Opinion Rule, rule 130 sections 48 to 50

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 116196 June 23, 1999

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PABLO ADOVISO, defendant-appellant.

KAPUNAN, J.:
Pablo Adoviso appeals from the Joint Judgment 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Camarines Sur 2 declaring him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt for two counts of Murder.
Appellant, allegedly a member of the Citizens Armed Forces Geographical Unit (CAFGU), was originally charged
with four unidentified persons who have, however, remained at large. The information 3 charging appellant with the
Murder of Rufino Agunos under Criminal Case No. P-2079 alleges:
That on or about the 18th day of February 1990 at about 8:00 o'clock [sic] in the evening at Sitio Tanagan, Barangay Casugad, Municipality of Bula, Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, while armed with assorted long
firearms, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill and with
treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously shoot one
Rufino Agunos several times with said firearms hitting the latter on the different parts of his body
which were the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of
said Rufino Agunos.
That the crime complained of against the accused is not service connected.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.
Except for the name of the victim, the information in Criminal Case No. P-2080 with respect to the killing of Emeterio
Vasquez, contains the same allegations. 4
Appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. At the joint trial of Criminal Case Nos. P-2079 and P-2080, the
prosecution presented their version of the events that transpired on the evening of February 18, 1990, as follows:
The spouses Emeterio and Anastacia Vasquez had two adjacent houses in Sitio Tan-agan, Barangay Casugad,
Bula, Camarines Sur. One of the houses was actually a camalig where they stored harvested rice. The spouses
preferred to live there because it was cooler. The living area of the camalig had walls of bamboo called salsag. This
area was elevated from the ground. Three steps led down to an awning (suyab) walled with bamboo slats. These
slats were placed horizontally approximately four to six inches apart. A portion of the awning was used as a kitchen
but another portion had a papag where the Vasquez' grandson, Rufino Agunos, son of their daughter Virginia, would
sleep whenever he tended the irrigation pump. The spouses son Bonifacio occupied the other house eight (8)
meters from the camalig with his own son Elmer.
At around 8:00 in the evening of February 18, 1990, Emeterio Vazquez was preparing coffee as his wife was about
to retire for the night. Their grandson Rufino had already gone to sleep in the papag. Anastacia had just finished
spreading the sleeping mat when she heard three or four gunshots. Emeterio then uttered that he had been shot.
Seeing Emeterio, Anastacia exclaimed, "Why should you not be hit when infact there are guns in front of you."
Anastacia saw the "protruding edge of the gun" on the wall near the stairs where Emeterio went down. A lamp near
the stairs where Emeterio drank coffee illuminated the camalig but Anastacia failed to recognize the persons who
fired their guns at her husband.
The Vasquez' son Bonifacio was in the bigger house when he heard the gunshots. Earlier that evening, Bonifacio
was talking to Rufino regarding the engine of the irrigation pump. Bonifacio was still talking when he noticed that
Rufino had fallen asleep, the latter's back against the bamboo wall. Bonifacio left Rufino snoring in the papag and
went to the other house. Only a minute had passed after he had gone up when Bonifacio heard the gunshots. He
and his 16-year-old son Elmer immediately went down the front yard to investigate.

Bonifacio hid himself in the dark portion of the yard, behind a coconut tree. From a distance of eight (8) meters,
Bonifacio saw Rufino, who was inside the camalig, being shot by several persons from the outside. Looking through
the bamboo slats of the camalig wall. Bonifacio recognized one of the assailants, with a large built and long hair, as
appellant Pablo Adoviso because of the gas lamp that was lighted inside the camalig. Of Rufino's assailants, only
appellant was not wearing a mask. Appellant was holding a long firearm wrapped inside a sack with its muzzle
protruding and directed where Rufino was sleeping. Appellant then fired hitting Rufino. At that moment, Bonifacio
heard his father Emeterio shout "Pino," (referring to his grandson Rufino) and saw his father go down the stairs
carrying a gas lamp. Appellant fired again, hitting Emeterio at the stomach.
For his part, Elmer, who rushed towards the camalig with his father Bonifacio, saw five (5) persons aiming their
firearms at the camalig. Except for appellant, each of these persons had a cover over their faces. Three (3) of them
were positioned in a ditch near the camalig while two (2) others were near its door. Elmer saw these five (5) persons
shoot his cousin Rufino who was lying down on the papag. Although his back was hit, Rufino was able to crawl
under the papag. Elmer's grandfather was also hit on the stomach but he managed to up the camalig. When
appellant and his companion by the camalig door saw Elmer, they fired at him then, with the three others at the
ditch, escaped to the banana plantation Elmer, on the other hand, fled towards the coconut plantation.
Upon returning to the camalig, Elmer saw his father carrying his grandfather Emeterio. He also found Rufino at the
foot of a coconut tree near the river, lying on his side with his body curled. Rufino told Elmer that he had been hit
and, when Elmer failed to locate his wound, Rufino took Elmer's hand and put it on his back. Elmer then moved
Rufino "sidewise." Upon returning to the camalig, Elmer carried his grandfather and bandaged his stomach with
diapers.
In the meantime, Bonifacio went to the municipal building of Bula to fetch the police. Inspector Antonio Lopez and
Senior Police Officer 1 Claro Ballevar returned to the scene of the crime with him. The police brought Emeterio and
Rufino to the municipal hall of Bula and then to the Bicol Regional Hospital. Both Emeterio and Rufino died early the
next morning.
The certification 5 dated March 7, 1990 and signed by Dr. Janice Nanette Estrada, resident physician of the Bicol
Regional Hospital in Naga City, states that 35-year-old Rufino Agunos died of four (4) gunshot wounds: at the inguinal
area, the sacral area, the thigh and the abdomen. The wounds at the inguinal area and the thigh bore contusion collars.
The same physician certified that Emeterio Vasquez, 88 years of age, sustained seven (7) gunshot wounds at the
paraumbilical area, lumbar area, hypogastrium, anterior aspect of the right forearm, anteromedial aspect of the right
forearm, anteromedial aspect left arm and anterolateral aspect of the left arm. Four (4) of these gunshot wounds had
contusion collars at the paraumbilical area, the hypogastrium, the right forearm and the left arm. 6
Appellant Adoviso interposed alibi and denial as his defense.
Appellant claimed that he was a member of the CAFGU whose headquarters was located in Barangay Palsong,
Bula, Camarines Sur. At around 7:00 in the evening of February 18, 1990, he was in Sitio Durabod, Palsong, about
a kilometer away from the CAFGU headquarters. He, together with Francisco Bislombre, Benjamin Alina, Jr. and
PFC Antero Esteron, had some drinks in the store of Honoria Tragante until around 11:00 p.m.
Honoria Tragante and Francisco Bislombre corroborated appellant's alibi. Antero Esteron likewise testified that from
7:00 until past 11:00 that night of February 18, 1990, he and appellant had a drinking spree at the Tragante store.
He distinctly remembered that date because it was the fiesta of Balatan.
To support his denial appellant presented Lt. Antonio Lopez, the deputy chief of police and SPO2 Claro Ballebar of
the PNP Bula Police Station. Lopez identified a police certification 7 prepared by Pfc. Ramon N. Canabe to the effect
that the shooting incident was perpetrated "by unidentified armed men." Lopez said that he (Lopez) was one of those who
brought the victims to the hospital who were then still conscious. The victims told him that they did not know who shot
them or why they were shot.
SPO2 Claro Ballebar, however testified that in the follow-up investigation he conducted several days after the
incident, Bonifacio Vasquez revealed to him that he (Bonifacio) "vividly saw the incident and recognized" appellant
as one of the perpetrators of the crime and that the killings had some something to do with land dispute between
Bonifacio's parents and the Galicia family.
The defense also offered in evidence the testimony of Ernesto A. Lucena, Polygraph Examiner II of the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in Manila, who conducted a polygraph test on appellant. In Polygraph Report No.
900175, 8 Lucena opined that appellants ''polygrams revealed that there were no specific reactions indicative of deception
to pertinent questions relevant" to the investigation of the crimes.
In rebuttal, Bonifacio Vasquez revealed that when he reported the incident to the police, he did not identify appellant
as one of the culprits because he was afraid of appellant who was a member of the CAFGU. Nevertheless,
Bonifacio did mention to the police that he recognized appellant as one of the perpetrators of the crime although he
told them that he did not recognize appellant's four (4) companions. He did not mention to Lopez and Canabe
appellant's identity because he was "confused" about what had happened in their house.

On March 25, 1994, the trial court rendered a Joint Judgment finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt for
two (2) counts of murder and disposing of Criminal Case Nos. P-2079 and P-2080 as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, joint judgment is hereby rendered:
In Criminal Case No. P-2079, finding the accused PABLO ADOVISO guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of MURDER and imposing upon him the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to
pay the legal heirs of Rufino Agunos, consisting of the widow, Evelyn T. Agunos and their four (4)
children the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) Philippine Currency;
In Criminal Case No. P-2080, likewise finding said accused PABLO ADOVISO guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER and imposing upon him another penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA and to pay the legal heirs of the late EMETERIO VASQUEZ, consisting of Anastacia
Vasquez and Bonifacio Vasquez, another sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00)
Philippine Currency with all the accessory penalties provided therefore in both cases and to pay the
costs in both instances.
SO ORDERED. 9
Appellant hinges his bid for exoneration on whether he was properly identified by the two (2) eyewitnesses as one of
the killers of the victims. He contends that eyewitnesses Bonifacio and Elmer Vasquez presented an "incredible"
story because it is "highly improbable" that they could have "distinctly and positively recognized accused-appellant
as one of the perpetrators of the crimes." 10 According to appellant, Bonifacio, who was in the dark portion of the yard
hiding behind a coconut tree, could not have identified appellant by the light emanating from gas lamp inside
the camaligwhere Emeterio Vasquez and Rufino Agunos were staying at the time of the incident. Neither could Elmer
Vasquez, who declared that he saw his grandfather shot by appellant, could have identified appellant because of the poor
lighting coming from the gas lamp being carried by his grandfather. Appellant claims that the gas lamp carried by Elmer's
grandfather was "a small can about two (2) inches tall and the wick is smaller than a cigarette" and the lamp inside
the camalig "was placed inside a bigger can so that the direction of the light emanating therefrom was upwards and not
sidewise." 11
Visibility is indeed a vital factor in the determination of whether or not an eyewitness could have identified the
perpetrator of a crime. However, it is settled that when conditions of visibility are favorable, and the witnesses do not
appear to be biased, their assertion as to the identity of the malefactor should normally be accepted. 12Illumination
produced by kerosene lamp or a flashlight is sufficient to allow identification of persons. 13 Wicklamps, flashlights, even
moonlight or starlight may, in proper situations be considered sufficient illumination, making the attack on the credibility of
witnesses solely on that ground unmeritorious. 14
In this case, not one (1) but two (2) gas lamps illuminated the place the one placed inside the camalig and that
held by Emeterio as he descended from the stairs after the first volley of gunfire. Appellant's contention therefore
that one particular gas lamp could not have lighted the place because it was placed inside a can is puerile. Besides,
Elmer was not describing either of the gas lamps during the incident. The defense counsel at the trial and
appellant's counsel misunderstood the testimonies of Elmer and his grandmother on that matter. Thus, Elmer
testified:
ATTY. CORTES:
Q Is it not that the lamp you said placed along the door, which is already marked as
lamp, is that not this lamp was placed inside a kerosene can as testified to by your
grandmother so that the cat could not cause it to fall?
A It was placed just on the floor not inside the can. 15 (Emphasis supplied.)
For her part, Anastacia testified as follows.
ATTY. CORTES:
xxx xxx xxx
Q Because you were already about to retire, the doors and windows were already
closed, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q That you also shut down or closed the light, is that correct?
A No, sir, we even placed the kerosene lamp inside a can.

Q You said, you placed the lamp inside a can so that the light is going up, is that
correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q So, the light was not illuminating sidewise because it was inside a can?
A When we left, I got the kerosene lamp and brought it with me.
ATTY. CORTES:
I think, the witness did not get the question right, Your Honor.
COURT:
Repeat the question.
ATTY. CORTES:
Q My question Madam Witness is, when you were about to retire?
A The lamp was placed on the floor where my husband was drinking coffee.
COURT :
Q Who are the persons you are referring to as having left when you placed the light
inside the can?
A My son, Bonifacio, and the policemen, Your Honor, when the(y) brought Emeterio
and Rufino to the hospital. 16 (emphasis supplied).
Clearly then, the lamp inside the camalig was placed on the floor and a can was placed over it only after the incident
when Anastacia left with her son and the police to bring the victims to the hospital.
The bamboo slats of the camalig could not have effectively obstructed the eyewitnesses' view of appellant,
considering that the slats were built four (4) meters apart. Besides, it is the natural reaction of relatives of victims to
strive to observe the faces and appearance of the assailants, if not ascertain their identities, and the manner in
which the crime is committed. 17 A relative will naturally be interested in identifying the malefactor to secure his conviction
to obtain justice for the death of his relative(s). 18 It must remembered that appellant was not a complete stranger to the
eyewitnesses. Bonifacio had known him for ten (10) years 19 while Elmer had been acquainted with him for four (4) years.
Elmer recalled that appellant used to join the rabuz at the barracks. 20 Familiarity with appellant's face and appearance
minimized if not erased the possibility that they could have been mistaken as to his identity.
Appellant's allegation that it was "improbable" for him to have committed the crimes without a mask, unlike the other
participants, deserves scant consideration. It is not contrary to human experience for a person to commit a crime
before the very eyes of people who are familiar to them. Indeed, some may even take pride in their identification as
the perpetrator of a criminal act.
Appellant also considers as a "positive sign," Bonifacio's failure to immediately identify him as the perpetrator of the
crime to the police. 21 The delay in reporting his participation to the police was however sufficiently explained by
Bonifacio. Bonifacio was afraid of appellant since the latter was a member of the CAFGU and, as such, was provided with
a gun. He was also hesitant in identifying appellant immediately lest he got wind of his impending arrest and posthaste
escaped the clutches of the law. The failure of a witness to reveal at once the identity of the accused as one of the
perpetrators of the crime does not affect, much less, impair his credibility as a witness. 22 The general or common rule is
that witnesses react to a crime in different ways. 23 There is no standard form of human behavioral response to a strange,
startling and frightful event, and there is no standard rule by which witnesses to a crime must react. 24
There is no merit in appellant's contention that Bonifacio had a motive in implicating him. According to appellant,
Bonifacio suspected that he was hired by the Galicia family to kill Bonifacio's father who had earlier won in a land
dispute with the Galicias. It is irrelevant here to talk of motive on the part of Bonifacio inasmuch as to credible
witnesses had positively identified appellant as one of the participants in the killing of Emeterio Vasquez and Rufino
Agunos.
Appellant's alibi thus crumbles in the face of his positive identification as one of the perpetrators of the crimes. 25For
an alibi to prosper, moreover, there must be proof that the defendant was not only somewhere else when the crime was
committed but that he could not be physically present at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the time of its
commission. 26 Appellant did not prove the physical impossibility of his being in Sitio Tan-agan which is not exactly remote
from Sitio Palsong where he claimed to be when the incident happened. Both places are within the Municipality of Bula.
Appellant admitted that the distance between the two sitios could be negotiated in three hours even without any means of

transportation. 27 On the other hand, his alleged companion in Sitio Palsong, Antero Esteron, testified that the distance
could be traveled in thirty-five (35) minutes by "trimobile" or private vehicle. 28

Apart from the fact that appellant's alibi was inherently weak, he was not even sure where he was and who were his
companions at the time the crimes were committed. We quote the observation of the trial court on this point:
On the premise that the trial court rendered the judgment of conviction on the basis of "mere conjectures and
speculations," 29 appellant argues that the negative result of the polygraph test should be given weight to tilt the scales of
justice in his favor.
A polygraph is an electromechanical instrument that simultaneously measures and records certain physiological
changes in the human body that are believed to be involuntarily caused by an examinee's conscious attempt to
deceive the questioner. 30 The theory behind a polygraph or lie detector test is that a person who lie deliberately will have
rising blood pressure and a subconscious block in breathing, which will be recorded on the graph. 31 However, American
courts almost uniformly reject the results of polygraphs tests when offered in evidence for the purposes of establishing the
guilt or innocence of one accused of a crime, whether the accused or the prosecution seeks its introduction, for the reason
that polygraph has not as yet attained scientific acceptance as a reliable and ascertaining truth or deception. 32 The rule is
no different in this jurisdiction. Thus, in People v. Daniel, 33 stating that much faith and credit should not be vested upon a
lie detector test as it is not conclusive. Appellant, in this case, has not advanced any reason why this rule should not apply
to him.
Appellant was therefore correctly adjudged guilty of two counts of Murder. Treachery qualified the killing to murder.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or
forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising
from the defense which offended party might make. 34 In other words, there is treachery when the attack on an unarmed
victim who has not given the slightest provocation is sudden, unexpected and without warning. 35 The victims in this case
were totally unaware of an impending assault Rufino was sleeping and Emetario was going down the stairs when they
were shot.
WHEREFORE, the Joint Judgment of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED.

1wphi1.nt

SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Pardo and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Penned by Judge Martin P. Badong, Jr.
2 Branch 31.
3 Records, p. 1, Criminal Case No. P-2079.
4 Id., at 3.
5 Id., at 35, Exh. D.
6 Id., at 34, Exh. C.
7 Id., at 370, Exh. 6.
8 Id., at 47, marking Exh. 8.
9 Id., at 422.
10 Rollo, p. 204.
11 Id., at 205-206.
12 People v. Cogonon, 262 SCRA 693 (1996).
13 People v. Fabrigas, Jr., 261 DVTS 436 (1996); People v. Penillos, 205 SCRA 546 (1992); People
v. Loste, 210 SCRA 614 (1992).
14 People v. Villaruel, 330 Phil. 79, 89 (1996).
15 TSN, July 30, 1993, p. 5.

16 TSN, August 9, 1993, pp. 15-16.

17 People v. Ramos, 260 SCRA 402 (1996).
18 People v. Sotes, 260 SCRA 353 (1996).
19 TSN, April 8, 1992, p. 3.
20 TSN, July 13, 1993, pp. 25-26.
21 Rollo, p. 208.
22 People v. Mendoza, 223 SCRA 108, (1993).
23 People v. Paynor, 261 SCRA 615 (1996).
24 People v. Teves, 321 Phil. 837 (1995).
25 People v. Santos, 270 SCRA 650 (1997).
26 People v. Alshaika, 261 SCRA 637 (1996).
27 TSN, September 4, 1992, p. 3.
28 TSN, July 30, 1993, pp. 26-27.
29 Rollo, p. 214.
30 WEST'S LEGAL THESAURUS/DICTIONARY, Special Deluxe Edition (1986).
31 WORDS AND PHRASES, "Lie Detector."
32 26A Am Jur 2d Evidence 1007.
33 86 SCRA 511 (1978).
34 Art. 14 (16), Revised Penal Code.
35 People v. Abapo, 239 SCRA 469 (1994).

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 155299

July 24, 2007

CHINA BANKING CORPORATION, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF AVELINA VDA. DE PIERO and EMMANUEL PIERO, Respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court questioning the
Decision1 dated December 13, 2000, promulgated by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 57249, which
reversed and set aside the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 68, Pasig City, in Civil Case SCA No.
171; and the CA Resolution2 dated September 16, 2002 which denied the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
This case originated from an action for Annulment of Real Estate Mortgage, Foreclosure of Mortgage, Notice of
Auction Sale and Damages with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction
filed by respondents against herein petitioner China Banking Corporation, Inc., Notary Public Ernesto Bonifacio,
Alfonso Kipte, Marivic Kipte and the Register of Deeds of Rizal, with the RTC.
The deceased Avelina Vda. de Piero (Avelina), herein respondents predecessor-in-interest, was the registered
owner of two adjoining parcels of land with improvements, consisting of 510 sq m situated in Mandaluyong City,
covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 64018 and 59833. On August 27, 1991, Alfonso Kipte obtained
aP1,200,000.00 loan from petitioner, secured by a promissory note and a real estate mortgage signed by Avelina
over her properties. The mortgage was annotated on the titles. The loan was also secured by a surety agreement
signed by Kipte as principal and by Avelina as surety. Due to Kiptes failure to pay his indebtedness, the mortgaged
properties were foreclosed and auction sale was scheduled on August 17, 1992.
Thus, Avelina and respondent Emmanuel Piero filed the complaint with the RTC, with Avelina denying having
signed the documents. They alleged that: sometime in September 1992, Avelina was surprised to receive a
foreclosure notice from the notary public, stating that her properties would be sold at public auction by virtue of a
petition for extrajudicial foreclosure filed by petitioner; after inquiring from petitioner, she learned that she allegedly
executed a real estate mortgage and a surety agreement to secure a loan of one Alfredo Kipte, whom she does not
know; the foreclosure is void since she never voluntarily executed the mortgage or surety agreement, never
appeared before the notary public, never received any proceeds from the loan, and was never a business associate
of Kipte; sometime in 1990, Emmanuels common-law wife, Ludivina Rinnoces, asked Avelina to sign some
documents allegedly pertaining to a loan from one Cerila de Leon; Avelina signed these documents without reading
the same, as she is blind, and without knowing the contents thereof; in 1991, Ludivina again asked her to sign some
documents, allegedly to pay the account to Cerila; again, Avelina was not able to read or know the contents of these
documents; the alleged mortgage was annotated on TCT No. 64018, but not on TCT No. 59833; and TCT No.
64018 also contained a cancellation of a mortgage in favor of Jose Macaraig and Cerila de Leon, both of whom she
does not know.3
Petitioner, however, contends among others, that upon the execution of the documents, Avelina was furnished with
copies thereof; that Avelina freely and voluntarily signed the documents; that at the time of the execution of the
documents, though physically weak, she was mentally sound and in complete possession of her faculties, and she
understood the nature of the transactions; and Avelina personally appeared before the notary public. 4
On September 6, 1996, Avelina died and was substituted by her heirs.
After trial, the RTC rendered its Decision dated October 21, 1997, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of CHINA BANKING
CORPORATION and ERNESTO BONIFACIO and orders the DISMISSAL of this action.
The Writ of Preliminary Injunction is hereby permanently LIFTED.
The compulsory Counter-claim of defendant is likewise DISMISSED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.5
Respondents then appealed to the CA, which, in a Decision dated December 13, 2000, reversed the RTC Decision.
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and judgment is
hereby rendered in favor of appellants. Appellee bank is further ordered to reconvey the property to appellant heirs
of appellant Avelina Vda. de Piero.
SO ORDERED.6
The CA held that the deceased Avelina was an old widow, 80 years of age and blind even before she purportedly
signed the Real Estate Mortgage and Surety Agreement on August 26, 1991 and August 29, 1991, respectively; that
Rebecca Piero-Galang, daughter of Avelina, testified that in 1985, her mother became totally blind, was not
physically fit, and suffered an eye disease or glaucoma; that Avelina herself testified that she was only persuaded to
sign the questioned documents as witness; that Ludivina guided her when she signed the foregoing documents; that
Avelina did not receive from Kipte, the principal borrower, any amount as consideration of the mortgage attests to
her credible theory that she was only a witness to the execution of the documents; that her deportment in court and
the fact that she had to be guided to take the witness stand constituted the "strongest proof of blindness"; that the
notary public, Atty. Restituto Fano, who claimed to have notarized the Surety Agreement, said that he remembered
Avelina to be an old lady, with white complexion and white hair, and who had to be assisted and accompanied to his
table to be able to sign the questioned agreements; that Atty. Fano noticed that "she could hardly see"; and that it
was unusual for Avelina, a woman of old age, to be so willing to act as surety to a promissory note of petitioner
Kipte, a complete stranger, which involved the large amount of P1,200,000.00.
Its Motion for Reconsideration having been denied in a Resolution dated September 16, 2002, petitioner now comes
before the Court raising the sole issue of
WHETHER THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REVERSING THE FINDING OF THE
TRIAL COURT THAT APPELLANT AVELINA VDA. DE PINERO (DECEASED) WAS BLIND, AND IN CONCLUDING
THAT SHE DID NOT VOLUNTARILY AND KNOWINGLY EXECUTE THE REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE DATED
AUGUST 26, 1991 AND SURETY AGREEMENT DATED AUGUST 29, 1991.7
The main issue in this case is one of fact, i.e., whether or not the deceased Avelina signed the real estate mortgage
and surety agreement knowingly and voluntarily, with full knowledge of its contents.
As a general rule, in the exercise of the Supreme Courts power of review, the Court is not a trier of facts and does
not normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the
case. But jurisprudence has recognized several exceptions in which factual issues may be resolved by this
Court,8 at least two of which are present in the instant case, namely: (1) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; and (2) when the findings of facts of the lower courts are conflicting.
Petitioner argues, in the main, that respondents admitted that Avelina indeed signed the mortgage and surety
agreements in question; that, as notarial documents, they are clothed with the prima facie presumption of regularity
and due execution; that Avelina, being of sound and disposing mind despite old age, was duly informed of the
nature and purpose of these agreements by petitioners branch manager and the notary public before she affixed
her signature; and that the respondents could have easily submitted a medical certificate attesting to the supposed
blindness of Avelina or made an ophthalmologist take the witness stand, but they did neither.
At the outset, it must be made clear that counsel for respondents stipulated to admit merely the authenticity of
Avelinas signature, which was done during trial.9 The admission of this fact does not by itself prove petitioners
case, since at bottom, the issue is not whether Avelina affixed her signature on the agreements in question, but,
ultimately, whether she gave her consent to be bound as surety.
1awphi1

While it is true that both the mortgage and surety agreement are public documents, notarization per se is not a
guarantee of the validity of the contents of a document. 10 Generally, a notarized document carries the evidentiary
weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution and has in its favor the presumption of regularity.
However, such presumption is not absolute. It may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.11
The rule of evidence requiring the opinion of expert witnesses applies only to such matters clearly within the domain
of medical science, and not to matters that are within the common knowledge of mankind which may be testified to
by anyone familiar with the facts.12 Thus, to prove whether one is blind, it is not necessary to submit a medical
certificate attesting to the blindness or to require an expert witness, such as an ophthalmologist, to testify to such
fact, since the fact of blindness can be determined through common knowledge and by anyone with sufficient
familiarity of such fact. In this case, Avelina, then alive during the trial of the case, categorically testified and attested
to her own blindness, a fact which even the trial court noted, viz:
q- You stated in paragraph 8 and 9 of the same transcript dated Sept. 25, 1992 that you remembered that
you were requested by your daughter-in-law to sign a document as a witness and in fact on page 9 thereof
you also stated that you were guided by your daughter-in-law in doing so, is that correct?
a- Yes, sir.
q- So, when you signed it as a witness, you were guided by your daughter-in-law?

a- I don [sic] not know who guided me because I could not see.
q- But you said, during the hearing for your application for writ of injunction that it was your daughter-in-law,
namely, Ludivina Piero who guided you?
a- I can not remember, sir.
q- You are an educated person Mrs. Witness, is it not true that it is basic for a person before signing a
document to read it first?
ATTY. DE GUZMAN:
Objection.
ATTY. CASIDING:
I am asking the witness if she knows?
COURT:
Yes, but precisely the witness is blind.
ATTY. CASIDING:
I will reform my question.
(to witness, continuing)
q- You are an educated person Mrs. Witness, is it very basic for you to read first know the contents of the
document before signing it?
a- That is true, but I could not read, sir.
q- Did you not ask Ludivina Pinero to first read the contents of the documents before you sign it?
a- I did not say it to Ludivina Pinero but she said to me that I would merely act as a witness only, sir.
q- When you were made to sign some documents in 1991 pertaining to the payment for the loan of Cerila de
Leon, did you not also request to asked [sic] Ludivina Piero to tell you what is the contents of the same
document all about?
a- No, I did not ask her, sir.
q- But do you believe Mrs. Witness that before you signed the documents, it is but natural for you to be
involved in the contents of the same document?
ATTY. DE GUZMAN:
Objection x x x.
COURT:
You may answer.
WITNESS:
Yes, sir.
ATTY. CASIDING:
(to witness, continuing)
q- If it is natural, then why did you not ask Ludivina to read or explain to you the contents of the documents
before signing it?
a- Because she only told me that I would merely act as a witness, sir. 13 (Emphasis supplied)

Also established are the facts that Avelina was already blind when she was manipulated into signing the questioned
documents by her daughter-in-law, Ludivina, who did not explain to her the contents and true nature of the
documents beforehand; that her hand had to be guided by Ludivina during the act of signing; that Avelina did not
know that the Surety Agreement and Real Estate Mortgage she signed were to secure the loan Kipte contracted
from the petitioner; that she was made to understand that she was to sign only as witness; and that Kipte was a total
stranger to her, and, by this reason, it is implausible that she agreed to be his surety.14 In fact, it was only after
Avelina received the notices of foreclosure that she learned that there was a mortgage document among the papers
she signed.
Avelina's blindness was further confirmed by the testimonies of her children, respondents Emmanuel M. Piero 15and
Rebecca Piero-Galang.16 Even the notary before whom she supposedly appeared testified to the fact that she was
indeed blind and that she was not made to understand the documents. 17
Based on the foregoing, it is therefore clear that Avelina was in fact blind, that she did not know the contents of the
documents she signed, and more importantly, that she did not know the capacity in which she was signing these
documents.
The evidence presented by respondents are clear and convincing, sufficient to overturn the presumption of
regularity of the subject documents.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
areAFFIRMED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice
ATT E S TATI O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
Penned by Associate Justice Mariano M. Umali (retired), with Associate Justices Ruben T. Reyes and
Rebecca de Guia-Salvador, concurring; rollo, pp. 43-50.
1

Penned by Associate Justice Ruben T. Reyes, with Associate Justices Mercedes Gozo-Dadole (retired)
and Rebecca de Guia-Salvador, concurring; id. at 52.
2

Records, pp. 5-8.

Id. at 90-91.

CA rollo, p. 88.

Rollo, p. 49.

Id. at 17.

Heirs of Dicman v. Cario, G.R. No. 146459, June 8, 2006, 490 SCRA 240, 261.

TSN, July 4, 1994, p. 3.

10

Mayor v. Belen, G.R. No. 151035, June 3, 2004, 430 SCRA 561, 567.

11

Id.

See Reyes v. Sisters of Mercy Hospital, 396 Phil. 87, 96 (2000); Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 378 Phil.
1198, 1221 (1999).
12

13

TSN, July 12, 1993, pp. 18-20.

14

TSN, September 25, 1992, pp. 8-10.

15

TSN, July 19, 1993, p. 8.

16

TSN, February 17, 1997, p. 12-13.

17

TSN, July 4, 1994, pp. 10-12.

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals (92-102), 509 U.S. 579

(1993).

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

DAUBERT et ux., individually and as guardians and litem for DAUBERT, et

al. v.MERRELL DOW PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 92-102. Argued March 30, 1993 -- Decided June 28, 1993
Petitioners, two minor children and their parents, alleged in their suit
against respondent that the children's serious birth defects had been
caused by the mothers' prenatal ingestion of Bendectin, a prescription drug
marketed by respondent. The District Court granted respondent summary
judgment based on a well credentialed expert's affidavit concluding, upon
reviewing the extensive published scientific literature on the subject, that
maternal use of Bendectin has not been shown to be a risk factor for
human birth defects. Although petitioners had responded with the
testimony of eight other well credentialed experts, who based their
conclusion that Bendectin can cause birth defects on animal studies,
chemical structure analyses, and the unpublished "reanalysis" of previously
published human statistical studies, the court determined that this
evidence did not meet the applicable "general acceptance" standard for
the admission of expert testimony. The Court of Appeals agreed and
affirmed, citing Fryev. United States, 54 App. D. C. 46, 47, 293 F. 1013,
1014, for the rule that expert opinion based on a scientific technique is
inadmissible unless the technique is "generally accepted" as reliable in the
relevant scientific community.
Held: The Federal Rules of Evidence, not Frye, provide the standard for
admitting expert scientific testimony in a federal trial. Pp. 4-17.
(a) Frye's "general acceptance" test was superseded by the Rules' adoption.
The Rules occupy the field, United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 49, and,
although the common law of evidence may serve as an aid to their
application, id., at 51-52, respondent's assertion that they somehow
assimilated Frye is unconvincing. Nothing in theRules as a whole or in the
text and drafting history of Rule 702, which specifically governs expert
testimony, gives any indication that "general acceptance" is a necessary
precondition to the admissibility of scientific evidence. Moreover, such a
rigid standard would be at odds with the Rules' liberal thrust and their
general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to "opinion" testimony.
Pp. 4-8.
(b) The Rules--especially Rule 702--place appropriate limits on the
admissibility of purportedly scientific evidence by assigning to the trial
judge the task of ensuring that an expert's testimony both rests on a
reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand. The reliability
standard is established by Rule 702's requirement that an expert's
testimony pertain to "scientific . . . knowledge," since the adjective

"scientific" implies a grounding in science's methods and procedures, while

the word "knowledge" connotes a body of known facts or of ideas inferred
from such facts or accepted as true on good grounds. The Rule's
requirement that the testimony "assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue" goes primarily to relevance by
demanding a valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry as a
precondition to admissibility. Pp. 9-12.
(c) Faced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony under Rule 702, the
trial judge, pursuant to Rule 104(a), must make a preliminary assessment
of whether the testimony's underlying reasoning or methodology is
scientifically valid and properly can be applied to the facts at issue. Many
considerations will bear on the inquiry, including whether the theory or
technique in question can be (and has been) tested, whether it has been
subjected to peer review and publication, its known or potential error
rate, and the existence and maintenance of standards controlling its
operation, and whether it has attracted widespread acceptance within a
relevant scientific community. The inquiry is a flexible one, and its focus
must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that
they generate. Throughout, the judge should also be mindful of other
applicable Rules. Pp. 12-15.
(d) Cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful
instruction on the burden of proof, rather than wholesale exclusion under
an uncompromising "general acceptance" standard, is the appropriate
means by which evidence based on valid principles may be challenged.
That even limited screening by the trial judge, on occasion, will prevent
the jury from hearing of authentic scientific breakthroughs is simply a
consequence of the fact that the Rules are not designed to seek cosmic
understanding but, rather, to resolve legal disputes. Pp. 15-17.
951 F. 2d 1128, vacated and remanded.
Blackmun, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court with respect to
Parts I and II-A, and the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts II-B, II-C,
III, and IV, in which White, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas,
JJ., joined. Rehnquist, C. J., filed an opinion concurring in part and
dissenting in part, in which Stevens, J., joined.

Character Evidence
In general,
rule 130, section 51
see also rule 132, section 14

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-12858

January 22, 1918

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
SANTIAGO PINEDA, defendant-appellant.
Francisco and Lualhati for appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Paredes for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
This appeal requires a construction and an application, for the first time, of the penal provisions of the Pharmacy
Law.
Santiago Pineda, the defendant, is a registered pharmacist of long standing and the owner of a drug store located at
Nos. 442, 444, Calle Santo Cristo, city of Manila. One Feliciano Santos, having some sick horses, presented a copy
of a prescription obtained from Dr. Richardson, and which on other occasions Santos had given to his horses with
good results, at Pineda's drug store for filling. The prescription read "clorato de potasa 120 gramos en seis
papelitos de 20 gramos, para caballo." Under the supervision of Pineda, the prescription was prepared and returned
to Santos in the form of six papers marked, "Botica Pineda Clorato potasa 120.00 en seis papeles para
caballo Sto. Cristo 442, 444, Binondo, Manila." Santos, under the belief that he had purchased the potassium
chlorate which he had asked for, put two of the packages in water the doses to two of his sick horses. Another
package was mixed with water for another horse, but was not used. The two horses, to which had been given the
preparation, died shortly afterwards. Santos, thereupon, took the three remaining packages to the Bureau of
Science for examination. Drs. Pea and Darjuan, of the Bureau of Science, on analysis found that the packages
contained not potassium chlorate but barium chlorate. At the instance of Santos, the two chemists also went to the
drug store of the defendant and bought potassium chlorate, which when analyzed was found to be barium chlorate.
(Barium chlorate, it should be noted, is a poison; potassium chlorate is not.) Dr. Buencamino, a veterinarian,
performed an autopsy on the horses, and found that death was the result of poisoning.
Four assignments of error are made. The first is that the lower court erred in admitting the testimony of the chemist
Pena and Darjuan as to their purchase of potassium chlorate at the drug store of the accused, which substance
proved on analysis to be barium chlorate. What the appellant is here relying on is the maxim res inter alios acta. As
a general rule, the evidence of other offenses committed by a defendant is inadmissible. But appellant has confused
this maxim and this rule with certain exceptions thereto. The effort is not to convict the accused of a second offense.
Nor is there an attempt to draw the mind away from the point at issue and thus to prejudice defendant's case. The
purpose is to ascertain defendant's knowledge and intent, and to fix his negligence. If the defendant has on more
than one occasion performed similar acts, accident in good faith is possibly excluded, negligence is intensified, and
fraudulent intent may even be established. It has been said that there is no better evidence of negligence than the
frequency of accidents. (See 10 R. C. L., pp. 938, 940.) The United States Supreme Court has held that:
On the trial of a criminal case the question relates to the tendency of certain testimony to throw light upon a
particular fact, or to explain the conduct of a particular person, there is a certain discretion on the part of the
trial judge which a court of errors will not interfere with, unless it manifestly appear that the testimony has no
legitimate bearing upon the question at issue, and is calculated to prejudice the accused.
Whenever the necessity arises for a resort to circumstantial evidence, either from the nature of the inquiry or
the failure of direct proof, objections to the testimony on the ground of irrelevancy are not favored.
Evidence is admissible in a criminal action which tends to show motive, although it tends to prove the
commission of another offense by the defendant. (Moore vs. U. S. [1893], 150 U. S., 57.)
The second assignment of error is that the lower court erred in finding that the substance sold by the accused to
Feliciano Santos on the 22d of June, 1916, was barium chlorate and not potassium chlorate. The proof
demonstrates the contrary.

The third and fourth assignments of error that the lower court erred in finding that the accused has been proved
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of an infraction of Act No. 597, section 17, as amended. The third assignment
contains the points we should consider, including, we may remark, a somewhat difficult question concerning which
the briefs have given little assistance.
The Pharmacy Law was first enacted as Act No. 597, was later amended by Act Nos. 1921, 2236, and 2382, and is
now found as Chapter 30 of the Administrative Code. The law provides for a board of pharmaceutical examiners,
and the examination and registration of pharmacists, and finally contains sundry provisions relative to the practice of
pharmacy. High qualification for applicants for the pharmaceutical; examination are established. The program of
subjects for the examination is wide. Responsibility for the quality of drugs is fixed by section 17 of the Pharmacy
Law, as amended (now Administrative Code [1917], section 751), in the following term:
Every pharmacist shall be responsible for the quality of all drugs, chemicals, medicines, and poisons he may
sell or keep for sale; and it shall be unlawful for any person whomsoever to manufacture, prepare, sell, or
administer any prescription, drug, chemical, medicine, or poison under any fraudulent name, direction, or
pretense, or to adulterate any drug, chemical, medicine, or poison so used, sold or offered for sale. Any
drug, chemical, medicine, or poison shall be held to be adulterated or deteriorated within the meaning of this
section if it differs from the standard of quality or purity given in the United States Pharmacopoeia.
The same section of the Pharmacy Law also contains the following penal provision: "Any person violating the
provisions of this Act shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not more than five hundred dollar." The
Administrative Code, section 2676, changes the penalty somewhat by providing that:
Any person engaging in the practice of pharmacy in the Philippine Islands contrary to any provision of the
Pharmacy Law or violating any provisions of said law for which no specific penalty s provided shall, for each
offense, be punished by a fine not to exceed two hundred pesos, or by imprisonment for not more than
ninety days, or both, in the discretion of the court.
These are the provisions of law, pursuant to which prosecution has been initiated and which it is now incumbent
upon us to construe.
Turning to the law, certain points therein as bearing on our present facts must be admitted. Thus, defendant is a
pharmacist. As a pharmacist, he is made responsible for the quality of all drugs and poisons which he sells. And
finally it is provided that it shall be unlawful for him to sell any drug or poison under any "fraudulent name." It is the
one word "fraudulent" which has given the court trouble. What did the Legislature intend to convey by this restrictive
adjective?
Were we to adhere to the technical definition of fraud, which the appellant vigorously insists upon, it would be
difficult, if not impossible, to convict any druggist of a violation of the law. The prosecution would have to prove to a
reasonable degree of certainty that the druggist made a material representation; that it was false; that when he
made it he knew that it was false or made it recklessly without any knowledge of its truth and as positive assertion;
that he made it with the intention that it should be acted upon by the purchaser; that the purchaser acted in reliance
upon it, and that the purchased thereby suffered injury. Such a construction with a literal following of well-known
principles on the subject of fraud would strip the law of at least much of its force. It would leave the innocent
purchaser of drugs, who must blindly trust in the good faith and vigilance of the pharmacist, at the mercy of any
unscrupulous vendor. We should not, therefore, without good reason so devitalize the law.
The profession of pharmacy, it has been said again and again, is one demanding care and skill. The responsibility of
the druggist to use care has been variously qualified as "ordinary care," "care of a special high degree," "the highest
degree of care known to practical men." Even under the first conservative expression, "ordinary care" with reference
to the business of a druggist, the Supreme Court of Connecticut has said must be held to signify "the highest
practicable degree of prudence, thoughtfulness, and vigilance, and most exact and reliable safeguards consistent
with the reasonable conduct of the business, in order that human life may not be constantly be exposed to the
danger flowing from the substitution of deadly poisons for harmless medicine." (Tombari vs. Connors [1912], 85
Conn., 235. See also Willson vs. Faxon, Williams and Faxon [1913], 208 N. Y., 108; Knoefel vs. Atkins [1907], 81 N.
E., 600.) The "skill" required of a druggist is denominated as "high" or "ample." (Peters vs. Jackson [1902], 50 W.
Va., 644; 57 L. R. A., 428.) In other words, the care required must be commensurate with the danger involved, and
the skill employed must correspond with the superior knowledge of the business which the law demands.
Under one conception, and it should not be forgotten that the case we consider are civil in nature, the question of
negligence or ignorance is irrelevant. The druggist is responsible as an absolute guarantor of what he sells. In a
decision which stands alone, the Supreme Court of Kentucky said:
As applicable to the owners of drug stores, or persons engaged in vending drugs and medicines by retail,
the legal maxim should be reversed. Instead of caveat emptor, it should be caveat venditor. That is to say,
let him be certain that he does not sell to a purchaser or send to a patient one drug for another, as arsenic
for calomel, cantharides for or mixed with snakeroot and Peruvian bark, or even one innocent drug,
calculated to produce a certain effect, in place of another sent for and designed to produce a different effect.
If he does these things, he cannot escape civil responsibility, upon the alleged pretext that it was an

accidental or an innocent mistake; that he had been very careful and particular, and had used extraordinary
care and diligence in preparing or compounding the medicines as required, etc. Such excuses will not avail
him. (Fleet vs. Hollenkemp [1852], 56 Am. Dec., 563.)
Under the other conception, in which the proof of negligence is considered as material, where a customer calls upon
a druggist for a harmless remedy, delivery of a poisonous drug by mistake by the druggist is prima facienegligence,
placing the burden on him to show that the mistake was under the circumstances consistent with the exercise of due
care. (See Knoefel vs. Atkins, supra,) The druggist cannot, for example in filling a prescription calling for potassium
chlorate give instead to the customer barium chlorate, a poison, place this poison in a package labeled "potassium
chlorate," and expect to escape responsibility on plea of mistake. His mistake, under the most favorable aspect for
himself, was negligence. So in a case where a druggist filled an order for calomel tablets with morphine and placed
the morphine in a box labeled calomel, it was said:
It is not suggested, nor can we apprehend that it is in any wise probable, that the act of furnishing the wrong
drug in this case was willful. If it was furnished by the clerk, it was undoubtedly a mistake and unintentional.
However, it was a mistake of the gravest kind, and of the most disastrous effect. We cannot say that one
holding himself out as competent to handle such drugs, and who does so, having rightful access to them,
and relied upon by those dealing with him to exercise that high degree of caution and care called for by the
peculiarly dangerous nature of this business, can be heard to say that his mistakes by which he furnishes a
customer the most deadly of drugs for those comparatively harmless is not, in and of itself, gross
negligence, and that of an aggravated form. (Smith's Admrx. vs. Middleton [1902], 56 L. R. A., 484.)
The rule of caveat emptor cannot apply to the purchase and sale of drugs. The vendor and the vendee do not stand
at arms length as in ordinary transactions. An imperative duty is on the druggist to take precautions to prevent death
or serious injury to anyone who relies on his absolute honesty and peculiar leaning. The nature of drugs is such that
examination would not avail the purchaser anything. It would be idle mockery for the customer to make an
examination of a compound of which he can know nothing. Consequently, it must be that the druggist warrants that
he will deliver the drug called for.
In civil cases, the druggist is made liable for any injury approximately resulting from his negligence. If B negligently
sells poison under the guise of a beneficial drug to A, he is liable for the injury done to A. In a case, which has
repeatedly been termed the leading case on the subject and which has been followed by the United States Supreme
Court, it was said, "Pharmacists or apothecaries who compound or sell medicines, if they carelessly label a poison
as a harmless medicine, and sent it so labeled into the market, are liable to all persons who, without fault on their
part, are injured by using it as such medicine, in consequence of the false label; the rule being that the liability in
such a case arises not out of any contract or direct privity between the wrong-doer and the person injured, but out of
the duty which the law imposes on him to avoid acts in their nature dangerous to the lives of others." (Nat. Savings
Bank vs. Ward [1879], 100 U. S., 195, following Thomas vs. Winchester [1852], 2 Seld. [N. Y.], 387.) In reality, for
the druggist, mistake is negligence and care is no defense. Throughout the criminal law, run the same rigorous
rules. For example, apothecaries or apothecary clerks, who are guilty of negligence in the sale of medicine when
death ensues in consequence, have been held guilty of manslaughter. (See Tessymond's Case [1828], 1 Lewin, C.
C., 169.)
Bearing these general principles in mind, and remembering particularly the care and skill which are expected of
druggist, that in some jurisdictions they are liable even for their mistake and in others have the burden placed upon
them to establish that they were not negligent, it cannot be that the Philippine Legislature intended to use the word
"fraudulent" in all its strictness. A plea of accident and mistake cannot excuse for they cannot take place unless
there be wanton and criminal carelessness and neglect. How the misfortune occurs is unimportant, if under all the
circumstances the fact of occurrence is attributed to the druggist as a legal fault. Rather considering the
responsibility for the quality of drugs which the law imposes on druggists and the position of the word "fraudulent" in
juxtaposition to "name," what is made unlawful is the giving of a false name to the drug asked for. This view is borne
out by Spanish translation, which we are permitted to consult to explain the English text. In the Spanish "supuesto"
is used, and this word is certainly not synonymous with "fraudulent." The usual badges of fraud, falsify, deception,
and injury must be present-but not scienter.
In view of the tremendous an imminent danger to the public from the careless sale of poisons and medicines, we do
not deem it too rigid a rule to hold that the law penalizes any druggist who shall sell one drug for another whether it
be through negligence or mistake.
The judgment of the lower court, sentencing the defendant to pay a fine of P100, with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency, and to pay the costs, is affirmed with the cost of this instance against the appellant, without
prejudice to any civil action which may be instituted. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Carson, Araullo, and Street, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-45179

March 30, 1937

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
BENJAMIN IRANG, ET AL., defendants.
BENJAMIN IRANG, appellant.
Conrado V. Sanchez for appellant.
Undersecretary of Justice Melencio for appellee.
VILLA-REAL, J.:
The accused Benjamin Irang appeals to this court from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija
finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime robbery with homicide, the robbery having been
committed in the house of Perfecto Melocotones and Maximiniana Melocotones, and sentencing him to the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P500, with the proportionate part of
the costs of the trial.
In support of his appeal the appellant assigns the following alleged errors as having been committed by the court a
quo in its decision in question, to wit:
1. The lower court erred in holding that the defendant Benjamin Irang had been sufficiently identified beyond
reasonable doubt, and in not giving due weight to the testimony of the witnesses for the defense.
2. The lower court erred in not acquitting the defendant Benjamin Irang on the ground of reasonable doubt.
The following undisputed facts have been established during the trial, to wit:
Between 7 and 8 o'clock of the night of November 9, 1935, seven individuals with white stripes upon their faces, two
of whom were armed with guns and two with bolos, went to the house of the spouses Perfecto Melocotones and
Maximiniana Vicente, where three lights were burning, one at the balcony, another in the room and another on a
table. Some of said individuals went up and others remained on guard downstairs. Those who went up approached
Perfecto Melocotones immediately and ordered him to bring his money. Melocotones answered in the affirmative but
before he could do what was ordered him he was attacked with bolos until he fell to the floor. Later another armed
with a gun went up and approaching Maximiana Vicente, wife of Perfecto Melocotones, struck herein the face with
the butt of his gun, making her lose consciousness momentarily. When she regained consciousness he saw her
husband already dead. One of the assailants then said to her: "Bring out the money and jewelry." Maximiniana
Vicente turned over to the man who had struck her with the butt of his gun P70 in cash and jewelry valued at P200,
which she has kept in a trunk. During the short space of time that she was turning over the money and jewelry, she
looked at the man's face and saw that he had pockmarks and a scar on his left eyelid. That same night the house of
Juana de la Cruz was assaulted by malefactors who had been firing shots before arriving at and going up the
house. All of them had white stripe upon their faces. Juana de la Cruz noticed that one of them had pockmarks and
a scar on the left eyelid and was dressed in a maong-colored suit. It was he who opened her trunk.
After the malefactors had left Perfecto Melocotones house, the latter's son Toribio Melocotones, who had seen the
assailants arrive but without recognizing them, immediately reported the matter to the municipal authorities and to
the constabulary, who went to the scene of the crime without loss of time. Maximiniana Vicente informed Lieutenant
Roman Alejandre of the Constabulary that the person who had struck her with the butt of his gun and taken her
money and jewelry was a man of regular statute, with a lean body and pockmarked face. With this description, said
lieutenant went in search of said individual. Having arrested a group of persons, he brought them to Maximiniana
Vicente's house so that the latter might identify among them the one who struck her with the butt of his gun, but she
did not find such man. Later another group was presented to her and in it she identified the herein accusedappellant Benjamin Irang as the one who had struck her with the butt of his gun and demanded delivery of her
money and jewelry. He was likewise the same man arrested by Lieutenant Alejandre at midnight on November 9,
1935, in the barrio of Tampac which is five or seven kilometers from Maturanoc to which he was taken and brought
to the house of the deceased. Juana de la Cruz also recognized Benjamin Irang, through his pockmarks and scar
on his left eyelid, as one of the men who had gone up to her house that same night. Once under arrest, the
accused-appellant Benjamin Irang made an affidavit in Tagalog (Exhibit B), stating that while he was in the barrio of
Tampac, municipality of Guimba. Province of Nueva Ecija, on November 9, 1935 at about 7 o'clock in the evening,
Fidel Estrella and Ignacio Sebastian arrived; that Fidel Estrella invited him to go to the house of Ignacio Sebastian's
brother-in-law named Angel Talens because Estrella had something to tell him; that upon arriving at Angel Talens'
house, Fidel Estrella invited him to go to Maturanoc to look for business; that the appellant asked Fidel Estrella why
he wanted to bring him in the latter told him to stop asking questions otherwise he would slash him with his bolo;
that Fidel Estrella carried a bolo and Ignacio Sebastian an unlicensed firearms; that they went to the house of
Perfecto Melocotones in the barrio of Maturanoc, Guimba, Nueva Ecija, and upon arriving there Fidel Estrella, who
acted as the ringleader, assigned to each and every one of them his corresponding place, designating those who

should assault that of Ursula Cabigon; that Benjamin Irang was in the group formed by Fidel Estrella and Ignacio
Sebastian, which assaulted the house of Perfecto Melocotones, having been assigned to stand guard on the stairs
of said house; that Fidel Estrella, once inside the house, slashed Perfecto Melocotones thrice with his bolo; that
Fidel Estrella later told him that they had succeeded in taking money and the shotgun; and that after the assault
they dispersed, each returning to his own home. This affidavit (Exhibit B) was sworn to by Benjamin Irang before the
deputy clerk of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija , in the presence of Graciano Pigol, the constabulary
soldier who accompanied him. Before Irang affixed his thumbmark and took his oath, the deputy clerk of court asked
him if he understood Tagalog and when he answered in the affirmative said deputy clerk read the contends of the
document to him. Asked whether he had any thing else to add thereto, the appellant answered that he had nothing
more to say.
The defense of the accused-appellant is an alibi to the effect that in the afternoon of the day of the commission of
the crime, he was in his rice field washing a fishing basket. There he met Roberto Alcantara. Later he went to the
house of Buenaventura Javier to return the fishing basket in question and to exercise on the rings (jugar a las
arogallas) with the latter's son Pedro, and two unmarried sons of the appellant's uncle, in the presence of several
persons, returning home at 8 o'clock that night. When he was arrested the constabulary soldiers opened his box but
found nothing in it. They later took him in a jitney to the victims house in the barrio of Maturanoc and upon being
brought face to face with the widow Maximiniana Vicente, Lieutenant Alejandre told the widow: "this is the one who
slashed your husband and punctured your face." The widow answered saying: "Is it that man, sir." As Benjamin
Irang answered that he had not left his house, the lieutenant gave him a blow which made him lose consciousness.
Then the lieutenant said to the widow: "He is the same man. It was he to whom you delivered the money and
jewelry. Look at him well. Identify him well." In the constabulary barracks in Cabanatuan the soldiers and a sergeant
manhandled him from the night of November 9, 1935, until 4 o'clock in the morning of the 11th of said month and
year, for having denied all knowledge of the crime, making him lose his breath and punching him in the stomach.
When he could no longer bear the maltreatment, he agreed to tell what they wanted him to tell. Upon being taken for
investigation, the constabulary soldiers told him to agree to all that the clerk of court might read to him, otherwise
they would again manhandle him at the barracks. He was not present when the affidavit Exhibit B was prepared.
Neither are the contents thereof true. He merely affixed his thumbmark upon said document for fear of the soldiers.
Lieutenant Alejandre as well as Sergeant Lubrico denied that the accused had been maltreated in the least.
The only question to be decided in the present appeal is whether or not the accused-appellant Benjamin Irang was
identified as one of those who assaulted the house of Perfecto Melocotones, killed him and robbed his wife
Maximiniana Vicente of money and jewelry.
Maximiniana Vicente, whom the accused-appellant Benjamin Irang struck in the face with the butt of his gun and of
whom he demanded delivery of her money and jewelry scrutinized the latter's face and notice that he had
pockmarks and a scar on his left eyelid. When on that same night of the assault Lieutenant Alejandre, guided by the
description given him by Maximiniana Vicente, went in search of the person who might have maltreated the latter
and robbed her of her money and jewelry and presented a group of persons to said Maximiniana Vicente, she said
that the man who had maltreated her was not among those who composed that first group. Said lieutenant later
presented another group to her but neither did the widow find in it the man who had struck her with the butt of his
gun. In the third group presented to her, she immediately pointed at one who turned out to be the herein accusedappellant. The man pointed at protested but when she told him that it was he who had struck her in the face with the
butt of his gun, the appellant became silent.
The testimony of Juana de la Cruz to the effect that her house, situated only about one hundred meters from that of
Perfecto Melocotones, was assaulted that same night by some malefactors with white stripes upon their faces, and
that one of them, with pockmarks on his face and a scar on his left eyelid and dressed in a maong-colored suit, who
later turned out to be the herein accused-appellant, opened her box, indirectly corroborates Maximiniana Vicente's
testimony that the man of the same description was the open who went to her house and demanded delivery of her
money and jewelry, having recognized him later to be the herein accused-appellant. While evidence of another
crime is, as a rule, not admissible in a prosecution for robbery, it is admissible when it is otherwise relevant, as
where it tends to identify defendant as the perpetrator of the robbery charged, or tends to show his presence at the
scene or in the vicinity of the crime at the time charged, or when it is evidence of a circumstance connected with the
crime (16, C. J., 610, 611, sec. 1196).
Maximiniana Vicente's identification of the herein accused-appellant is likewise corroborated by the latter's own
admission invited to assault the house of Perfecto Melocotones which they in fact the lower court of the appellant's
admission under oath upon the assumption that it was not made voluntarily, is erroneous, inasmuch as the only
evidence that it was not voluntarily is the accused-appellant's own testimony that he had been manhandled by the
constabulary soldiers and threatened with further maltreatment if he did not testify as they wished. This imputation of
fortune was categorically denied by Lieutenant Alejandre and Sergeant Lubrico of the Constabulary, before whom
the accused-appellant made the admission and who caused it to be put in writing. The imputation is likewise
contradicted by the deputy clerk of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija before whom the accused-appellant
swore to his admission and who testified that before he administered oath to said accused-appellant, he asked him
whether he understood Tagalog and, having been answered in the affirmative, he read said document to him and
asked him whether he had anything to add, the appellant affixing his thumbmark upon it after answering that he had
nothing more to say (U. S. vs. Zara, 42 Phil., 308). There is no doubt that an admission made under oath under
such circumstances cannot be considered involuntary and therefore is admissible against the person making it.

This court is of the opinion, therefore, that the accused-appellant identity as one of those who assaulted the house
of Perfecto Melocotones and robbed Maximiniana Vicente of her money and jewelry, is established conclusively
beyond reasonable doubt.
The defense of the accused is an alibi and has for its purpose to show that he could both have been at the scene of
the crime between 7 and 8 o'clock at night because he was in another place about seven kilometers away at that
time. This defense of alibi is contradicted by the above-stated testimony of Juana de la Cruz and by the accusedappellant's own admission under oath Exhibit B.
The facts established at the trial as committed by the accused-appellant beyond reasonable doubt constitute the
complex crime of robbery with homicide defined in article 293, in connection with article 294, paragraph 1, of the
Revised Penal Code, and punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Taking into consideration all the circumstances
of the case, the penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed by the trial judge is in accordance with the evidence and with
law. It is not so, however, with the pecuniary liability because, taking into account the gravity of the offense, the
indemnity to the heirs of the deceased should be P1,000 and that for the stolen goods not restored P390.
Wherefore, with the sole modification that the accused-appellant Benjamin Irang is sentenced further to indemnify
the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000 and to restore to Maximiniana Vicente the sum of P70 and the stolen
jewelry and gun, or to reimburse the value thereof in the amount of P390, the judgment appealed from is affirmed in
all other respects, with the costs of this instance to the appellant. So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Abad Santos, Imperial and Diaz, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions
LAUREL, J., dissenting:
I dissent.
The evidence presented by the prosecution consists in the main of (a) Exhibit B, which is alleged confession of the
appellant herein, (b) the testimony of Toribio Melocotones, son of the deceased, (c) the testimony of Juana de la
Cruz, (d) that the Lieut. Roman Alejandre of the Philippine Army, and (e) that of Maximiniana Vicente, widow of the
deceased.
In his affidavit, marked Exhibit B, the appellant admitted his participation in the commission of the crime charged.
This written confession was not given any value by the trial judge. According to the appellant, it was obtained from
him by an unknown soldier, through force and violence, under circumstances which makes it involuntary and,
therefore, inadmissible as proof of guilt (U. S. vs. Zara, 42 Phil., 308; People vs. Buda Singh, 45 Phil., 676;
Peoplevs. Takeo Tabuche, 46 Phil., 28; People vs. Guendo Nishishima, 57 Phil., 26; People vs. Francisco, 57 Phil.,
418).
Toribio Melocotones testified that he saw the band of seven robbers on their way to his father's house; that at that
time he did not know who they were but the he now knows five of them to be the accused Fidel Estrella, Jacinto
Sebastian, Ignacio Sebastian, Juan Levaste (alias Juan de Caste), and the appellant herein, Benjamin Irang; that he
saw the seven men enter the yard of his father's house, where he had planted himself; that the seven men entered
the house, one at a time, the smallest in the group, Fidel Estrella, first followed by a bigger man, the appellant
Benjamin Irang, then by Juan Levaste (alias Juan de Caste), by Jacinto Sebastian, by Ignacio Sebastian, and finally,
by the two members of the band who were unknown to him that as soon as they all had entered he followed them
but saw one of them standing guard and firing several shots, as a result of which he heard his brothers and sisters
shouting; that it was on that occasion when he came nearer the house but was seen by the guard who pointed a
gun at him and ran away. The trial judge brushed aside the testimony of this witness as unworthy of credence and
belief. He said:
. . . En primer lugar, cada uno de estos acusados fueron sucesivamente llevos a su casa y presentados alli
para ser reconocidos en dias y noches sucesivos. Sin embargo, dicho testigo no indico a ninguno de ellos
que fuera el que en la noche de autos asalto a su casa. Este testigo., no obstante, no fue llamado como tal
en la investigacion prelominarde esta causa en el Juzgado de Paz para indicar, de conformidad con los
detalles que he dado, que los acusados eran asaltaron su acsa. Es verdad que esta falta de explicacion no
es suficienta para desacreditar su testimonio. Este acusado es uno de los probatorio de su testimonio. Este
acusado es uno de los mas altos se entre to dos los acusados, por consiguente, no puede decirse que era
el mas pequeno. Aun admitiendo que el testimonio del testigo al hablar de que el primero que entro era el
mas pequeno se referia si volumen del individio. Fidel Estrella tampoco puede considerarse como el mas
flaco de entre los acusados. Es de cuerpo regular y se confunde casi como cualquiera de los otros
acusados en su volumen, a excepcion del acusado Emilio de Guzman, que es el mas grueso de entre los
mismos. Su testimonio, pues en opinion del Juzgado, no puede servir ni siquiera como un indicio de que los

acusados eran los ladrones que ni siquiera como un indicio de que los acusados eran los ladrones que
asaltaron su casa en la noche de autos. (underlining is mine.)
Juana de la Cruz testified that her house had also been assaulted by tulisanes on the same night and that she had
recognized the appellant as one of them. The testimony of this witness refers to an event wholly distinct and
separate from the criminal act imputed to the appellant in the case at bar, during the commission of which she
stated she was at her house about five meters away.
The testimony of Lieut. Alejandre refers to the investigation conducted by him and to posterior occurrences, of
scarcely any importance in proving the identity and guilt of the appellant. Lieut. Alejandre arrested the appellant on
the strength of the description furnished him by the widow of the deceased. How good the description is may be
judged from the fact that prior to the appellant's arrest, Lieut. Alejandre had arrested three other persons, later to
release them as "wrong parties!".
The only remaining basis for the conviction of the appellant by the lower court is the testimony of the widow,
Maximiniana Vicente. In the opinion of the trial court, this witness has sufficiently identified the appellant herein.
Lieut. Alejandre testified that when this witness, Maximiniana Vicente, confronted the defendant she recognized him
as one of the assaillants. This the appellant denied, stating that the widow identified him "in obedience to Lieut.
Alejandre's order." On cross-examination, the witness stated that she was able to identify the appellant "porque el
Teniente Alejandre le habia indicado que era uno de los que tomaron parte en el asalto de su casa." When called
again to the witness stand she retracted this statement. I am reluctant to join trial judge in attributing this
contradiction on her part merely to her ignorance.
Two important detail in this case deserve more than passing mention. It appears that soon after the band of robbers
had deported, Lieut. Alejandre arrived at the scene of the crime and conducted an investigation. The widow, on that
occasion referred to the appellant as a man with pockmarks. About one month later, she testified that she
recognized him besides by a scar on his left eyelid. A scar identifies a man more effectively than mere pockmarks,
these common. But I do not know why it took the witness one month to discover this important descriptive detail.
The widow also testified that she recognized the appellant, Irang, because of the light because it was he who hit her
with the butt of his gun and because it was to him that she delivered money and jewelry. It should be observed,
however, that the assaillants were disguised when they committed the crime. This makes identification difficult, if not
impossible, and probably accounts for the fact that the widow made no reference to the appellant's scar in the
beginning.
It is true that the finding of fact made by trial judge are entitled to great weight and credit and should not be
overturned unless grave considerations warrant the taking of such a course. But I am not convinced that appellant
has been satisfactorily identified in the case at bar (U. S. vs. Asio, 1 Phil., 304).
The defense interposed by the appellant is an alibi. While alibis are easily concocted and ,for this reason, are
received by court with great caution, I express the opinion that conviction should be predicated on the sufficiency of
the evidence for the prosecution and not on the weakness of the evidence for the defense. I am, therefore, of the
opinion that the appellant is entitled, like his six co-accused in the court below, to an acquittal.
Concepcion, J., concurs.