ANG LADLAD VS.

COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioner is a national organization which represents the lesbians,
gays, bisexuals, and trans-genders. It filed a petition for
accreditation as a party-list organization to public respondent.
However, due to moral grounds, the latter denied the said petition.
To buttress their denial, COMELEC cited certain biblical and quranic
passages in their decision. It also stated that since their ways are
immoral and contrary to public policy, they are considered
nuissance. In fact, their acts are even punishable under the Revised
Penal Code in its Article 201.
A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner filed this
instant Petition on Certiorari under Rule 65 of the ROC.
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it
justified the exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the
constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion.
Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions contravened its
constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly,
and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of the
Philippines international obligations against discrimination based on
sexual orientation.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not
have a concrete and genuine national political agenda to benefit the
nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds.
It also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is not among
the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that
petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged
its national existence contrary to actual verification reports by
COMELECs field personnel.
Issue:
WON Respondent violated the Non-establishment clause of the
Constitution;
WON Respondent erred in denying Petitioners application on moral
and legal grounds.
Held:

Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani

stands for the proposition that only those sectors specifically
enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals) may be registered under the party-list system. As we
explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v.
Commission on Elections, the enumeration of marginalized and
under-represented sectors is not exclusive. The crucial element is
not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a
particular organization complies with the requirements of the
Constitution and RA 7941.
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that [n]o law shall
be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof. At bottom, what our non-establishment
clause calls for is government neutrality in religious matters.
Clearly, governmental reliance on religious justification is
inconsistent with this policy of neutrality. We thus find that it was
grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to
utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.
Be it noted that government action must have a secular purpose.
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be
prevented, or why special protection is required for the youth.
Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its position that
petitioners admission into the party-list system would be so harmful
as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society.
We also find the COMELECs reference to purported violations of our
penal and civil laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article
694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as any act, omission,
establishment, condition of property, or anything else which shocks,
defies, or disregards decency or morality, the remedies for which
are a prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any local
ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial proceedings.
A violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other
hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal

conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of

violation of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public
morals cannot replace the institution of civil or criminal proceedings
and a judicial determination of liability or culpability.
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a
sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals
from participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang
Ladlads registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a
statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a
tool to further any substantial public interest.

ANG PAGLAUM VS COMELEC

694 SCRA 477 Political Law Constitutional Law Legislative Department Party-List
System
This case partially abandoned the rulings in Ang Bagong Bayani vs COMELEC and
BANAT vs COMELEC.
Atong Paglaum, Inc. and 51 other parties were disqualified by the Commission on Elections
in the May 2013 party-list elections for various reasons but primarily for not being qualified
as representatives for marginalized or underrepresented sectors.
Atong Paglaum et al then filed a petition for certiorari against COMELEC alleging grave
abuse of discretion on the part of COMELEC in disqualifying them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying
the said party-lists.
HELD: No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong
Bayani and BANAT. However, the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the
COMELEC as the Supreme Court now provides for new guidelines which abandoned some
principles established in the two aforestated cases. The new guidelines are as follows:

I. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must use the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or
organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or
organizations.

2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to

organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any marginalized and
underrepresented sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the
party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party,
whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in
party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the
party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked
to a political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be marginalized and underrepresented or
lacking in well-defined political constituencies. It is enough that their principal advocacy
pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are
marginalized and underrepresented include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The
sectors that lack well-defined political constituencies include professionals, the elderly,
women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
marginalized and underrepresented must belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral
parties or organizations that lack well-defined political constituencies must belong to the
sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
marginalized and underrepresented, or that represent those who lack well-defined
political constituencies, either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track
record of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional
parties or organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some
of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who
remains qualified.

II. In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed, as has always been the
practice, from participating in the party-list elections. But, since theres really no
constitutional prohibition nor a statutory prohibition, major political parties can now
participate in the party-list system provided that they do so through their bona fide
sectoral wing (see parameter 3 above).
Allowing major political parties to participate, albeit indirectly, in the party-list elections
will encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the
marginalized and underrepresented and to those who lack well-defined political
constituencies.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave weight to the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission when they were drafting the party-list system provision of the Constitution. The

Commissioners deliberated that it was their intention to include all parties into the party-list
elections in order to develop a political system which is pluralistic and multiparty. (In
the BANAT case, Justice Puno emphasized that the will of the people should defeat the
intent of the framers; and that the intent of the people, in ratifying the 1987 Constitution, is
that the party-list system should be reserved for the marginalized sectors.)

III. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-list system is NOT RESERVED for
the marginalized and underrepresented or for parties who lack well-defined political
constituencies. It is also for national or regional parties. It is also for small ideology-based
and cause-oriented parties who lack well-defined political constituencies. The common
denominator however is that all of them cannot, they do not have the machinery unlike
major political parties, to field or sponsor candidates in the legislative districts but they can
acquire the needed votes in a national election system like the party-list system of elections.
If the party-list system is only reserved for marginalized representation, then the system
itself unduly excludes other cause-oriented groups from running for a seat in the lower
house.
As explained by the Supreme Court, party-list representation should not be understood to
include only labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature
are economically at the margins of society. It should be noted that Section 5 of Republic
Act 7941 includes, among others, in its provision for sectoral representation groups of
professionals, which are not per se economically marginalized but are still qualified as
marginalized, underrepresented, and do not have well-defined political constituencies as
they are ideologically marginalized.

Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) vs

COMELEC
586 SCRA 210 Political Law Constitutional Law Legislative Department Party
List System; Proportional Representation; Proper Computation
Statutory Construction Rule in Interpreting the Constitution Intent of the Framers vs
Intent of the People
NOTE: This case is consolidated with BAYAN Muna vs COMELEC (G.R. No. 179295).
In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, made a
partial proclamation of the winners in the party-list elections which was held in May 2007.
In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the COMELEC considered the following rules:

1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative districts, while the remaining 20% shall
come from party-list representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987 Constitution);
2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list which garners at least 2%
of the total votes cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled to one seat;
3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners at least 6%, then it is entitled
to 3 seats this is pursuant to the 2-4-6 rule or the Panganiban Formula from the case of Veterans
Federation Party vs COMELEC.
4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if if garners more than 6% of the votes
cast for the party-list election (3 seat cap rule, same case).
The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), a party-list candidate,
questioned the proclamation as well as the formula being used. BANAT averred that the 2% threshold is
invalid; Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void because its provision that a party-list, to qualify for a congressional
seat, must garner at least 2% of the votes cast in the party-list election, is not supported by the
Constitution. Further, the 2% rule creates a mathematical impossibility to meet the 20% party-list seat
prescribed by the Constitution.
BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory. If it is mandatory, then with the
2% qualifying vote, there would be instances when it would be impossible to fill the prescribed 20% share
of party-lists in the lower house. BANAT also proposes a new computation (which shall be discussed in
the HELD portion of this digest).
On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions the validity of the 3 seat rule
(Section 11a of RA 7941). It also raised the issue of whether or not major political parties are allowed to
participate in the party-list elections or is the said elections limited to sectoral parties.
ISSUES:
I. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats in the lower house?
II. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory or a mere ceiling.
III. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat valid.
IV. How are party-list seats allocated?
V. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections.
VI. Whether or not the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is valid.
HELD:
I. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for every 5 seats allotted for legislative districts,
there shall be one seat allotted for a party-list representative. Originally, the 1987 Constitution provides
that there shall be not more than 250 members of the lower house. Using the 80-20 rule, 200 of that will
be from legislative districts, and 50 would be from party-list representatives. However, the Constitution
also allowed Congress to fix the number of the membership of the lower house as in fact, it can create

additional legislative districts as it may deem appropriate. As can be seen in the May 2007 elections,
there were 220 district representatives, hence applying the 80-20 rule or the 5:1 ratio, there should be 55
seats allotted for party-list representatives.
How did the Supreme Court arrive at 55? This is the formula:
(Current Number of Legislative District Representatives 0.80) x (0.20) = Number of Seats Available to
Party-List Representatives
Hence,
(220 0.80) x (0.20) = 55
II. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling meaning, the number of party-list
representatives shall not exceed 20% of the total number of the members of the lower house. However, it
is not mandatory that the 20% shall be filled.
III. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no constitutional basis to allow that only partylists which garnered 2% of the votes cast are qualified for a seat and those which garnered less than 2%
are disqualified. Further, the 2% threshold creates a mathematical impossibility to attain the ideal 80-20
apportionment. The Supreme Court explained:
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for the 100
participants in the party list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes cast, or one million votes,
gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the first 50 parties all get one million votes. Only 50
parties get a seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the operation of the two percent
threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we increase the available party-list seats to 60 seats and
even if we increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum number of parties get two
percent of the votes for every party, it is always impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats to
exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present.
It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the full
implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of the broadest
possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives.
IV. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list garners 2% of the votes cast, then it
is guaranteed a seat, and not qualified. This allows those party-lists garnering less than 2% to also get
a seat.
But how? The Supreme Court laid down the following rules:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the
number of votes they garnered during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for
the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional seats are allocated.

4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included because they have
already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the remaining available seats for
allocation as additional seats are the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the
guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941
allowing for a rounding off of fractional seats.
In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the seats. In the first round, all partylists which garnered at least 2% of the votes cast (called the two-percenters) are given their one seat
each. The total number of seats given to these two-percenters are then deducted from the total available
seats for party-lists. In this case, 17 party-lists were able to garner 2% each. There are a total 55 seats
available for party-lists hence, 55 minus 17 = 38 remaining seats. (Please refer to the full text of the case
for the tabulation).
The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used in the second round, particularly, in
determining, first, the additional seats for the two-percenters, and second, in determining seats for the
party-lists that did not garner at least 2% of the votes cast, and in the process filling up the 20% allocation
for party-list representatives.
How is this done?
Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party and multiply it against the remaining number of
seats. The product, which shall not be rounded off, will be the additional number of seats allotted for the
party list but the 3 seat limit rule shall still be observed.
Example:
In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest total vote of 1,169,234 which is 7.33% of the total
votes cast for the party-list elections (15,950,900).
Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote garnered) x (remaining seats) = number of additional
seat
Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79
Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed so 2.79 remains 2. BUHAY is a two-percenter
which means it has a guaranteed one seat PLUS additional 2 seats or a total of 3 seats. Now if it so
happens that BUHAY got 20% of the votes cast, it will still get 3 seats because the 3 seat limit rule
prohibits it from having more than 3 seats.
Now after all the tw0-percenters were given their guaranteed and additional seats, and there are still
unoccupied seats, those seats shall be distributed to the remaining party-lists and those higher in rank in
the voting shall be prioritized until all the seats are occupied.
V. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to disallow major political parties (the likes of
UNIDO, LABAN, etc) from participating in the party-list elections.

Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out that there is no prohibition either from the
Constitution or from RA 7941 against major political parties from participating in the party-list elections as
the word party was not qualified and that even the framers of the Constitution in their deliberations
deliberately allowed major political parties to participate in the party-list elections provided that they
establish a sectoral wing which represents the marginalized (indirect participation), Justice Puno, in his
separate opinion, concurred by 7 other justices, explained that the will of the people defeats the will of the
framers of the Constitution precisely because it is the people who ultimately ratified the Constitution and
the will of the people is that only the marginalized sections of the country shall participate in the party-list
elections. Hence, major political parties cannot participate in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.
VI. Yes, the 3 seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to ensure that no one party shall dominate the partylist system.

Senate of the Philippines vs. Eduardo Ermita

G.R. No. 169777 April 20, 2006
Carpio, Morales J.:
Facts:
The Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations to various officials of the Executive
Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project of the
North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group (hereinafter
North Rail Project).
The President then issued Executive Order 464, Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation of
Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials
Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and For Other Purposes,
which, pursuant to Section 6 thereof, took effect immediately.
Issues:
1. Whether or not E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress;
2. Whether or E.O. 464 violates the right of the people to information on matters of public concern; and
3. Whether or not respondents have committed grave abuse of discretion when they implemented E.O.
464 prior to its publication in a newspaper of general circulation.
Held:
1. The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution.
This power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch; it is co-extensive with the
power to legislate. The matters which may be a proper subject of legislation and those which may be a
proper subject of investigation are one. It follows that the operation of government, being a legitimate
subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation.

2. Yes. Although there are clear distinctions between the right of Congress to information which underlies
the power of inquiry and the right of the people to information on matters of public concern, any executive
issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of information in investigations in Congress necessarily
deprives the people of information which, being presumed to be in aid of legislation, is presumed to be a
matter of public concern.
3. Yes. While E.O. 464 applies only to officials of the executive branch, it does not follow that the same is
exempt from the need for publication.

Senate of the Philippines vs. Eduardo Ermita

G.R. No. 169777 April 20, 2006

Facts:
The Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations to various officials of the Executive
Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project of the
North Luzon Railways Corporation with the China National Machinery and Equipment Group (hereinafter
North Rail Project).
The President then issued Executive Order 464, Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation of
Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials
Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and For Other Purposes,
which, pursuant to Section 6 thereof, took effect immediately.
Issues:
1. Whether or not E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress;
2. Whether or E.O. 464 violates the right of the people to information on matters of public concern; and
3. Whether or not respondents have committed grave abuse of discretion when they implemented E.O.
464 prior to its publication in a newspaper of general circulation.
Held:
1. The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution.
This power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch; it is co-extensive with the
power to legislate. The matters which may be a proper subject of legislation and those which may be a
proper subject of investigation are one. It follows that the operation of government, being a legitimate
subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation.

2. Yes. Although there are clear distinctions between the right of Congress to information which underlies
the power of inquiry and the right of the people to information on matters of public concern, any executive
issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of information in investigations in Congress necessarily
deprives the people of information which, being presumed to be in aid of legislation, is presumed to be a
matter of public concern.
3. Yes. While E.O. 464 applies only to officials of the executive branch, it does not follow that the same is
exempt from the need for publication.

ROMULO L. NERI, petitioner vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC

OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND COMMERCE, AND
SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY
G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008
FACTS: On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered into a
contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services
for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately
P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the Peoples Republic of China.
The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In the September 18, 2007 hearing Jose
de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials and power brokers were using their influence to
push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared in one
hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC
tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He further narrated that he
informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe.
However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to
answer, invoking executive privilege. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the senate averring that the
communications between GMA and Neri are privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs
Ermita be applied. He was cited in contempt of respondent committees and an order for his arrest and
detention until such time that he would appear and give his testimony.

ISSUE:
Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive privilege?
HELD:
The communications are covered by executive privilege

The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive officials and employees to follow and abide by the
Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of Senate v. Ermita when
they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.), does not in any way diminish the concept of
executive privilege. This is because this concept has Constitutional underpinnings.

The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a
power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of military and foreign
relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the repository of the commander-in-chief, appointing,
pardoning, and diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, the information
relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.
Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential communications privilege:
1) The protected communication must relate to a quintessential and non-delegable presidential power.
2) The communication must be authored or solicited and received by a close advisor of the President or
the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in operational proximity with the
President.

3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome by a
showing of adequate need, such that the information sought likely contains important evidence and by
the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the ground
that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions fall under conversation and correspondence
between the President and public officials necessary in her executive and policy decision-making
process and, that the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as
economic relations with the Peoples Republic of China. Simply put, the bases are presidential
communications privilege and executive privilege on matters relating to diplomacy or foreign relations.

Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by the three (3)
questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the communications relate to a
quintessential and non-delegable power of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive
agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without
the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second,
the communications are received by a close advisor of the President. Under the operational proximity

test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyos cabinet. And
third, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege
and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioners claim of executive privilege violates
the constitutional provisions on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern.50 We
might have agreed with such contention if petitioner did not appear before them at all. But petitioner made
himself available to them during the September 26 hearing, where he was questioned for eleven (11)
hours. Not only that, he expressly manifested his willingness to answer more questions from the
Senators, with the exception only of those covered by his claim of executive privilege.
The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. Section 7 of Article III provides:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official
records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to
such limitations as may be provided by law.

Arturo TOLENTINO VS. SEC. OF FINANCE

235 SCRA 630 (1994) 249 SCRA 635 (1995) Political Law Origination of Revenue Bills EVAT
Amendment by Substitution
Arturo Tolentino et al are questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known as the Expanded
Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law. Tolentino averred that this revenue bill did not exclusively originate from the
House of Representatives as required by Section 24, Article 6 of the Constitution. Even though RA 7716
originated as HB 11197 and that it passed the 3 readings in the HoR, the same did not complete the 3
readings in Senate for after the 1 st reading it was referred to the Senate Ways & Means Committee
thereafter Senate passed its own version known as Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino averred that what Senate
could have done is amend HB 11197 by striking out its text and substituting it with the text of SB 1630 in
that way the bill remains a House Bill and the Senate version just becomes the text (only the text) of the
HB. (Its ironic however to note that Tolentino and co-petitioner Raul Roco even signed the said Senate
Bill.)
ISSUE: Whether or not the EVAT law is procedurally infirm.
HELD: No. By a 9-6 vote, the Supreme Court rejected the challenge, holding that such consolidation was
consistent with the power of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments to the version originated
in the HoR. What the Constitution simply means, according to the 9 justices, is that the initiative must
come from the HoR. Note also that there were several instances before where Senate passed its own
version rather than having the HoR version as far as revenue and other such bills are concerned. This
practice of amendment by substitution has always been accepted. The proposition of Tolentino concerns
a mere matter of form. There is no showing that it would make a significant difference if Senate were to
adopt his over what has been done.

TOLENTINO VS. SEC. OF FINANCE

G.R. No. 115455
235 SCRA 630 (1994)
FACTS
RA 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law, is an act that seeks to widen the
tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National
Internal Revenue Code. There are various suits questioning and challenging the constitutionality of
RA 7716 on various grounds.
Tolentino contends that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively from the House of Representatives but
is a mere consolidation of HB. No. 11197 and SB. No. 1630 and it did not pass three readings on
separate days on the Senate thus violating Article VI, Sections 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution,
respectively.
Art. VI, Section 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public
debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
Art. VI, Section 26(2): No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed
three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to
its Members three days before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of
its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no
amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter,
and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
ISSUE
Whether or not RA 7716 violated Art. VI, Section 24 and Art. VI, Section 26(2) of the Constitution.
HELD
No. The phrase originate exclusively refers to the revenue bill and not to the revenue law. It is
sufficient that the House of Representatives initiated the passage of the bill which may undergo
extensive changes in the Senate.
SB. No. 1630, having been certified as urgent by the President need not meet the requirement not
only of printing but also of reading the bill on separate days.