1. People v. Mercado (65 Phil.

665)
Facts:
On June 21, 1938, Francisco Mercado with intent to gain but without use of violence
whatsoever stole two (2) carabaos from Pedro Ladores and one (1) from Leon Ladores. The
crimes commenced in Gapan, Nueva Ecija and were completed in Candaba, Pampanga.
The foregoing information were filed by the provincial fiscal of Pampanga in the Court
of First Instance of said province after receiving the report of the preliminary inquiries made,
upon complaint, by the justice of the peace court of Candaba, Pampanga, where the case
originated. The appellee waived his right to a preliminary investigation and asked that the two
cases be remanded to the Court of First Instance for trial and final judgment.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of First Instance in Pampanga has jurisdiction to try the case.
Held:
No, it does not.
In criminal proceedings, the rule is that one cannot be held to answer for any crime
committed by him except in the jurisdiction where it was committed. Said rule is based on the
legal provision which prescribes the essential requisites of a good complaint or information, one
of which is the allegation that the crime was committed within the jurisdiction of the court where
the complaint or information is filed and that said court has authority to try it.
In conclusion, we are of the opinion and so hold that the sole court possessing
jurisdiction over the cases against the appellee for the theft of the carabaos in question is not that
of Pampanga, but that of Nueva Ecija in which they should have been and must be instituted.
2. Reodica v. CA (GR No. 125066, July 8, 1998)
Facts:
Isabelita Reodica was allegedly recklessly driving a van in Paranaque and hit Bonsol
causing him physical injuries preventing him from working for 9 days and damage to property
amounting to P 8,542.00.
Three days after the accident a complaint was filed before the fiscals office against the
petitioner. She was charged of "Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with
Slight Physical Injury." After pleading not guilty trial ensued. RTC of Makati rendered the
decision convicting petitioner of "quasi offense of reckless imprudence, resulting in damage to
property with slight physical injuries" with arresto mayor of 6 months imprisonment and a fine of
P 13,542.00. Petitioner made an appeal before the CA which re-affirmed the lower courts
decision. In its motion for reconsideration, petitioner now assails that the court erred in giving its
penalty on complex damage to property and slight physical injuries both being light offenses over
which the RTC has no jurisdiction and it cant impose penalty in excess to what the law
authorizes. And that the reversal of decision is still possible on ground of prescription or lack of
jurisdiction.
Issues:

1. Whether or not the duplicity of the information may be questioned for the first time
on appeal.
Held:
Right to assail duplicity of information
Rule 120, section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that when two or more offenses are
charged in a single complaint and the accused fails to object against it before the trial, the court
may convict the accuse to as many offenses as charged and impose a penalty for each of them.
Complainant failed to make the objection before the trial therefore the right to object has been
waived.
The case was dismissed due to lack of jurisdiction of the RTC of Makati and the decision
of the CA was set aside.
3. Zaldivia v. Reyes Jr. GR No. 102342, July 3, 1992)
Facts:
A complaint was filed before the fiscals office constituting an offense in violation of a
city ordinance. The fiscal did not file the complaint before the court immediately but
instead filed it 3 months later. The defendants counsel filed a motion to quash on ground that the
action to file the complaint has prescribed. The fiscal contends that the filing of the complaint
before
his
office
already
interrupts
the
prescription
period.
Issue:
Whether or not the filing of information/complaint before the fiscal office constituting a
violation against a special law/ordinance interrupts prescription.
Held:
The mere filing of complaint to the fiscals office does not interrupt the running of
prescription on offenses punishable by a special law. The complaint should have been filed within
a reasonable time before the court. It is only then that the running of the prescriptive period is
interrupted.
4. Pilapil v. Somera (GR No. 80116, June 30, 1989)
Facts:
Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married with private respondent, Erich
Ekkehard Geiling, a German national before the Registrar of Births, Marriages and Deaths at
Friedensweiler, Federal Republic of Germany. Thecouple lived in Malate, Manila where the
marriage produced a child who was born on April 20, 1980 and was named Isabella Pilapil
Geiling. Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the spouses,
followed by a separation de facto between them. The private respondent initiated a divorce
proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg Local Court in January 1983.
The petitioner (Pilapil) then filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of
property before the RTC Manila on January 23, 1983.
The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of failure of
marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted to the petitioner.

On June 27, 1986, five months after the divorce the private respondent filed 2 complaints
for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that while still married to Imelda, latter
had an affair with William Chia as early as 1982 and another man named Jesus Chua sometime
in 1983.
Issue:
Whether private respondent can prosecute petitioner on the ground of adultery even
though they are no longer husband and wife as decree of divorce was already issued.
Held:
The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the
person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse and nobody else.
Though in this case, it appeared that private respondent is the offended spouse, the latter obtained
a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, and said divorce and its legal
effects may be recognized in the Philippines in so far as he is concerned. Thus, under the same
consideration and rationale, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner and has no
legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended
spouse at the time he filed suit.
5. US v. Luna (1 Phil. 360)
Facts:
Juan Luna was sentenced to one year, eight months and twenty days of prision
correccional for the attempted abduction of Juana Isidro who was at the time 12 years old. The
victims mother, Tomasa Isidro, granted Luna pardon for the crime he has committed to her
daughter. The defendants lawyer immediately moved the court to declare the penal action as
extinguished and the bail bond cancelled.
Issue:
Whether or not the grant of pardon given by the victims mother is sufficient?
Held:
No, because it has not been made to appear that the offended party, Juana Isidro, has
expressly pardoned the injury alleged to have been done her by the defendant Juan Luna, and the
pardon of the girl's mother not being sufficient to authorize the dismissal of the case in
accordance with the provisions of the Penal Code, we are of the opinion that the contention of the
attorney for the defendant cannot be sustained, and therefore the motion is overruled.
6. Perez v. Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc. (GR No. 126210, March 9, 2000)
Facts:
Private respondent Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc. owns the Hagonoy Money Shop which
employed petitioner Cristina O. Perez as Officer-In-Charge, Cashier and Teller, Alberto S. Fabian
as Bookkeeper, and Cristina Medina and Milagros Martin as Solicitors/Field Managers. For the
period starting August 3, 1992 up to December 5, 1993, the Laya, Manabat, Salgado and
Company, an independent management, consultancy and accounting firm, conducted an audit of
the financial affairs of the Hagonoy Money Shop and found anomalies in more or less twentyeight (28) savings accounts consisting of withdrawals which were recorded in the subsidiary
ledgers of the money shop but not in the passbooks which were in the possession of the
depositors. The audit also revealed that to cover-up the anomalous withdrawals, fake deposits

were recorded in the money shop's subsidiary ledgers whenever the remaining balance in a
particular savings account went below the amount of legitimate withdrawals made by a depositor.
This prompted the private respondent to file an affidavit-complaint for estafa against the
aforementioned employees of the money shop and two outsiders, Susan Jordan and Brigida
Mangahas.
Acting Provincial Prosecutor, Jesus Y. Manarang (hereinafter "prosecutor"), issued a
resolution finding prima facie evidence that the petitioner and her co-employees had committed
the crime of estafa thru falsification of commercial documents, and recommending the filing of
the corresponding information against them with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos,
Bulacan. The charges against Susan Jordan and Brigida Mangahas were, however, dismissed.
Perez filed a petition for review with the Secretary of Justice praying for the dismissal of
the charges against her. On the other hand, private respondent moved for a reconsideration of the
portion of the same resolution dismissing the complaint against Susan Jordan. The prosecutor
granted private respondent's motion for reconsideration.8 Hence, on April 27, 1994, an
information for estafa thru falsification of commercial documents was filed against herein
petitioner, Alberto Fabian, Milagros Martin, Cristina Medina and Susan Jordan.
On September 23, 1994, then Secretary of Justice, Franklin M. Drilon, issued Resolution
No. 696, series of 1994 ordering the prosecutor to cause the dismissal of the information against
herein petitioner on the ground of insufficient evidence. The private respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order of the Secretary of Justice, which motion, however, was denied with
finality by the latter. Pursuant to the said resolution, the prosecutor filed a motion in the RTC
praying for the dismissal of the case against herein petitioner and the admission of an amended
information excluding petitioner as one of the accused which motion was granted by the RTC.
Private respondent assailed the dismissal of the case against the petitioner in a motion for
reconsideration filed in the RTC which motion was denied by the RTC after finding that the
private respondent, as private complainant, had no legal personality to question the dismissal of
the criminal charges against the petitioner.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Judge Masadao, presiding judge of RTC Branch 9, Malolos, Bulacan,
committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the prosecutor's motion to dismiss the criminal
case against petitioner without an independent assessment of the sufficiency or insufficiency of
the evidence against the latter.
2. Whether or not the private respondent, as private complainant, in a criminal case has
the legal personality to question the dismissal by the trial judge of the criminal charges against
herein petitioner upon the motion filed by the prosecutor.
Held:
1. YES, Judge Masadao acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting the prosecutor's motion to
dismiss the criminal charges against the petitioner on the basis solely of the recommendation of
the Secretary of Justice. The reason for such is as aptly observed by the Office of the Solicitor
General, in failing to make an independent finding of the merits of the case and merely anchoring
the dismissal on the revised position of the prosecution, the trial judge relinquished the discretion
he was duty bound to exercise. In effect, it was the prosecution, through the Department of
Justice which decided what to do and not the court which was reduced to a mere rubber stamp in
violation of the ruling in Crespo v. Mogul.

2. YES, because while it is only the Solicitor General who may bring or defend actions on behalf of
the Republic of the Philippines, or represent the People or State in criminal proceedings pending
in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, the private offended party retains the right to
bring a special civil action for certiorari in his own name in criminal proceedings before the
courts of law.
7. People v. Ilarde (GR No. L-57288, April 30, 1984)
Facts:
Ernesto Santibanez filed a case of adultery to his second wife Cecile Santibanez and Atty.
Avelino Javellana. Ernesto found out about the affair through his son. He devised a plan to catch
his wife and paramour. The plan fell through when he went to Manila which eventually led to the
arrest of Cecile and Atty Avelino.
Ernesto Santibanez found out that he had cancer and sought medical helpin the United
States but not before executing a will that specifically notes that he is disinheriting his wife.
When he died Cecile and Atty. Javellana filed a motion to quash the information because they say
that the required complaint was not filed therefor not granting the court jurisdiction of the case.
Issue:
Whether or not there has been compliance with the requirement of Article 344 of the
Revised Penal Code, reiterated in Section 4, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, that "the crimes of
adultery and concubinage shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended
party."
Held:
Yes, there has been compliance. Undoubtedly, the complaint-affidavit filed by Santibaez
contains all the elements of a valid complaint, as "it states the names of the defendants, the
designation of the offense by the statute, the acts or omission complained of as constituting the
offense; the name of the offended party, the approximate time of the commission of the offense,
and the place wherein the offense was committed.
The judge is ordered to proceed with the trial on the merits.
8. Donio-Teves v. Vamenta (GR No. L-38308, December 26, 1984)
Facts:
In July 1972, Julian Teves submitted a thumbmarked letter-complaint to Pablo Cabahug,
the City Fiscal of Dumaguete. The letter-complaint alleges that he is charging criminally his wife,
Milagros Donio-Teves, and his wifes paramour, Manuel Moreno, with adultery. The fiscal
conducted the initial preliminary investigation. Thereafter, Milagros and Manuel filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that the fiscal cannot charge them in court of the crime of adultery because
there was no valid complaint filed by Teves as it appeared that the letter-complaint filed by Teves
was not appended with his affidavit. The fiscal denied the motion. Teves however filed a second
letter-complaint, this time, he attached his affidavit. The fiscal however ordered the removal of
some witnesses for the prosecution. Hence, a third letter-complaint was submitted by Teves. It
was this third letter-complaint which was used by the fiscal as Information in charging the
accused. Eventually, teh case was docketed in court the two accused were set for arraignment.
Thereafter, Milagros and Manuel filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and
mandamus to enjoin the fiscal and Judge Cipriano Vamenta, Jr. from hearing the case. While the
petition was pending, Teves died. The accused then amended their petition to include the

argument that since Teves died, the case should be dismissed considering that adultery, the crime
charged against them, is a private crime which cannot be prosecuted without the offended party.
Issue:
Whether or not the arguments of the accused are tenable.
Held:
No. It is true that in cases of adultery, the complaint cannot be prosecuted de oficio
without compliance with the jurisdictional requirement for the proper filing of the complaint. But
the complaint contemplated under the rule refers to the complaint filed with the court and not that
filed with the fiscals office. In this case, although the first complaint filed by Teves lacked an
affidavit, that was still alright because it was merely filed with the fiscals office. The rule was
already complied with when Teves filed his second complaint with the attached affidavit. Further,
the second letter-complaint was also sufficient in form and it apprised the accused of the crime
being imputed against them. Further still, the SC noted that the rule which states that private
crimes cannot be prosecuted without a valid complaint from the offended party was borne out of
consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than
go through the scandal of a public trial. In this case, the intention of Teves to charge the accused
criminally is already evident in the first letter-complaint and according to the SC, this is the
overriding consideration in determining whether or not a proper complaint, with the intention to
criminally charge the accused, has been filed by an offended party.
Anent the issue of the death of Teves, his death is already immaterial. It should be noted
that in private crimes, the participation of the offended party is essential not for the maintenance
of the criminal action but solely for the initiation thereof. Once a private crime is properly
initiated, the law will be applied in full force beyond the control of, and in spite of the
complainant, his death notwithstanding. Further, death of the offended party is not a ground for
extinguishment of criminal liability whether total or partial.
9. Crespo v. Mogul (GR L-53373, June 30, 1987)
Facts:
Information for Estafa was filed by the Fiscal against Crespo in the Criminal Circuit
Court of Lucena. When the case was set for arraignment, Crespo filed a Motion to Defer
Arraignment on the ground that there was a pending Petition for Review with the Department of
Justice. Judge Mogul denied the said motion. Crespos Motion for Reconsideration also having
been denied, he filed a Temporary Restraining Order with the Court of Appeals, which granted
the same. Thereafter, the CA granted Crespos Writ of Injunction and perpetually restrained Judge
Mogul from having Crespo arraigned until the Secretary of Justice finally made his decision and
ordered the Fiscal to move for dismissal of the case. The Fiscal then filed a Motion attaching the
Secretarys Resolution calling for the dismissal of the case. Judge Mogul denied the Motion and
set Crespos arraignment. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court may refuse to grant a Motion to Dismiss filed by the Fiscal
under orders from the Secretary of Justice and insists on an arraignment.
Held:
The petition must fail. The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or
information is filed in court, the ultimate disposition thereof lies solely on its sound discretion.

Therefore, the Secretary of Justice should refrain from entertaining a petition for review when the
complaint or information has already been filed in court.
Petition dismissed.