PSB V Senate Impeachment Court 2 PDF

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G.R. No. 200238
EN BANC

G.R. No. 200238 PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK and PASCUAL M. GARCIA
III, as representative of PHILIPPINE SAVINGS BANK and in his personal
capacity, Petitioners, versus SENATE IMPEACHMENT COURT consisting of the
Senators of the Republic of the Philippines acting as Senator Judges, namely
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, JINGGOY EJERCITO ESTRADA, VICENTE C.
SOTTO III, ALAN PETER S. CAYETANO, EDGARDO J. ANGARA, JOKER
P. ARROYO, PIA S. CAYETANO, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, FRANCIS G.
ESCUDERO, TEOFISTO GUINGONA III, GREGORIO B. HONASAN II,
PANFILO M. LACSON, MANUEL M. LAPID, LOREN B. LEGARDA,
FERDINAND R. MARCOS, JR., SERGIO R. OSMEA III, KIKO
PANGILINAN, AQUILINO PIMENTEL III, RALPH G. RECTO, RAMON
REVILLA, JR., ANTONIO F. TRILLANES IV, MANNY VILLAR, and the
HONORABLE MEMBERS OF THE PROSECUTION PANEL OF THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents.
Promulgated:

February 9, 2012

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DISSENTING OPINION
SERENO, J.:
The prayer for a temporary restraining order (TRO) by petitioner Philippine
Savings Bank (PSBank) against the Senate Impeachment Court should not have been
granted for the following reasons: (1) the protection of absolute confidentiality under
[1]
the Foreign Currency Deposits Act (FCDA) or Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6426 can
only be invoked by the owner, and in this case, the five (5) Foreign Currency Deposits
[2]
(FCDs) involved are not being officially claimed by Chief Justice Renato C. Corona
at this time; (2) if indeed those five accounts belong to Chief Justice Corona, there
appears to be a constitutionally-generated permission on the latters part to disclose the
FCDs; (3) even if the permission to disclose is deemed absent, the subpoena issued by
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2012/february2012/200238_sereno.htm
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the Impeachment Court is a constitutionally-imposed exception to the secrecy of FCDs.

From all three perspectives, the requirements for the issuance of a TRO have not been
satisfied.

More important, what the people at the gut level understand to be true is that they
have, through the Constitution, enshrined the doctrine on the accountability of public
officers, on the fundamental belief that public office is a public trust. It cannot get
plainer, but truer, than that. The Constitution wove, not only in the central motif on
public accountability in Article XI of the Constitution, but in every thread of its fabric,
this legally demandable notion of public accountability. No interpretation of law nor
procedural requirement can be viewed in any manner that negates this bedrock principle
of Philippine constitutional governance.

It is disturbing to note that the majority of this Court failed to consider the care
with which the Senate Impeachment Court crafted its Resolution directing the issuance
of the assailed subpoena. The decision to lift the cloak of absolute secrecy was
categorically pronounced to apply only in the context of the impeachment trial of
[3]
Chief Justice Corona. There are only thirty-one (31) impeachable officers, and there
have been only two (2) impeachment trials since the beginning of Philippine
constitutional history. The care with which the Senate discharged its role is in sharp
contrast with the incomprehensible decision of the majority to abandon the clear stand
[4]
that the Court took in Salvacion v. Central Bank of the Philippines that exceptions in
the interest of justice can lift the absolute secrecy of FCDs. In the scale of constitutional
values, nothing can be higher than the requirement of public accountability.
Considering that 31 public officers cannot be removed from office by any other means
than impeachment, it is extremely unwise for this Court to enjoin the conduct of the
Senate Impeachment Court, especially considering as pointed out above the care
with which the latter approached the issuance of the subpoena over the alleged FCDs of
the Chief Justice. None of these 31 public officers can, contrary to the implication of the
opinion of Justice Arturo D. Brion, assert that their right to privacy over their foreign
currency assets should prevail over the power of the Impeachment Court to exact public
accountability.
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PSBanks Claims on the Presence of Rule 65
Elements and the Requirements for a TRO in
the Assailed Action

PSBank alleges in its Petition for Certiorari that it received a subpoena from the
Senate Impeachment Court on 07 February 2012 requiring the former to testify and
bring original and certified true copies of, among others, five FCDs in the name of Chief
Justice Corona. PSBank believes, however that

1. The FCDA bars any inquiry or examination as to the details of such

foreign currency accounts.

2. If Petitioner Garcia, the President of PSBank testifies and brings the
requested bank documents, he will be violating Section 8 of the FCDA and
will be exposed to criminal liability for doing so.

3. Petitioner PSBank, on the other hand, will suffer the possible revocation or
suspension of its authority to accept new foreign currency deposits by the
BSP . . . Also there are news reports of a possible bank run if the
Respondent Impeachment Court proceeds to require bank officials . . . to
divulge details of bank accounts of the Chief Justice.

4. The Respondent Impeachment Court committed grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it issued the Assailed
Subpoena for the following reasons:

I. The issuance of the Assailed Subpoena clearly violated the prohibition under
RA 6426. The cases of Salvacion v. Central Bank of the Philippines (the
Salvacion Case), China Banking Corporation v. Court of Appeals, et al
(the China Bank Case), and Ejercito v. Sandiganbayan (the Estrada Case)
cited in the Resolution do not support an exemption from the prohibition in the
Impeachment proceedings

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II. The Respondent Impeachment Court arbitrarily ignored Petitioners

Constitutional right to life and property when it issued the Assailed Subpoena
for foreign currency deposits. Petitioners will clearly incur criminal liability for
violation of RA 6426. Petitioner PS BANK will likewise risk revocation or
suspension of its authority to accept new foreign currency deposits by the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) pursuant to Section 87 of the Manual of
Regulations on Foreign Exchange Transactions. (Emphasis supplied.)

5. This Grave Abuse of Discretion was committed by the Senate Impeachment

Court in this manner:
30. The Respondent Impeachment Courts grant of the request for Subpoena
of the bank records of foreign currency deposits and the issuance of the Subpoena
against Petitioner PS BANK for such bank records contravenes the absolute
confidentiality of foreign currency deposits under Section 8 of Republic Act No.
6426, or the Foreign Currency Deposit Act of the Philippines (RA 6426) which
provides:
Sec. 8. Secrecy of Foreign Currency Deposits. All foreign
currency deposits authorized under this Act, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1035, as well as foreign currency deposits
authorized under Presidential Decree No. 1034, are hereby declared
as and considered of an absolutely confidential nature and, except
upon the written permission of the depositor, in no instance shall
such foreign currency deposits be examined, inquired or looked
into by any person, government official bureau or office whether
judicial or administrative or legislative or any other entity
whether public or private: Provided, however, that said foreign
currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, or
any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government
agency or any administrative body whatsoever. (Emphasis [in the
original].)
31. As admitted by the Respondent Impeachment Court, RA 6426,
which is the recognized law that governs foreign currency deposits, clearly provides
for only one exception to the prohibition on disclosure upon prior written
permission of the depositor.
xxx xxx xxx

33. The Respondent Impeachment Court gravely abused its discretion

when it went beyond applying RA 6426. The Respondent Impeachment Court did
not just unlawfully reinvent RA 6426, but it also contravened existing jurisprudence
that it cited to support its grant of the Prosecution Panels Request for Subpoena.
33.1. The Salvacion Case does not support the Impeachment
Courts issuance of Subpoena for the foreign currency deposits. No
less than this Honorable Court categorically stated that it decided not
to uphold the prohibition on disclosure on grounds of equity and
justice. The case had very peculiar circumstances and being an
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exception to the rule, it cannot be applied to the chief Justice

Coronas impeachment trial. It is a sui generis case.
33.1.1. In the Salvacion Case, this Honorable Court
allowed, as a strict exception, the inquiry of the
foreign currency deposit in question mainly due to the
peculiar circumstances of the case such that a strict
interpretation of the letter of the law would result to
rank injustice. In this case, Greg Bartelli, an
American tourist, was charged with criminal cases for
serious illegal detention and rape committed against
then twelve (12) year-old Karen Salvacion. A separate
civil case for damages with preliminary attachment
was filed against Greg Bartelli. The trial court issued
an Order granting the Salvacions application for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. A notice
of garnishment was then served on China Bank where
Bartelli held a dollar account. China Bank refused,
invoking the secrecy of bank deposits. This
Honorable Court ruled:
It would be unthinkable, that the questioned
Section 113 of Central Bank No. 960 would
be used as a device by accused Greg Bartelli
for wrongdoing, and in so doing, acquitting
the guilty at the expense of the innocent.
Call it what it may but is there no conflict
of legal policy here? Dollar against Peso?
Upholding the final and executory judgment of
the lower court against the Central Bank
Circular protecting the foreign depositor?
Shielding or protecting the dollar deposit of a
transient alien depositor against injustice to a
national and victim of a crime? This situation
calls for fairness against legal tyranny.
We definitely cannot have both ways and rest
in the belief that we have served the ends of
justice.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the provisions of
Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 and P.D.
No. 1246, insofar as it amends Section 8 of
R.A. No. 6426 are hereby held to be
INAPPLICABLE to this case because of its
peculiar circumstances. Respondents are
hereby REQUIRED to COMPLY with the
writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 89-
3214, Karen Salvacion, et al. vs. Greg
Bartelli y Northcott, by Branch CXLIV, RTC
Makati and to RELEASE to petitioners the
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dollar deposit of respondent Greg Bartelli y

Northcott in such amount as would satisfy the
judgment.
xxx xxx xxx

33.2 The Respondent Impeachment Court also misconstrued the China Bank Case.
The China Bank Case actually highlights the fact that the only exception to the prohibition
on disclosure on foreign currency deposits is the prior written permission of the depositor.
33.2.1. In the China Bank Case, respondent accused his daughter of
stealing his dollar deposits with Citibank, N.A. (Citibank). His daughter
allegedly received the checks from Citibank and deposited them to her
account in China Bank. The subject checks were presented in evidence. A
subpoena was issued to employees of China Bank to testify on these checks.
China Bank argued that the Citibank dollar checks with both respondent
and/or her daughter as payees, deposited with China Bank, may not be
looked into under the law on secrecy of foreign currency deposits. This
Honorable court, relying on the exception under RA 6426, as amended, ruled
that respondent, as owner of the funds unlawfully taken and which were
deposited with China Bank, had the right to inquire into the said deposits
because his consent was deemed given. This Honorable Court further
expressly stated that all things considered and in view of the distinctive
circumstances attendant to the present case, we are constrained to render a
limited pro hac vice ruling, or a ruling for this one particular occasion.
33.2.2. This Honorable Court emphasized the absolute confidentiality
of foreign currency deposits:
x x x the law provides that all foreign currency deposits authorized
under Republic Act No. 6426, as amended by Sec. 8, Presidential Decree
No. 1246, Presidential Decree No. 1035, as well as foreign currency deposits
authorized under Presidential Decree No. 1034 are considered absolutely
confidential in nature and may not be inquired into. There is only one
exception to the secrecy of foreign currency deposits, that is, disclosure is
allowed upon the written permission of the depositor.
33.3. The Respondent Impeachment Courts citation of the Estrada Case is utterly
misleading, because this case does not involve foreign currency deposit and did not mention
RA 6426.
33.3.1. The exceptions to confidentiality provided under another
statute, Republic Act No. 1405, The Secrecy of Bank Deposit Laws, as
amended, and related laws and jurisprudence, particularly in cases of
impeachment, where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of
the litigation and unexplained wealth, do not apply to foreign currency
deposits. In GSIS v. Court of Appeals, this Honorable Court explained that
the applicable law for foreign currency deposits is RA 6426, and not RA
1405.
33.3.2. Applying Section 8 of RA 6426, as amended, this Honorable
Court held that Westmont Bank cannot be compelled to disclose the dollar
deposits of Domsat Holdings, Inc. The Honorable Court ruled:
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These two laws both support the confidentiality of

bank deposits. There is no conflict between them. Republic
Act No. 1405 was enacted for the purpose of giving
encouragement to the people to deposit their money in
banking institutions and to discourage private hoarding so that
the same may be properly utilized by banks in authorized
loans to assist in the economic development of the country. It
covers all bank deposits in the Philippines and no distinction
was made between domestic and foreign deposits. Thus,
Republic Act No. 1405 is considered a law of general
application. On the other hand, Republic Act No. 6426 was
intended to encourage deposits from foreign lenders and
investors. It is a special law designed especially for foreign
currency deposits in the Philippines. A general law does not
nullify a specific or special law. Generalia specialibus non
derogant. Therefore, it is beyond cavil that Republic Act
No. 6426 applies in this case. (Emphasis [in the original].)
34. Based on the foregoing, it is abundantly clear that the Respondent
Impeachment Court exercised its power to issue the Assailed Subpoena in a
capricious, whimsical, and arbitrary manner. The abuse of discretion demonstrated
by the Respondent Impeachment Court is both patent and gross as it clearly violated
the law. On this ground alone, there is more than enough reason for this Honorable
Court to grant this Petition. (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx

38. It is clear from the foregoing that Petitioners disclosure of information related
to any foreign currency deposit under circumstances that are not covered by the exemptions
provided under RA No. 6426, even if done in good faith or pursuant to an order of the
Respondent Impeachment Court, will expose Petitioner Garcia upon conviction to criminal
liability and Petitioner PS Bank to possible revocation or suspension of its authority to accept
new foreign currency deposits by the BSP.

xxx xxx xxx
40. The curtailment of PS Banks right to property is also undeniable from the fact
that the revocation or suspension of PS Banks authority to accept new foreign currency
deposits by the BSP will necessarily translate to immediate loss of income for PS Bank.
This is in addition to the chilling effect that will be felt by the other banks, whose foreign
currency depositors may be alarmed by the Respondent Impeachment Courts arbitrary and
whimsical examination of a foreign currency deposit supposedly protected by RA 6426 and
[5]
subject to the strict requirement of disclosure under the AMLA.

The Reasoning of the Senate for Issuing the
Assailed Subpoena

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The Senate Impeachment Court laid down the legal basis for the issuance of the
assailed subpoena in its Resolution dated 02 February 2012 under the hand of Senate
President Juan Ponce Enrile, and we quote:
The Court has had to consider whether or not the issuance of the subpoenae would
violate existing laws on secrecy of bank deposits. Under R.A. No. 1405 as amended and
the Anti-Money Laundering Act, the disclosure of information relating to bank accounts in
local currency cannot be made except in five (5) instances, namely: a) upon written
permission of the depositor, (b) in cases of impeachment, (c) upon order of a competent
court in the case of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials or, (d) when the money
deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation, and (e) in cases of violation of the
Anti-Money Laundering Act (AMLA). However, it appears that for foreign currency bank
accounts, the disclosure may be made only upon written permission of the depositor
pursuant to Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426.
However, the Court has taken due notice of the fact that the Supreme Court has, in
several decisions, relaxed the rule on the absolute confidential nature of bank deposits, even
foreign currency deposit accounts, in the cases of Salvacion vs. Central Bank of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 94723, August 21, 1997 and China Banking Corporation v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140687, December 18, 2006 and Ejercito vs.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 157294-95, November 30, 2006. The majority is of the view
that the present impeachment proceedings present a valid exception to the general rule on
confidentiality of information on bank accounts even for foreign currency bank accounts.
The Court would like to emphasize that the non-disclosure of information relating to
the bank accounts of individuals is still the general rule and it has no intention of going
against the public policy on this matter. However, the Court is only issuing the subpoena
relating to the bank accounts of Chief Justice Corona because of the pendency of the
present impeachment proceedings and for no other reason.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the majority votes to grant the
Prosecutions Requests for Subpoenae to the responsible officers of Philippine Savings Bank
(PSBank) and Bank of Philippine Island (BPI), for them to testify and bring and/or produce
before the Court documents on the alleged bank accounts of Chief Justice Corona, only for
the purpose of the instant impeachment proceedings, as follows:
xxx xxx xxx

b) The Branch Manager (and/or authorized representative) of Philippine Savings

Bank, Katipunan Branch, Katipunan Avenue, Loyola Heights, Quezon City, is commanded
to bring before the Senate at 2:00 p.m. on February 8, 2012, the original and certified true
copies of the account opening forms/documents for the following bank accounts allegedly in
the name of Renato C. Corona, and the documents showing the balances of the said
accounts as of December 31, 2007, December 31, 2008, December 31, 2009 and December
31, 2010:
089-19100037-3
089-13100282-6
089-121017358
089-121019593
089-121020122
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089-121021681
089-141-00712-9
089-141-00746-9
089-14100814-5
089-121-01195-7
[6]
(Emphasis in the original.)

The Essence of PSBanks Attack Against the
Impeachment Court Action

PSBank is essentially arguing that the Senate Impeachment Court, in issuing the
subpoena, so grossly erred or was so whimsical and arbitrary in its understanding and
[7]
application of three (3) Decisions of the Supreme Court that its action amounted to
exercising a jurisdiction it did not have; or that it exceeded the same as to lose legitimate
jurisdiction over the matter in contention.

To succeed in such a line of reasoning, PSBank has to prove that the three cases
cited by the Senate are so categorical in their pronouncement on the absolute
confidentiality of FCDs, such that the Impeachment Court acted whimsically and
arbitrarily or was in gross negligence to such an extent that the Impeachment Court
could not justify its reasoning in issuing the subpoena, as found in the following
paragraph:

However, the Court has taken due notice of the fact that the Supreme Court has, in
several decisions, relaxed the rule on the absolute confidential nature of bank deposits,
even foreign currency deposit accounts, in the cases of Salvacion vs. Central Bank of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 94723, August 21, 1997 and China Banking Corporation v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 140687, December 18, 2006 and Ejercito vs.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 157294-95, November 30, 2006. The majority is of the view
that the present impeachment proceedings present a valid exception to the general rule on
confidentiality of information on bank accounts even for foreign currency bank accounts.

In plain language, was the Senate Impeachment Court so grossly incompetent or
malicious in invoking the three Decisions of the Supreme Court to justify the issuance of
the subpoena?

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Regarding Salvacion, PSBank claims that while the Supreme Court decided not
to uphold the prohibition on disclosure on grounds of equity and justice, [t]he case had
very peculiar circumstances and being an exception to the rule, it cannot be applied to
[8]
the Chief Justice Coronas impeachment trial. Salvacion is a sui generis case.

On this score, it must be emphasized that there are, in a country of 96 million
[9]
people, only thirty-one (31) people as earlier mentioned, who are removable from
office by the extraordinary process of impeachment. From the time that impeachment as
a mode of removal was provided for in the 1935 Constitution, an impeachment trial has
only been seen twice in the case of former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada and now
in that of Chief Justice Corona. It will be extremely difficult to find any other very
peculiar set of circumstances or sui generis case that would exceed the present
impeachment trial in those aspects. The Senate Impeachment Court was superbly careful
in ensuring that the issuance of the assailed subpoena does not create any legal effect
beyond that of the conduct of the impeachment trial. It thus declared:
The Court would like to emphasize that the non-disclosure of information relating to
the bank accounts of individuals is still the general rule and it has no intention of going
against the public policy on this matter. However, the Court is only issuing the subpoena
relating to the bank accounts of Chief Justice Corona because of the pendency of the
present impeachment proceedings and for no other reason.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the majority votes to grant the
Prosecutions Requests for Subpoenae to the responsible officers of Philippine Savings Bank
(PSBank) and Bank of Philippine Island (BPI), for them to testify and bring and/or produce
before the Court documents on the alleged bank accounts of Chief Justice Corona, only for
the purpose of the instant impeachment proceedings, as follows: xxx (Emphasis
supplied.)

On the other hand, while sexual abuse at the hands of anyone, including
foreigners, is one of the most cruel experiences a minor can ever undergo as in the
Salvacion case, it is not as peculiar nor as sui generis as the ongoing conduct of an
impeachment trial. And yet, PSBank considers the Salvacion situation sufficient to
justify the disclosure of the details of a foreign nationals FCD. Its own demand that the
situation needs to be very peculiar before the cloak of absolute confidentiality can be
lifted has been more than met in the context in which the assailed subpoena was issued.
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Regarding China Bank, PSBank claims that the case actually highlights the fact
that the only exception to the prohibition on disclosure on foreign currency deposits is
the prior written permission of the depositor. It then went to emphasize that the
authority given by the Supreme Court to disclose information on the FCD was a pro
hac vice ruling, meaning, it applies only to that case.

What PSBank failed to mention, however, was that while China Bank reiterated
the statutory privilege of the confidentiality of FCDs, the Supreme Court was careful to
balance this privilege with the following considerations:

It is in this light that the court in the case of Salvacion v. Central Bank of the
Philippines, allowed the inquiry of the foreign currency deposit in question mainly due to the
peculiar circumstances of the case such that a strict interpretation of the letter of the law
would result to rank injustice. Therein, Greg Bartelli y Northcott, an American tourist, was
charged with criminal cases for serious illegal detention and rape committed against then 12
year-old Karen Salvacion. A separate civil case for damages with preliminary attachment
was filed against Greg Bartelli. The trial court issued an Order granting the Salvacions
application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. A notice of garnishment
was then served on China Bank where Bartelli held a dollar account. China Bank refused,
invoking the secrecy of bank deposits. The Supreme Court ruled: In fine, the application
of the law depends on the extent of its justice x x x It would be unthinkable, that the
questioned law exempting foreign currency deposits from attachment, garnishment, or any
other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any
administrative body whatever would be used as a device by an accused x x x for
wrongdoing, and in so doing, acquitting the guilty at the expense of the innocent.
(Emphasis supplied.)

[10]
Petitioners are correct in stating that Ejercito v. Sandiganbayan
(which they
call the Estrada case) is inapplicable as it does not involve FCDs. Nevertheless, another
[11]
Estrada case, Estrada v. Desierto,
categorically pronounces that the privilege under
Section 8 of R.A. 6426 applies only to depositors who are non-residents, and who are
not engaged in trade and business in the Philippines. We quote in relevant part:

Finally, with respect to the complaint for violation of Section 8 of Rep. Act No.
6426 (Foreign Currency Deposits Act of the Philippines), public respondent ratiocinated
At this point, it is worth stressing, that this office in its previous Order
dated 20 February 2001, ruled that the absolute confidentiality of foreign
currency deposit account provided for under R.A. 6426 does not apply to
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the foreign currency deposit accounts of herein complainant, since the

protection under the said law is intended only for depositors who are
non residents and are not engaged in trade and business in the
Philippines. In coming out with such ruling, this office has as its basis
one of the Whereas clauses of P.D. 1246 which amended Sec. 8 of R.A.
6426. For emphasis, the pertinent provision of the said law is hereby
quoted:
WHEREAS, in order to assure the development and speedy
growth of the Foreign Currency Deposit System and offshore Banking
System in the Philippines, certain incentives were provided for under
the two systems such as confidentiality of deposits subject to certain
exceptions and tax exemptions on the interest of the income of depositors
who are non-residents and are not engaged in trade or business in the
Philippines.
Considering the previous Order of this Office, it necessarily follows
that the accusation for violation of Sec. 8 of R.A. 6426 against herein
respondents has no leg to stand on, thus, the dismissal of the charge for
violation of Sec. 8 of R.A. 6426 is therefore in order.
And:
In Salvacion v. Central Bank and China Bank, 278 SCRA 27 (1997), the
Highest Tribunal adopted the opinion of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
that only foreign currency deposits of foreign lenders and investors are given
protection and incentives by the law, and further ruled that the Foreign Currency
Deposits Act cannot be utilized to perpetuate injustice. Following such
pronouncements, it is respectfully submitted that foreign currency deposits of Filipino
depositors, including herein complainant, are not covered by the Foreign Currency
Deposits Act, and are thus not exempt from the processes duly-issued by the BIR.
We do not perceive any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the public respondent
when they issued the aforecited rulings. We, thus, defer to the policy of non-interference in the
conduct of preliminary investigations. We have invariably stated that it is not sound practice to depart
from the policy of non-interference in the Ombudsman's exercise of discretion to determine whether or
not to file information against an accused. The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory
and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon
practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable
petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the
Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same way that the courts would be
absolutely swamped if they could be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the
fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decided to file an information in court or dismissed a
complaint by a private complainant. Thus, in the absence of a clear case of abuse of discretion, this
Court will not interfere with the discretion of the Ombudsman, who, depending on his own findings
and considered evaluation of the case, either dismisses a complaint or proceeds with it. (Emphasis and
underlining supplied.)

Moreover, in this case, the Court en banc unanimously stated that the
Ombudsmans interpretation of R.A. 6426 and Salvacion, should it even be shown
to be erroneous, may not be the subject of a Petition for Certiorari, since the
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exercise of discretion was not so grave as to give this Court the power to interfere
with the proceedings therein, thus:

A cautionary word. A declaration by this Court that the public respondents did not gravely
abuse their discretion in issuing the resolutions dismissing petitioners complaint does not necessarily
translate to a declaration of assent in the findings of fact and conclusions of law contained therein.
With respect specifically to the resolution for violation of Section 8 of Rep. Act. No. 6426, public
respondents relied on the whereas clause of P.D. No. 1246 which amended Rep. Act No. 6426
and on the Salvacion case to conclude that only non-residents who are not engaged in trade and
business are under the mantle of protection of Section 8 of Rep. Act. No. 6426. Assuming that
such reliance is erroneous as contended by petitioner, this Court, on petition for certiorari,
cannot correct the same as the error is not of a degree that would amount to a clear case of
abuse of discretion of the grave and malevolent kind. It is axiomatic that not every erroneous
conclusion of law or fact is abuse of discretion. As adverted to earlier, this Court will interfere in
the Ombudsmans findings of fact and conclusions of law only in clear cases of grave abuse of
discretion. (Emphasis supplied)

In other words, the Senate Impeachment Court was more than amply justified in
issuing the assailed subpoena and demonstrated sufficient care to observe the law in
defining the parameters of the applicability of its assailed order to PSBank. This Court is
completely wrong to deny the Impeachment Courts use of the Salvacion case in
justifying the assailed subpoena, when this Court in Estrada v. Desierto recognized the
Ombudsmans right to rely on Salvacion.

The Requirements for the Issuance of a TRO

For a preliminary injunctive relief to issue, three conditions must obtain: (a) the
invasion of right sought to be protected is material and substantial; (b) the right of the
plaintiff is clear and unmistakable; and (c) there is an urgent and paramount necessity for
[12]
the writ to prevent serious damage.

In the present case, petitioners have miserably failed to show an actual existing
right that is violated or threatened with violation. The issuance by the Impeachment
Court of a subpoena relating to the alleged FCDs of therein respondent Chief Justice
Renato C. Corona does not entitle petitioners to a preliminary injunctive relief.

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Since Anyone Has Yet to Claim Ownership of the
5 FCDs, PSBank Cannot Prematurely Invoke
the Privilege of Absolute Confidentiality

Section 8 of R.A. No. 6426 provides an exception to the absolute confidentiality
nature of FCDs, in that the written permission of the depositor may constitute a waiver
of this privilege. What can be logically inferred from this provision is that the
confidentiality nature of the FCD is extended only in favor of the owner of the account.
Stated differently, it is only the depositor who may invoke the confidentiality privilege
and the exception thereto. This was precisely the pronouncement of this Court in Van
[13]
Twest v. Court of Appeals:

[T]he Court holds that the privileges extended by the statute cited by private
respondent are actually enjoyed, and are invocable only, by the petitioner, both because
private respondent's transactions fall outside the ambit of the statute, and because petitioner
is the owner of the foreign exchange fund subject of this case. This conclusion is anchored
on the consistent and contemporaneous administrative construction by the Central Bank of
the basic statute, as manifested in the relevant circulars issued by it in implementation of that
law, which are entitled to great respect by the courts.

Section 8 of R.A. No. 6426 (the Foreign Currency Deposit Act), as amended by P.D.
No. 1246, which is still in force, provides:

Sec. 8. Secrecy of Foreign Currency Deposits All foreign currency
deposits authorized under this Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No.
1035, as well as foreign currency deposits authorized under Presidential
Decree No. 1034, are hereby declared as and considered of an absolutely
confidential nature and, except upon the written permission of the depositor,
in no instance shall such foreign currency deposits be examined, inquired or
looked into by any person, government official, bureau or office, whether
judicial or administrative or legislative or any other entity whether public or
private: Provided, however, that said foreign currency shall be exempt from
attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court,
legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever.

xxx xxx xxx

Circular No. 960 was superseded by Circular No. 1318, Series of 1992, which did not
reenact and continue the administrative provision above-mentioned (Section 102).
Nevertheless, Section seventy-four, Chapter seven of Circular No. 1318, which deals with the
foreign currency deposit system, provides in relevant part:

Section 74. Definition of Terms. As used in this Chapter, the
following terms shall have the meaning indicated unless the context clearly
indicates otherwise:

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xxx xxx xxx

The definition of such other terms used in this Chapter shall be
consistent with the definition of terms used under the Chapter on Offshore
Banking System.

Section forty-nine, Chapter five of the same Circular, dealing with the Offshore
Banking System, stated in part:

Section 49. Definition of Terms. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

d. Deposits shall refer to funds in foreign currencies which are
accepted and held by an OBU (offshore banking unit) in the regular course of
business, with the obligation to return an equivalent amount to the owner
thereof, with or without interest;

xxx xxx xxx

In other words, although transfers from one foreign currency deposit account to
another foreign currency deposit account in the Philippines are now eligible deposits under
the Central Bank's Foreign Currency Deposit System, private respondent is still not entitled
to the confidentiality provisions of the relevant circulars. For, as noted earlier, private
respondent is not the owner of such foreign currency funds and her personal deposit
account is not, under Section 49 of Circular No. 1318, protected by this Circular. (Emphasis
supplied.)

In the present case, the prosecution alleges that the FCD accounts are owned by
the Chief Justice, while the defense denies his ownership of the same. The documents
relating to these accounts were in fact subpoenaed to ascertain whether the Chief Justice
is the named depositor therein. Thus, until the ownership of these FCDs is established,
the confidentiality privilege under R.A. 6426 is yet to attach.

Nowhere in the 28-page Petition of PSBank does it assert that the five FCDs
belong to Chief Justice Corona. Indeed, even under intense questioning by the Senator-
Judges, petitioner Garcia was not willing to share the slightest information regarding
[14]
these 5 FCDs.
Petitioners in their answer state:

x x x. On 3 February 2012, the Respondent Panel of Prosecutors filed its Supplemental
Request for Subpoena/Reply, designating therein the particular bank accounts in PS BANK
[15]
which allegedly belonged to the Chief Justice x x x

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Neither does the Chief Justice categorically claim in his related Petition for
Certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 200242 that the five FCDs belong to him.

Chief Justice Corona asserts that the documents on the five FCDs are just alleged
genuine documents, thus conveying the sense that he is unwilling to admit that the
FCDs are his. Yet, in the same breath, he vigorously protests that without the owners
permission, details on those FCDs cannot be disclosed even to the Impeachment Court.

After a draft of this Opinion was circulated among the members of this Court on
10 February 2011, a newspaper report came out the following day referring to a public
admission by the Chief Justice with respect to the dollar accounts in question and a
[16]
promise that he will make the disclosures in due time.
This however, is not the claim
of ownership contemplated in Van Twest.

Additionally, defense counsel tells the media that they are standing by the
[17]
accuracy of the SALNs of the Chief Justice.
Explicitly, Tranquil Salvador III, a
defense spokesperson, said that the answer to the basic issue of the accuracy of the details
of Chief Justice Coronas SALN was the basic defense, and to the question Is it
[18]
accurate? he responded: Yes, it is accurate.

Until therefore, there is a clear claim by the Chief Justice of ownership of the 5
FCDs, this Court has to consider that there exists an implied denial of ownership of any
bank account containing money beyond what is disclosed in the Chief Justices SALN.

What we have here is a situation in which a person seeks to have his cake and eat
it too. On the one hand, there is denial or at the very least, no outright claim of
ownership of the alleged FCDs; and yet, on the other, the person seeks the absolute
protection from disclosure that can only be granted to an owner.

Considering that it is still premature for the Chief Justice to avail of the
confidentiality privilege as he continues to be vague on the ownership of the FCDs,
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neither is it ripe for petitioners to invoke it on his behalf. Mere compliance with the
Impeachment Courts subpoena to bring the documents will not engender petitioners
perceived criminal liability or risk revocation of the banks license to operate or
suspension for violation of R.A. 6426, precisely because the rule on secrecy has not yet
attached. It is for the same reason why this Court should treat as absurd petitioner
Garcias contention that the resulting exposure to imprisonment will deprive him of the
right to life.

A Constitutionally-Generated Consent to Disclose
Attaches to the Holding of Any Public Office

In the present case, because of the fact that the Chief Justice is a public officer, he
is constitutionally and statutorily mandated to perform a positive duty to disclose all of
his assets and liabilities. This already operates as the consent required by law.

The Offices of the Chief Justice and of the 14 Associate Justices of the Supreme
[19]
Court are an express creation of the Constitution,
which vests them with explicit
[20]
powers
necessary for the proper functioning of a democratic government.

Foremost is the principle that public office is by virtue of the peoples mandate to
[21]
exercise a sovereign function of the government.
Hence, a public office is a public
[22]
trust or agency.
Appended to the constitutional principle that public office is a public
trust is the tenet that public officers occupy very delicate positions that exact certain
[23]
standards generally not demanded from or required of ordinary citizens.

Those who accept a public office do so cum onere, or with a burden, and are
considered as accepting its burdens and obligations, together with its benefits. They
thereby subject themselves to all constitutional and legislative provisions relating thereto,
and undertake to perform all the duties of their office. The public has the right to
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[24]
demand the performance of those duties.

One of these burdens or duties is explicitly articulated in Sec. 17 of Art. XI of the
1987 Constitution, viz:

A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office and as often thereafter
as may be required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities, and net
worth. In the case of the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, the
Congress, the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional
offices, and officers of the armed forces with general or flag rank, the declaration shall be
disclosed to the public in the manner provided by law. (Emphasis supplied.)

This provision requires all public officers and employees, regardless of rank, to
declare their assets and liabilities upon their assumption of office, as may be required by
law. However, it likewise imposes a positive duty and a heavier onus on the
President; the Vice-President; and members of the Cabinet, Congress, the Supreme
Court, Constitutional Commissions and other Constitutional offices and officers of the
Armed Forces with general or flag ranks to publicly disclose their assets and liabilities.
[25]

Even prior to the 1987 and the 1973 Constitution, our laws have already imposed
the obligation to disclose ownership of properties and assets. Thus, as early as 1960,
R.A. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, was
promulgated, requiring from every public officer a detailed and sworn statement of their
assets and liabilities. Under this law, failure to comply is prima facie evidence of
unexplained wealth, which may result in the dismissal from service of the public officer,
viz:
SECTION 7. Statement of assets and liabilities. Every public officer, within
thirty days after assuming office and, thereafter, on or before the fifteenth day of April
following the close of every calendar year, as well as upon the expiration of his term of
office, or upon his resignation or separation from office, shall prepare and file with the office
of the corresponding Department Head, or in the case of a Head of Department or Chief of
an independent office, with the Office of the President, a true, detailed and sworn statement
of assets and liabilities, including a statement of the amounts and sources of his income, the
amounts of his personal and family expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the
next preceding calendar year; Provided, That public officers assuming office less than two
months before the end of the calendar year, may file their first statement on or before the
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fifteenth day of April following the close of the said calendar year.
SECTION 8. Prima facie evidence of and dismissal due to unexplained wealth.
If in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act Numbered One thousand three hundred
seventy-nine, a public official has been found to have acquired during his incumbency,
whether in his name or in the name of other persons, an amount of property and/or money
manifestly out of proportion to his salary and to his other lawful income, that fact shall be a
ground for dismissal or removal. Properties in the name of the spouse and dependents of
such public official may be taken into consideration, when their acquisition through
legitimate means cannot be satisfactorily shown. Bank deposits in the name of or manifestly
excessive expenditures incurred by the public official, his spouse or any of their dependents
including but not limited to activities in any club or association or any ostentatious display of
wealth including frequent travel abroad of a non-official character by any public official
when such activities entail expenses evidently out of proportion to legitimate income, shall
likewise be taken into consideration in the enforcement of this section, notwithstanding any
provision of law to the contrary. The circumstances hereinabove mentioned shall constitute
valid ground for the administrative suspension of the public official concerned for an
indefinite period until the investigation of the unexplained wealth is completed.

On 13 November 1961, R.A. 3047 amended R.A. 3019 to the extent of
providing (a) the period within which a public official should make the disclosure and
(b) a specification of certain public officials who are exempted from the said requirement.

On 20 February 1989, R.A. 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, expanded the disclosure
obligation by (a) specifically enumerating the information required to be disclosed as
regards the assets, liabilities, business interests and financial connections; (b) requiring
the identification and disclosure of relatives in government; (c) making the statements
and disclosures available and accessible to the public; and (d) prohibiting certain acts.

Even during the martial law years, all public employees were required to declare
[26]
their assets and liabilities, as mandated by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 379.
It was
[27]
later amended by P.D. 417,
enlarging the coverage of the mandatory disclosure. It
[28]
was further amended by P.D. 555,
providing for stiffer penalties for the violation
thereof.

It is clear from these laws that it has been the thrust of the State to foster
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transparency and accountability of public officers through the mandatory disclosures of

[29]
their assets and liabilities. Thus, in Office of the Court Administrator v. Usman,
we
said:
From the foregoing, it is imperative that every public official or government
employee must make and submit a complete disclosure of his assets, liabilities and net worth
in order to suppress any questionable accumulation of wealth. This serves as the basis of
the government and the people in monitoring the income and lifestyle of public officials
and employees in compliance with the constitutional policy to eradicate corruption, to
promote transparency in government, and to ensure that all government employees
and officials lead just and modest lives, with the end in view of curtailing and
minimizing the opportunities for official corruption and maintaining a standard of
honesty in the public service.
In the present case, respondent clearly violated the above-quoted laws when he failed
to file his SALN for the years 2004-2008. He gave no explanation either why he failed to
file his SALN for five (5) consecutive years. While every office in the government service
is a public trust, no position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and
uprightness of an individual than a seat in the Judiciary. Hence, judges are strictly
mandated to abide with the law, the Code of Judicial Conduct and with existing
administrative policies in order to maintain the faith of our people in the
administration of justice. (Emphasis supplied.)

Additionally, all Members of the judiciary are bound by the Code of Judicial
[30]
Conduct to make a full financial disclosure, as required by law.

Further, and more importantly, the Chief Justice, as any other public officer, took
a solemn oath of office, which he signed, and is couched, more or less in the following
language:

Ako ay taimtim na nanunumpa na tutuparin ko nang buong husay at katapatan,
sa abot ng aking kakayahan, ang mga tungkulin ng aking kasalukuyang katungkulan at ng
iba pang pagkaraan nitoy gagampanan ko sa ilalim ng Republika ng Pilipinas; na aking
itataguyod at ipagtatanggol ang Saligang Batas ng Pilipinas na tunay; na mananalig at
tatalima ako rito; na susundin ko ang mga batas, mga kautusang legal, at mga dekretong
pinaiiral ng mga sadyang itinakdang maykapangyarihan ng Republika ng Pilipinas; at kusa
kong babalikatin ang pananagutang ito nang walang anumang pasubali o hangaring
umiwas.
Kasihan nawa ako ng Diyos.

When a public officer affixes his signature on his Oath of Office, he embraces all
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his constitutional and statutory duties as a public officer, one of which is the positive
duty to disclose all of his assets and liabilities. Thus, for all public officers, what is
absolute is not the confidentiality privilege, but the obligation of disclosure.

Public Interest must be Held Paramount over
Private or Economic Concerns

Even if this Court were to accept the mistaken view of petitioners that they need to
secure a written consent to disclose the alleged FCD accounts, the circumstances of this
case would nevertheless warrant their exemption from the confidentiality rule of Sec. 8
of R.A. 6426.

Petitioners, as well as the assailed Resolution, maintain that this Courts previous
[31]
rulings
on the interpretation of Sec. 8 of R.A. 6426 are inapplicable, and they
stubbornly cling to the theory that the secrecy of FCDs is absolute. This erroneous
contention behooves a review of the subject jurisprudence, which establishes two salient
points: (a) the law was enacted purely for economic considerations, and (b) the
application of the confidentiality privilege is not absolute.

[32]
In Salvacion v. Central Bank of the Philippines,
China Banking Corporation
[33]
v. Court of Appeals,
and Government Service Insurance System v. Court of Appeals,
[34]
this Court held that R.A. 6426 was enacted in the midst of a financial downturn as a
result of the Martial Law years, when foreign investments were minimal. Thus, the
legislation sought to address this economic trough by attracting FCDs that can, in turn,
be channelled to loans and investments in the Philippines.

More significantly, in Salvacion, this Court categorically established that the
prohibition under Sec. 8 of R.A. 6426 is not absolute. In that case, this Court weighed
the interests of a rape victim and those of the accused foreigner by determining the
hierarchy of interests in this wise:
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In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its justice. Eventually,
if we rule that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 which exempts
from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body,
government agency or any administrative body whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign
transient, injustice would result especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like
accused Greg Bartelli. This would negate Article 10 of the New Civil Code which
provides that "in case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is
presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. Ninguno non
deue enriquecerse tortizeramente con dano de otro. Simply stated, when the statute is silent
or ambiguous, this is one of those fundamental solutions that would respond to the vehement
urge of conscience. (Padilla vs. Padilla, 74 Phil. 377).

It would be unthinkable, that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank No.
960 would be used as a device by accused Greg Bartelli for wrongdoing, and in so
doing, acquitting the guilty at the expense of the innocent.

Call it what it may but is there no conflict of legal policy here? Dollar against
Peso? Upholding the final and executory judgment of the lower court against the Central
Bank Circular protecting the foreign depositor? Shielding or protecting the dollar deposit of
a transient alien depositor against injustice to a national and victim of a crime? This situation
calls for fairness against legal tyranny.

We definitely cannot have both ways and rest in the belief that we have served
[35]
the ends of justice.
(Emphasis supplied.)

Similarly in the present case, this Court is faced with the task of balancing two
interplaying interests.

On the one hand is the opinion of petitioners that they will be held accountable for
criminal and administrative liability, should they follow the Subpoena issued by the
[36]
Impeachment Court.
They allege that Sec. 10 of R.A. 6426 provides that any wilful
violation of the law shall expose them to criminal liability of imprisonment of not less
than one (1) year nor more than five (5) years or a fine of not less than five thousand
pesos (5,000), nor more than twenty-five thousand pesos (25,000), or both such fine
and imprisonment at the discretion of the court. They further allege that the Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) may also revoke or suspend their authority to accept new
[37]
foreign currency deposits, pursuant to the second paragraph of Sec. 87(1)
of the
Manual of Regulations for Foreign Exchange Transactions.
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On the other hand is the interest of the public in ensuring accountability of public
officers. Without a doubt, the scale of balance must tilt in favor of public interest.

First, the purpose of R.A. 6426 can never, even for the longest stretch of
imagination, defeat the purpose of the constitutionally established process of
impeachment.

As stated earlier, upon its passage, the purpose of R.A. 6426 was merely to
encourage foreign investments from foreign entities. It is therefore inconceivable to
sacrifice the peoples will expressed in the Constitution in favor of a private interest.

Second, petitioners presume that liability will automatically attach upon their
production of the alleged foreign currency deposit accounts, despite such compliance
being pursuant to a lawful order of the Impeachment Court. To say that they will
inevitably become criminally liable is to presume the filing of a Complaint for the
violation of R.A. 6426. The contention of petitioners is highly speculative and
preemptive.

Also tenuous are their fears that the intrusion upon the FCD accounts may cause a
chilling effect on other banks or may cause a bank run.

Petitioners have not denied lack of knowledge of Art. 11 of the Revised Penal
Code that enumerates the justifying circumstances that would ultimately exculpate an
accused from liability. Applicable to petitioners is paragraph (6), to wit:

Any person who acts in obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful
purpose.

This provision alone renders the fears of petitioners unfounded. To insist that they
will be held criminally liable for the acts that the subpoena ordered them to do is to say
that either the Impeachment Court is not a superior body, or that the impeachment
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proceedings are not a lawful purpose, or both.

This particular rule in criminal law was brought to the attention of petitioner
Garcia by Senator Francis Pangilinan during the impeachment proceedings on 8
February 2012.

Art. 11(6) was again explained by Senator Alan Peter Cayetano to petitioner
Garcia the following day. In the course of his questioning, Senator Cayetano asked
petitioner if the latter had read Salvacion. Petitioner Garcia replied, Yes. Later, while
he was again being questioned on this matter by Senator Pia Cayetano, it was evident
that he knew that the Court in Salvacion did not hold the bank employees criminally
liable for following the lawful order of the court, since he himself pointed out that the
disclosure in Salvacion was pursuant to a lawful order of the court therein. Throughout
the proceedings, petitioner Garcia repeatedly informed the Impeachment Court that he
was under advice of counsel, and that his options and the legal ramifications of the
subpoena had sufficiently been explained to him and to petitioner PS Bank. Petitioners
cannot claim innocence or ignorance of the rules on criminal liability.

[38]
It is also noteworthy that in Estrada v. Desierto,
this Court did not find any
grave abuse of discretion when the bank employees of Citibank were absolved from any
criminal liability, stating thus:

In dismissing petitioners complaint for Usurpation of Official Function against
private respondents, public respondents reasoned

xxx xxx xxx

With the establishment of respondent Heftis authority in the issuance
of the constructive distraint, the subsequent act of respondent Dagdag in
serving the said distraint to the Citibank, as well as the act of respondents
Equillos and Albiento in witnessing the service of the same to the said bank,
can not (sic) be construed as act in agreement to commit the crime of
Usurpation of Authority in the light of the foregoing discussion.

The same thing holds true to the bank officers who were made
respondents in this case, considering that their act in informing
complainant regarding the existence of the constructive distraint as well
as in implementing the said distraint against the latters account with the
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said bank, [were] merely in compliance to an order issued by a

competent authority. (Emphasis supplied.)
xxx xxx xxx
We do not perceive any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the public
respondents when they issued the aforecited rulings. xxx (Emphasis supplied.)

Equally speculative is petitioners fear that PSBanks authority to operate an FCD

account will be revoked.

It must be emphasized that the Impeachment Court is a special accountability
mechanism reserved for the highest officials of the State: the President, the Vice-
President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional
Commissions and the Ombudsman. It is the only process by which the public,
represented by the House of Representatives, demand from the Senate the prosecution of
public officials for culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and
corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust. Thus, it is a method of national
[39]
inquest into the conduct of public officers.

Granting the prayer of petitioners for injunctive relief is tantamount to endorsing
their position on absolute confidentiality, so much so that higher values, such as public
accountability, cannot even be considered as a valid exception to the said privilege. This
contention pushes the law to an absurdity, as the adherence to this absolutist stance
invites unscrupulous public officers to convert their peso deposits to foreign currency
accounts in order to hide from the law and evade criminal liability. As a result, R.A.
6426 is used as a shield to conceal malfeasance and other unlawful conduct. This Courts
Resolution has therefore created a safe haven for criminal acts and cultivated an
atmosphere of impunity. Certainly, this was never the intendment of the law.

In the end, this Courts Resolution results in an iniquitous situation, where the
supreme interest of the public to maintain accountability among public officers is
relegated to the sidelines in favor of a statutory privilege that arose purely out of
economic considerations. Considering that petitioners alleged entitlement to the
injunctive relief is based on mere news reports, exaggerated theories of a possible bank
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run, or stubborn fears of culpability, this Court has no basis to enjoin the Impeachment
Court from exercising its constitutional mandate to require the production of documents
and the rendering of testimony before it under the assailed subpoena.

Accordingly, I vote to DENY the application for a temporary restraining order.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice
[1]
AN ACT INSTITUTING A FOREIGN CURRENCY DEPOSIT SYSTEM IN THE PHILIPPINES, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES.
[2]
Foreign Currency Account Nos. 089-19100037-3, 089-13100282-6, 089-141-00712-9, 089-141-00746-9, and 089-
14100814-5.
[3]
Art. XI, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution enumerates the impeachable officers as the President, the Vice-President, the
fifteen members of the Supreme Court, the three members of the Civil Service Commission,
the seven members of the Commission on Election, the three members of the Commission of Audit, and the Ombudsman.
[4]
G.R. No. 94723, 343 Phil. 539 (1997).
[5]
Petition, pp. 12-22.
[6]
Senate Resolution dated 06 February 2012, pp. 4-6.
[7]
Salvacion v. Central Bank of the Philippines, 343 Phil. 539 (1997); China Banking Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 140687, 18 December 2006, 511 SCRA 110; Ejercito v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 157294-95, 30 November 2006, 509
SCRA 190.
[8]
Petition, p. 14.
[9]
See note 3.
[10]
G.R. No. 157294-95, 30 November 2006, 509 SCRA 190.
[11]
487 Phil. 169 (2004).
[12]
Duvaz Corporation v. Export and Industry Bank, G.R. No. 163011, 07 June 2007, 523 SCRA 405.
[13]
G.R. No. 106253, 10 February 1994.
[14]
See note 2.
[15]
Petition, p. 7.
[16]
Peresus Escheminada, Disclosure in Due Time, Says CJ, Philippines Star, 12 February 2012,
http://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?articleId=776250&publicationSubCategoryId=63 (Last visited 13 February 2012)
[17]
Marvin Sy, Corona SALN accurate defense, Philippine Star, 04 February 2012, http://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?
articleId=774196&publicationSubCategoryId=63 (Last visited 10 February 2012).
[18]
Christina Mendez. What is 'public trust?', Philippine Star, http://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?
articleId=774831&publicationSubCategoryId=63 (Last visited 10 February 2012).
[19]
1987 CONSTITUTION, Art. VIII Judicial Department:
Section 4. (1) The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit en
banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled within ninety days from the
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G.R. No. 200238
occurrence thereof.
[20]
Id., Section 5.
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over
petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
(2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide,
final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement,
law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
(b) All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in
relation thereto.
(c) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.
(d) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.
(e) All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
(3) Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may require. Such temporary
assignment shall not exceed six months without the consent of the judge concerned.
(4) Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the under-
privileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases,
shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.
Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the
Supreme Court.
(6) Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service Law.
[21]
F. Mechem, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICES AND OFFICER 1-2.
[22]
Cornejo v. Gabriel, 41 Phil. 188 (1920).
[23]
Pineda v. Claudio, 28 SCRA 334 (1969), 138 Phil. 37.
[24]
63A Am. Jur. 2d 893-895.
[25]
Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES A COMMENTARY,
2003 Ed.
[26]
Enacted on 21 January 1974.
[27]
Enacted on 19 March 1974.
[28]
Enacted on 16 September 1974.
[29]
A.M. No. SCC-08-12, 19 October 2011
[30]
Rule 5.08. CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT.
[31]
Salvacion v. Central Bank of the Philippines, 343 Phil. 539 (1997); China Banking Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 140687, 18 December 2006, 511 SCRA 110; Government Service Insurance System v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
189206, 08 June 2011, 509 SCRA 190.
[32]
343 Phil. 539 (1997).
[33]
G.R. No. 140687, 18 December 2006, 511 SCRA 110.
[34]
G.R. No. 189206, 08 June 2011.
[35]
343 Phil. 559-560 (1997).
[36]
On p. 19 of the Petition, petitioners state: The Respondent Impeachment Court arbitrarily ignored Petitioners
Constitutional right to life and property when it issued Assailed Subpoena for foreign currency deposits. Petitioners will
clearly incur criminal liability for violation of RA 6426.
[37]
The BSP may revoke or suspend the authority of a bank to accept new foreign currency deposits for violation of Republic
Act No. 6426, as amended, or these regulations, or if such bank ceases to possess the minimum qualifications required.
[38]
Supra note 11.
27/28
6/15/2014
G.R. No. 200238
[39]
Hamilton, THE FEDERALIST PAPERS: No. 65, 07 March 1788, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/fed65.asp,
(Last visited 09 February 2012)
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G.R. No. 200238

G.R. No. 200238

the Impeachment Court is a constitutionally-imposed exception to the secrecy of FCDs.

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1. The FCDA bars any inquiry or examination as to the details of such

G.R. No. 200238

II. The Respondent Impeachment Court arbitrarily ignored Petitioners

5. This Grave Abuse of Discretion was committed by the Senate Impeachment

33. The Respondent Impeachment Court gravely abused its discretion

G.R. No. 200238

exception to the rule, it cannot be applied to the chief Justice

G.R. No. 200238

dollar deposit of respondent Greg Bartelli y

G.R. No. 200238

These two laws both support the confidentiality of

xxx xxx xxx

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b) The Branch Manager (and/or authorized representative) of Philippine Savings

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(Emphasis in the original.)

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the foreign currency deposit accounts of herein complainant, since the

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G.R. No. 200238

xxx xxx xxx

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transparency and accountability of public officers through the mandatory disclosures of

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G.R. No. 200238

proceedings are not a lawful purpose, or both.

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said bank, [were] merely in compliance to an order issued by a

Equally speculative is petitioners fear that PSBanks authority to operate an FCD

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G.R. No. 200238

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