Migration of Minorities in Pakistan: A Case Study Analysis

Migration of Minorities in Pakistan
A Case Study Analysis
SafiyaAftab and ArifTaj
Copyrights AAWAZ Programme @2015

AAWAZ Programme is funded by the UKAid
through the Department for International
Development (DFID), AAWAZ was conceived
initially as a five-year programme, from 2012 to
2017. Development Alternatives Inc. (DAI) is the
Management Organization (MO) for
implementing the AAWAZ programme, while
Pakistans prime civil society organizations:
Aurat Foundation (AF), South-Asia Partnership
Pakistan (SAP-PK), Strengthening Participatory
Organisation (SPO) and Sungi Development
Foundation (SF) form the implementation
consortium responsible for directly working with
communities.
All publications by AAWAZ are copyrighted,
however, can be cited with reference.
We are greatly indebted to Michelle Chaudhry, President, Cecil and Iris Chaudhry
Foundation; Sylvester Saleem from the same organization, Gopal Singh Chawlaand
Kulbeer Singh from the Sikh community; Mehmood Mashooq from Shamsabad, and
Adeel Mirza and Amir Mahmood from Rabwahfor their assistance and facilitation.
Christopher John, an activist from Rahimyar Khan, deserves special mentionand
our gratitude for volunteering three days of his time to facilitate our researchers.
This study would not have been possible without their assistance. Lastly, we would
like to acknowledge the hard work of Kapil Dev and Ashraf Kakar who did the field
work for this study in extenuating circumstances.
invaluable.
Their contribution was
Table of Contents
Introduction ............................................................................................................................. 1
Context .............................................................................................................................................. 1
Migration and the Changing Structure of Society ............................................................................................... 2
The Rise of Extremism ............................................................................................................................................ 3
Persecution in Recent History ................................................................................................................................ 5
Data and Methodology ..................................................................................................................... 7
Background Interviews with Community Elders ............................................................................. 8
Case Studies ........................................................................................................................... 11

Migration in the Christian Community ........................................................................................... 11
Case 1: A School Teacher in Multan ................................................................................................................... 11
Case 2: A Lawyer Who Fled the Country ........................................................................................................... 12
Case 3: The Shop Owner Who Escaped a Mob ................................................................................................ 13
Case 4: The Educationist Accused of Proselytisation ..................................................................................... 13
Migration in the Ahmadi Community ............................................................................................ 14
Cases 1 and 2: Migration from Shamsabad a Community Relocates ......................................................... 14
Case 3: Harassment in College ............................................................................................................................. 16
Case 4: Migration from Sindh............................................................................................................................... 16
Migration in the Hindu Community .............................................................................................. 17
Case 1: A Tenant is Forced off the Land............................................................................................................ 17
Case 2: A Land Dispute Turns Ugly.................................................................................................................... 18
Case 3: A Young Girls Vulnerability Prompts a Family to Move ................................................................. 18
Migration in the Sikh Community .................................................................................................. 19
Case 1: A Family is Targeted Twice..................................................................................................................... 20
Case 2: Escaping Militants in the Tribal Area .................................................................................................... 20
Case 3: A Target Killing in Peshawar .................................................................................................................. 20
Key Findings .......................................................................................................................... 22

Common Trends ............................................................................................................................. 22
Issues Specific to the Ahmadi Community .................................................................................... 24
Issues Specific to the Christian Community .................................................................................. 25
Issues Specific to the Hindu Community....................................................................................... 25
Issues Specific to the Sikh Community .......................................................................................... 26
Conclusions and Recommendations ..................................................................................... 28

Works Cited ............................................................................................................................ 30
Annexure A: Ahmadis Booked for Religious Offences 1984-2014 ......................................... 31
Annexure B: Questions for Migrant....................................................................................... 32
Annexure C: Questions for Migrant's Family........................................................................ 35
Annexure D: Questions for Community ................................................................................ 38
Acronyms
CPC
Country of Particular Concern
FATA
Federally Administered Tribal Area
FFP
Fund for Peace
KP
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
MRGI
Minority Rights Group International
MSF
Muslim Students Federation
PCC
Pakistan Christian Congress
PML-N
Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz
USCIRF
US Commission on International Religious Freedom
VAW
Violence Against Women
Migration of Minorities in Pakistan: A Case Study Analysis
Introduction
Migration is as eternal as human beings themselves. It occurs at a variety of scales, from millions of people
to an individual or a household, depending on the cause. The study of the phenomenon is, of necessity, interdisciplinary, as migration is typically caused by a range of factors, including economy, race, religion, gender,
language, and culture, which typically combine to make each migration or displacement case a complex whole.
Migration may be inter-continental, intra-continental, or simply internal indeed sometimes over short
distances.It does, however, always exact a cost, not just in monetary terms, but also social and emotional. This is
particularly true when migration is involuntary, or, as it is more commonly called, forced.
This paper looks at a specific form of migration that of non-Muslim Pakistanis, which has occurred as a
result of religious persecution. This migration could be domestic (from one city or town to another inside the
country) or international (where a migrant has left the country to escape threats). Unlike migration which occurs
due to state persecution, migrants are, in this case, not escaping from state violence per se, but from the effects of
state apathy and incompetence, or, in the case of some groups, a policy of ignoring or even covertly encouraging
offences against them.
The focus of this paper is on understanding the circumstances of this form of migration, and placing the
phenomenon within the context of a growing culture of intolerance in Pakistan.
Context
Pakistan regularly appears inside the top 10 on the list of fragile states issued by the Fund for Peace (FFP)
annually.1 While this branding is highly controversial for a number of reasons, there is little doubt that governance
issues have multiplied in the country in the last decade or so, that Pakistan is increasingly susceptible to violence
and conflict at all levels (local, provincial and national), and that the country faces an existential threat from
different groups of non-state actors who have not only effectively caused the state to retreat from some
geographical areas, but have succeeded in significantly weakening the states ability to enforce its writ across the
board. For all these reasons, it is not wrong to infer that Pakistan is, if not a fragile state, then at least one
The index is published annually by Foreign Policy magazine. For the most recent ranking see: Fragile States Index 2014,
Foreign Policy. Available athttp://foreignpolicy.com/fragile-states-2014/
1
characterised by weak capacity of key state institutions. As is typical of states with this combination of
characteristics, Pakistan is liable to render its most vulnerable citizens further susceptible to exploitation,
mistreatment, and violence.
Migration and the Changing Structure of Society

The current situation in the country has, not surprisingly, taken time to evolve. Religion has been
inextricably woven into Pakistani politics ever since the demand for a separate homeland for Muslims was first
tabled. The partition of the subcontinent in 1947 led to large-scale cross border migration, with Hindus and Sikhs
in what is now Pakistan heading for Hindu majority areas, mostly in north-central India, and Muslims from those
regions heading mainly to West Punjab and Sindh. There are no reliable estimates of the numbers of those who
migrated but numbers from the censuses of 1951, held in both India and Pakistan, demonstrated that 7.3 million
and 7.2 million people in each country respectively, were classified as displaced four years after partition.
Historians believe that the bulk of these were those who had migrated across the border. Even a conservative
estimate would thus suggest that at least ten million people left their homes and moved to what was perceived as a
safer environment in a separate country.
This migration resulted in the large-scale displacement of minority populations from their ancestral
homelands, leaving a particularly strong impact on Pakistan. According to the census of 1941 conducted in
undivided India, non-Muslims constituted about 20 percent of the population in the areas that came to form West
Pakistan.2 By 1951, however, non-Muslims constituted just 4 percent of the population in the same area. This
proportion has remained roughly constant since according to the last census conducted in Pakistan in 1998, nonMuslims (mainly Christians and Hindus) constituted 3.7 percent of the population. Nonetheless, there are some
variations across provinces regarding the constitution of minorities. The bulk of Pakistans Hindu population is
concentrated in Sindh. Khyber Pakhtunkhwa is largely homogenous with regard to religious affiliation, with only
0.6 percent of the population being non-Muslim. In Punjab, about 2.3 percent of the population in 1998 was
Christian, while the proportion of Hindus in the province constituted a negligible 0.13 percent.3
2
3
See complete census data for 1941 at http://www.censusindia.gov.in/Census_And_You/old_report/TABLE_1941_1.HTM

See the complete religious breakdown for each province for the 1998 census at http://census.gov.pk/Religion.htm
The Rise of Extremism
While the proportion of minorities in Pakistan has remained small, those who did choose to live in the
country contributed to the pluralistic society that characterised the first few decades of the countrys existence.
Pakistans founder had discerned that the country was bound to be pluralist, to be governed democratically, and
had enunciated in his first speech to the Constituent Assembly that religious freedom would be at a premium in the
new state. For a significant part of Pakistans early existence, this was in fact the case. With exception of antiAhmadiriots in 1953-54, and (mainly non-violent) incidents of Shia-Sunni conflict, sectarian and religious
extremism posed no major law and order threat from the 1950s to the 1970s (see Box 1).
Box 1:
Statement of Tariq Khosa, former Director General, Federal Investigation
Agency, in the Senate Committee on Defence and Defence Production 4
When I started my service in 1973 the only aggressive exchanges we saw in the
sectarian context were between Deobandis and Barelvis, and we would try to control
them. The maximum that used to happen was that there would be aggressive
exchanges over the loudspeakers during Friday prayers, but weapons were never used,
except a few irritants during Muharram.
This began to change with the advent of General ZiaulHaqs military rule in 1977. Zia started a policy of
Islamisation in the country atwo pronged strategy that helped himto retain powerand crush political forces
within the country on the one hand, and seek legitimacy for his coup on the other. The promotion of an orthodox
interpretation of religion domestically, and the establishments support of the Afghan Mujahideen in the war
against the Soviet Union, combined to create an atmosphere in the country wherein deviation from Sunni Islam
became a basis for discrimination, if not outright persecution.
Persecution was not just confined to social relations. The period of military rule from 1977 to 1985 saw the
enactment of legislations such as Ordinance XX of 1984, which attempted to prohibit Ahmadis from indulging in
anti-Islamic activities. A draconian law, this barred the community from using certain forms of address and
4Report
of the Defence Committee on Defence and Defence Production. Available at:

http://www.senate.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1365092265_822.pdf
greeting, and even prohibited the call to prayer from being issued from the communitys places of worship.5 As a
result, 3,680 Ahmadis have been booked for offences ranging from displaying the kalima, to preaching or even
posing as Muslims between 1984 and December 2014.6 Moreover, the entire population of the town of Rabwah
(about 60,000 persons) has been charged twice under Section 298-C of the Pakistan Penal Code (once in 1989 and
then again in 2008), while the entire Ahmadi population of Kotli was charged under the same Section in 2008 for
repairing their place of worship.7
Similarly, amendments to the Penal Code, specifically the introduction of Sections 295B in 1982 and 295C
in 1986, made the defilement of the Holy Quran and the utterance of derogatory remarks against the Prophet
(PBUH), respectively, offences that were punishable by death. In an important omission, the text of the
amendments does not contain the words willfully or on purpose or any other term that would specify that the
accused must have demonstrated mala fide intent. As such, the law can be applied in circumstances in which no
intent to defame was apparent.
The amendments to the blasphemy law (sections 295B and 295C) in 1986 resulted in a surge of registered
cases on the issue. From 1927, when section 295A of the Indian Penal Code (later adopted as the Pakistan Penal
Code) was promulgated as the first form of a regulation against blasphemy, to 1986, only 14 cases were registered
under the law.8 But in the 29 years since the additional amendments were introduced, the number of blasphemy
cases registered soared to over 1,000.9 In 2011 alone, 80 blasphemy cases were registered. About 50 percent of
these cases were registered against non-Muslims, who constitute roughly three percent of the population. Ahmadis
and Christians are the main victims of the law.
General Zia ulHaq died in 1988, but the intolerance and extremism which had taken root in society in his
era, continued to flourish, aided by domestic political rivalries as well as regional and international power
struggles. The emergence of militant groups threatening the Pakistani state is the culmination of decades of misgovernance, and of the states promotion of divisive ideologies. Another manifestation of these poorly conceived
policies is the now systematic persecution of religious minorities.
Ordinance No. XX published in the Gazette of Pakistan, April 26 1984.

to statistics provided by the Jamaat e Ahmadiyya. See Annex A.
7 This section prohibits Ahmadis from preaching or propagating their faith or calling themselves Muslim.
8 Section 295A prohibits Deliberate and malicious acts intended to outrage religious feelings of any class by insulting its
religion or religious beliefs.
9Blasphemy Laws in Pakistan: A Historical Overview, Center for Research and Security Studies (June 2013).
5
6According
Persecution in Recent History
Since 2002, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) has been recommending
that Pakistan be designated a country of particular concern or CPC with regard to the states failure to uphold its
citizens rights to basic religious freedoms. Similarly, the international NGO, Minority Rights Group International
(MRGI), which publishes an annual ranking of People under Threat, consistently places Pakistan amongst the top
ten countries where minorities are under the threat of large-scale violence.
While incidents of violence against minority groups are too numerous to recount here, some of the major
incidents in recent years include: the 2009 mob violence against Christians in Gojra, a village in Punjab, in which
eight people were killed and over a hundred houses burnt; an attack on an Ahmadi place of worship in Lahore in
May 2010 in which ninety people were killed and 125 injured; an attack on a church in Peshawar in September
2013 in which more than a hundred people died; mob violence and arson in March 2013 in a Christian colony in
Lahore; and more recently, the burning of a Christian couple accused of blasphemy in a brick kiln in district Kasur.
In addition to outright murder and arson, forced marriages and conversions, threats and intimidation, and target
killings of leaders of minority communities are regularly reported in national newspapers and by minority rights
groups.
The response of non-Muslim Pakistanis to this systemic persecution has been muted, not least because of
the scale of the threat that they face, and because the leadership of the various communities continues to be
targeted. One form of response, which has increasingly been reported on in recent years, however, is migration.
While in most cases this is internal migration, with individuals or communities shifting to places where they can
rely on kinship networks, international migration resulting from systemic persecution has also increased over the
past decade (see Box 2).
Box 2: Around 21 non-Muslims fleeing Pakistan every day

According to a report which appeared in Dawn newspaper on May 13 2014, Dr. Ramesh
Kumar Vankwani, a member of the ruling Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) told
the National Assembly on May 12, 2014 that around 5,000 Hindus were migrating from
Pakistan to India every year.10 The Economist, quoting UNHCR, reported on May 3, 2014,
that the number of asylum-seekers, mostly Christians and members of the Ahmadi
community, arriving in Sri Lanka from Pakistan increased to 1,489 last year, up from just
102 in 2012.11 Similarly, the Express Tribune reported on July 15, 2014 that around 1,000
Christians and Ahmadis had taken refuge in Thailand in 2014. Furthermore, 175 members
of the Pakistani Sikh community, according to its own members, moved to India in 2014.12
If all the figures are put together, we see that about 21 people from amongst religious
minorities appear to be fleeing the country every day.
The most commonly reported stories are those of the Hindu community in Sindh leaving for India, which
include such prominent cases as a former member of the Sindh Provincial Assembly who migrated in 2011.13 The
magnitude of this migration can be judged from the fact that in September 2014, the Indian government set up a
task force to expedite pending citizenship requests for Hindu and Sikh migrants from Pakistan and Bangladesh.14
According to a statement made by a Hindu Member of the National Assembly in May 2014, an estimated 5,000
Hindus have been migrating to India every year over the last few years.15 Additional information from an
organisation overseeing the welfare of Sikhs in Pakistan indicates that 128 Sikh families have migrated to India
over the last five years.16 Seventy of these fled from the tribal area.
More recently, in June 2014, Sri Lanka cancelled the on-arrival visa facility for Pakistanis, alleging that the
facility was being abused by potential asylum seekers. According to news reports, the bulk of these asylum seekers
belong to the Ahmadi community.17 However, the Pakistan Christian Congress (PCC) asserts that Christians are
105000
Hindus Migrating to India every year, NA told, Dawn, May 13, 2014. http://www.dawn.com/news/1105830
Haven, The Economist, May 3, 2014. Available at: http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21601562-minoritiesfleeing-pakistan-sri-lanka-best-temporary-refuge-uncertain-haven
12Packing their bags: Christians moving to Thailand to escape violence, insecurity, Express Tribune, July 15, 2014.
http://tribune.com.pk/story/735724/packing-their-bags-christians-moving-to-thailand-to-escape-violence-insecurity/
13 The case of the MPA, Ram Singh Sodho, who belonged to Pakistan Muslim League (Q), became controversial as the Sindh
Government initially denied that he had migrated.
14See: Indian Citizenship, Visas Made Easier for Minority Refugees from Pakistan, Bangladesh, NDTV, September 5, 2014.
http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/indian-citizenship-visas-made-easy-for-minority-refugees-from-pakistan-bangladesh587389. The report estimates that about 400 Hindu refugees from Pakistan are awaiting immigration documents.
15 See statement by Dr. Ramesh Kumar Vankwani carried in Dawn report on May 13 2014, above.
16 The organisation has asked not to be named.
17See: Sri Lanka seeks help from the UN to resettle asylum seekers, Reuters, October 3, 2014:
11Uncertain
well represented amongst asylum seekers in Sri Lanka as well, while the community has also witnessed the recent
large-scale migration of its members to Thailand and Malaysia.18
While news reports suggest that out-migration of non-Muslim Pakistanis has increased significantly in
recent years, there is little reliable data regarding the numbers of those departing the country, or on how migration
is effected, or even on the circumstances which compel migrants to take the first step. But out-migration at least
makes headlines. On the other hand, there is a real dearth of information on internal migration as a result of
religious persecution specifically, the phenomenon wherein a ghetto-isation of minorities is taking place, as
individuals and households flee religious persecution to live in safe areas where other members of their
community are well represented.
Data and Methodology

This paper is an attempt to explore the issue of forced migration as a result of religious persecution, looking
primarily at internal, but also at international migration. The study broadly focuses on the causes of migration,
with an emphasis on the circumstances that prompted the decision to migrate. It attempts to assess the costs (both
economic and social) of the exercise, not only those that are incurred by the migrants themselves, but also those
that are incurred by the community that is left behind.
This paper takes a case study approach, using a particular individual migrant as the focal point of each case.
In most cases, a set of three interviews was conducted for each migrant one with the migrant himself or herself,
one with the migrants family, and one with the community from which the migration had taken place. Cases
included members of the Christian, Ahmadi, Hindu, and Sikh communities, and fieldwork took place in Punjab and
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, in districts where AAWAZ is operating.19In addition to the case study centered interviews
and discussions, consultations were also held with community leaders to explain the purpose of the study, and to
request assistance in identifying cases. These discussions were particularly important to gain the confidence of the
communities, as they were in many cases reluctant to divulge information for fear of harassment. In the case of the
Sikh community in particular, a convenient sampling approach had to be used where at least three or four
The PCC issued a press note to this effect on October 2 2014. Details of the note can be found
at:http://www.pakistanchristianpost.com/headlinenewsd.php?hnewsid=4980
19 It was decided to restrict fieldwork to AAWAZ districts because of the relative ease of facilitation of interviews with the help
of district programme staff. Also, as the paper dealt with a sensitive topic, it was important to conduct fieldwork within the
framework of a larger programme dealing with rights issues.
18
meetings were held with community leaders in Peshawar, Hasan Abdal, and Nankana Sahib, before any member of
the community agreed to more detailed interviews. A similar approach was used with the Ahmadi community. The
Christian community, and the Hindu community in south Punjab, were approached through intermediaries who
have long-standing links with these groups.
The table below shows the breakdown of interviews across districts and by the religious affiliation of
migrant.
Table 1: Breakdown of Interviews
Districts/Community
Hindu
Christian
Ahmadi
Sikh
Lahore
Hasan Abdal
Nankana Sahib
Rahimyar Khan
Peshawar
Rabwa
Rawalpindi
Sabqaddar
Charsadda
Total
The total migrant cases recorded were fourteen, and the total number of interviews conducted, one with
the migrant herself/himself, one with the family, and one with the community, totaled about forty. The relevant
questionnaires used are attached as Annexures to this study.
Background Interviews with Community Elders

Prior to the commencement of documentation of cases, community elders were approached for permission
to interview members of their community. The experience of the AAWAZ researchers with these
preliminaryinterviews varied significantly across communities, and was indicative of how the actual interviews
would proceed.20
20Names
in this report are either not revealed, or changed, to avoid creating security or social issues for the respondents.
Interviews with leaders of the Ahmadi community took place in Lahore, Rabwah, and Kasur districts. They
were arranged through prominent members of the Jamaat-e-Ahmadiyya, which only allowed AAWAZ researchers
access to the community after a series of meetings that AAWAZ held to establish liaison, and after checking the
credentials of the programme. Community elders emphasised that persecution of the Ahmadis had been, to a
degree, legitimised by the state, leaving them with little recourse to systems of justice. The second constitutional
amendment, as well as the enactment of anti-Ahmadi legislation, specifically Ordinance XX, has effectively opened
the door for a range of actors, from extremist groups to public officials, and even ordinary citizens, to lodge
complaints against members of the community on a range of offences which can range from something as minor
as greeting someone with the traditional Islamic greeting, to carrying out proselytisation in any form. This has
resulted in a climate of fear for the community wherein they are increasingly restricting their interaction with nonAhmadis, and in fact seeing the town of Rabwah, where the community is centered, as their only safe haven in
Pakistan.
A similar climate of fear pervades the Christian community as well, and once again it is the use of
legislation, specifically the amendments to the blasphemy law, which are to blame. Ironically, victims of the
blasphemy law are not restricted to those against whom cases are registered the threat of accusation under the
law is enough to endanger lives and property. The assassinations in 2011 of the former Governor of Punjab, and
the Minister for Minorities Affairs, which took place in response to the two individuals support for a Christian
accused under the blasphemy law, adequately highlight the vulnerability of the community. In addition, some
recent high profile cases involving Christians, including arson in Joseph Colony, Lahore; the RimshaMasih case in
which a teenage girl with learning difficulties was accused of blasphemy; and the incineration of a couple in a brick
kiln in Kasur district, are all examples of how accusations of blasphemy can trigger an extreme response before any
formal judicial proceeding even commences. The Christian community has responded to this pervasive threat by
marshaling its professional resources, ensuring strong legal representation where necessary, starting
communications and advocacy campaigns through inter-faith NGOs and community based organisations, and using
the offices of its church leaders to propagate the communitys plight in the media. However, these efforts are
necessarily muted, as community leaders and activists are aware that a prominent role in countering extremism
would put them at risk.
The Hindu and Sikh communities have not been victimised by the legal system to the extent that the
Ahmadis and Christians have, but sections of the Hindu community who work as agricultural labour are subject to
intense exploitation on the part of local landlords, and have not been able to highlight their issues at the national
level. Further, the fact that they are co-religionists with the majority population in a hostile neighbour has
rendered them vulnerable in a society where their religion has been vilified in school textbooks, in which Hindus in
general are painted as the prime enemy. The bulk of the community is settled in Sindh, where the atmosphere until
recently was relatively benign and a long tradition of peaceful coexistence was apparent. This has changed
radically in the last decade, and the community has suffered incidents of forced conversions (mainly of girls),
kidnappings (mainly of businessmen), and extortion. In south Punjab, where the community mainly consists of
agricultural labour, their vulnerability stems from their poor economic status.
The Sikh community on the other hand is generally well-off, with businesspeople well represented in their
numbers. The bulk of the community was settled in the tribal areas, where the Sikhs have had a presence since the
expansion of Ranjit Singhs empire more than two hundred years ago. The Sikhs maintained a low profile, and have
traditionally been somewhat protected due to their superior socio-economic status. Over the last decade, however,
the community has been under threat from militants in the tribal agencies, where the jizya (or a tax on
unbelievers) was imposed on them, and there also began an extortion racket targeting their community. Some
members of the community initially moved from the tribal areas to Peshawar district, but the target killing of a
Sikh businessman in the outskirts of Peshawar in March 2014 prompted further migration of some Sikh families to
Hasan Abdal and Nankana Sahib in Punjab. As mentioned earlier, there has been an increase in the migration of
Sikhs and Hindus to India, but the community was reluctant to provide any information about such cases.
10
Case Studies
A total of fourteen cases were covered in this study, as detailed in Table 1. The accounts of the migrants
varied with regard to the nature of the threats they faced, the circumstances that prompted their migration, and
their choice of destination. Most of the migrants interviewed were men, as it was typically they who had taken the
decision to migrate, and had made arrangements for families to accompany them.However, two women migrants
also formed part of the study. This section details the responses, and highlights underlying trends.
Migration in the Christian Community

The four Christian migrants (three male and one female) interviewed were all from Punjab four of them
had migrated within the province (two had in fact moved localities within the city of Lahore), while one had left the
country and was interviewed via Skype from the U.S. All were urban based, generally well educated (one had a
post-graduate degree while two had completed their Intermediate), and had been working either as salaried
employees, or running their own businesses. One was a professional lawyer.
The circumstances that prompted the migration were similar for four out of the five interviewees in the
sample. In all four cases, harassment by neighbours, colleagues, or acquaintances, which carried the threat of
accusations of blasphemy, prompted the decision to migrate.
Case 1: A School Teacher in Multan

In the first case documented, a 40 year-old female school teacher with a Masters degree, working in Multan,
was harassed to a point where she left her job and went back to her hometown, Rahimyar Khan, leaving behind
opportunities for significant career growth in a bigger city. She recounted that she had been transferred to Multan
and taken up her responsibilities in a government school. Her husband and family had moved with her, and they
began to settle down in their new home. However, having moved to an environment where she was unfamiliar
with her co-workers and away from her family and core community, she soon began to experience harassment
from her colleagues. The issue began when some colleagues began to hold friendly discussions with her about
how she should consider converting to Islam. But it soon went beyond discussion she began to face sustained
pressure to convert, even being told that she should leave her husband and rely on her new community to find a
suitable Muslim husband for her. She reacted strongly to such suggestions, but soon found that this only made
11
things worse. The situation became worrying when she began to receive phone calls from unknown numbers at
odd times telling her that she must convert or face the consequences. After a few months of experiencing this
harassment, she and her husband decided to return to their hometown, Rahimyar Khan, where they could
essentially operate within the environs of a familiar community consisting of family and other co-religionists.
The costs of this reverse migration (back to the couples hometown) were significant. Being a government
employee, the process of having a transfer approved was not only time intensive, but also entailed dealing with
rent-seeking officials. The couple claimed to have paid Rs. 70,000 to officials of the Education Department to
ensure that the teacher was formally transferred from a post in Multan to one in Rahimyar Khan. Other financial
losses incurred included the cost of selling a newly acquired plot in Multan at less than market price (the couple
claimed to have incurred a loss of Rs. 100,000 or so) in order to fund the cost of relocation. Above all, the emotional
and psychological costs of the relocation were tremendous, as was the couples perception that they had not had
the opportunity to take advantage of the superior education (for their children) and health facilities in Multan,
which were key factors in their initial decision to move to the bigger city.
Case 2: A Lawyer Who Fled the Country

A Christian lawyer, known particularly for his willingness to defend those accused of blasphemy, formed
the subject of the second case study. With three post-graduate degrees in addition to his qualification in law, he
was a well-respected member of the community. His involvement in the defense of some high-profile blasphemy
cases had brought him into the public eye over the last decade, and he had been receiving threats from unknown
sources for a while. In 2006, he was physically attacked by unknown assailants, and while he escaped unhurt, a
colleague of his was killed, and his car destroyed. However, he continued with his work in human rights and with
his law practice, focusing on false accusations of blasphemy.
In 2010, his defense of a particular blasphemy case pitted him against powerful leaders of the Namoos-eRisalat (Honour of the Messenger) movement, and the threat level he faced began to escalate. Later that year, his
office was attacked and he and his staff were beaten up. By early 2011, following the assassinations of the then
Governor of Punjab (an outspoken critic of the blasphemy law) and the Minister for Minorities Affairs, the lawyer
was convinced that his life, as well as the lives of other outspoken critics of the law, were in danger. Being a
prominent human rights activist, he was in touch with some international NGOs, and was eventually helped by a
faith-based organisation, which arranged for him to leave the country and seek asylum overseas. He has been
settled there for almost four years.
12
Although the migrant himself did not provide this information, newspaper reports detailing the attacks on
him, as well as his subsequent migration, suggest that he was targeted by an extremist group, which were carrying
out an organised campaign against him. Although he lived in an area of Lahore where the bulk of the population is
Christian, his family who remain in the area testified that he was threatened in his locality in addition to his place
of work. As such, he feared not just for himself but also for his immediate family. In fact his nephew, who now
resides at his house in Lahore, claims to have received threats from the same organisation.
Case 3: The Shop Owner Who Escaped a Mob

The third case studied involved the owner of a small steel-works shop in Islamabads F-10 area. The
migrant had an exchange of hot words with a labourer at his store, who proceeded to share the details of this
incident with the Imam of a local mosque. Without bothering to ascertain the facts of the case, the Imam issued a
fatwa in the Friday prayer, accusing the shop owner of blasphemy. Fortunately for the Christian shop owner, a
Muslim friend of his was listening to the sermon, and immediately called him to tell him that his business, and in
fact his life, was under threat, as a mob was planning to leave for his place of business immediately after the prayer.
The shop-owner hurriedly called a relative in the neighbouring city of Rawalpindi, who lives in a majority Christian
locality, and within a matter of hours, left the locality.
The shop owner has not returned to Islamabad, and in fact, has not managed to successfully resuscitate his
business in Rawalpindi. He ended up selling his shop at below market price, and was, for many months, entirely at
the mercy of his relatives in Rawalpindi. Even now, more than five years since the family left Islamabad, they have
been unable to recoup their economic loss, or to set up another trading establishment.
Case 4: The Educationist Accused of Proselytisation

The most recent case studied was that of an educationist who, along with his wife, used to run a school in a
middle class locality of Lahore. Although the couple is Christian, and the school was named after a Christian saint, it
had only a handful of Christian students, and no Christian teacher other than the co-owner. Nevertheless, rumours
began to circulate in the community of how the school was being used for proselytisation, and that the owners
were trying to convert children to Christianity.
As the school continued to do well, with growing enrolment (student strength had reached 400 in three
years), the school owners started receiving complaints from parents of enrolled students, saying that they were
worried about their children being exposed to Christianity. When assured that this was not the case, the parents
13
retreated, but the community in general remained restive. The situation escalated to a point when, in 2013, a group
of people attempted to storm the couples house. A potentially ugly situation was averted as Christian and Muslim
elders managed to intervene in time and the mob dispersed. Nevertheless, the couple began to rethink their future,
and decided that in the long run, it was better for them to move to a Christian majority area. They sold their school
and moved to Yohannabad, a locality in Lahore that mostly houses Christians.
The couple has suffered significant financial losses as a result of their decision to move. They sold a thriving
establishment (the school) at a throwaway price, and now work as middle order employees in another school.
Their monthly income loss alone is estimated at about Rs. 40,000. More than that, the couple was proud of their
accomplishment in building a school from scratch, and bringing it to a level where they had a substantial student
body and good examination results. Although they feel safer in their new locality, they are disappointed that they
cannot pursue their passion.
Migration in the Ahmadi Community

Two of the four Ahmadi migrants interviewed for this study had migrated in similar circumstances from
the town of Shamsabad in Kasur district to Rabwah, which is the center of the Jamaat-e-Ahmadiyya and the only
town in Pakistan where the community constitutes a majority. One had migrated from the same town to Lahore,
while the fourth migrant had arrived from Sindh, seeking refuge in Rabwah.
Cases 1 and 2: Migration from Shamsabad a Community Relocates

The organised persecution of Ahmadis in Pakistan has been well documented, but the interviews of
migrants from Shamsabad throw the plight of the community in sharp relief. The village of Shamsabad has about
2,000 households, of which about 20 consisted of Ahmadi families. The two communities have had a history of
inter-marriage in the past, and as such, there are strong kinship ties between some Ahmadi and Sunni households.
Ahmadis were well integrated in the community, and participated in the public life of the village. It was, however,
precisely due to this strong tradition of interaction that the problems arose.
Tensions between the two communities began to build when prominent members of the Jamaat-eAhmadiyyaand other local notables got into a series of discussions about the origin of the Ahmadi sect, and its key
teachings. What started as a regular neighbourhood gathering soon assumed a more ominous flavour, and after a
14
particularly serious altercation in late 2012, the Sunni notables decided to challenge the Ahmadi community to a
munazara or a theological debate.
To this extent, the accounts of the two communities concur. But with regard to the terms of the debate, two
conflicting accounts appear. The Ahmadi community says that the debate was to be an intra-community affair, with
only locals participating, but that the Sunnis called in a religious leader from the Khatm-e-Nabuwwat (or Finality of
Prophethood) movement, from the nearby city of Faisalabad, to support the debate on their behalf. The Sunni
community denies that any outsiders came for the munazara. Nevertheless, what is indisputable is that the debate
soon deteriorated into a name-calling session, and Ahmadi religious leaders were mocked and ridiculed. As this
series of events unfolded, a rumour emerged that a young Sunni boy in the village had converted to the Ahmadi
belief. The young man had allegedly left for Rabwah, with the Sunni community alleging that he had been
kidnapped and the Ahmadis denying this claim. The atmosphere in the village became ever more strained, and the
community became further marginalised. A local chapter of the virulently anti-Ahmadi Khatm-e-Nabuwwat
movement was formed in the village. This was followed by outright threats to the Ahmadi households, and
eventually an announcement that Ahmadis would be subjected to a social boycott.
The local police had been informed of the rising tension in Shamsabad, and had in fact sent some personnel
to be stationed in the village to avoid clashes. As the situation became more strained, however, they expressed
their inability to defuse the escalating tensions. In fact, as told by members of the Ahmadi community interviewed
for this report, the police advised the Ahmadi community to leave the village, saying that it was unfeasible for law
enforcement agencies to maintain a continued presence in the area, and that the security of Ahmadi households
could not be guaranteed in the longer run. At this point, the leaders of the Ahmadi community in the village, in
consultation with leaders of the Jamaat-e-Ahmadiyyain Rabwah, advised the Ahmadis of Shamsabad to move to
Rabwah if at all possible.
The two migrants interviewed for this study, who had migrated from Shamsabad to Rabwah in 2012, both
confirmed that their families decided to leave the village in the aftermath of the debate. One family decided to
settle in Rabwah as two sons from the household were already settled there, and they arranged to rent a house for
their parents and helped them settle in. The second family chose Rabwah because they received financial help from
the Jamaat-e-Ahmadiyya based in the town. The Jamaat helped them settle in at the time of the time of the
interview in December 2014, was still paying for their basic food and rent. They also confirmed that only two
Ahmadi families remained in Shamsabad one family was too poor to move, and the main breadwinner of the
15
other worked in an office in a nearby town and could not afford to leave his job. However, their interaction with the
village at large is apparently limited, and their former neighbours worry for their safety.
Although the migration of the community from Shamsabad was planned over the course of some weeks or
months, the families still incurred financial losses in their migration, mainly on account of having to sell off their
houses and businesses to the locals at half the market price. Property markets in rural areas are narrow at the best
of times, and in this case, people in the area were aware that the Ahmadis had no choice but to leave. However, the
process of settling into Rabwah was relatively simple for them, and the migrants were able to find new jobs and
rent houses.
Case 3: Harassment in College

The case of the third migrant from the Ahmadi community is also linked to Shamsabad. The migrant, whose
wife is Sunni, disclosed that his family was from Shamsabad and his son was studying in a local government degree
college. The young man had not told most of his classmates that he was Ahmadi. The fact that his mother belonged
to a known Sunni family helped maintain his privacy. However, as tensions grew in his home village, his
classmates, some of whom belonged to Sunni families from Shamsabad, began a campaign against him in the
college. Essentially, the tensions of the village spilled over into the nearby campus. The involvement of the student
wing of a center-right political party added impetus to the campaign against the Ahmadi student, and as news of
the debate in Shamsabad filtered through to the campus, his position became ever more untenable. At some point,
the Muslim Students Federation (MSF) launched a complaint against him accusing him of blasphemy, and tried to
pressurise the principal of the college to register a case.
Although the principal refused to oblige, the threat of the blasphemy accusation was a game changer for the
student, and created a panic in his household. The family, including the student, left for Lahore overnight. The
family has kept a low profile since, although their relatively superior socio-economic status, and close relationship
with Sunni households does allow them to maintain links in the village. Nevertheless, they cannot return to their
ancestral homes.
Case 4: Migration from Sindh

The fourth migrant interviewed from the Ahmadi community had reached Rabwah from Larkana in Sindh
in October 2013. A young, newly married man, he had been working as a salesperson in a shop in Larkana city,
when activists of a political party started a campaign against him and urged other shopkeepers to cut off all ties
16
with him. Threats to him and to his family were soon followed up with pressure to convert to Sunni Islam. His
resistance led to an attempt to file a blasphemy case against him an act in which workers of a right wing political
party, which has lately gained traction in Sindh, were prominent. The migrant had been in touch with the head of
the Jamaat-e-Ahmadiyya in Larkana, who informed senior leaders of the Jamaat in Rabwah about the situation,
and arranged for him to leave Sindh within a few days. Given the superior organisation of the Jamaat, he was able
to leave his native town having paid just for train tickets for himself and his wife. The rest of his expenses were
taken care of by the Jamaat, and he was provided with a house, basic necessities, and a job upon his arrival in
Rabwah.
Migration in the Hindu Community

All of the Hindu migrants interviewed for this paper belonged to district Rahimyar Khan in southern
Punjab. As mentioned earlier, Hindus from this area have also migrated to India but there is little or no information
about them, and their neighbours, friends, and families who remain in Pakistan are reluctant to even admit that
they know someone who is currently in India. Most of the cases detailed here therefore relate to people who have
migrated within the district, often from one village to another, in order to escape some form of persecution.
Case 1: A Tenant is Forced off the Land

An 80 year-old Hindu migrant living in union council Bahishti in Rahimyar Khan was found to have
migrated four years ago from a village in the Liaquatpur area of the same district. The migrant owned 25 acres of
land, which he had obtained during the land reforms of the early 1970s. But in addition, he was working as a
sharecropper on the landholdings of the powerful Mahar family, whose lands were contiguous to his. The tenancy
agreement was verbal, as is often the case, but his understanding was that he would work the Mahar lands for
twenty years. About four years ago, the migrants family became involved in a dispute with the Mahars. Accounts
differ here the migrants family said that the dispute was land related, but when the community was questioned,
they pointed to a more personal matter. Apparently, a girl from the Mahar family was thought to have gotten
involved with one of the migrants grandsons. For the Mahars, this was a slight on their family honour not only
because the boy involved was a Hindu, but also because he belonged to the family of a tenant. The family reacted by
not only forcing the tenant family off their land, but in fact hounding them out of the village. Given the sensitivity of
the matter, none of the other Hindu families in the village supported the migrants.
17
The migrant family moved to another union council in the same district, where they had a benefactor a
Muslim landlord who offered them shelter, has employed them on his lands, and initially provided food, housing,
and helped place the children of the family into school. The migrants family incurred significant losses in the
process as the Mahars ransacked their house, confiscated their dairy animals, and took away their stock of grain
and seed.
The nature of the dispute recounted above was such that a similar outcome could have been expected even
if the tenant family had been Muslim. However, the fact that the family is Hindu added another dimension to the
threat they faced. They claimed that even before their migration, they and other Hindus in the village were
constantly being pressurised to convert. This was confirmed by other Hindu families in the village from where the
migrants originated. But the incident fueled the fear that the powerful landlords of the area could, if they wished,
unleash extremist groups against them, which would then have endangered the lives of the entire community. They
felt it was better to leave rather than confront the Mahars in any way.
Case 2: A Land Dispute Turns Ugly

The second case studied in the Hindu community involved a person who had in fact migrated to India,
where he already had some family. The migrant ran a photographers studio in Rahimyar Khan city. In late 2013, a
dispute arose in the Basti Ali Lahar area, wherein a group tried to occupy a Hindu cremation ground/burial site,
claiming that they had rights to that land. The migrant took a strong stand against this his forefathers had been
buried in the area, and he felt that the Hindu community should unite and take action. He urged the Hindus of the
area to register a case against the claimants. As his campaign gained prominence, he began to receive threats from
unknown quarters. The migrants elder brother had already moved to India some years ago, and was settled in
Jodhpur. He urged the migrant to sell his shop and his house, and apply for a visa for India. The migrant made all
the arrangements in utmost secrecy, and only informed his close family (his sister and brother-in-law) of his
decision to leave four days prior to his departure. He has been living in India since November 2014 and has no
plans to return.
Case 3: A Young Girls Vulnerability Prompts a Family to Move

The third case examined was of a young Hindu girl who had migrated to India with her parents and was
now back in Rahimyar Khan making arrangements for her husband to join her family in India.
18
About five years ago, she had begun to be noticed by a Muslim boy in the community who began to
pressurise her to convert to Islam and marry him. Having heard of instances of forced conversions of Hindu girls in
Sindh, and fearing that the girl would be kidnapped or dishonoured if the situation was allowed to fester, her father
decided to send her to Sindh to live with some relatives, and also arranged a marriage for her in the Hindu
community. In the longer run though, the family was convinced that it would be safer to leave the country. An
incident in a nearby locality where Hindu houses were burnt down during a land dispute further strengthened
their resolve.21 The familys decision was facilitated by the fact that the girls father had an elder brother and other
relatives who had migrated to India in the 1990s and are well settled in the city of Jodhpur.
The girl was married off and was living in Rahimyar Khan when the familys visas came through and they
decided to move. She accompanied her family to Jodhpur and lived there for a few months to assess the situation.
She then returned to Rahimyar Khan a few months ago to make arrangements for her husband to also leave
Pakistan and join them permanently in India. She has run into some documentation issues and is waiting for these
to be resolved before they make the final move. Her account of her familys life in India was largely positive. The
family had had time to plan their move, and her father had sold off his property and assets before he left. He has
bought a small house in Jodhpur and works as a day labourer. The girl is confident that once her paperwork is
sorted out, she can sell the remaining assets that the family has in Pakistan (some milch animals and gold
ornaments) and generate enough income to have a comfortable start for herself and her husband in Jodhpur. Her
husband, who was also interviewed, is also keen to leave.
Migration in the Sikh Community

The Sikh communitys migration patterns are distinct from those of others, as they take the form of step
migration. The first wave of migrations took place from 2002 onwards, when the community started moving from
the tribal areas to Peshawar and other areas in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. A more recent wave of migrations has been
prompted by growing militancy in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Sikhs have now started moving further west to
Nankana Sahib and Hasan Abdal in Punjab both districts where they have traditionally had a strong presence.
AAWAZ researchers confirmed that such an incident had taken place in Rahimyar Khans Sunni Bridge area. Some people
laid claim to land where some Hindu households lived, showed allotment papers, and razed the houses to the ground. The
Hindus contested this claim, and succeeded in getting a stay order against the land allotment. The matter is now sub-judice.
21
19
Further migration to India has also begun to take place over the last few years, although the community does not
discuss this.
Case 1: A Family is Targeted Twice

The family interviewed for the first case study had faced militancy twice. In the first case, which occurred in
2009, the now 56 year-old head of the family had been kidnapped by militants from his home in the Khyber Agency
and had been transported to Orakzai Agency. He was released upon payment of ransom. Two years later, in 2011,
his son was shot dead by unknown persons in Khyber Agency. After that incident, the migrant decided to move his
family from the tribal area to the relative safety of Peshawar. Being a hakeem or traditional medicine man by
profession, he felt that he could earn a living anywhere. His immediate family, as well as the families of his two
brothers, moved to Peshawar in 2011. Although the family is settled in a mohalla or locality with many Sikh
inhabitants (most of whom have also migrated from the tribal area), they still feel unsafe. The migrant has, for
example, curtailed his trips to Multan, where he used to go regularly to see patients, as he was receiving
threatening letters in the city warning him not to travel in Punjab.
Case 2: Escaping Militants in the Tribal Area

Another Sikh migrant told a similar story. He is a businessman who was working in Peshawar, but his
family lived in Khyber Agency and he was in the habit of visiting them on weekends and holidays. He began to
receive threats from a militant group which is particularly strong in Khyber Agency, and had announced that all
non-Muslim residents of the Agency would henceforth have to pay jizya. The threats escalated to a point where he
arranged for his family to flee the Agency, sold his business in Peshawar, and is now living along with other
members of the Sikh community, in a gurdwara in Hasan Abdal. The migrant was candid about his future plans,
saying that he plans to take his family to India at the earliest opportunity. He does not see a future for his
community in Pakistan, saying that they, along with all non-Muslims are easy targets for extremists.
Case 3: A Target Killing in Peshawar

A Sikh migrant interviewed in Nankana Sahib revealed that he and his family had moved to the district in
March 2014, following the target killing of his brother in the outskirts of Peshawar that month. The migrant was in
fact the brother of the Sikh hakeem killed in the ShabQadar area near Peshawar, whose murder had made
headlines in Pakistan. The migrant revealed that two of his brothers still lived in Peshawar, but that he had
volunteered to bring his dead brothers children to Nankana Sahib for safety. This was the second step in a series of
20
migrations twenty years ago, in 1994, the family had moved from Khyber Agency to Peshawar. They had been
well settled in Peshawar for two decades and lived in a mohalla with many Muslim neighbours in addition to ten
other Sikh families. However, the killing in ShabQadar had prompted another migration, this time to an area with a
significant Sikh population, where the migrant already had family and even owned a piece of land.
When asked if he knew who had targeted his brother, the migrant expressed ignorance. He said that his
brother had not received any threats, and nor did the family have enmity with anyone. The family has registered a
case with the police, but no progress has been made. This is a relatively well to do family, but even they have been
helpless when it comes to ensuring that the killers are apprehended.
21
Key Findings
The cases presented in the previous section are fairly diverse, but enable us to derive some key patterns in
forced migrations due to persecution, which cut across communities. These are discussed as follows.
Common Trends
The accounts of persecution and subsequent migration of minorities point to a complete breakdown of
the citizen-state compact in Pakistan. Over and over again, interviewees recounted how they had no hope of
intervention of law enforcement agencies on their behalf, nor did they feel that they had the option of recourse to
the judicial system. Those who threaten them, whether individuals, groups, or militant organisations, seem to be
operate with impunity. In the few cases when law enforcement agencies were approached to defuse a situation,
they either made token gestures, simply failed to take any action, or, most damaging of all, admitted to their
incapacity (for example in the case of the Ahmadi community of Shamsabad, which was advised by police to
migrate). The state is failing to enforce its writ, and is giving in to extremism at the expense of its constitutional
and legal obligations.
Militant organisations alone, or in some cases, in conjunction with certain political parties, are
carrying out a sustained campaign against minorities in general, and some communities in particular.
Extremism has been on the rise in Pakistan over the last three decades, and more recently, has given rise to a
sustained militant movement against Pakistani society and the state. This culture of extremism and the associated
rise of militant movements have had significant negative impact on the lives of religious minorities. At least two of
the cases recounted earlier, both pertaining to the Ahmadi community, point to the involvement of right-wing
political parties in hate campaigns targeting individuals (a salesman from Sindh and a student from Shamsabad),
while a religious group took the lead in organising a campaign against the community in the village of Shamsabad,
where they had been settled for generations. Interviews with Hindus in South Punjab revealed that the community
is wary of confronting certain families or groups due to their known links with militant organisations. But the most
glaring example of a community being targeted exclusively by militant groups is that of the Sikh community.
Having been based in the tribal areas and northern Khyber Pakhtunkhwa for centuries, the community has been
targeted by militant organisations active in the area that have not only targeted them for extortion, but also carried
out target killings of prominent members of the community.
22
Minorities are being ghetto-ised, and are increasingly retreating to safe haven settlements or towns
where they are surrounded by other members of their community. Evidence from around the world indicates
that intolerance is best confronted by mainstreaming the healthy integration of a minority community is
facilitated by their participation in community life, and their visibility in places of work and commercial centres.
The case studies indicate that the reverse is happening in Pakistan. Ahmadis are retreating to Rabwah, Christians
to areas like Yohannabad in Lahore where there is a Christian majority, and Sikhs to areas around major gurdwaras
in Punjab. As this trend gathers pace, social interaction across communities is weakening, as minority groups
increasingly opt to use social services run by their own communities, carry out business dealings preferably within
the community, and generally limit their interaction with the larger society. The researchers working on this study
encountered this trend as a barrier to their fieldwork as well people were wary of meeting with outsiders and
were loath to share their experiences unless introduced by an intermediary from within their community whom
they could trust.
The threat of use of the blasphemy law is enough to force the potential accused to flee. In most of the
cases recounted above, no formal complaint under the blasphemy law was actually filed with the police.
Nevertheless, threats of blasphemy accusations were made, particularly against Christians and Ahmadis, and these
threats alone, even when they were not explicit, were enough to force a decision on an individual or a family. With
almost sixty extra-judicial killings having taken place against the blasphemy accused or convicted post 1987,22 an
accusation in itself is enough to place lives in danger, and as such, migration, or effecting a disappearance is a
rational response.
There are indications that unscrupulous elements are using the cover of extremism to make financial
and economic gains by initiating action against minority groups. Although not explicitly stated, and difficult to
prove, there are indications that many cases of persecution are economically motivated. Forcing a teacher out of a
job or a trader out of business leaves avenues open for others who may covet appointments or promotions.
Creating a climate of fear against neighbours and prompting overnight departures downgrades the value of their
properties and assets, enabling acquisition of such assets at below market rates. In essence, a climate of intolerance
makes it simple to exploit marginalised groups.
The persons interviewed do not, for the most part, see their situation as temporary. Across the board,
interviewees affirmed that they do not see themselves returning to their original homes or to their former lives,
See infographic in: Arafat Mazhar, Why Blasphemy Remains Unpardonable in Pakistan, Dawn, Feb 19, 2015. Available
at:http://www.dawn.com/news/1163596
22
23
although in some cases they expressed a desire to do so. Instead, there is an air of resignation amongst the
displaced. They either talk of moving on further, or of building lives in their new locations. What is more unsettling
is that they do not see a bright future for their compatriots either. Those who have left the country or are trying to
do so were vocal about how they would encourage their families and friends to find similar avenues.
While the above common trends apply to all minorities, some aspects of forced migration or persecution
are specific to certain communities as recounted below.
Issues Specific to the Ahmadi Community

The Ahmadi community, as mentioned earlier, is facing a form of state endorsed persecution, and as such,
their situation is the most untenable of all minority groups interviewed for this study.
Legal provisions in place against the Ahmadi community specifically provide a carte blanche for those
set on targeting them. Interviews in communities where Ahmadis had once lived, and from where they had been
forced to leave, confirmed that there is no sense of their rights to the basic privileges of citizenship, let alone any
remorse on the treatment meted out to them. Unlike other minority groups, Ahmadis are considered apostates, and
as such deserving of extreme punishment.
Most incidents against Ahmadis arise in circumstances that prompt an emergency response. Ahmadis
are extremely vulnerable to two pieces of legislation, Ordinance XX and Sections 295B and C. As such, accusations
against individuals or the community at large can arise at the slightest pretext. Further, inciting mob violence
against the community is relatively easy, as a sustained hate campaign has been carried out against the community
for decades. As such, the community is more liable than most to be dispossessed of all assets and forced to flee
homes and communities with little preparation or planning. The leadership of the community is organised,
recognizes this, and has tried to provide assistance whenever possible. However, their outreach in small towns and
villages is limited, and the community is large. As a result, not everyone can be accorded protection and provided
with shelter and alternate means of livelihood.
24
Issues Specific to the Christian Community

The community is generally centered amongst the poorest sections of society, who are also the most
vulnerable to blasphemy accusations. Christians are most liable to be accused under Section 295B, which
pertains to the defiling of the Holy Quran. According to the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, around 90
percent of cases filed under this Section are against Christians. The community is particularly susceptible to this
provision of the law as many of them are employed as sanitary workers in homes and municipalities, and thus
handle waste paper. Many sanitary workers are illiterate, and cannot defend themselves if accused of mishandling
religious texts.
Due to the nature of accusations under the blasphemy law, the forced migration of Christians,
particularly those accused of blasphemy, also takes place under hurried circumstances. As in the case of
Ahmadis, Christians are liable to face accusations at the slightest pretext, and are often forced to flee overnight.
Unlike the Ahmadi community though, their leadership is not very organised and they have little recourse to
assistance.
Issues Specific to the Hindu Community

Forced conversions of Hindu girls have rendered the community fearful and apprehensive. Members of
the Hindu community, mainly in Sindh but also in South Punjab, have been agitating about how Hindu girls are
forced into marriages with Muslim men, and are not only forced to convert, but are also prevented from ever
contacting their families. Girls who convert but then manage to go back to their families are considered apostates
and their lives are in danger. According to a recent news report, up to a thousand girls have been subject to forced
conversions and marriages in Pakistan the past year.23 This phenomenon has also forced a trend of early marriages
in the community, since they are loath to let their daughters move beyond the confines of their homes due to this
perceived threat.In the context of migration, it is a key cause of the international migration of Hindu families to
India.
23MahamJavaid,
Forced Conversions Torment Pakistans Hindus, Al-Jazeera, August 18, 2014.

http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/08/forced-conversions-torment-pakistan-hindus201481795524630505.html
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A form of apartheid is practiced against Hindus in Pakistan. The subjects of the case studies reported
that discriminatory practices against Hindus are of the worst kind, which restricts their upward economic mobility.
They cannot run any businesses pertaining to food and edibles, as Muslims are increasingly loath to eat and drink
with them. Their community is systematically vilified in textbooks, and their interaction with relatives across the
border is deemed suspicious. As these trends intensify, the community is feeling increasingly beleaguered and
though reluctant to discuss this, is looking beyond Pakistans borders.
Chain migration patterns are evident in the Hindu community. Unlike the cases of Christians and
Ahmadis who are often forced to migrate at short notice and are the main victims of legislation, Hindus are facing a
more systematic form of discrimination, which aims to isolate them. A good number of people in the community
have relatives and friends in India, and with a more liberal visa regime for the community now in place, the trend
of moving across the border is becoming more pronounced. Hindu migration to India is generally well planned and
executed over a period of some months or even years. Commonly, one member of a family migrates, meets up with
relatives or friends across the border, and then over a period of some years, calls other family members from
Pakistan to join him or her. Reports of reverse migration in the community are also being cited, with the notion
that migrants from Pakistan are viewed with suspicion across the border, and also face issues of literacy (being
unable to read and write in the Devanagri script). In the course of this research, however, no case of reverse
migration was found.
Issues Specific to the Sikh Community

The Sikh community has been targeted by militants, and has responded with large-scale migration
from the tribal area. The community is conspicuous because of the distinctive appearance of its male members,
and is also prominent in business circles and in the practice of hikmat or herbal medicine, professions which entail
significant public dealing. They thus constituted easy targets for extremists. While they became targets for
extortion from the time militancy in the tribal area gained ground over a decade ago, the targeted killings that have
traumatised the community are a more recent phenomenon, and remain largely unexplained. Interestingly, most of
the victims of target killings, in the Khyber Agency and in Peshawar, have been practitioners of herbal medicine.
Whether this group is being targeted because of their public dealing or because of their reputed wealth and power
is not clear. The communitys reaction to the wave of target killings has been to close ranks and to refrain from
bringing up the issue publicly. The community is also closely watched by intelligence agencies wherever they are
26
stationed in Punjab because they are perceived to be under threat from militant groups. This surveillance makes it
even more difficult to access Sikh community leaders.
Sikh persecution is largely confined to the Pashtun belt. In Punjab, the community is shielded by its
relatively superior socio-economic status, and the fact that it tends to remain confined to areas around places of
worship.
Sikh migration can be characterised as step migration, and the degree of urgency of the migration
varies by stage. Thus the communitys migration from the tribal areas in the wake of the militancy typically took
place abruptly, with families initially resisting migration, but often being forced to leave overnight or within the
space of a few days as the threat to their lives and livelihoods increased. This first stage of migration typically took
families from the tribal area to Peshawar and other parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. More recently, and particularly
after target killings in the outskirts of Peshawar, a further step of migration has manifested itself as Sikhs move
from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa to Nankana Sahib and Hasan Abdal in Punjab. Some families are now effecting a further
step and moving across the border to India. Once again, there are few details on this last step as members of the
community are generally reluctant to discuss plans to move across the border. This last stage of migration, when it
does take place, is planned over a period of time, and as in the case of the Hindu community, usually takes place
when friends and/or relatives across the border facilitate it.
The Sikh community has not been affected by the blasphemy laws or other legislations. This could be
because the community has only recently taken up residence outside the tribal area, which is not governed through
the application of the penal code. Nevertheless, the community is unique in that the source of its persecution lies
more in the ongoing militancy than in societal attitudes.
27
Conclusions and Recommendations
There is much evidence that minorities are increasingly under threat in Pakistan and are resorting to
extreme steps, including abandonment of ancestral homes and livelihoods, to secure themselves. Not only is this
indicative of the complete failure of the essential state function of protecting the lives and property of its citizens, it
is also traumatic for families and communities. This study analyses patterns across communities and finds that
while many issues are commonly experienced, different religious groups are also targeted in distinctive ways.
The following key recommendations stem from the research conducted:
An Act for the establishment of a National Human Rights Commission was passed by the National Assembly
in December 2011, and by the Senate in May 2012. However, the Commission has yet to be constituted. The
governments reluctance to constitute the Commission is difficult to justify, given that Pakistan is signatory
to the 1993 UN Resolution calling for member countries to constitute national institutions for the
promotion and protection of human rights.24 As per the Act, the proposed Commission includes at least one
minority member, and has been given extensive powers to investigate instances of rights violations. As
such, an effective, functioning Commission could do much to stem the effects of the rising tide of
intolerance against minorities. The findings of this study point to the fact that the immediate constitution of
the Commission is a must.
The Supreme Court, in a landmark judgment dated June 19, 2014, issued a number of directives on the
issue of promoting inter-faith harmony.25 Among other observations, the judgment states that there is a
general lack of awareness about minority rights in the population. The judgment also has very strong
recommendations on measures to protect the rights of minorities, including the formation of a taskforce on
religious tolerance, and instructions to provincial governments on curriculum revision to remove hate
speech against minorities, in addition to promoting a realisation that people of different faiths have a right
to profess and propagate their beliefs. This judgment has been relegated to a backburner and little action
has been taken on its recommendations. The governments of Punjab and Sindh have submitted reports to
the court claiming that curriculum reform is underway, and the government of Punjab has pledged that
24
25
General Assembly Resolution 48/134 dated December 20, 1993.

Supreme Court judgment 1/2014 dated June 19, 2014.
28
new textbooks will be issued by the summer of 2015. Such measures are also now part of the National
Action Plan to fight terrorism, and their implementation needs to be facilitated urgently. In general, the
Supreme Courts directives on inter-faith harmony, as laid out in the aforesaid judgment, should be
operationalised at the earliest.
The government must recognise that minorities are especially vulnerable to blasphemy accusations and
that an accusation, or even the threat of an accusation can be life threatening. The authorities have to take
action against instances of vigilante justice, and stem the tide of extra-judicial killings that take place in the
wake of accusations.
There is an urgent need to take action against hate speech and the incitement to violence against
individuals and communities. According to Section 153A of the Penal Code, promoting enmity between
different groups, on religious or other grounds, is a crime liable to imprisonment of up to five years.
However, hate speech is being commonly employed against non-Muslim Pakistanis and against minority
sects and no action is taken against the perpetrators.
Turning back the tide of intolerance that has engulfed Pakistan in recent decades will be a long, slow, and
painstaking process. But the first steps have to be taken before it is too late. The migration of minorities is just one
indicator of how the spread of extremism can strike at the essence of societal organisation. This trend has to be
curtailed before it encompasses the larger society.
29
Works Cited
Reports and Newspaper Articles
Javaid, Maham. Forced Conversions Torment Pakistans Hindus.Al-Jazeera, August 18, 2014.
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2014/08/forced-conversions-torment-pakistan-hindus201481795524630505.html
Mazhar, Arafat. Why Blasphemy Remains Unpardonable in Pakistan,Dawn, Feb 19, 2015. Available at:
http://www.dawn.com/news/1163596
5000 Hindus Migrating to India every year, NA told, Dawn, May 13, 2014. http://www.dawn.com/news/1105830
Blasphemy Laws in Pakistan: A Historical Overview. Center for Research and Security Studies (June 2013).
Fragile States Index 2014. Foreign Policy. Available at http://foreignpolicy.com/fragile-states-2014/
Indian Citizenship, Visas Made Easier for Minority Refugees from Pakistan, Bangladesh, NDTV, September 5,
2014. http://www.ndtv.com/article/india/indian-citizenship-visas-made-easy-for-minority-refugees-frompakistan-bangladesh-587389.
Packing their bags: Christians moving to Thailand to escape violence, insecurity,Express Tribune, July 15, 2014.
http://tribune.com.pk/story/735724/packing-their-bags-christians-moving-to-thailand-to-escape-violenceinsecurity/
Report of the Defence Committee on Defence and Defence Production.Available at:
http://www.senate.gov.pk/uploads/documents/1365092265_822.pdf
Sri Lanka seeks help from the UN to resettle asylum seekers, Reuters, October 3, 2014.
Uncertain Haven. The Economist, May 3, 2014. Available at: http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21601562minorities-fleeing-pakistan-sri-lanka-best-temporary-refuge-uncertain-haven
Websites
Census data for 1941. Census India.
http://www.censusindia.gov.in/Census_And_You/old_report/TABLE_1941_1.HTM
Census data for 1988. Census Pakistan. http://census.gov.pk/Religion.htm
Pakistan Christian Post. http://www.pakistanchristianpost.com/headlinenewsd.php?hnewsid=4980
30
Annexure A
Ahmadis Booked Under Religious Offences from 1984 to December 2014
NO.
Description of cases
Number of Ahmadis booked for displaying Kalima, i.e. There is none

worthy of worship except Allah, Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah
Number of Ahmadis booked for calling Azan, call to prayers
Number of Ahmadis booked for posing as Muslims
Number of Ahmadis booked for using Islamic epithets
Number of Ahmadis booked for offering prayers
Number of Ahmadis booked for preaching
Number of Ahmadis booked for celebrating Ahmadiyya Centenary in 1989
Number of Ahmadis booked for celebrating the 100 year anniversary of
the eclipses of the sun & moon that occurred in 1894 as a sign for the
Promised Mahdi, i.e. Founder of the Ahmadiyya Community
Number of Ahmadis booked for distributing a pamphlet EkHarf-eNasihana i.e. A Word of Advice commenting upon anti-Ahmadiyya
Ordinance XX
Number of Ahmadis booked for distributing Mubahala pamphlet, i.e. A
challenge to the opponents for prayer duel
Number of Ahmadis booked for allegedly defiling the Holy Quran
Various other cases against Ahmadis on religious grounds
Number of Ahmadis charged under the Blasphemy Law, i.e. PPC 295-C
Former Supreme Head of the Community while living in London was
charged in his absence in sixteen cases.
Present Supreme Head of the Community while living in London
The entire population of Rabwah i.e. Ahmadiyya headquarters in Pakistan
was charged under section PPC 298-C on 15-12-1989, and again on June 8,
2008. (Population of Rabwah is approximately sixty thousand.)
A case against the entire Ahmadi population of Ahmadis in Kotli, was
registered for taking up repairs and improvement in their mosque in 2008
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
Total
number of
cases
765
38
447
161
93
796
27
50
27
148
45
1065
303
16
2
31
Annexure B
Questions for Migrant
Province
District
Tehsil
Town
Union Council
Village
Migrants Information
Gender
1. Male
2. Female
Age
Marital Status
1. Married
2. Never married
3. Divorced
4. Widow/Widower
Highest level of education completed
Number of children
Migrated to (City, Country if abroad)
Migrated From (City/Town/Village/District in

Pakistan)
Date of Migration (Month and year)
Have you migrated alone or with your family?
Employment status and current occupation if

employed
Family Profile
What was the approximate population of the village/town from which you migrated?
What was your fathers occupation?
How long had your family been settled in the community from which you migrated?
32
What were the key occupations followed by the majority of the people in your original community?
What was the ethnic/sectarian/religious structure in your original community? To which
ethnic/sectarian/religious group does your family belong?
Circumstances Preceding Migration
When did you first decide to migrate (year)?
What prompted you to first start thinking of such a course of action? If a specific incident, please describe
in detail. If it was due to general circumstances, please say what these were?
Did you ever receive a direct or indirect threat from anyone in your original place of residence? If yes,
describe what kind of threat it was?
a) killing,
b) kidnapping,
c) hate speech d) specify if threat was of any other nature
Also, if describe whom the threat emanated from?

a) Organisation,
b) individual,
c) both
Was that organisation a religious outfit?

What was the name, if Yes,
If a threat was received, did you report it to any law enforcement agencies?
a) Police,
b) court,
c) other
What action was taken against your complaint?
Was the threat followed up by any attack (verbal, physical, smear campaign, other)?
Did you make the decision to migrate in consultation with your family?
a) Parents,
b) spouse,
c) siblings),
d) in-laws,
e) or on your own
Did your family agree with your decision or not? If not, why did they disagree?
How did you make the decision of where to go how did you choose your current place of stay? Was your
choice based on job prospects/safety/the fact that other members of your community are here/other?
33
Circumstances of Migration
What arrangements did you make prior to migration, if at all (job search in new place/contact friends and
family who are already there/arranging housing or schooling/sold property/other)?
What is the approximate cost of your migration (cost of moving, as well as opportunity cost of employment
etc. left behind).
Approximate cost of the property if any left behind)?
Who helped you to make these decisions regarding migration?
Did anyone help you settle into your new place of abode? If so, how?
Do you think you made the right decision? Or would you go back to your original home if you could or
threat eliminated?
If you have decided not to return to your original place, why you do not want to return?
Thoughts on Circumstances in Original Community
Do you have close family remaining behind in your original community? Or are there extended family or
other close friends and community members still there?
Do you think they are safe and protected?
Would you advise others to follow your example? If yes, why and if no, why not?
Thoughts on Political Representation
Are you satisfied with the minorities representatives performance against minorities persecution?
Yes
No
Why, if yes
Why, if no
Do you think minorities political representatives can help curb minorities persecution? How, elaborate:
34
Annexure C
Questions for Migrants Family
Province
District
Tehsil
Town
Union Council
Village
Respondents Information
Gender
3. Male
4. Female
Age
Marital Status
5. Married
6. Never married
7. Divorced
8. Widow/Widower
Family member Migrated to (City, Country if
abroad)
Relationship with migrant
Did he/she migrate alone or with his/her family?
Date of Migration (Month and year)
Family Profile
What was the approximate population of this village/town?
What is yours and your fathers occupation?
What are the levels of education of the adults (men as well as women) in your household (some years of
schooling/college/technical qualifications)?
How long had your family been settled in this community?
What are the key occupations followed by the majority of the people in this community?
35
What is the ethnic/sectarian/religious structure in this community? To which ethnic/sectarian/religious group

does your family belong?
Circumstances Preceding Migration
When did your relative first decide to migrate (year)?
What prompted him/her to first start thinking of such a course of action? If a specific incident, please
describe in detail. If it was due to general circumstances, please say what these were?
Did you or any other family member ever receive a direct or indirect threat from anyone in this
community? If yes, describe. Also, if possible, say whom the threat emanated from?
a) Organization,
b) individual
c)
both
Why your or other family feel threatened?
If a threat was received, did your family report it to any law enforcement agencies?
Was the threat followed up by any attack (verbal, physical, smear campaign, other)?
Was any action was taken by the law enforcement agencies on your family complaint?
a)Yes
b) No
What action was taken on the complaint, specify, if Yes?
Why action was not taken, specify, if No?
Did your relative make the decision to migrate in consultation with you or on his/her own?
Did you agree with their decision or not? If not, why not?
How did he/she/they make the decision of where to go how did he/she/they choose their current
place of stay?
Specify if the choice was based on:
a) Job prospects
b) safety,
c) the fact that other members of your community are there,
d) elaborate, if any other?
36
Do you want your relative to be back again?

Why if yes
Why if No
Do you want your relative to be back if threat to him/her is eliminated?
Do you think he/she/they safe after migration?
Was any property left behind by the migrant(s)?
Who manages that property in his/her/their absence?
Do you also want to migrate for family re-union?
Circumstances of Migration
What arrangements did the migrant make prior to migration, if at all (job search in new place/contacting
friends and family who are already there/arranging housing or schooling/other), specify?
What was the approximate cost of the migration (cost of moving, as well as opportunity cost of
employment etc. left behind)?
Who helped them to make these decisions regarding migration?
Did anyone help them settle into their new place of abode? If so, how?
Do you think they made the right decision?
How many members of your close family have remained in this community?
How many members of your ethnic/sectarian/religious group remain here? If there has been wide-scale
migration from this area, describe how and over what period of time that has happened.
Would you advise others to follow the example of your family member who migrated? If no, why not?
37
Annexure D
Questions for Community
Province
District
Tehsil
Town
Union Council
Village
Respondents Information
Number of people in FGD
Number of Males
Number of Females
Community Profile
What was the approximate population of this village/town?
What are the general levels of education of the adults (men as well as women) in this community (some years of
schooling/college/technical qualifications)?
What are the key occupations followed by the majority of the people in this community?
What is the ethnic/sectarian/religious structure in this community?
Migration trends
How many people have migrated from this community in the last five years dont have to give exact
numbers but indicate if it has been quite a few or not many?
Have they migrated as individuals or have whole households left?
What do you think has prompted the migration that has taken place? Why have people migrated from
here?
38
If members of a particular ethnic or sectarian group or religious community have migrated, can you tell us
how many of such households have left, and how many remain in the village/town?
Has the migration been caused by threats emanated from religious outfits, affiliated individual or other sort
of religious oppression/persecution?
Specify:
a) Religious outfits,
b) Affiliated individuals, c) specify, if other kind of oppression/persecution?
What is the nature of threats if any?

a) Murder, b) kidnapping, c) hate speech,
d) specify if other
Did they ever complain to law enforcement agencies of such threats?

a) Yes,
b) No
What action was taken, if Yes?
If no action was taken, why do you think the law enforcement did not react?
Have some of the migrants (individuals or households) returned to this community? If so, do you know
why they returned?
Would such people be safe after returning?
Which of the four communities stand vulnerable or oppressed as number 1, 2, 3,4 in your view?
Communities
Sikh
Hindus
Christian
Ahmadis
Number assigned by communities
Probes:
Why do you thinkis No. 1
Why do you think is ..is No. 4
39
What is the biggest threat to religious minorities in Pakistan?

Elaborate:
Security and Conflict Issues
In general, do you think this community is safe and secure? Do most families feel safe here?
What sorts of conflicts have taken place here recently (last five years or so) if any?
What sorts of festivals/events are celebrated in this community on a regular basis? Who participates in
these?
40
House 4A, Street 42

F-7/1, Islamabad
92-51-2652891-4
info@aawaz.org.pk
www.aawaz.org.pk

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Migration of Minorities in Pakistan

A Case Study Analysis

SafiyaAftab and ArifTaj

Copyrights AAWAZ Programme @2015

Their contribution was

Case Studies ........................................................................................................................... 11

Key Findings .......................................................................................................................... 22

Conclusions and Recommendations ..................................................................................... 28

Country of Particular Concern

Federally Administered Tribal Area

Fund for Peace

Minority Rights Group International

Muslim Students Federation

Pakistan Christian Congress

Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz

US Commission on International Religious Freedom

Violence Against Women