Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
Scientific Knowledge:
IP Protection and Academic Publication
Joshua Gans, Fiona Murray & Scott Stern
26th February, 2010
t
A
Increase in
Knowledge
t
A
Increase in
Knowledge
t
A
Increase in
Knowledge
t
A
Increase in
Knowledge
δ H A (At + A t )
R&D Productivity
t
A
Increase in
Knowledge
δ H A (At + A t ) t +1
A
Future Knowledge
R&D Productivity
t
A
Appropriated
Increase in
Knowledge
δ H A (At + A t ) t +1
A
Future Knowledge
R&D Productivity
t
A
Appropriated
Increase in
Knowledge
δ H A (At + A t ) t +1
A
Future Knowledge
R&D Productivity
Spillover
Low High
Low
Scientific
Merit
High
Starting with publications: From a sample of 341 research publications (all the research
articles from the leading life science journal Nature Biotechnology between 1997 and 1999).
Examine which publications are also disclosed in patents. (Murray and Stern 2007)
Starting with patents: From the full population of human gene patents (US patents identified using
bioinformatics methods that disclose and claim a human gene sequence or fragment; Jensen and
Murray 2005), which patents are also disclosed in publications? (Huang and Murray 2008).
Empirical backdrop
High and increasing incidence of patent-paper pairs (Murray)
Evidence that patents may reduce inter-temporal spillovers (Murray
& Stern, Williams)
Disclosure strategy
Outcome of negotiation between (academic) scientist and firm over payments, IP
strategy and publication rights
Scientist assumed to be wealth constrained
Disclosure strategy
Outcome of negotiation between (academic) scientist and firm over payments, IP
strategy and publication rights
Scientist assumed to be wealth constrained
Simplifying assumptions
Single scientist and single firm (bilateral monopoly)
Single project (more about funding an academic scientist than scientist-employee)
No outside options (relaxed in the paper)
Π
− k − w − Pr(successful entry)(Π − π )
Monopoly capital Competitive
Profit cost Profit
13
13
Blocked entry
Probability entry is prohibited entirely: ρ
13
Blocked entry
Probability entry is prohibited entirely: ρ
Disclosures
Minimum disclosure requirements in the patent: dPAT
Literally, the probability disclosures yield knowledge that
reduces entry costs by bE
13
Blocked entry
Probability entry is prohibited entirely: ρ
Disclosures
Minimum disclosure requirements in the patent: dPAT
Literally, the probability disclosures yield knowledge that
reduces entry costs by bE
Congruence
Probability patent and publication disclosures overlap: α
13
14
14
π
(1 − i ρ )π
14
π
(1 − i ρ )π
(1 − i ρ )π − iλ
14
π
(1 − i ρ )π
(1 − i ρ )π − iλ + bE Pr(Disclosure)
(1 − i ρ )π − iλ
14
π
(1 − i ρ )π
(1 − i ρ )π − iλ + bE Pr(Disclosure)
(1 − i ρ )π − iλ
14
(1 − i ρ )π
(1 − i ρ )π − iλ + bE Pr(Disclosure)
(1 − i ρ )π − iλ
14
(1 − i ρ )π − iλ + bE Pr(Disclosure)
(1 − i ρ )π − iλ
14
(1 − i ρ )π − iλ + bE Pr(Disclosure)
(1 − i ρ )π − iλ
14
π
(1 − i ρ )π
(1 − i ρ )π − iλ + bE (idPAT + d − α idPAT d)
(1 − i ρ )π − iλ
14
(1 − i ρ )π − iλ + bE (idPAT + d − α idPAT d)
0 0
14
Random
Fixed
(1 − i ρ )π − iλ + bE (idPAT + d − α idPAT d) Cost, θ
0 0
14
Random
Fixed
(1 − i ρ )π − iλ + bE (idPAT + d − α idPAT d) Cost, θ
0 0
14
Random
Fixed
(1 − i ρ )π − iλ + bE (idPAT + d − α idPAT d) Cost, θ
= Pr (entry)
0 0
14
15
Pr (successful entry)
= (1 − i ρ )Pr(entry)
= (1 − i ρ ) ( (1 − i ρ )π − iλ + bE (idPAT + d − α idPAT d))
15
Pr (successful entry)
= (1 − i ρ )Pr(entry)
= (1 − i ρ ) ( (1 − i ρ )π − iλ + bE (idPAT + d − α idPAT d))
15
17
18
18
18
18
19
19
Commercial Patent-Paper
Science Pairs
Open
Secrecy
Science
1 Δd
d =
* ( )
Π − k − (1 − iρ ) (1 − iρ )π − iλ + bE id PAT (Π − π )
i
2(1 − iρ )bE (1 − α id PAT )(Π − π )
Increasing λ and ρ
More likely to take out a patent
If there is publication, negotiate more disclosure
Increasing dPAT
Less likely to take out a patent
If there is a publication, reduces disclosure
Patent-Paper Pairs
For δ sufficiently high, patent-paper pairs can be an
equilibrium
Presence of patent reduces incentives for publication and
vice versa when γ < 1
Open
Secrecy Science
1 Δd
Consequences:
A reduced future license fee when there is a publication
In negotiations, the scientist and firm are less likely to publish
as this will reduce license revenues even further
Openness may be facilitated by leaving IP rights in the firm’s
hands.