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Hegeler Institute

CAUSATION, PHYSICAL AND METAPHYSICAL


Author(s): C. Lloyd Morgan
Source: The Monist, Vol. 8, No. 2 (January, 1898), pp. 230-249
Published by: Hegeler Institute
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27897481
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PHYSICALAND METAPHYSICAL
CAUSATION,
in a world where

in an orderly
and, itwould seem, inevitable rhythm. It matters not where
we tap the fount of scientific inspiration, we always find that the
untiring search for the antecedents of any event is founded on the
E

LIVE

effect follows cause

**

that

conviction

for

that

event

there

is

some

ascertainable

cause.

has yielded to the statistical method, so that its laws


may be formulated. By dealing with larger and larger numbers we
eliminate more and more the idiosyncrasies of the particular case.
Even

chance

thus we come to realise that what we call chance in the tossing


of a coin is only our ignorance of the nature and immediate cause
of these idiosyncrasies.
Just in so far as our science or its applica

And

tion is imperfect, do we project upon the screen of nature, woven


by our experience, the shadow of fortuity, blurring the details of
processes which, to less imperfect mental vision, would stand out
clearly as causally related. Thus it arises that, for those who have
been led to this point of view, the doctrine of evolution, as applic
able throughout the range of an experience which science indefi
to the daily strengthening belief
nitely prolongs, gives expression
that the state of matters at any given moment is the outcome of a
in the preceding moment, and in like manner
state of matters
serves to determine

the state of matters

It may be said, however,


was, with

inferior knowledge

that what

in the moment

that follows.

I have spoken of as chance


but with greater reverence,

perhaps
regarded by our forefathers as a direct action of the Power that lies
All that
behind the fleeting phenomena of the material universe.
modern science has done, itwill be urged, is to bring into stronger

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CAUSATION,

AND

PHYSICAL

METAPHYSICAL.

231

and stronger relief the fact that the nature of this Power is without
or shadow of turning. Science thus shows behind the
variableness
of
multiplicity
phenomena the unity of the causal power. How far
sense

and inwhat

this is true, it is the object of the present essay

to discuss.

former essay on "The


Realities
of Experience"1
I
to prepare the way for this discussion.
It was
there shown that both the physical and the psychological
sciences
In my

have

endeavored

deal with data

afforded by experience ; that the incontrovertible


dictum on which they take their stand is experientia est, that the
phenomena of the world, which through experience we construct,
have a practical reality on which we may rely with implicit confi
dence ; but that the sciences which take their stand on experience
have no right to proceed a single step?to assert anything positive
or negative?beyond
founded thereon.

that which

of causation,

problems

is given in experience or securely


to say that in presence of the

I even ventured

is smitten with

science

the dumbness

of

that behind

agnosticism;
adding, however,
ence I, for one, believe in a causal

the realities of experi


reality which makes that experi

ence possible and explicable.


Now, what in the name of reason
contradictions?

tounding
that science

Almost

is the meaning of these as


in the same breath we are told

has established the all-embracing sway of natural cau


sation ; and that science can tell us nothing whatever about this
(or is it some other?) causation, in which we are none the less sol
If the reader deem the matter worthy of
emnly invited to believe!
his serious attention, he will not be unwilling to look into it some
what

carefully.

in his Scepsis Scientifica says: "All knowledge of causes


; forwe know of none by simple intuition, but through
the mediation of their effects. So that we cannot conclude anything
Glanvill

is deductive

to be the cause of another but from its


continually]
"What
it; for the causality itself is insensible."
ence,"

said Hobbes,

1
Monist,

October,

"is

nothing

else

accompanying
we call experi
but remembrance of what

1897.

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THE

232
have

antecedents

been

MONIST.

followed

by what

state

Such

consequents."

are quoted by Lewes, may have been the


in the mind of Hume and developed
into
germinated
In any case it is evident that
his well-known
theory of causation.
as

ments

these, which

seeds which

he thought the matter out for himself with his customary vigor and
We may profitably make his treatment of the sub
independence.
our
starting point.
ject
we

"When
of causes,"

or necessary

power
does

is not,

there

in a

able

which

any quality,

or inward

of one billiard-ball

is attended

of objects.

of cause

instance

or necessary

senses.

to the outward

from this succession

particular

the idea of power

and

only find, that the one

We

that appears

impression

of
any

the effect to the cause,

binds

impulse

is the whole

the Idea

to discover

instance

single

the operation

treats of

which

of the other.
The

the other.

and consider

objects,

the Enquiry

in any single,

can suggest

which

never

This

feels no sentiment

Consequently

of

consequence

in the second.

mind

anything

infallible

in fact, follow

actually,

with motion
The

are

"we
connexion,

the one an

renders

external

in that section

Connexion,

Necessary

us towards

look about

said Hume

and

effect*

"

connexion.

a comprehension
stress must be
of Hume's
conception
on
a
the words "in
laid, in this passage,
single instance." When
For

he

that we

says

are

or necessary

power

never

in a

able

single

these

connexion,

to discover

instance
are

four words

not

any
in

merely

the never; they are to be taken literally. We


serted to emphasise
are never able, from the study of a single and isolated case or ex
to

ample,

discover

more

pears

evidently

or penetration,

sagacity
event will
mediately

have

justly esteemed

observed

We

rule, or

of event has always,

that reasoning,
then call

is some

or senses.

'tis impossible
without

conjecture,

which

the one object,

connexion

in all

between

Cause;

assure
and

them ; some

what
is im

to follow upon

another,

we are not en

happen
of

been

in like cases

; it being

course

of nature

the whole

or certain.

the one upon

can alone

which

or experiment,

accurate

instances,

experience,

that object,
instance

to judge

temerity

however

to foretell

event

for us, by any

after one

Even

foretell what will

an unpardonable

no longer any scruple


ploy

is presented,

or even

a particular

from one single experiment,


species

or event

to the memory

ap

passages.

to discover,

to form a general

titled

object

This

connexion.

necessary

from it, or to carry our foresight beyond

result
present

we

or

power

in later

any natural

"When

when

any

conjoined

appearance

But when

with another,
of

us of any matter

the other Effect.


power

one particular

We

the other,

we make
and

to em

of fact or existence.
suppose

in the one, by which

that there
it infallibly

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the other, and

produces

AND

PHYSICAL

CAUSATION,

with

operates

METAPHYSICAL.

the greatest

233
neces

and strongest

certainty

sity.
"It

in all

similar

; except

ried by habit,
and

that after a repetition

only,

the appearance

to believe,

that it will

mind,

or customary

ant,

is the sentiment

but

readily
When

of two billiard
but only

instances

has happened
now feels these

many

the same

event

; we

that itwas

conjoined

not pronounce

with

instances
then begin

of

to be

the one

appear,

the other.

he then pronounces

to give rise to this new


events

the existence

uniform

he could

balls,

of this nature,

alteration

foretell

in the

or nec

connected;

that he

from one object

is car

attendant,

we feel

therefore, which

connexion,

exactly

or impression, from which we form the idea of power


. . .The
saw communication
first time a man
of motion

pulse,

What

its usual

of

attend

as by the shock
several

to be
the mind

instances,

to expect

instances,

to its usual

connexion.

event was

This

transition of the imagination

essary

observed

exist.

is supposed

of similar

the one event,

of

conjunction

in a number

there is nothing

instance, which

single

events

amongst

by any one of these

But

positions.

connexion

occur, of the constant

that idea ever be suggested

from every

upon

of a necessary

idea

instances, which

lights and

possible

different

instances,

this

of similar

; nor can

of these events
surveyed

that

then,

appears,

from a number

arises

and

to entertain

from

After he has

them to be connected.

idea of connexion?

connected

by im

that the one

in his

Nothing

imagination,

the appearance

the same

object

the notion

of cause

and can

the other.

of

is always

. . .

followed

by

or connexion."

first question we may ask concerning the views which are


so
thus
clearly and forcibly expressed is this : Does Hume disclose
or frequently observed succession?
anything beyond observable
The

The
Obviously not. Let us take a matter of common experience.
flash and the report of a distant cannon are so connected in expe
rience that the occurrence of the one suggests the other through
association.
antecedent

In Hume's

interpretation, first, the visible flash is the


of the heard report ; secondly, the flash is the antece

dent of an expectation or anticipation of the report ; and thirdly,


custom is the antecedent condition of the settled and established
Here we are simply describing
anticipation.
rience in terms of antecedence and sequence.
"strongest necessity" Hume
the last to see inmere custom

cedents

the smallest

To modify
indication.
we
his
without altering
may say :
meaning
we call custom is nothing else but remembering what ante

the words
"What

certain facts of expe


"
or
Of any " power
should be, and I take it actually was,

of Hobbes

have

been

followed by what

consequents";

and we may

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THE

234
in the phrase

add

of Glanvill

MONIST.

"for

the causality

itself is insensi

ble."

question may be put thus : Is anything gained by


shifting the field of discussion from the physical to the psychologi
cal aspect of one common experience?
Otherwise stated : Is there
A

second

any advantage

in dealing with the sequence,

seen-flash?expectation
of-the-report, instead of with the frankly objective sequence, flash?
In some respects there would seem to be a distinct disad
report.
though in the subjective scheme on which we inter
the flash and the report stand in the relation of
pret experience
antecedent and sequent, in the objective
scheme on which we in
For

vantage.

For experi
terpret experience they do not stand in this relation.
ence itself discloses the fact that ifwe lessen our distance from the
cannon

the interval between

port is proportionally
approach the cannon.

flash and sequent re


two converge in time as we

the antecedent

lessened.

The

to its ideal limit


Carrying this convergence
van
sphere, the two coalesce, and antecedence

in the objective
ishes, at the cannon's mouth.

tion of experience by physical


dent or cause of the report.
antecedent

common

to both.
between

abiding

discrepancy
interpretation of experience,

Hence,
science,

They are the diverse effects of an


Of course there is no lasting and
the psychological
and the physical
a
in scheme of knowledge
that is ade

quately organised and correlated.


tion and correlation is necessary,
tation of the discussion

in the objective interpreta


the flash is not the antece

But

the fact that such organisa


should warn us against any limi
to the subjective sphere of
It need hardly be said that this

of causation

impressions and expectations.


does not imply any forgetfulness of the fact that there is a subjec
tive aspect in all experience, and in every stage of its interpreta
tion. This-we may now take for granted ; and we may say that

experience, whether we regard it objectively or subjectively, affords


certain observable sequences which in any consistent interpretation
must

be duly correlated. We
thus come back to what may be re
garded as Hume's
primary contention which may be thus summa
rised. All

in the objective treatment of experience


in terms of actually observed antecedence
and

that is disclosed

may be expressed

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AND

PHYSICAL

CAUSATION,

METAPHYSICAL.

235

scenes of the universe are continually shifting,


"The
sequence.
and one object follows another in uninterrupted succession ; but
the

or

power

concealed

force,

actuates

which

the whole

from us, and never discovers

is

machine,

entirely

itself in any of the sensible

qualities of body."
Is this way of
And so we may pass on to our third question.
modern
science?
But
in order to
causation
regarding
accepted by
lead up to an answer to this question we must consider briefly in
what

respects

terial

of sensory

of science

the conceptions

differ from the raw ma

experience.

It is clear that the conceptions of science are mental products.


They form part of an ideal scheme, often highly abstract and gen
of our sensory ex
eralised, by which we interpret the phenomena
The law of gravitation is an abstract and general form
perience.
to any one of the thousands of particular cases of
ula applicable
gravitative attraction which may at any time, and in any part of
to our observation.
The
be presented
law that the
celestial
influence
of
varies
any
tide-producing
body
directly as its
mass and inversely as the cube of its distance from the Earth, is a
the universe,

formula which

results from a consideration

of the differential effects

of gravitative attraction on a body which is in part rigid and in part


mobile.
That such abstract formulae and general schemes for the
interpretation of a multiplicity
"

term

constructs

tion. But

"

of

it is obvious

going essay precludes


general
pect

nature,
from

the

the

the

cases, are what we may

needs

mind,

no

further

that our treatment of experience in the fore


that, save in their abstract and
of

of sensory

less than the former are mental


in so far as the immediate data

science

differ

experience.

in

any

For

essential
the

latter

as
no

; and they are constructs


are supplemented
by the
revived inmemory. A subtle

products
of sense

products of past experience


and characteristic scent leads me to construct violets

associated

illustra

our saying

constructs

constructs

of particular

human

; a sound

the street leads me

in

to construct tram-car ; the sight of distant


on
of
the
grey
swelling chalk downs leads me to construct
specks
This whole range
sheep ; and so on in a thousand familiar cases.
our
is a mental product ; and every object
of
sensory experience

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THE

236
is a construct,

therein

or,

as Dr.

sense supplies

theton, of which

MONIST.

Johnstone

the nucleus

Stoney

terms

it, a syn~

and memory fills in the

rest.

Shall we
more

abstract

a distinction

then discover

in the fact that the con

an objective reality which is lacking to the


and general constructs of science ? That depends on

structs of sense

have

how we define the term objective, and on what we understand by


reality.
Subject and object are, in our interpretation, products of
the analysis of experience.
Both are implicit in every definite item
experience ; both may be rendered explicit in thought as
Now if we limit the term "ob
but inseparable.
distinguishable
"
one
to
of
then itwill follow
this
sensory experience
aspect
jective
that, by definition, the constructs of sense have an "objective"
of human

But such a
reality which is lacking to the constructs of science.
limitation is arbitrary and leads rather to confusion than to clear
ness of ideas. We
commonly speak of objects of thought, objects
of desire, objects of reverence, and so forth. It is more consistent
and more helpful to regard all experience,
sensory and super
into an objective aspect
of analysis
sensory alike, as susceptible
and a subjective aspect.
In which case the conceptions which form
the

constructs

of

science

constitute,

from

the

appropriate

stand

point of analysis, an objective scheme which we, so to speak, pro


ject on to the screen of the phenomenal universe.
As to the reality of the constructs of science, that is their ina
lienable right as products of the widened
experience of rational
est. To say that they are products
beings.
Experientia
implies
to make clear
that they are real products in the sense I endeavored
"
But if the word "real
be used, as it often
in my former essay.
then we may say that the con
of "valid,"
is, as the equivalent
just in so far as they fulfil their pur
us to interpret the particular phenomena to which

structs of science

pose of enabling
they are applicable.

are valid
The

ideal scheme of science must fit the facts

and by whomsoever
it may be applied as a canon of
If the scheme fits, under all possible circumstances
interpretation.
it is as real and
within the sphere of its appropriate application,
whenever

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AND

PHYSICAL

CAUSATION,

valid as anything within

METAPHYSICAL.

the range of human

237

can possi

experience

bly be,
It is therefore not in any lack of reality or of objective import
that the constructs of science differ from the constructs of sensory
It is their abstract and general character which alone
experience.
them. We may add, however, that there is another
distinguishes
feature about them which Dr. Karl Pearson well expresses by say
ing that they have been carried in thought to their ideal limits.
the law of gravitation for example.
It is sometimes asked, by
right we assume from a limited number of observations?very

Take
what

numerous

the law is universal ; and,


perhaps but still limited?that
limited in
further, by what right we assume from measurements
no
but
still falling short of that
accurate,
accuracy?very
doubt,
which is absolute?that
in no particular case is there any variation,
even by so much as a hair's breadth, from the formula which New
ton expressed inmathematical
terms. The answer is that we carry
our law to an ideal limit unattainable
by sense and by practical
measurement.
because

assume

We

in no case has

that it is absolutely and universally true


it been shown to be actually and observa

sweep our ideal curve through the recorded data of


bly false. We
and regard the minute deviations of the act
physical measurement
ual

from

the

ideal

as

due

to

errors

of

reality of thought which we believe


realities

observation.

We

trust

to be truer and wider

to a

than the

of sense.

Thus we

use

explain

the conceptual constructs of science, carried in


to their ideal limits and rendered absolute for thought, to
the phenomena presented to our observation in the field of

sense.

But

this way

here

we

must

pause

again

for a moment

and

render

clear

the meaning which attaches


to the word "explanation."
it
be
is
the
of
law
What,
may
asked,
gravitative attraction, but a
highly general and abstract description of certain facts and phenom
ena stripped of merely incidental errors of observation? Given cer
tain antecedent

conditions, certain consequent events follow. That


is no explanation, not even an attempt at explanation,
which shall afford an answer to the question why they should thus
follow. Your law, itwill be said, presents us with the how of gravi
is all. There

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THE

238

MONIST.

It tells us nothing
of the why. If a boy asks why a stone falls to the earth, you do not
of the law of gravitation.
Or ifyou do, he will, if
reply : Because
in convenient

tative attraction

schematic

: But

a tolerably sharp lad, make answer


that the law is an ideal construct
now

whereas

facts,

the stone to move


; in what

seem

to tell me

you to say
to interpret the

I understood
us

to enable
that

it somehow

constrains

toward the earth !

truth is that

The
senses

you

form.

we

may

the word
term

"explanation"

the

sense

scientific

in two

is used

in the meta

and

we refer a given fact of observation to the


law under which it falls, we are said to give a scientific ex
sense.

physical
general

When

planation of the fact. Thus we explain the magnifying power of a


under the gen
pocket lens by bringing the particular phenomena
eral laws of refraction. We explain the easting of the trade winds
in terms of the differential velocity, under rotation, of the tropical
zones. We
explain the formation of hoar frost by
is below the freezing point,
showing that, when the dew-point

and equatorial

condenses

water-vapor

a word,
tions

the explanation,

of particular

law

of crystalline

needles

explanation
ultimate

to the

constructs

abstract

But

in

none

of

the

cases

in the metaphysical
Cause.

sense.
The

In

no

case

constructs

ice.

In

the rela

of science.

by referring it to
above

taken as sufficiently typical examples,

underlying

of

in this sense of the term, exhibits

phenomena

of gravitation.

which may be
to an

form

the fall of a stone to the earth is explained

Hence
the

in the

are

adduced,

is there any
referred

they

of sensory

as data ; the constructs of science


rience are accepted
upon them in conceptional
synthesis ; the ideal scheme

expe

are built

is repeat
to
for
of
purposes
interpretation ; ob
phenomena
edly applied
served facts are again and again referred to the ideal scheme for
the facts and the sensory data are
a question
is
formetaphysics,
not
are,
they
If an answer to this question can be given, itwill be

scientific explanation.
thev are and as

what

for science.

But why

an explanation
sense.
in the metaphysical
The observable
sequences of natural

as given in
phenomena
from
the
here
be
inevitable
distinguished
practical experience may
we
can
of
Of
the
former
logical thought.
only say (apart
sequiturs

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AND

PHYSICAL

CAUSATION,

METAPHYSICAL.

23g

that they are ; of the latter


the three angles of any plane
must
to
two
be
equal
right angles, or that the square de
triangle
of any right-angled triangle must be
scribed on the hypothenuse
sum
to
the
the
of
squares on the other two sides, are inevita
equal

from some metaphysical


explanation)
we may say that they must be. That

for all who accept

ble sequiturs
ideal

of

scheme,

the postulates,

These

geometry.

the

and understand
not

statements

only

are

true,

but they must be true within that ideal scheme. That an unsup
ported stone falls to the earth with a given acceleration, as a natu
fact ; as a natural phe
ral phenomenon
is simply an observable
no "must
in the
be"
there is (apart frommetaphysics)
case.
The
idea of necessity only arises when we incorporate the
an
ideal scheme of physics.
facts in
Assuming the universality of

nomenon

the law of gravitation we may then say that, apart from disturbing
influences, the stone must fall to the earth. But it is clear that the
thought ; and not
scheme is founded.
be

sequitur lies in the scheme of logical


on which
in the observable
that
sequences
From the point of view we thus reach itmay

inevitable

and

necessary

se
that any necessity we may ascribe to the observable
is an importation from the products
of natural phenomena

said

quences
of our logical thought.
far we

So

bears

sequiturs

been

to natural

phenomena

are now in a position

concerning

to make

endeavoring

clear

the

the relation which an ideal scheme with

and

explanation
We

have

Hume's

with

their

observed

nature

of

its logical
sequences.

to return to the third question we asked

doctrine

of

accepted by modern science?


follows : All that is disclosed

causation

That

: Is

his

main

contention

contention we summarised

as

in the objective treatment of experi


in terms of actually observed antecedence

ence may be expressed


If we ask what
sequence.

is the cause of the attraction, by


stone, we shall perhaps be told "the

and

the earth, of an unsupported


And if we require more exact information, ex
force of gravity."
pressed in general terms, itwill be said that every substance in the
universe attracts every other substance with a force jointly propor
tional

to the mass

and varying

of the attracting and of the attracted body,


How does
inversely as the square of the distance.

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THE

240

MONIST.

this force, as

conclu
the cause of attraction, square with Hume's
Is there an observed antecedent "force" and then an ob

sion?

the physical
sequent "attraction"?
Surely not. From
point of view it is all one whether we say the force of gravitative
attraction or the attraction of gravitative force. For physics the
served

and the force are identical. We

attraction

to force in the above

statement of Newton's

may cut out all reference


law without detracting

from its scientific value, and say that every substance in the uni
attracts every other substance
in a degree jointly propor
tional to the masses and inversely as the square of their distance.

verse

is a statement of observed

That

are content

many physicists
in mathematical
pression,

and observable phenomena.


And
to an ex
to restrict the term "force"

formula, of the measure

them physical causation may be expressed


and sequence.
essentially those of antecedence

For

while

they adopt this usage, give also


tion of force, as the cause of motion.

Others,

however,

and distinct defini

another

It is not for an outsider


But

between

decide

of intensity.
in terms which are

to an outsider

to

it seems

contending giants.
if force be regarded as the cause of motion, the
clear
that
perfectly
word "cause"
is used in a sense quite different from that which is
on

founded

the

conception

us

Let
physical

of antecedence

frankly accept
or scientific causation which

cedents,

and

this conclusion.

sequence.

And

refers events

the results of observation

generalising
of physical science ; and

let us

speak of
to their ante

in an ideal scheme

let us

causation
speak of metaphysical
to get behind or beneath phenomena
and to give the
raison d'?tre of their being, generalising
in an ideal
its conclusions
scheme of metaphysical
with
this'distinction
And,
interpretation.
in view, let us proceed to consider physical causation a little more

which

seeks

closely that we may see how far and with what amendments mod
ern science accepts Hume's doctrine. Three points may be noticed.
I. Hobbes,
in a passage which is quoted by Jevons, brought
out an important feature when he said: "A cause is the sum or
aggregate of all such accidents, both in the agents and the patients,
as concur in the producing of the effect propounded
; all which ex
but that the effect existed
isting together, it cannot be understood

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AND

PHYSICAL

CAUSATION,

METAPHYSICAL.

24I

them ; or that it can possibly exist if any one of them be ab


"The real cause,"
sent." Mill accepted and endorsed this view.
and we have, philo
he said, "is
the whole of the antecedents;

with

sophically speaking, no right to give the name of cause to any one


True and important, "philo
of them exclusively of the others."
sophically speaking," as is this identification of the cause with the
totality of the antecedent

conditions,

it is none

the less true that

it is the aim of physics to isolate the fac


"scientifically
speaking"
tors of phenomena and to disentangle
the threads which are woven
It is this disentangle
into the totality of antecedent conditions.
ment which
of physics

in part at least, to distinguish the ideal scheme


from the complex web of natural phenomena which with
serves,

success

ever-increasing

time it should

us

it enables

be noted

to

At

interpret.

the

same

that this method

of scientific procedure
For though physics
contention.

does not at all invalidate Hobbe's

adopts the method of analysis with a view to isolating the factors


of causation, it still remains true that, when its results are applied
to a complex phenomenon
such as Hobbes
had in view, no inter
pretation can be satisfactory unless all the co-operating antecedents
are represented synthetically in due quantitative proportion.
Ac
cepting,
cause

therefore, the validity

is the

totality

of

the

of Hobbes's

conditions,

we

may

contention
add,

as

that the
rider,

that

science analyses this complex into its factors and utilises the results
of its analysis in synthetic interpretation.
2. Hume's doctrine on the effects of custom and habit led him,
no doubt, as Reid pointed out, to exaggerate the importance of the
the conception of uniformity has
When
repetition of experience.
been reached, a single accurate and precise determination of the
antecedent conditions is sufficient. The value of repeti
tion is, first, to eliminate errors of observation, and secondly (where
others repeat the observations of the original investigator), to en
sure the social validity of the conclusion, and to make allowance,
essential

if necessary,

Hume's
for the personal equation.
error, if such it
a
he
had
double purpose in
from the fact that

arose

be regarded,
view ; first, to show how the conception of uniformity arises, and
secondly, to interpret causation in terms of observable sequence.

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THE

242

MONIST.

3. Much has been written concerning the time-element in cau


sation ; and it has been urged that, since the cause shades insens
ibly into the effect, so that it may even be said that the effect is
in the conditions, the time-element must be
already precontained
excluded, and with it, therefore, must go the whole conception of
Not a little confusion has, however,
antecedence
and sequence.
arisen

from a

from metaphysical
failure to distinguish physical
In the latter, as we shall see, the time-element is ab
it is essential.
But though it is
in physical causation

causation.
sent ; but

essential, it is, after the method


its ideal limit. For an adequate

of science,

carried

in thought

to

conception of physical causation,


as interpreted synthetically by modern science, two essential ideas
have to be borne in mind. First, the continuity of progress wherein
from antecedent into se
there is a constant shading and passage
quent ; and secondly, the ideal nature of the boundary between the
one and the other. For the purposes of our thought we draw this
ideal plane, at any moment we wish to select, through the onward
The
flowing stream of events.
totality of conditions on the one
side of this dividing plane we term the cause, the totality on the
other side of the plane we call the effect. But the dividing plane
save for our thought; and its time-breadth, re
It is like
to its ideal limit, is for that thought infinitesimal.
mere dividing line
the philosophical
concept of the present,?the

has no existence
duced

between

the

past

and

future.

When

we

narrow

down

our

consid

eration of physical causation to its ideal limits, we place ourselves


on this dividing line and see cause pass into effect as the stream of
crosses

phenomena

the

boundary.

it, is the conception of physical causation we


reach when we reduce the notion of sequence to its ideal limits. It
Such,

I take

is the doctrine of Hume

translated from the region of practical ob


into the region of conceptual
thought founded thereon.
And in this sense we may say that modern science accepts the doc
the sequence is of that nature
trine in its essential features. Why
servation

which we
soience

as

find it to be in the data of sensory experience, physical


Here
such, does not, I conceive, attempt to explain.

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are the facts as practically


far as

physical

Some

science

METAPHYSICAL.

243

given ; that is an end of the matter

so

is concerned.
are,

physicists

AND

PHYSICAL

CAUSATION,

as we

however,

have

already

un

noticed,

able to accept this limitation. They define force as a cause in a


sense wholly different from that in which this term is used as the
equivalent

of antecedent.

not as
they do so as metaphysicians
that kind of explanation which we

But

physicists.
They supplement
term physical by the totally different kind of explanation which
should in strictness be regarded as metaphysical.
Force as a cause
is not its antecedent

of motion

but its raison d'?tre.

origin and justification of such procedure would seem to


be somewhat as follows : First as to origin.
Certain objective se
The

are

quences
terms

of any

given,

as matter
so

sequence,

of

fact,
are,

given,

but not connected.

By analysis,
frame an ideal scheme of physical

in

sensory

as Hume

The

experience.
contends,

conjoined

generalisation, and synthesis we


science, founded on the data of

Within
this scheme the terms are not merely
experience.
are
but
joined,
logically connected for rational thought. We
mere
sequences, given in sensory experience,
project into the
nexions

con
then
con

to those which obtain within the ideal scheme of

analogous
physical science. We make the connexions part of our completed
construct.
So much for origin ; now for justification.
The
ideal
scheme of physical science is admittedly rational and connected.
But when

this scheme (which is the product of rational thought) is


to
the data of sensory experience (which are independent
applied
of our rational thought and over which reason has no control) it is

found to fit the given sequences.


Hence,
just in so far as the con
nexions of the ideal scheme coincide with the sequences of sensory
experience, may we assume that these sequences have an underly

endeavors to formulate. In brief


ing connexion which metaphysics
therefore the justification runs thus. The constructs of physical
science supply us with an ideal scheme which is connected, ra
tional, and explicable.

But

this scheme

seems to fit the constructs

they too are assumed

to be con
of sensory experience.
nected, rational, and explicable.
It may be said that, since the ideal scheme of physical science
Hence

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THE

244
on

MONIST.

of sensory experience,
its connexions are
derived from, and not imported into, the sequences of natural phe
nomena.
But it is clear that, unless we are to deny in our conclu
is founded

sion what
some

the data

is granted

in our premises,

metaphysical

this is no argument

It merely

connexion.

asserts

that

the

against
connex

ion is already there awaiting our discovery.


A more plausible crit
icism is that since the sensory data form part of the experience of a
But the
rational being the}' must, as such, be logically connected.
sensory data are not the product of our rational thought. And if
they were, what ground would there be for the contention that they
are merely observable sequences without underlying connexion?
It
is this contention which

the metaphysician
deems inadequate and
to
desires
supplement by his doctrine of causation.
Here
itwill be necessary to make a fresh start and approach
the problem by a somewhat different path.
It will be remembered
is it that we have
that, in my former essay, the question : How
was
as
one
sensory experience ?
involving a metaphys
passed by
Speaking of the milestones on the Dover road I said :
if it be contended that something, at any rate, does exist, in

ical answer.
"And

dependently, which generates, or is the occasion of, the several ex


of those who journey along the Dover
road, I am cer
periences
tainly not prepared to deny the statement ; but it belongs to the
domain

not to that of practical


causes experience?
here is :What

of metaphysics,

real question
cannot be answered

The
knowledge."
And this question

in terms of physical antecedence


but only in
terms of metaphysical
The practical man in the street,
causation.
a
who does not realise that he is metaphysician
malgr? lui, may be
inclined

to doubt

this.

any one who considers

it cannot be seriously questioned


by
causa
the nature of the inquiry. Physical
But

as given in experience.
is what calls experience
But that which we now wish to ascertain
a
stone
from the earth is the antece
into being. The separation of
dent condition of its fall ; but ifwe ask, what makes it fall, we are
tion deals with antecedence

constrained

to have

and sequence

recourse

to the metaphysical
of
conception
ifwe could say with any certainty that the

gravitative force. Even


physical antecedent is some kind of ethereal

stress, we

should

still

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CAUSATION,

PHYSICAL

AND

METAPHYSICAL.

245

Push any physical


the ether "stressy."
or scientific inquiry deep enough, and you get the general reply,
And man the metaphy
"That's
the way things are constituted.''
sician will still want to know what is the cause of this constitution.
to ask, what makes

have

I am fully aware that many philosophical


agnostics
that the modest and honest attitude in face of such in

Of course
contend

"We don't know and there's


quiries is a confession of ignorance.
an end on't."
But it is, rightly or wrongly, characteristic of the
that he cannot rest content with this reply at this
metaphysician
stage of the inquiry. He must endeavor to get a little deeper down
and frame a wider construct, even if he then, in his turn, must
make confession of ignorance of its nature independently of our ra
tional thought.
sets to work and what kind
Let us see then how metaphysics
of suggestion it has to offer. It proceeds on the method of science
and frames an ideal scheme.
by aPPlymg
ical science,
human
which
gards

it tests the validity of the scheme


it to the phenomenal universe, as interpreted by phys
to see how it fits.
If the ideal scheme, fashioned by
And

reason, when superimposed


upon the sensory data, over
re
reason has no control, is found to coincide, metaphysics
this as the only possible, but at the same time the rationally

sufficient, guarantee of its validity.


Sensory experience discloses
a sequence of phenomena.
If we ask why this sequent follows that
antecedent,

experience

and

physical

science

can

give

no

answer.

They can only say : Such are the facts as given. Metaphysical
sumptions give an ideal scheme as a framework, supplying
threads on which the passing beads are strung.

as
the

is the continuity of
cause.
as
Of this exist
of acting
are regarded as the effects. The
ence the data of sense-impressions
effects may come and go, with the opportunities of experience ; but
A fundamental

assumption
that existence which is capable

of metaphysics

by which they are caused persists. As people pass to


and fro along the Dover road, the mile-stones
pop in and out of
causes
these fleeting effects
experience ; but the existence which
is
The discontinuity of sensory experience
remains and abides.
the existence

supplemented

by the continuity of metaphysical

existence.

John

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THE

246

MONIST.

is not generally regarded as a champion of meta


as "permanent
physics, would describe the mile-stones
possibili
ties of sensations."
But whence did he derive the permanence?
Stuart Mill, who

from experience : for experience, which relies solely on its own


data, has no right to go beyond them, or to make any assertion,
positive or negative, as to what exists in the absence of experience,

Not

when no one is travelling along the Dover road. There seems to


be little difference between a permanent possibility of sensation
and a continuous existence capable of acting as cause.
But the
and the latter is franklymetaphysical.
former is pseudo-experiential
The ideal scheme of metaphysical
existence
is however to be re
garded, like the ideal scheme of physical science, as a construct of
the human mind, valid just in so far as it fits the facts. Though
again the accord of a rational
data of experience may be regarded
the rational character of these data.

here

scheme with

the observable

as presumptive

evidence

of

It may be said that the continuity and rationality of causal


existence are after all nothing more nor less than our old friends
the uniformity of nature and the universality of physical causation
inmetaphysical
To which the metaphysi
disguise.
masquerading
cian's reply is that, just in so far as the nature, of which uniformity
is a connected whole, and not merely a given series of
is predicated,
observed,

remembered,

assumptions
them

realizes

or

their

true

experiences,

anticipated

inevitable, whether
character

the man who


or

not.

are

metaphysical

makes

Furthermore,

or accepts
for

the

the so-called

experientialist,
thoroughgoing
uniformity of nature
He
is nothing more nor less than the uniformity of experience.
a
who believes in material universe which exists independently of
our experience, and teaches that this material universe is the cause
of our sensory impressions and the like, is committed to a meta
physical proposition which the experience on which he relies can
never be in a position to demonstrate.
And so we seem to be fully
so
as the uniformity of nature
in
that
far
in
asserting
just
justified
is held to be a cause

of (and not merely a convenient


of
the
it is a metaphysical
uniformity
experience
for)
physical

expression
and not a

conception.

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cause

is the

which

existence

METAPHYSICAL.

247

as a fundamental postulate

If we thus assume,
an

AND

PHYSICAL

CAUSATION,

of

the

of metaphysics,

our

sequences

sense-impres

sions present, we cannot regard it as, in its essential nature, like


once more, "the caus
these impressions ; for, to quote Glanvill
It
is
itself
insensible."
is
unnecessary here to repeat the ar
ality
guments

of Berkeley

disciples, by which it is, to


that this existence, as cause, cannot
to resemble the sense-products which are

and his modern


shown

my mind,

conclusively
be reasonably supposed
its effects in human experience.

Those who understand

the physiol

ogy of sensation and realise that what we call a visual impression


is the concomitant of certain molecular vibrations in the grey mat
ter of the brain, and that the brain particles are separated from the
retinal* image (to say nothing of all that lies beyond) by a tract of
nerve-fibres conveying physiological
impulses of whose nature we
I say, who realise all this, can hardly expect to
know little?those,
resembles in any
convince us that the product in conscientiousness
conceivable
materialism

calls it into being. Philosophical


so
is, however, already
completely dead that it is su
to belabor its defunct corpse.
way

the cause which

perfluous
At the present stage of our inquiry it is, indeed, impossible to
nature of that exist
make any suggestion as to the metaphysical
to play the r?le of cause.
to its ideal limits we may indeed predicate

ence which we

assume

conception
on the lines of the scientific conception
Thus

regarded

as

universal,

time-reference

Carrying

universality?

of universal
and

the

gravitation.

space-reference

The universalised
to become meaningless.
present
we
When
tense is alone admissible.
speak of universal gravita
tion, we do not say that itwas or will be ; we use this comprehen
We mean that substances
sive "is."
always attract each other

would

seem

under the appropriate


able to the particular
consideration.
is.

The

So

expression

is only applic
instances of such attraction as they fall under
conditions.

Time-reference

is itwith the existence which


First

Cause,

if used with

acts as cause

: //

time-reference,

is

It is probably
legacy of the confusion of
wholly misleading.
causation. The cause,
thought between physical and metaphysical
as antecedent, is itself caused by a previous antecedent, this by an

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THE

248
so on

other, and

in an

of which

beginning
inating antecedent.

MONIST.

indefinite retrogressive series, at the very


was conceived as the very orig

the First Cause

On which follows the pertinent question, Why


here?
stop
Presumably you do so simply because you do not know
the antecedent of your First Cause.
should I not stop just
Why

one stage short of your completed series and begin with what you
term the second cause?
The mistake, of course, is to confuse the
to physical causation)
antecedent
of
(which belongs
conception
raison d'?tre implied on conception
of a
the metaphysical
cause and effect are the
For metaphysics
called First Cause.
aspects, experiential and existential, of the same reality. They
simultaneous not successive ; one on the hither side, the other

so

with

two
are
on

And the question.?what


the further side, of the phenomenal veil.
cause
cause
??is
of the
sheer nonsense, since it implies a
is the
of the meaning of the term as used in a metaphys
misconception
ical as contrasted with a scientific scheme.
The

to metaphys
of all space-reference, as applicable
involves further the exclusion of any conception of

absence

ical existence,
cause

the

based

as

external.

on sensible

construct.

The

like

Externality,

experience
as

existence

cause

is

time-sequence,

and has no place

not

is conceived

an

idea

in the metaphysical
as

external

to

the phenomena and producing them fromwithout, but as co-exten


sive with the universe of experience and as everywhere immanent.
again we are but carrying a cenception to its ideal limits. We
have seen that physical causation, carried to its ideal limits, places
the antecedent and sequent on either side of a boundary line which

Here

is conceived

as

in itself timeless

and

spaceless.

Herein

lies the

the conjoined phenomena.


But
connexion between
metaphysical
such an ideal boundary may be drawn anywhere and at any time in
Hence
the conception may be univer
the flow of natural events.
salised
nected

and

conceived

phenomena,

Thus we

reach

as everywhere

whenever

and

and always within

wherever

they

the con

occur.

the metaphysical
conception of a unifying ex
in space and time, and immanent, founded on

istence, omnipresent
the conviction that experience

is rational and explicable?a

convie

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causation,

tion without which

physical

and

metaphysical.

the search for knowledge

249

is a vain

and illusory

dream-quest.

It only remains to point out, or to repeat, that the metaphy


If it leads us to
sical scheme is a construct of the human mind.
of experience there is a causal re
ality which makes that experience possible and explicable, we must
is a reality for rational
existence
remember that metaphysical

believe

that behind

the realities

thought. And if, in Kantian phrase, we speak of this existence as


noumenal, as contrasted with the phenomenal data of sensory expe
" noumenal " as that which exists for
rience, we must define
thought but not for sense, and has for thought a reality analogous
Sci
right of sensory experience.
ence presents us with an ideal scheme formulated in terms of ante
cedence and sequence ; metaphysics with an ideal scheme by which
to that which

is the indefeasible

If we
and sequence may be rationally explained.
are
that natural phenomena
admit, with Hume,
merely conjoined,
we may none the less claim that a causal nexus is a fundamental
this antecedence

postulate

of rational

thought.
C.

Bristol,

Lloyd

Morgan.

England.

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