Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
employ the symbols of truth-functional and first-order logic. Students will be introduced to
the idea of formal derivations using natural deduction. They will also study the elements
of probability theory, a part of mathematics that creates almost as many philosophical
problems as it solves.
The Part IA logic course is in two parts, one on formal logic and one on philosophical
logic.
The notion of meaning is central to the philosophy of logic and to the philosophy of
language in general. The course covers the relationships between meaning and intention.
Is there a stable distinction to be drawn between analytic truths, which are true solely in
virtue of their meaning (e.g. All bachelors are unmarried) and synthetic truths, which
require the world to be a certain way (e.g. Most people die before the age of 80)? How is
this related to two others, that between necessary and contingent truths and that between
a priori and a posteriori truths?
SYLLABUS
Objectives
Students will be expected to:
1. Acquire a broad understanding of the scope and purpose of logic.
2. Learn how to symbolize natural language arguments using formal languages, and
how to test the resulting formalizations for correctness.
3. Begin studying philosophical issues in logic.
4. Develop their powers of philosophical analysis and argument through study of what
constitutes a valid argument.
Prerequisites
None
Preliminary Reading
For the idea of a formal logic:
Course Outline
GUTTENPLAN, Samuel, The Languages of Logic. 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1997).
This compulsory course aims to introduce students to some basic issues in the
philosophy of logic and language and to the idea of a formal logic. There is a complex
interplay between these informal and formal elements of the course. The key notion is the
idea of a valid argument (e.g. All men are mortal; Socrates is a man; so, Socrates is
mortal). Arguments can be constructed in English and in the various formal languages
which the logician invents, and formalised arguments are supposed to tell us something
about the corresponding English arguments. Hence we need to know what validity is and
why it is significant: are all good arguments valid? Are all valid arguments good? Validity
of English arguments is an imprecise and intuitive notion, but validity of arguments framed
in a formal language can be made precise.
For some philosophical reflection on logic-related matters, dip into the opening chapters
of :
SAINSBURY, R. Mark, Logical Forms (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991).
For a brisk overview of some issues both formal and philosophical see:
PRIEST, Graham, Logic: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2000). Also available online at:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/actrade/9780192893208.001.0001
Students will be introduced to two simple formal languages, those of truth-functional and
first-order logic, and shown how validity is defined for each. They will practise moving
between English and these languages, and they will reflect on the problems this
generates. This task will assist the understanding of philosophical writings, many of which
1
READING LIST
BEALL, J., and Greg RESTALL, 'Logical Consequence', in E.N. Zalta, ed., Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2009 Edition) [Online]. Available at:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logical-consequence (Accessed: 15 July 2014).
The following offer some alternative approaches to paraphrasing between formal and
natural languages:
FORBES, Graeme, Modern Logic: A Text in Elementary Symbolic Logic (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1994), chs. 2, 5 & 7.
GOLDFARB, Warren, Deductive Logic (Cambridge, MA: Hackett, 2003), sects. 1-8, 18-22
& 28-29.
SMITH, Peter, An Introduction to Formal Logic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2009), chs. 23-24 & 33-34.
TELLER, Paul, A Modern Formal Logic Primer (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall,
1989), vol. 1; ch. 2 & vol. 2; ch. 4. Also available online at:
http://tellerprimer.ucdavis.edu.
STEINHART, Eric, More Precisely: The Math You Need to Do Philosophy (Peterborough,
ON: Broadview Press, 2009), chs. 1 & 2.
The book's website is at: www.ericsteinhart.com/TOOLS/tools-resources.html. Some
further support materials and exercises can be found there.
PAPINEAU, David, Philosophical Devices (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), ch. 1.
Also available online at: www.dawsonera.com.
(B) Further Reading
Everyone could profit from looking at:
HODGES, Wilfrid, Logic (London: Penguin, 1977), sects. 30-33. [Another introductory
treatment of relations]
POLLOCK, John L., Technical Methods in Philosophy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press,
1990), ch. 1, sects. 1-3. [An alternative to Steinhart]
SMITH, Peter, An Introduction to Formal Logic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2009), ch. 32. [Helpful introduction to relations]
With the Important Warning in mind, students may sometimes wish to read beyond the
textbook. This article discusses the idea of logical consequence, going into a bit more
detail than sections 1-4 of forallx:
DEVLIN, Keith, The Joy of Sets. 2nd ed. (New York, NY: Springer, 1993), ch. 1.
HALMOS, P., Nave Set Story (New York, NY: Springer, 1974).
SAINSBURY, R. Mark, Logical Forms (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991; 2nd rev. ed. 2000), ch. 2,
especially sects. 4-8.
SMITH, Peter, An Introduction to Formal Logic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2003; 2009), chs. 7, 14 & 15.
STEINHART, Eric, More Precisely: The Math You Need to Do Philosophy (Peterborough,
ON: Broadview Press, 2009), ch. 5.
LEPORE, Ernest, Meaning and Argument (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), chs. 3, 4, 6 & 7.
JACKSON, Frank, 'Indicative Conditionals', in E. Craig, ed., Routledge Encyclopedia of
Philosophy [Online]. Available at: www.rep.routledge.com/article/X017 (Accessed:
15 July 2014).
GRICE, H. P., 'Logic and Conversation', in his Studies in the Way of Words (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), pp. 22-40. Reprinted in F. Jackson, ed.,
Conditionals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991). Also available on Camtools.
One of the deepest ideas that we meet in elementary logic is treatment of quantified
expressions (e.g. "everyone loves someone") with quantifiers and variables. For a brisk
reminder of the modern treatment, re-read the chapters on First-Order Logic from forallx.
We have Frege (and Peirce) to thank for realising that logic could be approached in this
way. For a hint at Frege's achievements, read:
6
ENGEL, Pascal, The Norm of Truth: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic (London:
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), 58-61, 86-91.
POTTER, Michael, Reason's Nearest Kin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp. 6264 [starting half-way down p. 62]. Also available online at:
www.oxfordscholarship.com.
The landmark explanation of Frege's achievement is hard to read, but worth it:
DUMMETT, Michael, Frege: Philosophy of Language (London: Duckworth, 1973; 2nd ed.
1981), ch. 2, especially pp.9-22. Also available on Camtools. Reprinted in R.I.G.
Hughes, ed., A Philosophical Companion to First-Order Logic (Indianapolis, IN:
Hackett, 1993).
One of the most startling deployments of the use of quantifiers and variables is in
Russell's Theory of Descriptions. This is sometimes regarded as the paradigm of analytic
philosophy. Russell first presented his Theory of Descriptions in On Denoting, Mind, 14
(1905): 479-93. But this is a much more accessible explanation:
RUSSELL, Bertrand, Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy (London: Allen and Unwin,
1919), ch. 16. Reprinted in P. Ludlow, ed., Readings in the Philosophy of Language
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997); also in G. Ostertag, ed., Definite Descriptions:
A Reader (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998), ch. 3; and in A. P. Martinich, ed.,
The Philosophy of Language (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).
The following is an excellent analysis of Russell's arguments:
SAINSBURY, R. Mark, 'Philosophical Logic', in A. Grayling, ed., Philosophy 1: A Guide
through the Subject (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), sects. 2.1-2.3.
The next stage in the discussion of variables and quantifiers considers how we should
understand quantification. This is a difficult topic, and before going in, you need to make
sure you really understand the semantics for quantifiers presented in forallx. One of the
foremost defenders of substitutional quantification was Ruth Barcan Marcus, and this is a
clear introduction to her reasons for favouring it.
MARCUS, Ruth Barcan, 'Interpreting Quantification', Inquiry, 5 (1962): 252-59.
After reading this, take a look at two fairy light surveys of the options:
ENGEL, Pascal, The Norm of Truth: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Logic (London:
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), pp. 76-86.
HAACK, Susan, Philosophy of Logics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978),
ch. 4, sects. 1 & 3. Also available online at:
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511812866.
You should also read the classic debate between Russell and Strawson:
STRAWSON, Peter, 'On Referring', Mind, 59 (1950): 320-44. Reprinted in his LogicoLinguistic Papers (London: Methuen, 1971); and in G. Ostertag ed., Definite
Descriptions: A Reader (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998); also in A. P. Martinich
and D. Sosa, eds., Analytic Philosophy: An Anthology (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001).
RUSSELL, Bertrand, 'Mr Strawson on Referring', Mind, 66 (1957): 385-89.
The debate surrounding Russell's Theory continues, with the following landmarks:
DONNELLAN, Keith, 'Reference and Definite Description', Philosophical Review, 75
(1966): 281-304. Reprinted in P. Ludlow, ed., Readings in the Philosophy of
Language (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997); also in G. Ostertag, ed., Definite
Descriptions: A Reader (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998); and in A. P. Martinich,
ed., The Philosophy of Language (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).
KRIPKE, Saul, 'Speaker's Reference and Semantic Reference', Midwest Studies in
7
The classic empiricist view is that necessity, analyticity and a priori come as a single
package. For a defense of this view, see:
AYER, A. J., 'The a Priori', in his Language, Truth and Logic. 2nd ed. (London: Gollancz,
1946). Reprinted in P.K. Moser, ed., A Priori Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1987).
8
KRIPKE, Saul, 'A Priori Knowledge, Necessity, and Contingency', in P.K. Moser, ed., A
Priori Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), ch. 7. [Excerpt of his
Naming and Necessity]
For discussion, try:
AHMED, Arif, Saul Kripke (London: Continuum, 2007), ch. 3. Also available online at:
http://lib.myilibrary.com/?id=327232.
CASULLO, Albert, 'Kripke on the a Priori and the Necessary', Analysis, 37 (1977): 15259.
PAPINEAU, David, Philosophical Devices: Proofs, Probabilities, Possibilities, and Sets,
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), ch.6. Also available online at:
www.dawsonera.com.
You might also want to look at this wide-ranging textbook treatment:
GRAYLING, A.C., An Introduction to Philosophical Logic. 3rd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell,
1997), ch. 3.
(B) Further Reading
WALKER, Ralph, ed., Kant on Pure Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982).
[Essays by Parsons and Hopkins]
VAN CLEVE, James, Problems from Kant (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), ch. 2.
Also available online at: www.dawsonera.com.
9
10