3. Tests a.

BUT FOR
SALUD VDA. DE BATACLAN vs. MARIANO MEDINA,
1. On September 1952, Bus No. 30 of the Medina Transportation, owned by Mariano, left
the town of Cavite on its way to Pasay City, driven by, Conrado Saylon.
2. There were about eighteen passengers and among them Juan Bataclan.
3. At about 2:00 o'clock a.m., while the bus was running, one of the front tires burst and
the vehicle began to zig-zag until it fell into a ditch.
4. Some of the passengers, after they had clambered up to the road, heard groans and
moans from the four passengers inside the bus, particularly from Juan Bataclan.
5. There is nothing in the evidence to show that the free passengers including the driver
and the conductor, made any attempt to rescue the four passengers trapped inside
bus.
6. Subsequently, about ten men, one of them carrying a lighted torch. These men
presumably approach the overturned bus, and almost immediately, a fierce fire
started, burning the bus including the four passengers trapped inside causing the the
death of Juan Bataclan and other passengers.
7. By reason of his death, his widow, Salud Villanueva, in her name and in behalf of her
five minor children, filed a suit to recover from Mariano Medina damages in the total
amount of P87K.
8. CFI ruled in favor of the plaintiff awarding 1K plus P600 as attorney's fee, plus P100,
the value of the merchandise being was lost in the fire.
9. The plaintiffs and the defendants appealed to the CA, but CA endorsed the appeal to
SC because of the value involved in the claim in the complaint.
ISSUE: Whether Medina transportation is liable
HELD: Yes. SC agreed with the ruling of trial court because the case involves a breach
of contract of transportation for hire. The evidence also shows that at the time of the
blow out, the bus was speeding and failed to apply the brakes to stop the bus.
There is no question that under the circumstances, the defendant carrier is liable. A
satisfactory definition of proximate cause is found in Volume 38, pages 695-696 of
American jurisprudence. It is as follows: 'that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which
the result would not have occurred.'

In the present case, under the circumstances SC held that the proximate cause was the
overturning of the bus for the reason that:
1. the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back caused the leaking
of the gasoline from the tank which was not unnatural or unexpected;
2. that the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help
and because it was dark, made not only by the passengers, but most probably, by the
driver and the conductor themselves;
3. that said rescuers innocently approach the vehicle to extend the aid and effect the
rescue requested from them;
4. and that the burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the negligence of the
carrier, because they must have known the area where the gasoline could and must
have leaked;

Application of But For Test

1. The injury would not have occurred if not for the defendant's negligent act.

b. Sufficient Link
Dy Teban vs Jose Ching/Liberty Forest Inc. and Limbaga
1. Rogelio Ortiz, was driving a Nissan van, owned by petitioner Dy Teban Trading, Inc.,
along with Romeo Catamora. They were roaming around nearby barangays and
municipalities delivering commercial ice.
2. On the opposite lane towards, a Joana Paula passenger bus was cruising.

3. In between the two vehicles

was a parked prime mover with a trailer in between the

two vehicles owned by Liberty Forest, Inc. as the trailer suffered a tire blow-out.
Cresilito Limbaga, driver of the primer rover parked it askew occupying a substantial
portion of the national highway.

4. The

prime mover was not equipped with triangular reflectorized plates. As a

substitute, Limbaga placed a Banana Trunk with leaves as an early warning device to
warn incoming motorists. It is alleged that helikewise placed kerosene lighted tin cans
near the trailer.

5. To avoid hitting the parked prime mover , the incoming passenger bus swerved to the
right approaching Nissan van.
6. Ortiz saw two bright and glaring headlights and the approaching passenger bus. He
swerved to the left to avoid collision with the bus but the van hit the front of
stationary prime mover.
7. The passenger bus hit the rear of the prime mover.
8. Ortiz and Catamora only suffered minor injuries. The Nissan van, however, became
inoperable as a result of the incident.
9. Subsequently, Dy Teban (owner of the Nissan van) filed a complaint for damages
against the owner of the prime mover and driver.

10.

RTC rendered a decision in favor of Dy Teban Trading. On appeal, the Decision was
reversed by the CA. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the skewed parking is the proximate cause.

HELD: Yes. The skewed parking of the prime mover was the proximate cause of the
collision plus the fact that Limbaga did not put lighted kerosene tin cans on the front and
rear of the prime move.
According to SC, there must be a sufficient link between the act or omission and the
damage or injury. That link must not be remote or far-fetched; otherwise, no liability will
attach. The damage or injury must be a natural and probable result of the act or
omission.

In the case at bar, Private respondents Liberty Forest, Inc. and Limbaga are liable for all
damages that resulted from the skewed parking of the prime mover. Limbaga was utterly
negligent in parking the prime mover askew while Liberty Forest, Inc. was negligent in in
ensuring that the prime mover was in proper condition as well as in supervising Limbaga.

c. Substantial Factor Test

Philippine Rabbit vs IAC
1. On the eve of Christmas 1966, seven passengers boarded a jeepney bound for
Pangasinan via Dau.
2. Manalo drove the jeep owned by Magune and Carreon.
3. When they reached Tarlac, the right wheel of the jeep was detached resulting to its
180 degree turn invading the other lane with the jeeps front facing south.
4. The bus driven by Delos Reyes collided with the jeepney resulting in the death of
three passengers and physical injuries to some.
5. Manalo was convicted of Multiple Homicide and Serious Physical Injuries.
6. Three Civil Cases for Damages was filed anchored on the contractual liability of the
jeepney owner and Philippine Rabbits liability based on quasidelict.
7. Trial court also decided against the jeepney operator as well as the joint liability of his
Insurance Agency. The decision of the trial court is based from the testimonies of the
other passageners.
8. On Appeal, CA reversed the decision of trial court. It ordered Plaintiff bus operator and
driver to pay jointly and severally the damages awarded. It based its decisions
primarily on 1.) the doctrine of last clear chance; 2.) presumption of the responsibility
of the vehicle on the rear end to avoid collision; 3.) the substantial test concluding
Bus driver negligent by not making an effort to avoid accident.
9. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether Philippine Rabbit and the driver are liable for negligence?
Held: No. The proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of the jeepney
operator for failure to exercise precautions needed. Negligence was proven based on the
testimony-evidences adduced by the trial court.
According to SC, the substantial factor test is testing whether the actors conduct is a
substantial factor in bringing about harm to another. The fact that the actor neither
foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of harm or manner in which the event
occurred does not prevent his liability. However, this test does not apply in the instant
case. The court does not fault Delos Reyes for not having avoided such since no other
options are available to him. The other lane even though empty was narrow and covered
with tall grass.

Also, last clear chance cannot be applied. It does not aride where a passenger demands
responsibility under culpa contractual. A negligent driver and its owner cannot be
exempted on the ground that the other party was likewise guilty of negligence.
IAC decision is set aside. The Trial Court decision is reinstated.

d. Mixed Considerations
Dy Teban vs Jose Ching/Liberty Forest Inc. and Limbaga
11. Rogelio Ortiz, was driving a Nissan van, owned by petitioner Dy Teban Trading, Inc.,
along with Romeo Catamora. They were roaming around nearby barangays and
municipalities delivering commercial ice.
12.

On the opposite lane towards, a Joana Paula passenger bus was cruising.

13.

In between the two vehicles was a parked prime mover with a trailer in between
the two vehicles owned by Liberty Forest, Inc. as the trailer suffered a tire blow-out.
Cresilito Limbaga, driver of the primer rover parked it askew occupying a substantial
portion of the national highway.

14.

The prime mover was not equipped with triangular reflectorized plates. As a
substitute, Limbaga placed a Banana Trunk with leaves as an early warning device to
warn incoming motorists. It is alleged that helikewise placed kerosene lighted tin cans
near the trailer.

15. To avoid hitting the parked prime mover , the incoming passenger bus swerved to
the right approaching Nissan van.
16. Ortiz saw two bright and glaring headlights and the approaching passenger bus. He
swerved to the left to avoid collision with the bus but the van hit the front of
stationary prime mover.
17.

The passenger bus hit the rear of the prime mover.

18. Ortiz and Catamora only suffered minor injuries. The Nissan van, however, became
inoperable as a result of the incident.
19. Subsequently, Dy Teban (owner of the Nissan van) filed a complaint for damages
against the owner of the prime mover and driver.

20.

RTC rendered a decision in favor of Dy Teban Trading. On appeal, the Decision was
reversed by the CA. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the skewed parking is the proximate cause of the collision.

HELD: Yes. Limbaga was utterly negligent in parking the prime mover askew while
Liberty Forest, Inc. was negligent in in ensuring that the prime mover was in proper
condition as well as in supervising Limbaga.
In the case at bar, Private respondents Liberty Forest, Inc. and Limbaga are liable for all
damages that resulted from the skewed parking of the prime mover which was the
proximate cause of the accident.
According to SC, there is no exact mathematical formula to determine proximate cause.
It is based upon mixed considerations of logic, common sense, policy and precedent.
Their liability includes those damages resulting from precautionary measures taken by
other motorist in trying to avoid collision with the parked prime mover. Ortiz obviously
would not have swerved if not for the passenger bus abruptly occupying his vans lane.

e. Cause v Condition
Phoenix Construction vs. IAC
1. During the Martial Law period, Dionisio, was driving home from a dinner meeting
where he had a shot or two of liquor.
2. While driving down the street, his headlights were turned off. When he switched on
his headlights to, he suddenly saw a Ford dump truck some 2 meters away from his
Volkswagen car.
3. The dump truck is by and registered in the name Phoenix Construction Inc. was
parked facing the oncoming traffic and in such a manner that it is partly blocking the
way of oncoming traffic. There were also no lights nor reflector devices set anywhere
near the dump truck. The dump truck was parked by Carbonel, Phoneixs regular
driver.
4. Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid but it was too late and his car smashed into the
dump truck. As a result, hesuffered some physical injuries, a "nervous breakdown"
and loss of two gold bridge dentures.
5. Dionisio commenced an action for damages in the CFI claiming that the legal and
proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent manner in which Carbonel had
parked the dump truck.
6. Phoenix and Carbonel, on the other hand, countered that the proximate cause of
Dionisio's injuries was his own recklessness in driving fast at the time of the accident,
while under the influence of liquor, without his headlights on and without a curfew
pass.
7. CFI rendered judgement in favor of Dionisio and order Phoneix and Carbonel to pay
damages.
8. On appeal, CA affirmed the decision of the CFI but modified the award of damages.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the parking of the Truck is the proximate cause of the accident.

HELD: YES. According to SC, the true legal and proximate cause of the accident was the
way in which the dump truck had been parked.
There are four factual issues that need to be looked into:
1. Fisrt, Dionisio has no curfew pass.
2. Second, whether or not Dionisio was speeding home that night without any headlights
3. Third, Dionisio purposely turned off his headlights, and when he on it, it malfunctioned, and
when he succeeded in switching it on again, it was already a split seconds before contact with
the dump truck.
4. Fourth, the evidence showed that Dionisio smelled of liquor at the time he was taken from his
smashed car

The petitioners, however, urge that the truck driver's negligence was merely a "passive
and static condition" and that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was an "efficient
intervening cause and that consequently Dionisio's negligence must be regarded as the
legal and proximate cause of the accident rather than the earlier negligence of Carbonel.
However, according to SC, the distinctions between "cause" and "condition" which the
have already been "almost entirely discredited."
Professors and Keeton make this quite clear:
"Cause" and "condition" still find occasional mention in the decisions; but the distinction
is now almost entirely discredited. So far as it has any validity at all, it must refer to the
type of case where the forces set in operation by the defendant have come to rest in a
position of apparent safety, and some new force intervenes. But even in such cases, it is
not the distinction between "cause" and "condition" which is important but the nature of
the risk and the character of the intervening cause
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY vs. SOTERO REMOQUILLO et al and the COURT OF
APPEALS (May 18, 1956)
1. Sometime in 1950, Efren Magno went to the 3-story house of Antonio Pealoza, his
stepbrother in Manila, to repair a media agua that is in a leaking condition. The
media agua was just below the window of the third story.
2. Standing on said media agua, Magno received from his son thru that window a 3 X
6 galvanized iron sheet to cover the leaking portion. In doing so, the iron sheet came
into contact with the electric wire of the Manila Electric Company causing the death of
Magno by electrocution.
3. His widow and children filed a suit to recover damages from the company.
4. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of his widow and children and ordered the
company to pay P10K - compensatory damages; P784 - actual damages; P2K-moral
and exemplary damages and 3K-attorneys fees, with costs.
5.

On appeal, the CA latter affirmed the judgment of trial court but reduced the
attorneys fees from to 1K.

6. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Were the acts of Magno the proximate or the remote cause of the incident.
HELD: Magnos acts were the proximate cause. It is clear that the principal and
proximate cause of the electrocution was not the electric wire, evidently a remote cause,
but rather the reckless and negligent act of Magno in turning around and swinging the
galvanized iron sheet without taking any precaution. Magno was expected, as a person
who is deemed a professional in his line of work, to have looked back toward the street
and at the wire to avoid contacting with the iron sheet, the same being length of 6 feet.
According to SC, A prior and remote cause cannot be made the basis of an action if such
remote cause did nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by
which the injury was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote
cause and the injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury,
even though such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If
no danger existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, such
condition was not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective
condition sets into operation the circumstances which result in injury because of the prior
defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause.
Furthermore, the owner of the house disregarded a city ordinance, building the media
agua less than 3 feet distance between a building and the electric pole. The electric
company cannot be expected to be always on the lookout for any illegal construction.
However, in the present case, the violation of the permit for the construction of the
"media agua" was not the direct cause of the accident. It merely contributed to it.

Rodrigueza vs. Manila Railroad Co.

1. Manila Railroad Co. operates a line through the district of Daraga.
2. As one of its trains passed over the line, sparks were emitted from the smokestack of
the locomotive, and fire was communicated to four houses nearby, and they were
entirely consumed.
3. All of these houses were of light construction except that of Rodriguezs, which was of
strong materials, though the roof was covered with nipa and cogon.
4. The fire occurred immediately after the passage of the train, and a strong wind was
blowing it. It doesnt appear whose house caught fire first, though Manila railroad
claimed that it was first communicated to Rodriguezs house and spread to the others.
5. The Rodriguezs claim that Manila Railroad was negligent in the following manners:
a. in failing to exercise proper supervision over the employees in charge of the
locomotive;
b. in allowing the locomotive which emitted these sparks to be operated without
having the smokestack protected;

c. in using in its locomotive Bataan fuel, a fuel of known inferior quality which
upon combustion, producessparks in great quanity.
6. Manila Railroad, on the other hand, argued that Rodriguezs house stood partly within
the limits of the land owned by it. It also claimed that they notified the Rodriguezs to
get their house off the land of the company but that Rodrigueza did not comply.
Issue: Who should be liable?
Held: Manila Railroad should be liable. Whether or not the fire may have been
communicated through Rodriguezs house, or directly from the locomotive is immaterial.
With regard to the position of Rodriguezs house, there is no proof that Rodrigueza
unlawfully intruded upon the railroads property in the act of building his house.
Rodriguez cannot be held to have assumed the risk of any damage that might result from
the unlawful negligent acts of Manila Railroad.
According to SC, the circumstances cannot be imputed to Rodriguez as contributory
negligence destructive of his right of action because:
a) that condition was not created by himself,
b) his house remained on the ground by toleration and therefore with the consent of
the Railroad co., and
c) even supposing the house to be improperly there, this fact would not justify the
defendant company in negligently destroying it

f. Last Clear Chance

Picart vs Smith
1. Picart was riding on his pony over Carlatan Bridge in La Union. Smith approached
from the opposite direction, driving a car.
2. Before he had gotten half way across the bridge, Smith saw Picart and blew his horn
to give warning of his approach as Picart was on the wrong side of the road. He
continued his course and gave two more successive blasts.
3. Picart saw the automobile coming and heard the blowing of horn. However, being
worried by the rapid approach of Smith, he pulled the pony closely up against the
railing on the right side of the bridge as he did not have sufficient time to go to the
left side.
4. Smith assumed that Picart would move to the other side but he did not and even
continued to approach directly toward the horse without slowing down.
5. When Smith had gotten near, there being then no possibility of the horse getting
across to the other side, he quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right to avoid
hitting the pony.

6. But his car passed in such close proximity to the pony that it became frightened and
turned its body across the bridge, got hit by the car and broke its limb.
7. The horse fell and Picart was thrown off with some violence. As a result of its injuries
the horse eventually died. Picart received contusions which caused temporary
unconsciousness and required medical attention for several days.
8. CFI of La Union absolved Smith from liability. Picart appealed.
Issue: Whether the doctrine of last clear chance is attributable to Smith.
HELD: Yes. Smith is negligent and liable under the doctrine of last clear chance even
though the plaintiff was on the wrong side of the bridge. Smith had the opportunity to
avoid the accident after realizing that the negligence by the plaintiff could not have
placed him in a position of better safety.
The last clear chance was passed unto the defendant driving the automobile. It was his
duty to bring the car to an immediate stop or upon seeing no other persons were on the
bridge to take the other side and pass far away from the pony to avoid collision. Instead
of doing this, Smith ran straight on until he was almost upon the horse.
Under the circumstances, the law is that the person who has the last clear chance to
avoid the impending harm and fails to do is chargeable with the consequences, without
reference to the prior negligence of the other party. The Supreme Court reversed the
judgment of the lower court, and rendered judgment that Picart recover of Smith the sum
of P200, with costs of both instances.
Separate Opinion: MALCOLM, J., concurring: After mature deliberation, I have finally decided to
concur with the judgment in this case. I do so because of my understanding of the "last clear chance"
rule of the law of negligence as particularly applied to automobile accidents. This rule cannot be
invoked where the negligence of the plaintiff is concurrent with that of the defendant. Again, if a
traveler when he reaches the point of collision is in a situation to extricate himself and avoid injury,
his negligence at that point will prevent a recovery. But Justice Street finds as a fact that the
negligent act of the interval of time, and that at the moment the plaintiff had no opportunity to avoid
the accident. Consequently, the "last clear chance" rule is applicable. In other words, when a traveler
has reached a point where he cannot extricate himself and vigilance on his part will not avert the
injury, his negligence in reaching that position becomes the condition and not the proximate cause of
the injury and will not preclude a recovery.>

Bustamante vs. Court Of Appeals

1. A bus was traversing an inclined road. From 30 meters away, the bus diver saw a
truck, carrying sand and gravel, fast approaching with its front wheels wiggling.
2. The bus driver also observed that the truck was heading towards his lane. Not
minding this circumstance and believing that truck driver was merely joking, the bus
driver shifted from 4th to 3rd gear to gain more power and speed in order to overtake a
Kubota hand tractor being pushed by a person along the highway.
3. All of this happened while the truck was descending and the bus was ascending the
inclined part of the road.

4. Unfortunately, a collision happened between the two trucks. Due to the impact,
several passengers of the bus were thrown out and died as a result of the injuries
they sustained.
5. Their heirs sued the respective owners and drivers of both the bus company and the
truck.
6. The trial concluded that the negligent acts of both drivers contributed to or combined
with each other in directly causing the accident, thus the liability of the two drivers for
their negligence is solidary.
7. On Appeal, the CA, absolved the owner and driver of the truck based on the doctrine
of last clear chance, saying that the bus driver had the last clear chance to avoid the
accident and that it is his negligence which was the proximate cause of mishap.
Issue: Whether or not the doctrine of last clear chance is correctly applied.
Held: NO. The doctrine of Last Clear Chance is not applicable. The principle of last clear
chance applies in a suit between the owners and drivers of colliding vehicles. It does not
arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier to enforce its
contractual obligations. For it will be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver and its
owners on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence.
In the case at bar, it is not a suit between the owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles
but a suit brought by the heirs of the deceased passengers against both owners and
drivers of the colliding vehicles. Therefore, the doctrine is not applicable.
The doctrine of last clear chance, stated broadly, is thatthe negligence of the plaintiff
does not preclude recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it appears that the
defendant, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might have avoided injurious
consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the plaintiff's negligence. In other words,
the doctrine of last clear chance means that even though a person's own acts may have
placed him in a position of peril, and an injury results, the injured person is entitled to
recovery.

Phoenix Construction vs. IAC

1. During the Martial Law period, Dionisio, was driving home from a dinner meeting
where he had a shot or two of liquor.
2. While driving down the street, his headlights were turned off. When he switched on
his headlights to, he suddenly saw a Ford dump truck some 2 meters away from his
Volkswagen car.

3. The dump truck is by and registered in the name Phoenix Construction Inc. was
parked facing the oncoming traffic and in such a manner that it is partly blocking the
way of oncoming traffic. There were also no lights nor reflector devices set anywhere
near the dump truck. The dump truck was parked by Carbonel, Phoneixs regular
driver.
4. Dionisio claimed that he tried to avoid but it was too late and his car smashed into the
dump truck. As a result, hesuffered some physical injuries, a "nervous breakdown"
and loss of two gold bridge dentures.
5. Dionisio commenced an action for damages in the CFI claiming that the legal and
proximate cause of his injuries was the negligent manner in which Carbonel had
parked the dump truck.
6. Phoenix and Carbonel, on the other hand, countered that the proximate cause of
Dionisio's injuries was his own recklessness in driving fast at the time of the accident,
while under the influence of liquor, without his headlights on and without a curfew
pass.
7. CFI rendered judgement in favor of Dionisio and order Phoneix and Carbonel to pay
damages.
8. On appeal, CA affirmed the decision of the CFI but modified the award of damages.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUES: Whether the last clear chance doctrine should be applied, therefore exculpating
Phoenix from paying damages.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court held that private respondent Dionisio's negligence was
"only contributory," that the "immediate and proximate cause" of the injury remained the
truck driver's "lack of due care" and that consequently Dionisio may recover damages
though are subject to mitigation by the courts.
With regard to damages, considering the contributory negligence of Dionisio, the court
believes that the demands of substantial justice are satisfied by allocating the damages
on a 20-80 ratio. Thus, 20% of the Dionisio; only the balance of 80% needs to be paid by
petitioners.
(Additional Information: The historical function of that doctrine of last clear chance was to
mitigate the harshness of another common law doctrine of contributory negligence. The
common law rule of contributory negligence prevented any recovery at all by a plaintiff who was
also negligent, even if the plaintiff's negligence was relatively minor as compared with the
NOTE: The law concepts of last clear chance and contributory negligence are counterintuitive. Interestingly, contributory negligence in our jurisdiction does not mean that the plaintiff
can no longer recover, but while he may recover, the liability of person ultimately responsible is
mitigated. This is clearly visible from our treatment of contributory negligence in Art. 2179,
which states:
Art. 2179. When the plaintiff's own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his
injury, he cannot recover damages. But if his negligence was only contributory, the immediate

and proximate cause of the injury being the defendant's lack of due care, the plaintiff may
recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded.

Glan Peoles Lumber And Hardware vs. IAC

1. Engineer Calibo was driving a Davao city-bound jeep owned by the Bacnotan
Consolidated Industries, Inc. Also aboard the jeep were Rorane and Patos.
2. On the other hand, a cargo truck driven by Paul Zacarias and loaded with cement
bags, GI sheets and plywood was coming from the opposite direction.
3.

Just after the cargo truck went across a bridge, it collided with the jeep and as a
consequence, Engineer Calibo died while Roranes and Patos sustained physical
injuries. Zacarias was unhurt.

4. As a result of the impact, the left side of the truck was slightly damaged while the left
side of the jeep, , was extensively damaged.
5. A civil suit was filed by the wife of Calibo against Zacarias and the owner of the truck
(Bacnotan Consolidated)
6. The lower court dismissed the case, and accepted the argument that even if there
was negligence on the part of Zacarias, Calio had the last clear chance to avoid the
accident.
7. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision on the ground that Zacarias saw the jeep
already at about 150 meters and Zacarias did not have a drivers license at the time
of the incident.
8. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether last clear chance is attributable to Calio.
HELD: YES. The evidence indicates that it was Engineer Calibos negligence that was
the proximate cause of the accident.
Assuming there was antecedent negligence on the part of Zacarias, Calibo had the last
clear chance to avoid the accident. Both drivers had a full view of each other's vehicle
from a distance of one hundred fifty meters. Both vehicles were travelling at a speed of
approximately thirty kilometers per hour. The survivors of the jeep also admitted that the
truck was already at a full stop when they collided with it.
The logical conclusion is that the driver of the jeep had the last clear chance to avoid the
accident, while at that distance of thirty meters away from the truck, by stopping or
swerving his jeep away from the truck, either of
which he had sufficient time to do while running at a speed of only thirty kilometers per
hour.

Pantranco vs. Baesa

1. In the morning of June 1981, spouses Ceasar and Marilyn Baesa and their three
children, along with spouses David Iand Fe Ico and their son, and seven other
persons, were onboard a passenger jeepney on their way to Isabela, to celebrate the
spouses Baesas fifth wedding .
2. When the jeepney was already on the highway, a speeding PANTRANCO bus, driven
by Ramirez, encroached on the jeepney'slane and collided with it.
3. David Ico, spouses Ceasar Baesa and Marilyn Baesa and two of their children, died
while the rest of the passengers sustained injuries.
4. The jeepney is extensively damaged. The driver of the bus went into hiding, and has
never been seen since.
5. Maricar Baesa through her guardian and Fe O. Ico filed separate actions for damages
arising from quasi-delict against PANTRANCO.
6. In their defense, PANTRANCO, pointed the late David Ico's alleged negligence as the
proximate cause of the accident, and invoked the defense of due diligence in the
selection and supervision of its driver
7. RTC rendered a decision in favor of Maricar and Fe.
8. On appeal, CA affirmed. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether Can PANTRANCO can invoke the defense of Last Clear Chance.
HELD: No. The doctrine of "last clear chance" finds no application in this case. For the
doctrine to be applicable, it is necessary to show that the person who had the last
opportunity to prevent the accident was aware of the existence of the peril or should,
with exercise of due care, have been aware of it.
In this case, there is nothing to show that the jeepney driver David Ico knew of the
impending danger. When he saw at a distance that the approaching bus was encroaching
on his lane, he did not immediately swerve the jeepney since he must have assumed
that the bus driver will return to its own lane upon seeing the jeepney approach from the
opposite direction. At the time David Ico must have realized that the bus was not
returning to its own lane, it was already too late to swerve the jeepney to his right to
prevent an accident.
The Court held that the last clear chance doctrine can never apply where the party
charged is required to act instantaneously, and if the injury cannot be avoided by the
application of all means at hand after the peril is or should have been discovered.

Philippine Bank of Commerce vs. CA

1. Rommel's Marketing Corporation (RMC) maintained two separate current accounts
with the Pasig Branch of PBCom in connection with its business of selling appliances.
2. From May 5, 1975 to July 16, 1976, Romeo Lipana, RMCs GM, claims to have
entrusted RMC funds in the to his secretary, Irene Yabut, for the purpose of depositing
said funds to RMCs account with PBCom.
3. It turned out, that these deposits were not credited to RMC's account but were
instead deposited to the PBCom account of Yabut'shusband, Bienvenido.
4. Irene Yabut would accomplish two copies of the deposit slip, an original and a
duplicate. The original showed the name of her husband as depositor and his current
account number. On the duplicate copy was written the account number of her
husband but the name of the account holder was left blank.
5. PBC's teller, Azucena, would validate and stamp both the original and the duplicate of
these deposit slips retaining only the original copy despite the lack of information.
6. The second copy was kept by Irene Yabut. After validation, Yabut would then fill up the
name of RMC in the space left blank in the duplicate copy and change the account
number written thereon and make it appear to be RMC's account number.
7. Unfortunately, it was never the practice of Romeo Lipana to check these monthly
statements reposing complete trust and confidence to PBCom and to his secretary.
8. Upon discovery of the loss of its funds, RMC demanded from petitioner bank the
return of its money.
9. RTC held that PBCom and Azucena Mabayad jointly and severally liable
10. CA affirmed with modification deleting awards of exemplary damages and
attorney's fees.
11.

Hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether the doctrine of last clear chance is attributable to PBCom and its teller.
Held: Yes. Under the doctrine of "last clear chance", where both parties are negligent,
but the negligent act of one is appreciably later in time than that of the other, or when it
is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence should be attributed to the incident,
the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm and failed to do
so is chargeable with the consequences thereof.
In this case, assuming that private respondent RMC was negligent in entrusting cash to a
dishonest employee, the bank, thru its teller, had the last clear opportunity to avert the
injury by faithfully observing their self-imposed validation procedure.

Considering, however, that the fraud was committed in a span of more than one (1) year
covering various deposits, it cannot be denied that RMC was likewise negligent in not
checking its monthly statements of account. Such omission by RMC is to be considered
contributory negligence on its part. Therefore the SC held that in the award of actual
damages, RMC shall shoulder 40% of the loss, while PBComshall pay 60% of the loss.

Ong vs. Metropolitan Water District

1. Metropolitan Water District owns and operates three swimming pools in Quezon City.
It allows the public to use the pools for a fee.
2. Dominador Ong, a 14-year old boy, went to the pool with his two brothers.
Subsequently, Dominador told his brothers that he was going to the locker room.
3. Upon hearing this, Ruben and Eusebio Ong went to the bigger pool leaving Dominador
in the small pool. Later that day, a bather reported that a person was underwater for
too long. Upon hearing this, the lifeguard on duty dove into the pool to retrieve Ongs
lifeless body.
4. The lifeguard, nurse and sanitary inspector tried to revive the boy using artificial
resuscitator and injected him with camphorated oil but to no avail.
5. The investigation revealed that the cause of death is asphyxia by submersion in
water.
6. The parents of Ong brought this action for damages against Metropolitan, alleging
negligence on the selection and supervision of its employees and if not negligent,
they had the last clear chance to revive Ong.
7. The lower court found that the action of plaintiffs is untenable and dismissed the
complaint. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the doctrine of last chance is applicable in this case.
Held: NO. In the instant case, it is not known how minor Ong came into the big
swimming pool and it being apparent that he went there without any companion in
violation of pool regulations and it appearing that lifeguard Abao responded to the call
for help as soon as his attention was called and immediately exhausted all efforts to
bring him back to life, it is clear that there is no room for the application of the doctrine.
Furthermore, Metropolitan has taken all necessary precautions to avoid danger to the
lives of its patrons.
a) The swimming pools are provided with a ring buoy, towing line, oxygen
resuscitator and a first aid kit.
b) The bottoms of the pools are painted black so as to insure clear visibility.
c) On display in a conspicuous place are rules and regulations governing the use of
the pools

d) Metropolitan also employs six trained lifeguards, all of whom were issued
certificates of proficiency and two guards at a time are on duty to look after the
safety of the bathers.
e) There is a male nurse and a sanitary inspector with a clinic provided with oxygen
resuscitator.
f) And there are security guards who are available always in case of emergency.
The record also shows that when the body of minor Ong was retrieved from the bottom
of the pool:
a) the employees of Metropolitan did everything possible to revive him; (b)When they
found that the pulse of the boy was abnormal, the inspector immediately injected
him with camphorated oil; (c)When the manual artificial respiration proved
ineffective they applied the oxygen resuscitator until its contents were exhauste;
(d) they sent for Dr. Ayuyao from the University of the Philippines who however
arrived late.

Anuran vs Buno
1. On January 1958, passenger jeepney, driven by Buno, was on thee road to Batangas.
It stopped to allow passengers to alight.
2. But the jeepeney was parked in such a way that of its width was on the asphalted
pavement of the road and the other half, on the right shoulder of the said road.
3. A motor truck speeding along, negligently bumped it from behind, which such
violence that three of its passengers died, while two other passengers suffered
injuries that required confinement in the Provincial Hospital.
4. The heirs of the dead and injured passengers filed a case against the respective
drivers and owners of the truck and of the jeepney to recover damages.
5. The Court of First Instance absolved the driver of the jeepney and its owners, but it
ordered the truck driver and the owners to pay damages.
6. Plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals but CA affirmed the decision of the lower
court.
7. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the driver and owners of the jeepney should also be made
liable.
2. Whether the doctrine of last clear chance applies in the instant case.
HELD:
1. YES. It must be remembered that the degree of diligence required of a carrier in
transporting its passengers is utmost diligence (Art. 1755) and consequently, they are
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that
they have observed extraordinary diligence (Art. 1756).

In this instance, this legal presumption of negligence is confirmed by the appellate

courts finding that the jeepney driver parked the vehicle improperly. It must follow that
the driver and the owners of the jeepney must answer for injuries to its passengers.
2. No. The principle of last clear chance applies in a suit between the owners and
drivers of the two colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands
responsibility from the carrier to enforce its obligations under a contract of carriage. For
it would be inequitable to exempt the negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners on
the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of negligence.
In the case at bar, it is not a suit between the owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles
but a suit brought by the heirs of the deceased passengers against both owners and
drivers of the colliding vehicles. Therefore, the doctrine is not applicable.