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PHYSICALAND METAPHYSICAL
CAUSATION,
in a world where
in an orderly
and, itwould seem, inevitable rhythm. It matters not where
we tap the fount of scientific inspiration, we always find that the
untiring search for the antecedents of any event is founded on the
E
LIVE
**
that
conviction
for
that
event
there
is
some
ascertainable
cause.
chance
And
inferior knowledge
that what
in the moment
that follows.
perhaps
regarded by our forefathers as a direct action of the Power that lies
All that
behind the fleeting phenomena of the material universe.
modern science has done, itwill be urged, is to bring into stronger
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CAUSATION,
AND
PHYSICAL
METAPHYSICAL.
231
and stronger relief the fact that the nature of this Power is without
or shadow of turning. Science thus shows behind the
variableness
of
multiplicity
phenomena the unity of the causal power. How far
sense
and inwhat
to discuss.
have
endeavored
that which
of causation,
problems
I even ventured
is smitten with
science
the dumbness
of
that behind
agnosticism;
adding, however,
ence I, for one, believe in a causal
tounding
that science
Almost
carefully.
is deductive
said Hobbes,
1
Monist,
October,
"is
nothing
else
accompanying
we call experi
but remembrance of what
1897.
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THE
232
have
antecedents
been
MONIST.
followed
by what
state
Such
consequents."
ments
these, which
seeds which
he thought the matter out for himself with his customary vigor and
We may profitably make his treatment of the sub
independence.
our
starting point.
ject
we
"When
of causes,"
or necessary
power
does
is not,
there
in a
able
which
any quality,
or inward
of one billiard-ball
is attended
of objects.
of cause
instance
or necessary
senses.
to the outward
particular
and
We
that appears
impression
of
any
binds
impulse
is the whole
the Idea
to discover
instance
single
the operation
treats of
which
of the other.
The
the other.
and consider
objects,
the Enquiry
in any single,
can suggest
which
never
This
feels no sentiment
Consequently
of
consequence
in the second.
mind
anything
infallible
in fact, follow
actually,
with motion
The
are
"we
connexion,
the one an
renders
external
in that section
Connexion,
Necessary
us towards
look about
said Hume
and
effect*
"
connexion.
a comprehension
stress must be
of Hume's
conception
on
a
the words "in
laid, in this passage,
single instance." When
For
he
that we
says
are
or necessary
power
never
in a
able
single
these
connexion,
to discover
instance
are
four words
not
any
in
merely
ample,
discover
more
pears
evidently
or penetration,
sagacity
event will
mediately
have
justly esteemed
observed
We
rule, or
that reasoning,
then call
is some
or senses.
'tis impossible
without
conjecture,
which
connexion
in all
between
Cause;
assure
and
them ; some
what
is im
to follow upon
another,
we are not en
happen
of
been
in like cases
; it being
course
of nature
the whole
or certain.
can alone
which
or experiment,
accurate
instances,
experience,
that object,
instance
to judge
temerity
however
to foretell
event
after one
Even
an unpardonable
is presented,
or even
a particular
or event
to the memory
ap
passages.
to discover,
to form a general
titled
object
This
connexion.
necessary
result
present
we
or
power
in later
any natural
"When
when
any
conjoined
appearance
But when
with another,
of
us of any matter
one particular
We
the other,
we make
and
to em
of fact or existence.
suppose
that there
it infallibly
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produces
AND
PHYSICAL
CAUSATION,
with
operates
METAPHYSICAL.
the greatest
233
neces
and strongest
certainty
sity.
"It
in all
similar
; except
ried by habit,
and
only,
the appearance
to believe,
that it will
mind,
or customary
ant,
is the sentiment
but
readily
When
of two billiard
but only
instances
has happened
now feels these
many
the same
event
; we
that itwas
conjoined
not pronounce
with
instances
then begin
of
to be
the one
appear,
the other.
he then pronounces
the existence
uniform
he could
balls,
of this nature,
alteration
foretell
in the
or nec
connected;
that he
is car
attendant,
we feel
therefore, which
connexion,
exactly
pulse,
What
its usual
of
attend
as by the shock
several
to be
the mind
instances,
to expect
instances,
to its usual
connexion.
event was
This
essary
observed
exist.
is supposed
of similar
of
conjunction
in a number
there is nothing
instance, which
single
events
amongst
But
positions.
connexion
from every
upon
of a necessary
idea
instances, which
lights and
possible
different
instances,
this
of similar
; nor can
of these events
surveyed
that
then,
appears,
from a number
arises
and
to entertain
from
After he has
them to be connected.
idea of connexion?
connected
by im
in his
Nothing
imagination,
the appearance
the same
object
the notion
of cause
and can
the other.
of
is always
. . .
followed
by
or connexion."
The
Obviously not. Let us take a matter of common experience.
flash and the report of a distant cannon are so connected in expe
rience that the occurrence of the one suggests the other through
association.
antecedent
In Hume's
cedents
the smallest
To modify
indication.
we
his
without altering
may say :
meaning
we call custom is nothing else but remembering what ante
the words
"What
of Hobbes
have
been
followed by what
consequents";
and we may
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THE
234
in the phrase
add
of Glanvill
MONIST.
"for
the causality
itself is insensi
ble."
second
any advantage
seen-flash?expectation
of-the-report, instead of with the frankly objective sequence, flash?
In some respects there would seem to be a distinct disad
report.
though in the subjective scheme on which we inter
the flash and the report stand in the relation of
pret experience
antecedent and sequent, in the objective
scheme on which we in
For
vantage.
For experi
terpret experience they do not stand in this relation.
ence itself discloses the fact that ifwe lessen our distance from the
cannon
port is proportionally
approach the cannon.
the antecedent
lessened.
The
in the objective
ishes, at the cannon's mouth.
common
to both.
between
abiding
discrepancy
interpretation of experience,
Hence,
science,
But
of causation
be duly correlated. We
thus come back to what may be re
garded as Hume's
primary contention which may be thus summa
rised. All
that is disclosed
may be expressed
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AND
PHYSICAL
CAUSATION,
METAPHYSICAL.
235
or
power
concealed
force,
actuates
which
the whole
is
machine,
entirely
qualities of body."
Is this way of
And so we may pass on to our third question.
modern
science?
But
in order to
causation
regarding
accepted by
lead up to an answer to this question we must consider briefly in
what
respects
terial
of sensory
of science
the conceptions
experience.
formula which
term
constructs
tion. But
"
of
it is obvious
nature,
from
the
the
the
needs
mind,
no
further
of sensory
science
differ
experience.
in
any
For
essential
the
latter
as
no
products
of sense
associated
illustra
our saying
constructs
constructs
of particular
human
; a sound
in
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THE
236
is a construct,
therein
or,
as Dr.
sense supplies
theton, of which
MONIST.
Johnstone
the nucleus
Stoney
terms
it, a syn~
rest.
Shall we
more
abstract
a distinction
then discover
structs of sense
have
But such a
reality which is lacking to the constructs of science.
limitation is arbitrary and leads rather to confusion than to clear
ness of ideas. We
commonly speak of objects of thought, objects
of desire, objects of reverence, and so forth. It is more consistent
and more helpful to regard all experience,
sensory and super
into an objective aspect
of analysis
sensory alike, as susceptible
and a subjective aspect.
In which case the conceptions which form
the
constructs
of
science
constitute,
from
the
appropriate
stand
structs of science
pose of enabling
they are applicable.
are valid
The
and by whomsoever
it may be applied as a canon of
If the scheme fits, under all possible circumstances
interpretation.
it is as real and
within the sphere of its appropriate application,
whenever
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AND
PHYSICAL
CAUSATION,
METAPHYSICAL.
237
can possi
experience
bly be,
It is therefore not in any lack of reality or of objective import
that the constructs of science differ from the constructs of sensory
It is their abstract and general character which alone
experience.
them. We may add, however, that there is another
distinguishes
feature about them which Dr. Karl Pearson well expresses by say
ing that they have been carried in thought to their ideal limits.
the law of gravitation for example.
It is sometimes asked, by
right we assume from a limited number of observations?very
Take
what
numerous
assume
We
in no case has
from
the
ideal
as
due
to
errors
of
observation.
We
trust
to a
than the
of sense.
Thus we
use
explain
sense.
But
this way
here
we
must
pause
again
for a moment
and
render
clear
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THE
238
MONIST.
It tells us nothing
of the why. If a boy asks why a stone falls to the earth, you do not
of the law of gravitation.
Or ifyou do, he will, if
reply : Because
in convenient
tative attraction
schematic
: But
whereas
facts,
seem
to tell me
you to say
to interpret the
I understood
us
to enable
that
it somehow
constrains
truth is that
The
senses
you
form.
we
may
the word
term
"explanation"
the
sense
scientific
in two
is used
in the meta
and
physical
general
When
and equatorial
condenses
water-vapor
a word,
tions
the explanation,
of particular
law
of crystalline
needles
explanation
ultimate
to the
constructs
abstract
But
in
none
of
the
cases
in the metaphysical
Cause.
sense.
The
In
no
case
constructs
ice.
In
the rela
of science.
by referring it to
above
underlying
of
phenomena
of gravitation.
which may be
to an
form
Hence
the
in the
are
adduced,
is there any
referred
they
of sensory
expe
are built
is repeat
to
for
of
purposes
interpretation ; ob
phenomena
edly applied
served facts are again and again referred to the ideal scheme for
the facts and the sensory data are
a question
is
formetaphysics,
not
are,
they
If an answer to this question can be given, itwill be
scientific explanation.
thev are and as
what
for science.
But why
an explanation
sense.
in the metaphysical
The observable
sequences of natural
as given in
phenomena
from
the
here
be
inevitable
distinguished
practical experience may
we
can
of
Of
the
former
logical thought.
only say (apart
sequiturs
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AND
PHYSICAL
CAUSATION,
METAPHYSICAL.
23g
ble sequiturs
ideal
of
scheme,
the postulates,
These
geometry.
the
and understand
not
statements
only
are
true,
but they must be true within that ideal scheme. That an unsup
ported stone falls to the earth with a given acceleration, as a natu
fact ; as a natural phe
ral phenomenon
is simply an observable
no "must
in the
be"
there is (apart frommetaphysics)
case.
The
idea of necessity only arises when we incorporate the
an
ideal scheme of physics.
facts in
Assuming the universality of
nomenon
the law of gravitation we may then say that, apart from disturbing
influences, the stone must fall to the earth. But it is clear that the
thought ; and not
scheme is founded.
be
inevitable
and
necessary
se
that any necessity we may ascribe to the observable
is an importation from the products
of natural phenomena
said
quences
of our logical thought.
far we
So
bears
sequiturs
been
to natural
phenomena
concerning
to make
endeavoring
clear
the
and
explanation
We
have
Hume's
with
their
observed
nature
of
its logical
sequences.
doctrine
of
causation
That
: Is
his
main
contention
contention we summarised
as
and
to the mass
and varying
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THE
240
MONIST.
this force, as
conclu
the cause of attraction, square with Hume's
Is there an observed antecedent "force" and then an ob
sion?
the physical
sequent "attraction"?
Surely not. From
point of view it is all one whether we say the force of gravitative
attraction or the attraction of gravitative force. For physics the
served
attraction
statement of Newton's
from its scientific value, and say that every substance in the uni
attracts every other substance
in a degree jointly propor
tional to the masses and inversely as the square of their distance.
verse
is a statement of observed
That
are content
many physicists
in mathematical
pression,
For
while
Others,
however,
another
between
decide
of intensity.
in terms which are
to an outsider
to
it seems
contending giants.
if force be regarded as the cause of motion, the
clear
that
perfectly
word "cause"
is used in a sense quite different from that which is
on
founded
the
conception
us
Let
physical
of antecedence
frankly accept
or scientific causation which
cedents,
and
this conclusion.
sequence.
And
refers events
generalising
of physical science ; and
let us
speak of
to their ante
in an ideal scheme
let us
causation
speak of metaphysical
to get behind or beneath phenomena
and to give the
raison d'?tre of their being, generalising
in an ideal
its conclusions
scheme of metaphysical
with
this'distinction
And,
interpretation.
in view, let us proceed to consider physical causation a little more
which
seeks
closely that we may see how far and with what amendments mod
ern science accepts Hume's doctrine. Three points may be noticed.
I. Hobbes,
in a passage which is quoted by Jevons, brought
out an important feature when he said: "A cause is the sum or
aggregate of all such accidents, both in the agents and the patients,
as concur in the producing of the effect propounded
; all which ex
but that the effect existed
isting together, it cannot be understood
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AND
PHYSICAL
CAUSATION,
METAPHYSICAL.
24I
with
conditions,
it is none
success
ever-increasing
time it should
us
it enables
be noted
to
At
interpret.
the
same
of scientific procedure
For though physics
contention.
is the
totality
of
the
of Hobbes's
conditions,
we
may
contention
add,
as
that the
rider,
that
science analyses this complex into its factors and utilises the results
of its analysis in synthetic interpretation.
2. Hume's doctrine on the effects of custom and habit led him,
no doubt, as Reid pointed out, to exaggerate the importance of the
the conception of uniformity has
When
repetition of experience.
been reached, a single accurate and precise determination of the
antecedent conditions is sufficient. The value of repeti
tion is, first, to eliminate errors of observation, and secondly (where
others repeat the observations of the original investigator), to en
sure the social validity of the conclusion, and to make allowance,
essential
if necessary,
Hume's
for the personal equation.
error, if such it
a
he
had
double purpose in
from the fact that
arose
be regarded,
view ; first, to show how the conception of uniformity arises, and
secondly, to interpret causation in terms of observable sequence.
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THE
242
MONIST.
from a
from metaphysical
failure to distinguish physical
In the latter, as we shall see, the time-element is ab
it is essential.
But though it is
in physical causation
causation.
sent ; but
of science,
carried
in thought
to
has no existence
duced
between
the
past
and
future.
When
we
narrow
down
our
consid
phenomena
the
boundary.
I take
which we
soience
as
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physical
Some
science
METAPHYSICAL.
243
so
is concerned.
are,
physicists
AND
PHYSICAL
CAUSATION,
as we
however,
have
already
un
noticed,
of antecedent.
not as
they do so as metaphysicians
that kind of explanation which we
But
physicists.
They supplement
term physical by the totally different kind of explanation which
should in strictness be regarded as metaphysical.
Force as a cause
is not its antecedent
of motion
are
quences
terms
of any
given,
as matter
so
sequence,
of
fact,
are,
given,
By analysis,
frame an ideal scheme of physical
in
sensory
as Hume
The
experience.
contends,
conjoined
Within
this scheme the terms are not merely
experience.
are
but
joined,
logically connected for rational thought. We
mere
sequences, given in sensory experience,
project into the
nexions
con
then
con
analogous
physical science. We make the connexions part of our completed
construct.
So much for origin ; now for justification.
The
ideal
scheme of physical science is admittedly rational and connected.
But when
But
this scheme
to be con
of sensory experience.
nected, rational, and explicable.
It may be said that, since the ideal scheme of physical science
Hence
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THE
244
on
MONIST.
of sensory experience,
its connexions are
derived from, and not imported into, the sequences of natural phe
nomena.
But it is clear that, unless we are to deny in our conclu
is founded
sion what
some
the data
is granted
in our premises,
metaphysical
this is no argument
It merely
connexion.
asserts
that
the
against
connex
the metaphysician
deems inadequate and
to
desires
supplement by his doctrine of causation.
Here
itwill be necessary to make a fresh start and approach
the problem by a somewhat different path.
It will be remembered
is it that we have
that, in my former essay, the question : How
was
as
one
sensory experience ?
involving a metaphys
passed by
Speaking of the milestones on the Dover road I said :
if it be contended that something, at any rate, does exist, in
ical answer.
"And
of metaphysics,
real question
cannot be answered
The
knowledge."
And this question
to doubt
this.
as given in experience.
is what calls experience
But that which we now wish to ascertain
a
stone
from the earth is the antece
into being. The separation of
dent condition of its fall ; but ifwe ask, what makes it fall, we are
tion deals with antecedence
constrained
to have
and sequence
recourse
to the metaphysical
of
conception
ifwe could say with any certainty that the
stress, we
should
still
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CAUSATION,
PHYSICAL
AND
METAPHYSICAL.
245
have
Of course
contend
experience
and
physical
science
can
give
no
answer.
They can only say : Such are the facts as given. Metaphysical
sumptions give an ideal scheme as a framework, supplying
threads on which the passing beads are strung.
as
the
is the continuity of
cause.
as
Of this exist
of acting
are regarded as the effects. The
ence the data of sense-impressions
effects may come and go, with the opportunities of experience ; but
A fundamental
assumption
that existence which is capable
of metaphysics
supplemented
existence.
John
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THE
246
MONIST.
Not
here
scheme with
the observable
as presumptive
evidence
of
remembered,
assumptions
them
realizes
or
their
true
experiences,
anticipated
inevitable, whether
character
not.
are
metaphysical
makes
Furthermore,
or accepts
for
the
the so-called
experientialist,
thoroughgoing
uniformity of nature
He
is nothing more nor less than the uniformity of experience.
a
who believes in material universe which exists independently of
our experience, and teaches that this material universe is the cause
of our sensory impressions and the like, is committed to a meta
physical proposition which the experience on which he relies can
never be in a position to demonstrate.
And so we seem to be fully
so
as the uniformity of nature
in
that
far
in
asserting
just
justified
is held to be a cause
expression
and not a
conception.
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cause
is the
which
existence
METAPHYSICAL.
247
as a fundamental postulate
If we thus assume,
an
AND
PHYSICAL
CAUSATION,
of
the
of metaphysics,
our
sequences
sense-impres
of Berkeley
my mind,
conclusively
be reasonably supposed
its effects in human experience.
the physiol
perfluous
At the present stage of our inquiry it is, indeed, impossible to
nature of that exist
make any suggestion as to the metaphysical
to play the r?le of cause.
to its ideal limits we may indeed predicate
ence which we
assume
conception
on the lines of the scientific conception
Thus
regarded
as
universal,
time-reference
Carrying
universality?
of universal
and
the
gravitation.
space-reference
The universalised
to become meaningless.
present
we
When
tense is alone admissible.
speak of universal gravita
tion, we do not say that itwas or will be ; we use this comprehen
We mean that substances
sive "is."
always attract each other
would
seem
The
So
expression
is only applic
instances of such attraction as they fall under
conditions.
Time-reference
Cause,
if used with
acts as cause
: //
time-reference,
is
It is probably
legacy of the confusion of
wholly misleading.
causation. The cause,
thought between physical and metaphysical
as antecedent, is itself caused by a previous antecedent, this by an
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THE
248
so on
other, and
in an
of which
beginning
inating antecedent.
MONIST.
one stage short of your completed series and begin with what you
term the second cause?
The mistake, of course, is to confuse the
to physical causation)
antecedent
of
(which belongs
conception
raison d'?tre implied on conception
of a
the metaphysical
cause and effect are the
For metaphysics
called First Cause.
aspects, experiential and existential, of the same reality. They
simultaneous not successive ; one on the hither side, the other
so
with
two
are
on
to metaphys
of all space-reference, as applicable
involves further the exclusion of any conception of
absence
ical existence,
cause
the
based
as
external.
on sensible
construct.
The
like
Externality,
experience
as
existence
cause
is
time-sequence,
not
is conceived
an
idea
in the metaphysical
as
external
to
Here
is conceived
as
in itself timeless
and
spaceless.
Herein
lies the
and
conceived
phenomena,
Thus we
reach
as everywhere
whenever
and
wherever
they
the con
occur.
the metaphysical
conception of a unifying ex
in space and time, and immanent, founded on
istence, omnipresent
the conviction that experience
convie
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causation,
physical
and
metaphysical.
249
is a vain
and illusory
dream-quest.
believe
that behind
the realities
is the indefeasible
If we
and sequence may be rationally explained.
are
that natural phenomena
admit, with Hume,
merely conjoined,
we may none the less claim that a causal nexus is a fundamental
this antecedence
postulate
of rational
thought.
C.
Bristol,
Lloyd
Morgan.
England.
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