application for leave would need to be considered at the hearing on 16 March
2009.
END QUOTE
.
Transcript 16 March 2009 page 12 line 29 (MS MORRIS)
QUOTE
So on 2 March 2009, Council wrote to the respondent and Mr Peter Sier and requested that they indicate
whether or not they consented to Councils request to withdraw the application as soon as practicable.
The letter was also copied to Mr Gerit Shorel-Hlavkia.
On 7 March 2009, Council received an email from Mr Shorel-Hlavkia which appeared to assert that the
respondent opposes Councils request to withdraw the application, and I got a copy of that letter if the
tribunal would like me to hand it up.
END QUOTE
Transcript 16 March 2009 page 26 line 14

QUOTE (MR SHOREL-HLAVKIA) (Should be MR SCHOREL-HLAVKA)
As I indicated in the material that in my view they have no position to withdraw because its a matter
between VCAT as to whether or not the contempt shall be punished, contempt for it, and that is all they
had the position was to make a recommendation, what kind of punishment should be applied.
END QUOTE
QUOTE MR SHOREL-HLAVKIA (should be Mr Schorel-Hlavka)
Because I believe that the integrity of a tribunal, including Your Honour, you dont want to be used like
some kind of a fool, lets say, and theyve been playing this tribunal to issue orders , then after all there
never was any justification for it. I think this is a very serious matter.
Therefore, just to give them leave to withdraw I think would be the wrong thing to do. If anything maybe
there should be a judicial inquiry. I have also written to the president of VCAT. I have also written to
Chief Justice Rozenes of County Court. Because I take this matter very serious.
I might not be a lawyer but I always and I quite it in the Foster case where they said that a barrister or
whatever, should have that. He must present the truth. No matter if it goes against his client, he must
present the truth. In this case this withdrawal now is to cover up their deception and if Your honour were
to grant that in that manner, I think that Your Honour will then place yourself doubt as to the credibility of
standing of VCAT to allow this kind of process to proceed.
Therefore, that I seek, and I think that Frank himself totally support it, that Your Honour will say that
these matters will be adjourned, Your Honour will have these matters fully investigated, no further
proceedings should be taken in the meantime. When those matters are investigated, including my
allegations, because if I make scandalous allegations against lawyers or against VCAT, then I cop it. But I
can assure you, and if you anyone who reads my material will know that Im very careful when I make
statements.
And also, Your Honour is now aware, that we were told by a ruling that we would have the files before
this hearing and we havent got them because of a defect in the orders, this hearing itself could never be a
fair and proper hearing. So therefore that should be adjourned in any event for that.
END QUOTE
Transcript 16 March 2009 page 53 line 12 (HER HONOUR HARBISON J)
QUOTE
HER HONOUR: THANK YOU.
Now, this is an application by the Moorabool shire Council, who is the applicant in contempt proceedings to
withdraw those proceedings on the basis that there be no further order as to cost of the proceedings. The
application was made under s.74 (1) of the VCAT Act.
Normally an application to withdraw a proceeding is a routine matter. There are some aspects of this case
which are not routine, and the principal aspect of the case which is not routine is that this is a contempt
proceeding. Once contempt proceedings are issued, then the proceedings are not the property of the
applicant, they are the property of the tribunal, as was correctly pointed out on behalf of Mr Colosimo.
So it is not simply a matter of the proceedings finishing when an applicant decides to withdraw, it is a
matter of the tribunal itself having the responsibility to decide whether or not the course of conduct which
has been engaged in by the respondent is in truth contempt of the tribunal.
END QUOTE
Again
QUOTE
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Once contempt proceedings are issued, then the proceedings are not the property of the applicant, they are
the property of the tribunal, as was correctly pointed out on behalf of Mr Colosimo.
END QUOTE
.
QUOTE
In my view it is not appropriate for me to grant the applicants application to withdraw, however at the
moment Mr Colosimo is under Administration.
END QUOTE
.
QUOTE
Thirdly, it is clear that the State Trustees, which is presently the Administrator, is not in a position to
proceed with this application given the uncertainties about the present state of the Guardianship
proceedings.
Therefore it is my view that the proceedings should not continue past this point and what I will do is to
make an order that this proceeding be stayed until further order.
END QUOTE
I may add that Mr Francis James Colosimo had been represented by a barrister in previous
proceedings, but discharged him and then requested my wife to have me to take on his case. This I
accepted. I conducted the appeal successfully against the guardianship orders.
Originally, at the first hearing, as I understand it Mr Francis James Colosimo had objected to the
jurisdiction of VCAT but Deputy President Gibson had merely stated that Mr Francis James
Colosimo had to pursue this in another court.
Deputy president Gibson obviously was in error to claim this, and this resulted in years of litigation
involving Mr Francis James Colosimo prior to that I commenced to represent him, which all could
have been avoided had Deputy President Gibson dealt first with the OBJECTION TO
JURISDICTION in which Mr Francis James Colosimo relied upon his constitutional rights of the
Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK).
.
Held that a State Court exercising federal jurisdiction when it erroneously applies
Commonwealth Act to subject matter before the Court. Commonwealth v Cole, (1923) 32
C.L.R. 602 and Commonwealth v Dalton, (1924) 33 C.L.R.. 452; 30 A.L.R. 85
Held by the Full Court of the Supreme Court of Queensland that the police magistrate
exercising Federal jurisdiction is not an officer of a Federal Court within the meaning of
this paragraph (Section 39 of the Judicial Act 1903) R. v. Archdall and Others; Ex parte
Taylor, 1919 St. R. Qld 207; 13 Q.J.P.R. 22 C.L.R. 437 in which the High Court (Isaacs,
Higgins, Gavan Duffy and Ricch JJ ; Griffith CJ and Barton J dissenting) held that a Judge of
an inferior Court of a State invested with and purporting to exercise Federal jurisdiction is not
an officer of the Commonwealth within the meaning of s. 75 (v) of the Constitution.
Per Evatt J.; Each question of the validity of the Commonwealth legislation in s51 of the
Constitution (and a fortiori in s. 52) necessarily raised a question as to the limits of
Commonwealth and State powers. Ibid at p. 682 C.L.R. and p 255 A.L.R.
.
The prosecutor pursued an Infringement Notice which within the provisions of the Infringement Act
2006 means to be place d before the Infringement Registrar for enforcement. However a prosecutor
may withdraw the Infringement Notice and instead issue a summons for hearing in a court. The
prosecutor however has pursued a summons that relies upon the Infringement Notice and to which I
submit the Court has no jurisdiction.
What I view eventuated is that the prosecutor seeks to pursue matters to which this court has no
jurisdiction. The Infringement Notice first of all never provided an option other than that I could
select to pay the penalty of the Infringement Notice or elect to go to court. I made clear I chose
neither, as I objected to the jurisdiction of any court, including the so called Infringement Court.
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The Infringement Notice relied upon a noticed as I recall it. I requested Buloke Shire Council to
provide me with a copy of the Infringement Notice as the original was misplaced, but it
failed/refused to do so.
Regardless if I were or were not have paid the penalty stated, the issue is that the Prosecutor
prevented me the option to use a copy of the Infringement Notice, and cannot now complain to the
court where it failed itself.
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legislation, which would abrogate them. Miranda v. Arizona 384 US 436, 125:
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or penalty imposed on one because of this Constitutional right. Sherer v. Cullen 481 F. 945:
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the case must be dismissed. Louisville v. Motley 2111 US 149, 29S. CT 42. The Accuser
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Bears the Burden of Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt.
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v. Matthews, 310 F supra 341, 342 (1969): and Want of Jurisdictionmay not be cured by
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consent of parties. Industrial Addition Association v. C.I.R., 323 US 310, 313.
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The legal doctrine of ex turpi causa non oritur action denies any remedy to a litigant (including
a prosecutor) who does not come to court with clean hands.
If your own action is very unlawful and very unethical, if you come to court with Dirty Hands
best not to question others legality, morality, and ethics!
Where rights secured by the Constitution are involved, there can be no rule-making or
The claim and exercise of Constitutional Rights cannot be converted into a crime. Miller v.
Kansas 230 F 2nd 486, 489:
For a crime to exist, there must be an injured party (Corpus Delicti) There can be no sanction
If any Tribunal (court) finds absence of proof of jurisdiction over a person and subject matter,
Lack of Federal Jurisdiction can not be waived or overcome by agreement of parties. Griffin
QUOTE
BROWN v. TEXAS, 443 U.S. 47 (1979) -- CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE 3527. The law helps the vigilant,
before those who sleep on their rights. "A statute does not trump the Constitution." People v. Ortiz, (1995)
32 Cal.App.4th at p. 292, fn. 2 Conway v. Pasadena Humane Society (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 163 UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA, v. JERRY ARBERT POOL, C.A. No. 09-10303, IN THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT (Opinion filed September 14, 2010), On Appeal From
The United States District Court For The Eastern District of California "A statutory privilege cannot
override a defendant's constitutional right." People v. Reber, (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d. 523 [223 Cal.Rptr.
139}; Vela v. Superior Ct, 208 Cal.App.3d. 141 [255 Cal.Rptr. 921], however, "the judiciary has a solemn
obligation to insure that the constitutional right of an accused to a fair trial is realized. If that right would be
thwarted by enforcement of a statute, the state ...must yield." Vela v. Superior Ct., 208 Cal.App.3d. 141 [255
Cal.Rptr. 921 Obviously, administrative agencies, like police officers must obey the Constitution and may
not deprive persons of constitutional rights. Southern Pac. Transportation Co. v. Public Utilities Com., 18
Cal.3d 308 [S.F. No. 23217. Supreme Court of California. November 23, 1976.] If evidence of a fact is clear,
positive, un-contradicted and of such nature it cannot rationally be disbelieved, the court must instruct that
fact has been established as a matter of law. Roberts v. Del Monte Properties Co., 111 CA2d. 69 (1952) If
they can get you asking the wrong questions, they don't have to worry about answers. Thomas Pynchon
They will do whatever we let them get away with. Joseph Heller ~*~
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END QUOTE
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The following applies as much to Federal laws of the Commonwealth of Australia as it does to
federal laws in the USA; http://familyguardian.taxtactics.com/Subjects/LawAndGovt/ChallJurisdiction/AuthoritiesArticle/AuthOnJurisdiction.htm
QUOTE
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37 Am Jur 2d at section 8 states, in part: "Fraud vitiates every transaction and all contracts. Indeed, the principle
is often stated, in broad and sweeping language, that fraud destroys the validity of everything into which it enters,
and that it vitiates the most solemn contracts, documents, and even judgments."
END QUOTE
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Sixteenth American Jurisprudence 2d; SS: 256 & 257:
And
QUOTE
The general misconception is that any statute passed by legislators bearing the appearance of law constitutes the
law of the land. The U.S. Constitution is the supreme law of the land, and any statute, to be valid, must be in
agreement. It is impossible for both the Constitution and a law violating it to be valid; one must prevail. This is
succinctly stated as follows:
The general rule is that an unconstitutional statute, though having the form and name of law, is in reality
no law, but is wholly void, and ineffective for any purpose; since unconstitutionality dates from the time
of its enactment, and not merely from the date of the decision so branding it. An unconstitutional law, in
legal contemplation, is as inoperative as if it had never been passed. Such a statute leaves the question that
it purports to settle just as it would be had the statute not been enacted.
Since an unconstitutional law is void, the general principles follow that it imposes no duties, confers no
rights, creates no office, bestows no power or authority on anyone, affords no protection, and justifies no
acts performed under it. . .
A void act cannot be legally consistent with a valid one. An unconstitutional law cannot operate to supersede any
existing valid law. Indeed, insofar as a statute runs counter to the fundamental law of the land, it is superseded
thereby.
No one is bound to obey an unconstitutional law and no courts are bound to enforce it.
END QUOTE
Sixteenth American Jurisprudence

Second Edition, 1998 version, Section 203 (formerly Section 256)
"The general rule is that an unconstitutional statute is in reality no law, but is wholly void, and
ineffective for any purpose; since unconstitutionality dates from the time of it's enactment, and not merely
from the date of the decision so branding it. An unconstitutional law, in legal contemplation, is as
inoperative as if it had never been passed. Such a statute leaves the question that it purports to settle just
as it would be had the statute not been enacted. 'Such an unconstitutional law is void', the general
principles follow that it imposes no duties, confers no rights, creates no office, bestows no power or
authority to anyone, affords no protection, and justifies no acts preformed under it . . . 'A void act cannot
be legally consistent with a valid one. An unconstitutional law cannot operate to supersede any existing
valid law. Indeed, insofar as a statute runs counter to the fundamental law of the land, it is superseded
thereby. 'No one is bound to obey an unconstitutional law and no courts are bound to enforce it." . . . The
fact that one acts in reliance on a statute which has theretofore been adjudged unconstitutional does not
protect him from civil or criminal responsibility ....
QUOTE Mr. HIGGINS:
I think it is advisable that private people should not be put to the expense of having important questions of constitutional law decided
out of their own pockets.
END QUOTE
.
QUOTE Main v. Thiboutot, 100 S. Ct. 2502 (1980).
The law provides that once State and Federal jurisdiction has been challenged, it must be proven.
END QUOTE
QUOTE Hagens v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 533,
Once jurisdiction is challenged, it must be proven
END QUOTE
QUOTE Standard v. Olsen, 74 S. Ct. 768,
No sanctions can be imposed absent proof of jurisdiction.
END QUOTE
QUOTE Basso v. Utah Power & Light Co., 495 2nd 906 at 910,
Jurisdiction can be challenged at any time, even on final determination.
END QUOTE
.
QUOTE Thompson v. Tolmie, 2 Pet. 157, 7 L.Ed. 381; Griffith v. Frazier, 8 Cr. 9, 3L. Ed. 471.
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Where there is absence of jurisdiction, all administrative and judicial proceedings are a nullity and confer no right, offer no
protection, and afford no justification, and may be rejected upon direct collateral attack.
END QUOTE
.
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The above in my view makes it very clear the court cannot merely ignore the OBJECTION TO
JURISDICTION nor can hear the matter of the summons together with the jurisdictional issue as it
cannot hear the matter unless and until it has decided the jurisdictional issue and has dismissed it.
Not that I seek to indicate this is what the court would do.
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I may also make known that I did file a complaint with the Legal Service Commissioner regarding
what I view unethical/unlawful conduct involving the prosecutor and its legal representatives ES&a.
I did provide, albeit didnt have to do so, both the Prosecutor (Buloke Shire Council) and its legal
representatives ES&a with a copy of my complaint and supplements.
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Where the legal service commissioner find that my complaints are upheld then obviously this place
in question the conduct of both the Prosecutor and its legal representatives ES&a to pursue these
matters before this court, as they may involve fraud, etc.
QUOTE Yunghanns & Ors & Yunghanns & Ors & Yunghanns [1999] FamCA 64
(2) The Court always has jurisdiction to entertain proceedings for the purpose of and up to
the point of deciding whether it has jurisdiction to make the orders sought in the proceedings.
(3) In carrying out that limited exercise of jurisdiction, the Court is required to determine any
essential facts upon which the existence of its jurisdiction to make the orders sought ultimately
depends (the jurisdictional facts). That determination is a function which is incidental to the
exercise of the jurisdiction referred to in (2) above.
END QUOTE
And
QUOTE Yunghanns & Ors & Yunghanns & Ors & Yunghanns [1999] FamCA 64
(6) Once a respondent challenges the Courts jurisdiction to make the orders sought, the Court, before
considering the adjudicational facts, must find the existence of the jurisdictional facts, on the balance
of probabilities.
END QUOTE
QUOTE.
FAMILY LAW RULES 20042003 No. 375 - RULE 3.05
Objection to jurisdiction
(1)
If, in a Form 3A, a respondent objects to the jurisdiction of the court, the respondent will not be
taken to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court by also seeking an order that the
application be dismissed on another ground.
(2)
The objection to the jurisdiction must be determined before any other orders sought in the Form
3A.
END QUOTE
.
Watson v Director-General, Department of Services, Technology and Administration [2010] NSWADT 44 (12
February 2010)
QUOTE
He also stated that, if the Tribunal agreed this view, he would seek an order that the Respondent pay the
Applicants costs occasioned by the objection to jurisdiction on an indemnity basis.
END QUOTE
And
QUOTE
The orders to be made
64 For the foregoing reasons, each of the applications constituting these proceedings is dismissed for want of
jurisdiction.
65 In consequence, the Tribunals orders made on 6 January 2010 are discharged.
66 In addition, the directions hearing set down for 15 February 2010 is vacated.
END QUOTE
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Foster (1950) S.R. (N.S.W.) 149, at p151 (Lord Denning, speaking on the role of an advocate)
QUOTE
As an advocate he is a minister of Justice equally with a judge, A Barrister cannot pick or choose his
clients...He must accept the brief and do all he honourably can on behalf of his client. I say 'All he
honourably can' because his duty is not only to his client. He has a duty to the court which is paramount.
It is a mistake to suppose that he is a mouthpiece of his client to say what he wants: or his tool to do
what he directs. He is none of those things. He owes his allegiance to a higher cause. It is the cause of
truth and Justice. He must not consciously misstate the facts. He must not knowingly conceal the truth.
He must not unjustly make a charge of fraud, that is, without evidence to support it. He must produce
all relevant authorities, even those that are against him. He must see that his client discloses, if ordered, all
relevant documents, even those that are fatal to his case. He must disregard the specific instructions of his
client, if they conflict with his duty to the court.
END QUOTE
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In my submission the court should be the last resort and legal representatives should make
reasonable attempts to resolve matters without litigation in the courts. In my view this ES&a failed
to adhere to. Buloke Shire Council records involving other litigation may show that identical;
Taylor v. Taylor (1979) Fam LR 5, 289289 at 290 298 and 300 HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
QUOTE
In my opinion, the words 'false evidence' in s79A(1) do not mean evidence which is wilfully false. The subsection should be read according to its terms. To say that 'false evidence should be read as 'wilful false
evidence' is to introduce a provision not expressed by the provision; cf s6H of the Royal Commission Act 1902
which speaks of a witness 'who knowingly gives false testimony'. This interpretation is reinforced by reference
elsewhere in s79A(1) to the separate grounds of fraud and suppression of evidence which would
comprehend cases of wilful false evidence. At common law, a judgment will be set aside if it has been
obtained by fraud. In the exercise of this jurisdiction, it has been held that an applicant must show something
more than perjury, ie. new facts (Baker v. Wadsworth [1898] 67 LJQB 301; Everett V. Ribbands [1946] 175
LT 143). This tends to suggest that the words 'false evidence' should be given their literal meaning
END QUOTE
QUOTE R.V. Crimmins (1959) VR 270
Suppression of relevant evidence
END QUOTE
.
QUOTE Byrne v Byrne (1965) 7 FLR 342 at 343

Fraud: Usually takes the form of a statement of what is false or the suppression of what is true.
END QUOTE
I understand that in the case of MORIATY v LONDON, CHATMAM & DOVER RY Queens
Bench 1870 L.R. 5 Q.B. 314;39 L.T.Q.B. 109;22 L.T. 163;34 J.P. 692;18 W.R. 625 in which the
plaintiff sued a railway company for personal injuries sustained and this plaintiff has gone about
suborning false evidence and it was held by the Court that even so the plaintiff would have had a
genuine and justify to case to sue normally, by the plaintiff conduct to suborn false evidence this
was seen by the Court that this conduct amounted to an admission that he had no case.
I received a correspondence purportedly from ER&a lawyers which had no contact details and
purportedly was signed by one of its lawyers but forwarded to me in an envelope of the Prosecutor
stating to contact Mr Wayne Wall (of Buloke Shire Council). As ES&a Lawyers is ab out 300
kilometres from Wycheproof where Buloke Shire Council offices are I couldnt accept that a lawyer
would travel a 600 kilometres plus to just sign a letter and then send it out in a Buloke Shire
envelope. As such I suspected that Buloke Shire Council has pre-signed letters in which it merely
inset the date, the name of the other party and the Infringement Number and then pretend it was
issued by ES&a. In my view it would be an offence for a person not being a legal practitioner to use
the signature of a legal practitioner pretending it was the legal practitioner who request the contact
with Mr Wayne Wall. If indeed this is the modus operandi of ES&a and Buloke Shire Council then
I view this may be a very serious matter, in particular if in previous litigation with other parties
ES&a claimed cost regarding such correspondences. Also, it is to deny the other party any
reasonable opportunity to communicate with the lawyers allegedly involved, and in this case it
means the lawyers did no more but then file for the summons.
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correspondences were issued to other persons bar for the date, name and Infringement Notice
number. I view this would constitute fraud. It could be regarded as to terrorise a party to better pay
up because lawyers are involved without actually the lawyers making any attempt whatsoever to
communicate themselves.
QUOTE Sorell v Smith (1925) Lord Dunedin in the House of Lords
In an action against a set person in combination, a conspiracy to injure, followed by actual injury, will give
good cause for action, and motive or instant where the act itself is not illegal is of the essence of the
conspiracy.
END QUOTE
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2013/08/23/11-15354.pdf
QUOTE
608 F.3d 406, 43031 (9th Cir. 2010). We held that liability for a constitutional violation requires only that the
defendant set[] in motion a series of acts by others which the [defendant] knows or reasonably should know
would cause others to inflict the constitutional injury. Id. at 430 (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743
44 (9th Cir.1978)).
END QUOTE
As I from onset set out extensively to Buloke Shire Council numerous legal issues then for it to
litigate without any reasonable attempt to seek to address certain issues may underline that the
Prosecutor is so to say hell bend to pursue me regardless of how inappropriate/unlawful this might
be.
This is an issue that has gone on for years where Buloke Shire council has acted as I view it
unlawfully/unconstitutionally and caused considerable harm in the process.
As I indicated to Buloke Shire Council from onset there is NO CASE TO ANSWER and as such
anything I wrote cannot be used against me as evidence.
.
On 19 July 2006 I appeared in the County Court of Victoria (exercising federal jurisdiction) on
appeals of convictions of FAILING TO VOTE. I succeeded unchallenged in both appeals upon
numerous constitutional issues I raised (I had filed and served upon all Attorney-Generals a s78B
NOTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL MATTERS) to which the then Attorney-General Mr Robert
Hulls made clear that the state of Victoria would abide by the court ruling.
This included that I challenged the lack of separation of powers of the Victorian courts. As such the
Prosecutor (Buloke Shire Council) cannot circumvent this issue nor re-litigate this matter because
the State of Victoria is bound by the courts decision.
Convention)
QUOTE
5. A very important consideration is the following:-In every colony possessing a Constitution the
legislature is exercising powers created by a Statute of the Imperial Parliament. Its powers are limited by
this document, and the document is [start page 972] subject to the interpretation of the Court, of law of
the country. The Supreme Court of each of these colonies has jurisdiction to decide that a colonial Act is
ultra vires. The power has actually been exercised in this colony in the case of an Act for deporting fugitive
ofienders, it being held that the General Assembly of New Zealand is incompetent to provide for the
custody of such persons during their passage over-sea to another colony. The difficulty has since been
removed by Imperial legislation. Now, it is evident that if the integrity of the empire is to be maintained
(which is our common object), the decision of a local court in regard to the powers of the local Parliament
ought to be subject to review by an Imperial court. Otherwise, all limit to the local power of legislation
might be disregarded, and practically set aside, by judges with strong separatist tendencies.
END QUOTE
.
I have been critical upon Buloke Shire Council and how it goes about seemingly making moneys by
using Infringement Notices to cause people to hand over their properties. I wrote to the Buloke
Shire Council in the past about it so no need to go into details now. Also, I exposed how Buloke
Shire Council was having weed higher than 1 metres along highways, and that at times motor
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vehicles pulling over in the soft shoulders unaware their exhaust pipe is hot, then end up a
grass/weed fire.
I also was a main drive against the nonsense to amend the constitution to accept municipal/shire
councils as a level of government. The High Court of Australia is on record that councils when
enforcing State legislation are in the position to litigate as the State. As such, in that regard no
amendment of the constitution is required to pursue to enforce state laws.
FW: Sydney City Council v Reid 1994 NSW Full Court councils do not represent the crown.
QUOTE
13. It is, we think, important to recognize that the Crown, being
relevantly the executive branch of government, carries out in modern
times multifarious functions involving the use and occupation of many
premises and the possession of many things. It carries out those
functions through servants and agents who, notwithstanding that they
act with the authority of the Crown, have no immunity from the
ordinary criminal law (15 See Bropho v. Western Australia (1990) 171
CLR at 21, 26; A. v. Hayden [1984] HCA 67; (1984) 156 CLR 532 at 580-582). The Crown itself may not
be subjected to criminal liability, save in the most
exceptional circumstances (16 See Cain v. Doyle [1946] HCA 38; (1946) 72 CLR 409 at
424), but those who actually occupy Crown premises or hold Crown
property are in a different position. There may exist on Crown
premises things which, whether the property of the Crown or not, will
afford evidence as to the commission of an offence or which are
intended to be used for the purpose of committing an offence, whether
the offence is one committed or to be committed by a servant or agent
of the Crown or someone else.
END QUOTE
QUOTE
The exceptional powers of ministerial
intervention remain that: exceptions. For the purpose of characterisation of
the nature of the service , it is more appropriate to catalogue it as being "in
the service of local government authorities" and not "in the service of the
Crown".
END QUOTE
QUOTE
MEAGHER JA. In this matter I have had the benefit of reading in draft
the judgment of the President. I agree both with his Honour's reasons and
with the orders he proposes. The issue with which the appeal is concerned is
whether an employee of a local council can be said to be "in the service of
the Crown". Manifestly he cannot. Even the learned solicitor who argued the
case for the respondent, Mr D M Bennett QC, did not advance so farouche
a submission that a municipal council was the Crown, or an arm of the
Crown, or an emanation of the Crown, or an agent of the Crown. The
Whilst local government is indeed a form of government, it is also a
creature of statute. Out of recognition of the imperatives of democratic selfgovernment,
the statutory provisions have enacted the creation of largely
Page 19
independent corporations accountable (in the ordinary course) not to the
minister (that is, the Crown), but to the people who elect them. In this sense,
the high measure of independence of statutory corporations, by which local
government is ordinarily carried out, is inconsistent with viewing their
employees as servants of the Crown. The exceptional powers of ministerial
intervention remain that: exceptions. For the purpose of characterisation of
the nature of the service, it is more appropriate to catalogue it as being "in
the service of local government authorities" and not "in the service of the
Crown".
This view also coincides with what must be deemed to have been the view
of the drafter in making express provision for other highly independent
statutory corporations and adding them expressly to the list in Schedule 4 to
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the GREAT Act. If local government employees are to be regarded as "in

the service of the Crown", so, almost certainly, would be all of the employees
of all of the employing authorities for whom express provision was made in
s 4 and Schedule 4 of the GREAT Act. It would render Schedule 4
unnecessary.
I do not say that local government employees should not be within the
ambit of the GREAT Act. In a very real sense, they are government
employees. They carry on many activities which are governmental in
character. They do so under legislation of the State Parliament. But from the
beginning of this form of statutory review, both under the Crown Employees
Appeal Board Act 1944 and under the GREAT Act, local government
employees have been excluded. As the terms of reference for the Bowen
Committee suggest, this has been a deliberate decision of succeeding
governments and parliaments. That decision can be unmade. But in the end I
have concluded that it should be unmade by parliament, not by the court,
reading into an admittedly ambiguous provision an operation which fairly
clearly was not intended.
aldermen of a council are elected by popular suffrage, not appointed by the

Crown. They neither ask for, nor, in general, receive, any assistance from the
Crown in the discharge of their daily tasks. The extent to which the Crown
can interfere with their activities is slight, and the extent to which it does is
minimal. In what sense, then can it be said that an employee is "in the
service of the Crown"? Because, as Mr Bennett said -- and said more than
once-- local government councils exercise what a political scientist might
call"governmental functions": for example, they might build roads, or
conduct schools, or run hospitals. But, as is obvious enough, so can and do
many private persons and bodies. This suggested discrimen is inadequate.
POWELL JA. I have read, in draft, the judgment which has been prepared
by Kirby P. I agree with his Honour's conclusion that an employee of a local
council is not to be regarded as being a person "in the service of the Crown",
and with his reasons for so concluding.
Page 21
END QUOTE
QUOTE
15. In The Municipal Council of Sydney v. The Commonwealth 23 (' Municipal Council of Sydney' ), in three
separate judgements, all judges of the High Court agreed that the Municipal Council of Sydney was the 'State'
for the purposes of section 114 of the Constitution. The power delegated to the Council, by State legislation,
which allowed the Council to levy rates, was the determinative factor in that case.
END QUOTE
QUOTE
15E. The decisions in Municipal Council of Sydney and Dandenong City Council are contrasted with decisions
where the Court has determined that local governments do not operate as instrumentalities of a State or Territory
Crown, and therefore are not considered to have the immunities of the Crown. 27 However, the principles for
determining whether an agency or instrumentality represents the 'Crown' and has been endowed with the
privileges and immunities of the 'Crown' for a particular purpose are different to the principles applied to
determine whether a body is a 'State' for the purposes of section 114 of the Constitution. 28 Therefore, a local
government that does not share the immunities of the Crown may, nevertheless, be the State for the purposes
of section 114 of the Constitution and may, similarly, be the State or Territory for the purposes of the GST Act.
END QUOTE
Therefore Buloke Shire Council acting in this case for and on behalf of State legislation are bound
by the courts ruling of 19-7-2006 and neither has this court (Magistrates Court of Victoria) any
judicial powers to undermine or otherwise overrule the County Court of Victoria decision. I am
entitled to the benefits of the courts 19-7-2006 ruling.
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When one consider the notice that was issued by Buloke Shire Council then it is clear it is more
of a general notice and not stating precise details. Hence, the person who receives a fire notice
then has to be guessing what on earth might be the issues concerned. Where Buloke Shire Council
seeks to enforce State legislation then it must do so consistently to all and any alleged offenders and
not as I reported itself violate the very legislative provision. After all the soft shoulder of the across
the road of my property towards Calder Highway had more than a metre high weed. At various
placed along Calder Highway one could observe small parts having been subject to a fire, which
appeared to me the result of motor vehicles pulling over into the soft shoulder of the road and then
the hot exhaust causing a grass fire. As this soft shoulder of the road is the responsibility of the
Prosecutor then clearly it fails itself to act within the provisions of the legislation it relies upon and
as such fails to be what is called a model litigant.
The notice referred to in the Infringement Notice, as I recall it, is not an offence known in law.
Nor did the Prosecutor provide any further details that could reasonably relied upon. As was made
clear to the Prosecutor and was never contested by the Prosecutor, the property had been twice
slashed by a neighbour and I was given the understanding that it was equally to his own property. I
understand no Infringement Notice was issued against my neighbour.
The Prosecutor didnt advise what was the issue it complained about. It simply issued the
Infringement Notice and as to date never clarified why, other than claiming the notice wasnt
complied with.
FOURTH SUPPLEMENT
TO THE
VICTORIA
GOVERNMENT GAZETTE
OF FRIDAY, DECEMBER 28, 1900.
Published by Authority
No. 2.] WEDNESDAY, JANUARY 2. [1901.
QUOTE
VII., The Governor , in Our name and on Our behalf, may make and execute, under the said Public Seal, grants and
dispositions of any land which may be lawfully granted and disposed of by Us within the State.
END QUOTE
This authorize the Governor to do so and His/Her Ministers of State may do so for the governor, but
the Proclamation doesnt appear to provide for that the Governor (so the minister) can do so at their
own terms. Hence, the FEE SIMPLE rights of the land must be dee4med to be as the rights was in
the Crown without restrictions. It means that any encroachment upon the FEE SIMPLE rights must
be held invalid. In my view the inclusion of the wording which may be lawfully granted and disposed of by Us
within the State is a limitation to what the Governor (so a Minister) can do. As the Monarch cannot
interfere with the FEE SIMPLE rights of a property owner then I view likewise the Minister cannot
do so. Any legislation that encroaches upon my FEE SIMPLE rights, such as an alleged fire danger
cannot be deemed to be lawful where in the end no fire eventuated at all. In my view only if a fire
were to have eventuated that was because of grass/weed being excessive and being the cause of the
fire then the State may have an issue, that is if the courts hold this to be so, but where no fire
eventuates then the alleged fire danger never eventuated.
As I indicated the person allegedly doing the inspections may have an eye sight problem where
he/she doesnt seem to be able to notice weed/grass higher than 1 metres on land the responsibility
of the council.
In the Colosimo case Mr Colosimo was certified by 2medical expert witnesses, who assessed him
on the basis he refused to accept having been convicted for CONTEMPT OF COURT, as they had
been advised by the Office of the Public Advocate Mr Colosimo had been convicted,
Transcript 16 March 2009 page 24 at 18
QUOTE
MR SHOREL-HLAVKIA: And half-way at the bottom part of it, it states what I stated was, After Harbison J
already found contempt to have been proven and therefore the matter is now one between VCAT and Mr
Francis James Colosimo as to determine what if any term of imprisonment should be measured out. So
thats what Her Honour indicated earlier. So this is a matter regarding sentencing itself.
HER HONOUR: No, no, thats not quite right. I havent found Mr Colosimo guilty of contempt because one of
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the elements that I need to be satisfied about as to whether or not hes committed a contempt, is whether
his actions were willful. And thats the reason the matter went to the Guardianship Tribunal, because I
didnt know whether he was intentionally disobeying the order or because he was doing so because he had
a medical condition. So thats the matter that the guardianship application was to explore.
END QUOTE
What was clear was that the Office of the Public Advocate had mislead the expert witnesses and
their evidence/reports were based upon Mr Colosimo having been convicted and refusing to
acknowledge he had been. This even so he had not been convicted, and as I discovered later from
the transcript, he had never been formally charged either. As such 6 contempt hearings were held
without Mr Colosimo having been formally charged, and this while Victorian Legal Aid previously
had written to Mr Colosimo to purge his contempt. To also consider ab out 20 lawyers were
involved in the cases but only because I took up the case for Mr Colosimo was I able to expose it all
and show Mr Colosimo was innocent of any wrong doing!
QUOTE (MR SHOREL-HLAVKIA) (Should be MR SCHOREL-HLAVKA)
But the reason counts is that of all Ms Preuss, on the 27 th, made a ruling of my submission that neither
Moorabool Shire Council or Maddocks lawyers had a legal standing in the case. Now, thats not in the
orders I have requested Ms Preuss and I will tender in a minute a copy of the letter that I have provided,
even so it was by email already forwarded, if therefore they had been ruled that they have no legal
standing on the basis that I went to the original application of 27 January 2007/
If therefore they had no legal standing, then it is a direct and a collateral estoppel between the parties.
They did not appeal the ruling of Ms Preuss and they cannot say, Well we still have a legal standing. If
they now apply for withdraw, then you would give them a legal standing. We challenge the State Trustees
have no legal standing.
END QUOTE
Hansard 6-4-1897 Constitution convention Debates (Official Record of the Debates of the National Australasian
Convention)
QUOTE Mr. DEAKIN:
In the first instance, the power of the Crown itself is nowhere defined, and cannot be defined under this
constitution.
END QUOTE
In the Colosimo case I extensively detailed FEE SIMPLE issues and in my view in addition of
what is set out above, I cannot accept that the State can dictate how I can or cannot use my property.
The property was purchased in 1987 as FEE SIMPLE, under the authority of the British Crown. In
Sue v Hill the High Court of Australia held that the Commonwealth of Australia is now an
independent country under the Queen of Australia and that the Queen of the United Kingdom was
of a foreign power (that is how I perceived it) and hence Heather Hill was unceremonially kicked
out of the Federal Parliament, to which on 19 July 2006 I submitted was not applicable and beyond
the courts power to adjudicate upon.
.

QUOTE
Mr. SYMON ( South Australia ).In the preamble honorable members will find that what we desire to do is to unite in one indissoluble Federal
Commonwealth -that is the political Union-"under the Crown of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Ireland , and under the Constitution hereby established." Honorable members will therefore see that the
application of the word Commonwealth is to the political Union which is sought to be established. It is not
intended there to have any relation whatever to the name of the country or nation which we are going to create
under that Union . The second part of the preamble goes on to say that it is expedient to make provision for the
admission of other colonies into the Commonwealth. That is, for admission into this political Union, which is
not a republic, which is not to be called a dominion, kingdom, or empire, but is to be a Union by the name
of "Commonwealth," and I do not propose to interfere with that in the slightest degree.
END QUOTE
.
Hence, the High Court of Australia lacked any jurisdiction to amend the true meaning and
application of the constitution as to purport that the Commonwealth of Australia no longer is a
political union. One cannot claim to have the European Nationality but rely upon the nationality
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of one of its members country. In case of the Commonwealth of Australia this relates to the being
British Subjects:
QUOTE
Mr. BARTON.-I did not say that. I say that our real status is as subjects, and that we are all alike
subjects of the British Crown.
END QUOTE
Hansard 17-3-1898 Constitution convention Debates (Official Record of the Debates of the National Australasian
Convention)
QUOTE
Mr. BARTON.Providing, as this Constitution does, for a free people to elect a free Parliament-giving that people
through their Parliament the power of the purse-laying at their mercy from day to day the existence of
any Ministry which dares by corruption, or drifts through ignorance into, the commission of any act
which is unfavorable to the people having this security, it must in its very essence be a free Constitution.
Whatever any one may say to the contrary that is secured in the very way in which the freedom of the
British Constitution is secured. It is secured by vesting in the people, through their representatives, the
power of the purse, and I venture [start page 2477] to say there is no other way of securing absolute
freedom to a people than that, unless you make a different kind of Executive than that which we
contemplate, and then overload your Constitution with legislative provisions to protect the citizen from
interference. Under this Constitution he is saved from every kind of interference. Under this
Constitution he has his voice not only in the, daily government of the country, but in the daily
determination of the question of whom is the Government to consist. There is the guarantee of freedom
in this Constitution. There is the guarantee which none of us have sought to remove, but every one has
sought to strengthen. How we or our work can be accused of not providing for the popular liberty is
something which I hope the critics will now venture to explain, and I think I have made their work
difficult for them. Having provided in that way for a free Constitution, we have provided for an
Executive which is charged with the duty of maintaining the provisions of that Constitution; and,
therefore, it can only act as the agents of the people. We have provided for a Judiciary, which will
determine questions arising under this Constitution, and with all other questions which should be dealt
with by a Federal Judiciary and it will also be a High Court of Appeal for all courts in the states that
choose to resort to it. In doing these things, have we not provided, first, that our Constitution shall be free:
next, that its government shall be by the will of the people, which is the just result of their freedom: thirdly,
that the Constitution shall not, nor shall any of its provisions, be twisted or perverted, inasmuch as a
court appointed by their own Executive, but acting independently, is to decide what is a perversion of its
provisions? We can have every faith in the constitution of that tribunal. It is appointed as the arbiter of the
Constitution. It is appointed not to be above the Constitution, for no citizen is above it, but under it; but
it is appointed for the purpose of saying that those who are the instruments of the Constitution-the
Government and the Parliament of the day-shall not become the masters of those whom, as to the
Constitution, they are bound to serve. What I mean is this: That if you, after making a Constitution of
this kind, enable any Government or any Parliament to twist or infringe its provisions, then by slow
degrees you may have that Constitution-if not altered in terms-so whittled away in operation that the
guarantees of freedom which it gives your people will not be maintained; and so, in the highest sense, the
court you are creating here, which is to be the final interpreter of that Constitution, will be such a
tribunal as will preserve the popular liberty in all these regards, and will prevent, under any pretext of
constitutional action, the Commonwealth from dominating the states, or the states from usurping the
sphere of the Commonwealth. Having provided for all these things, I think this Convention has done
well.
END QUOTE
As I did set out before the County court of Victoria that constitutionally that is a person can obtain
state citizenship and by this automatically obtains Australian citizen ship which is a political
status and nothing to do with nationality.
QUOTE
Mr. SYMON.-Very likely not. What I want to know is, if there is anybody who will come under the operation
of the law, so as to be a citizen of the Commonwealth, who would not also be entitled to be a citizen of the state?
There ought to be no opportunity for such discrimination as would allow a section of a state to remain outside the
pale of the Commonwealth, except with regard to legislation as to aliens. Dual citizenship exists, but it is not
dual citizenship of persons, it is dual citizenship in each person. There may be two men-Jones and Smith-in
one state, both of whom are citizens of the state, but one only is a citizen of the Commonwealth. That
would not be the dual citizenship meant. What is meant is a dual citizenship in Mr. Trenwith and myself.
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That is to say, I am a citizen of the state and I am also a citizen of the Commonwealth; that is the dual
citizenship. That does not affect the operation of this clause at all. But if we introduce this clause, it is open to
the whole of the powerful criticism of Mr. O'Connor and those who say that it is putting on the face of the
Constitution an unnecessary provision, and one which we do not expect will be exercised adversely or
improperly, and, therefore, it is much better to be left out. Let us, in dealing with this question, be as careful as
we possibly, can that we do not qualify the citizenship of this Commonwealth in any way or exclude anybody
[start page 1764] from it, and let us do that with precision and clearness. As a citizen of a state I claim the right
to be a citizen of the Commonwealth. I do not want to place in the hands of the Commonwealth
Parliament, however much I may be prepared to trust it, the right of depriving me of citizenship. I put this
only as an argument, because no one would anticipate such a thing, but the Commonwealth Parliament might say
that nobody possessed of less than 1,000 a year should be a citizen of the Federation. You are putting that
power in the hands of Parliament.
Mr. HIGGINS.-Why not?
Mr. SYMON.-I would not put such a power in the hands of any Parliament. We must rest this Constitution
on a foundation that we understand, and we mean that every citizen of a state shall be a citizen of the
Commonwealth, and that the Commonwealth shall have no right to withdraw, qualify, or restrict those
rights of citizenship, except with regard to one particular set of people who are subject to disabilities, as
aliens, and so on.
END QUOTE
QUOTE
Sir JOHN DOWNER.-Now it is coming out. The Constitution is made for the people and the states on
terms that are just to both.
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Mr. DEAKIN.-It is made for the lawyers under this clause.

Sir JOHN DOWNER.-I do not think so. If you say "Trust the Parliament," no Constitution is required at
all; it can simply be provided that a certain number of gentlemen shall be elected, and meet together, and,
without limitation, do what they like. Victoria would not agree to that. But there is a desire to draw the very lifeblood of the Constitution, so far as the states are concerned, by this insidious amendment, which would give the
Houses authority from time to time to put different constructions on this most important part of the
Constitution. I hope we will do as we have done in many instances before, in matters that have been much
debated-adhere to the decision we have already arrived at.
END QUOTE
Convention)
QUOTE
Mr. WISE.-If the Federal Parliament chose to legislate upon, say, the education question-and the
Constitution gives it no power to legislate in regard to that question-the Ministers for the time being in each state
might say-"We are favorable to this law, because we shall get 100,000 a year, or so much a year, from the
Federal Government as a subsidy for our schools," and thus they might wink at a violation of the
Constitution, while no one could complain. If this is to be allowed, why should we have these elaborate
provisions for the amendment of the Constitution? Why should we not say that the Constitution may be
amended in any way that the Ministries of the several colonies may unanimously agree? Why have this
provision for a referendum? Why consult the people at all? Why not leave this matter to the Ministers of
the day? But the proposal has a more serious aspect, and for that reason only I will ask permission to
occupy a few minutes in discussing it.
END QUOTE
Again, it is beyond the powers of the Prosecutor to litigate this issue because the County Court of
Victoria faced that none of the Attorney-Generals challenged any of my submissions and supportive
evidence then clearly had to rule in my favour to uphold my appeals unreserved. The Prosecutor is
bound by this
.

QUOTE Mr. DEAKIN:
It appears to me that the representatives of the less populous States decline to distinguish sufficiently between
the money powers and the general powers to be conferred by a Constitution. Now the distinction is no mere
fantasy. It should be recognised in the forefront of the Constitution. In the exercise of both powers there are
instances in which it is possible that State interests may be put in jeopardy. State rights cannot be put in. such
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jeopardy; they are enshrined and preserved under the Constitution and protected by the courts to be
established under that Constitution.
END QUOTE
The Infringement Court is not a court established under the constitution. It is a violation of the
separation of powers.
From The Age
http://www.theage.com.au/news/Opinion/The-corporatising-of-our-courts/2005/03/23/1111525218521.html
The corporatising of our courts

Retirement speech of John K. Phillips, Supreme Court of Victoria
March 24, 2005
QUOTE
As we all know, the independence of the judiciary is a cornerstone of our constitutional system,
particularly the independence of this court, which must, from time to time, tell the political arms what
they can and cannot do according to law. As a court we will rarely, if ever, be popular with politicians,
but while I have been sitting here, I have seen what appears to me to be some erosion of this court's
independence.
END QUOTE
Clearly, the wording As we all know, the independence of the judiciary is a cornerstone of our
constitutional system indicates that this justice held there was a separation of powers within
state level.
From The Age
http://www.theage.com.au/news/Opinion/The-corporatising-of-our-courts/2005/03/23/1111525218521.html
QUOTE
28
The corporatising of our courts
29
Retirement speech of John K. Phillips, Supreme Court of Victoria
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March 24, 2005
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In his parting words from the Supreme Court bench, John D. Phillips warns of a dangerous erosion of the
court's independence.
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For more than 14 years I have been sitting here, and it has been hard and unremitting, but exciting and
rewarding - emotionally, I hasten to add, before I am misunderstood. But for much of that time I have had to
bite my tongue.
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I refer to policy matters rather than the debate within a particular case. For, during my time on the bench, and
especially as I grew more senior, I have watched with some concern a change emerge in the perception of
this court by others and some blurring of essential distinctions. I want to speak briefly of that now because I
have been unable to say much about it until now and when my resignation becomes effective, I fear that
nobody will listen.
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As we all know, the independence of the judiciary is a cornerstone of our constitutional system,
particularly the independence of this court, which must, from time to time, tell the political arms what
they can and cannot do according to law. As a court we will rarely, if ever, be popular with politicians, but
while I have been sitting here, I have seen what appears to me to be some erosion of this court's
independence.
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One of the most public examples recently was the refusal of the executive to accept the decision on
remuneration handed down by the tribunal established by the Parliament for the very purpose of freeing both
Parliament and the executive from the invidiousness of the decision-making process over judicial salaries
and so ensuring the independence of which I am speaking.
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Less well known was the refusal of earlier governments to allow that the court's own chief executive officer
be appointed by the Governor-in-Council and its insistence that that officer be appointed by and be
ultimately answerable to the Department of Justice, which is what happened.
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That appears now, if I may say so, to have been but part of a movement towards this court's becoming
absorbed into that department, and it is that to which I want to draw attention in particular; for such a
movement must be reversed if this court is to have, and to keep, its proper role under the constitution.
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This court is not some part of the public service and it must never be seen as such. Established as a court of
plenary jurisdiction and with supervisory jurisdiction over all other courts and tribunals, this court is the third
arm of government, co-equal in concept with Parliament and the executive. Its role, inter alia, is to control
and to limit those other arms according to law and to that end to stand between those other arms and the
citizen. Hence the emphasis on the court's independence, especially from the executive.
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Yet within the Department of Justice this court is now identified and dealt with - would you believe as "Business Unit 19" within a section labelled "courts and tribunals", a section which
indiscriminately includes all three tiers of the court structure and VCAT.
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This court is subject to direction on the raising of taxes in the form of court fees - in that these are prescribed
by departmental regulation, even if a part of those fees is redirected to the court by the department at its
discretion. The other day the department used a regulation to prescribe a procedure in this court, apparently
in disregard, if not in defiance, of the convention that such matters are for rules of court.
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And perhaps most troubling of all: the judges' computers, which were provided by and through the
department, are but part of the departmental network. I do not say that departmental officers ordinarily avail
themselves of the access that that affords; one hopes the department has some controls in place. But access is
possible, and that seems to me altogether inappropriate when the state, in one form or another, is the major
litigant in this court, and sometimes on matters of critical import to the wider community.
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Nobody is suggesting that the executive would ever seek to influence a judge's decision directly, otherwise
than by argument in open court, but what has been happening is more insidious. What is evolving is a
perception of the court as some sort of unit or functionary within the Department of Justice, a perception
which is inconsistent with this court's fundamental role and underlying independence.
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Indeed I think it is fair to say that the Supreme Court, despite its dominant role within the court structure and
its constitutional role vis-a-vis the other arms of government, is now seen by some in authority as no
different from a tribunal, nowadays the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal in particular. That is
simply not the case; yet the distinction between a court and a tribunal has been steadily undermined over the
years, and it must be restored if the proper constitutional position is not 2to be subverted.
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The basic distinction is easy enough. A court exercises judicial power and must be, and be seen to be,
impartial and so must be independent of all else. Accordingly, its judges are appointed once and for all, and
ideally, without hope of additional gain or reward from anyone, including any other arm of government.
Hence Parliament's creation of the specialist remuneration tribunal. In contrast to a court, a tribunal, properly
so called, exercises administrative functions but not judicial power, and many things flow from that. Such a
tribunal may be an arm of the executive; its members may be appointed for fixed terms, with the possibility
of renewal at the discretion of the executive; and the need is not so great, to see that their remuneration is
fixed independently of the executive.
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You will see, now, how far the distinction between court and tribunal has become blurred. While the
Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal is staffed by a few judges, it consists mainly of members
appointed for fixed terms, capable of renewal at the discretion of the executive - and hence my alarm when,
in addition to its administrative work, that tribunal was given some judicial power to exercise, for the latter is
altogether inconsistent with such a form of tenure.
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There is talk now of acting judges for this court, and again, because this is a court which is exercising
judicial power, such would be anathema. It is one thing to tolerate the occasional acting appointment to this
court for a limited time or purpose; it is altogether different to institutionalise such temporary appointments
at the discretion of the executive. Judges of a court properly so called must have security of tenure or, in a
relatively small community like this in Victoria, the whole system is put at risk. Our courts have been
remarkably free from any taint of bias or corruption; let it remain that way. A judge must be, and be seen to
be, impartial and so must eschew all other interests which might one day give rise to conflict or the
appearance of bias.
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In my book, the judge must forgo the current cult of the individual: to adapt Edmund Burke, "individuals
pass like shadows, but the (institution) is fixed and stable". The judge is sometimes accused of remoteness
but in one sense that is no more than the reverse side of the commitment, the total commitment, which is
demanded of the appointee.
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John D. Phillips is retiring as a judge of the Supreme Court of Victoria. This is part of his farewell address to
the court.
END QUOTE
Constitutionally there is a division between the Judiciary and the legislators and executives.
.
It should be noted that the wording and for the due and impartial administration of justice
which Oaths the said Chief Justice or Judge is hereby required to administer leaves it
beyond doubt that the Chief Justice or Judge must for the due and impartial administration
of justice make an oath. As such the separation of powers in the State of Victoria is
enshrined in this Proclamation as the Governor cannot act otherwise nor so any judge.
FOURTH SUPPLEMENT
TO THE
VICTORIA
GOVERNMENT GAZETTE
QUOTE
follows :
IV. Every person appointed to fill the Office of Governor shall with, all due solemnity, before entering on
any of the duties of his Office, cause the Commission appointing to be Governor to be read and published
at, the seat of Government, in the presence of the Chief .Justice, or some other Judge of the Supreme Court
of the State, and of she Members of the Executive Council thereof, which being done, he shall then and there
take before them the Oath of Allegiance, in the form provided by an Act passed in the Session holden in tile
Thirty-first and Thirty-second years of Our Reign, intituled an Act to amend the Law relating to Promissory
Oaths ; ,and likewise the usual Oath for the due execution of the Office of Governor, and for the due and
impartial administration of justice which Oaths the said Chief Justice or Judge is hereby required to
administer.
END QUOTE
The Office of the Governor (Victoria) as per 2-1-1901 PROCLAMATION, that was Gazetted
requires that the Governor appoints independent judges! As such, any notion that there being no
separation of powers in the states utter and sheer nonsense.
Where then unions find that their union members and others are denied their constitutional rights
and the Victorian Parliament for example without authority of the State electors purportedly
referred legislative (and so judicial) powers to the Commonwealth of Australia then one hardly
can wonder that unions will seek to use their powers in whatever way they deem fit and
appropriate to try to address issues. I may not approve of unions doing so but then the courts
themselves should have acted appropriately and this I view it fails far too often to do.
Workers (not just members) by this have been robbed of their constitutional rights of contracts as
was provided for by the legal principles embedded in the constitution, also applicable to the
State of Victoria.
In my 2-5-2015 correspondence to Buloke Shire Council I also stated:
QUOTE 2-5-2015 CORRESPONDENCE
As I understand it the Infringement Act requires matter that is if pursued (As Buloke Shire Council
can simply not proceed with it), requires it to be filed with the Infringement court. However, as I
indicated in my previous correspondences, I object to it on constitution grounds (that is the Federal
constitution - Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK)) which in s106 created the
States subject to this constitution. And as the Infringement Court purportedly is part of the
Magistrates Court of Victoria but not one that allows a hearing as a Chapter III court of the
constitution then I view it has no jurisdiction to hear and determine the matters. The Infringement
Court is not a Court invested with federal jurisdiction.
In February 2011 the Victorian Police alleged that I had been exceeding the speed limit by 5
kilometres an hours and issue an Infringement Notice. I challenged this on constitutional grounds as
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a CONSTITUTIONALIST I for example on 19 July 2006 comprehensively defeated the

Commonwealth of Australia on compulsory voting in the County Court of Victoria exercising
federal jurisdiction, to which all state and Territorian Attorney-Generals had been served with a
s78B NOTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL MATTERS. I also challenged the validity of the
purported Victorian Constitution Act 1975 and raised the issue that it is a violation of separation of
powers to have courts using the same ABN number as the Attorney-Generals Department.
I on 6 July 2006 published a book:
INSPECTOR-RIKATI & What is the -Australian way of life- really?
A book on CD on Australians political, religious & other rights
ISBN 0-9751760-2-1
CHAPTER 03 NOT VOTING IN BANANA REPUBLIC
County Court of Victoria, Case numbers T01567737 & Q10897630
060719gh-address-part 1-v7
Below you will find I have quoted parts of the ADDRESS TO THE COURT in which proceedings
I comprehensively defeated the Commonwealth of Australia regarding numerous constitutional
issues.
ADDRESS TO THE COURT, Part 2
QUOTE ADDRESS TO THE COURT, Part 2
I am well aware that there is an implied bias by the County Court of Victoria where it shares the same ABN business
registration number as the Justice Department and the magistrates Court of Victoria against which I appealed its
conviction, and this also is a issue of concern to me.
To me it represents to be a STAR CHAMBER COURT which is outlaws under the, so called, 1640 STAR
CHAMBER COURT Act and which is part of Victorian legislation, at least when I last checked the Act
Interpretation Act 1980 (Vic).
I refer back to the extensive set out on this matter that I placed on file in my ADDRESS TO THE COURT filed for
the 16 and 17 November 2005 proceedings held before the Magistrates Court of Victoria at Heidelberg and now
being DE NOVO before this Court. For example that the County court of Victoria, the Magistrates Court of
Victoria, the Justice the Department and among many others the Prostitution Committee are all in the same
business by sharing the same ABN number.
QUOTE 130721- John Wilson
The Constitutional Matter raised in these proceedings is a re-visit to the Boilermakers Case, Citation: (1956) 94
CLR 254. ... R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers' Society of Australia. The High Court Of Australia ruled that a
statutory body that is not a court has no judicial authority and cannot act judicially. An example being
the State Debt Recovery Office (SDRO) of New South Wales Australia cannot impose any judgement or
penalty or fines, which can only be done by a court. The SDRO is not a court, instead is a private corporation
conducting business/commerce (a statutory body). So the cancelling of car licenses and registrations at the
direction of the SDRO to the Road and Traffic Authority (RTA) of New South Wales, Australia (another
private corporation conducting business/commerce) is unlawful.
END QUOTE
Momcilovic v The Queen [2011] HCA 34 (8 September 2011)
QUOTE
1.
Independence of the courts is integral to their institutional integrity. Judgments of this Court
confirm the importance of the perception of a judge's role in this regard. In connection with functions which do
not involve exercising judicial power, it was held in Wilson v Minister for Aboriginal and Torres Strait
Islander Affairs that legislation which required a federal judge, appointed by the Minister, to report to the
Minister was invalid. Gaudron J there said that "impartiality and the appearance of impartiality are defining
features of judicial power."[848] Her Honour went on to observe that a court exercising judicial power must
"be and be seen to be completely independent" of the legislative and executive branches of government[849].
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The need for independence and impartiality, and the separation of the judiciary and the other arms of
government, also underlie the requirement of a "matter" in s 76 of the Constitution which operates to limit the
circumstances in which judicial power can be exercised[850]. Closer to the subject at hand, and in connection
with the application of Kable, Gummow J in Fardon v Attorney-General (Qld) stated that it was preferable to
view a perception which may undermine public confidence as an indicator, but not the touchstone, of
invalidity. The touchstone, his Honour said, is the institutional integrity of the court[851].
1.
In some cases it may be difficult to view the way a court is perceived as unconnected to its integrity as
an institution. Whilst the judgments in Totani confirmed that the practical operation of the legislation there was
to enlist a judge to effect executive and legislative policy, the legislation also, and misleadingly, gave the
appearance of the Magistrates Court participating in the pursuit of the objectives of the Act in question, whilst
giving effect to that executive and legislative policy[852]. Problems created by the appearance of a want of
independence were evident in Wainohu, where the statute denied the duty of a judge to give reasons, but at the
same time created an apparent connection between the non-judicial function conferred and the exercise of
jurisdiction by a Supreme Court judge. It was there said that[853]:
"The appearance of a judge making a declaration is thereby created while the giving of reasons, a hallmark
of that office, is denied. These features cannot but affect perceptions of the role of a judge of the court".
1.
The process by which the Court of Appeal here reached its conclusion of inconsistency cannot be said
to involve functions which are incompatible with, or antithetical to, judicial power. The process involves an
ordinary interpretive task. The content of the declaration cannot be a cause for concern. It merely records a
finding of inconsistency between s 5 of the Drugs Act and s 25(1) of the Charter. It does not answer a question
directed to the Court, as to the validity of legislation, as was the case in In re Judiciary and Navigation Acts.
The Court does not purport to advise as to law reform. It is not unknown for judges to incidentally pass
comments upon conclusions they have reached about defects in legislation in the course of their reasons[854].
Doing so in the course of a permissible exercise of judicial power is "a function properly regarded as incidental
to the exercise of the power."[855] However, that function is not a function which, if it were undertaken
independently of the exercise of "a principal judicial duty"[856], might be said to "belong to an
administrator."[857] The form of the process under s 36(2) does not alter that analysis.
1.
The argument for the invalidity of s 36 is about perceptions. The matters in this case which are
relevant to the appearance of the Supreme Court as independent of the executive and legislative branches of
the Victorian State Government are (a) that the non-judicial function of making a declaration is embellished by
being styled a "declaration" to give the appearance of an order of the Court; and (b) that the legislation requires
a copy of the declaration to be given to the Attorney-General.
1.
The first-mentioned feature calls to mind what was said in Mistretta v United States[858], namely,
that the reputation of the judicial branch may not be borrowed by the legislative and executive branches "to
cloak their work in the neutral colors of judicial action."[859] But that statement was directed to a legislative or
executive function which was disguised by use of a court's processes. Here the declaration, whilst not
dispositive because it is made only incidentally with respect to a matter, does not implement any policy or
action of the executive or the legislature. Putting to one side the description given to it as a "declaration", it is
readily apparent that it is no more than a statement made by the Supreme Court as to an apparent
inconsistency. So far as it concerns the executive and the legislature, the statement serves only to draw
attention to that effect. The steps, if any, which are proposed by the relevant Minister to change the law do not
involve the Court.
1.
The requirements of notification are the only mandatory aspects of the declaration process. Too much
should not be read into these obligations, given that it is the Court which decides, in the first place, whether to
make a declaration. In doing so it is not responsive to any legislative command. These requirements and the
declaration itself are largely innocuous so far as concerns the Supreme Court. Their principal purpose is to set
in train a process whereby the relevant Minister considers what should be done by way of legislative change.
No incompatibility with the institutional integrity of the Supreme Court is disclosed by reference to these
matters.
END QUOTE
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/R_v_Kirby;_Ex_parte_Boilermakers'_Society_of_Australia
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R v Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers' Society of Australia
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R v. Kirby; Ex parte Boilermakers' Society of Australia [1956] HCA 10; (1956) 94 CLR 254 (2
March 1956) was a case in which the High Court of Australia held that the judicial power of the
Commonwealth could not be vested in a tribunal that also exercised non-judicial functions.
Although the court's reasons did not examine the fundamental justifications for the separation of
judicial and executive powers, this case is one of the foundations for that doctrine in Australian law.
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
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The significance of the case was that it restricted the use of judicial power to Chapter III courts
(under the Australian Constitution), also established that these courts could exercise no other power.
In this way, it set a high standard for the separation of judicial power.
Lord Denning described it as "the greatest constitutional document of all times the foundation of
the freedom of the individual against the arbitrary authority of the despot".[5] In a 2005 speech,
Lord Woolf described it as the "first of a series of instruments that now are recognised as having a
special constitutional status",[6] the others being the Habeas Corpus Act (1679), the Petition of
Right (1628), the Bill of Rights (1689), and the Act of Settlement (1701).
.
Where therefore the courts are now referred to as Business Unit 19 then clearly sharing the same
ABN number underlines that there is a violation of separation of powers, and a failure to be an
impartial administration of justice as is required by the proclamation to which the legislators
(Parliament) has no legislative powers to overrule.
FOURTH SUPPLEMENT
TO THE
VICTORIA
GOVERNMENT GAZETTE
QUOTE
follows :
IV. Every person appointed to fill the Office of Governor shall with, all due solemnity, before entering on
any of the duties of his Office, cause the Commission appointing to be Governor to be read and published
at, the seat of Government, in the presence of the Chief .Justice, or some other Judge of the Supreme Court
of the State, and of she Members of the Executive Council thereof, which being done, he shall then and there
take before them the Oath of Allegiance, in the form provided by an Act passed in the Session holden in tile
Thirty-first and Thirty-second years of Our Reign, intituled an Act to amend the Law relating to Promissory
Oaths ; ,and likewise the usual Oath for the due execution of the Office of Governor, and for the due and
impartial administration of justice which Oaths the said Chief Justice or Judge is hereby required to
administer.
END QUOTE
On Friday 14 August 2015 I was in a meeting when a lawyer happen to pass by and well in a short
conversation as I understood it made known that he as an officer of the court couldnt challenge
the jurisdiction of the court. To me this is a very serious matter as what this means is that because a
lawyer is admitted to the Bar then he cannot challenge the jurisdiction unless the lawyer represents
the state, such as I referred to above in 1988. There is a clear implied bias when a lawyer is a
member of the bar and is appointed to a judicial position while being a member of the bar. Being a
member of the bar doesnt mean to be a member of the court. As a CONSTITUTIONALIST and
Professional Advocate in Legal Service Commission v Harold James Johnson I represented Mr
Johnson QC on 4 occasions, including in the Supreme Court of Victoria. As a Professional
Advocate I have the immunity and protection as a solicitor appearing for a party in the Supreme
Court of Victoria. Just that I am not a member of the bar, not a legal practitioner, not officer of the
court. Hence, when I represented a party I was without bias to the court. It was held that Mr
Johnson QC when appearing in personal legal proceedings nevertheless acted as a lawyer. Hence
his comments were subject to disciplinary action.
The book "Law Made Simple" by Colin F. Padfield, LL.B.,D.P.A.(Lond.) on page 55:
QUOTE
"The Rule against Bias. A true judicial decision can be reached only if the judge himself is impartial. This is an
obvious requirement in a court of law or a tribunal. In R. v Rand (1866) it was held that a judge is disqualified
where (i) he has a direct pecuniary interest, however small, in the subject-matter in dispute; or (ii) there is real
likelihood that the judge would have a bias in favour of one of the parties.
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For example, if a judge is related to, or is a friend of, one of the parties to a dispute there would be real likelihood
of bias. It is immaterial whether a judicial decision was in fact biased, for as was said by Lord Chief Justice
Heward in R. v Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy (1924): 'Justice should not only be done, but should
manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done.'
As an example of pecuniary bias we may quote:
Dimes v. Grand Junction Canal (1852). Lord Chancellor Cottenham made decrees in a Chancery suit in favour
of a canal company. Lord Cottenham held several shares in the company. Held: (by the House of Lords): that the
decrees be set aside on the ground of pecurniary interest. No bias was proved in fact, nor could it be shown that
Lord Cottenham was in any way influenced by his shareholding.
As an example of likelihood of bias we may quote:
R. v Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy (1924). A was summoned before magistrates for a motoring offence.
The acting clerk to the justices was a member of a firm of solicitors representing A in civil proceedings arising
out of the same accident. The acting clerk did not advise the magistrates, but he retired with them to consider
their decision. Held: that as the acting clerk was connected with the case in the civil action he ought not to advise
the magistrates in the criminal prosecution. Conviction accordingly quashed, despite the fact that the acting clerk
took no part in the decision to convict and had not been asked by the justices to give his opinion or advice. "
END QUOTE
In Sykes v Cleary the High Court of Australia held that Mr Cleary was not validly elected as he had
not resigned his employment with the State prior to standing for the election. While as a
CONSTITUTIONALIST I may state the Court misconceived State office of profit with that of the
Commonwealth office of profit the issue is that clearly the resignation after appointment was
irrelevant. Meaning that any layer being a member of the bar not resigning prior to the appointment
of being a judge of a court would violate the separation of powers also as well as to be bias.
After all the purported judge is a member of the bar to which legal practitioners appearing before
him would be like wise. And implied bias.
Likewise where the Government has access to the court computers, as this would allow the
government to interfere with any judicial decision on the computer and alter words, etc.
As such when I appear before a court, even in personal matters then it must be accepted I do so as a
CONSTITUTIONALIST and a Professional Advocate without bias towards the court.
I will quote below my 9-5-2015 correspondence to Buloke Shire Council in which I also made clear
that rates are a delegated State land taxation power that no longer is valid since 11-11-1910, at
which time the concurrent legislative powers of s512 of the constitution became exclusive
Commonwealth legislative powers.
This is relevant in that my wifes motor vehicle I use to travel to and from Berriwillock property
needed as gearbox repair, and in fact was towed to the repairer. The repair however was delayed
due to Buloke Shire Council charging unconstitutionally council rates as well as garbage
charges this even so no garbage service has been used for numerous years. Obviously where both
my wife and I are on a pension then monies so to say are very tight and so being slugged
unconstitutional council rates and unlawful garbage charges have a great impact upon our ability to
have monies for repairs. Despite my past request to refund the monies Buloke Shire Council failed
to do so. Hence by its own conduct it caused that I was prevented to have the vehicle available to
travel to Berriwillock, and in the circumstances I arranged for a neighbour to do the slashing, which
I understand was done on 2 occasions prior to the issue of the Infringement Notice. Hence the
alleged non-compliance to a notice cannot be maintained, as 2 slashings were done. Moreover, I
had in fact advised Buloke Shire Council that I had authorized the local captain of the fire brigade
to remove all fire wood from my property. This was thousands of dollars of firewood. Therefore it
was not ill will on my part but to what I consider unlawful and illegal conduct by Buloke Shire
Council to obstruct me in every way it can.
--
The following incorrectly refer to the 1901 constitution, which should be read as1900
QUOTE 9-5-2015 correspondence
Buloke Shire Council

9-5-2015
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Buloke Shire Council's Head Office is located 367 Broadway, Wycheproof, Victoria 3527.
C/o buloke@buloke.vic.gov.au
Cr Reid Mather (Mayor) MALLEE WARD Mobile:
0438 306 259 crmather@buloke.vic.gov.au
Cr David Pollard (Deputy Mayor) LOWER AVOCA WARD Mobile: 0458 918 638 crpollard@buloke.vic.gov.au
Cr Leo Tellefson MOUNT JEFFCOTT WARD Mobile:
0427 320 166 crtellefson@buloke.vic.gov.au
Cr Stuart McLean LOWER AVOCA WARD Mobile: 0439 327 839 crmclean@buloke.vic.gov.au
Cr Graeme Milne MOUNT JEFFCOTT WARD Mobile: 0419 126 911 crmilne@buloke.vic.gov.au
Cr Gail Sharp MOUNT JEFFCOTT WARD Mobile: 0437 090 172 crsharp@buloke.vic.gov.au
Cr Ellen White, MALLEE WARD, Mobile: 0417 560 706, crwhite@buloke.vic.gov.au
Re: Infringement Notice -Fire danger etc

Sir/Madam,
further to my previous correspondences (upon which I rely upon also) as to my property
at 10 Anderson Avenue, Berriwillock, I will now raise some points of my previous
correspondences, albeit they are not all points raised, nor are to be deemed to be the most important
points and neither are listed in order of priority.
Where Buloke Shire Council exercises delegated state powers of Infringement Act then it is
bound by relevant issues.
Any monies raised by or on behalf of the State Government by any alleged delegated
powers must be paid into Consolidated Revenue Funds as not to do so would violated the
Victorian Constitution Act 1975 that all monies must be drawn by Appropriation Bills.
Buloke Shire Council cannot apply a fine of about $1,474.00 where another council for the
same alleged offence reportedly apply a $550.00 fine.
Buloke Shire Council failed/refused to provide a copy of the Infringement Notice when I
advised it that the original could not be located and my wife due her eye sight problems may
accidentally have thrown it out. Hence, Buloke Shire Council failed to provide therefore for
any opportunity, regardless if this was pursued, as provided for on the reverse of the
Infringement Notice.
Buloke Shire Council issued the Infringement Notice without setting out the precise alleged
offence other than to refer to that a notice had not been complied with. Where it didnt
provide specifics then there is no legal basis for an Infringement Notice for this also.
Buloke Shire Council didnt at all act reasonable in the circumstances, where it issued an
Infringement Notice despite that the property have been slashed/mowed twice in the weeks
prior to the Infringement Notice having been issued. It would have in my view been more
appropriate for Buloke Shire Council to have issued a further notice setting out why the
previous slashing/moving was not deemed sufficient, if this was the real issue.
Buloke Shire Council itself has been an offender as not to have sufficiently had weed/grass
slashed at the side of a major highway, such as Calder Highway and clearly fails to be so to
say a model litigant where it allows fire prone and dangerous areas along the Calder
Highway whereas my property is remove from the Calder Highway.
In 2013 I purchased a ride on mower specifically for the sole purpose of mowing/slashing
the Berriwillock property and did so. As such, having purchased a ride on mower at
considerable cost it indicated that I had every intent to use the ride on mower for the
Berriwillock property in future. However, due to my motor vehicle being broken down and
requiring the gearbox to be replaced, for which a receipt was provided to Buloke Shire
Council that this had incurred, I had clearly made prior arrangements to have the property
slashed/mowed, and this was done twice in the weeks prior to the issue of the Infringement
Notice.
As I disputed since February 2011 the validity of the Infringement Act (in other legal
matters) and the State of Victoria had not taken the matter to a competent court of
jurisdiction to determine the matter then as I did set out the INFRINGEMENT ACT is and
remains to be ULTRA VIRES.
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As I did set out the then Attorney-General Robert Hulls made clear, in writing, that he
would accept the County Court of Victoria decision in matters where I appealed two
convictions of FAILING TO VOTE successfully, and during the same proceedings, without
being challenged by any of the Attorney-Generals raised the issue that the Victorian
Constitution Act 1975 is not a valid constitution. I also indicated in my recent writings (see
my blog www.scribd.com/inspectorrikati) that upon Federation the newly created State of
Victoria on 2-1-1901 published a Gazette in which the British Monarch had revoked the
Letters Patent appointing the Governor of the Colony of Victoria and instead commissioned
a permanent Office of the Governor where the governor was to impartially appoint judges,
etc. As such the Courts cannot exercise any ABN registration which also involves the
Justice Department and even the Prostitution Control Commission. And I also provided a
retirement statement of Phillips J of 2005 as published then in The Age newspaper that the
government had access to the courts computers and that the courts were listed as Business
Unit 19 with the government. Hence, no court/tribunal can hear the matters in dispute
where they are not impartial from the Government and so any one exercising delegated
powers of the Government.
I also did refer to Sydney Municipal Council v Commonwealth (1904) where the High
Court of Australia held that a council is exercising delegated powers of a State government
when charging rates, which are a land tax. I also did set out that after the 1904 High Court of
Australia decision the commonwealth on 11-11-1910 commenced the Land Tax Office by
this the States no longer had any legislative powers to apply land taxation and so neither
municipal/shire councils being able to exercise delegated land taxation because the States
lacked to delegate such powers as from 11-11-1910.
I also did set out that the commonwealth abolished land taxation by the Land Tax Abolition
act 1952 and specifically provided that no further land taxation could be applied.
I also did set out that s51 of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1901 provided
for concurrent legislative powers up and until the Commonwealth legislated on the subject
matter as then it became exclusive legislative powers of the Commonwealth. Hence all
state and so any purported delegated powers regarding councils rates land taxes are
unconstitutional and so ULTRA VIRES.
As I also did set out that as from federation the sovereign Parliaments of the colonies were
no more but became constitutional Parliaments where the State constitutions were
subject to the provisions of the commonwealth of Australia Constitution act 1900 (UK) and
could only be amended by a successful State referendum. Hence, where this never
eventuated that all and any legislation purportedly done within the provisions of the
Victorian Constitution Act 1975 are ULTRA VIRES and have no legal force.
I also did set out that for federation purposes the Colonies became States but the Framers of
the constitution held that the States were the local Government and the Commonwealth
was the central government. One cannot have a purported local government being
municipal/shire councils as the States themselves are the local government within the
Federation. Further, the States created within s106 of the constitution subject to this
constitution are bound by the legal provisions and implied legal principles of the federal
constitution. As such a separation of powers (as also indicated in the 2-1-1901 Gazette
published in Victoria) that the judiciary shall be impartial must be adhered to.
Municipal/shire councils are not a level of Government provided for in the federal
constitution and as such violates the legal principles embedded in this constitution. Neither
is the structure of a municipal/shire council conforming with the legal principles embedded
in the federal constitution. The purported Local Government Act (Vic) allows for a council
to sell a persons property, whereas the Federal constitution doesnt allow for this kind of
absurd principle. The federal constitution provides for acquisition and a just price to be paid.
If there is a debt or alleged debt then the courts are there to decide the matter. No unilateral
grabbing of a citizens property and selling the property, as has been found in the past the
council having sold the wrong property of a person who had no debt whatsoever.
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I have made clear that in past litigation (not involving Buloke Shire Council) the
Infringement Registrar refused a review which made the Infringement court to be
unconstitutional, this as the High Court of Australia in Harris v Caladine made clear a
registrars decision always must be reviewable and if it is refused the Registrars orders as
unconstitutional. For this also the Infringement Court cannot hear and determine any
matters.
I have also set out that the Infringement Court is not an open court and its decisions are
not published by the Magistrates Court of Victoria, this even so it is claimed to be part of the
Magistrates Court of Victoria. As I did set out that on 19 July 2006 after a 5 year epic legal
battled I comprehensively defeated the Commonwealth of Australia, and all AttorneyGenerals were provided with the s78B NOTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL MATTERS and
accepted the court decision, that the County Court of Victoria exercising federal jurisdiction
upheld all my submissions when it upheld both appeals unchallenged. Hence the state of
Victoria cannot litigate the same issues against me again as it is bound by the courts
decision. Likewise so any council seeking to exercise delegated powers. Further, An
Infringement Court is not a court that is invested with federal jurisdiction. Further, the
Magistrates Court of Victoria allowing under its heading to have an Infringement Court
operating in violation to the Framers of the Constitution that a judicial determination can
only be handed down after hearing both sides, which the Infringement Court doesnt
provide for, and allows a private company to use the Magistrates Court of Victoria letter
head to purport a decision was made by or under authority of the Magistrates Court of
Victoria then it has itself proven to be bias and cannot hear and determine matters. Nor can
the Magistrates Court of Victoria overrule or otherwise undermine the legal benefits I
gained from the 19-7-2006 County Court of Victoria (having exercised federal jurisdiction)
decision to uphold my appeals on all matters I submitted to the court and so unchallenged,
including by the then Attorney-General of the State of Victoria.
I indicated that no court within the commonwealth of Australia can hear and determine any
matters because I challenge the validity of citizenship and this was also neither challenged
on 19-7-2006 before the County Court of Victoria exercising federal jurisdiction, and as
such only if the matter were to be heard before the Privy Council can any impartial court be
deemed to deal with the matters on hand, this as each and every judge of the High Court of
Australia would have a self-interest (bias) in seeking to defeat my upheld challenge that
citizenship is not a Commonwealth of Australia legislative power.
I also made clear there is NO CASE TO ANSWER.
Further I made clear that where I challenged the jurisdiction of any court within the
Commonwealth of Australia to hear and determine matters then the onus is upon the
Prosecutor to prove jurisdiction.
Another issue is that Buloke Shire Council is charging me rates purportedly for services
rendered and then slug me about $360 for garbage collection even so this is not used. As
such the purported rates (apart of it being unconstitutionally) is not at all for services
rendered, rather it is so to say double dipping for services not even used.
I have also set out that councils are performing certain services (not necessarily for me) that
are actually so to say delegated by the State Government but for which the state government
provides no funding or not enough and the councils then are charging its citizens for the
same again. As such, councils are not excising delegated powers if it is not being funded
sufficiently to exercise the delegated powers and by this charge its citizens for something
where other councils do not do the same.
As I indicated one cannot come to court with dirty hands, besides the numerous other legal)
quotations and Authorities referred to that I listed in my various correspondences, and as
such it cannot pursue me for something to which itself is so to say in violation off.
No cost can be awarded for constitutional challenge nor for Infringement Notices litigation,
as I provided previously relevant Supreme Court of Victoria Authority regarding this also!
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The Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK) within which the States are
created (from the former colonies) in Section 106 is based upon separation of powers of the
executives, legislators and judiciary as well as the Inter-State Commission (s101). It doesnt
provide for a system such as a municipal/shire council as a form of local government,
where the councillors are both the executives as well as the legislators (council by laws) as
this defies the separation of powers as well as that the Framers of the Constitution held that
councils were incorporated looking after the interest of rate payers, as then rates (land taxes)
could be applied. As the legal status of a council such as in Victoria, N.S.W and Queensland
is considerably different as provided for by each State then clearly this cannot be deemed to
be a structure of government or delegated powers exercised because any laws, including that
of a State must be within the ambit of the legal principles embedded in the constitution. As
such municipal/shire councils being incorporated and using ABN numbers cannot
LEGISLATE, ADJUDICATE!
See further my various writings previously provided.
As councils are registered as a business with a business number (ABN) then I view it also should
consider its legal liability. After all if it is in the business to claim fire safety but fails itself to
comply then this can be misleading/deceptive business practice as to procure monies from residents
under falsehood/deception.
http://www.cbp.com.au/Publications/Councils-can-be-found-guilty-of-misleading-ordece?utm_source=Mondaq&utm_medium=syndication&utm_campaign=View-Original
QUOTE
24
Councils can be found guilty of misleading or deceptive

conduct
25
28 April 2015
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Councils can be found guilty of misleading or deceptive conduct
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By Mathew Deighton
In brief - Councils not exempt from operation of
Competition and Consumer Act (CCA)
It has long been considered that local councils (like trade unions) are not engaged in trade or commerce and
therefore are exempt from the operation of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), which replaced the
well-known Trade Practices Act. However, that is not the case. Like individuals, partnerships and companies,
councils can fall foul of the CCA, including its misleading or deceptive conduct provisions.
Council issues "Expression of Interest" and negotiates

with two supermarkets
The application of the CCA to the conduct of local councils was considered in the Supreme Court of NSW case of
Fabcot Pty Ltd v Port Macquarie-Hastings Council [2010] NSWSC 726.
In 2005 Port Macquarie-Hastings Council sought expressions of interest (EOI) for the development of council
land. Coles and Woolworths both expressed interest in the project. The council initially approved Woolworths'
proposal. When those negotiations reached an impasse, the council commenced negotiations with Coles.
Dissatisfied with the progress made, in 2007 the council again sought EOIs for the development of the land. Coles
and Woolworths again expressed their interest. In 2008 the council gave in principle approval to Woolworths'
development proposal. However, after several months of negotiations, the council and Woolworths were unable to
reach agreement on the terms of the agreement.
Unsuccessful party sues council for misleading and

deceptive conduct
As a result of the impasse it had reached with Woolworths, in 2009 the council re-opened negotiations with Coles.
For commercial reasons, the council deliberately refrained from informing Woolworths that it was also negotiating
with Coles. Woolworths continued negotiating with council and carrying out preliminary works in the belief that it
had an exclusive arrangement with the council.
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On 1 July 2009, council agreed to sell the land to Coles. Woolworths sued the council, alleging amongst other
things that the council's failure to disclose to Woolworths that it was also negotiating with Coles was misleading
and deceptive.
The court held that the council's conduct was misleading and deceptive. Moreover, the court found that the
council's conduct fell well short of commercial fair dealing and the standards which a commercial party was
entitled to expect when dealing with a council.
Councils need to act with honesty and candour in their

commercial dealings
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Councils (and their officers) need to ensure that when carrying on their commercial activities, they act with
honesty and candour. Otherwise, councils, like any other person or entity involved in trade or commerce, run the
risk of being found to have engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct in contravention of the CCA.
Exposure to risks from engaging in misleading or

deceptive conduct
Councils that are found to have engaged in misleading or deceptive conduct expose themselves to:
Having damages awarded against them (e.g. a party in Woolworths' position would in most cases be entitled to
receive compensation for the expenditure it incurred in negotiating with the council)
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Being injuncted from engaging in the contravening conduct
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Having executed contracts set aside or varied in order to overcome the contravention
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Prosecution and the imposition of penalties by the ACCC
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Reputational damage due to adverse publicity
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Risks to officers who work for councils

Further, officers acting as the organ of the council are also exposed to the risk of being found to have been
knowingly involved in, or aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the contravention. In the event that an officer is
found to have been a party to the contravention of the CCA, the aggrieved party would be entitled to seek
damages from the officer.
Officers of councils need to be covered by liability

insurance
To the extent that council officers are involved in commercial negotiations or commercial decisions, officers ought
to ensure that the council has appropriate directors and officers liability insurance policies in place.
END QUOTE
This document is not intended and neither must be perceived to limit the scope and application of
my past writings it merely highlight some but not all issues and neither list issues on basis of
importance.
Awaiting your response, G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B. (Gerrit)
MAY JUSTICE ALWAYS PREVAIL

Our name is our motto!)
END QUOTE 9-5-2015 correspondence
While a police officer may enforced road laws against a motorist if the police officer himself such
as when not on duty is speeding then the police officer can be held legally accountable for doing
so. In my view the same with Buloke Shire Council where it seeks to enforce or purportedly seek to
enforce fire danger provisions while itself blatantly disregarding the same.
When a motor is registered it is supposed to be in a roadworthy status, yet when a motor vehicle is
in an accident with resulted to considerable damage then the repair shop will take it apart and repair
it. No police officer would come into the panel beating shop and then claim the vehicle is unroadworthy. The same with if a vehicle had a bold tire it is not an offence unless the motor vehicle
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is put onto the road and used for transporting a person. A private property of FEE SIMPLE usage
might be deemed a perceived harm being it to the environment, or whatever, but in itself cannot
constitute any offence unless there is an actual harm eventuating. The Prosecutor doesnt provide
any actual harm that was caused by me, and in fact ignores the actual harm of which it is
responsible with fires along the high way in soft shoulders.
It is common knowledge that when a person objects to the police entering private property then as
they say not even the King/Queen can enter the property without permission. As such the police
officer needs to obtain a court order to override the property owner refusal. The property owner
doesnt need to obtain a court order as his objection is sufficient in itself. Likewise when a person
objects to the validity of legislation it is ULTRA VIRES unless the courts pronounce against it
to be intra vires.
.

QUOTE
Mr. GLYNN.-I think they would, because it is fixed in the Constitution. There is no special court, but the
general courts would undoubtedly protect the states. What Mr. Isaacs seeks to do is to prevent the question of
ultra vires arising after a law has been passed.
[start page 2004]
Mr. ISAACS.-No. If it is ultra vires of the Constitution it would, of course, be invalid.
END QUOTE
NO CASE TO ANSWER
When assisting in the van Rooy case, where Ms Josepha van Rooy was charged with 3 criminal
accounts including injuring as police officer, and there were 4 police officers as witnesses, the clerk
of court and the deputy clerk of court also being witnesses as well as an expert witness in medical
matters, whereas Ms van Rooy was on her own, I then wrote to the DPP (Director of Public
Prosecutions that there was NO CASE TO ANSWER (about 2 years prior to the trail was held)
upon which the DPP responded to withdraw 2 out of 3 charges. Subsequently when the matter came
before His Honour Wood J in the County Court of Victoria, after the Prosecutor over 5 days
presented its witnesses, upon conclusion His Honour Wood J directed the jury to return as verdict
NOT GUILTY, without Ms van Rooy requiring to present her case. This proved that unlike lawyers
waiting for the prosecutor to present its cased and then to claim NO CASE TO ANSWER, that that
doing so about 2 years prior to the case being heard can reduce litigation considerably, as clearly 2
of the 3 criminal charges were immediately withdrawn. Hence, the fact I advised Buloke Shire
Council of this but nevertheless it still went ahead to pursue matters without bothering to address
the issues I raised may underline its blatant disregard to appropriate communication.
I in 1985, fed up with judicial officers and opponent lawyers interrupting me when presenting
submissions created the concept of the ADDRESS TO THE COURT so that I would provide in
writing a written document of submissions, albeit this can be complimented with oral submissions.
After one judge refused to consider what I had placed in written submission and made orders
against me, upon which I appealed. The Full Court (on appeal) consisting of 3 judges made clear
that the trail judge had erred in laws not to consider the content of the ADDRESS TO THE
COURT and upheld the appeal and set aside the orders.
The ADDRESS TO THE COURT has been used in all levels of courts including the High Court
of Victoria both in civil and criminal matters.
ISSUE OF COST & OTHER ISSUES
QUOTE Mr. HIGGINS:
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I think it is advisable that private people should not be put to the expense of having important questions of
constitutional law decided out of their own pockets.
END QUOTE
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http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/vic/VSC/2011/140.html
In my 19 June 2015 correspondence to the Prosecutor as well as to ES&a legal representatives I

stated the following:
QUOTE my 2-5-2015 CORRESPONDENCE TO Buloke Shire Council
I draw your attention to the decision in Hobsons Bay Council v Viking in Supreme Court of
Victoria re an infringement notice, where the Supreme Court upheld the Magistrates decision
that cost should not be awarded where cost isnt applied if the Police prosecuted for the same.
(I have reproduced the decision below)
END QUOTE my 2-5-2015 CORRESPONDENCE TO Buloke Shire Council
I inderstand you can download the decision from the following weblink:
Hobsons Bay City Council v Viking Group Holdings Pty Ltd [2010] VSC 386 (27 August 2010)
I understand that at times the Supreme Court of Victoria ordered cost against the legal practitioners
themselves where shoddy and/or other inappropriate conduct was held to have eventuated by the
Court.
END QUOTE 19-6-2015 CORRESPONDENCE
QUOTE Hobsons Bay City Council v Viking Group Holdings Pty Ltd [2010] VSC 386 (27 August 2010)
Conclusion and orders
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176 For these reasons the plaintiff Council is entitled to relief, substantially in the form it seeks, against all
of the defendants and the defendants counterclaims must be dismissed. I will hear counsel as to the
appropriate form of orders to give effect to these conclusions.
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Costs
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177 In view of the fact that the plaintiff did not plead or rely upon the statutory answers to the
defendants estoppel claims until after the Court raised the matter on the first day of the hearing, whereby
delay and extra cost were encountered; and in view of the additional time, trouble and expense to which
the parties and the Court have been put as a result of non-compliance with the pre-trial direction for an
agreed statement of facts and as a result of the case not being properly prepared for hearing on either
side, for all of which the plaintiff Council appears to be partly responsible, I am provisionally inclined to
make considerable allowance in favour of the defendants in relation to costs. I will hear counsel on that
issue as well.
END QUOTE
QUOTE
Hobsons Bay City Council v Viking Group Holdings Pty Ltd [2010] VSC 386 (27 August 2010)
Last Updated: 27 August 2010
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA
44
AT MELBOURNE
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COMMON LAW DIVISION
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VALUATION, COMPENSATION & PLANNING LIST
Not Restricted
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No. 689 of 2010

and No. 690 of 2010
HOBSONS BAY CITY COUNCIL
Appellant
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v
VIKING GROUP HOLDINGS PTY LTD (ACN 133
909 145)
Respondent
and
HOBSONS BAY CITY COUNCIL
Appellant
v
VIKING ASSET MANAGEMENT PTY LTD (ACN
112 893 884)
Respondent
---
JUDGE:
WHERE HELD:
DATE OF HEARING:
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
CASE MAY BE CITED AS:
MEDIUM NEUTRAL
CITATION:
OSBORN J
Melbourne
13 August 2010
27 August 2010
Hobsons Bay City Council v Viking
[2010] VSC 386
---
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COMMON LAW Appeal from Magistrates Court cost award in criminal proceeding Costs awarded covered
disbursements fees only - Review of discretionary judgments - Presumption in favour of the correctness of the
decision - Appellant must demonstrate a vitiating error of law - It was open to the Magistrate to exercise his
discretion in award of costs Consistency of cost awards - Proportionality of cost awards - Magistrates Court
Act 1989 s 131(1)
--APPEARANCES:
For the Appellant
Counsel
Mr A Marshall
Solicitors
Brand Partners Commercial
Lawyers
For the Respondent
Mr J Searle
Viking Group
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
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HIS HONOUR:
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1 These appeals relate to orders made in the Magistrates Court at Sunshine in January 2010.
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2 In the first proceeding, the presiding Magistrate, following conviction of the respondent in respect of six
charges under the Victorian Road Rules relating to parking offences, ordered that the respondent pay an
aggregate fine of $600 and costs in the amount of $180.80.
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3 In the second proceeding the presiding Magistrate convicted the respondent of two further such offences and
fined it an aggregate fine of $250 and ordered it to pay costs in the sum of $65.20.
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4 In each proceeding the matters were initially listed for hearing on a mention day and following no appearance
by the respondent were listed for ex parte hearing.
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5 At the conclusion of the first case the solicitor for the appellant applied for costs comprising legal fees of
$1,470.26, service fees of $91.10, filing fees of $66.60 and a courtesy letter of $23.10. The solicitor deposes that
these were a true calculation of the amounts properly incurred by the Council in the prosecution of the case.
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6 After the Magistrate awarded costs in the sum of $180.80[1] he was asked to give reasons for his order. He
then stated:
The application for legal costs is refused on the basis that I think that theyre disproportionate to the criminality
of the defendants conduct. I believe weve had this discussion in the past Mr Prosecutor, but the same reasons
apply. It seems to me to be unfair to award costs based on the defendants bad luck in being prosecuted by a
council rather than by the police as a matter of principle, it cannot be or should not be the defendant that incurs
the additional liability of substantial costs based on who prosecutes. It strikes me as unfair that an award of costs
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against the defendant when thieves, drug traffickers and other wrongdoers who do far more harm than the
defendant has, are not asked to pay costs. Additionally, citizens pay rates and taxes for services, including the
cost of prosecuting, supervising and imprisoning wrongdoers. It seems to me that principle ought to apply to this
prosecution as well and as I also say that the costs are disproportionate to the criminality of the defendants
conduct (sic). In the exercise of my discretion, the application for costs is refused.[2]
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8 The Magistrate refused the greater portion of the application for costs on the same basis as he had refused the
greater portion of the application for costs in the first matter.[3]
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9 It can be seen that the Magistrates reasons invoke notions of proportionality and consistency.
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10 The appellant acknowledges:
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(a) the power of the Court to award costs is contained in s 131(1) of the Magistrates Court Act 1989 which
states:
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11 As counsel for the respondent emphasised, the latter part of s 131(1) emphasises the full power of the Court
to determine the question of costs.
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12 The grounds of appeal allege that the Magistrate failed to exercise his discretion properly or at all, and in the
alternative that he purported to act for improper reasons and/or took into account irrelevant matters. In the
further alternative it is alleged that the Magistrate failed to take relevant considerations into account.
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13 The fundamental question raised by the appeal is whether it was open to the Court to exercise its discretion as
it did. The general principles governing appeals from the exercise of discretion as to costs were expressed by
Kitto J in Australian Coal and Shale Employees Federation v The Commonwealth:[4]
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16 In Kenyon v Drissen,[8] Ashley J (as he then was) observed:
7 At the conclusion of the second case the Magistrate again received an application for costs consisting of legal
fees of $170.50, filing fees of $42.10 and a courtesy letter of $23.10. The solicitor for the appellant again
deposes that the costs for which application was made comprised a true and correct calculation of amounts
properly incurred by the appellant in the prosecution of the case.
The costs of, and incidental to, all proceedings in the Court are in the discretion of the Court and the Court has
full power to determine by whom, to whom and to what extent the costs are to be paid.
(b) such discretion is effectively unfettered.
..the true principle limiting the manner in which appellate jurisdiction is exercised in respect of decisions
involving discretionary judgment is that there is a strong presumption in favour of the correctness of the decision
appealed from, and that that decision should therefore be affirmed unless the court of appeal is satisfied that it is
clearly wrong. A degree of satisfaction sufficient to overcome the strength of the presumption may exist where
there has been an error which consists in acting upon a wrong principle, or giving weight to extraneous or
irrelevant matters, or failing to give weight or sufficient weight to relevant considerations, or making a mistake
as to the facts. Again, the nature of the error may not be discoverable, but even so it is sufficient that the result is
so unreasonable or plainly unjust that the appellate court may infer that there has been a failure properly to
exercise the discretion which the law reposes in the court of first instance: House v. The King[5]....
14 His Honour went on to endorse the following statement by Jordan CJ in Schweppes Limited v Archer:[6]
In appeals as to costs, the principles to be applied are these. The Court will always review a decision of a Taxing
Officer where it is contended that he has proceeded upon a wrong principle, for the purpose of determining the
principle which should be applied; and an error in principle may occur both in determining whether an item
should be allowed and in determining how much should be allowed. Where no principle is involved, and the
question is, whether the Taxing Officer has correctly exercised a discretion which he possesses and is purporting
to exercise, the Court is reluctant to interfere. It has undoubted jurisdiction to review the Taxing Officer's
decision even where an exercise of discretion only is involved, and will do so freely on a proper case, using its
own knowledge of the circumstances, but it will in general interfere only where the discretion appears not to
have been exercised at all, or to have been exercised in a manner which is manifestly wrong; and where the
question is one of amount only, will do so only in an extreme case. (Citations omitted)
15 In Urban No 1 Co-operative Society v Kilavus & Anor,[7] Hedigan J observed that in cases involving the
review of discretionary judgments there is a strong presumption in favour of the correctness of the decision
appealed from and the general rule is that the decision should be affirmed unless the appellate court of review is
satisfied that it is clearly wrong.
It is true that an exercise of discretion is not to be tested by an appeal court asking itself whether it would have
exercised the discretion in the same or a different way to the way in which it was exercised in fact. On the other
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hand, the appeal court, before it interferes with an exercise of discretion, must be satisfied that the decision was
clearly wrong. In my opinion the correct approach is that in considering that question an appeal court is not
constrained to hold that an exercise of discretion was wrong only by reason that weight was given to some
irrelevant consideration, or by reason only of complaint that insufficient weight was given to some relevant
consideration. It may be, despite such matters, that the decision was very evidently supportable by pertinent
grounds relied upon by the decision-maker.
17 These observations and the observations of Hedigan J were made in the context of appeals from the
Magistrates Court to this Court. These reflect the need for an appellant in an appeal on questions of law to
demonstrate not only that an error of law occurred but that it was a vitiating error.[9]
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18 In Kymar Nominees Pty Ltd v Sinclair,[10] Cavanough J stated:
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Preliminary questions
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20 The appellant relied on the decision in Latoudis v Casey.[14] It must be recognised however that the present
case is not one such as Latoudis, where a successful defendant, having been brought to Court by the informant, is
ordinarily entitled to his or her costs.
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21 In Oshlack v Richmond River Council[15] Kirby J observed:[16]
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23 It was next submitted that if costs were not ordinarily recoverable by the Council then the Council would be
deterred from bringing further prosecutions of the type in issue. I do not accept this inference should be drawn.
Such prosecutions enforce a system of parking regulation from which municipal councils derive significant
revenue and the evidence simply does not establish the conclusion contended for.
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24 The appellant also placed substantial emphasis on the following observations by McHugh J in Oshlack:[18]
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I do not accept that the learned Magistrate refused the appellant costs simply because it is a municipal council.
Rather as I have said, he considered the issue of costs by reference to broader notions of consistency and
proportionality.
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Oshlack was concerned with fundamentally different proceedings. It was concerned with the costs of a
successful council responding to an unsuccessful claim for injunctive relief, brought by a member of the public
seeking to ventilate issues of the public interest.
There is a strong presumption in favour of the correctness of a discretionary judgment of a court, and all the
more so in relation to the taxation of costs. Although, strictly speaking, the present question is not one of
taxation of costs but of the extent of the parties respective liability, a reviewing court will rarely interfere on
such a question, especially in an appeal limited to questions of law.
19 The right of appeal to this Court from final orders within criminal proceedings of the Magistrates Court is
one on questions of law only.[11] Accordingly, just as it is not open to challenge the weight given to relevant
factors in reaching a conclusion of fact, it is not open to challenge the weight given to relevant factors bearing on
the exercise of a discretion.[12] The critical question is whether it was open to the Magistrate to conclude as he
did having regard to relevant factors.[13]
The decision in that case [Latoudis] does not, and could not, lay down a general rule that the only consideration
to be taken into account in the exercise of a statutory costs discretion is the compensation of the successful party
for the recoverable expense to which it has been put by the litigation. With respect to the learned judges of the
Court of Appeal, this reads too much into Latoudis. Such a rule was required neither by the matter which was
before this Court for decision in that case nor by the majority's reasons.
22 Likewise, cases such as Ohn v Walton,[17] which was concerned with a power in the Medical Tribunal of
New South Wales to order the complainant ... to pay such costs to such person as the Tribunal may determine,
are of no real assistance in the present case.
Nor is the status of the respondent as a public authority presently relevant. The law judges persons by their
conduct not their identity. In the exercise of the costs discretion, all persons are entitled to be treated equally and
in accordance with traditional principle. The fact that a successful respondent is a public authority should not
make a court less inclined to award costs in its favour. Gone are the days when one could sensibly speak of a
public authority as having available to them almost unlimited public funds.[19] Moreover, if costs awards are
not made in favour of successful respondents such as the Council, the public services which those authorities
provide must be adversely affected. Every irrecoverable dollar spent on litigation is one dollar less to spend on
the services that public authorities do and ought to provide. Often enough the services that will be reduced will
be those that favour the politically weak children, the unemployed, the disabled and the aged. Such results
cannot be in the public interest.
25 These observations do not assist the appellant because:
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McHugh Js observations were made in dissent and the majority of the High Court affirmed the breadth of the
discretion available to the Court of first instance.
Consistency
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26 I turn then to the underlying bases of the Magistrates reasons. In my view it cannot be said that it was not
open to the learned Magistrate to take into account questions of consistency. Counsel for both parties referred to
the observations of Mason and Deane JJ in Norbis v Norbis[20] (a case concerning the exercise of discretion as
to costs under the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)):
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29 It was open to the Magistrate to form the view that the discrepancy in costs outcomes between police
prosecutions and council prosecutions in respect of the same offence and more generally raised a relevant issue
of consistency. Inconsistent outcomes do not support a system in which the public may be expected to have
confidence. They give rise to a system which may appear adventitious and arbitrary in its outcomes.
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Proportionality
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30 Likewise the related issue of proportionality was a relevant factor. In some jurisdictions, achieving
proportionality of procedural costs to the dispute in issue is an explicit obligation of civil case management.[22]
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31 The same underlying concept is relevant here, but in the criminal jurisdiction of the Magistrates Court the
notion of proportionality has a further dimension. Proportionality is a touchstone of just outcomes of the criminal
justice system. In Hoare v The Queen[23] the High Court stated:
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35 It was in turn open to him to conclude that the costs sought were disproportionate to the criminality of the
respondents conduct. The conclusion he reached was one by a member of the court which is confronted with a
large number of summary offences on a daily basis and accordingly, the issue is one on which the Magistrate
was well placed to form an opinion.
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36 I am not persuaded that it was not open to him to conclude that the costs sought were disproportionate to the
criminality of the respondents conduct.
The point of preserving the width of the discretion which Parliament has created is that it maximizes the
possibility of doing justice in every case. But the need for consistency in judicial adjudication, which is the
antithesis of arbitrary and capricious decision-making, provides an important countervailing consideration
supporting the giving of guidance by appellant courts, whether in the form of principles or guidelines.
27 Brennan J, who agreed generally with the reasons of Mason and Deane JJ stated at 536:
The orderly administration of justice requires that decisions should be consistent one with another and decisionmaking should not be open to the reproach that it is adventitious ... An unfettered discretion is a versatile means
of doing justice in particular cases, but unevenness in its exercise diminishes confidence in the legal process.
28 In the present case it should be noted that breaches of the Victorian Road Rules with respect to parking
infringements may be prosecuted either by a police officer, an authorised council officer or certain other
authorised persons.[21]
Secondly, a basic principle of sentencing law is that a sentence of imprisonment imposed by a court should never
exceed that which can be justified as appropriate or proportionate to the gravity of the crime considered in the
light of its objective circumstances (see Veen v The Queen [No 2]).[24]
32 In R v Young[25] the Victorian Court of Appeal addressed a sentence in which Veen [No 2] and associated
cases had been misinterpreted. The Court said at 953:
... there is nothing whatever new in what the learned judge called the principle of proportionality. We shall have
to return to the question later but for the moment it is sufficient to say that for as long as any member of the court
can remember it has been the law in Victoria that an offender must not be sentenced to a more severe
punishment than is appropriate or proportionate to the offence which he has committed...
33 Proportionality in sentencing is necessarily a matter of judgment on which individual views may differ. In
The Queen v S[26] the Court of Appeal adopted with approval the following further statement in Young:[27]
What is a sentence proportionate to an offence is a matter of discretion and there must in most cases be a range
of sentences open to a sentencing judge which are proportionate to the offence.
34 I accept that the purpose of an award of costs is not to punish the unsuccessful party but to indemnify the
successful party. Nevertheless, in the present case the Magistrate was in my view entitled to compare total
outcomes in terms of fines plus costs, with other outcomes of the summary prosecution system not only as
informing a view as to consistency, but also as informing a conclusion as to the proportionality of the costs
sought to the criminality of the conduct in issue.
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37 It is submitted for the appellant that the notion of proportionality might have justified the award of a lesser
award of costs, but it could not justify the award of effectively no professional costs. This submission enters into
questions of the weight of relevant factors. It is not for this Court however to weigh up the relevant factors. It is
simply for this Court to ensure that the Magistrates Court did not have regard to irrelevant factors and reached a
conclusion open to it. I accept that the view put forward on behalf of the Council might be accepted, but not that
it was the only view open to the Magistrate.
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38 It is clear from the terms of his reasons that the Magistrate regarded his conclusions as to proportionality as
fundamental to the proper exercise of his discretion. In turn his discretionary decision must stand if, as I have
said, the view he reached is regarded as open to him.
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Irrelevant considerations
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39 Insofar as the appeal is put on the basis that the Magistrate failed to take into account relevant considerations,
there is no evidence that, save in one respect, the matters relied on were expressly urged upon him and I am not
able to infer that a failure to refer to them in his reasons means that he did not take account of them. The matters
allegedly overlooked are stated in the amended notice of appeal as follows:
17
(b) prevention of breaches of council by-laws;
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(c) failure of the respondent to pay on-the-spot fines;
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(d) deterrence to wrongdoers.
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40 Factor (a) was of course squarely put before the Magistrate and factors (b), (c) and (d) were implicitly caught
up in the question of proportionality.
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41 The relevant principle is that in some circumstances a failure to advert to particular matters in reasons will
enable an inference to be drawn that regard was not had to those matters in reaching the decision in issue. In
others it will not.[28] This is not a case in which an inference adverse to the Magistrate can be drawn.
25
Conclusion
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42 In order to succeed in an appeal of this type the appellant must satisfy the Court that the Magistrates decision
was vitiated by reason of the matters to which he or she had regard, or that the decision was simply not open to
him or her.
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43 In my view the factors upon which the Magistrate based his decision in the present case were capable of
being regarded as relevant to the exercise of his discretion and the consequent exercise of that discretion was
open to him.
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44 Accordingly the appeal must be dismissed.
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[1] The summation of the disbursement charges plus the courtesy letter.
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[2] Affidavit of Lloyd Dewar sworn 15 February 2010, [7].
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[3] The cost award was the summation of the disbursement charge and courtesy letter.
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[4] [1953] HCA 25; (1953) 94 CLR 621, 627.
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[5] [1936] HCA 40; (1936) 55 CLR 499, 504-505.
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[6] (1934) 34 SR (NSW) 178, cited in Australian Coal and Shale Employees Federation v The Commonwealth
[1953] HCA 25; (1953) 94 CLR 621, 628-9.
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[7] [1993] VicRp 69; [1993] 2 VR 201.
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[8] Unreported decision, 6 October 1994.
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[9] Portland Properties Pty Ltd v Melbourne & Metropolitan Board of Works (1971) 38 LGRA 6, 18 and 22.
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[10] [2006] VSC 488, [61].
... relevant material considerations including:

(a) the cost to municipal councils in properly prosecuting council by-laws and other laws;
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[11] Criminal Procedure Act 2009, s 272(1).
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[12] Secombs (a firm) v Sadler Design Pty Ltd [1999] VSC 79, [58]-[59]; Transport Accident Commission v
Hoffman [1989] VicRp 18; [1989] VR 197, 199.
[13] S v Crimes Compensation Tribunal [1998] 1 VR 83, 89 per Phillips JA.
[14] [1990] HCA 59; (1990) 170 CLR 534.
[15] [1998] HCA 11; (1998) 193 CLR 72 (Oshlack).
[16] Ibid, 118.
[17] (1995) 36 NSWLR 77.
[18] [1998] HCA 11; (1998) 193 CLR 72, 107.
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[19] Kent v Cavanagh (1973) 1 ACTR 43, 55, cited in Oshlack.
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[20] [1986] HCA 17; (1986) 161 CLR 513, 518.
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[21] Road Safety Act 1986, s 87(1) read with s 77(2).
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[22] See, eg Calabro v Zappia [2010] NSWDC 127.
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[23] [1989] HCA 33; (1989) 167 CLR 348, 354.
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[24] [1988] HCA 14; (1988) 164 CLR 465, 472, 485-486, 490-491, 496, cited ibid, 354.
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[25] [1990] VicRp 84; [1990] VR 951 (Young).
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[26] [2006] VSCA 134.
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[27] At 960 as cited ibid, [20].
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[28] The accepted test is stated by Sholl J in Yendall v Smith Mitchell & Co Ltd[1953] VicLawRp 53; [1953]
VLR 369, 379 as set out by his Honour in Harrison v Mansfield [1953] VicLawRp 60; [1953] VLR 399, 404.
END QUOTE Hobsons Bay City Council v Viking Group Holdings Pty Ltd [2010] VSC 386 (27 August 2010)
QUOTE
Mr. HIGGINS.-Suppose the sentry is asleep, or is in the swim with the other power?
Mr. GORDON.-There will be more than one sentry. In the case of a federal law, every member of a state
Parliament will be a sentry, and, every constituent of a state Parliament will be a sentry.
As regards a law passed by a state, every man in the Federal Parliament will be a sentry, and the whole
constituency behind the Federal Parliament will be a sentry.
END QUOTE
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Magistrates%27_Court_of_Victoria#Closed_country_locations
QUOTE
Magistrates' Court of Victoria
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Jump to: navigation, search
This article needs additional citations for verification. Please help improve this article by adding citations
to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (July 2013)
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The Magistrates' Court of Victoria is the lowest court in the Victorian court system, with the County Court of
Victoria and the Supreme Court of Victoria respectively judicially higher. The Magistrates' Court is a court of summary
jurisdiction.
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A typical courtroom layout consists of a witness box, a public gallery, the bar table (at which the parties sit), a raised
bench for seating the sitting magistrate and a clerk and sometimes a dock for housing defendants in custody. Many
Victorian magistrates' courts have video link facilities for witnesses to appear via remote video conference rather than in
person and is used for when witnesses cannot travel or the prisoner is deemed too high-risk to travel to court in person.
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The Magistrates' Court of Victoria hears many different types of cases, such as:
warrant application hearings;
committal hearings and police prosecutions;
bail application hearings;
money claims and other civil disputes, not exceeding $100,000;
family law and Family violence matters;
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All Magistrates are appointed as members of the Victims of Crime Assistance Tribunal (VOCAT), which is a separate
and independent statutory entity which determines claims for compensation made by victims of crime and their
families.[1]
Contents
[hide]
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1 History
1.1 Recent history
2 Courthouses
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2.1 Metropolitan locations
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2.2 Country locations
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2.3 Closed metropolitan locations
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2.4 Closed country locations
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3 External links
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4 References
History[edit]
Although the current court was established by the Magistrates' Court Act 1989 (Victoria), Victoria has had magistrates
since 1836, when the people of Melbourne elected an arbitrator of the city to resolve minor disputes. Captain William
Lonsdale, a police magistrate, was appointed in 1836 and the first case was heard at a location near the present site of
Southern Cross Station (formerly Spencer Street Station).
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In 1838, a third court, the Court of Petty Sessions was created. By 1890, all three types of courts were held at 235
locations throughout Victoria.
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On 20 January 1914, the new City Court was opened at Russell Street in Melbourne and Phillip Blashki JP was the first
Chairman of the City Court Bench. The then Prime Minister, Alfred Deakin, presented Blashki with an illuminated
address signed by 30 of the court's solicitors when he retired, aged 70. [2]
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Police magistrates were able to sit in on Petty Court sessions, but generally two or three Justice of the Peace were
required for cases to be heard. The Court of Petty Sessions, also originally attended to matters under 20 pounds, and
even criminal matters, like drunkenness and minor assaults.
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Recent history[edit]
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On 29 May 2000, a Deed of Apology was signed for the treatment of Aboriginal peoples, which tied in with National
Sorry Day actions, by the Chief Magistrate and Principal Registrar on behalf of the Magistrates' Court of Victoria. The
deed was received at the Wangaratta courthouse by Wally Cooper. [3]
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In 2000, Chief Magistrate of the Court Michael Adams was forced to stand down on 31 October after claims that he
harassed female members of his court. This was reported on The 7.30 Report[4] and also in the Melbourne newspapers,
resulting in the extraordinary vote.
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The Chief Magistrate is currently Peter Lauritsen. The Chief Executive Officer is Andrew Tenni. The Principal
Registrar is Simone Shields.
Courthouses[edit]
Metropolitan locations[edit]
Melbourne Magistrates' Court, Melbourne
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Broadmeadows Magistrates' Court, Broadmeadows
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Dandenong Magistrates' Court, Dandenong
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Frankston Magistrates' Court, Frankston
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Heidelberg Magistrates' Court, Heidelberg
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Moorabbin Justice Centre, Highett
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Neighbourhood Justice Centre, Collingwood
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Ringwood Magsitrates' Court, Ringwood
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Sunshine Magistrates' Court, Sunshine
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Werribee Magistrates' Court, Werribee
Country locations[edit]
Ararat
Bacchus Marsh
Bairnsdale
Ballarat
Benalla
Bendigo
Castlemaine
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Cobram
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Colac
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Corryong
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Dromana
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Echuca
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Edenhope
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Geelong
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Hamilton
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Hopetoun
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Horsham
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Kerang
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Korumburra
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Kyneton
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Latrobe Valley, Morwell
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Mansfield
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Maryborough
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Mildura
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Moe
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Myrtleford
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Nhill
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Omeo
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Orbost
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Ouyen
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Portland
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Robinvale
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Sale
Seymour
Shepparton
St Arnaud
Stawell
Swan Hill
Wangaratta
Warrnambool
Wodonga
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Wonthaggi
Closed metropolitan locations[edit]
Ferntree Gully Magistrates' Court, Ferntree Gully (latitude: 3753'17.55"S, longitude: 14517'31.59"E; now
owned by Knox Community Health Service)
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Box Hill Magistrates' Court
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Springvale Magistrates' Court
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Prahran Magistrates' Court
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Williamstown Magistrates' Court
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Moonee Ponds Magistrates' Court, Moonee Ponds
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Preston Magistrates' Court, Preston
Closed country locations[edit]
Kilmore Magistrates' Court
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Alexandra Magistrates' Court
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Yarrawonga Magistrates' Court
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Beechworth Magistrates' Court
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Warragul Magistrates' Court
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Yarram Magistrates' Court
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Lakes Entrance Magistrates' Court
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Casterton Magistrates' Court
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Warracknabeal Magistrates' Court
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Bright Magistrates' Court
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Euroa Magistrates' Court
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Leongatha Magistrates' Court
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Red Cliffs Magistrates' Court
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Cohuna Magistrates' Court
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Traralgon Magistrates' Court
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Nagambie Magistrates' Court
END QUOTE
What I view is that the State of Victoria has done is to utilize VCAT (an unconstitutional
administrative body) and the Infringement Courts as to circumvent constitutionally required court
processes.
While the amount of chargers against Victorians and visitors have escalated to the absurdity the
Government has effectively closed down courts as to obtain much better convictions at the denial of
fair and proper hearings. As such the government is undermining the very constitutional legal
processes. It is causing accused to travel long distances and with an aging society this adds further
complications.
QUOTE
Mr. OCONNOR.-No, it would not; and, as an honorable member reminds me, there is a decision on the point.
All that is intended is that there shall be some process of law by which the parties accused must be heard.
Mr. HIGGINS.-Both sides heard.
Mr. OCONNOR.-Yes; and the process of law within that principle may be [start page 689] anything the
state thinks fit. This provision simply assures that there shall be some form by which a person accused will
have an opportunity of stating his case before being deprived of his liberty. Is not that a first principle in
criminal law now? I cannot understand any one objecting to this proposal.
END QUOTE
Clearly an Infringement Court that albeit using the Magistrates Court of Victoria letterhead
unconstitutional as it doesnt provide for any open hearing not provide for both sides to be
heard.
And with VCAT, purportedly to have been an alternative to litigation in the courts effectively now
can end up with greater cost awarded against an unsuccessful party. As such it never was about
enabling aggrieved persons to litigate at a lower cost, but a strategy by the Government to lower its
cost on employing magistrates and other court staff while ensuring a greater increase in convict ion
no matter how unconstitutional it may be.
.
To force an accused to travel long distances merely to attend to a court in my view is in itself a
gross denial of justice
.
There is no public transport to my knowledge from Berriwillock to St Arnauds but there is to

Bendigo. There is however a Magistrates Court of Victoria at Heidelberg a mere 4 kilometres from
where I reside.
Basically the more difficult the Government makes it for a party to be able to attend to a
Magistrates Court of Victoria location the easier it has to obtain convictions. We may now declare
Magistrates to be endangered species, this as the dwindling of the Magistrate Court of Victoria
locations is reducing the need for magistrates. And as was made clear as I understood it by Deputy
President Gibson in the Colosimo case she held that she was bound by government policy. As such
impartial courts are to be disposed of.
.
I did request, without conceding jurisdiction, for the Prosecutor to have the matter listed for hearing
in the Magistrates Court of Victoria at Heidelberg, but there was a deafening silence. This also due
to health problems where my wife (82) at times has suddenly a vein in her leg bursting and if I am
too far away she could bleed to death. She is awaiting an operation for this. Also being on pensions
our financial abilities are limited and the expense to travel to and from St Arnaud would jeopardize
my ability to travel to Berriwillock for the slashing of the grass/weed. Neither does it seem to make
sense for a firm of lawyers located in Clifton Hill (Melbourne) to lodge a case with the magistrates
Court of Victoria at Collingwood for a hearing in St Arnaud. In particular considering the charges
by lawyers it would made more sense to have the hearing at Heidelberg, to avoid long distance
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travelling. Innocent until proven guilty must means that the accused must not unduly be forced
to travel long distances as to undermine the ability of the accused to attend to the court location.
With VCAT in the Great Body Works case I exposed that the opponent lawyers and VCAT were
fraternizing, to the extent that on 7-6-2010 opponent lawyers phoned VCAT to issue orders,
without filing any application and without advising the party I represented, and the Deputy
President simply then issued the orders. At a later time the opposing party filed documentation that
proved it often contacted VCAT by phone and were able to obtain orders by this.
Every private communication to a judge, for the purposes of influencing his decision upon a matter publicly
before him, always is, and ought to be, reprobated; it is a course calculated, if tolerated, to divert the course of
justice, and is considered, and ought more frequently than it is, to be treated as, what it really is, a high contempt
of court. Re Dyce Sombre (1849) 1 Mac & G 116 at 122; (1849)
Judicial officer Lulham then commenced to accuse me of unlawful conduct and requested the legal
Service Commission to investigate me, where after what I understand to have been more than a
yearlong investigation it found no evidence against me, neither did the transcript of the hearings
before Lulham prove the allegations he had made. And at a later time I represented Mr Johnson QC
with the Legal Service Commission to be the other party. What this underlines is to expose the rot
likely will cause problems in response. This is what I view is what the Prosecutor (Buloke Shire
Council) is about that I exposed numerous issues and well seeking to score a conviction against me
at all cost seems to be the ultimate revenge for it.
As was reproduced above the DEED OF APPOLOGY AND COMMITMENT by Magistrates
and registrars of the Magistrates Court of Victoria this to needs to be exposed.
After all Registrars are not OFICERS OF THE COURT but are mere employees of the court.
Neither can any employee within the court system be public servants under the government, as
they must be public servants within the court system itself. There is an implied bias if those
employed within the court system are on the payroll of the government. They must always be
within the budget of the court itself and the Chief Justice/Chief Magistrate must be deemed
accountable for the financial cost of the employees. Likewise the Chief Magistrate should be the
one who decides to close any court location if this no longer is affordable and neither warranted to
operate within the court budget.
In my view the DEED OF APPOLOGY AND COMMITMENT also underlines how little
magistrates appear to understand their constitutional position. The court is there to adjudicate in law
not with favours based upon race/religion. As such magistrates can only make apologies for errors
in law they made.
I understand there is now something like a Koori court that is in my view a legal nonsense, as this
is unconstitutional, in violation to ss51(xxvii).
.
The 1967 ss51(xxvi) referendum to delegate Aboriginals to be subject to discriminatory race laws
prohibited the State to further legislate regarding Aboriginals also.
Section 51 of the constitution is generally misconceived to be of concurrent legislative powers it
merely is a Section that provides legislative powers to the commonwealth and for as long as the
Commonwealth of Australia doesnt legislate upon a subject matter the states can continue to
legislate on such subject matter.
.

QUOTE
Mr. BARTON.-I was going to explain when I was interrupted that the moment the Commonwealth
legislates on this subject the power will become exclusive.
END QUOTE
QUOTE
Mr. BARTON (New South Wales).-If this is left as an exclusive power the laws of the states will nevertheless
remain in force under clause 100.
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Mr. TRENWITH.-Would the states still proceed to make laws?

Mr. BARTON.-Not after this power of legislation comes into force. Their existing laws will, however,
remain. If this is exclusive they can make no new laws, but the necessity of making these new laws will be all
the more forced on the Commonwealth.
END QUOTE
QUOTE
Mr. BARTON.-We are going to suggest that it should read as follows:-
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the people of any race for whom it is deemed necessary to make any laws not applicable to the general
community; but so that this power shall not extend to authorize legislation with respect to the affairs of the
aboriginal race in any state.
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Mr. ISAACS.-My observations were extended much further than that. The term general community" I
understand to mean the general community of the whole Commonwealth. If it means the general community
of the whole Commonwealth, I do not see the meaning of saying that the Parliament of the Commonwealth shall
have the exclusive authority to do that, because any single state would have the right to do it under any
circumstances. If it means less than that-if it means the general community of a state-I do not see why it should
not be left to the state. We should be placed in a very awkward position indeed if any particular state is forbidden
to pass any distinctive legislation in certain well-known instances. For instance, if Victoria should choose to
enact that Afghans shall only get hawkers' licences under certain conditions which are not [start page 228]
applicable to Europeans she may be debarred by this sub-section from doing so. I do not know how it will affect
our factory law in regard to the Chinese which does not operate beyond the confines of Victoria at all.
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Sir EDWARD BRADDON.-Why single out the Afghans?
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Mr. ISAACS.-If any other race possess the same characteristic as the Afghans I will put them in the same
class. At all events, the expression general community" means the whole community of the Commonwealth. I do
not think that this has any application. If it is to have any application at all, it seems to me to be intended to debar
the state from passing legislation-necessary legislation, but purely confined to that state. I do not think that that
sub-section ought to be there at all if that is the meaning of it.
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Mr. BARTON (New South Wales).-I think the original intention of this sub-section was to deal with the
affairs of such persons of other races-what are generally called inferior races, though I do not know with
how much warrant sometimes-who may be in the Commonwealth at the time it is brought into existence,
or who may under the laws of the Commonwealth regulating aliens come into it. We have made the
dealing with aliens, which includes a certain degree of coloured immigration, a power of the
Commonwealth, and we have made the dealing with immigration a power of the Commonwealth, so that
all those of the races who come into the community after the establishment of the Commonwealth will not
only enter subject to laws made in respect to their immigration, but will remain subject to any laws which
the Commonwealth may specially devise for them. There is no reason why the Commonwealth should not
have power to devise such laws.
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Sir GEORGE TURNER.-An exclusive power?
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Mr. BARTON.-It ought to have an exclusive power to devise such laws.
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Sir GEORGE TURNER.-If it does not exercise it can the state exercise it?
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Mr. BARTON.-Once the Commonwealth legislates with reference to the question of aliens and immigration,
its legislation displaces the state law.
END QUOTE
QUOTE
Sir JOHN DOWNER.-There must be some body which deems it necessary, and the only body to which the
words can refer is the Commonwealth Parliament. What very substantial difference does it make whether we
leave the provision as it stands or put it into clause 52? True, if the provision is left where it stands, the Federal
Parliament will have exclusive power in connexion with this matter; but that body will only have exclusive
power when it chooses to exercise it. It is only when the Federal Parliament has passed legislation dealing
with the people about whom regulations are to be made that this exclusive power will have arisen.
END QUOTE
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QUOTE
Mr. GLYNN (South Australia).-I desire to call the attention of the leader of the Convention to an
apparent vagueness in the word "exclusive," to which reference has not yet been made. The word
"exclusive," no matter at what time the power arises, whether on the coming into being of the
Commonwealth, or the exercise of the power by the Federal Parliament, may mean, and I believe does
mean, that the power of the state to legislate ceases. On the question of whether the exclusive power under
this provision comes into being with the establishment of the Commonwealth, I would call the attention of
the leader of the Convention to clause 84. That clause seems to indicate that this exclusive power arises the
moment an Act is passed. It speaks of the exclusive power of enforcing customs duties being vested in the
Federal Parliament, but the second paragraph says-
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But this exclusive power shall not come into force until uniform duties of customs have been imposed by
the Parliament.
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It would appear that without that limitation the exclusive power would come into force at once, and the position
would be as stated by the Victorian representatives. If you pass this clause as it [start page 255] stands the state
could no longer legislate with regard to Chinese.
Mr. BARTON.-If the exclusive power is given without any restriction, I think it would arise immediately on
the establishment of the Commonwealth.
END QUOTE
QUOTE
Mr. GLYNN.-There seems to be some doubt as to whether the exclusive power arises upon the
establishment of the Commonwealth or on the exercise of the power of legislation. The doubt seems to be
removed by clause 84. It is said that if we put this provision in clause 52 the exclusive power may be postponed
until legislation takes place. But may you not then have a concurrent power, and may not the competence of the
local Legislature to legislate in the matter be continued as long as the legislation is not in contradiction of federal
legislation?
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Mr. DEAKIN.-That is the point.
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Mr. GLYNN.-Yes, and there is still a vagueness in the word "exclusive." If it is doubtful whether the
exclusive power commences with the foundation of the Commonwealth, and if it is possible that it may only
come into being on the passing of legislation, may it not still be said that on the passing of exclusive legislation
the power of the local Parliaments to legislate is extinguished, but that on the passing of concurrent legislation
that power does not cease?
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Mr. REID (New South Wales).-I think that enough has now been said on this subject by honorable
members both sides of the chamber, and I have only a very few remarks to offer. It appears that if the
sub-section remains where it is state laws will be valid until federal legislation, but the states will not be
able to alter or improve those laws during the possibly long interval between federation and federal
legislation. Under these circumstances, as we leave to the states for an indefinite time the power of
maintaining the laws they have, we should grant to them the power of improving those laws. It would
recommend the Constitution more to a large number of persons if we put the sub-section in clause 52, thus
enabling each state to legislate on this matter until the Federal Parliament comes in and legislates for all.
END QUOTE
.

QUOTE Mr. REID:
We must make it clear that the moment the Federal Parliament legislates on one of those points
enumerated in clause 52, that instant the whole State law on the subject is dead. There cannot be two laws,
one Federal and one State, on the same subject. But that I merely mention as almost a verbal criticism,
because there is no doubt, whatever that the intention of the framers was not to propose any complication
of the kind.
END QUOTE
.

QUOTE
The Hon. R.E. O'CONNOR (New South Wales)[3.18]: We ought to be careful not to load the commonwealth
with any more duties than are absolutely necessary. Although it is quite true that this power is permissive,
you will always find that if once power is given to the commonwealth to legislate on a particular question,
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there will be continual pressure brought to bear on the commonwealth to exercise that power. The
moment the commonwealth exercises the power, the states must retire from that field of legislation.
END QUOTE
.

QUOTE
Mr. OCONNOR.-Directly it is exercised it becomes an exclusive power, and there is no doubt that it will be
exercised.
END QUOTE
As such, unless legislation is within s25 of the constitution, any race law, including regarding
Aboriginals,since the 1967 referendum amending ss51(xxvi) are unconstitutional.
The same with the so called radar speed detection cameras which are not certified by the
Commonwealth of Australia, any conviction that relies upon such cameras will and remain to be
unconstitutional
.
As I understand it the Victorian Parliament legislated that Aboriginals could look after the High
country, this I view is unconstitutional as it is limited to as race. But suppose a person of Aboriginal
descent were to put poultry on the highland in violation of the legislation, then his legal
representatives in my view, like it or not, should challenge the jurisdiction of the court, in that it
couldnt enforce unconstitutional legislation and as such no crime could have been deemed
committed.
We had this apology by then Prime Minister Kevin Rudd also for the Parliament. He had no
authority to do so as he is merely a Member of Parliament. Likewise magistrates cannot apologize
other than for their own errors of law. How can any defendant trust the magistrate who made such
as pledge regarding Aboriginals and so might be bias?
Constitutionally for federal purposes Aboriginals were deemed to be equal to other Australians,
hence s41 of the constitution protecting their rights also.
Having an apology while nevertheless maintaining the unconstitutional Northern Territory
Intervention Act only underlines how hollow such an apology is. Basically the apologies are selfserving but hollow in their meanings as equality in the courts clearly is denied.
.
Then there is this further erosion of judicial powers such as the usage of Reference of powers.
French CJ, before becoming a Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia, published an article
about s51(xxvii) and correctly pointed out that ss51(xxvii) merely provided the entitlement for the
Commonwealth of Australia to accept reference of legislative power but it didnt itself authorize
the state to refer its legislative powers to the Commonwealth of Australia. The State of Victoria
however has purportedly referred legislative powers to the Commonwealth of Australia on
numerous occasions without the required State Referendum approval to authorize this. Hence any
such reference of power is unconstitutional. After all because of the separation of powers the
Parliament cannot diminish the judicial powers of the Supreme Court of Victoria, yet purport to do
so when referring legislative powers to the Commonwealth. This ass when the Commonwealth
accepts legislative powers then by this the Federal Courts take possession of the associated judicial
powers
It must be very clear that I am acting as a sentry to protect our state judicial and other legal rights
and expose the misuse and abuse of it.
.
Convention)
QUOTE
Mr. BARTON.-They do not require to get authority from home, for this reason: That the local
Constitutions empower the colonies separately to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of
the community, and that is without restriction, except such small restrictions as are imposed by the
Constitutions themselves, and, of course, the necessary restriction that they can only legislate for their own
territory. The position with regard to this Constitution is that it has no legislative power, except that which
is actually given to it in express terms or which is necessary or incidental to a power given.
END QUOTE
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Here we have that the Commonwealth in 2009 made pensions and other welfare payments subject
to the CPI (Consumer Price Index) and by implication the States (so any delegated powers to any
municipal/shire council) must be in compliance to this. Yet if one check the increases in the
unconstitutional rates then one find it violated the Commonwealth CPI rates application. Ass such
besides it being unconstitutional to charge rates as a form of land unconstitutional taxation it also
is escalating above the CPI rates.
Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (UK)
QUOTE
109 Inconsistency of laws

When a law of a State is inconsistent with a law of the Commonwealth, the latter shall prevail, and the
former shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be invalid.
END QUOTE
As such in that regard the conduct of the prosecutor (Buloke Shire Council) is to act ongoing in an
unconstitutional/illegal manner and by this deprived me of finances to have the station wagon
repaired for me to personally attend to the Berriwillock property. Hence having relied upon a
neighbor to do so as well as having authorized the captain of the local fire brigade to remove all
fire wood from the property, means that I in the circumstances prevailing acted within my capacity,
this while Buloke Shire Council itself left weed/grass to real fire danger in excess of 1metre along
the highway. I did provided images of this to the Prosecutor.
.

QUOTE
Mr. WISE (New South Wales).-The only class of cases contemplated by this section are offences
committed against the criminal law of the Federal Parliament, [start page 354] and the only cases to which
Mr. Higgins' amendment would apply are those in which the criminal law of the state was in conflict with
the criminal law of the Commonwealth; in any other cases there would be no necessity to change the
venue, and select a jury of citizens of another state. Now, I do not know any power, whether in modern or in
ancient times, which has given more just offence to the community than the power possessed by an Executive,
always under Act of Parliament, to change the venue for the trial of criminal offences, and I do not at all view
with the same apprehension that possesses the mind of the honorable member a state of affairs in which a jury of
one state would refuse to convict a person indicted at the instance-of the Federal Executive. It might be that a law
passed by the Federal Parliament was so counter to the popular feeling of a particular state, and so calculated to
injure the interests of that state, that it would become the duty of every citizen to exercise his practical power
of nullification of that law by refusing to convict persons of offences against it. That is a means by which
the public obtains a very striking opportunity of manifesting its condemnation of a law, and a method
which has never been known to fail, if the law itself was originally unjust. I think it is a measure of protection
to the states and to the citizens of the states which should be preserved, and that the Federal Government should
not have the power to interfere and prevent the citizens of a state adjudicating on the guilt or innocence of one of
their fellow citizens conferred upon it by this Constitution.
END QUOTE
It is a legal principle in the constitution that the courts, including juries, can nullify legislative
provisions and so also charges.
The onus is upon the courts to protect itself against unconstitutional erosion of the judiciary as we
now have in an unprecedented manner. The mere factthat the Infringment Court is operated by a
private having access to the Magistrates Court of Victoria court files and using its letter heads as
well as that of the Sheriffs Office, the Victorian Police, etc, may that the court may have to resort
to nullify charges time and again until the government abides by its constitutional obligations to
ensure as the Letter Patent stands for an impartial administration of justice.
.
In the 2011 alleged speeding of 5 kilometres an hour I challenged the validity of the Infringement
act and unless and until my objection has been overruled by a competent court of jurisdiction I am
entitled, and so any other person, that the Infringement Act 2006 is and remains to be ULTRA
VIRES. The Court therefore can validly hold there is for this also no jurisdiction, as the State of
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Victoria has not proved against my objection to jurisdiction regarding the question of validity of the
Infringement Act 2006.
.
There is however still also the issue that lawyers and neither so judges can be deemed to be validly
appointed in their opposition if they lack Australian citizenship which is not a nationality but a
political position. This is where the messy mesh commenced and as I canvassed this extensively in
the successful appeals on 19 July 2006 before the County Court of Victoria and it was a
constitutional issue, then it is beyond the prosecutor now to re-litigate this matter but is bound by it
that my unchallenged submissions remain to be the applicable status.
.
The above stated is not intended and neither must be perceived to address all issues/details and no
obligation existed for me to provide this set out, however as always facing lawyers who lack proper
understanding/comprehension of relevant legal matters I have been willing to explain some that
may assist the court also. Other than issues already decided by the County Court of Victoria on 19
July 2006, to which this court lacks any judiciary powers to interfere with/undermine it is my
submission the Prosecutor acted in a malicious manner to institute proceedings against me and these
proceedings are vexatious/frivolous and should have been struck out.
There can be no question about it that I notified the Prosecutor long before the Prosecutor initialed
legal proceedings against me that I would OBJECT TO THE JURISDICTION of any court and
there was a NO CASED TO ANSWER. Regretfully as I understand it councilors often are wasting
monies citizens (referred to as rate payers) in the councils area have been caused to pay, as they win
or lose are free from any harm. Well that is what they think.
.
Sorell v Smith (1925) Lord Dunedin in the House of Lords

QUOTE
In an action against a set person in combination, a conspiracy to injure, followed by actual injury, will give good
cause for action, and motive or instant where the act itself is not illegal is of the essence of the conspiracy.
END QUOTE
As currently I myself suffer ill health which place in question my ability to attend to St Arnaud in
time, this ADDRESS TO THE COURT still indicates what I am on about.
And the Prosecutor with its legal representatives would be obligated to present Authorities I
referred to in any event.
Foster (1950) S.R. (N.S.W.) 149, at p151 (Lord Denning, speaking on the role of an advocate)
QUOTE
As an advocate he is a minister of Justice equally with a judge, A Barrister cannot pick or choose his
clients...He must accept the brief and do all he honourably can on behalf of his client. I say 'All he
honourably can' because his duty is not only to his client. He has a duty to the court which is paramount.
It is a mistake to suppose that he is a mouthpiece of his client to say what he wants: or his tool to do
what he directs. He is none of those things. He owes his allegiance to a higher cause. It is the cause of
truth and Justice. He must not consciously misstate the facts. He must not knowingly conceal the truth.
He must not unjustly make a charge of fraud, that is, without evidence to support it. He must produce
all relevant authorities, even those that are against him. He must see that his client discloses, if ordered, all
relevant documents, even those that are fatal to his case. He must disregard the specific instructions of his
client, if they conflict with his duty to the court.
END QUOTE
This ADDRESS TO THE COURT is not intended and neither must be perceived to limit the
scope of the OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION as it merely adds to what the Prosecutor has to
overcome, which I view it cannot because I rely upon and entitled to do so on the 19 July 2006
County Court of Victoria decision to uphold my appeals and set aside the orders.
.
The Prosecutor has for long been aware that I rely upon my constitutional and other legal rights. As
such the Prosecutor had ample of time to prepare its case in response. Despite of this and having
engaged ES&a Lawyers no response was provided.
I may add that in 2001 Mr Peter Hanks QC made presentation to the Federal Court of Australia such
as referred to below:
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QUOTE
For example, checking the transcript of the hearing, it is noted that Mr Peter Hanks QC in his argument in point 22 and
22.1 of the OUTLINE stated the following;
QUOTE
In Foster v Jododex Australia Pty Ltd (1972) 127 CLR 421 at 445, Gibbs J referred to the general rule
that not less than so many days refers to clear days unless the context or the statutory intention
reveals a contrary intention.
END QUOTE
His quotation is again false and misleading!
22
Mr Peter Hanks QC quoted of the judgment the following;

QUOTE
unless the context or the statutory intention reveals a contrary intention
END QUOTE
This ought to be;
QUOTE
unless the context or the subject matter reveals a contrary intention
END QUOTE
Clearly, that is a gross deception. In legal terms there can be a significant difference in a case for the Court to deal with
a statutory intention versus subject matter.
Mr Peter Hanks QC stated to the Court (7 November 2001);
The researches of counsel have been unable to find provisions using simular language (not less that or at
least a number of days) where the language is as clear and specific as found in ss156(1) and 157.
Thousands upon thousands of Internet references can be found upon a search shall not be less than or shall not be
less that. As such this statement by Mr. Peter Hanks QC for the Australian Electoral Commission was a fraudulent
statement. Likewise other statement were found by the defendant to be deceptive and/or misleading.
We also have the fact that Counsel Mr peter Hanks QC argued the authority of the
ASSOCIATED DOMINIONS ASSURANCE SOCIETY PTY. LTD. v. BALMFORD (1950) 81 CLR 161
What counsel did however was to make a false and misleading presentation of what the case really was on about.
As the authority stated:
The notice actually served did not "specify" such a period: it "specified" a period which was too short by one
day, and the Acts Interpretation Act does not affect this position.
Mr Peter Hank QC didnt argue that the authority wasnt relevant, to the contrary he argued its relevance only by
misrepresenting how it applied and what the authority really was on about. As such, it had nothing to do with within
as Mr Peter Hanks QC argued as clearly the usage within was in a different context and not at all as Mr Hanks sought
to imply and did imply.
It ought to be considered a serious matter that a barrister employs these kind of tactics, indeed deceptive tactics, but it
seems the Australian Electoral Commissioner does not seem to worry about the means as long as it achieves his end
results.
Because I expect the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions to come up with any nonsense and unable to
verify the correctness of any claims they may make about any AUTHORITY they may refer to I am left no alternative
but to present my own research.
Lawyers are OFFICERS OF THE COURT but I experienced that when it comes to the Australian Electoral
Commissioner being the instructing party then it seems to me from experiences their oath of alliance is worthless and
they cannot be trusted, as set out also further in this ADDRESS TO THE COURT.
It is my view, that had Mr Peter Hanks QC not concealed matters and not presented fraudulent Authorities and how
they applied then the Federal Court of Australia would not have ruled that it had no legal jurisdiction, and would in fact
have granted the orders I sought. And in the end this case would never have eventuated before this Court as then matters
could have been addressed appropriately before any federal election had been held!
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I take the position that Subsection 245(14) of the Constitution is not and cannot be regarded to limit the right of a
objection to be only a (theistic belief ) religious objection but includes also any secular belief objection.
If Subsection 245(14) was limited to being theistic belief then it would be unconstitutional.
QUOTE 4-6-2006 CORRESPONDENCE FAXED 10.36 pm 4-6-2006
WITHOUT PREJUDICE
Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions
C/o Judy McGillivray, lawyer
Melbourne Office, 22nd Floor, 2000 Queen Street, Melbourne VIC 3000
GPO Box 21 A, Melbourne Vic 3001
Tel 03 9605 4333, Fax 03 9670 4295
4-6-2006
ref; 02101199, etc

T01567737 & Q01897630
AND WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

Re; religious objection (Subsection 245(14) of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918) offend Section 116 if the
Constitution if it excludes secular belief based objections.
Madam,
As you are aware I continue to refer to my religious objection albeit do wish to indicate that while using the
religious objection referred to in subsection 245(14) of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 I do not consider that
this subsection 14 limits an objection only to an theistic belief based religious objection but in fact it also includes
any secular belief based religious objection, as it must be neutral to whatever a person uses as grounds for an
objection. This, as Section 116 of the Constitution prohibit the Commonwealth of Australia to limit the scope of
subsection 245(14) to only theistic belief based religious objections. Therefore, any person having a purely moral,
ethical, or philosophical source of religious objection have a valid objection.
Neither do I accept that a person making an religious objection requires to state his/her religion, and neither which
part of his/her religion provides for a religious objection as the mere claim itself is sufficient to constitute what is
referred to in subsection 245(14) as being a religious objection. Therefore, the wording religious objection is to be
taken as objection without the word religion having any special meaning in that regard.
If you do not accept this as such, then there is clearly another constitutional issue on foot!
I request you to respond as soon as possible and set out your position in this regard.
Awaiting your response, G. H. SCHOREL-HLAVKA
END QUOTE 4-6-2006 CORRESPONDENCE FAXED 10.36 pm 4-6-2006
END QUOTE

QUOTE
WELSH v. UNITED STATES, 398 U.S. 333 (1970), 398 U.S. 333, WELSH v. UNITED STATES,
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH
CIRCUIT, No. 76., Argued January 20, 1970, Decided June 15, 1970
1. The language of 6 (j) cannot be construed (as it was in United States v. Seeger, supra, and
as it is in the prevailing opinion) to exempt from military service all individuals who in good
faith oppose all war, it being clear from both the legislative history and textual analysis of
that provision that Congress used the words "by reason of religious training and belief" to
limit religion to its theistic sense and to confine it to formal, organized worship or shared
beliefs by a recognizable and cohesive group. Pp. 348-354.
2. The question of the constitutionality of 6 (j) cannot be avoided by a construction of that
provision that is contrary to its intended meaning. Pp. 354-356.
3. Section 6 (j) contravenes the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment by exempting
those whose conscientious objection claims are founded on a theistic belief while not
exempting those whose claims are based on a secular belief. To comport with that clause an
exemption must be "neutral" and include those whose belief emanates from a purely moral,
ethical, or philosophical source. Pp. 356-361.
4. In view of the broad discretion conferred by the Act's severability clause and the
longstanding policy of exempting religious conscientious objectors, the Court, rather than
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nullifying the exemption entirely, should extend its coverage to those like petitioner who
have been unconstitutionally excluded from its coverage. Pp. 361-367.
END QUOTE
Many an accused despite having high priced lawyers still lose their cases regarding FAILURE TO
VOTE, whereas I succeeded representing myself, this is because I did so to say the hard yakka, and
researched the legal principles embedded in the constitution. The ruling of the Supreme Court of
Victoria that it had no jurisdiction resulted that my investigation/research exposed that we have an
illusionary legal system that holds no reality to what is constitutionally appropriate. Because of the
separation of powers I view the Victorian Government/Parliament has no powers to cause courts to
be registered with an ABN by this wiping out the independence of the judiciary. Where the
Magistrates Court of Victoria shares the same ABN number with the Victorian Government to
which the Prosecutor seeks to enforce it purported laws then clearly there is an implied bias at the
very least where it is part of Business Unit 19 with the Victorian Government. As this was
unchallenged litigated by me on 19 July 2006 then this court and any other court cannot get around
it and so neither the Prosecutor.
In my view the Court has the powers to hear and determine the jurisdictional issue, albeit bound by
the County Court of Victoria 19 July 2006 decision to uphold my appeal and so all submissions
then before the court unchallenged. This without that I concede nor can be deemed to concede the
court jurisdiction as to other matters referred to in the summons.
As a judge way back in 1985 made clear it is like opening a Pandoora box when I commence to
cross examine witnesses.
And not long ago a barrister complained that I was surgically taking apart his clients affidavit.
I do not deny that the issues I raised are very critical and need to be addressed appropriately but the
issue is should this be addressed in court or should an appropriate investigation be conducted to
ensure that any unconstitutional/unlawful conduct and the impartiality of the courts appropriately
attended to?
In my view the matters I raised are relevant to the conduct of the Prosecutor also and as such if the
Prosecutor persist in litigating then well these matters are to be canvassed, and more extensive then
above. However, I view the Court has the powers to permanently stay proceedings (as
eventuated in the Colosimo case) and only I am given the right to apply for reinstatement of
the matters before this court.
.
If this court decides to proceed with the hearing of the OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION then as I
provided my set out to certain but not all matters then I view the Prosecutor must on 20 August
2015 provide me with a set out why the court had jurisdiction and provide me with ample of time to
respond to this set out submissions, so I can check, as I did with Mr Peter Hanks QC if its
presentation is not including fraudulent representations, etc. the matters I have so far referred to are
very complicated and difficult to understand/comprehend by those in the legal system where it often
totally contrary to what they were dealing with. As such a rush to deal with the matter will in itself
to deny a proper hearing and to pervert the course of justice.
.
I do not accept that this court can grand the summons to be withdrawn, for that unless it deals with
the OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION first, this as it has no judicial powers to invoke to allow
for the summons to be withdrawn.
.
As this is an OBJECTION TO JURISDICTION the court cannot take any plea.
As the Magistrates Court of Victoria at St Arnaud only sits one day a week it would be
inappropriately to have matters heard at the St Arnauds location, as matters will likely be tasking
more than one day.

20150820-ADDRESS To The COURT-In The Matter Buloke Shire Council V Schorel-Hlavka

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20150820-ADDRESS To The COURT-In The Matter Buloke Shire Council V Schorel-Hlavka

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Page 1

ADDRESS TO THE COURT

107 Graham Road, Viewbank 3084, Victoria

(Buloke Shire Council) Prosecutors legal representatives ES&a Lawyers

As I understand it the so called Victorian Constitution Act 1975 is not a constitution or

HANSARD 17-3-1898 Constitution Convention Debates

107 Graham Road, Viewbank 3084, Victoria

(Buloke Shire Council) Prosecutors legal representatives ES&a Lawyers

Deponent: Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.

107 Graham Road, Viewbank 3084, Victoria

(Buloke Shire Council) Prosecutors legal representatives ES&a Lawyers

When I appeared as a CONSTITUTIONALIST and Professional Advocate (now retired) before

Transcript 16 March 2009 page 12 line 22 (MS MORRIS)

107 Graham Road, Viewbank 3084, Victoria

(Buloke Shire Council) Prosecutors legal representatives ES&a Lawyers

Transcript 16 March 2009 page 26 line 14

107 Graham Road, Viewbank 3084, Victoria

(Buloke Shire Council) Prosecutors legal representatives ES&a Lawyers

Deponent: Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.

107 Graham Road, Viewbank 3084, Victoria

(Buloke Shire Council) Prosecutors legal representatives ES&a Lawyers

Bears the Burden of Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt.

consent of parties. Industrial Addition Association v. C.I.R., 323 US 310, 313.

107 Graham Road, Viewbank 3084, Victoria

(Buloke Shire Council) Prosecutors legal representatives ES&a Lawyers

Sixteenth American Jurisprudence 2d; SS: 256 & 257:

Sixteenth American Jurisprudence

Deponent: Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.

107 Graham Road, Viewbank 3084, Victoria

(Buloke Shire Council) Prosecutors legal representatives ES&a Lawyers

Deponent: Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.

107 Graham Road, Viewbank 3084, Victoria

(Buloke Shire Council) Prosecutors legal representatives ES&a Lawyers

QUOTE Byrne v Byrne (1965) 7 FLR 342 at 343

Deponent: Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.

107 Graham Road, Viewbank 3084, Victoria

(Buloke Shire Council) Prosecutors legal representatives ES&a Lawyers

Deponent: Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.

107 Graham Road, Viewbank 3084, Victoria

(Buloke Shire Council) Prosecutors legal representatives ES&a Lawyers

107 Graham Road, Viewbank 3084, Victoria

(Buloke Shire Council) Prosecutors legal representatives ES&a Lawyers

the GREAT Act. If local government employees are to be regarded as "in

aldermen of a council are elected by popular suffrage, not appointed by the

Deponent: Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.

107 Graham Road, Viewbank 3084, Victoria

(Buloke Shire Council) Prosecutors legal representatives ES&a Lawyers

107 Graham Road, Viewbank 3084, Victoria

(Buloke Shire Council) Prosecutors legal representatives ES&a Lawyers

Hansard 2-3-1898 Constitution Convention Debates

107 Graham Road, Viewbank 3084, Victoria

(Buloke Shire Council) Prosecutors legal representatives ES&a Lawyers

107 Graham Road, Viewbank 3084, Victoria

(Buloke Shire Council) Prosecutors legal representatives ES&a Lawyers

Mr. DEAKIN.-It is made for the lawyers under this clause.

Hansard 30-3-1897 Constitution Convention Debates

107 Graham Road, Viewbank 3084, Victoria

(Buloke Shire Council) Prosecutors legal representatives ES&a Lawyers

The corporatising of our courts

The corporatising of our courts

Retirement speech of John K. Phillips, Supreme Court of Victoria

March 24, 2005

Deponent: Mr G. H. Schorel-Hlavka O.W.B.