AZNAR vs.

GARCIA

State; so that he appears never to have intended to abandon his

G.R. No. L-16749

California citizenship by acquiring another. But at the time of his

January 31, 1963

death, he was domiciled in the Philippines.

FACTS: EDWARD Christensen died testate. The estate was

ISSUE: what law on succession should apply, the Philippine law or

distributed by Executioner Aznar according to the will, which

the California law?

provides that: Php 3,600 be given to HELEN Christensen as her

HELD: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby

legacy, and the rest of his estate to his daughter LUCY Christensen,

reversed and the case returned to the lower court with instructions

as pronounced by CFI Davao.

that the partition be made as the Philippine law on succession

Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by

provides.

Helen, insofar as it deprives her of her legitime as an acknowledged

The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is

natural child, she having been declared by Us an acknowledged

defined in Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which is as

natural child of the deceased Edward in an earlier case.

follows:
As to his citizenship, we find that the citizenship that he acquired in
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the

California when he resided in Sacramento from 1904 to 1913, was

law of the country where it is situated.

never lost by his stay in the Philippines, and the deceased appears to
have considered himself as a citizen of California by the fact that

However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect

when he executed his will he declared that he was a citizen of that

to the order of succession and to the amount of successional rights

and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be

It is argued on executors behalf that as the deceased Christensen was

regulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under

a citizen of the State of California, the internal law thereof, which is

consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and

that given in the Kaufman case, should govern the determination of

regardless of the country where said property may be found.

the validity of the testamentary provisions of Christensens will, such

law being in force in the State of California of which Christensen was

The application of this article in the case at bar requires the

a citizen. Appellant, on the other hand, insists that Article 946 should

determination of the meaning of the term national law is used

be applicable, and in accordance therewith and following the

therein.

doctrine of the renvoi, the question of the validity of the testamentary

provision in question should be referred back to the law of the

The next question is: What is the law in California governing the

decedents domicile, which is the Philippines.

disposition of personal property?

The decision of CFI Davao, sustains the contention of the executor-

We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of

appellee that under the California Probate Code, a testator may

laws rule, while the rule applied in In re Kaufman, its internal law. If

dispose of his property by will in the form and manner he desires.

the law on succ ession and the conflict of laws rules of California are

But HELEN invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code of

to be enforced jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate

California, which is as follows:

sphere, the principle cited In re Kaufman should apply to citizens

living in the State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens

If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal

as are not domiciled in California but in other jurisdictions. The rule

property is situated, it is deemed to follow the person of its owner,

laid down of resorting to the law of the domicile in the determination

and is governed by the law of his domicile.

of matters with foreign element involved is in accord with the general

principle of American law that the domiciliary law should govern in

domicile. The conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil

most matters or rights which follow the person of the owner.

Code, precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not

domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in

Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the

the case at bar. The court of the domicile can not and should not

Philippines pointed out as the national law is the internal law of

refer the case back to California; such action would leave the issue

California. But as above explained the laws of California have

incapable of determination because the case will then be like a

prescribed two sets of laws for its citizens, one for residents therein

football, tossed back and forth between the two states, between the

and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions.

country of which the decedent was a citizen and the country of his
domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own law as directed in

It is argued on appellees (Aznar and LUCY) behalf that the clause if

the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the question

there is no law to the contrary in the place where the property is

has to be decided, especially as the application of the internal law of

situated in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of

California provides no legitime for children while the Philippine law,

the Civil Code of the Philippines and that the law to the contrary in

Arts. 887(4) and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes natural

the Philippines is the provision in said Article 16 that the national

children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing

law of the deceased should govern. This contention can not be

them.

sustained.

We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Edward, a

As explained in the various authorities cited above, the national law

citizen of California, is the Philippines, the validity of the provisions

mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws

of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child, the appellant

in the California Civil Code, i.e., Article 946, which authorizes the

HELEN, should be governed by the Philippine Law, the domicile,

reference or return of the question to the law of the testators

pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the

internal law of California..

NOTES: There is no single American law governing the validity of

testamentary provisions in the United States, each state of the Union
having its own private law applicable to its citizens only and in force
only within the state. The national law indicated in Article 16 of the
Civil Code above quoted cannot, therefore, possibly mean or apply to
any general American law. So it can refer to no other than the private
law of the State of California.

50 Ill.2d 152 (1971)

277 N.E.2d 870

committed to the custody of the Department of Mental Health, which

placed him in the Kankakee State Hospital on November 19, 1963.

In re CONSERVATORSHIP OF THE ESTATE OF FRED W.

SCHNEIDER. (THE DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH,
Appellee, v. RUTH A. TAYLOR, Conservator, Appellant.)

Subsequently, the Department filed a petition in the circuit court of

Cook County, probate division, against the conservator of
Schneider's estate for reimbursement for the cost of his hospital care

Supreme Court of Illinois.

and maintenance at the determined rate of $132 per month. (Ill. Rev.

Rehearing denied January 27, 1972.

Stat. 1969, ch. 91 1/2, par. 12-12.) The circuit court granted the

WILLIAM J. SCOTT, Attorney General, of Springfield, (FRANCIS T.

CROWE, JEROME F. GOLDBERG, JOAN M. MATLAW and SAMUEL E.
HIRSCH, Assistant Attorneys General, of counsel,) for appellant.

Department the relief sought, entered judgment against the

ALPHONSE CERZA and ANTHONY J. DE TOLVE, both of Chicago, for

appellee.

reversed the order of the circuit court (In re Estate of Schneider,130

conservator in the sum of $6,807.50, and ordered the payment of the

monthly charges thereafter. The Appellate Court for the First District
Ill.App.2d 440), and we granted leave to appeal from the decision of
the appellate court.

Reversed and remanded with directions.

Schneider was first committed to the Department of Mental Health on

MR. JUSTICE DAVIS delivered the opinion of the court:

November 19, 1963, was discharged on December 28, 1965, but

was recommitted on February 4, 1966, after again being found

The question before the court in this case is whether a person, or his

incompetent to stand trial. Prior to January, 1966, the Department did

estate, is liable for his hospital care when he has been charged with

not attempt to collect charges when patients were committed to a

a felony and is committed to the hospital on a finding that he is

State hospital on a criminal proceeding, as in the instant case.

incompetent to stand trial.

[50 Ill.2d 154]

Fred W. Schneider was indicted for the murder of his wife. He was

On January 1, 1966, however, Mental Health Regulation No. 51 was

amended to provide that treatment charges would be established against the
estate and income of patients committed under similar proceedings, but that
no charges would be imposed against the relatives of such patients.

found incompetent to stand trial pursuant to sections 12 and 13 of

division II of the Criminal Code of 1874, now sections 104-1 et
seq. of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1963, ch. 38,
pars. 592 and 593; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, pars. 104-1 et seq.), and was

Subsequent to the decision of the appellate court in this case, we

Courts in other States have considered this question and have

held in Department of Mental Health v. Pauling, 47 Ill.2d 269, that a

reached a conclusion which is in accord with our

person committed to the Department of Mental Health upon a finding

[50 Ill.2d 155]

that he was not guilty by reason of insanity when the offense was

view in Pauling. See: State v. Kosioreck (Conn. 1969), 259 A.2d 151; State
v. Griffith (Ohio 1941), 36 N.E.2d 489; and Commonwealth v. Evans (1916),
253 Pa. 524, 98 A. 722.

committed, and who had not recovered from such insanity at the time
of the trial, was liable for the monthly charges imposed under section
12-12 of the Mental Health Code. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 91 1/2, par.

One additional matter is raised in this case. In Pauling, the

12-12.) We believe that Pauling is determinative of the principal

Department did not seek to impose charges for the period of time

issue raised in this case. We there held that a commitment under

prior to January 1, 1966, the date it amended its regulations. In this

such circumstances was neither an imposition of any penalty, nor

case, the Department served notice upon the conservator that it had

was it based upon any finding of guilt of a crime, but rather, was the

determined that charges of $132 per month should commence as of

result of a finding as to mental condition, and the commitment was of

February 4, 1966 the date Schneider was recommitted. However,

the same nature and substance as a commitment in a civil

in this proceeding, the Department sought to impose charges for

proceeding under the Mental Health Act. As a result, we held that the

hospitalization from November 19, 1963, the date of Schneider's

defendant, Pauling, was subject to the same statutory costs as any

original commitment, and judgment was entered on this basis.

other patient.

We find that the charges prior to January 1, 1966, the date of the

As in Pauling, it is contended in this case that Schneider was

amended regulations, were without validity. Prior to January 1, 1966,

committed for the protection of the public and not for hospitalization

the Department had determined, for policy or other considerations

for his mental condition. The argument has no more validity here

which it deemed sufficient, not to seek payment from persons

than in Pauling. The proceeding to determine whether one is

committed under such circumstances. Inconceivable hardship and

competent to stand trial is primarily for the protection of his

injustice could result if the Department were permitted to change its

constitutional rights to due process and for his benefit not for the

procedures in this respect and now seek monies from persons for

protection of the public. The proceeding is distinct and apart from the

hospitalization given in years long past. We find no justification, or

criminal proceeding. People v. Bender, 20 Ill.2d 45, 47, 48, 53;

authority, for making the change of policy retroactive. We see no

People v. Redlich, 402 Ill. 270, 276.

reason to broaden our decision in Pauling, and we uphold the

imposition of the monthly charges only for that period of time during
which Schneider was hospitalized subsequent to January 1, 1966.
The judgments of the circuit and appellate courts are reversed, and
the cause is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings
consistent herewith.
Reversed and remanded, with directions.

Pfau v. Trent Aluminum Co.

55 N.J. 511 (1970)

263 A.2d 129

guest statute which provides that a host-driver is not liable to his

passenger-guest for ordinary negligence.[1] The defendants pleaded,

STEVEN PFAU ET AL., PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS, v. TRENT

inter alia, the Iowa guest statute as a defense. On plaintiff's motion,

ALUMINUM COMPANY ET AL., DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.

Judge Demos, in the Law Division, struck *514 this defense, holding
that the New Jersey law requiring a host to use at least ordinary care

The Supreme Court of New Jersey.

for the safety of his guest was applicable. The Appellate Division
ruled that the Iowa guest statute applied to the case and accordingly

Argued January 20, 1970.

reversed and reinstated the defense. 106 N.J. Super. 324 (1969).
Plaintiff petitioned this Court for certification. Since we were not

Decided March 17, 1970.

confronted with a final judgment, we granted defendants' motion to

*513 Mr. Jacob D. Fuchsberg, of the New York Bar, argued the cause

dismiss, but allowed plaintiff 15 days to file a motion for leave to

for Plaintiffs-Appellants (Messrs. Yesko and Marcus, attorneys; Mr.

appeal an interlocutory order. Such a motion was filed and granted.

Elliot F. Topper, of the New York Bar, of counsel).

The facts pertinent to this appeal are undisputed. Plaintiff, Steven
Mr. Richard D. Catenacci argued the cause for Defendants-

Pfau, a domiciliary of Connecticut, was a student at Parsons College

Respondents (Messrs. Pindar, McElroy, Connell, Foley & Geiser,

in Iowa, and the defendant, Bruce Trent, a domiciliary of New Jersey,

attorneys; Mr. John A. Pindar of counsel; Mr. Richard D. Catenacci

was a student at the same college. The boys met for the first time at

on the brief).

Parsons.

The opinion of the court was delivered by PROCTOR, J.

Following the Easter vacation in 1966, the defendant, Bruce Trent,

drove the automobile involved in the accident back to Iowa for his

This appeal presents a conflct of laws problem regarding a host's

use at college. The automobile was registered in New Jersey in the

liability to his guest for negligence arising out of an automobile

name of the Trent Aluminum Company, a New Jersey corporation

accident. Plaintiff, a Connecticut domiciliary, was injured in Iowa

owned by Bruce's father. Bruce was using the car with the owner-

while a passenger in an automobile driven by a New Jersey

corporation's consent. The vehicle was insured in New Jersey by a

domiciliary and owned by a New Jersey corporation. Iowa has a

New Jersey carrier.

About a month after Bruce's return to college and several days

apply the Ohio guest statute. The purposes discerned in the Ohio

before the accident, he agreed to drive the plaintiff to Columbia,

statute by that state's own courts were the prevention of collusive

Missouri, for a weekend visit. They never reached their destination.

suits and the preclusion of suits by "ungrateful guests." Since both

Shortly after leaving Parsons on April 22, 1966, and while still in

plaintiff and defendant were New Jersey domiciliaries and since the

Iowa, Bruce failed to negotiate a curve and the car he was operating

car was insured in New Jersey, we did not believe that Ohio had any

collided with an oncoming vehicle driven by Joseph Davis. Mr. Davis

interest in the application of its guest statute to the case. Instead, we

and his wife and child, who were Iowa domiciliaries, were injured in

applied New Jersey's strong declared policy of requiring a host to

the accident. Their claims have now been settled by defendants'

exercise at least ordinary care for the safety of his guest. Cohen v.

insurance carrier. The sole question presented by this appeal is

Kaminetsky, 36 N.J. 276, 283 (1961).

whether the Iowa guest statute is applicable to this action.

Our decision in Mellk followed Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473,

In Mellk v. Sarahson, 49 N.J. 226 (1967) this Court abandoned the

240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963) in which the New York

old lex loci delicti rule for determining choice of law in tort cases, e.g.,

Court of Appeals rejected the traditional choice of law rule which

Harber v. Graham, 105 N.J.L. *515 213, 214-215 (E. & A. 1928), 61

looked invariably to the place of the tort, and reached the same result

A.L.R. 1232 and adopted the governmental interest analysis

as Mellk on similar facts. There, two New York residents began an

approach. We did so because we believed that the lex loci delicti

automobile trip from that state to Ontario. The plaintiff, a guest in

doctrine worked unjust results in many cases and ignored the

defendant's car, was injured when the defendant-driver struck a

interests which jurisdictions other than that where the tort occurred

stone wall in Ontario. Although the Ontario statute barred any

may have in the resolution of the particular issues involved. Id. at

recovery by a guest-passenger against a host-driver, the court

229. In Mellk, the plaintiff was injured while riding as a passenger in

applied New York law which permitted the guest to sue his host.

the defendant-driver's car when it struck a parked vehicle in Ohio.

Babcock achieved widespread acclaim from legal scholars, e.g.,

Plaintiff and defendant were both New Jersey domiciliaries and their

Cavers, Cheatham, Currie, *516 Ehrenzweig, Leflar and Reese,

guest-host relationship began in this state. When the accident

"Comments on Babcock v. Jackson," 63 Colum. L. Rev. 1212 (1963),

happened, they were returning from a brief visit to the home of a

and New York has continued to apply the Babcock approach in

mutual friend in Wisconsin. Defendant's automobile was insured and

subsequent decisions. See Dym v. Gordon, 16 N.Y.2d 120, 262

registered in New Jersey. In those circumstances we declined to

N.Y.S.2d 463, 209 N.E.2d 792 (Ct. App. 1965); Macey v. Rozbicki, 18

N.Y.2d 289, 274 N.Y.S.2d 591, 221 N.E.2d 380 (Ct. App. 1966);

litigation in the Iowa courts; no hitchhiker is involved; no Iowa insurer

Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y 2d 569, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519, 249 N.E.2d 394

will be subjected to a "collusive suit" since the insurer is a New

(Ct. App. 1969). These post-Babcock decisions have indicated some

Jersey corporation; there is no "Good Samaritan" Iowa host-driver to

of the difficulties which are inevitable when a court applies a new

be protected; and finally, there is no Iowa guest displaying his

approach to various factual patterns. We are faced with the same

"ingratitude" *517 by suing for ordinary negligence. The desire of

problem in the present case, for defendants do not argue that New

Iowa to prevent collusive suits and suits by ungrateful guests and to

Jersey should return to lex loci delicti; they disagree, however, with

cut down litigation would ordinarily apply to Iowa domiciliaries,

the plaintiff over what state's law modern conflicts principles dictate

defendants insuring motor vehicles there, and persons suing in its

should be applied.

courts. Melik v. Sarahson, supra, 49 N.J., at 231.

In order to determine whether the Iowa guest statute should apply to

Defendants contend, however, that application of the Iowa guest

this case, we must first examine its purposes as articulated by the

statute is required because the plaintiff and the individual defendant

Iowa courts. See Mellk v. Sarahson, supra, 49 N.J., at 230. These

were residing in Iowa at the time of the accident, because the host-

purposes are: "to cut down litigation arising from the commendable

guest relationship began and ended in Iowa, and because non-guest

unselfish practice of sharing with others transportation in one's

Iowa domiciliaries were injured in the accident. These factors were

vehicle and protect the Good Samaritan from claims based on

treated as significant in the post-Babcock decision of Dym v. Gordon,

negligence by those invited to ride as a courtesy," Rainsbarger v.

supra.

Shepherd, 254 Iowa 486, 492, 118 N.W.2d 41, 44, 1 A.L.R.3d 1074

In Dym the plaintiff sued for injuries which she suffered in a collision

(1962); to prevent ingratitude by guests, Knutson v. Lurie, 217 Iowa

between two automobiles in Colorado. Both the plaintiff-guest and

192, 195, 251 N.W. 147, 149 (1933); to prevent suits by hitchhikers,

the defendant-host were New York domiciliaries who were attending

Id.; "to prevent collusion suits by friends and relatives resulting in

summer school at the University of Colorado when the accident

excessively high insurance rates," Hardwick v. Bublitz, 253 Iowa 49,

54, 111 N.W.2d 309, 312 (1961).

occurred. They had gone separately to Colorado. The defendant was

The above policies expressed by the Iowa courts would not appear to

riding in collided with another vehicle. Defendant's car was registered

be relevant to the present matter. This action will not increase

and insured in New York and he had brought it to Colorado for use at

driving the plaintiff to a nearby golf course when the car they were

10

college. After returning to New York, the plaintiff brought suit to

or legislative pronouncements in Colorado. 16 N.Y.2d at 132, 262

recover for her injuries. Defendant pleaded the Colorado guest

N.Y.S.2d at 473, 209 N.E.2d at 799.

statute which required a showing of intentional misconduct,

In the later case of Macey v. Rozbicki, supra, the same court, in a six

intoxication, or "negligence consisting of a willful and wanton

to one decision, substantially narrowed Dym. In Macey, the

disregard of the rights of others" in order for a guest to recover from

his host.

defendants, husband and wife, were New York domiciliaries who

In a four to three decision, the New York Court of Appeals held that

plaintiff, who was the wife's sister and who was also a New York

the Colorado guest statute was applicable. The majority reasoned

domiciliary, to spend a 10-day vacation with them. During this visit

that the statute was based on three policy considerations, i.e., "the

the plaintiff was injured while riding as a passenger when defendants'

protection of Colorado drivers and their insurance carriers against

automobile collided with another vehicle owned and operated by a

fraudulent claims, the prevention of suits by `ungrateful guests', and

Canadian. The plaintiff and wife defendant had intended to drive to

the priority of injured parties in other cars in the assets of the

church in nearby Niagara Falls, Ontario, and then return to the

negligent *518 defendant." 16 N.Y.2d at 124, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 466,

defendants' summer home. Plaintiff sued in New York and the

209 N.E.2d at 794. Since another vehicle was involved in the

defendants pleaded the Ontario guest act which immunizes an

accident, the majority believed that the policy of priority of claims was

automobile owner and driver from liability for personal injury to or

a significant factor. The majority also noted that the parties had

death of his guest. The court held that New York law permitting a

become temporary residents of Colorado, and that the host-guest

guest to sue his host for ordinary negligence was applicable and

relationship began and ended in that state. This latter factor the seat

rejected the defense of the Ontario guest statute. That the trip in

of the relationship was strongly emphasized.

question was to begin and end in Canada was said to be "not

were vacationing at their summer home in Ontario. They invited the

particularly significant," since the parties were living permanently in

In a dissent, Judge Fuld (now Chief Judge) contended that the case

New York and "undoubtedly" had made the plans for the plaintiff's

was not materially distinguishable from Babcock, supra. He noted

visit in New York. 18 N.Y.2d at *519 292, 274 N.Y.S.2d at 593, 221

that the majority's conclusion that Colorado's guest statute

N.E.2d at 381. The court distinguished Dym by saying that in that

envisioned a third party priority policy found no support in any judicial

case the principal situs of the relationship was in Colorado. No

11

mention was made of any priority of claims theory based on the

time of the accident they were en route from the University to Detroit,

Canadian car involved in the accident.

Michigan, to spend a weekend. Miss Tooker and Miss Lopez were

both New York domiciliaries. The automobile which Miss Lopez was

In a concurring opinion Judge Keating pointed out that Dym and

driving belonged to her father who lived in New York, where the car

Macey were indistinguishable except for two facts: 1) in Dym, there

was registered and insured.

was no prior arrangement for the plaintiff and defendant to meet in

Colorado; and 2) that the parties in Dym were going to reside in

*520 The administrator of Miss Tooker's estate sued for wrongful

Colorado for a longer period of time. He could not accept the

death. The defendant pleaded as a defense the Michigan guest

majority's conclusion that these factors were grounds for a valid

statute which bars a guest's recovery from his host for ordinary

distinction. He reasoned that where the parties were New York

negligence.

domiciliaries and the automobile was insured under the laws of that

Judge Keating, this time writing for the majority of the court, held that

state, the "seat of the relationship was irrelevant." Accordingly, he

the New York standard of ordinary care for a guest was applicable to

thought that Dym should no longer be followed. 18 N.Y.2d, at 296298, 274 N.Y.S.2d, at 596-598, 221 N.E.2d, at 384-385.

the case and that Michigan's guest statute could not be raised as a

Most recently, the New York Court of Appeals decided Tooker v.

which underlie the ostensibly conflicting laws of Michigan and New

Lopez, supra, which explicitly rejected the rationale and holding of

York, it was clear that the latter had the only real interest in whether

Dym. 24 N.Y.2d, at 574-575, 301 N.Y.S.2d, at 523, 249 N.E.2d, at

recovery should be granted. Judge Keating reasoned that the

394. See also the concurring opinion of Judge Burke who wrote for

application of Michigan law would defeat New York's legitimate

the majority in Dym, 23 N.Y.2d, at 591, 301 N.Y.S.2d, at 538, 249

interest without serving any legitimate interest of Michigan. He

N.E.2d, at 407-408. In Tooker, Catharina Tooker, a student at

identified New York's interest as its strong policy of holding all drivers

Michigan State University, was killed when the car in which she was

of motor vehicles financially responsible for their negligent acts

a passenger overturned after the driver had lost control of the vehicle

irrespective of the guest status of the victims. Michigan, on the other

while attempting to pass another car. The driver, Marcia Lopez, was

hand, had no interest in whether a New York plaintiff is denied

also killed and another passenger, Susan Silk, was seriously injured.

recovery against a New York defendant where the car was insured in

The two girls were classmates of Miss Tooker at the University. At the

New York. He rejected as "plainly irrevelant" the fact that the

defense. The court held that in light of the policy considerations

12

deceased guest and driver were residing in Michigan for an extended

campus from Dade City, Florida, the automobile operated by the

period of time. 24 N.Y.2d, at 577, 301 N.Y.S.2d, at 525, 249 N.E.2d

defendant, William Stavola, and owned by his mother, Mary Stavola,

399. Although Judge Keating did not specifically treat the "seat of the

collided with a telephone pole. Utilizing the same governmental-

relationship" factor, i.e., that the trip was arranged for and began and

interest analysis approach taken later in Tooker, the court refused to

ended in Michigan, it is obvious that he considered this factor equally

apply Florida's guest statute which barred guests' suits for the

irrevelant. Judge Burke in his concurring opinion, while marking the

ordinary negligence of their hosts. Judge Halpern reasoned that

passing of Dym with regret, conceded that the "origin of the

since all of the parties were domiciled here and since the car was

relationship" could not be considered in an interest analysis

registered and insured here, New Jersey had the "paramount

approach. 24 N.Y.2d, at 590-591, 301 N.Y.S.2d, at 537-538, 249

governmental interest, or concern, in fixing the rights and liabilities

N.E.2d, at 407-408.

between the parties." Id., at 187-189. He explicitly rejected the result

and rationale in Dym.

Finally, Judge Keating abjured the third-party-fund theory enunciated

in Dym, saying:

We are in accord with both Tooker and Mullane. While Iowa was the
"seat of the relationship" in the instant case, this "contact" does not

*521 If the purpose of the statute is to protect the rights of the injured

relate to any interest or policy behind Iowa's guest statute. Nor do we

"non-guest", as opposed to the owner or his insurance carrier, we fail

attach any importance to the temporary Iowa residence of plaintiff

to perceive any rational basis for predicating that protection on the

and defendant. Both parties were still permanently domiciled in other

degree of negligence which the guest is able to establish. 24 N.Y.2d

states which retained interests. Moreover, the insurer is a New

at 575, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 524, 249 N.E.2d at 397.

Jersey corporation which issued its policy at rates applicable to New

Jersey. See Ehrenzweig, "Guest Statutes in the Conflict of Laws

In Mullane v. Stavola, 101 N.J. Super. 184 (Law Div. 1968), a pre-

Towards a Theory of Enterprise Liability Under `Foreseeable and

Tooker decision, Judge Halpern, sitting in the Law Division in our

Insurable Laws,'" 69 Yale L.J. 595, 603 (1960). Iowa's interest in

state, reached the same result on similar facts. There, plaintiffs-

these temporary residents is limited to enforcement of its *522 rules

guests and defendant-host were all New Jersey domiciliaries in

of the road at least where the litigation is not in that state.[2] Finally,

attendance at St. Leo's College in Florida. The defendants' vehicle

we are not persuaded by the third-party-fund theory. Iowa has never

was registered and insured in New Jersey. While returning to the

expressed such a purpose behind its guest statute, and it is not

13

appropriate for us to impute inarticulated purposes to the legislature

repealed its guest statute, Con. Public Acts, 1931, Chap. 270, 1937

of another state. See Comment, "Conflict of Laws Two Case Studies

Supp. 351d repealing 1628, and now permits guest-passengers

in Governmental-Interest Analysis," 65 Colum. L. Rev. 1448, 1459

to recover from their host-drivers for ordinary negligence. See Massa

(1965). The danger of injured Iowa domiciliaries being deprived of

v. Nastri, 125 Conn. 144, 3 A.2d 839, 120 A.L.R. 939 (1939); Laube

available funds because of recovery by the negligent driver's guest is

v. Stevenson, 137 Conn. 469, 475-476, 78 A.2d 693, 697, 25

merely speculative. If Iowa had identified the protection of these third

A.L.R.2d 592 (1951). There is no doubt that if this plaintiff-guest had

parties as a policy underlying its guest statute, we could still give

been injured in a Connecticut accident by a Connecticut host-driver,

effect to that policy by giving priority to the third party's judgment lien

there would be no bar to recover for ordinary negligence if suit were

against defendant's assets. See Baade, "Counter-Revolution or

brought in that state. See Palombizio v. Murphy, 146 Conn. 352, 150

Alliance For Progress? Reflections on Reading Cavers, The Choice-

A.2d 825, 73 A.L.R.2d 1173 (1959); Costanzo v. Sturgill, 145 Conn.

of-Law Process," 46 Tex. L. Rev. 141, 168 (1967). We need not

92, 139 A.2d 51 (1958).

decide whether such a procedure is the proper solution to this

Turning to New Jersey's law, we are led to Cohen v. Kaminetsky,

problem because the claims of the Iowa domiciliaries have been

settled.[3]

supra, where we held that the strong policy of this state is to allow a

It is clear to us that Iowa has no interest in this suit. Recovery for

ordinary negligence. Thus, the substantive laws of Connecticut and

negligence in this action will not transgress any of the purposes

New Jersey are in accord.

guest-passenger to be compensated by his host-driver in cases of

behind Iowa's guest statute as enunciated by that state's courts or

In Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal.2d 551, 63 Cal. Rptr. 31, 432 P.2d 727

legislature, and will not in the slightest impair traffic safety in Iowa.

(1967), commented on by Cavers, Cheatham, D. Currie, Ehrenzweig,

Nor do we believe that the reasons urged by defendants for applying

Gorman, Horowitz, Kay, Leflar, Rosenberg, Scoles, Trautman, and

Iowa law *523 are valid. We are convinced that if the plaintiff were a
New Jersey domiciliary Iowa's guest statute would be inapplicable.

Weintraub in 15 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 551 (1968), the California Supreme

In this case, however, we are faced with a more complex situation

case. There the court dealt with a Missouri statute which limited

since plaintiff is a domiciliary of Connecticut. Thus, we must consider

damages for wrongful death. Lee and Jeffry Reich, father and son,

the law of both New Jersey and Connecticut. Connecticut long ago

brought a wrongful death action for damages arising out of a head-

Court was faced with a situation similar in principle to the present

14

on collision between two automobiles in Missouri. One of the

Writing for a unanimous court Chief Justice Traynor rejected

automobiles was owned and operated by the defendant, a

defendant's contention that the Missouri ceiling applied. The court

domiciliary of California, *524 who was on his way to a vacation in

held that Missouri had no substantial interest in extending the

Illinois. The other automobile was owned and operated by plaintiffs'

benefits of its statute to travelers from states having no similar

decedent, Mrs. Reich. The Reichs were domiciled in Ohio and Mrs.

limitation. Having resolved that Missouri law did not apply, Justice

Reich and her two children were on their way to California where the

Traynor next examined the interests of California and Ohio. He

family was contemplating settling. Mrs. Reich and one child were

refused to give any weight to the plaintiffs' California domicile since

killed in the collision. Plaintiffs later became California domiciliaries.

they had moved to California after the accident. Nor did he believe

The estates of Mrs. Reich and the deceased child were being

that defendant's California domicile was significant since that state

administered in Ohio. Neither Ohio nor California limits recovery in

did not have any limitation on damages to protect its defendants.

wrongful death actions. Missouri's statute limits damages in such

Accordingly, he concluded that Ohio, the state of decedents' domicile

cases to a maximum of $25,000. It was stipulated that the damages

at the time of the accident, was the only interested state and that its

for Mrs. Reich's death were substantially in excess of that amount.

law should apply to the case.

It may well be that in this case, however, New Jersey has an interest.
We are not certain that a defendant's domicile lacks an interest in
seeing that its domiciliaries are held to the full measure of damages
or the standard of care which that state's law provide for. A state
should not only be concerned with the protection and self-interest of
its citizens. See Tooker v. Lopez, 24 N.Y.2d, at 577, 301 N.Y.S.2d, at
525-526, 249 N.E.2d, at 399. In Cohen v. *525 Kaminetsky, supra,
we emphasized a host's duty to his guests. There we said: "We see
no reason why the host should be less vigilant for his own guest than
he must be for the guest in another car. The duty to exercise
reasonable care is as appropriate in the one situation as in the
other." 36 N.J., at 283. It would not seem just to limit the imposition of

15

this duty to instances where a New Jersey host negligently injures a

that plaintiff would be unable to recover in either *526 of those states.

New Jersey guest in a state which has a guest statute. See Mellk v.

[4] More importantly, however, we see no reason for applying

Sarahson, supra. Therefore, if Connecticut had a guest statute in this

Connecticut's choice-of-law rule. To do so would frustrate the very

case, we would be forced to choose between our state's policy of

goals of governmental-interest analysis. Connecticut's choice-of-law

holding our hosts to a duty of ordinary care and Connecticut's policy

rule does not identify that state's interest in the matter. Lex loci delicti

of denying a guest recovery for the ordinary negligence of his host

was born in an effort to achieve simplicity and uniformity, and does

and we might have a true conflict. But since Connecticut has the

not relate to a state's interest in having its law applied to given issues

same policy of applying principles of ordinary negligence to the host-

in a tort case. See B. Currie, "The Disinterested Third State," 28 Law

guest relationship as does New Jersey, this case presents a false

& Contemp. Prob. 754, 784-85 (1963); Cavers, The Choice-of-Law

conflict and it is unnecessary for use to decide whether this state has

Process at 106; Ehrenzweig, Conflict of Laws at 235; Comment,

an interest sufficient to warrant application of its law. See Leflar,

"False Conflicts," 55 Calif. L. Rev. 74, 84-85 (1967). It is significant

American Conflicts Law at 328-29.

that in Reich v. Purcell, supra, the California Supreme Court applied

the substantive law of Ohio to the Missouri accident. The court did

It would appear that Connecticut's substantive law allowing a guest

not apply Ohio's choice-of-law rule which was lex loci delicti, and

to recover for his host's ordinary negligence would give it a significant

would have called for application of the Missouri limitation on

interest in having that law applied to this case. Defendants argue,

damages. Lyons v. Lyons, 2 Ohio St.2d 243, 208 N.E.2d 533 (1965).

however, that if we apply Connecticut's substantive law, we should

Professor Kay in her comment on Reich v. Purcell was in agreement

apply its choice-of-law rule as well. In other words, they contend

with *527 the above authorities that only the foreign substantive law

Connecticut's interest in its domiciliaries is identified not only by its

should be applied, and she agreed with the court in Reich that Ohio's

substantive law, but by its choice-of-law rule. Connecticut adheres to

choice-of-law rule should be ignored. Kay, "Comment on Reich v.

lex loci delicti and according to its decisions would most likely apply

Purcell," 15 U.C.L.A.L. Rev., supra at 589 n. 31 See also Haumschild

the substantive law of Iowa in this case. E.g., Landers v. Landers,

v. Continental Casualty Co., 7 Wis.2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959).

153 Conn. 303, 216 A.2d 183 (1966). Defendants contend that
plaintiff should not be allowed to recover when he could not do so in

We conclude that since Iowa has no interest in this litigation, and

either Iowa where the accident occurred or in Connecticut where he

since the substantive laws of Connecticut and New Jersey are the

is domiciled. We cannot agree for two reasons. First, it is not definite

same, this case presents a false conflict and the Connecticut plaintiff

16

should have the right to maintain an action for ordinary negligence in

our courts. In this situation principles of comity, and perhaps the
equal protection and privileges and immunities clauses of the
Constitution, dictate that we should afford the Connecticut plaintiff the
same protection a New Jersey plaintiff would be given. Cavers, The
Choice-of-Law Process, 144 n. 8, 299 n. 14 (1965).
For the reasons expressed the order of the Appellate Division is
reversed and the order of the trial court striking the separate defense
of the Iowa guest statute is reinstated.
For reversal Chief Justice WEINTRAUB and Justices JACOBS,
FRANCIS, PROCTOR, HALL, SCHETTINO and HANEMAN 7.
For affirmance NONE.

17

Lorenzo returned to the Philippines. In 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia

Fortuno. They had three children.
In 1981, Lorenzo executed his last will and testament where he left
all his estate to Alicia and their children (nothing for Paula). In 1983,
he went to court for the wills probate and to have Alicia as the
345 SCRA 592 Civil Law Application of Laws Foreign Laws

administratrix of his property. In 1985, before the probate proceeding

Nationality Principle Effects of Foreign Divorce

can be terminated, Lorenzo died. Later, Paula filed a petition for

letters of administration over Lorenzos estate.

Succession Last Will and Testament of an Alien

The trial court ruled that Lorenzos marriage with Alicia is void
In 1927, Lorenzo Llorente, then a Filipino, was enlisted in the U.S.

because the divorce he obtained abroad is void. The trial court

Navy. In 1937, he and Paula Llorente got married in Camarines Sur.

ratiocinated that Lorenzo is a Filipino hence divorce is not applicable

In 1943, Lorenzo became an American citizen.

to him. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court.

In 1945, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines for a vacation. He

ISSUES: Whether or not Lorenzos divorce abroad should be

discovered that Paula was already living illicitly with Ceferino

recognized.

Llorente (brother of Lorenzo). Ceferino and Paula even had a son.

HELD: Yes. It is undisputed by Paula Llorente that Lorenzo became
Lorenzo then refused to live with Paula. He also refused to give her

an American citizen in 1943. Hence, when he obtained the divorce

monetary support. Eventually, Lorenzo and Paula agreed in

decree in 1952, he is already an American citizen. Article 15 of the

writing Lorenzo shall not criminally charge Paula if the latter agrees

Civil Code provides:

to waive all monetary support from Lorenzo. Later, Lorenzo returned

to the United States.

Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition

and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the

In 1951, Lorenzo filed a divorce proceeding against Paula in

Philippines, even though living abroad.

California. Paula was represented by an American counsel. The

divorce was granted and in 1952, the divorce became final.

Since Lorenzo was no longer a Filipino, Philipine laws relating to

family rights, duties, or status are no longer applicable to him.

18

Therefore, the divorce decree he obtained abroad must be

be governed by the Philippine law, thus the creation of two separate

respected. The rule is: aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided

wills.

they are valid according to their national law.

ISSUE:

However, this case was still remanded to the lower court so as for

Whether or not the Philippine law be applied in the case in the

the latter to determine the effects of the divorce as to the

determination of the illegitimate childrens successional rights

successional rights of Lorenzo and his heirs.

RULING:

Anent the issue on Lorenzos last will and testament, it must be

Court ruled that provision in a foreigners will to the effect that his
properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and

respected. He is an alien and is not covered by our laws on

not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law

succession. However, since the will was submitted to our courts for

cannot be ignored in view of those matters that Article 10 now

probate, then the case was remanded to the lower court where the

Article 16 of the Civil Code states said national law should govern.

foreign law must be alleged in order to prove the validity of the will.

Where the testator was a citizen of Texas and domiciled in Texas, the
intrinsic validity of his will should be governed by his national law.

G.R. No. L-23678 (June 6, 1967)

Since Texas law does not require legitimes, then his will, which
Bellis vs. Bellis

deprived his illegitimate children of the legitimes, is valid.

FACTS:

The Supreme Court held that the illegitimate children are not entitled

Amos G. Bellis was a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United

to the legitimes under the texas law, which is the national law of the
deceased.

States. He had five legitimate children with his first wife (whom he
divorced), three legitimate children with his second wife (who
survived him) and, finally, three illegitimate children.
6 years prior Amos Bellis death, he executed two(2) wills,
apportioning the remainder of his estate and properties to his seven
surviving children. The appellants filed their oppositions to the
project of partition claiming that they have been deprived of their
legitimes to which they were entitled according to the Philippine law.
Appellants argued that the deceased wanted his Philippine estate to

19

purchased at a discount of 75% while that of their daughter was a full

fare ticket. All three tickets represented confirmed reservations.

While in New York, on June 4, 1984, the spouses Zalamea and their
daughter received a notice of reconfirmation of their reservations for
said flight. On the appointed date, however, the spouses Zalamea
and their daughter checked in at 10:00 am, an hour earlier than the
scheduled flight at 11:00 am but were placed on the wait-list because
the number of passengers who checked in before tem had already
taken all the seats available on the flight.

Out of the 42 names on the wait-list, the first 22 names were

eventually allowed to board the flight to Los Angeles, including Cesar
Zalamea. The two others, on the other hand, being ranked lower
than 22, were not able to fly. As it were, those holding full-fare ticket
were given first priority among the wait-listed passengers. Mr.
Zalamea, who was holding the full-fare ticket of his daughter, was

Zalamea vs. Court of Appeals 288 SCRA 23 (1993)

allowed to board the plane; while his wife and daughter, who
presented the discounted tickets were denied boarding. Even in the

FACTS:

next TWA flight to Los Angeles, Mrs. Zalamea and her daughter,

Spouses Cesar and Suthira Zalamea, and their daughter, Liana

could not be accommodated because it was full booked. Thus, they

Zalamea, purchased three (3) airline tickets from the Manila agent of

were constrained to book in another flight and purchased two tickets

respondent TransWorld Airlines, Inc. (TWA) for a flight from New

from American Airlines.

York to Los Angeles on June 6, 1984. The tickets of the spouses

were
Upon their arrival in the Philippines, the spouses Zalamea filed an
action for damages based on breach of contract of air carriage

20

before the RTC of Makati which rendered a decision in their favor

ordering the TWA to pay the price of the tickets bought from

1.) Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor can the court take

American Airlines together with moral damages and attorneys fees.

judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and

On appeal, the CA held that moral damages are recoverable in a

proved. Written law may be evidenced by an official publication

damage suit predicated upon a breach of contract of carriage only

thereof or by a copy attested by the officers having legal custody of

where there is fraud or bad faith. It further stated that since it is a

the record, or by his deputy and accompanied with a certificate that

matter of record that overbooking of flights is a common and

such officer has custody. The certificate may be made by a secretary

accepted practice of airlines in the United States and is specifically

of an embassy or legation, consul-general, consul, vice-consul, or

allowed under the Code of Federal Regulations by the Civil

consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Phil.

Aeronautics Board, neither fraud nor bad faith could be imputed on

stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and

TWA.

authenticated by the seal of his office. Here, TWA relied solely on the
testimony of its customer service agent in her deposition that the
Code of Federal Regulations of the Civil Aeronautic Board allows
overbooking. Aside from said statement, no official publication of said
code was presented as evidence. Thus, the CAs finding that
overbooking is specifically allowed by the US Code of Federal

ISSUE:

Regulations has no basis in fact.

Whether or not the CA erred in accepting the finding that

overbooking is specifically allowed by the US Code of Federal
Regulations and in holding that there was no fraud or bad faith on
the part of TWA ?

"That there was fraud or bad faith on the part of respondent airline
when it did not allow petitioners to board their flight for Los Angeles
in spite of confirmed tickets cannot be disputed. The U.S. law or

HELD:

regulation allegedly authorizing overbooking has never been proved.

The CA was in error. There was fraud or bad faith on the part of TWA

Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor can the courts take

when it did not allow Mrs. Zalamea and her daughter to board their

judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and

flight for Los Angeles in spite of confirmed tickets. The US law or

proved. Written law may be evidenced by an official publication

regulation allegedly authorizing overbooking has never been proved.

21

thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody

principle of lex loci contractus which requires that the law of the

of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied with a certificate

place where the airline ticket was issued should be applied by the

that such officer has custody. The certificate may be made by a

court where the passengers are residents and nationals of the forum

secretary of an embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice-

and the ticket is issued in such State by the airline.

consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of

the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office.

3.) Existing jurisprudence explicitly states that overbooking amounts

Respondent TWA relied solely on the statement of Ms. Gwendolyn

to bad faith, entitling the passengers concerned to an award of moral

Lather, its customer service agent, in her deposition dated January

damages. Where an airline had deliberately overbooked, it took the

27, 1986 that the Code of Federal Regulations of the Civil

risk of having to deprive some passengers of their seats in case all of

Aeronautics Board allows overbooking. Aside from said statement,

them would show up for check in. for the indignity and inconvenience

no official publication of said code was presented as evidence. Thus,

of being refused a confirmed seat on the last minute, said passenger

respondent court's finding that overbooking is specifically allowed by

is entitled to an award of moral damages. This is so, for a contract of

the US Code of Federal Regulations has no basis in fact."

carriage generates a relation attended with public duty --- a duty to

provide public service and convenience to its passengers which must
be paramount to self-interest or enrichment. Even on the assumption

"Even if the claimed U.S. Code of Federal Regulations does exist,

that overbooking is allowed, TWA is still guilty of bad faith in not

the same is not applicable to the case at bar in accordance with the

informing its passengers beforehand that it could breach the contract

principle of lex loci contractus which require that the law of the place

of carriage even if they have confirmed tickets if there was

where the airline ticket was issued should be applied by the court

overbooking. Moreover, TWA was also guilty of not informing its

where the passengers are residents and nationals of the forum and

passengers of its alleged policy of giving less priority to discounted

the ticket is issued in such State by the defendant airline. Since the

tickets. Evidently, TWA placed self-interest over the rights of the

tickets were sold and issued in the Philippines, the applicable law in

spouses Zalamea and their daughter under their contract of carriage.

this case would be Philippine law."

Such conscious disregard make respondent TWA liable for moral

Other Issues:

damages, and to deter breach of contracts by TWA in similar fashion

in the future, the SC adjudged TWA liable for exemplary damages,

2.) Even if the claimed US Code of Federal Regulations does exist,

as well.

the same is not applicable to the case at bar in accordance with the

22

in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila for the probate of
this will, on the ground that 1) Johnson was, at the time of his death,
a citizen of the State of Illinois, United States of America; 2) that the
will was duly executed in accordance with the laws of that State; and
hence could properly be probated here pursuant to section 636 of
the Code of Civil Procedure. Petitioner alleged that the law is
inapplicable to his fathers will

In Re: Estate of Johnson G.R. No. 12767. November 16, 1918

Issue: Whether or not there was deprivation of due process on the

Facts: On February 4, 1916, Emil H. Johnson, a native of Sweden

part of the petition

and a naturalized citizen of the United States, died in the city of

Manila. He left a will disposing an estate with an estimated amount of

Held: No.

P231,800. The will was written in the testators own handwriting, and
is signed by himself and two witnesses only, instead of three

Ratio: Due publication was made pursuant to this order of the court

witnesses required by section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

through the three-week publication of the notice in Manila Daily

This will, therefore, was not executed in conformity with the

Bulletin. The Supreme Court also asserted that in view of the statute

provisions of law generally applicable to wills executed by inhabitants

concerned which reads as A will made within the Philippine Islands

of these Islands, and hence could not have been proved under

by a citizen or subject of another state or country, which is executed

section 618. On February 9, 1916, however, a petition was presented

in accordance with the law of the state or country of which he is a

23

citizen or subject, and which might be proved and allowed by the law

contracted a debilitating illness while rendering services under a

of his own state or country, may be proved, allowed, and recorded in

subsisting job contract in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The assailed

the Philippine Islands, and shall have the same effect as if executed

Decision affirmed the award 4 by the Workers' Assistance and

according to the laws of these Islands the state, being not

Adjudication Office of the Philippine Overseas Employment

capitalized, does not mean that United States is excluded from the

Administration (hereafter POEA) in favor of private respondent in the

phrase (because during this time, Philippines was still a territory of

amount of U.S. $1,110.00 or its peso equivalent as and for his

the US).

medical compensation benefits.

The facts of the case are not in dispute:
On May 21, 1982, petitioner Dumez Company, a French company,
through petitioner Trans-Orient Engineers, Inc., a corporation
organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, engaged
the services of private respondent Veronico Ebilane as carpenter for
one of its projects in the Middle East, with Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, as
his place of actual employment. The parties executed and signed a

G.R. No. 74495 July 11, 1996

one-year overseas employment agreement embodying the terms

and conditions of private respondent's employment.

DUMEZ COMPANY and TRANS-ORIENT ENGINEERS, INC.,

petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION

Private respondent commenced performance of said contract on July

and VERONICO EBILANE, respondents.

3, 1982. On August 31, 1982, while at the job site, private

respondent was suddenly seized by abdominal pain and rushed to

HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:p

the Riyadh Central Hospital where appendectomy was performed on

Before us is a petition for certiorari assailing the Decision 1 of the

him. During his confinement, he developed right-sided weakness and

National Labor Relations Commission (hereafter, NLRC) 2 in an

numbness and difficulty of speaking which was found to have been

illegal dismissal case 3 involving an overseas contract worker who

caused by Atrial Fibrillation and CVA embolism.

24

In a letter dated September 22, 1982, petitioner formally terminated

private respondent's employment effective September 29, 1982, up
to which time petitioners paid private respondent his salaries under

Believing that the POEA Administrator erred in finding them liable for

his employment contract. Thereafter, on October 13, 1982, private

private respondent's medical compensation benefits, petitioners

respondent was repatriated to Manila.

appealed to the NLRC. In a Resolution 7 promulgated on March 25,

1986, the NLRC affirmed in toto the assailed Decision and dismissed
the appeal for lack of merit.

On November 23, 1982, private respondent filed a complaint for

Petitioners thus came to this Court on a petition for certiorari 8

illegal dismissal against petitioners. Such complaint was filed with

seeking the voiding of the Resolution of the NLRC. In the meantime,

the Workers' Assistance and Adjudication Office of the POEA.

petitioners prayed that a temporary restraining order be issued to

enjoin the POEA from enforcing the assailed Resolution.

Private respondent asseverates that he had been terminated

pursuant to the provision of Section 1 (d) of the employment

As prayed for, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the

agreement which refers to termination of an employee who is

POEA and the NLRC from enforcing the assailed Resolution. 9

unqualified. He maintains that such ground for termination did not

On November 17, 1986, the Solicitor General filed a Comment "as

exist in his case and, thus, his dismissal was without cause. 5

his own, considering that he is unable to agree with the position

On January 24, 1984, the POEA Administrator rendered the assailed

adopted by public respondent National Labor Relations

Decision ordering petitioners to pay private respondent medical

Commission." 10 The Solicitor General does not dispute private

compensation benefits in the amount of U.S. $1,110.00 or its peso

complaint's entitlement, under Saudi Arabia law, to medical benefits

equivalent. Notwithstanding an explicit finding made in the assailed

corresponding to the period of his physical incapacity. It is his

Decision that "there can be no dispute that complainant could be

position, however, that while payment of said medical benefits is

terminated for medical reasons," still petitioners were found to have

explicitly mandated by the Social Insurance Law of Saudi Arabia,

failed to perform its obligation to give private respondent his "daily

allowance for each day of work disability, including holidays." 6

25

. . . the same law . . . is equally explicit that the liability decreed

to cases before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies in the light of

therein devolves "at the General Organization's expense," and not on

the well-settled rule that administrative and quasi-judicial bodies are

the employer of the private respondent. 11

not bound strictly by technical rules. 13 Nonetheless, only to this

extent were the acts of the POEA Administrator amply supported by

Significantly, neither the private nor the public respondent that has

the law. Her actual application thereof, however, is starkly erroneous.

filed any pleading to refute the aforementioned postulate of the

Solicitor General.

Section 6(a) of the Overseas Employment Agreement entered into

and signed by the private parties herein, provides and "Workmen's

Understandably, the sole error attributed to the NLRC and the POEA

Compensation insurance benefits will be provided within the limits of

is that there is no legal basis to require petitioners to pay private

the compensation law of the host country." 14 That compensation for

respondent medical compensation benefits equal 75% of his salaries

disability was to be provided in accordance with the law of the host

for four (4) months.

country, Saudi Arabia, is a necessary consequence of the

compulsory coverage under the General Organization for Social

Petitioners are correct.

Insurance Law of Saudi Arabia (hereafter, "GOSI Law of Saudi

Arabia"), upon all workers, regardless of nationality, sex or age, who

The POEA Administrator, in finding petitioners liable to private

render their within the territory of Saudi Arabia by virtue of a labor

respondent for medical benefits accruing to the latter under the

contract.

Social Insurance Law of Saudi Arabia, took judicial notice of the said
law. To this extent, the POEA Administrator's actuations are legally

Article 49 of the GOSI Law of Saudi Arabia provides that the General

defensible. We have earlier ruled in Norse Management Co. (PTE)

Organization shall pay to the beneficiaries the insurance

vs. National Seamen Board 12 that evidence is usually a matter of

compensation, the employer being under no obligation to pay any

procedure of which a mere quasi-judicial body is not strict about.

allowance to the insured or to his heirs unless the injury has been

Although in a long line of cases, we have ruled that a foreign law,

intentionally caused by the employer or the injury has occurred by

being a matter of evidence, must be alleged and proved, in order to

reason of the latter's gross error or failure to abide by the GOSI Law

be recognized and applied in a particular controversy involving

or the rules relating to occupational health and safety. 15

conflicts of laws, jurisprudence on this matter was not meant to apply

26

Under the GOSI Law of Saudi Arabia as pleaded by petitioners

the nature thereof could not be so dissimilar. Suffice it to say that our

clearly the obligation to pay medical benefits as compensation for

own compensation program imposes on the employer nothing more

work-related injury or illness, devolves upon the General

than the obligation to remit monthly premiums to the State Insurance

Organization and not upon petitioners. Furthermore, after taking

and it is the latter, not the employer, on which is laid the burden of

judicial notice of the GOSI Law of Saudi Arabia, the POEA

compensating the employee for any disability; in fact, once the

Administrator considered the said law as one of a similar nature as

employer pays his share to the fund, all obligation on his part to his

that of our own compensation laws. Thus, in awarding the medical

employees is ended. 16 No showing at all has there been that

benefits to private respondent, she rationalized the same by quoting

petitioners had failed to comply with its obligations as employer

Article 166 of the Labor Code of the Philippines which provides that

under the GOSI Law of Saudi Arabia.

"the State shall promote and develop a tax-exempt employees'

WHEREFORE, the petitioner for certiorari is GRANTED. The

compensation program whereby employees

decision of the POEA Administrator and of the NLRC are hereby

. . . in the event of work-connected disability or death, may promptly

ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. No pronouncement as to costs.

secure adequate income benefit and medical or related benefits."

SO ORDERED.

Indeed, we may postulate further that the policies underlying our

compensation laws and the GOSI Law of Saudi Arabia being similar,

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