RULE 118

Rule 118-Pre- Trial

Criminal Procedure
1. People vs. Tac-an and Austria GR 148000, February 27, 2003
Facts of the case:

A petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 61535 (SP) dismissing
the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner for the nullification of the Order dated August 1, 2002 and the
subsequent Order denying the motion for reconsideration issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 84 of
Batangas City in People vs. Mario Austria, docketed as Criminal Case No. 10766.

On February 22, 2000, an Information was filed by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Batangas City against
Mario N. Austria for falsification of public official document.

The accused, a public officer, he being the Officer-in-Charge Provincial Warden of the Batangas Provincial Jail
located at Brgy. Cuta Bilibid, Batangas City, and taking advantage of his official position, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify a Memorandum Receipt for Equipment Semi-Expendable
and Non-Expendable Property, by stating in said memorandum receipt dated June 2, 1999 that Colt MKIV
Series 80 Government Model, Pistol Cal. .380 SN-26917 with 40 rounds of ammunitions, is a provincial
government property duly registered with the Firearms and Explosives Unit, Batangas PNP Command,
Kumintang Ilaya, Batangas City, and issued to Mr. Alberto Tesoro, Civilian Agent, for his own use in
connection with the performance of his official duties and functions, when in truth and in fact said
statements are absolutely false when he has the legal obligation to disclose the truth, as said
firearm is not a property of the Provincial Government of Batangas; that it is not registered with the
Firearms and Explosives Units of Batangas PNP Command, Batangas City and Camp Crame, Quezon City; and
that Alberto Tesoro is not an employee of the Provincial Government of Batangas, to the damage and prejudice
of public interest.

There were 11 witnesses listed in the information, as witnesses for the People of the Philippines.

The trial court set the arraignment of the accused and the initial pre-trial on August 1, 2000. However, out of
the eleven witnesses listed in the Information, only the first three witnesses were notified of said arraignment
and pre-trial.

During the pre-trial, none of the 3 witnesses who were notified by the court was in attendance. On motion of
the accused and over the objection of the public prosecutor, trial court issued an order dismissing the case for
failure of said witnesses to appear before it .

The public prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration of said order, contending that the trial court acted
arbitrarily and capriciously when it dismissed the case simply because three of its witnesses who were notified
failed to appear at the initial pre-trial.

The public prosecutor asserted that it had eleven witnesses but only three were subpoenaed by the trial court.
He argued further that the dismissal of the case was not authorized under Republic Act No. 8493. The trial
court issued an order denying the motion for reconsideration of the public prosecutor.

The trial court posits that under R.A. No. 8493 pre-trial is mandatory and the presence of the complaining
witnesses is likewise required during the trial for the parties to participate in the plea bargaining and
stipulation of facts during said proceedings. If the complaining witnesses are absent, the principal purpose of
the pre-trial cannot be achieved.
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 8493 provides, Mandatory Pre-trial in Criminal Cases. In all criminal cases cognizable by
the Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Regional Trial Court and the
Sandiganbayan, the justice or judge shall, after arraignment, order a pre-trial conference to consider the following:
(a) Plea bargaining;
(b) Stipulation of Facts;
(c) Marking for identification of evidence of parties;
(d) Waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence; and
(e) Such other matters as will promote a fair and expiditious (sic) trial.

The People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a petition for certiorari with
the Court of Appeals under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, for the
nullification of the orders of the trial court. The People alleged that the trial court acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in ordering the
dismissal of the case and denying its motion for reconsideration.

On April 3, 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision dismissing the petition on the ground that the errors
committed by the trial court were mere errors of judgment which are not correctible by a writ of certiorari. The
appellate court also stated that a reinstatement of Criminal Case No. 10766 will place the private respondent
in double jeopardy.

Petitioner filed the present petition for the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Issue:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in ruling that the trial court did not commit grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when it dismissed Criminal Case No. 10766 simply
because three witnesses of its eleven witnesses failed to appear at the initial pre-trial of the case.
Ruling:

Under R.A. 8493, the absence during pre-trial of any witness for the prosecution listed in the Information,
whether or not said witness is the offended party or the complaining witness, is not a valid ground for the
dismissal of a criminal case.

Even if none of the witnesses listed in the information for the State appeared for the pre-trial, the same can
and should proceed. After all, the public prosecutor appeared for the State. The public prosecutor is vested
with authority to consider those matters catalogued in Section 2 of R.A. 8493.

The trial court thus acted without jurisdiction when it dismissed the case merely because none of
the witnesses notified by the trial court appeared for the pre-trial. The State, like the accused is also
entitled to due process in criminal cases. The order of the trial court dismissing the criminal case deprived the
State of its right to prosecute and prove its case. Said order is, therefore, void for lack of jurisdiction, and is of
no effect.
This Court ruled in Dimatulac vs. Villon:
The judge, on the other hand, should always be imbued with a high sense of duty and responsibility in the
discharge of his obligation to promptly and properly administer justice. He must view himself as a priest, for the
administration of justice is akin to a religious crusade. Thus, exerting the same devotion as a priest in the performance
of the most sacred ceremonies of religious liturgy, the judge must render service with impartiality commensurate with
the public trust and confidence reposed in him. Although the determination of a criminal case before a judge lies within
his exclusive jurisdiction and competence, his discretion is not unfettered, but rather must be exercised within
reasonable confines.
The Court of Appeals also erred in ruling that the reinstatement of the case does not place the private respondent in
double jeopardy. This Court ruled in Saldana vs. Court of Appeals, et al. that:
When the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case, its right to due process
is thereby violated. Respondent Judges dismissal order dated July 7, 1967 being null and void for lack of jurisdiction,
the same does not constitute a proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy (Serino vs. Zosa, supra.).

Thus, apparently, to raise the defense of double jeopardy, three requisites must be present:
(1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second;
(2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and
(3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first.
Legal jeopardy attaches only
(a) upon a valid indictment,
(b) before a competent court,
(c) after arraignment,
(d) a valid plea having been entered; and
(e) the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.
In effect, the first jeopardy was never terminated, and the remand of the criminal case for further hearing
and/or trial before the lower courts amounts merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy, and does not
expose the accused to a second jeopardy.
The petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals and the Orders of respondent Regional
Trial Court, (Annexes A, C, and E of the petition,) are SET ASIDE. Respondent Regional Trial Court is ordered to
REINSTATE People vs. Mario Austria, Criminal Case No. 10766 in the docket of the court.

2. Garayblas et. al. vs. Hon. Ong GR 174507, August 3, 2011

Facts of the case:

This resolves the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, praying that the Order1 of the 4th
Division of the Sandiganbayan (SB 4th Division) dated June 14, 2006, holding petitioners liable for their nonappearance in the scheduled pre-trial conferences, and the Resolution2 dated August 10, 2006, denying
petitioners' motion for reconsideration, be annulled and set aside.

Petitioner Atty. Emelita H. Garayblas (Atty. Garayblas) is the principal legal counsel, with petitioner Atty. Renato
G. De la Cruz (Atty. De la Cruz) as collaborating counsel, for Gen. Jose S. Ramiscal who is facing charges for
falsification of public documents and violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019.

Accused Gen. Jose S. Ramiscal was arraigned on February 20, 2006, and the SB 4th Division set the pre-trial for
April 6, 2006 in Davao City.

On February 28, 2006, the Office of the Clerk of Court of the SB 4th Division sent a Notice of Hearing to all the
parties, informing them of the cancellation of the April 6, 2006 pre-trial hearing and the resetting to April 27,
2006 in Davao City.

Petitioner Atty. Garayblas, opposing the resetting to April 27, 2006, filed a Motion to Reset. On March 23, 2006,
the SB 4th Division issued an Order4 denying said motion to reset, stating that "Atty. Garayblas and Associates
must adjust their schedule to suit all the other accused and their counsels, who are available for the pre-trial
hearing in Davao City on April 27, 2006."

Petitioners failed to appear for pre-trial on April 27, 2006 in Davao City; hence, public respondents ordered
petitioners to explain why they should not be held in contempt.
Atty. Garayblas filed a Compliance/Manifestation dated June 5, 2006 stating that her failure to appear before
the court was due to her health condition (sugar count was 420 and the blood pressure, was 170/140, a very
precarious condition).
Atty. De la Cruz also filed his Explanation7 dated June 3, 2006, stating that he did not attend the pre-trial of the
cases on April 27, 2006 in Davao City because he had to appear before the Second Division of the SB in
Criminal Case No. 25741 involving the same accused, attaching a certificate of appearance from the Second
Division as proof of his explanation.
After reading and considering the respective submissions of Attys. De la Cruz and Habacon-Garayblas for their
absence in the scheduled pre-trial proceedings of the above-entitled cases in Davao City on April 27, 2006,
which caused the cancellation thereof, the Court finds them not quite satisfactory.
It appears that they belong to the same law office and, therefore, one or the other should have appeared or
made the necessary arrangement to let one of their associates or colleagues appear in the pre-trial conference
knowing as they do of the Davao City (out of town) schedule and the corresponding expenses thereof.
the Court is constrained to hold Attys. De la Cruz and Habacon-Garayblas liable for their absence or nonappearance which caused the cancellation of the scheduled pre-trial conference and thus wasted the time of
the Court.
Pursuant to Sec. 3 of Rule 118 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Court hereby orders them to pay
the amount of ten thousand pesos (P10,000) each as sanction or penalty and to partially answer the traveling
and other expenses of the Court in holding the subject pre-trial conference in Davao City, within ten (10) days
from receipt of this order.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration. Atty. Garayblas reasoned that:
(1) she had no intention whatsoever of disregarding the scheduled pre-trial but her health and physical
condition prevented her from attending the same, and records would show that except for her non-appearance
at the pre-trial, she had never been absent in all the proceedings for subject criminal cases before the SB 4th
Division;
(2) her failure to submit a medical certificate was purely out of inadvertence;
(3) her non-appearance was not the only reason for the cancellation of the pre-trial as the records
show that all the accused failed to submit their respective pre-trial briefs;
(4) while the Court has the duty to act on cases with promptness, it should also act with understanding
and compassion;
(5) just so there would be a lawyer to attend the proceedings scheduled on the same date in both the
Second Division and the Fourth Division, they agreed that Atty. De la Cruz would be the one to appear before
the Second Division, while she (Atty. Garayblas) would be the one to attend the pre-trial in Davao City before
the Fourth Division; and
(6) there were no other lawyers from their law office who could attend the pre-trial in Davao City, as
one had already resigned and another member, Atty. Rafaelito Garayblas, just suffered from acute myocardial
infraction complicated by diabetes.

The Sandiganbayan 4th Division promulgated the Resolution denying petitioners' motions for
reconsideration, stating that even if the Court is inclined to believe Atty. Garayblas' illness, the Court
still expected her to make the necessary arrangement for co-counsel or any other colleague to attend
the pre-trial. It was also reiterated in said Resolution that Atty. De la Cruz should have given priority to
the pre-trial hearing in Davao City.

Issue:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan 4th Division acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in not finding their explanation satisfactory and ordering them to pay a fine of Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000.00) each and to partially answer the traveling and other expenses of the Court in holding the subject pre-trial
conference in Davao City.
Ruling:

Section 3, Rule 118 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides as follows:
Sec. 3. Non-appearance at Pre-Trial Conference. - If the counsel for the accused or the prosecutor does
not appear at the pre-trial conference and does not offer an acceptable excuse for his lack of cooperation, the
court may impose proper sanctions or penalties.

Pursuant to the foregoing provision, the court may sanction or penalize counsel for the accused if the following
concur:
(1) counsel does not appear at the pre-trial conference: and
(2) counsel does not offer an acceptable excuse.

The importance of having counsel who is the most well-versed on the facts of the case, to be the one attending
a pre-trial conference. In Bayas v. Sandiganbayan, the Court expounded on the role of lawyers in pre-trials, to
wit:
Pre-trial is meant to simplify, if not fully dispose of, the case at its early stage.
during pre-trial, attorneys must make a full disclosure of their positions as to what the real issues of the trial
would be. They should not be allowed to embarrass or inconvenience the court or injure the opposing litigant by
their careless preparation for a case; or by theirfailure to raise relevant issues at the outset of a trial.

The Court deems imposing a fine on petitioners and ordering them to answer part of the court personnels'
travel expenses to be too harsh. In Inonog v. Ibay,17 the Court reiterated that:
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts so as to preserve order in judicial
proceedings as well as to uphold the administration of justice. The courts must exercise the power of
contempt for purposes that are impersonal because that power is intended as a safeguard not for the
judges but for the functions they exercise. Thus, judges have, time and again, been enjoined to
exercise their contempt power judiciously, sparingly, with utmost restraint and with the end in view of
utilizing the same for correction and preservation of the dignity of the court, not for retaliation or
vindication.
Atty. Garayblas should have at least sent word to the SB 4th Division and to her co-counsel, Atty. De la Cruz,
when she began feeling the symptoms of hypertension and hyperglycemia, that she would be unable to attend
said pre-trial conference. This would have been the courteous thing to do.
Petitioner Atty. De la Cruz has presented a valid and acceptable excuse, for which he should not be found liable
under Section 3, Rule 118 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. On the other hand, petitioner Atty.
Garayblas showed some lapse in judgment, not to mention discourteous behavior, in not informing the SB 4th
Division at the earliest possible time of her illness and inability to attend said pre-trial conference.
The petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Sandiganbayan 4th Division's Order dated June 14, 2006 and its
Resolution dated August 10, 2006 in Criminal Cases Nos. 25122, 25125-29, 25133, 25135, 25137-38, are
hereby MODIFIED by DELETING the fine and the order for both petitioners to pay part of the traveling expenses
of the court. Instead, petitioner Atty. Garayblas is hereby given a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the
same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

RULE 119

JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN, Petitioner, v. THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN Respondent.

Facts:
Joselito Raniero J. Daan (petitioner), one of the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 24167-24170, 24195-24196, questions
the denial by the Sandiganbayan of his plea bargaining proposal.
-Accused was charged of malversation together with Benedicto E. Kuizon.
-Both were also indicted with 3 counts of falsification since they falsify the timebook and payrolls for a given period
making it appear that some laborers worked on the construction of the new municipal hall building of Bato, Leyte and
collected their respective salaries thereon when, in truth and in fact, they did not.
-In the falsification cases, the accused offered to withdraw their plea of "not guilty" and substitute the same with a
plea of "guilty", provided, the mitigating circumstances of confession or plea of guilt and voluntary surrender will be
appreciated in their favor.
-In the falsification cases, the accused offered to withdraw their plea of "not guilty" and substitute the same with a
plea of "guilty", provided, the mitigating circumstances of confession or plea of guilt and voluntary surrender will be
appreciated in their favor.
-On the other hand, in the malversation cases, the accused offered to substitute their plea of "not guilty" thereto with
a plea of "guilty", but to the lesser crime of failure of an accountable officer to render accounts.
-The prosecution recommended the plea bargaining agreement proposal of the defendant. Pleading of "guilty" to the
lesser crime of falsification of public document by a private individual.
-Insofar as the malversation cases are concerned, the prosecution was likewise amenable to the offer of said accused
to plead "guilty" to the lesser crime of failure of an accountable officer to render accounts because:
-JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN has already restituted the total amount of P18,860.00 as per official receipt issued by the
provincial government of Leyte dated February 26, 2002. In short, the damage caused to the government has already
been restituted.

-Petitioners Motion to Plea Bargain was denied by the Sandigangbayan. Motion for Reconsideration was also
subsequently denied.
-This compelled petitioner to file the present case for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/ or writ of preliminary injunction under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
-Petitioner argued that Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying his plea bargaining offer on the
following grounds: first, petitioner is not an accountable officer and he merely affixed his signature on the payrolls on a
"routinary basis," negating any criminal intent; and that the amount involved is only P18,860.00, which he already
restituted.
Issue:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the plea bargaining agreement
offer?
Held:
-The petition is meritorious.
Plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually
satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval. It usually involves the defendant's pleading guilty to a
lesser offense or to only one or some of the counts of a multi-count indictment in return for a lighter sentence than
that for the graver charge.
Plea bargaining is authorized under Section 2, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit:
SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. - At arraignment, the accused, with the consent of the offended party and the
prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the
offense charged. After arraignment but before trial, the accused may still be allowed to plead guilty to said lesser
offense after withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No amendment of the complaint or information is necessary. (sec. 4,
cir. 38-98)
Ordinarily, plea bargaining is made during the pre-trial stage of the proceedings. Sections 1 and 2, Rule 118 of the
Rules of Court, require plea bargaining to be considered by the trial court at the pre-trial conference, viz:
SEC. 1. Pre-trial; mandatory in criminal cases. - In all criminal cases cognizable by theSandiganbayan, Regional Trial
Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the
court shall, after arraignment and within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over the person
of the accused, unless a shorter period is provided for in special laws or circulars of the Supreme Court, order a pretrial conference to consider the following:
(a) plea bargaining;
(b) stipulation of facts;
(c) marking for identification of evidence of the parties;
(d) waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence;
(e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge but interposes a lawful defense; and
(f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the criminal and civil aspects of the case.
SEC. 2. Pre-trial agreement. - All agreements or admissions made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be
reduced in writing and signed by the accused and counsel, otherwise, they cannot be used against the accused. The
agreements covering the matters referred to in section 1 of this Rule shall be approved by the court.
But it may also be made during the trial proper and even after the prosecution has finished presenting its evidence
and rested its case. Thus, the Court has held that it is immaterial that plea bargaining was not made during the pretrial stage or that it was made only after the prosecution already presented several witnesses.

Section 2, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court presents the basic requisites upon which plea bargaining may be made, i.e.,
that it should be with the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, and that the plea of guilt should be to a
lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense charged. The rules however use word may in the second
sentence of Section 2, denoting an exercise of discretion upon the trial court on whether to allow the accused to make
such plea. Trial courts are exhorted to keep in mind that a plea of guilty for a lighter offense than that actually charged
is not supposed to be allowed as a matter of bargaining or compromise for the convenience of the accused.
-WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated March 25, 2004 and May 31, 2004 are SET ASIDE.
The Sandiganbayan is hereby ORDERED to grant petitioner's Motion to Plea Bargain. Let records of this case
be REMANDED to the Sandiganbayan for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.

IMPERIAL VS JOSON
Facts:
- At or about 2:00 oclock in the morning of 11 May 2001, along the portion of the National Highway in Barangay
Concepcion, Sariaya, Quezon, an Isuzu ten-wheeler truck collided with a Fuso six-wheeler truck. Owned by petitioner
Nelson Imperial, the Isuzu ten-wheeler truck was then being driven by petitioner Santos Francisco, while the Fuso sixwheeler truck was driven by respondent Santiago Giganto, Jr. who was, at the time, accompanied by a helper or
pahinante, respondent Samuel Cubeta.
-After colliding with the Fuso six-wheeler truck, the Isuzu ten-wheeler truck further rammed into a Kia Besta Van which
was, in turn, being driven by respondent Arnel Lazo. The KIA Besta Van was owned by Noel Tagle who was then on
board said vehicle, together with 8 passengers.
-As a consequence of the collisions which resulted to the death of the driver of a Kia Besta van and and its 8
passengers, a criminal complaint for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Multiple Homicide, Multiple Serious Physical
Injuries and Damage to Property was filed against petitioners Santos Francisco and Noel Imperial.
-The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 01-99 before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sariaya, Quezon. (Many
action have been brought to different courts by one party against the other. But for purposes of the issue on rights of
the accused, we'll take the one filed in the MTC Sariaya).
Issue:
Whether or not the fact that the nine postponements of the pre-trial conference of the case amounted to a violation of
Francisco's constitutional right to a speedy trial.
Held:
- In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case and to a
speedy trial, four factors must be considered:
(a) length of delay; (b) the reason for the delay; (c) the defendants assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice to the
defendant. xxxx 48 Petitioner Francisco claims that his right to a speedy trial was violated when the Public
Prosecutors assigned to the case failed to attend the nine hearings scheduled by the Sariaya MTC. Far from being
vexatious, capricious and oppressive, however, the delays entailed by the postponements of the aforesaid hearings
were, to a great extent, attributable to petitioner Franciscos own pursuit of extraordinary remedies against the
interlocutory orders issued by the Sariaya MTC and the assignment of at least three public prosecutors to the case.
- Although the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure concededly mandates commencement of the trial within 30 days
from receipt of the pre-trial order and the continuous conduct thereof for a period not exceeding 180 days, Section 3 a
(1), Rule 119 provides that delays resulting from extraordinary remedies against interlocutory orders shall be excluded
in computing the time within which trial must commence. -In determining the right of an accused to speedy trial,
moreover, courts are "required to do more than a mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the
scheduled hearings of the case" and to give particular regard to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case.

G.R. No. 173637

April 21, 2009

DANTE T. TAN, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
FACTS:

The assailed Decision reinstated Criminal Case No. 119830, earlier dismissed by the trial court due to an
alleged violation of petitioner Dante T. Tans right to speedy trial.lawphil.net The assailed Resolution denied his
Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Inhibit.

On 19 December 2000, a Panel of Prosecutors of the Department of Justice (DOJ), on behalf of the People of the
Philippines (People), filed three Informations against Dante T. Tan (petitioner) before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Pasig City. The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases No. 119830, No. 119831 and No. 119832, all
entitled, "People of the Philippines v. Dante Tan."

The People insists that during the pendency of the initial hearing on 27 February 2001, the parties agreed that
Criminal Cases No. 119831 and No. 119832 would be tried ahead of Criminal Case No. 119830, and that
petitioner would not interpose any objection to its manifestation, nor would the trial court disapprove it.

On 2 December 2003, petitioner moved to dismiss Criminal Case No. 119830 due to the Peoples alleged
failure to prosecute. Claiming violation of his right to speedy trial, petitioner faults the People for failing to
prosecute the case for an unreasonable length of time and without giving any excuse or justification for the
delay. According to petitioner, he was persistent in asserting his right to speedy trial, which he had allegedly
done on several instances. Finally, he claimed to have been substantially prejudiced by this delay.

On 22 December 2003, Judge Briccio C. Ygana of the Pasig RTC, Branch 153, ruled that the delays which
attended the proceedings of petitioners case (Criminal Case No. 119830) were vexatious, capricious and
oppressive, resulting in violation of petitioners right to speedy trial. The RTC ordered 13 the dismissal of
Criminal Case No. 119830

On motion for reconsideration, the prosecution insisted that the parties agreed to hold separate trials of the
BW cases, with petitioner acquiescing to the prosecution of Criminal Cases No. 119831 and No. 119832 ahead
of Criminal Case No. 119830. In an Order dated 20 January 2004, the RTC denied the Motion for
Reconsideration for lack of merit.

Setting aside the trial courts order of dismissal, the Court of Appeals granted the petition for certiorari in its
Decision dated 22 February 2006. In resolving the petition, the appellate court reinstated Criminal Case No.
119830 in this wise:
ISSUES:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE ACTING SECRETARY OF JUSTICE MAY VALIDLY EXECUTE THE CERTIFICATE OF NONFORUM SHOPPING ATTACHED TO THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED BY THE PEOPLE WITH THE COURT OF
APPEALS EVEN THOUGH THE CRIMINAL ACTION WAS INSTITUTED BY A COMPLAINT SUBSCRIBED BY THE
AUTHORIZED OFFICERS OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION.
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI VIOLATED TANS RIGHT AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY.
3. WHETHER OR NOT CRIMINAL CASE NO. 119830 WAS CORRECTLY DISMISSED BY THE TRIAL COURT ON THE
GROUND OF VIOLATION OF TANS RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL.
4. WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
RULING:
1. YES.

Acting DOJ Secretary Merceditas N. Gutierrez, being the head of the DOJ, therefore, had the authority to sign
the certificate of non-forum shopping for Criminal Case No. 119830, which was filed on behalf of the People of
the Philippines.
2. NO.

For double jeopardy to attach then, the following elements in the first criminal case must be present:
(a) The complaint or information or other formal charge was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a
conviction;
(b) The court had jurisdiction;
(c) The accused had been arraigned and had pleaded; and
(d) He was convicted or acquitted or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express
consent of the accused.43

Among the above-cited elements, we are concerned with the fourth element, conviction or acquittal, or the
case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. This element is
crucial since, as a general rule, the dismissal of a criminal case resulting in acquittal, made with the express
consent of the accused or upon his own motion, will not place the accused in double jeopardy. 44 This rule,
however, admits of two exceptions, namely: insufficiency of evidence and denial of the right to speedy
trial.45 While indeed petitioner was in fact the one who filed the Motion to Dismiss Criminal Case No. 119830,
the dismissal thereof was due to an alleged violation of his right to speedy trial, which would otherwise put him
in double jeopardy should the same charges be revived. Petitioners situation is different. Double jeopardy has
not attached, considering that the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 119830 on the ground of violation of his right
to speedy trial was without basis and issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Where the right of the accused to speedy trial has not been violated, there is no reason to support
the initial order of dismissal.


3.

4.

Double jeopardy does not apply to this case, considering that there is no violation of petitioners right to
speedy trial.

NO.

In determining whether the accused has been deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the case and to a
speedy trial, four factors must be considered: (a) length of delay; (b) the reason for the delay; (c) the
defendants assertion of his right; and (d) prejudice to the defendant. x x x.

From the initial hearing on 27 February 2001 until the time the prosecution filed its formal offer of evidence for
Criminal Cases No. 119831-119832 on 25 November 2003, both prosecution and defense admit that no
evidence was presented for Criminal Case No. 119830. Hence, for a period of almost two years and eight
months, the prosecution did not present a single evidence for Criminal Case No. 119830.

Petitioners objection to the prosecutions stand that he gave an implied consent to the separate trial of
Criminal Case No. 119830 is belied by the records of the case. No objection was interposed by his defense
counsel when this matter was discussed during the initial hearing. 33 Petitioners conformity thereto can be
deduced from his non-objection at the preliminary hearing when the prosecution manifested that the evidence
to be presented would be only for Criminal Cases No. 119831-119832. His failure to object to the prosecutions
manifestation that the cases be tried separately is fatal to his case. The acts, mistakes and negligence of
counsel bind his client, except only when such mistakes would result in serious injustice. 34 In fact, petitioners
acquiescence is evident from the transcript of stenographic notes during the initial presentation of the Peoples
evidence in the five BW cases on 27 February 2001, herein quoted below:

As to the assertion that delay in the presentation of evidence for Criminal Case No. 119830 has prejudiced
petitioner because the witnesses for the defense may no longer be available at this time, suffice it to say that
the burden of proving his guilt rests upon the prosecution. 40 Should the prosecution fail for any reason to
present evidence sufficient to show his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, petitioner will be acquitted. It is safely
entrenched in our jurisprudence that unless the prosecution discharges its burden to prove the guilt of an
accused beyond reasonable doubt, the latter need not even offer evidence in his behalf. 41

In the cases involving petitioner, the length of delay, complexity of the issues and his failure to invoke said
right to speedy trial at the appropriate time tolled the death knell on his claim to the constitutional
guarantee.42 More importantly, in failing to interpose a timely objection to the prosecutions manifestation
during the preliminary hearings that the cases be tried separately, one after the other, petitioner was deemed
to have acquiesced and waived his objection thereto.

For the reasons above-stated, there is clearly insufficient ground to conclude that the prosecution is guilty of
violating petitioners right to speedy trial. Grave abuse of discretion defies exact definition, but generally refers
to "capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction." Any capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment in dismissing a criminal case is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. This is true in
the instant case.
YES.

Following this Courts ruling in Almario v. Court of Appeals, 46 as petitioners right to speedy trial was not
transgressed, this exception to the fourth element of double jeopardy that the defendant was acquitted or
convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused
was not met. Where the dismissal of the case was allegedly capricious, certiorari lies from such order of
dismissal and does not involve double jeopardy, as the petition challenges not the correctness but the validity
of the order of dismissal; such grave abuse of discretion amounts to lack of jurisdiction, which prevents double
jeopardy from attaching.47
Evidently, the task of the pillars of the criminal justice system is to preserve our democratic society under the rule
of law, ensuring that all those who appear before or are brought to the bar of justice are afforded a fair opportunity
to present their side. As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, Criminal Case No. 119830 is just one of the
many controversial cases involving the BW shares scam where public interest is undoubtedly at stake. The State,
like any other litigant, is entitled to its day in court, and to a reasonable opportunity to present its case. A hasty
dismissal, instead of unclogging dockets, has actually increased the workload of the justice system and unwittingly
prolonged the litigation.52
Finally, we reiterate that the rights given to the accused by the Constitution and the Rules of Court are shields, not
weapons. Courts are tasked to give meaning to that intent. There being no capricious, vexatious, oppressive delay
in the proceedings, and no postponements unjustifiably sought, we concur in the conclusions reached by the Court
of Appeals.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed 22 February 2006 Decision and 17 July 2006 Resolution issued by
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 83068 are hereby AFFIRMED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (SPECIAL DIVISION), JOSEPH EJERCITO
ESTRADA, JOSE JINGGOY ESTRADA and ATTY. EDWARD SERAPIO, respondents.

FACTS:

On March 24, 2003, public respondent Special Division of the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners Motion for
Three Days Hearing Per Week whereby the Office of the Special Prosecutor sought to hasten the trial

before said court of Criminal Cases Nos. 26558, 26565, and 26905, entitled People of the Philippines v. Joseph
Ejercito Estrada, et al. Public respondent also denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Hence, petitioner
through the Office of the Special Prosecutor now comes to this Court in this petition for certiorari and
mandamus to assail the denial of its petition and to compel public respondent to conduct three hearings of the
cited cases each week.
Originally, public respondent conducted trial hearings twice a week, from 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon. [1] Later, on
February 26, 2002, public respondent issued aResolution modifying this six-hours-per-week schedule. Public
respondent ordered that starting March 18, 2002, the cases would be heard thrice a week, every Mondays,
Wednesdays and Fridays, from 9:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon. [2]
Although this schedule could have expedited the proceedings, it was never implemented. Shortly after the
order was issued, private respondents former President Joseph Estrada and Jose Jinggoy Estrada dismissed
their counsel de parte. Counsel de oficio had to be appointed and trial did not resume until April 17, 2002. [3]
Determined to expedite the prosecution of the cases, the Office of the Special Prosecutor started insisting on
additional hearing days. The newly-appointed counsel de oficio, however, needed time to study the cases so
the Office of the Special Prosecutor opted instead to agree to private respondents proposition that hearings be
extended to five hours a day. The parties agreed that starting May 8, 2002, hearings shall be from 8:00 a.m. to
1:00 p.m. twice a week or for a total of ten hours per week. Criminal Case No. 26558, for Plunder, and Criminal
Case No. 26565, for Illegal Use of Alias, would be heard every Monday while Criminal Case No. 26905, for
Perjury, was to be heard every Wednesday. On April 22, 2002, public respondent issued an Order adopting the
agreement as new trial schedule. Thereafter, this schedule was consistently followed starting May 8, 2002.
When the longer hearings still did not result in expedited proceedings, the Office of the Special Prosecutor filed
on March 21, 2003, the abovementioned Motion for Three Days Hearing Per Week. [4] The Office of the Special
Prosecutor asked public respondent to implement the schedule provided in the February 26, 2002, Resolution.
On March 24, 2003, public respondent denied the motion. [5]

ISSUE:

Whether or not public respondent Sandiganbayan, Special Division, committed grave abuse of discretion in
ordering two trial days per week instead of three.

RULING:

NO.
The determination of how many hearing days shall be devoted to trial rests within the sound discretion of the
trial court. There is no justifiable reason to interfere with a trial courts scheduling of trial dates unless it clearly
appears that the judge abused its power and that injustice has been done. [16] Having failed to show that public
respondent has been guilty of grave abuse of discretion or that injustice would result from the adoption of a
schedule of ten hours per week, the writ of certiorari sought by the Office of the Special Prosecutor cannot be
granted.
The writ of mandamus likewise cannot issue. The Office of the Special Prosecutor has not sufficiently shown
that public respondent has the imperative duty to conduct three hearings per week. Mandamus is employed to
compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty. [17] It does not lie to control or review the exercise
of discretion.[18] It is unavailable to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way or the
retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of either. Of course, this rule admits of
exceptions as when there is grave abuse of discretion, [19] manifest injustice[20] or palpable excess of authority.
[21]
But, as discussed above, none has been shown thus far in this case. Worth stressing, the Office of the
Special Prosecutor has not shown how the assailed Order of public respondent can constitute an evasion or
refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The
assailed Order dated March 24, 2003, and theResolution dated May 13, 2003, of the public respondent Sandiganbayan,
Special Division, are AFFIRMED.

Bautista and Alcantara vs. Sharon Pangilinan G.R. 189754, oct. 24, 2012 (WALEY)
Singian vs. SB G.R. No. 195011-19, September 30, 2013 (WALEY)

People vs. Sandiganbayan and Barcenas GR 174504 March 21, 2011 (Rule 119) Demurrer to evidence
Facts:

 That on or about December 19, 1995 at Toledo City, Province of Cebu, Philippines, MANUEL G. BARCENAS, a
high-ranking public officer, being a Vice-Mayor of Toledo City, was accused of committing the offense in relation to
office, having obtained cash advances from the City Government of Toledo in the total amount (P61,765.00).
This amount he received by reason of his office, for which he is duty bound to liquidate the same within the
period required by law
With deliberate intent and intent to gain, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally fail to liquidate
said cash advances despite demands to the damage and prejudice of the government in the aforesaid amount.
On May 21, 2004, private respondent was charged with violation of Section 89 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
14452 before the Sandiganbayan.
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 27990 and raffled to the Third Division. On October 20, 2004,
private respondent was arraigned for which he pleaded not guilty.
The prosecution presented its lone witness, Manolo Tulibao Villad, Commission on Audit (COA) State Auditor.
Thereafter, the prosecution filed its formal offer of evidence and rested its case.

On April 20, 2006, private respondent filed a motion for leave to file demurrer to evidence.

On June 16, 2006, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution granting the motion.

On June 30, 2006, private respondent filed his demurrer6 to evidence.

The SB granted the Demurrer to evidence and the case was ordered DISMISSED.

Petitioners Arguments:
Although it concedes that the private respondent eventually settled the subject cash advances sometime in
March 1996, petitioner theorizes that damage is not one of the elements of the offense charged. Hence, the settlement
of the cash advance would not exonerate the private respondent but only mitigate his criminal liability. Otherwise, the
purpose of the law would be rendered futile since accountable officers can easily make cash advances and liquidate
the same beyond the period prescribed by law without being penalized for doing so.
Finally, petitioner argues that double jeopardy does not lie in this case because the order of dismissal was
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Private Respondents Arguments:
Private respondent counters that the grant of a demurrer to evidence is equivalent to an acquittal from which
the prosecution cannot appeal as it would place the accused in double jeopardy. Further, assuming that the
Sandiganbayan erroneously granted the demurrer, this would, at most, constitute an error of judgment and not an
error of jurisdiction. Thus, certiorari does not lie to correct the grant of the demurrer to evidence by the
Sandiganbayan.
Issue:
Whether the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
giving due course to and eventually granting the demurrer to evidence.
Held:
An order of dismissal arising from the grant of a demurrer to evidence has the effect of an acquittal unless the
order was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
In criminal cases, the grant of a demurrer is tantamount to an acquittal and the dismissal order may not be
appealed because this would place the accused in double jeopardy.
Although the dismissal order is not subject to appeal, it is still reviewable but only through certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. For the writ to issue, the trial court must be shown to have acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction such as where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to
present its case or where the trial was a sham thus rendering the assailed judgment void.

 The burden is on the petitioner to clearly demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a
point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice.
In the case at bar, the Sandiganbayan granted the demurrer to evidence on the ground that the prosecution
failed to prove that the government suffered any damage from private respondents non-liquidation of the subject cash
advance because it was later shown, as admitted by the prosecutions witness, that private respondent liquidated the
same albeit belatedly.

RULE 120
Rufina Chua vs. Chiok GR 14082 april 12, 2007 (Rule 120, Promulgation of Judgment in absentia)
FACTS:

In 1989, Rufina Chua, petitioner, met Wilfred Chiok, respondent, who represented himself as a licensed
stockbroker and an expert in the stock market. For several years, respondent acted as petitioners stockbroker.
In 1995, respondent encouraged petitioner to purchase shares in bulk as this will increase her earnings. Hence,
in June 1995, she entrusted to him the amount of P9,563,900.00 for the purpose of buying shares of stocks in
bulk, then there was no more news from respondent. Finally, when petitioner was able to contact him,
respondent admitted that he spent the money. At any rate, he issued two checks as payment but when
petitioner deposited them in the drawee bank, the checks were dishonored for insufficient funds.
In a letter dated October 25, 1995, petitioner demanded payment from respondent, but this remained
unheeded.
She caused the filing of an information for estafa against him with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 165, Pasig
City, docketed as Criminal Case No. 109927.
During the arraignment, respondent, assisted by his counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued.
Respondent denied the charge against him.
After the prosecution and the defense had presented their respective evidence, the trial court set the
promulgation of judgment on January 26, 1999. However, respondent and his counsel failed to appear on said
date despite notice.
The trial court reset the promulgation of judgment on February 1, 1999, with notice to respondent. Again,
respondent failed to appear.
The trial court then promulgated its Decision convicting respondent of estafa and sentencing him to suffer
twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
Respondent was likewise ordered to pay herein petitioner the amount of P9,563,900.00 with interest
On the same day, February 1, 1999, the prosecution filed a motion for cancellation of bail on the ground that
respondent might flee or commit another crime.
On February 13, 199, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the judgment of conviction.
Meanwhile, or on February 15, 1999, the motion for cancellation of bail was set for hearing. The prosecution
presented a Record Check Routing Form issued by the Bureau of Immigration showing that respondent has an
Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) and Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR). During that hearing,
respondent admitted using the names "Mark Tan" and Tong Wai Fat" as aliases.
Consequently, on May 28, 1999, the trial court issued an Omnibus Order (a) denying respondents motion for
reconsideration of the judgment of conviction; (b) canceling his bail; and (c) giving him five (5) days from
notice within which to appear before the trial court, otherwise he would be arrested.
On June 18, 1999, respondent interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals from the trial courts judgment of
conviction and from the Omnibus Order insofar as it denied his motion for reconsideration of said judgment.
The following day, or on June 19, 1999, respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari with
application for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a writ preliminary injunction assailing the trial courts
Omnibus Order canceling his bail.
On June 25, 1999, the trial court issued a warrant of arrest against respondent for his failure to appear despite
the lapse of the 5-day period provided in the May 28, 1999 Omnibus Order. The warrant was returned unserved
because he could not be found at his given address.
However, the Court of Appeals, in a Resolution dated July 27, 1999 issued a TRO enjoining the trial court from
implementing its Omnibus Order of May 28, 1999.
On September 20, 1999, after hearing respondents application for injunction, the appellate court issued a writ
of preliminary injunction enjoining the arrest of respondent, holding that the latter should not be deprived of
his liberty pending resolution of his appeal as the offense for which he was convicted is a non-capital offense;
and that the probability that he will flee during the pendency of his appeal is merely conjectural.

Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution
dated November 16, 1999.
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the arrest of respondent.

Whether or not the lower court erred in not promulgating in absentia on the first time the promulgation of
judgment was set and reset it on another day.
HELD:

The petition is meritorious.

Firstly, the petition for certiorari with prayer for a TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction (CA-G.R. SP No.
53340) is not the proper recourse in assailing the trial courts May 28, 1999 Omnibus Order canceling his bail.

Secondly, the assailed September 20, 1999 Resolution of the Court of Appeals granting respondents
application for a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the implementation of the trial courts Omnibus Order
canceling his bail, is bereft of any factual or legal basis. To be entitled to an injunctive writ, the applicant must
show that (1) he has a clear existing right to be protected; and (2) the acts against which the injunction is to
be directed are in violation of such right.

SEC. 6. Promulgation of judgment. The judgment is promulgated by reading it in the presence of the accused
and any judge of the court in which it was rendered. However, if the conviction is for a light offense, the
judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his counsel or representative. When the judge is absent or
outside the province or city, the judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court.
xxx
The proper clerk of court shall give notice to the accused personally or through his bondsman or warden and
counsel, requiring him to be present at the promulgation of the decision. x x x.
In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment despite notice, THE
PROMULGATION SHALL BE MADE BY RECORDING THE JUDGMENT IN THE CRIMINAL DOCKET and serving him a
copy thereof at his last known address or thru his counsel.
If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable cause, he shall
lose the remedies available in these Rules against the judgment and the court shall order his arrest. Within
fifteen (15) days from promulgation of judgment, however, the accused may surrender and file a motion for
leave of court to avail of these remedies. He shall state the reasons for his absence at the scheduled
promulgation, and if he proves that his absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said
remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice.10 (Underscoring supplied)
It bears stressing that the rule authorizing the promulgation of judgment in absentia is intended to obviate the
situation in the past where the judicial process could be subverted by the accused jumping bail to frustrate the
promulgation of judgment.11 As mentioned earlier, the trial court should have promulgated the judgment in
absentia on January 26, 1999. The resetting the promulgation on February 1, 1999 is tantamount to condoning
respondents act of making a mockery of our judicial process, thereby defeating the avowed purpose of the
Rule.

SB of Taguig vs. Judge Estrella

Facts:

At bar is a sworn letter-complaint dated October 20, 1997 filed by 10 members of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Taguig, Metro Manila charging Judge Santiago G. Estrella of Branch 68 of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital
Judicial Region stationed in Pasig City with serious misconduct relative to Election Protest No. 144, entitled Ricardo D.
Papa, Jr. vs. Isidro B. Garcia.

The present controversy stems from an election protest filed by then mayoral candidate Ricardo D. Papa, Jr.
against Isidro B. Garcia, the candidate proclaimed mayor of Taguig, Metro Manila in the May 8, 1995 elections. In his
protest, Papa impugned the results of all 713 precincts in the municipality. This was filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig and eventually raffled to the sala of respondent wherein it was docketed as Election Protest No. 144.

Garcia filed his answer with counter-protest and after the rejoinder of issues, Papa filed a Motion to Withdraw
First, Second, Fourth, and Fifth Causes of Action, thereby limiting his cause of action to only one: the determination of
the number of the plain Garcia votes which should be considered stray and their number deducted from votes credited
to protestee Garcia, there having been another candidate surnamed Garcia.


The motion was granted and forthwith, the revision committee opened 712 questioned ballot boxes, examined
the contents, and revised the ballots.

On March 14, 1996, after the revision of ballots was completed, Papa filed a Motion for Technical Examination,
wherein he objected to more than 5,000 ballots, the same allegedly having been Written By One (WBO) or Written By
Two (WBT) persons. Respondent judge granted the motion. However, on March 25, 1996, Papa withdrew this motion.

On April 10, 1996, a final revision report was submitted to respondent judge by Atty. Katherine A. Go, the overall chairperson of the Revision Committee. The report stated that Papa actually objected to a total of 11,290 ballots for
Garcia, over 5,000 of which were objected to by reason of the same having been written by one person (WBO) or
written by two (WBT). The said report also mentioned that Garcia had 3,049 plain Garcia votes.

Thereafter, both parties offered their respective exhibits, which were all admitted by respondent judge.

On February 11, 1997, respondent issued an order directing the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to
examine the contested ballots in the presence of a representative of both parties. The pertinent portion of the order
provided that so as to enable the court to get a complete overview of the matter, it was better to have a handwriting
expert examine the questioned ballots to settle once and for all the questions and objections relative to the ballots.

After the NBI finished its examination of the contested ballots and upon the determination by respondent that
he had no further need of the ballot boxes, he issued an order dated May 19, 1997 directing the removal of the ballot
boxes and election paraphernalia from his courtroom. On May 27, 1997, respondent ordered the immediate transfer of
all the ballot boxes and election paraphernalia to the sala of Judge Vivencio Baclig, Branch 157 of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City, so that Judge Baclig may proceed with the trial of the vice-mayoralty election protest of the same
municipality. On June 5, 1997, all the ballot boxes which contained both contested and uncontested ballots were
removed from the custody of respondent and transferred to RTC, Branch 157. On June 26, 1997, the NBI Report was
submitted to respondent.

On July 22, 1997, Garcia filed a Manifestation and Formal Motion with Formal Query, praying that an order be
issued to the Branch Clerk of Court to be furnished a copy of the NBI Reports and/or allow him to copy or review or at
least to read said reports. Respondent judge denied the motion on the same day, proclaiming that the examination of
contested ballots by the NBI was ordered, upon the instance of the court, and not by the parties, hence, only the court
was given copies of the NBI Reports.

On the same day that Garcias motion was denied, respondent also set the date of promulgation of judgment
for July 31, 1997. This prompted Garcia to file a Manifestation and Most Urgent Motion to Defer and/or Cancel
Scheduled Promulgation of Judgment premised on respondents refusal to furnish him a copy of the NBI Reports, and
Garcias physical impossibility of examining the contested ballots because (a) the report was submitted on June 26,
1997, and (b) the contested ballots and other election paraphernalia had been transferred to the sala of Judge Vivencio
Baclig in RTC, Branch 157. Respondent judge denied Garcias motion on July 28, 1997, explaining that: xxx To allow
parties at this stage to secure copies of the NBI report and to comment on the same before promulgating the decision
would be opening the floodgates for undue delay.

Thereafter, Garcia filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, with a prayer for restraining order
and preliminary injunction with the COMELEC on July 29, 1997. The very next day or on July 30, 1997, the COMELEC
issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining respondent judge from proceeding with the scheduled
promulgation of judgment set on July 31, 1997.

On August 21, 1997, after the expiration of the TRO, Papa filed a Motion for Immediate Promulgation of
Judgment, requesting that the same be heard on August 25, 1997. This was, however, granted by respondent judge
the very next day, three days ahead of the date set for hearing of the motion, with respondent setting August 27, 1997
as the promulgation date. Forthwith, Garcia filed with the COMELEC an Urgent Manifestation and Motion Reiterating
Prayer for Preliminary Injunction.

One day before the scheduled promulgation of judgment, or on August 26, 1997, the COMELEC issued an order
directing respondent to allow both parties or their counsel to have access to the NBI reports and to give the parties
copies thereof before the promulgation of the decision.

On the day of the promulgation of judgment (August 27, 1997), respondent gave Garcias counsel 5 minutes to
go over Questioned Documents Report No. 152-297 which consisted of 53 pages, and Questioned Document Report
No. 152-297(A), which consisted of 17 pages

Thereafter, judgment was promulgated, disposing:

WHEREFORE, and all the forgoing considered, the Court resolves to SUSTAIN as it hereby SUSTAINS the Protest
lodged by Ricardo D. Papa, Jr., and accordingly renders judgment DECLARING the aforenamed Protestant the duly
elected mayor of the Municipality of Taguig, Metro Manila.

The Counter-Protest filed by protestee Isidro B. Garcia is ordered DISMISSED.

Issue:
(1) whether it was proper for respondent to have designated the NBI to conduct the necessary handwriting
examination and to submit reports on the results thereof to the court and not to the parties considering that said
reports were the sole basis of the decision rendered by the court, and (2) whether it was proper for respondent to have
granted the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal filed by the declared winner Ricardo D. Papa, Jr., allowing him to take

his oath notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal filed with the Commission on Elections concerning the decision
rendered by respondent.
Ruling:

In addressing the first issue, respondent claimed that the examination conducted by the NBI, which included
the segregation, photocopying, and photographing of the contested ballots was in fact done in the presence of the
court and the representatives of the parties. Respondent also alleged that the NBI gave one copy each of the reports
only to the court since the request therefor did not emanate from the parties. He further claimed that the reports were
made available to the parties as early as August 25, 1997, but that neither party took the time to reproduce the same.

In the case at bar, respondents demeanor during the entirety of the trial is clearly wanting. From the outset, it
must be noted that Garcia obtained a total of 41,900 votes as compared to Papas 36,539. However, respondent based
his decision to proclaim Papa the winner of the 1995 elections on the basis of the NBI reports which recommended the
deduction of 12,734 votes from Garcia's total votes of 41,900 (per revision report), and 3,809 votes from Papas total
votes of 36, 539 (per revision report). Deducting 12,734 votes from Garcias votes would give him a total of 29,166;
while deducting 3,809 votes from Papas votes would result in him getting a total of 32,730 votes. This will wipe out
Garcias edge of 5,361 and give Papa a judge-made plurality of 3,564 votes.

A more careful perusal of the data contained in the NBI reports would have shown a different outcome. Upon
analyzing the NBI report, it should have been apparent to respondent that the actual count of the listed Garciamanufactured ballots (GMB) to be deducted is 12,388 votes. This would have resulted in a total of 29,512 votes for
Garcia as compared to 32,730 for Papa. It must also be noted that there were 3,049 votes for Garcia which were not
counted because these were considered stray votes, there having been another candidate surnamed Garcia. This other
candidate was, however, declared a nuisance candidate. Upon adding these 3,049 alleged stray Garcia votes to
Garcias 29,512, we get a total of 32,561 votes for Garcia as compared to 32,730 for Papa. This would have given Papa
only a margin of 169 votes. This close margin between the two candidates should have given respondent reason
enough to subject the NBI Reports to closer scrutiny. It should be noted that respondent had already transferred the
questioned ballot boxes to another RTC sala on June 5, 1997, 21 days before he received the reports and
recommendation of the NBI. This fact made it impossible for him to form a proper basis for his decision, as clearly,
there was no way for him to ascertain the veracity of the NBI Reports. Section 255 of the Omnibus Election Code
requires that, where allegations in a protest or counter-protest so warrant, or whenever in the opinion of the court the
interests of justice so require, it shall immediately order the book of voters, ballot boxes and their keys, ballots and
other documents used in the election be brought before it and that the ballots be examined and the votes recounted.

In this case, respondent was remiss in examining the questioned ballots despite the wrong figures,
computations, and typographical errors and mistakes present in the NBI Reports. Notwithstanding these errors,
respondent based his decision solely on the conclusions and findings of the NBI.

Concerning the second issue, respondent asserted that he acted in accordance with the Rules of Civil
Procedure which provide that upon motion of the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party, the court may, in its
discretion and upon good reasons, order the execution of a judgment or final order even before the expiration of the
period to appeal. Respondent further contended that Papa, the rightful winner of the May 1995 elections, had been
deprived of his right to sit as the duly elected mayor of the Municipality of Taguig and that his constituents had been
equally deprived of his services as their duly elected municipal head.

Respondents obvious partiality for Papa is further bolstered by his acts during the promulgation of judgment on
August 27, 1997. The facts show that respondent did not set the NBI Reports for hearing, nor was Garcia allowed to
confront the NBI officials concerned. He did not even allow Garcia to get copies of the reports until after the
promulgation of the decision on August 27, 1997, and this, only after the COMELEC had ordered respondent to do so
on August 26, 1997. In fact, the only time Garcias counsel was able to study the two reports of the NBI consisting of 53
and 17 pages, respectively, was five minutes before the promulgation of judgment. Respondents justification that he
alone should have copies of the reports since these were court-sponsored and the request did not emanate from either
of the parties, is an explanation which this Court finds hard to accept.

The Judge should always be imbued with a high sense of duty and responsibility in the discharge of his
obligation to promptly and properly administer justice. He must view himself as a priest for the administration of
justice is akin to a religious crusade. Thus, exerting the same devotion as a priest in the performance of the most
sacred ceremonies of religious liturgy, the judge must render service with impartiality commensurate with public trust
and confidence reposed in him. (Dimatulac vs. Villon, 297 SCRA 679 [1998])

A judge should, in pending or prospective litigation before him, be scrupulously careful to avoid such action as
may reasonably tend to waken the suspicion that his social or business relations or friendships constitute an element
in determining his judicial course. He must not only render a just, correct and impartial decision but should do so in
such a manner as to be free from any suspicion as to his fairness, impartiality and integrity. A decision which correctly
applies the law and jurisprudence will nevertheless be subject to questions of impropriety when rendered by a
magistrate or tribunal believed to be less than impartial and honest.

WHEREFORE, Judge Santiago G. Estrella is hereby found guilty of serious misconduct, partiality, and
inexcusable negligence, and is ordered to pay a fine in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), with the
stern warning that any similar misconduct on his part in the future will be dealt with more severely.

Moll vs. CA, Judge Almonte GR 145425 Dec. 9, 2002

Facts:

Before this Court is an Urgent Motion to Lift, Recall and/or Withdraw Warrant of Arrest, filed by petitioner
relative to a criminal case filed against him in which he was convicted.

Petitioner Salvador K. Moll was elected as vice-mayor of the Municipality of Malinao, Albay in 1989.

Sometime in April 1989, petitioner entered into a contract with a certain Ysmael Zepeda for and in behalf of
the local government of Malinao. The said memorandum of agreement placed under administration of the municipal
government the catching and sale of bangus in the coastal waters of Malinao and authorized Zepeda to be the
administrator thereof.

Mayor Misericordia Clavecilla, the duly elected mayor at that time, did not share the same view. She asserted
that herein petitioner and the Sangguniang Bayan members were bereft of any authority to enter into such a contract
nor was he vested with any appointing authority. Consequently, the mayor filed criminal charges against petitioner.

Herein petitioner was initially charged and convicted for violation of Section 3 (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 by
the Regional Trial Court of Tabaco, Albay. This case is still the subject of an appeal at the Sandiganbayan.

Petitioner was likewise charged before and convicted by the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Tiwi-Malinao in
Criminal Case No. 4088 for usurpation of authority as penalized under Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code, in a
decision dated March 29, 1999, penned by public respondent Judge Samuel Buendia.

The promulgation of judgment of the aforestated Criminal Case No. 4088 was initially set by respondent Judge
Samuel Buendia on April 21, 1999. It was, however, postponed and reset to May 5, 1999 because petitioner and
counsel did not appear. However, on May 4, 1999, a day before the intended promulgation, petitioner Salvador K. Moll
filed a motion to quash on the ground of double jeopardy and set the hearing of the said motion on May 11, 1999.

The promulgation of judgment which was rescheduled on May 5, 1999 was, however, again cancelled due to
the absence of petitioners counsel and the pendency of his motion to quash which was set for hearing on May 11,
1999.

On May 11, 1999, after counsels were allowed to deliberate on the motion to quash, respondent Judge Buendia
denied the aforesaid motion and proceeded to render his judgment. The pertinent order stated:
On call of this case for promulgation of judgment, the accused and his counsel Atty. Romeo Gonzaga appeared.
Accuseds motion to quash is also set for hearing. This case was also set for promulgation of judgment on April 21 and
May 5, 1999 during which accused and counsel respectively did not appear. Before the promulgation of judgment, the
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor and defense counsel were allowed by this Court to argue their respective position anent
the motion to quash. After the oral arguments, the Court decided to deny the motion.

A motion for reconsideration of the denial of the motion to quash was filed but was denied in an order dated
June 18, 1999.

Thereafter, petitioner, believing that he was denied due process when the promulgation of judgment
proceeded despite his absence on June 25, 1999, filed before the Regional Trial Court of Tabaco, Albay, a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65. This was, however, also dismissed in an order dated July 12,1999, on the ground that the
petition was insufficient in form and substance.

A motion for reconsideration of the said order also proved futile.

Undaunted, herein petitioner, on October 18, 1999, filed a petition for review under Rule 42 before the Court of
Appeals. The appellate court, in a decision dated May 22, 2000, denied it for lack of merit.

Petitioner filed two motions for reconsideration before the appellate court. Both were denied.

On October 30, 2000, petitioner filed before the Supreme Court a petition for review on certiorari. He
contended that the Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the decision of the trial court, considering that there was
an invalid or improper promulgation of the judgment in his criminal case. In fact, petitioner even posited the view that
his period to appeal never commenced to run in view of the improper promulgation made by the trial court.

Despite the consistent denials of his petition for review and two motions for reconsideration, petitioner, on
October 24, 2001, again filed before us an Urgent Motion to Elevate Case To En Banc. But it was denied
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner was denied due process when the promulgation of judgment proceeded despite
his absence
Ruling:

Petitioner cannot even continue to harp on the alleged denial of due process when respondent MCTC Judge
Buendia decided to promulgate the decision in Criminal Case No. M-4088 on the very same day the order denying the

motion to quash was resolved. What is repugnant to due process is the denial of opportunity to be heard (Korean
Airlines Co., Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, 247 SCRA 599). There is nothing in the facts as to show us that petitioner was
never afforded the opportunity to be heard. The fact that the promulgation of the decision in Criminal Case No. M-4088
was reset several times cannot be attributed to the MCTC. Petitioner and his counsel, even with due notice, had
repeatedly failed to appear at the prior dates scheduled for the said promulgation. In view of the foregoing, we find no
error on the part of respondent MCTC who at times even exercised liberality to accommodate the postponement.
Petitioner, therefore, should be the last to claim denial of opportunity after squandering several opportunities to do so.

Considering the foregoing discussion, the denial of petitioners case in Special Civil Action No. T-2022 must
remain undisturbed, more so in the light of the fact that while it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities it
is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly
and speedy administration of justice (Garbo v. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 159).

At any rate, assuming arguendo that the petition in Special Civil Action No. T-2022 is not defective in either its
form or substance, we nevertheless would have reached the same conclusion of the MCTC upholding in toto the
decision in Criminal Case No. M-4088, finding ourselves similarly constrained to proceed with the promulgation
consisting in the recording of the judgment in the criminal docket. Besides, we see no point in remanding the case to
the trial court just for the purpose of reading again the judgment which is not only sound but also already known to the
petitioner.
CASE #8

DAVID SO VS. CA
FACTS:

This is an appeal by certiorari from a decision rendered by the Court of Appeals dated January 22, 1999 which
dismissed the petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order filed by
petitioner David So, and its Resolution dated May 21, 1999 denying the Motion for Reconsideration

the petitioner was the accused for violation of BP 22 on the basis of PCB Check 393662 dated January 6, 1983
in the amount of P6,000.00 and PCB Check No. 393663 dated January 10, 1983 in the amount of P28,600.00 which he
issued to Faustino Puzon and which were both dishonored by the drawee bank for the reason "Account Closed"

However, at the time of the issuance of the aforesaid checks, Circular No. 4 dated December 15, 1981 of the
then Ministry of Justice was in effect. The circular provides:
'2.3.4. Where issuance of bouncing check is neither estafa nor violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
Where the check is issued as part of an arrangement to guarantee or secure payment of an obligation, whether preexisting or not, the drawer is not criminally liable for either estafa or violation of B.P. Blg. 22 x x x.'

This circular was subsequently reversed by Ministry Circular No. 12 dated August 8, 1984

In a decision dated May 19, 1987, the trial court convicted him of the offense charged. He appealed his
conviction before this Court which, in a decision dated November 12, 1990 the conviction was affirmed. Forthwith, he
appealed to the Supreme Court and the same was denied due course

On April 1, 1988, after the Supreme Court decision had become final and executory, the trial court issued a
warrant of arrest against the petitioner in order to execute the judgment of conviction

On August 4, 1998, petitioner filed with the trial court an "Urgent Motion for Declaration of Nullity of Judgment"
x x x invoking the doctrine laid down in the case of People vs. Co (should be Co vs. Court of Appeals) whereby the
Supreme Court rendered that:
"It would seem, then, that the weight of authority is decidedly in favor of the proposition that the Court's decision of
September 21, 1987 in Que vs. People, 154 SCRA 160 (1987) - i.e., that a check issued merely to guarantee the
performance of an obligation is nevertheless covered by B.P. 22 - should not be given retrospective effect to the
prejudice of the petitioner and other persons similarly situated, who relied on the official opinion of the Minister of
Justice that such a check did not fall within the scope of B.P. 22."

Petitioner claims that the facts of the said case are similar to his case, that is, he issued the subject checks to
guarantee or secure the performance of his obligation with the complainant. He thereby prayed for the declaration of
nullity of the decision of the trial court

court

The trial court denied the Motion. He then filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was also denied by the trial

Petitioner David So filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari with prayer for Preliminary Injunction
and Temporary Restraining Order seeking to enjoin the execution of the judgment of the trial court. The Court of
Appeals issued on December 8, 1998 a temporary restraining order enjoining the trial court from implementing the
warrant of arrest. On January 22, 1999, respondent appellate court rendered a decision dismissing the petition for

certiorari after finding that the case of Co vs. Court of Appeals did not apply to petitioner's case where the trial court
ruled that the checks were issued in exchange for cash. Hence this petition
ISSUE:
Whether or not the ruling in Co vs. Court of Appeals applies hinges primarily on the question of whether the checks
issued by petitioner were guarantee checks or not
HELD:

NO. The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Temporary Restraining Order issued on July 5, 1999 is
hereby LIFTED

It will be noted that in the petitioners petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 108209, he raised
the following arguments: (1) that the two checks were issued in payment of a loan and hence his conviction infringes
his constitutional right not to be imprisoned for non-payment of a debt; (2) that the two checks were issued as mere
guarantee and hence covered under MOJ Circular No. 4; and (3) that MOJ Circular No. 12 cannot be given retroactive
effect

In the case at bar, petitioner is raising exactly the same issues passed upon in G.R. No. 108209, under the
guise, however, of invoking the ruling in Co vs. Court of Appeals that the doctrine laid down in Que vs. People - that
B.P. 22 applies even in cases where dishonored checks are issued merely in the form of a deposit or a guaranteeshould not be given retrospective application

It bears to stress that contrary to petitioner's asseveration, the trial court found that the checks were issued in
exchange for cash, and not to guarantee payment of a loan. The judgment of the court is to the effect that MOJ
Circular Nos. 4 and 12, which involve guarantee checks only, do not apply to the case of petitioner because what is
involved here is a transaction not for guarantee but for value or in exchange for cash

The Court of Appeals affirmed this finding of fact. This finding was again affirmed by this Court in G.R. No.
108209 when in a minute resolution it denied due course to the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner. Our minute
resolution is deemed a disposition on the merits and has the effect of resolving the issues raised therein. It constitutes
res judicata to the case at bar

Petitioner is now bound by such adverse judgment on account of finality of judgment. It has to be so,
otherwise, there would be no end to litigation. Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is
essential to an effective administration of justice that once a judgment has become final, the issue or cause therein
should be laid to rest

Even an alleged erroneous application of a legal principle cannot bring a judgment that has already attained
the status of finality to an absolute nullity under the well-entrenched rule of finality of judgment. This rule is grounded
on the fundamental principle of public policy and sound practice that at the risk of occasional error, the judgment of
the court must become final at some definite date fixed by law

Considering that the cases of Co vs. Court of Appeals and Que vs. People likewise involve the issuance of
guarantee checks, the doctrinal rulings enunciated therein cannot properly be applied to petitioner's case

CASE #9

TEVES V. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS:

Edgar Y. Teves, former Mayor of Valencia, Negros Oriental, and his wife Teresita Z. Teves seeks to annul and set
aside the 16 July 2002 Decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 2337 convicting them of violation of
Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law for possessing direct pecuniary interest in the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation
Center in Valencia

Upon their arraignment on 12 May 1997, the petitioners pleaded not guilty. Pre-trial and trial were thereafter
set. The petitioners and the prosecution agreed on the authenticity of the prosecutions documentary evidence. Thus,
the prosecution dispensed with the testimonies of witnesses and formally offered its documentary evidence marked as
Exhibits A to V


On 23 February 1998, the petitioners filed their Comment/Objections to the evidence offered by the
prosecution and moved for leave of court to file a demurrer to evidence. On 29 July 1998, the Sandiganbayan admitted
Exhibits A to S of the prosecutions evidence but rejected Exhibits T, U, and V

It also denied petitioners demurrer to evidence, as well as their motion for reconsideration. This
notwithstanding, the petitioners filed a Manifestation that they were, nonetheless, dispensing with the presentation of
witnesses because the evidence on record are inadequate to support their conviction

On 16 July 2002, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a decision (1) convicting petitioners Edgar and Teresita
Teves of violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law; (2) imposing upon them an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment of nine years and twenty-one days as minimum to twelve years as maximum; and (3) ordering the
confiscation of all their rights, interests, and participation in the assets and properties of the Valencia Cockpit and
Recreation Center in favor of the Government, as well as perpetual disqualification from public office

The conviction was anchored on the finding that the petitioners possessed pecuniary interest in the said
business enterprise on the grounds that (a) nothing on record appears that Mayor Teves divested himself of his
pecuniary interest in said cockpit; (b) as of April 1992, Teresita Teves was of record the owner/licensee of the cockpit;
and (c) since Mayor Teves and Teresita remained married to each other from 1983 until 1992, their property relations
as husband and wife, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, was that of the conjugal partnership of gains. Hence,
the cockpit is a conjugal property over which the petitioners have pecuniary interest. This pecuniary interest is
prohibited under Section 89(2) of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991, and
thus falls under the prohibited acts penalized in Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law

The Sandiganbayan, however, absolved the petitioners of the charge of causing the issuance of a business
permit or license to operate the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center on or about 4 February 1992 for not being
well-founded

On 26 August 2002, the petitioners filed the instant petition for review on certiorari seeking to annul and set
aside the 16 July 2002 Decision of the Sandiganbayan. At first, the petition was denied for failure of the petitioners to
sufficiently show that the Sandiganbayan committed any reversible error in the challenged decision as to warrant the
exercise by this Court of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction. But upon petitioners motion for reconsideration, the
petition was reinstated

The petitioners assert that the Sandiganbayan committed serious and palpable errors in convicting them. In
the first place, the charge was for alleged unlawful intervention of Mayor Teves in his official capacity in the issuance of
a cockpit license in violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law. But they were convicted of having a direct financial
or pecuniary interest in the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center prohibited under Section 89(2) of the LGC of 1991,
which is essentially different from the offense with which they were charged

Thus, the petitioners insist that their constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against them was transgressed because they were never apprised at any stage of the proceedings in the
Sandiganbayan that they were being charged with, and arraigned and tried for, violation of the LGC of 1991. The
variance doctrine invoked by the respondent is but a rule of procedural law that should not prevail over their
constitutionally-guaranteed right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against them

Second, according to the petitioners, their alleged prohibited pecuniary interest in the Valencia Cockpit in 1992
was not proved. The Sandiganbayan presumed that since Mayor Teves was the cockpit operator and licensee in 1989,
said interest continued to exist until 1992. It also presumed that the cockpit was the conjugal property of Mayor Teves
and his wife, and that their pecuniary interest thereof was direct. But under the regime of conjugal partnership of
gains, any interest thereon is at most inchoate and indirect

Also assigned as glaring error is the conviction of Teresita Teves, who is not a public officer. In the information,
only Mayor Teves was accused of having a direct financial or pecuniary interest in the operation of the Valencia Cockpit
and Recreation Center in Negros Oriental. His wife was merely charged as a co-conspirator of her husbands alleged act
of while in the performance and taking advantage of his official functions, willfully, unlawfully and criminally caus[ing]
the issuance of the appropriate business permit/license to operate the said cockpit arena. Teresita Teves could not be
convicted because conspiracy was not established. Besides, the Sandiganbayan had already absolved the petitioners
of this offense

On the other hand, the Sandiganbayan, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), insists that the
uncontroverted documentary evidence proved that petitioner Edgar Teves had direct pecuniary interest over the

cockpit in question as early as 26 September 1983. That interest continued even though he transferred the
management thereof to his wife Teresita Teves in 1992, since their property relations were governed by the conjugal
partnership of gains

The Sandiganbayan found that the charge against Mayor Teves for causing the issuance of the business permit
or license to operate the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center is not well-founded. This it based, and rightly so, on
the additional finding that only the Sangguniang Bayan could have issued a permit to operate the Valencia Cockpit in
the year 1992. Indeed, under Section 447(3) of the LGC of 1991, which took effect on 1 January 1992, it is the
Sangguniang Bayan that has the authority to issue a license for the establishment, operation, and maintenance of
cockpits. Unlike in the old LGC, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, wherein the municipal mayor was the presiding officer of the
Sangguniang Bayan, under the LGC of 1991, the mayor is not so anymore and is not even a member of the
Sangguniang Bayan. Hence, Mayor Teves could not have intervened or taken part in his official capacity in the issuance
of a cockpit license during the material time, as alleged in the information, because he was not a member of the
Sangguniang Bayan

There is no legal basis to convict Teresita Teves as a co-conspirator in the absence of a finding that Mayor
Teves himself is guilty of the offense charged. In short, the Sandiganbayan correctly absolved the petitioners of the
charge based on the first mode. And there is no need to belabor this point

The Sandiganbayan, however, convicted the petitioners of violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law based
on the second mode. It reasoned that the evidence overwhelmingly evinces that Mayor Teves had a pecuniary interest
in the Valencia Cockpit, which is prohibited under Section 89(2) of the LGC of 1991

The information accuses petitioner Edgar Teves, then Municipal Mayor of Valencia, Negros Oriental, of causing,
while in the performance and taking advantage of his official functions, and conspiring and confederating with his wife
the issuance of the appropriate business permit/license to operate the Valencia Cockpit and Recreation Center in favor
of one Daniel Teves. The last part of the dispositive portion of the information states that said accused Edgar Y. Teves
having a direct financial or pecuniary interest therein considering the fact that said cockpit arena is actually owned
and operated by him and accused Teresita Teves

A careful reading of the information reveals that the afore-quoted last part thereof is merely an allegation of
the second element of the crime, which is, that he has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any
business, contract or transaction. Not by any stretch of imagination can it be discerned or construed that the aforequoted last part of the information charges the petitioners with the second mode by which Section 3(h) of the AntiGraft Law may be violated. Hence, we agree with the petitioners that the charge was for unlawful intervention in the
issuance of the license to operate the Valencia Cockpit. There was no charge for possession of pecuniary interest
prohibited by law

However, the evidence for the prosecution has established that petitioner Edgar Teves, then mayor of Valencia,
Negros Oriental, owned the cockpit in question. In his sworn application for registration of cockpit filed on 26
September 1983 with the Philippine Gamefowl Commission, Cubao, Quezon City, as well as in his renewal application
dated 6 January 1989 he stated that he is the owner and manager of the said cockpit. Absent any evidence that he
divested himself of his ownership over the cockpit, his ownership thereof is rightly to be presumed because a thing
once proved to exist continues as long as is usual with things of that nature

Effective January 1990 he turned over the management of the cockpit to Mrs. Teresita Z. Teves for the reason
that [he] could no longer devote a full time as manager of the said entity due to other work pressure is not sufficient
proof that he divested himself of his ownership over the cockpit. Only the management of the cockpit was transferred
to Teresita Teves effective January 1990. Being the owner of the cockpit, his interest over it was direct

Even if the ownership of petitioner Edgar Teves over the cockpit were transferred to his wife, still he would
have a direct interest thereon because, as correctly held by respondent Sandiganbayan, they remained married to
each other from 1983 up to 1992, and as such their property relation can be presumed to be that of conjugal
partnership of gains in the absence of evidence to the contrary. Article 160 of the Civil Code provides that all property
of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the
husband or to the wife. And Section 143 of the Civil Code declares all the property of the conjugal partnership of gains
to be owned in common by the husband and wife. Hence, his interest in the Valencia Cockpit is direct and is, therefore,
prohibited under Section 89(2) of the LGC of 1991

The offense proved, therefore, is the second mode of violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law, which is
possession of a prohibited interest

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners can be convicted of violation of Section 89(2) of the LGC of 1991 considering that it was
not charged in the information
HELD:

YES. The answer is in the affirmative in view of the variance doctrine embodied in Section 4, in relation to
Section 5, Rule 120, Rules of Criminal Procedure, which both read:
Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. When there is a variance between the offense
charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily
includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense
charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved.
Sec. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. An offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved
when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information,
constitutes the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved when the essential
ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.

The elements of the offense charged in this case, which is unlawful intervention in the issuance of a cockpit
license in violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law, are
1. The accused is a public officer;
2. He has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract, or transaction, whether or not
prohibited by law; and
3. He intervenes or takes part in his official capacity in connection with such interest.

On the other hand, the essential ingredients of the offense proved, which is possession of prohibited interest in
violation of Section 3(h) of the Anti-Graft Law, are as follows:
1. The accused is a public officer;
2. He has a direct or indirect financial or pecuniary interest in any business, contract or transaction; and
3. He is prohibited from having such interest by the Constitution or any law.

It is clear that the essential ingredients of the offense proved constitute or form part of those constituting the
offense charged. Put differently, the first and second elements of the offense charged, as alleged in the information,
constitute the offense proved. Hence, the offense proved is necessarily included in the offense charged, or the offense
charged necessarily includes the offense proved. The variance doctrine thus finds application to this case, thereby
warranting the conviction of petitioner Edgar Teves for the offense proved

People vs. Sumingwa GR 183619 Oct. 13, 2009 (WALEY)

People vs. Larranaga et. al. G.R. 138874-75, February 3, 2004 (WALEY)

Corpuz vs. Sandiganbayan, GR 166214, Nov. 11, 2004 (Rule 120

Section 1)
FACTS:

Ombudsman Prosecutors, Office of the Ombudsman, accuse MARIALEN C. CORPUZ at. al, of violation of Section
3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

That, during the period from 13 May 1994 to 09 June 1997, accused Antonio P. Belicena and Uldarico P.
Andutan, Jr., both public officers, being then the Assistant Secretary/Administrator, and Deputy Executive Director,
respectively, of the One Stop Shop Inter-Agency Tax Credit & Duty Drawback Center, Department of Finance, Manila,
while in the performance of their official functions and acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality, conspiring
and confederating with each other, together with accused Monico V. Jacob, et. al., all officials of Petron Corporation,
and Antonio H. Roman, Sr. and Marialen C. Corpuz, both officers of Filsyn Corporation, did then and there, willfully, and
unlawfully and recommend and criminally approve the transfer of the following Tax Credit Certificates purportedly
issued to Filsyn Corp. amounting to a total of P131,547,043.00.

Criminal Case No. 25922, along with other cases involving allegedly anomalous TCC transfers, namely,
Criminal Cases Nos. 25911-25915, 25917-25921, 25923-25939, and 25983-26016 were raffled to the Fourth Division of
the Sandiganbayan.

On 17 April 2000, petitioners filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a Very Urgent Motion for Leave to File
Motion for Reconsideration or Reinvestigation dated 16 April 2000, with an attached Motion for Reconsideration or
Reinvestigation (Re: Resolution dated 27 March 2000) dated 17 April 2000, through which they sought reversal of the
Office of the Ombudsmans 27 March 2000 Resolution which directed the filing of the Information in Criminal Case No.
25922. A copy of petitioners Very Urgent Motion for Leave to File Motion for Reconsideration or Reinvestigation dated
16 April 2000, with their Motion for Reconsideration or Reinvestigation (Re: Resolution dated
March 2000) dated 17
April 2000 attached to it as its Annex 1, is attached to this Petition, and made an integral part of it, as its Annex D.


On 28 April 2000, the Fourth Division of the Sandiganbayan issued an Order granting petitioners, among other
movants, leave to file their respective motions for reinvestigation or reconsideration, and gave the Prosecution sixty
(60) days to resolve the said motions.

The sixty (60) day deadline given the Prosecution to complete its reinvestigations and report its findings in
relation to such reinvestigations passed without the Prosecution resolving petitioners Motion for Reconsideration or
Reinvestigation (Re: Resolution dated 27 March 2000) dated 17 April 2000.

The Prosecutions failure to resolve the motions for reconsideration filed by petitioners and the other accused in
Criminal Cases Nos. 25911-25939 and 25983-26016 dragged on into the middle of 2001.

At the hearing of Criminal Cases Nos. 25911-25939 and 25983-26016 held on 1 June 2001, the Prosecution
was specifically warned by the court that should it fail to resolve the accused pending motions for reconsideration, it
was possible that Criminal Cases Nos. 25911-25939 and 25983-26016 would be dismissed.

The courts warning notwithstanding, the Prosecution, in a Manifestation dated 21 June 2001, again sought
cancellation of the arraignment and pre-trial conference in Criminal Cases Nos. 25911-25939 and 25983-26016 set on
2 July 2001, but the court denied that request in a Resolution dated 26 June 2001, in which the court again reminded
the Prosecution that Criminal Cases Nos. 25911-25939 and 25983-26016 had been pending for more than a year and
that further delay caused by it would not be countenanced.

Despite the courts warning, the Prosecution still failed to resolve the pending motions for reinvestigation by
the time of the scheduled arraignment and pre-trial conference set on 2 July 2001, prompting the court to issue an
order which gave the Prosecution an additional ten (10) days to resolve the motions, and reset the scheduled
arraignment and pre-trial conference to 17 July 2001.

Despite the lapse of the ten (10) day additional period given it, the Prosecution again failed to complete, and
submit the results of, its reinvestigation, and instead filed a Manifestation requesting the cancellation and resetting of
the arraignment and pre-trial conference set on 17 July 2001.

In an Order dated 17 July 2001, the court directed the Prosecution to complete its reinvestigation, and submit
the results of that reinvestigation to the court, by 16 August 2001, and granted the Prosecutions request for a resetting
by canceling the scheduled arraignment and pre-trial conference and setting it on 20 August 2001.

On 16 August 2001, the Prosecution again failed to report completion of the reinvestigation process, but only
filed an Omnibus Motion in which it informed the court only that the prosecutor concerned had already made a
recommendation to the Office of the Special Prosecutor. There being no resolution of the pending motions for
reinvestigation yet, the Prosecution sought yet another cancellation of the scheduled arraignment and pre-trial
conference on 20 August 2001.

The Prosecution repeated its request for deferment of the scheduled arraignment and pre-trial conference at
the scheduled hearing on 20 August 2001, but this time, the request was denied by Justice Nario.

Justice Nario issued an oral order dismissing the case on account of the long delay associated with the
Prosecutions resolution of the motions for reinvestigation filed by accused.

However, since Justice Nario and the other (2) regular members of the Fourth Division of the Sandiganbayan
could not reach unanimity on upholding Justice Narios dismissal of Criminal Cases Nos. 25911-25939 and 2598326016, a Special Fourth Division composed of five (5) members of the Honorable Sandiganbayan was constituted
pursuant to Section 1(b) of Rule XVIII of the 1984 Revised Rules of the Sandiganbayan.

On 4 February 2002, a bare majority of respondent court,[5] overruling dissents by Justice Nario and Justice
Raoul Victorino, issued its first questioned Resolution dated 4 February 2002, the dispositive portion of which set aside
the order of dismissal issued by Justice Nario in open court at the hearing of 20 August 2001.

Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration

For lack of merit, the court issues an Omnibus Resolution denying all the above described motions for
reconsideration.

The petitioners filed their petition for certiorari and mandamus

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Special Fourth Division of the Honorable Sandiganbayan erred in setting aside the dismissal
order issued by Justice Nario.
HELD:

The petition is denied due course.

For a petition for certiorari to be granted, it must set out and demonstrate, plainly and distinctly, all the facts
essential to establish a right to a writ. The petitioners must allege in their petition and establish facts to show that any
other existing remedy is not speedy or adequate and that (a) the writ is directed against a tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (b) such tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction; and, (c) there is no appeal or
any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

The public respondent acts without jurisdiction if it does not have the legal power to determine the case; there
is excess of jurisdiction where the respondent, being clothed with the power to determine the case, oversteps its
authority as determined by law.


There is grave abuse of discretion where the public respondent acts in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or
despotic manner in the exercise of its judgment as to be said to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of
discretion is not enough.

In a petition for certiorari, the jurisdiction of the court is narrow in scope. It is limited to resolving only errors of
jurisdiction. It is not to stray at will and resolve questions or issues beyond its competence such as errors of judgment.

Errors of judgment of the trial court are to be resolved by the appellate court in the appeal or via a petition for
review on certiorari in this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of
jurisdiction. It is not a remedy to correct errors of judgment. An error of judgment is one in which the court may
commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is reversible only by an appeal.

As long as the court acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its discretion
will amount to nothing more than mere errors of judgment, correctible by an appeal or a petition for review under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court. An error of jurisdiction is one where the act complained of was issued by the court without or
in excess of jurisdiction and which error is correctible only by the extraordinary writ of certiorari.

Generally, the performance of an official act or duty which necessarily involves the exercise of discretion or
judgment cannot be compelled by mandamus. However, a writ of mandamus may issue where there is grave abuse of
discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable excess of authority.

In this case, we find and so rule that the Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting
to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed resolutions. We also held that the petitioners are not entitled to a
writ of mandamus.

We agree with the foregoing ratiocination. Section 1, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
mandates that a judgment must be written in the official language, personally and directly prepared by the judge and
signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts and the law upon which it is based. The
rule applies to a final order dismissing a criminal case grounded on the violation of the rights of the accused to a
speedy trial.

A verbal judgment or order of dismissal is a violation of the provision; hence, such order is, in contemplation of
law, not in esse, therefore, ineffective. Justice Nario failed to issue a written resolution dismissing the criminal cases for
failure of the prosecution to submit its report on the reinvestigation of the cases within the sixty-day period fixed by
the graft court. Moreover, the verbal order was rejected by majority vote of the members of the Sandiganbayan
Special Division. In fine, there has been no valid and effective order of dismissal of the cases. The Sandiganbayan
cannot then be faulted for issuing the assailed resolutions.

Villena, Doroja vs. People GR 184091 Jan. 31. 2011 (Rule

120 Section 6)

Petitioners (P/Insp.) Edward Garrick Villena and (PO1) Percival Doroja, together with (PO3 Macalinao at. al.
were indicted for the crime of robbery (extortion) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 202, Las Pinas City.

After arraignment, where the accused all pled not guilty, and pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued. Petitioners
failed to appear before the trial court to adduce evidence in their defense. It was only PO3 Macalinao who appeared
before the court to present his evidence.

On August 29, 2007, the RTC rendered its decision convicting petitioners, together with PO3 Macalinao et. al, of
the crime charged.

During the promulgation of judgment on September 3, 2007, petitioners again failed to appear despite proper
notices to them at their addresses of record. In the absence of petitioners, the promulgation was made pursuant to
paragraphs 4 and 5, Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. Consequently, the RTC issued
warrants of arrest against them.

On October 11, 2007, petitioners, through their new counsel, Atty. William F. delos Santos, filed their separate
notices of appeal before the RTC. In the said notices, they explained that they failed to attend the promulgation of
judgment because they did not receive any notice thereof because they were transferred to another police station.

Subsequently, PO3 Macalinao filed a Motion with Leave of Court to Reconsider the November 20, 2007 Order.
Petitioners likewise filed a joint Motion for Reconsideration (of the Order of November 20, 2007).

Resolving the said motions, the RTC issued its Order dated February 8, 2008, granting the prayer for
reconsideration of PO3 Macalinao, giving his notice of appeal due course. However, the said Order denied herein
petitioners motion, for failure to adduce any valid excuse or compelling justification for the reconsideration, reversal,
and setting aside of the November 20, 2007 Order.

Aggrieved, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court before the CA.


The CA, in its Resolution dated April 30, 2008, initially dismissed the petition for not being accompanied with
clearly legible duplicate originals or certified true copies of the questioned Orders. Petitioners thus moved to
reconsider the April 30, 2008 Resolution.

In the August 1, 2008 Resolution, even as it took into account the merits of petitioners motion for
reconsideration, the CA nevertheless resolved to deny the same for failure to show prima facie evidence of any grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC. Hence, this petition ascribing error to the CA in dismissing their petition and
in not finding grave abuse of discretion against the RTC for denying their notices of appeal.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in upholding the RTC in its denial of their respective notices of appeal since
according to them they already contained the required manifestation and information as to the cause of their nonappearance on the scheduled.

Whether or not the CA erred to accept their claim that their notices of appeal have substantially complied with
the requirement of Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court, and have effectively placed them under the RTCs
jurisdiction.
HELD:

The petition is without merit.

While it is true that an appeal is perfected upon the mere filing of a notice of appeal and that the trial court
thereupon loses jurisdiction over the case, this principle presupposes that the party filing the notice of appeal could
validly avail of the remedy of appeal and had not lost standing in court. In this case, petitioners have lost their
standing in court by their unjustified failure to appear during the trial and, more importantly, during the promulgation
of judgment of conviction, and to surrender to the jurisdiction of the RTC.

Petitioners contend that their act of filing notices of appeal was already substantial compliance with the
requirements of Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court. The SC differs and reiterated the last part of Section 6 of
Rule 120 of the Rules of Court which states:
If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without justifiable cause, he shall lose
the remedies available in these rules against the judgment and the court shall order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days
from promulgation of judgment, however, the accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of
these remedies. He shall state the reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation and if he proves that his
absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice.

Thus, the accused who failed to appear at the promulgation of the judgment of conviction shall lose the
remedies available under the Rules of Court against the judgment(a) the filing of a motion for new trial or
reconsideration (Rule 121), and (b) an appeal from the judgment of conviction (Rule 122). However, the Rules allow the
accused to regain his standing in court in order to avail of these remedies by: (a) his surrender, and (b) his filing of a
motion for leave of court to avail of these remedies, stating therein the reasons for his absence, within 15 days from
the date of promulgation of judgment. If the trial court finds that his absence was for a justifiable cause, the accused
shall be allowed to avail of the said remedies within 15 days from notice or order finding his absence justified and
allowing him the available remedies against the judgment of conviction.

Thus, petitioners mere filing of notices of appeal through their new counsel, therein only explaining their
absence during the promulgation of judgment, cannot be considered an act of surrender, despite the fact that said
notices were filed within 15 days from September 28, 2007, the purported date when their new counsel personally
secured a copy of the judgment of conviction from the RTC. The term surrender under Section 6, Rule 120 of the Rules
of Court contemplates an act whereby a convicted accused physically and voluntarily submits himself to the
jurisdiction of the court to suffer the consequences of the verdict against him. The filing of notices of appeal cannot
suffice as a physical and voluntary submission of petitioners to the RTCs jurisdiction. It is only upon petitioners valid
surrender, and only after proper motion, that they can avail of the remedy of appeal. Absent compliance with these
requirements, their notices of appeal, the initiatory step to appeal from their conviction, were properly denied due
course.

FULL TEXT:
G.R. No. 189754, October 24, 2012, LITO BAUTISTA and JIMMY ALCANTARA, Petitioners, vs. SHARON G.
CUNETA-PANGILINAN, Respondent.
If The Trial Court Finds That The Prosecution Evidence Is Not Sufficient And Grants The Accuseds
Demurrer To Evidence, The Ruling Is An Adjudication On The Merits Of The Case Which Is Tantamount To
An Acquittal And May No Longer Be Appealed

Sharon filed a case for libel against the Author, the Editor and the Associate Editor of a tabloid for alleged libelous and
defamatory articles printed on the column of the Author, which tend to cast malicious imputation on the person of the
Megastar, particularly her weigh and her alleged behaviour with respect to a wealthy supporter of her husband, then
running for Senator. (It was 2001). Words such as:
Sharon Cuneta, the mega-taba singer-actress, Id like to believe, is really brain-dead. Mukhang totoo yata yung
sinasabi ng kaibigan ni Pettizou Tayag na ganyan siya.
Hayan at buong ingat na sinulat namin yung interview sa kaibigan ng may-ari ng Central Institute of Technology at ni
isang side comment ay wala kaming ginawa and all throughout the article, weve maintained our objectivity, pero sa
interview sa aparadoric singer- actress in connection with an album launching, ay buong ningning na sinabi nitong
shes supposedly looking into the item that weve written and most probably would take some legal action. (Excerpt
from Information in Criminal Case No. MC02-4872)
and:
NABURYONG SA KAPLASTIKAN NI SHARON ANG MILYONARYANG SUPPORTER NI KIKO!
FREAKOUT pala kay Sharon Cuneta ang isa sa mga loyal supporters ni Kiko Pangilinan na si Pettizou Tayag, a multimillionaire who owns Central Institute of Technology College in Sampaloc, Manila (it is also one of the biggest schools
in Paniqui, Tarlac).
x x x (Excerpt from Information in Criminal Case No. MC02-4875)
All the accused were tried.
After the prosecution presented its case, the Editor and the Associate Editor filed a Motion for Leave to File Attached
Demurrer to Evidence, which the trial court granted.
The prosecution moved to have its Comment to the Motion For Leave of Court to File Attached Demurrer to Evidence
admitted by the trial court, contending that its failure to file was due to oversight on the part of the prosecutor
handling the case, and that the prosecution will be deprived of due process if its comment will not be admitted.
The trial court granted the prayer of the prosecution and admitted the Comment of the prosecution.
On the other hand, the Megastar filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA) questioning the grant of
the Demurrer to Evidence filed by the accused. The CA partially granted the petition filed by the Megastar and
remanded the case to the RTC to allow the accused to present evidence in their behalf, in effect reversing the grant by
the trial court of the demurrer to evidence. The accused filed a motion for reconsideration with the CA but the same
was denied.
Was the Court of Appeals correct in reversing the order of the trial court granting the Demurrer to Evidence filed by the
Editor and the Associate Editor?
The Supreme Court, in siding with the Editor and the Associate Editor, ruled:
Under Section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court on Demurrer to Evidence, after the prosecution terminates the
presentation of evidence and rests its case, the trial court may dismiss the case on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence upon the filing of a Demurrer to Evidence by the accused with or without leave of court. If the accused files a
Demurrer to Evidence with prior leave of court and the same is denied, he may adduce evidence in his defense.
However, if the Demurrer to Evidence is filed by the accused without prior leave of court and the same is denied, he
waives his right to present evidence and submits the case for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the
prosecution.
Corollarily, after the prosecution rests its case, and the accused files a Demurrer to Evidence, the trial court is required
to evaluate whether the evidence presented by the prosecution is sufficient enough to warrant the conviction of the
accused beyond reasonable doubt. If the trial court finds that the prosecution evidence is not sufficient and grants the
accuseds Demurrer to Evidence, the ruling is an adjudication on the merits of the case which is tantamount to an
acquittal and may no longer be appealed. Any further prosecution of the accused after an acquittal would, thus, violate
the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy.

The grant or denial of a Demurrer to Evidence is left to the sound discretion of the court, and its ruling on the matter
shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of such discretion. This Petition for Certiorari Ad Cautelam1
seeks to set aside the August 5, 2010 Resolution2 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 26297-26305,denying
petitioner Gregorio Singian, Jr.'s Demurrer to Evidence3 and the November 18, 2010 Resolution4 denying
reconsideration thereof.
Antecedents
The criminal cases involved in the present Petition have been the subject of a previous disposition of the Court,
specifically Singian, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan.5 In said case, the Court made the following recital of facts:
Atty. Orlando L. Salvador was Presidential Commission On Good Government Consultant on detail with the Presidential
Ad Hoc Committee on Behest Loans (Committee). He was also the coordinator of the Technical Working Group
composed of officers and employees of government financing institutions to examine and study the reports and
recommendations of the Asset Privatization Trust relating to loan accounts in all government financing institutions.
Among the accounts acted upon by the Committee were the loans granted to Integrated Shoe, Inc. (ISI) by the
Philippine National Bank (PNB).
It would appear that on 18 January 1972, ISI applied for a five-year confirmed irrevocable deferred letter of credit
amounting to US$2,500,000.00 (P16,287,500.00) to finance its purchase of a complete line of machinery and
equipment. The letter of credit was recommended to the PNB Board of Directors by then Senior Vice[-]President, Mr.
Constantino Bautista.

Singian vs. SB G.R. No. 195011-19, September 30, 2013

On 27 January 1972, the PNB approved the loan, subject to certain stipulations. The said letter of credit was to be
secured by the following collaterals: a) a second mortgage on a 10,367-square meter lot under Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 218999 with improvements, machinery and equipment; b) machinery and equipment to be imported under
the subject letter of credit; and c) assignment of US$0.50 per pair of shoes of ISIs export sales. It was further
subjected to the following pertinent conditions: a) that the letter of credit be subject to joint and several signatures of
Mr. Francisco J. Teodoro, Mrs. Leticia T. Teodoro, Marfina T. Singian, Tomas Teodoro, and Gregorio Singian, Jr.; b) that ISI,
which has a paid-up capital amounting to P1,098,750.00 as of January1972, shall increase its authorized capital to
P5,000,000.00, and in the event that cash receipts do not come up to the projections, or as may be required by the
bank, ISI will further increase its capitalization and the present stockholders will subscribe to their present holdings;
and c) that ISI shall submit other collaterals incase the appraised value of the new machinery and equipment be
insufficient.
ISI was further extended the following subsequent loan accommodations:
1. P1,500,000.00 on 10 February 1972 for the purchase of raw materials;
2. P1,000,000.00 on 18 January 1973 as export advance;
3. P1,500,000.00 on 21 March 1973 as export advance;

4. P600,000.00 on 06 March 1974 as credit line;

5. P2,500,000.00 renewed on 15 December 1976;
6. P5,000,000.00 on 19 November 1978 as export advance;
7. P1,500,000.00 on 04 August 1980 as export advance; and
8. P7,000,000.00 on 15 December 1980 also as an export advance.
The Committee found that the loans extended to ISI bore characteristics of behest loans specifically for not having
been secured with sufficient collaterals and obtained with undue haste.
As a result, Atty. Orlando Salvador filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a sworn complaint dated 20 March 1996, for
violation of Section 3, paragraphs (e) and (g), of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, against the following: Panfilo

Domingo, former PNB President, Constantino Bautista, former PNB Senior Vice-President, Domingo Ingco, former
member of the PNB Board of Directors, John Does, former members of the PNB Board of Directors, Francisco Teodoro,
President of ISI, Leticia Teodoro, Vice-President of ISI, Marfina Singian, Incorporator of ISI, Tomas Teodoro, General
Manager of ISI, and Gregorio Singian, Jr., Executive Vice-President of ISI. The complaint, docketed as OMB-0-96-0967,
was assigned to Graft Investigation Officer I Atty. Edgar R. Navales (Investigator Navales) of the Evaluation and
Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB) for investigation.
xxxx
Hence, the corresponding eighteen (18) Informations against petitioner and his co-accused for violation of Section 3(e)
and (g) of Rep. Act No. 3019,docketed as Criminal Cases No. 26297 to No. 26314, were filed before the Sandiganbayan
and were raffled to the Third Division thereof. The eighteen (18)Informations correspond to the nine (9) loan
accommodations granted to ISI, each loan being the subject of two informations alleging violations of both paragraphs
of Section 3 of Rep. Act No. 3019.6
Thus, herein petitioner was charged with nine counts of violation of Section 3(e),7 and another nine counts of violation
of Section 3(g),8 of Republic Act No.3019 (RA 3019), or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Docketed as Criminal
Case Nos. 26297-26314, the cases involved the purported granting of behest loans by the governments Philippine
National Bank (PNB) to Integrated Shoes, Inc. (ISI), in various amounts and on different dates as above-enumerated.
The Informations9 covering Section 3(e) charged that Panfilo Domingo(Domingo), then PNB Director/President/VicePresident (Europe); Domingo C. Ingco (Ingco), then PNB Director; and Constantino Bautista (Bautista), then PNB Senior
Executive Vice-President, while in the performance of their official functions and taking advantage of their official
positions, conspired with private individuals, specifically officers of ISI, including petitioner, who was ISIs Executive
Vice-President, in willfully, unlawfully and criminally causing undue injury to the government and giving unwarranted
benefits, advantage and preference to ISI by accommodating and granting several loans and advances to the latter,
despite knowing that it lacked sufficient capitalization, or failed to give adequate collateral or raise its working capital
to secure the governments interest in case it failed to pay said loans, as in fact it failed to pay these loans.
On the other hand, the Informations10 covering Section 3(g) charged the above individuals, including petitioner, with
conspiring, confederating, and willfully, unlawfully and criminally entering into the above-mentioned loan transactions
which are grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government, for lack of sufficient capitalization or adequate
collateral, and for failure of ISI to raise its working capital to secure the governments interest in case it failed to pay
said loans, which indeed ISI failed to pay.
On January 27, 2004, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty on all counts. All the other accused were arraigned as well,
except for Bautista, who passed away prior to his scheduled arraignment.
On April 29, 2005, the Sandiganbayan dismissed Criminal Case Nos.26306-26314.11 On October 6, 2007, the accused
Ingco passed away; as a result, the cases against him were dismissed as well. Accused Domingo likewise passed away
on June 26, 2008 resulting in an October 29, 2008 Resolution wherein the Sandiganbayan dropped the cases against
him.
Trial with respect to the remaining cases ensued. For its testimonial evidence, the prosecution called to the stand nine
witnesses:
1. Director Danilo R.V. Daniel, then Coordinator of the Technical Working Group on Behest Loans (TWG) and Director of
the Research Division of the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), who testified on the investigation
conducted by the TWG of the ISI account and on various documents relative thereto, including the Fourteenth (14th)
Report of Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans12 (Ad Hoc Committee) dated July15, 1993
which he drafted, and which characterized the ISI account as a behest loan;13
2. Atty. Reginald Bacolor from the Legal Department, Privatization Management Office of the Asset Privatization Trust
(APT), who testified on the deeds, documents and titles covering the foreclosed properties offered as collaterals in the
ISI account and thereafter sold by the government through the APT;14
3. Atty. Edwin Flor V. Barroga, then Deputy Registrar of Deeds of Binangonan, Rizal, who testified on the property
offered as collateral by ISI, which was the subject of a prior encumbrance to the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS);15
4. Atty. Cinderella Benitez, Securities Counsel II of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), who testified on
ISIs SEC documents, specifically its capitalization and financial status. She identified certified copies of ISIs Articles of
Incorporation, By-Laws, Amended Articles of Incorporation, Certificates of Increase of Capital Stock, etc.;16

5. Atty. Mary Ann B. Morales, SEC Securities Counsel III from its Registration and Monitoring Department, who likewise
testified on ISIs SEC documents. She identified ISIs General Information Sheets, Schedule of Stockholders, Subscribed
and Paid-Up Capital, Certificate of Corporate Filing/Information, etc. She testified, among others, that as of 1973, ISIs
subscribed capital stock was only P1.6 million, while its paid-up capital was merelyP1,298,750.00;17
6. Cesar Luis Pargas, of the Privatization Management Office, APT, custodian of ISIs loan documents, who testified on
and brought with him the loan documents, deeds, titles, notes, etc. covering the ISI account;18
7. Claro Bernardino, Senior Manager of PNBs Human Resource Group, who brought the personnel records/certificates
of employment of the accused Domingo and Ingco;19
8. Ramonchito Bustamante, Manager of the Loans and Implementing Services Division of PNB, expert witness on
banking policy and PNBs loan policies, as well as ISIs loan data; and20
9. Stephen Tanchuling, Chief Administrative Officer of the Records Division of the Research Department of the PCGG,
custodian of documents turned over to PCGG by the Ad Hoc Committee. He testified that his function was to
authenticate documents in his custody, which consisted of records transmitted to the Ad Hoc Committee by different
government agencies. He identified as well the Executive Summary21 of the ISI account; the Fourteenth (14th) Report
of Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans dated July 15, 1993; the Executive Summary of the Ad
Hoc Committee Findings; and other relevant documents.22
For its documentary evidence, the prosecution presented the following, among others:
1) Photocopy of the Fourteenth (14th) Report of Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans23 which
listed ISI as among the corporations with loans obtained from the government or government banks (in this case,
PNB)which were found to possess the characteristics of a behest loan;
2) Photocopy of an Executive Summary of Findings of the Ad Hoc Committee,24 detailing the particulars of the ISI
account;
3) Photocopy of the certified true copy of the January 10, 1972 Memorandum25 from Bautista to the PNB Board of
Directors, detailing Bautistas findings and recommendations regarding ISIs application for a $2.5
million(P16,287,500.00) letter of credit for the purpose of purchasing machinery and equipment for a new shoe factory
then being built in Bataan.
4) Certified photocopy of a Deed of Undertaking and Conformity to Bank Conditions26 (Deed of Undertaking) dated
March 24, 1972 executed by ISI in favor of PNB;
5) Certified photocopy of a Deed of Assignment27 dated March 24, 1972,assigning $0.50 per pair of shoes of all export
sales of ISI in favor of PNB;
6) Certified photocopy of Chattel Mortgage with Power of Attorney28 executed by ISI in favor of PNB;
7) Certified true copy of Certificate of Filing of Certificate of Increase of Capital Stock29 issued by the SEC dated
February 6, 1974, showing that ISI increased its authorized capital stock from P3 million to P7 million; and
8) Certified true copy of the By-Laws of Integrated Pacific, Inc. (ISIs predecessor corporation).30
After the presentation of its testimonial and documentary evidence, the prosecution rested its case and filed its Formal
Offer of Exhibits.31 The respondent court admitted in toto the States documentary exhibits.
Petitioners Demurrer to Evidence
On February 17, 2010, petitioner, with prior leave, filed a Demurrer to Evidence32 anchored on the following grounds:
(1) lack of proof of conspiracy with any PNB official; (2) the contracts with PNB contained provisions that are beneficial,
and not manifestly and grossly disadvantageous, to the government; (3)the loans could not be characterized as behest
loans because they were secured by sufficient collaterals and ISI increased its capitalization; and (4) assuming the
loans are behest loans, petitioner could not be held liable for lack of any participation.33
In particular, petitioner claimed that the prosecution failed to adduce evidence of conspiracy to defraud the
government because his co-accused from PNB had no power to approve the alleged behest loans; that if a theory of
conspiracy were to be pursued, then all the members of the PNBs Board of Directors at the time the loans and credit

accommodations to ISI were approved, and not only Domingo and Ingco, should have been impleaded as they were
the ones who directed PNBs affairs; that the prosecution failed to show that he exercised any kind of influence over
PNBs Board of Directors in order to ensure the grant of the loans and accommodations applied for; and for failure to
present evidence that the accused colluded with each other in entering into the loan agreements and
accommodations.
Petitioner contended further that the contracts and agreements entered into by and between PNB and ISI were
standard contracts used by PNB in its dealings with its clients; that the terms thereof were couched in words and
fashioned in a manner that favored the bank; that the agreements guaranteed repayment of the loan and the putting
up of sufficient collateral, and provided for interest and penalties in the event of breach, and thus were not grossly and
manifestly disadvantageous to the government.
Next, petitioner argued that the subject loans were not undercollateralized; that ISI was not undercapitalized as the
corresponding increase in its authorized capital stock and paid-up capital was timely made; and that the loans could
not have been characterized as behest loans considering the following stipulations: a) the assets intended for
acquisition through the letter of credit would serve as the collateral therefor; b) the officers and majority stockholders
of ISI were made jointly and severally liable for its obligations; c) ISI may not declare dividends while the loans are
subsisting; d) PNB is given the right to designate its Comptroller in ISI; and e) even if it is assumed for the sake of
argument that the subject loans were undercollateralized, this fact standing alone does not make for a behest loan,
as the presence of at least two (2) criteria out of the eight enumerated in Presidential Memorandum Order No. 61
dated November 9, 1992is required to characterize the loans as behest loans.
Assuming that the loan agreements are behest loans, petitioner claimed that he may not be held liable because his
indictment was based solely on the Deed of Undertaking which was altered such that his name was stricken out and
instead the name "Gregorio T. Teodoro" was inserted; that the accountee-mortgagor-assignor under said deed was ISI;
that the obligations were assumed by ISI; that ISI had already fully complied with all its obligations under the deed;
and that he was not a member of ISIs Board of Directors, which alone was tasked as ISIs governing body with the
observance of the obligations set forth under the deed; nor may he seek to compel action thereon at a stockholders
meeting, as he is not a shareholder of ISI either.
Finally, petitioner claimed that the Ad Hoc Committee documents specifically the Executive Summary and Fourteenth
(14th) Report of Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans are inadmissible for not being
photocopies of the originals, but mere copies of photocopies in the custody of the PCGG; and that they were prepared
and issued by individuals who have no personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances which transpired during the
proceedings adverted to.
Petitioner thus prayed that as against him, Criminal Case Nos. 26297-26305 be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
Prosecutions Opposition
In its Opposition,34 the prosecution insisted that conspiracy may be inferred from the following pattern of events:
a. The frequency of the loans or closeness of the dates at which they were granted;
b. The quantity of the loans granted;
c. The failure of PNB to verify and to take any action on ISIs failure to put up additional capitalization and additional
collaterals; and d. The eventual absence of any action by PNB to collect full payment from ISI.35
The prosecution noted that without ISI putting up additional capitalization or collateral, PNB kept granting loans to it,
such that in 1973, its in debtedness already rose to P16,360,000.00 while its capital stock stood at only P7 million; that
petitioner is intimately connected with the incorporators and officers of ISI Leticia Teodoro is his mother-in-law, while
Francisco Teodoro is his father-in-law; and Marfina Teodoro-Singian is his wife; that as of 1983, ISIs debt to PNB
amounted to P71,847,217.00, as a result of the undercapitalized and undercollateralized loans extended to it; and that
as signatory to the Deed of Undertaking, petitioner assumed the obligations of a surety.
Finally, the prosecution noted that petitioners arguments in his Demurrer to Evidence constitute matters of defense
which should be passed upon only after trial on the merits.
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
On August 5, 2010, the Sandiganbayan issued the first assailed Resolution, which decreed as follows:

WHEREFORE, considering all the foregoing, this Court DENIES the Demurrer to Evidence filed by accused Gregorio
Singian, Jr. as the evidence for the prosecution sufficiently established the essential elements of the offense charged
and overcame the presumption of innocence in favor of said accused.
SO ORDERED.36
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration37 having been denied on November 18, 2010 by the respondent court, he filed
the present Petition for Certiorari.
Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues:
THE RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSEOF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS
OFJURISDICTION WHEN IT ISSUED THE ASSAILED RESOLUTIONS XX X CONSIDERING THAT:
I.
THE FIRST ELEMENT OF SECTION 3(G) OF R.A. 3019 IS NOT PRESENTBECAUSE THE EXISTENCE OF CONSPIRACY IS
NEGATED BY THEFACT THAT THE PUBLIC OFFICERS WHO WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR GRANTING THE LOANS IN QUESTION
WERE NEVER CHARGED, ACCUSED OR INCLUDED IN THE INFORMATIONS SUBJECT OFTHESE CASES.
II.
EVEN IF IT IS PRESUMED, PURELY IN GRATIA ARGUMENT IS, THAT ACONSPIRACY ATTENDED THE GRANT OF THE
QUESTIONED LOANSTO ISI, THERE IS, NEVERTHELESS, NO OVERT ACT ATTRIBUTABLETO THE PETITIONER THAT EVEN
REMOTELY JUSTIFIES HISINCLUSION IN THE PROSECUTIONS CONSPIRACY DRAGNET.
III.
THE PROSECUTIONS EXHIBITS "C" (ALSO MARKED AS EXHIBIT"RR") AND "QQ" WHICH THE PROSECUTION FOISTED
TO MAKE ITAPPEAR THAT THE CREDIT ACCOMMODATIONS SUBJECT OF THECRIMINAL CASES BELOW ARE BEHEST
LOANS, DO NOT HAVE ANYPROBATIVE VALUE AND ARE COMPLETELY INADMISSIBLEBECAUSE THEY ARE UNDISPUTABLY
AND BLATANTLYHEARSAY.38
Petitioners Arguments
Essentially, petitioner reiterates all his arguments in his Demurrer to Evidence and Motion for Reconsideration of the
respondent courts denial thereof. He emphasizes, however, that he had nothing to do with the application and grant
of the questioned loans, since he was never a member of ISIs Board of Directors which, under the law and ISI by-laws,
had the sole power and authority to approve and obtain loans and give collaterals to secure the same; nor is he a
stockholder of ISI. Nor has it been shown from the testimonial and documentary evidence that as Executive VicePresident, he participated in ISIs loan and credit transactions, or that he actively participated in the commission of the
crimes of which he is charged. Without such proof, petitioner believes that he may not be charged with conspiracy.
Petitioner adds that no evidence was presented as well to show that he had any participation in PNBs failure to verify
and take action against ISI to compel it to put up additional capital and collaterals, or that he was responsible for PNBs
failure to collect or secure full payment of the ISI credit.
Finally, petitioner justifies his resort to certiorari on the argument that the collective acts of the prosecution and the
respondent court constitute a denial of his constitutional right to due process, which gives ground for the availment of
the extraordinary remedy.39
Respondents Arguments
In its Comment,40 the prosecution asserts that the respondent court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
denying the Demurrer to Evidence arguing that in petitioners case, all the elements under Section 3(g) exist to hold
petitioner liable. It adds that petitioner was part of the conspiracy to defraud the government, as evidenced by his
participation and signature in the Deed of Undertaking, the terms of which ISI violated and PNB failed to enforce.
On the other hand, the PCGG in its Comment41 adopts the arguments of the prosecution and asserts that the
respondent court arrived at its conclusion after careful examination of the record and the evidence, which justify a

finding sustaining petitioners indictment. It adds that all the elements of the crime under Section 3(g) have been
proved, which thus justifies a denial of petitioners Demurrer to Evidence.
Our Ruling
The Court dismisses the Petition.
Demurrer to evidence
"A demurrer to the evidence is an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence which his
adversary produced is in sufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue. The
party demurring challenges the sufficiency of the whole evidence to sustain a verdict. The court, in passing upon the
sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or
sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt."42
"Sufficient evidence for purposes of frustrating a demurrer thereto is such evidence in character, weight or amount as
will legally justify the judicial or official action demanded according to the circumstances. To be considered sufficient
therefore, the evidence must prove: (a) the commission of the crime, and (b) the precise degree of participation
therein by the accused."43
Elements of Section 3(g), RA 3019
For one to be successfully prosecuted under Section 3(g) of RA 3019, the following elements must be proven: "1) the
accused is a public officer; 2) the public officer entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and
3) the contract or transaction was grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government."44 However, private
persons may likewise be charged with violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019 if they conspired with the public officer.
Thus, "if there is an allegation of conspiracy, a private person may be held liable together with the public officer, in
consonance with the avowed policy of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act which is to repress certain acts of
public officers and private persons alike which may constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead thereto."45
The Sandiganbayan found competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt for
violation of Section 3(g), RA 3019
The Sandiganbayan found that the prosecution presented sufficient or competent evidence to establish the three
material elements of Section 3(g) of RA3019. First, although petitioner is a private person, he was shown to have
connived with his co-accused. Second, ISI and PNB entered into several loan transactions and credit accommodations.
Finally, the loan transactions proved disadvantageous to the government.
There is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan in denying petitioners Demurrer to Evidence
At the outset, we emphasize that "the resolution of a demurrer to evidence should be left to the exercise of sound
judicial discretion. A lower courts order of denial shall not be disturbed, that is, the appellate courts will not review the
prosecutions evidence and precipitately decide whether such evidence has established the guilt of the accused
beyond a reasonable doubt, unless accused has established that such judicial discretion has been gravely abused,
there by amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction. Mere allegations of such abuse will not suffice."46
"Grave abuse of discretion is the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment on the part of the public officer
concerned which is equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross
as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
hostility."47
In this case, petitioner miserably failed to present an iota of evidence to show that the Sandiganbayan abused, much
more, gravely abused, its discretion in denying petitioners Demurrer to Evidence. We agree with the PCGGs
observation that the Sandiganbayan arrived at its conclusion after a careful and deliberate examination and
assessment of all the evidence submitted. A closer scrutiny of the assailed Resolutions would indeed show that the
Sandiganbayan meticulously discussed both testimonial and documentary evidence presented by the prosecution.48 It
was only after a careful analysis of the facts and evidence presented did the respondent court lay down its findings
and conclusions.49
Based on the evidence presented, the Sandiganbayan was convinced that all three elements of Section 3(g), RA 3019
were satisfactorily established. It found that PNB and ISI entered into several contracts or loan transactions. The
Sandiganbayan also assessed that petitioner conspired with his co-accused in defrauding the government considering

"(1) the frequency of the loans or closeness of the dates at which they were granted; (2) the quantity of the loans
granted; (3) the failure of the bank to verify and to take any action on the failure of ISI to put up additional
capitalization and additional collaterals; and (4) the eventual absence of any action by the Bank to collect full payment
from ISI."50 The Sandiganbayan ratiocinated that
x x x the loans subject of this case refer to not just one but several loans. The first two loans were granted in a span of
two months x x x The first loan was in the amount of P16,287,500.00 when the capital stock of ISI amounted to
onlyP1,000,000.00. This was followed by two additional loans in January and March 1973 x x x then another loan x x x
in the following year x x x. Two years later x x x ISI obtained another loan x x x which was succeeded by an additional
loan x x x. Still, ISI was granted two more loans x x x.
xxxx
However, all loans subject of this case were granted despite failure of ISI to raise its working capital, and to put up
additional collateral. The Certificate of Filing of Amended Articles of Incorporation and the Amended Articles of
Incorporation likewise show that ISI last increased its authorized capital stock toP7,000,000.00 on April 27, 1973, when
the indebtedness of the corporation was already P16,360,000.00. Indeed, it would appear that inaction on the part of
the PNB to notify ISI to further increase its capital and the corresponding inaction on the part of ISI to comply with its
undertaking indicate conspiracy between the accused.
Accused-movant further negates his liability by asserting that his name does not appear in the Deed of Undertaking,
and neither has he signed the same. A cursory examination of the Deed, however, reveals otherwise. It also bears
stressing at this point that as he has never denied his position as Executive Vice-President of ISI, he would undeniably
have participation in its transactions, especially where loan accommodations of the corporation are concerned.51
The Sandiganbayan also found that the loan transactions were grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the
government. Based on the documentary evidence presented by the prosecution, it noted that ISI was undercapitalized
while the loans were undercollateralized. It also noted that the government was only able to foreclose properties
amounting to P3 million whereas ISIs indebtedness stood at more than P71 million.
Based on the foregoing, we find no showing that "the conclusions made by the Sandiganbayan on the sufficiency of
the evidence of the prosecution at the time the prosecution rested its case, were manifestly mistaken."52 The
Sandiganbayan did not exercise its judgment in a whimsical or capricious manner.1wphi1 As we aptly held:
Given the sufficiency of the testimonial and documentary evidence against petitioner, it would, therefore, be
premature at this stage of the proceedings to conclude that the prosecutions evidence failed to establish petitioners
participation in the alleged conspiracy to commit the crime. Likewise, the Court cannot, at this point, make a
categorical pronouncement that the guilt of the petitioner has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. As there is
competent and sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment for the crime charged, it behooves petitioner to adduce
evidence on his behalf to controvert the asseverations of the prosecution. Withal, respondent court did not gravely
abuse its discretion when it found that there was a prima facie case against petitioner warranting his having to go
forward with his defensive evidence.
The determination of the sufficiency or insufficiency of the evidence presented by the prosecution as to establish a
prima facie case against an accused is left to the exercise of sound judicial discretion. Unless there is a clear showing
of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the trial courts denial of a motion to dismiss
or a demurrer to evidence may not be disturbed.53
Similarly, we have also ruled that:
When there is no showing of such grave abuse, certiorari is not the proper remedy. Rather, the appropriate recourse
from an order denying a demurrer to evidence is for the court to proceed with the trial, after which the accused may
file an appeal from the judgment of the lower court rendered after such trial. In the present case, we are not prepared
to rule that the Sandiganbayan has gravely abused its discretion when it denied petitioners demurrer to evidence.
Public respondent found that the prosecutions evidence satisfactorily established the elements of the crime charged.
Correspondingly, there is nothing in the records of this case nor in the pleadings of petitioner that would show
otherwise.54
At this juncture, it is worth mentioning that the issues raised herein are almost the same as those raised by petitioner
before the Court when he questioned the Sandiganbayans denial of his Motion for Re-determination of Existence of
Probable Cause.55 In resolving petitioners contention that he should not be made liable for ISIs failure to put up
additional capitalization and collaterals because he is not a member of the Board of Directors, the Court declared that:

True, the power to increase capitalization and to offer or give collateral to secure indebtedness are lodged with the
corporations Board of Directors. However, this does not mean that the officers of the corporation other than the Board
of Directors cannot be made criminally liable for their criminal acts if it can be proven that they participated therein. In
the instant case, there is evidence that petitioners participated in the loan transactions when he signed the
undertaking. x x x56
Anent the issue regarding the sufficiency of ISIs collateral, we also declared the same to be "a matter of defense
which should be best ventilated in a full-blown trial."57 Moreover, we declared that
Fifth. It is petitioner's view that the prosecution failed to adduce evidence that he took part in any conspiracy relative
to the grant of the loan transactions. Suffice it to state that the alleged absence of any conspiracy among the accused
is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense, the truth of which can be best passed upon after a full-blown trial
on the merits.58
In fine, we hold that "the presence or absence of the elements of the crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of
defense that may be passed upon after a full-blown trial on the merits," and "the validity and merits of a party's
defense or accusation, as well as admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are better ventilated during trial
proper."59 Petitioner's claims and defenses in his Demurrer to Evidence can best be tackled during trial. In the
presentation of his defense, he shall have the opportunity to explain or show why he should not be made liable. For
example, if there is any truth to the allegation in his Demurrer of Evidence that the Deed of Undertaking was altered,
or that the signature therein affixed is not his own, such that there arise serious doubts as to his participation in the
execution of said document, this can be resolved only upon proof presented during trial. Petitioner must present
evidence regarding such claim, the truth of which he can demonstrate during trial. Since this Court is not a trier of
facts, there is no way that this issue can be resolved by this Court at this stage of he proceedings.
In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that the respondent court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioner's Demurrer to Evidence; it was done in the proper exercise of its jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED.

People vs. Sumingwa GR 183619 Oct. 13, 2009

On appeal before us is the January 31, 2008 Court of Appeals (CA) Decision[1] in CA-G.R. CR No. 30045 affirming with
modification the February 14, 2006 Regional Trial Court[2] (RTC) Consolidated Judgment[3] against appellant Salvino
Sumingwa in Criminal Case Nos. 1644 and 1645 for Acts of Lasciviousness; 1646, 1649 and 1654 for Rape; 1651 for
Attempted Rape; and 1655 for Unjust Vexation. Assailed also is the June 5, 2008 CA Resolution[4] denying appellants
motion for reconsideration.
In twelve Informations, the prosecution charged appellant with two (2) counts of Acts of Lasciviousness,[5] four (4)
counts of Rape,[6] three (3) counts of Unjust Vexation,[7] one (1) count of Other Light Threats,[8] one (1) count of
Maltreatment,[9] and one (1) count of Attempted Rape[10] for acts committed against his minor[11] daughter AAA
from 1999-2001.
Appellant pleaded not guilty to all the charges. On September 24, 2004, the RTC dismissed[12] Criminal Case Nos.
1647 for Rape; 1648 for Unjust Vexation; 1650 for Other Light Threats; 1652 for Unjust Vexation; and 1653 for
Maltreatment, on the basis of the Demurrer to Evidence[13] filed by appellant.
Sometime in August 1999, between 8:00 and 10:00 in the morning, AAA, together with her brothers and her father,
appellant herein, was in their residence in Mountain Province, watching television. Appellant called AAA and ordered
her to sit in front of him. As she was sitting, appellant told her that it was not good for a girl to have small breasts.
Suddenly, he inserted his hands into AAAs shirt then fondled her breast. AAA resisted by moving her hands backwards.
[14]
One afternoon in September 1999, AAAs mother and brothers went to school leaving AAA and appellant in their house.
While in the masters bedroom, appellant ordered AAA to join him inside. There, appellant removed his undergarments
then forced her to grasp and fondle his penis until he ejaculated. Appellant thereafter told her not to be malicious
about it.[15]
The same incident took place in August 2000. This time, appellant forced AAA to lie down on the bed, went on top of
her, removed her short pants and panty, then rubbed his penis against her vaginal orifice. AAA resisted by crossing her
legs but appellant lifted her right leg and partially inserted his penis into her vagina. As she struggled, appellant stood
up then ejaculated. AAA felt numbness on her buttocks after the bestial act committed against her.[16]

Appellant repeated his dastardly act against AAA on separate occasions in September and November 2000. During
these times, appellant satisfied himself by rubbing his penis against AAAs vagina without trying to penetrate it. After
reaching the top of his lust, he used AAAs short pants to wipe his mess. Instead of keeping her harrowing experience
to herself, AAA narrated it to her best friend.[17]
On November 24, 2000, appellant approached AAA and told her that he wanted to have sex with her. When she
refused, appellant forcibly removed her pants and boxed her right buttock. AAA still refused, which angered appellant.
He then went to the kitchen and returned with a bolo which he used in threatening her. Luckily, AAAs grandmother
arrived, prompting appellant to desist from his beastly desires.[18]
On December 20, 2000, AAA and her best friend were doing their school work in front of the formers house. When
appellant arrived, he embraced AAA. He, thereafter, pulled her inside the house and kissed her on the lips.[19]
The last incident occurred inside the comfort room of their house on May 27, 2001. When AAA entered, appellant
pulled down her short pants and panty, unzipped his trousers, brought out his penis, then repeatedly rubbed it on her
vagina while they were in a standing position.[20]
AAA decided to report the sexual abuses to her grandmother who forthwith brought her to the National Bureau of
Investigation where she was examined by the medico-legal officer. It was found during the examination that there
were no extragenital physical injuries on AAAs body but there were old, healed, and incomplete hymenal lacerations.
[21]
Appellant denied all the accusations against him. He claimed that in August and September 1999, he was at the house
of his mistress in Antipolo City. He also explained that in August 2000, he stayed in Baguio City and worked there as a
karate instructor. He added that he only went home in September 2000 but left again in October for Quirino, Ilocos Sur
where he stayed for three weeks. When he went back home, his wife informed him that AAA had not been coming
home. Thereafter, appellant went to Baguio City to buy medicine for his wife, then returned home again on the third
week of December 2000. While there, he was confronted by his wife about his womanizing. His wife got mad and
refused to forgive him despite his repeated pleas. Consequently, he became furious and almost choked his wife to
death when she ignored and refused to talk to him. This prompted him to leave and go back to Baguio.[22]
Sometime in April 2001, appellant went back home to reconcile with his wife. While talking to his wife and the latters
family, his mother-in-law berated him and demanded his separation from his wife. Appellant got mad and threatened
to kill his wifes family. His mother-in-law, in turn, threatened to file charges against him.[23]
To belie the claim of AAA that she was sexually abused in August, November and December 2000, allegedly during
school hours, her teacher testified that the former was not absent in class during those times.[24]
On November 24, 2004, AAA executed an Affidavit of Recantation[25] claiming that while appellant indeed committed
lascivious acts against her, she exaggerated her accusations against him. She explained that appellant did not actually
rape her, as there was no penetration. She added that she charged appellant with such crimes only upon the prodding
of her mother and maternal grandmother.
On February 14, 2006, the RTC rendered a decision convicting appellant of six (6) counts of acts of lasciviousness,[26]
one (1) count of attempted rape[27] and one (1) count of unjust vexation,[28] the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, a Consolidated Judgment is hereby rendered sentencing Salvino Sumingwa to suffer
1. The penalty of six (6) months of [arresto mayor] as minimum to six (6) years of [prision correccional] as maximum;
and ordering him to pay the offended party P10,000.00 [as] indemnity [ex-delicto], P10,000.00 as moral damages and
P5,000.00 as exemplary damages for each count of Acts of Lasciviousness charged in Crim. Cases 1644, 1645, 1646,
1649 and 1654;
2. The penalty of six (6) years of [prision correccional] as minimum to twelve (12) years of [prision mayor] as
maximum; and ordering said offender to pay the victim P15,000.00 as indemnity [ex-delicto], P15,000.00 as moral
damages and P10,000.00 as exemplary damages in Crim. Case 1651 for Attempted Rape; and
3. The penalty of thirty (30) days of [arresto menor] and fine of P200.00 for Unjust Vexation in Crim. Case 1655.
SO ORDERED.[29]

The trial court gave credence to AAAs testimonies on the alleged lascivious acts committed against her. In view of the
withdrawal of her earlier claim of the fact of penetration, the court sustained the innocence of appellant on the rape
charges and concluded that the crime committed was only Acts of Lasciviousness.
n Criminal Case No. 1651, the RTC found that appellant committed all the acts of execution of the crime of Rape, but
failed to consummate it because of the arrival of AAAs grandmother. Hence, he was convicted of attempted rape. In
embracing and kissing AAA in full view of the latters best friend, appellant was convicted of Unjust Vexation.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction of appellant, except that in Criminal Case No. 1646; it convicted him of
Qualified Rape instead of Acts of Lasciviousness. The pertinent portion of the assailed decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, herein appeal is hereby DISMISSED for evident lack of merit and the assailed
Consolidated Judgment dated 14 February 2006 is hereby AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATION:
1. The Appellant SALVINO SUMINGWA is hereby convicted of the crime of QUALIFIED RAPE in Criminal Case No. 1646
and the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA is hereby imposed upon him. The Appellant is likewise ordered to pay the
Victim, [AAA], civil indemnity in the amount of Php75,000.00 as well as moral damages in the amount of
Php50,000.00, in conformity with prevailing jurisprudence.
2. In Criminal Case No. 1651 for Attempted Rape, the Appellant, is hereby ordered to indemnify the victim [AAA] in the
sum of P30,000.00 as civil indemnity, plus the sum of P25,000.00 as moral damages.

SO ORDERED.[30]
The appellate court concluded that, notwithstanding AAAs retraction of her previous testimonies, the prosecution
sufficiently established the commission of the crime of Rape. It added that the qualifying circumstances of minority
and relationship were adequately proven.
Hence, this appeal.
First, in light of the recantation of AAA, appellant questions the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and insists that
his constitutional right to be presumed innocent be applied.[31] Second, he argues that in Criminal Case No. 1651 for
Attempted Rape, he should only be convicted of Acts of Lasciviousness, there being no overt act showing the intent to
have sexual intercourse.[32] Lastly, he insists that he could not be convicted of all the charges against him for failure
of the prosecution to show that he employed force, violence or intimidation against AAA; neither did the latter offer
resistance to appellants advances.[33]
In rape cases particularly, the conviction or acquittal of the accused most often depends almost entirely on the
credibility of the complainants testimony. By the very nature of this crime, it is generally unwitnessed and usually the
victim is left to testify for herself. When a rape victims testimony is straightforward and marked with consistency
despite grueling examination, it deserves full faith and confidence and cannot be discarded.[34] If such testimony is
clear, consistent and credible to establish the crime beyond reasonable doubt, a conviction may be based on it,
notwithstanding its subsequent retraction. Mere retraction by a prosecution witness does not necessarily vitiate her
original testimony. [35]
A retraction is looked upon with considerable disfavor by the courts.[36] It is exceedingly unreliable for there is always
the probability that such recantation may later on be repudiated. It can easily be obtained from witnesses through
intimidation or monetary consideration.[37] Like any other testimony, it is subject to the test of credibility based on
the relevant circumstances and, especially, on the demeanor of the witness on the stand.[38]
As correctly held by the CA, AAAs testimony is credible notwithstanding her subsequent retraction. We quote with
approval its ratiocination in this wise:
Clearly, the retraction made by the Victim is heavily unreliable. The primordial factor that impelled the Victim to retract
the rape charges against her father was her fear and concern for the welfare of her family especially her four (4)
siblings. It does not go against reason or logic to conclude that a daughter, in hopes of bringing back the harmony in
her family tormented by the trauma of rape, would eventually cover for the dastardly acts committed by her own
father. Verily, the Victims subsequent retraction does not negate her previous testimonies accounting her ordeal in the
hands for (sic) her rapist.[39]
We now proceed to discuss the specific crimes with which appellant was charged.

Criminal Case Nos. 1646, 1649 and 1654 for Rape

The CA correctly convicted appellant of Qualified Rape in Criminal Case No. 1646, and of Acts of Lasciviousness in
Criminal Case Nos. 1649 and 1654.
The crime of rape is defined in Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by the Anti-Rape Law of
1997, as follows:
ART. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. - Rape is committed
1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
A.. Through force, threat or intimidation.
In her direct testimony, AAA stated that appellant removed her short pants and panty, went on top of her and rubbed
his penis against her vaginal orifice. She resisted by crossing her legs but her effort was not enough to prevent
appellant from pulling her leg and eventually inserting his penis into her vagina. Clearly, there was penetration.
It is noteworthy that appellant pulled AAAs leg, so that he could insert his penis into her vagina. This adequately shows
that appellant employed force in order to accomplish his purpose. Moreover, in rape committed by a father against his
own daughter, the formers moral ascendancy and influence over the latter may substitute for actual physical violence
and intimidation. The moral and physical dominion of the father is sufficient to cow the victim into submission to his
beastly desires, and no further proof need be shown to prove lack of the victims consent to her own defilement.[40]
While appellants conviction was primarily based on the prosecutions testimonial evidence, the same was corroborated
by physical evidence consisting of the medical findings of the medico-legal officer that there were hymenal
lacerations. When a rape victims account is straightforward and candid, and is corroborated by the medical findings of
the examining physician, the same is sufficient to support a conviction for rape.[41]
Aside from the fact of commission of rape, the prosecution likewise established that appellant is the biological father of
AAA and that the latter was then fifteen (15) [42] years old. Thus, the CA aptly convicted him of qualified rape, defined
and penalized by Article 266-B of the RPC, viz.:
ART. 266-B. Penalties. x x x.
xxxx
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances:
1) When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian,
relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common law spouse of the parent of the victim.
In view of the effectivity of Republic Act (R.A.) 9346, appellant was correctly meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
without eligibility for parole.
As to damages, appellant should pay AAA P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, which is awarded if the crime is qualified by
circumstances that warrant the imposition of the death penalty.[43] In light of prevailing jurisprudence,[44] we
increase the award of moral damages from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00. Further, the award of exemplary damages in the
amount of P30,000.00[45] is authorized due to the presence of the qualifying circumstances of minority and
relationship.[46]
In Criminal Case Nos. 1649 and 1654, although appellant was charged with qualified rape allegedly committed on the
second week of November 2000 and May 27, 2001, he should be convicted with Acts of Lasciviousness committed
against a child under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. 7610,[47] which reads:
SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any
other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse
or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:

xxxx
(b)
Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or
subjected to other sexual abuse: Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators
shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised
Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when
the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period; x x x. (Italics supplied.)
The elements of sexual abuse under the above provision are as follows:
1 The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.
2 The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse.
3.

The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.[48]

AAA testified that in November 2000, while she and appellant were inside the bedroom, he went on top of her and
rubbed his penis against her vaginal orifice until he ejaculated.[49] She likewise stated in open court that on May 27,
2001, while inside their comfort room, appellant rubbed his penis against her vagina while they were in a standing
position.[50] In both instances, there was no penetration, or even an attempt to insert his penis into her vagina.
The aforesaid acts of the appellant are covered by the definitions of sexual abuse and lascivious conduct under Section
2(g) and (h) of the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse Cases promulgated to
implement the provisions of R.A. 7610:
(g) Sexual abuse includes the employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of a child to engage
in, or assist another person to engage in, sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or the molestation, prostitution, or
incest with children;
(h) Lascivious conduct means the intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin,
breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person,
whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the
sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or public area of a person.
Following the variance doctrine embodied in Section 4, in relation to Section 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, appellant can be found guilty of the lesser crime of Acts of Lasciviousness committed against a child. The
pertinent provisions read:
Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. When there is variance between the offense
charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily
includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense
charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved.
Sec. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. An offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved
when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information,
constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved, when the essential
ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the latter.
As the crime was committed by the father of the offended party, the alternative circumstance of relationship should be
appreciated. In crimes against chastity, such as Acts of Lasciviousness, relationship is always aggravating.[51]
Section 5(b) of R.A. 7610 prescribes the penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua.
Since there is an aggravating circumstance and no mitigating circumstance, the penalty shall be applied in its
maximum period --- reclusion perpetua for each count.[52]
Consistent with previous rulings[53] of the Court, appellant must also indemnify AAA in the amount of P15,000.00 as
moral damages and pay a fine in the same amount in Criminal Case Nos. 1649 and 1654.
Criminal Case Nos. 1644 and 1645 for Acts of Lasciviousness
Appellant is likewise guilty of two (2) counts of Acts of Lasciviousness under Section 5(b), Article III, R.A. 7610
committed against AAA on the second week of August 1999 and on the first week of September 1999. AAA testified

that in August, appellant, with lewd design, inserted his hands inside her shirt then fondled her breasts; and in
September, he forced her to hold his penis until he ejaculated.
The trial and the appellate courts were correct in giving credence to the victims testimony, in dismissing appellants
defense of denial and alibi, and in disbelieving that AAA initiated the criminal cases only upon the prodding of the
latters grandmother. Settled jurisprudence tells us that the mere denial of ones involvement in a crime cannot take
precedence over the positive testimony of the offended party.[54]
We are not unmindful of the fact that appellant was specifically charged in an Information for Acts of Lasciviousness
defined and penalized by Article 336 of the RPC. However, the failure to designate the offense by statute, or to
mention the specific provision penalizing the act, or an erroneous specification of the law violated, does not vitiate the
information if the facts alleged clearly recite the facts constituting the crime charged.[55] The character of the crime is
not determined by the caption or preamble of the information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged
to have been violated, but by the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint or information.[56]
In the present case, the body of the information contains an averment of the acts alleged to have been committed by
appellant which unmistakably refers to acts punishable under Section 5(b), Article III, R.A. 7610.
Appellant should, therefore, be meted the same penalties and be made to answer for damages as in Criminal Case
Nos. 1649 and 1654.
Criminal Case No. 1651 for Attempted Rape
AAA testified that on November 24, 2000, while AAA and her brothers were sleeping inside their parents bedroom,
appellant entered and asked AAA to have sex with him. When AAA refused, appellant forcibly removed her clothes and
boxed her right buttock. As she still resisted, he took a bolo, which he poked at her. Appellant desisted from
committing further acts because of the timely arrival of AAAs grandmother. With these, appellant was charged with
Other Light Threats in Criminal Case No. 1650; Attempted Rape in Criminal Case No. 1651; Unjust Vexation in Criminal
Case No. 1652; and Maltreatment in Criminal Case No. 1653.
On September 24, 2004, the RTC dismissed Criminal Case Nos. 1650, 1652 and 1653 for insufficiency of evidence.
Criminal Case No. 1651, among others, proceeded, however. Eventually, appellant was convicted of Attempted Rape,
which the CA affirmed.
A careful review of the records reveals, though, that the evidence is insufficient to support appellants conviction of
Attempted Rape.
Rape is attempted when the offender commences the commission of rape directly by overt acts and does not perform
all the acts of execution by reason of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance.[57] The
prosecution must, therefore, establish the following elements of an attempted felony:
1.

The offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts;

2.

He does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony;

3.

The offenders act be not stopped by his own spontaneous desistance;

4.
The non-performance of all acts of execution was due to cause or accident other than his spontaneous
desistance.[58]
The attempt that the RPC punishes is that which has a logical connection to a particular, concrete offense; and that
which is the beginning of the execution of the offense by overt acts of the perpetrator, leading directly to its realization
and consummation.[59] In the instant case, the primary question that comes to the fore is whether or not appellants
act of removing AAAs pants constituted an overt act of Rape.
We answer in the negative.
Overt or external act has been defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention to commit a
particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried out to its complete termination following
its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the voluntary desistance of the perpetrator,
will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense.[60]

The evidence on record does not show that the above elements are present. The detailed acts of execution showing an
attempt to rape are simply lacking. It would be too strained to construe appellants act of removing AAAs pants as an
overt act that will logically and necessarily ripen into rape. Hence, appellant must be acquitted of Attempted Rape.
Neither can we hold appellant liable for Other Light Threats for threatening AAA with a bolo; for Unjust Vexation for
undressing her without her consent, causing disturbance, torment, distress, and vexation; nor for Maltreatment for
boxing the right side of AAAs buttocks. Although all of the above acts were alleged in the Information for Attempted
Rape in the Order dated September 24, 2004, Criminal Case Nos. 1650, 1652 and 1653 involving the above crimes
were dismissed for insufficiency of evidence based on the demurrer to evidence filed by appellant.
The order granting appellants demurrer to evidence was a resolution of the case on the merits, and it amounted to an
acquittal. Any further prosecution of the accused after an acquittal would violate the proscription on double jeopardy.
[61] Accordingly, appellants conviction of any of the above crimes, even under Criminal Case No. 1651, would trench
in his constitutional right against double jeopardy.
Criminal Case No. 1655 for Unjust Vexation
Appellant was charged with Unjust Vexation, defined and penalized by Article 287 of the RPC, which reads:
ART. 287. Light coercions. Any person who, by means of violence, shall seize anything belonging to his debtor for the
purpose of applying the same to the payment of the debt, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum
period and a fine equivalent to the value of the thing, but in no case less than 75 pesos.
Any other coercion or unjust vexation shall be punished by arresto menor or a fine ranging from 5 to 200 pesos, or
both.
The second paragraph of this provision is broad enough to include any human conduct that, although not productive of
some physical or material harm, could unjustifiably annoy or vex an innocent person. The paramount question to be
considered is whether the offenders act caused annoyance, irritation, torment, distress, or disturbance to the mind of
the person to whom it was directed.[62]
Appellants acts of embracing, dragging and kissing AAA in front of her friend annoyed AAA. The filing of the case
against appellant proved that AAA was disturbed, if not distressed by the acts of appellant.
The penalty for coercion falling under the second paragraph of Article 287 of the RPC is arresto menor or a fine ranging
from P5.00 to P200.00 or both. Accordingly, appellant is sentenced to 30 days of arresto menor and to pay a fine of
P200.00, with the accessory penalties thereof.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the January 31, 2008 Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 30045 with
MODIFICATIONS. The Court finds appellant Salvino Sumingwa:
1. GUILTY of QUALIFIED RAPE in Criminal Case No. 1646. He is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
without eligibility for parole and ordered to pay AAA P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and
P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.
2. GUILTY of four (4) counts of ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS under Section 5 (b) Article III of R.A. 7610 in Criminal Case
Nos. 1644, 1645, 1649, and 1654. He is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay AAA
P15,000.00 as moral damages and a fine of P15,000.00, for EACH COUNT.

3. NOT GUILTY in Criminal Case No. 1651.

4. GUILTY of UNJUST VEXATION in Criminal Case No. 1655. He is sentenced to suffer 30 days of arresto menor and to
pay a fine of P200.00, with the accessory penalties thereof. SO ORDERED.

People vs. Larranaga et. al. G.R. 138874-75, February 3, 2004

Most jurisdictions recognize age as a barrier to having full responsibility over ones action. 1 Our legal system, for
instance, does not punish a youth as it would an adult, and it sees youthful misconduct as evidence of unreasoned or
impaired judgment. Thus, in a myriad of cases, we have applied the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority
embodied in Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code -- the rationale of which is to show mercy and some extent of

leniency in favor of an accused who, by reason of his age, is presumed to have acted with less discernment. The case
at bar is another instance when the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority must apply.
For our resolution is the motion for reconsideration 2 filed by brothers James Anthony and James Andrew, both
surnamed Uy, praying for the reduction of the penalties we imposed upon the latter on the ground that he was a minor
at the time the crimes were committed.
A brief review of the pertinent facts is imperative.
On February 3, 2004, we rendered a Decision 3 convicting the Uy brothers, together with Francisco Juan Larraaga,
Josman Aznar, Rowen Adlawan, Alberto Cao and Ariel Balansag of the crimes of (a) special complex crime of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape; and (b) simple kidnapping and serious illegal
detention. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Cebu City in Criminal Cases Nos. CBU 45303 and
45304 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
(1) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, appellants FRANCISCO JUAN LARRAAGA alias PACO; JOSMAN
AZNAR; ROWEN ADLAWAN alias WESLEY; ALBERTO CAO alias ALLAN PAHAK; ARIEL BALANSAG;
and JAMES ANDREW UY alias MM, are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime
of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape and are sentenced to suffer the penalty of
DEATH by lethal injection;
(2) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45304, appellants FRANCISCO JUAN LARRAAGA alias PACO; JOSMAN
AZNAR; ROWEN ADLAWAN alias WESLEY; ALBERTO CAO alias ALLAN PAHAK; ARIEL BALANSAG;
and JAMES ANDREW UY alias MM, are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple kidnapping and
serious illegal detention and are sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA;
(3) In Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, appellant JAMES ANTHONY UY who was a minor at the time the
crime was committed, is likewise found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of RECLUSION PERPETUA; in Criminal Case No. CBU-45304, he is declared guilty of simple kidnapping and
serious illegal detention and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of TWELVE (12) years of prision mayor in its
maximum period, as MINIMUM, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as
MAXIMUM;
(4) Appellants are ordered to pay jointly and severally the heirs of Marijoy and Jacqueline, in each case, the
amounts of (a) P100,000.00 as civil indemnity; (b) P25,000.00 as temperate damages; (c) P150,000.00 as
moral damages; and (d) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Three (3) Justices of the Court maintain their position that RA 7659 is unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes the death
penalty; nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the majority that the law is constitutional and the death penalty can
be lawfully imposed in the case at bar.
In accordance with Article 83 of The Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of RA No. 7659, upon the finality
of this Decision let the records of this case be forthwith forwarded to the Office of the President for the possible
exercise of Her Excellencys pardoning power.
SO ORDERED.
On March 23, 2004, the Uy brothers filed a motion for reconsideration anchored on the following grounds:
I
ACCUSED JAMES ANDREW S. UY WAS, LIKE HIS YOUNGER BROTHER JAMES ANTHONY S. UY, A MINOR AT
THE TIME THE OFFENSES AT BAR ALLEGEDLY HAPPENED LAST JULY 16, 1997;
II
THE IDENTITY OF THE DEAD BODY OF THE WOMAN FOUND IN TAN-AWAN, CARCAR, CEBU LAST JULY 18,
1997 WAS NEVER CONCLUSIVELY ESTABLISHED THUS THE NEED FOR ITS EXHUMATION FOR DNA TESTING.4

The issues raised in the above motion being intertwined with those raised by Larraaga, Aznar, Adlawan, Cao and
Balansag in their separate motions for reconsideration, we deemed it appropriate to consolidate the motions. After a
painstaking evaluation of every piece and specie of evidence presented before the trial court in response to the
movants plea for the reversal of their conviction, still we are convinced that the movants guilt has been proved
beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, in our Resolution dated July 21, 2005, we denied all the motions. However, left
unresolved is the issue of James Andrews minority.
Hence, this disquisition.
In their motion, the Uy brothers claim that James Andrew was only seventeen (17) years and two hundred sixty two
(262) days old at the time the crimes were committed. To substantiate such claim, he begs leave and pleads that we
admit at this stage of the proceedings his (1) Certificate of Live Birth issued by the National Statistics Office, and (2)
Baptismal Certificate. In the ultimate, he prays that his penalty be reduced, as in the case of his brother James
Anthony.
Considering that the entry of James Andrews birth in the proffered Certificate of Live Birth is not legible, we required
the Solicitor General (a) to secure from the City Civil Registrar of Cotobato, as well as the National Statistics Office, a
clear and legible copy of James Certificate of Live Birth, and thereafter, (b) to file an extensive comment on the Uy
brothers motion, solely on the issue of James Andrews minority.
On November 17, 2005, the Solicitor General submitted his comment. Attached therewith are clear and legible copies
of James Certificate of Live Birth duly certified by the Office of the City Civil Registrar of Cotobato and the National
Statistics Office. Both documents bear the entry October 27, 1979 as the date of his birth, thus, showing that he was
indeed only 17 years and 262 days old when the crimes were committed on July 16, 1997.
Consequently, the Solicitor General recommended that the penalty imposed on James Andrew be modified as follows:
In Criminal Case No. CBU-45303 for the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with
homicide and rape, the death penalty should be reduced to reclusion perpetua.
In Criminal Case No. CBU-45304, for the crime of simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention, the penalty of
reclusion perpetua should be reduced to twelve (12) years of prision mayor in its maximum period, as minimum, to
seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum, similar to the penalty imposed on his
brother James Anthony in Criminal Case No. CBU-45303.
The motion is meritorious.
Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 68. Penalty to be imposed upon a person under eighteen years of age. When the offender is a minor under
eighteen years and his case is one coming under the provisions of the paragraph next to the last of article 80 of this
Code, the following rules shall be observed:
xxx
2. Upon a person over fifteen and under eighteen years of age the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall
be imposed, but always in the proper period.
Thus, the imposable penalty on James Andrew, by reason of his minority, is one degree lower than the statutory
penalty. The penalty for the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape,
being death, one degree lower therefrom is reclusion perpetua.5 On the other hand, the penalty for simple kidnapping
and serious illegal detention is reclusion perpetua to death. One degree lower therefrom is reclusion temporal.6 There
being no aggravating and mitigating circumstance, the penalty to be imposed on James Andrew is reclusion temporal
in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of
twelve (12) years of prision mayor in its maximum period, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal
in its medium period, as maximum.7
Accordingly, in Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, the penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed upon James
Andrew; while in Criminal Case No. CBU-45304, the imposable penalty upon him is twelve (12) years of prision mayor
in its maximum period, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. Our Decision dated February 3, 2004 is AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATION that in Criminal Case No. CBU-45303, James Andrew Uy is sentenced to suffer the penalty of

reclusion perpetua; while in Criminal Case No. CBU-45304, the penalty of twelve (12) years of prision mayor in its
maximum period, as MINIMUM, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum.