Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
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Quantitative
Strategy
Quantitative Strategy
North America United States
18 April 2012
Reseach Summary
Uncertainty and episodic shifts in risk
appetite can rotate style factors towards
unwanted and even dangerous risk
profiles. We investigate the drivers and
dynamics behind these stealth rotations
and show how to monitor, control and
even profit from them.
Team Contacts
Miguel-A Alvarez
Strategist
(+1) 212 250-8983
miguel-a.alvarez@db.com
Javed Jussa
Strategist
(+1) 212 250-4117
javed.jussa@db.com
Zongye Chen
Strategist
(+1) 212 250-2293
john.chen@db.com
Sheng Wang
Strategist
( +1) 212 250-8983
sheng.wang@db.com
18 April 2012
Table of Contents
References ........................................................................................ 23
Page 2
18 April 2012
Thanks,
Yin, Rocky, Miguel, Javed, John & Sheng.
1
Our conversations with clients lead us to believe that performance across large cap quantitative funds was more
mixed than overall good.
2
See Luo et al, 2012 QCD Model: DB Quant Handbook for a detailed model methodology.
Page 3
18 April 2012
Monthly Return
15%
re-risking
50%
40%
30%
10%
20%
5%
10%
0%
0%
-5%
-10%
-10%
-20%
-15%
-20%
Cumulative Return
25%
-30%
de-risking
-40%
3
We are aware that this definition and characterization of the demand for risk is oversimplified. However, as we will
see, this characterization is sufficient to gauge risk preferences within the aggregate equity universe.
Page 4
Unless otherwise noted, we will use stock Predicted Beta from the Axioma medium horizon risk model.
18 April 2012
The negative returns to Beta and the market during August and September of 2011
correspond to sharp declines in risk appetite (aka de-risking) brought along in most part by
the worsening European risk landscape as Italian sovereign yields increased to dangerous
levels. The subsequent re-risking episodes in October and more recently in January
correspond to what many are calling a resolution to tail risk in Europe. While we are unsure
of the full resolution of Europes economic troubles, we do agree that the likelihood of a US
recession has decreased since the summer.
Last, we note from Figure 1 that positive returns to the market portfolio do not always
coincide with larger returns to higher Beta stocks, i.e., positive market return does not
necessarily translate to increases in risk appetite. Two good examples are April 2011 and
March 2012. A risk explanation for this phenomenon would lie in the generally accepted
notion that Beta is not the sole driver of systematic return. Fundamentally, it is the result of
the Market having a much larger Size bias than the Beta portfolio. Therefore, these episodes
can be interpreted as investors shifting towards Size in a stronger way than they are shifting
away from higher Beta.
Risk appetite in other markets
Outside the US, we find that risk appetite in the rest of the world had similar behavior during
2011 and beginning of 2012 (Figure 2).
Figure 2: Global ex-US Monthly & Cumulative return to high minus low Beta Portfolio
(D10 D1) and Market Portfolio (cap weighted), S&P BMI Global ex-US universe.
25%
Monthly Return
15%
10%
re-risking
40%
30%
20%
5%
10%
0%
0%
-5%
-10%
-10%
-20%
-15%
de-risking
-20%
Cumulative Return
20%
50%
Beta Monthly Return (RHS)
Market Portfolio (LHS)
Beta Cumulative Return (RHS)
Market Portfolio Cumulative Return (RHS)
-30%
-40%
http://www.wikinvest.com/rate/TED_Spread
Page 5
10%
TED Spread
50
15
-10%
30
-20%
20
TED Spread
40
Cumulative Return
0%
20%
TED (change)
Beta Monthly Return (RHS)
10
10%
5
0
0%
-5
-10
Monthly Return
18 April 2012
-10%
-30%
10
-15
-40%
Source: Axioma, Russell, S&P, Bloomberg LLP, Deutsche Bank Quantitative Strategy
-20
-20%
Source: Axioma, Russell, S&P, Bloomberg LLP, Deutsche Bank Quantitative Strategy
Momentum/Sentiment
Quality
Growth
Factor
Direction
Price-to-Book
--
Price-to-Sales
--
Momentum 12-month
Momentum 6-month
--
ROE
Page 6
18 April 2012
30%
Cumulative Return
20%
25%
20%
25%
30%
FY1 Dividend Yield
Momentum
15%
10%
5%
Price-to-Sales
FY1 EPS Revision
YoY EPS Growth
15%
10%
5%
0%
0%
-5%
-5%
-10%
-10%
A closer look at factor performance in Figure 6 shows that the de-risking episode starting in
August generated significant gains for each of the factors with exception to 12-month
Momentum. Similarly, the factors depicted in Figure 6 underperformed during the re-risking
in October and subsequently in January and February of 2012.
Conversely, the factors depicted in Figure 7 showed to underperform during the de-risking
episodes, while outperforming (albeit slightly in the case of Earnings Revision) during the
episodes of re-risking. Figure 8 shows the performance to the other factors in our study. The
returns refer to the decile portfolio spreads.
Figure 8: Factor decile spread portfolio statistics over Jan 2011 Mar 2012
Factor
Average Return
ROE
Volatility
Sharpe Ratio
9.61%
5.90%
1.63
11.97%
10.11%
1.18
13.85%
13.29%
1.04
Market
11.81%
15.79%
0.75
5.27%
8.46%
0.62
Momentum 12-month
5.01%
10.68%
0.47
5.73%
12.62%
0.45
Price-to-Sales
1.66%
11.35%
0.15
0.41%
4.68%
0.09
0.61%
7.75%
0.08
Momentum 6-month
-1.87%
20.38%
-0.09
Beta (D10-D1)
-13.73%
33.65%
-0.41
Price-to-Book
-6.59%
7.26%
-0.91
Page 7
30%
6%
4%
10%
2%
0%
0%
-2%
-10%
-4%
Predicted Beta (LHS)
FY1 Dividend Yield (RHS)
FY1 EPS Dispersion (RHS)
-6%
-8%
-30%
20%
30%
10%
8%
-20%
Figure 10: FY1 Earnings Yield & YoY EPS Growth versus
Beta return decile spreads. Russell 1000
-10%
10%
8%
20%
6%
4%
10%
2%
0%
0%
-2%
-10%
-4%
Predicted Beta (LHS)
-20%
-6%
-8%
-30%
18 April 2012
-10%
Figure 9 and Figure 10 show that during the summer of 2011 to early 2012, the comovement
between Beta and style factors was very strong. However, not all factors were linked in the
same way, i.e. the relationship between Beta and different factors seem to vary widely even
between factors representing the same styles. For example, Dividend Yield and Earnings
Yield are both considered to be Value factors, but their performance and their relationship
with Beta was very different during this period7. In the next section, we discuss how to
measure the relationship between a factor and Beta in an accurate and timely manner. This
will prove useful to determine ex-ante how certain style factors will perform during an
episode of de-risking or re-risking.
Portfolio Beta
Expected Correlation between the factor portfolio and the Beta portfolio
The first is simply the Beta of the factor portfolio and is computed in the typical manner, i.e.
the portfolio weighted average stock Beta. In general, the Beta of a portfolio lends insight in
that it will provide a sense of the direction of the comovement (positive Beta implies positive
comovement and vice versa). However, it is of little use for quantifying an accurate measure
of the co-dependency between two factors.
Page 8
In fact, many investors regard Dividend Yield more representative of Quality than Value.
18 April 2012
The second metric is a forward estimate of the correlation between the factor portfolio and
the Beta portfolio9. This measure is somewhat more involved and requires a stock covariance
matrix, but is essential if accuracy is the primary objective. The expected correlation measure
is quite powerful in that it yields timely and accurate forecasts of factor co-dependency. More
importantly, it is a useful tool for monitoring and understanding factor dynamics as well as for
applications in risk and portfolio construction.
In the following sections, we analyze the exposures and correlation of each of the style
factors to Beta. We will show how Beta affects the performance of the factors, but more
importantly how episodes of de-risking/re-risking dynamically rotate their risk exposures
profiles.
In addition, we will use the changes in factor correlations to Beta gain insight into the
interactions and dynamic relationships between the factors.
9
This can be generalized to factor scores in general (not just decile spread portfolios) as we showed in Alvarez et al,
2011 Reviving Momentum: Mission Impossible?
Page 9
18 April 2012
Value
Value factors did not exhibit similar cumulative performance during 2011-2012 (Figure 6 and
Figure 7). In this section, we shed more light on the role that Beta plays in driving the
divergence and convergence across Value style factor performance.
We begin with a simple synopsis covering the more recent period. The top graph in Figure 11
shows the expected correlation to Beta for different value factors during 2011-2012. The first
half of 2011 saw varying levels of correlation across the different Value factors. In addition,
the chart shows that FY1 Earnings Yield and Price-to-Book have significant shifts in their
correlation to Beta. With exception to FY1 Dividend Yield, the de-risking/re-risking episodes
during the summer and fall of 2011 cause a series of shifts in Beta correlations culminating in
convergence. These numbers suggests that the homogeneity between different value factors
can be quite dynamic over time and across varying market conditions.
But is Beta driving performance? The graph at the bottom of Figure 11 shows that Beta will
overwhelm factor performance when both the correlation to Beta and the magnitude of the
return of the Beta portfolio is significant. For example, note that during the first half of 2011
when Beta return magnitude was relatively low, there was not much consistency between
the correlations to Beta and factor performance. However, during the de-risking/re-risking
episodes in the second half of the year, Beta plays a more significant role in driving factor
performance. Also note the mixed performance during November and December 2011,
which saw relatively low magnitudes to the Beta portfolio returns.
Figure 11: Expected correlation with Beta (top chart) and performance (bottom
chart) between Value factors during 2011-2012. Russell 1000
Page 10
18 April 2012
If we analyze the past (Figure 12 through Figure 15), we find that the dynamic relationship
with Beta is a common theme across value factors. In addition, the exposures and
correlations to Beta can vary widely across value factors over different market regimes. Also
note that in contrast to the behavior in Figure 11, the Dividend Yield factor can actually
experience shifts in Beta exposure and correlation over time. For example, note that leading
into the Financial Crisis of 2008, the Dividend Yield factor became more correlated with
higher Beta stocks. This is due to the fact that the sell-off of risky stocks during this period
was so robust that it even penetrated dividend paying stocks mainly financial stocks that
had by that time become the riskier (higher Beta) of that group.
Figure 12: Portfolio Beta: FY1 Earnings Yield, FY1
Dividend Yield, Russell 1000
1.0
100%
Portfolio Beta
80%
0.5
0.0
-0.5
-1.0
-1.5
60%
40%
20%
0%
-20%
-40%
-60%
-80%
Jan-12
Jan-11
Jan-10
Jan-09
Jan-08
Jan-07
Jan-06
Jan-05
Jan-04
Jan-03
Jan-02
Jan-01
Jan-00
Jan-99
Jan-98
Jan-97
Jan-96
Jan-95
Jan-94
Jan-93
Jan-92
Jan-91
Jan-90
Jan-12
Jan-11
Jan-10
Jan-09
Jan-08
Jan-07
Jan-06
Jan-05
Jan-04
Jan-03
Jan-02
Jan-01
Jan-00
Jan-99
Jan-98
Jan-97
Jan-96
Jan-95
Jan-94
Jan-93
Jan-92
Jan-91
-100%
Jan-90
-2.0
Last, it is worthwhile to note that Figure 14 and Figure 15 lend insight into the relationship
between Price-to-Book and Price-to-Sales factors. The exposures and correlations show that
the two factors exhibit a similar Beta profile over time with exception to the period after the
technology bubble circa 2000 2003.
Figure 14: Portfolio Beta: Price-to-Book, Price-to-Sales.
Russell 1000
Figure 15: Expected Correlation with Beta: Price-toBook. Price-to-Sales, Russell 1000
1.0
100%
Price to Book
Price to Book
80%
Price to Sales
Portfolio Beta
0.5
0.0
-0.5
-1.0
-1.5
Price to Sales
60%
40%
20%
0%
-20%
-40%
-60%
-80%
Jan-12
Jan-11
Jan-10
Jan-09
Jan-08
Jan-07
Jan-06
Jan-05
Jan-04
Jan-03
Jan-02
Jan-01
Jan-00
Jan-99
Jan-98
Jan-97
Jan-96
Jan-95
Jan-94
Jan-93
Jan-92
Jan-91
Jan-90
Jan-12
Jan-11
Jan-10
Jan-09
Jan-08
Jan-07
Jan-06
Jan-05
Jan-04
Jan-03
Jan-02
Jan-01
Jan-00
Jan-99
Jan-98
Jan-97
Jan-96
Jan-95
Jan-94
Jan-93
Jan-92
Jan-91
-100%
Jan-90
-2.0
Page 11
18 April 2012
Note that correlations were significant leading into the de-risking, both factors held up rather
well. This indicates that their non-Beta component (e.g. stock-specific component) had
positive performance over this period. Indeed, the correlation levels between 25-50%
indicate that Beta will account for only a quarter to half of the variability of returns. The
historical correlation to Beta of both factors (Figure 18) shows that both the 12-month
10
See Alvarez et al 2011, Reviving Momentum, Mission Impossible? and Alvarez et al 2010, Neutralization and
Beyond.
Page 12
18 April 2012
Momentum and FY1 EPS Revision factors had picked up on lower Beta stocks during the derisking in the summer of 2010. This helps explain the outperformance of these factors during
the slow de-risking in the beginning of 2011 as well as the flat performance during the
stronger de-risking in August and September of 2011.
Last we note that a historical analysis of Beta exposure and correlation of both factors (Figure
17 and Figure 18) show that both factors exhibit very similar profiles to Beta over time.
Indeed, this suggests that in aggregate, analyst revisions are strongly tied to past stock
return momentum.
Figure 17: Portfolio Beta: Momentum (12M) and FY1
EPS Revisions factors, Russell 1000
1.5
100%
80%
1.0
0.0
-0.5
-1.0
-1.5
60%
40%
20%
0%
-20%
-40%
-60%
Momentum (12M)
Momentum (12M)
Jan-12
Jan-11
Jan-10
Jan-09
Jan-08
Jan-07
Jan-06
Jan-05
Jan-04
Jan-03
Jan-02
Jan-01
Jan-00
Jan-99
Jan-98
Jan-97
Jan-96
Jan-95
Jan-94
Jan-93
Jan-92
Jan-90
Jan-12
Jan-11
Jan-10
Jan-09
Jan-08
Jan-07
Jan-06
Jan-05
Jan-04
Jan-03
Jan-02
Jan-01
Jan-00
Jan-99
Jan-98
Jan-97
Jan-96
Jan-95
Jan-94
Jan-93
Jan-92
Jan-91
-100%
Jan-90
-2.5
Jan-91
Portfolio Beta
0.5
Quality
Typical factors used to characterize firm quality such as Return on Equity (ROE) and Earnings
Dispersion also varied to some extent over 2011 and early 2012, albeit factor performance for
this style was more heterogeneous than that found for Value.
Quality factors typically load up on safer assets with lower Beta and overall risk profiles. This
is evident when looking at the exposure and correlation to Beta of these factors over time
(Figure 19 and Figure 20).
Figure 19: Portfolio Beta: ROE, FY1 Earnings Dispersion
(3M Avg). Russell 1000
1.0
ROE
ROE
80%
Portfolio Beta
0.5
0.0
-0.5
-1.0
-1.5
60%
40%
20%
0%
-20%
-40%
-60%
-80%
-2.0
Jan-12
Jan-11
Jan-10
Jan-09
Jan-08
Jan-07
Jan-06
Jan-05
Jan-04
Jan-03
Jan-02
Jan-01
Jan-00
Jan-99
Jan-98
Jan-97
Jan-96
Jan-95
Jan-94
Jan-93
Jan-92
Jan-91
Jan-90
Feb-12
Feb-11
Feb-10
Feb-09
Feb-08
Feb-07
Feb-06
Feb-05
Feb-04
Feb-03
Feb-02
Feb-01
Feb-00
Feb-99
Feb-98
Feb-97
Feb-96
Feb-95
Feb-94
Feb-93
Feb-92
Feb-91
Feb-90
-100%
However, the historical analysis reveals that these factors can also exhibit different and
varying Beta sensitivity over time. Indeed, the more recent period saw the correlation
between ROE and Beta to increase to relatively high levels.
Deutsche Bank Securities Inc.
Page 13
18 April 2012
Growth
Two factors commonly used to describe firm Growth are year-over-year EPS growth (YoY
EPS Growth) and five year EPS growth (EPS Growth 5yr.). Fundamentally, the two are similar
except that they try to capture different cycles. However, the Beta exposure and correlation
analysis shown in Figure 21 and Figure 22 show that the two can exhibit significantly
different risk profiles as measured by their exposure and correlation to Beta.
Figure 21: Portfolio Beta: YoY EPS Growth and 5yr EPS
Growth. Russell 1000
1.5
80%
0.5
0.0
-0.5
-1.0
40%
20%
0%
-20%
-40%
-60%
-80%
Page 14
Jan-12
Jan-11
Jan-10
Jan-09
Jan-08
Jan-07
Jan-06
Jan-05
Jan-04
Jan-03
Jan-02
Jan-01
Jan-00
Jan-99
Jan-98
Jan-97
Jan-96
Jan-95
Jan-94
Jan-93
Jan-92
Jan-91
Jan-12
Jan-11
Jan-10
Jan-09
Jan-08
Jan-07
Jan-06
Jan-05
Jan-04
Jan-03
Jan-02
Jan-01
Jan-00
Jan-99
Jan-98
Jan-97
Jan-96
Jan-95
Jan-94
Jan-93
Jan-92
Jan-91
-100%
Jan-90
-1.5
60%
Jan-90
Portfolio Beta
1.0
18 April 2012
One last interesting bit of insight we can get from Figure 23 is to observe the Beta
correlations during the periods of strong de-risking and re-risking. Note that during August derisking episode; analyst began their downward revisions of higher Beta stocks so much that it
offset an increase the correlation that would happen naturally by strong de-risking episodes in
which higher Beta stocks experience stronger decreases in price and consequently making
them cheaper relative to their past (see Figure 13).
11
Page 15
18 April 2012
A rolling correlation analysis over time (Figure 25) shows that the predictive power observed
in Figure 24 is consistent over time, albeit recent predictive power is much stronger than the
historical norm.
12
Page 16
See Luo et al, 2012, Quantitative Tactical Asset Allocation and Luo et al. 2012 New Insights in Country Rotation.
18 April 2012
Figure 25: Rolling 60-month correlation with one-month lagged VRP: Market and Beta
Portfolios (Decile 10 minus Decile 1). US DBQS universe.
Correlation with one-month lagged VRP
(60-month rolling window)
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
-10%
Market
-20%
Beta (D10-D1)
-30%
Jan-12
Jan-11
Jan-10
Jan-09
Jan-08
Jan-07
Jan-06
Jan-05
Jan-04
Jan-03
Jan-02
Jan-01
Jan-00
Jan-99
Jan-98
Jan-97
Jan-96
Jan-95
Jan-94
Jan-93
Jan-92
Jan-91
Jan-90
-40%
25
40%
20
35%
15
10
30%
5
45%
30
60%
55%
25
50%
20
45%
40%
15
35%
30%
10
25%
5
20%
15%
0
25%
13
Page 17
18 April 2012
(1)
RM ,t = + RM ,VRPVRPt 1 + t
In this equation RM , t is the return to the market over t-1 to t; RM ,VRP is the beta of the
forward market return to the current value of VRP; the intercept, , captures the mean effect
of both variables; and t is a random error term.
To estimate the RM ,VRP and parameters in equation (1), we can simply use OLS15. Once
these parameters are estimated, then the forecast of the next period market return is:
(2)
R M , t +1 = + RM ,VRPVRPt
In practice, we will update our estimates RM ,VRP and every month so a realistic backtest
will follow the same practice. Now we have a realistic forecast of market return for each
month that can be used for market timing and asset allocation among other uses.
Scaling the forecast
For market timing purposes, it is desired that higher forecasts imply higher market allocation
and vice-versa. An intuitive strategy is to allocate to the market portfolio in proportion to the
forecasts so that our market weight Wt takes on the following form:
Wt = k R M , t + 1 .
where k is a constant that we will use to target a specific volatility or tracking error. Then to
rescale the forecasts we estimate the volatility of the strategy for k = 1 . We can do this
analytically through the model or empirically using a history of returns for the strategy for
k = 1 . To keep things simple, we use the latter and call it k =1 . Now we choose a volatility
target (or tracking error target) for the timing strategy Target , and set k to:
k =
Target
k = 1
So the weight set to the market portfolio for the timing strategy at time t is:
Wt =
Target
k = 1
R M , t + 1
In the next example, we set a volatility target of 2.5% annualized and run the timing strategy
on its own and then add it to the market portfolio.
14
Under certain assumptions, the regression estimate is optimal in the sense of being the linear unbiased estimator
with the minimum amount of estimation error.
15
The error does not satisfy all the properties for OLS optimal estimates, but we leave a more sophisticated model for a
future study. The idea is to see how implement the VRP timing strategy in practice.
Page 18
18 April 2012
Figure 28 shows the monthly returns to our VRP market timing strategy with a 2.5%
annualized volatility target, while Figure 29 shows the cumulative return of mixing the market
portfolio with the same strategy.16
Figure 28: VRP Market-timing strategy monthly return
(2.5% target annual volatility)
6%
400%
VRP Strategy with 2.5% annulized vol.
12 per. Mov. Avg. (VRP Strategy with 2.5% annulized vol.)
350%
4%
Market
Market + 2.5% Volatility of VRP Timing Strategy
Cumulative Return
Monthly Return
300%
2%
0%
250%
200%
150%
100%
-2%
50%
-4%
0%
Last we note that adding the VRP timing strategy to the market in a more optimal manner
requires the estimation of the covariance matrix between the timing strategy and the market
portfolio, which can be done analytically or empirically. Then a rigorous signal weighting
technique could be used to obtain an optimal mean-variance portfolio17
16
The estimates for the parameters in the model were computed using an expanding window.
17
See Luo et al, 2011 Robust Factor Models or Alvarez et al, 2011, Driving in the fast lane.
18
This will be an extension of our previous style rotation research and model (see Luo et al, 2010 Style Rotation).
Page 19
18 April 2012
The methodology for the style-timing scheme is outlined in the following 5 steps:
Step 1: Set each factor to the same risk level using the factor portfolio historical volatility or a
forecast from a risk model.
Step 2: Identify the expected correlation of each style factor to Beta.
Step 3: Divide style factors into two groups:
Step 4: Use the VRP forecast to select the bullish or bearish group of factors. To do this we
center VRP by subtracting its mean over the last 12-months19. Then for positive values of
this centered VRP we select the bullish group of factors; conversely for negative VRP we
select the bearish set.
Step 5: Build two models for the weights to the selected group.
VRP-EW: equal weighted: equal weight all the factors in the group chosen in Step 3
VRP-CW: correlation weighted: weight factors selected in Step 3 in proportion to the
absolute value of their correlations
Note that the risk scaling in Step 1 ensures that a factor with very high volatility does not
dominate the model. We can also consider this to be a nave version of risk adjustment in the
absence of an optimizer.
The correlation weighted model will overweigh factors with higher correlation to Beta, which
is an implicit reference to those factors having greater implied alpha as referred to in our last
section.
Our benchmark will be the equally weighted factor combination of the all the factors,
EQWGT, which as we have documented in past research is not an easy benchmark to beat20.
The results of the three models over different periods are shown in Figure 30. The Sharpe
ratios show that over the full period the VRP-EW performs the best in risk-adjusted space.
The VRP-CW model shows similar performance to the benchmark (EQWGT) over the full
history, but significantly outperforms in subsequent periods, especially post 2009. In fact, the
performance subsequent to 2010 is significantly better for the correlation weighted model,
suggesting that level (not just the sign) of the correlation between factors is a strong
predictor of factor outperformance.
Last, we note that the volatility of the VRP-CW strategy is significantly larger than both other
strategies. This is because the VRP-CW model tends to load up heavily on factors with
higher/lower correlation to Beta given that we are targeting the Beat component of each of
the style factors.
19
The results are quite robust for different window lengths. Specifically, we tried an expanding window, 60, 48, 36 and
24 month windows and all showed similar results. We chose a 12-month window to capture faster dynamics at the cost
of higher turnover and possibly more error.
20
Page 20
See Luo et al, 2010, Portfolios Under Construction: Robust Factor Models.
18 April 2012
Figure 30: Style rotation results for three style rotation models
Period
Mean
(Annual)
EQWGT
Std. Dev.
(Annual)
VRP-EW VRP-CW
EQWGT
Sharpe
Ratios
VRP-EW VRP-CW
11%
11%
21%
21%
18%
42%
0.53
0.61
0.50
13%
16%
30%
24%
21%
47%
0.58
0.78
0.63
5%
16%
49%
18%
13%
44%
0.28
1.21
1.12
-6%
13%
56%
18%
12%
44%
-0.33
1.04
1.29
5%
13%
45%
14%
12%
26%
0.40
1.14
1.70
Figure 31 and Figure 32 show the return series to both VRP factor timing strategies. Note
that in risk adjusted terms, the VRP-EW factor timing strategy outperformed the VRP-CW
strategy. However, the more recent period shows that VRP-CW strategy significantly
outperformed the VRP-EW strategy. This implies that the level of Beta mattered more during
the more recent period. Indeed, this is consistent with both high correlations and higher
systematic cross-sectional dispersion (Figure 26 and Figure 27).
Figure 31: VRP-CW style rotation model
60%
VRP_CORR
VRP_EW
40%
20%
20%
10%
0%
0%
-20%
-10%
-40%
-20%
-60%
-30%
The weights to the factors given by the VRP-CW strategy since January 2009 are shown in
Figure 33. Note that the cells in blue indicate that the factor is turned off. The factors that are
turned on, range from yellow to red, depending on the intensity of the absolute value of the
correlation to Beta. Also note that the VRP-EW strategy has the same active factors shown in
the figure. The difference is that the VRP-EW strategy equally weights the active factors in
the model.
It is also worthwhile to note that Momentum has turned off during the more recent period.
More importantly, was turned off during the re-risking that hurt the factor in January 2012.
Similarly the models had turned off Momentum during the risk-rally in the spring of 2009; and
interestingly enough has only appeared episodically since January 2009. In contrast, Price-toBook and Price-to-Sales were turned on throughout most of 2009. These factors were ripe
for the re-risking that took place throughout that year since they had rotated towards higher
Beta stocks that were made cheap during the 2008 de-risking.
Finally Figure 34 shows the VRP-CW factor weights along with factor expected correlations
to Beta. If we compare with the last few months in Figure 33, we find that VRP has switched
more bearish sentiment as is illustrated above in Figure 24. It has switched its allocation
towards the more defensively positioned factors and styles such as Momentum and Quality.
Page 21
18 April 2012
Figure 33: Factor loadings for the VRP-CW model January 2009 March 2012
FY1 Dividend Yield (RHS)
FY1 Earnings Yield
Price-to-Book
Price-to-Sales
Momentum (12M)
Momentum (6M)
ROE
FY1 EPS Dispersion
YoY EPS Growth
EPS GROWTH (5Yr)
FY1 EPS Revision
Jan-09
17%
15%
35%
28%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
6%
0%
Feb-09
20%
21%
31%
27%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
Mar-09
23%
13%
33%
31%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
Apr-09
22%
0%
41%
36%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
May-09
4%
0%
52%
44%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
Jun-09
0%
0%
53%
47%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
Jul-09
0%
0%
41%
38%
0%
22%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
Aug-09
0%
0%
37%
35%
0%
27%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
Sep-09
0%
0%
31%
29%
0%
40%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
Oct-09
0%
0%
28%
28%
0%
44%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
Nov-09
0%
0%
36%
31%
0%
33%
0%
0%
0%
0%
0%
Dec-09
11%
20%
0%
0%
0%
0%
21%
20%
18%
8%
2%
Jan-10
10%
20%
0%
0%
0%
0%
21%
20%
17%
8%
4%
Feb-10
12%
22%
0%
0%
0%
0%
23%
22%
17%
5%
0%
Mar-10
13%
19%
0%
0%
0%
0%
22%
22%
16%
9%
0%
Apr-10
15%
16%
0%
0%
0%
6%
20%
21%
16%
6%
0%
May-10
17%
18%
0%
0%
0%
0%
22%
23%
12%
8%
0%
Jun-10
16%
20%
0%
0%
0%
0%
22%
23%
6%
13%
0%
Jul-10
0%
0%
25%
27%
27%
0%
0%
0%
1%
0%
20%
Aug-10
17%
19%
0%
0%
0%
7%
20%
22%
0%
15%
0%
Sep-10
0%
0%
23%
23%
1%
0%
0%
0%
29%
0%
23%
Oct-10
0%
0%
17%
26%
0%
0%
0%
0%
35%
0%
23%
Nov-10
20%
12%
0%
0%
0%
17%
18%
20%
0%
13%
0%
Dec-10
0%
0%
28%
38%
4%
0%
0%
0%
29%
0%
0%
Jan-11
0.192028
0.178586
0
0
0
0
0.184169
0.200319
0
0.170959
0.073938
Feb-11
0
0
0.163218
0.202718
0.111048
0.294686
0
0
0.22833
0
0
Mar-11
0.236637
0.148297
0
0
0
0
0.177604
0.246433
0
0.191029
0
Apr-11
0.311962
0.019851
0.03068
0
0
0
0.1555
0.312195
0
0.169812
0
May-11
0.331006
0
0.088089
0
0
0
0.134873
0.315973
0
0.130059
0
Jun-11
0.36996
0
0.135135
0
0
0
0.084403
0.340666
0
0.069836
0
Jul-11
0.400082
0
0.239542
0.032063
0
0
0.013361
0.314953
0
0
0
Aug-11
0
0.165365
0
0.095594
0.229961
0
0
0
0.243417
0.00668
0.258983
Sep-11
0.285303
0
0
0
0
0.202833
0.162924
0.271174
0
0.077767
0
Oct-11
0
0.279379
0.166944
0.286247
0
0
0
0
0.267429
0
0
Nov-11
0
0.212653
0.155782
0.274596
0
0
0
0
0.356969
0
0
Dec-11
Jan-12 Feb-12 Mar-12
0.14783
0
0
0
0 0.217863 0.220262 0.222494
0 0.242979 0.229495 0.294093
0 0.264078 0.276759 0.357995
0.150566
0
0
0
0.163803
0
0
0
0.118958
0
0
0
0.156504
0
0
0
0 0.27508 0.273484 0.125418
0.12725
0
0
0
0.135089
0
0
0
20%
80%
20%
20%
71%
Correlations
59%
60%
45%
19%
40%
35%
17%
15%
Weight
13%
10%
10%
Correlation
20%
0%
-6%
-20%
-40%
-45%
-60%
5%
1%
0%
0%
0%
0%
-58%
-80%
-75%
-84%
0%
-100%
-90%
-91%
Source: Axioma, Russell, S&P, Bloomberg LLP, Deutsche Bank Quantitative Strategy
Page 22
18 April 2012
References
Alvarez, M., Luo, Y., Cahan, R., Jussa, J., Chen, J., [2010], Portfolios Under Construction:
Volatility=1/N, Deutsche Bank Quantitative Strategy, June 16, 2010.
Alvarez, M., Kassam, A., Mesomeris, S. [2010], Factor Neutralization and Beyond,
Deutsche Bank Quantitative Strategy, September 21, 2010.
Alvarez, M., Luo, Y., Cahan, R., Jussa, J., Chen, J., [2010], Portfolios Under Construction:
Driving in the fast lane, Deutsche Bank Quantitative Strategy, April 26, 2011.
Alvarez, M., Luo, Y., Cahan, R., Jussa, J., Chen, J., [2011], Signal Processing: Reviving
Momentum: Mission Impossible?, July 6, 2011.
Alvarez, M., Luo, Y., Cahan, R., Jussa, J., Chen, J., [2011], Portfolios Under Construction:
Correlation and Consequences, January 24, 2012.
Bansal, R., Khatchatrian, V., and Yaron, A., 2005, Interpretable Asset Markets?, European
Economic Review, Vol. 49.
Luo et al, 2010, QCD Model: DB Quant Handbook, Deutsche Bank Quantitative Strategy,
22 July 2010.
Luo, Y., Cahan, R., Jussa, J. Alvarez, M., [2010], Signal Processing: Style Rotation,
Deutsche Bank Quantitative Strategy, September 7, 2010.
Luo, Y., Cahan, R., Jussa, J. Alvarez, M., [2011], Portfolios Under Construction: Robust
Factor Modeling, Deutsche Bank Quantitative Strategy, January 21, 2011.
Luo, Y., Cahan, R., Jussa, J. Alvarez, M., Chen, J., [2011], Signal Processing: Quant Tactical
Asset Allocation (QTAA), Deutsche Bank Quantitative Strategy, September 19, 2011.
Luo, Y., Cahan, R., Jussa, J. Alvarez, M., Chen, J., Sheng, W., [2012], Signal Processing:
New Insights in Country Rotation, Deutsche Bank Quantitative Strategy, September 2012.
Londono, J.M., (2011), The Variance Risk Premium Around the World, FRB International
Finance Discussion Paper No. 1035, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2009065
Page 23
18 April 2012
Appendix 1
Important Disclosures
Additional information available upon request
For disclosures pertaining to recommendations or estimates made on a security mentioned in this report, please see
the most recently published company report or visit our global disclosure look-up page on our website at
http://gm.db.com/ger/disclosure/DisclosureDirectory.eqsr.
Analyst Certification
The views expressed in this report accurately reflect the personal views of the undersigned lead analyst(s). In addition, the
undersigned lead analyst(s) has not and will not receive any compensation for providing a specific recommendation or view in
this report. Miguel-A Alvarez/Yin Luo/Rochester Cahan/Javed Jussa/Zongye Chen/Sheng Wang
Hypothetical Disclaimer
Backtested, hypothetical or simulated performance results have inherent limitations. Unlike an actual performance record
based on trading actual client portfolios, simulated results are achieved by means of the retroactive application of a
backtested model itself designed with the benefit of hindsight. Taking into account historical events the backtesting of
performance also differs from actual account performance because an actual investment strategy may be adjusted any time,
for any reason, including a response to material, economic or market factors. The backtested performance includes
hypothetical results that do not reflect the reinvestment of dividends and other earnings or the deduction of advisory fees,
brokerage or other commissions, and any other expenses that a client would have paid or actually paid. No representation is
made that any trading strategy or account will or is likely to achieve profits or losses similar to those shown. Alternative
modeling techniques or assumptions might produce significantly different results and prove to be more appropriate. Past
hypothetical backtest results are neither an indicator nor guarantee of future returns. Actual results will vary, perhaps
materially, from the analysis.
Page 24
18 April 2012
Regulatory Disclosures
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countries:
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relating
to
our
obligations
under
MiFiD
can
be
found
at
http://www.globalmarkets.db.com/riskdisclosures.
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