Documente Academic
Documente Profesional
Documente Cultură
13
Editors
Ren Dirven
Ronald W. Langacker
John R. Taylor
Mouton de Gruyter
Berlin . New York
Historical Semantics
and Cognition
Edited by
Andreas Blank
Peter Koch
Mouton de Gruyter
Berlin . New York 1999
Copyright 1999 by Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, D-I0785 Berlin
AlI rights reserved, including those oftranslation into foreigo languages. No part ofthis book
may be reproduced or transmitted in any forrn or by any means, electronic or mechanical,
ineluding photoeopy, reeording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without
perrnission in writing from the publisher.
Printing: Werner Hildebrand, BerHn
Binding: Lderitz & Bauer, Berlin
Printed in Germany
Preface
John R. Taylor
I S John R. Taylor
types is unfortunate, in that there is much more to Cognitive Grammar than categorisation by prototype!
1 have several aims in this chapter. One is to dispel what appear to
be sorne current misunderstandings about Cognitive Grarnmar. 1 also
question sorne of the assumptions underlying Structural Semantics ,
arguing that sorne of the postulated distinctions may be unnecessary,
and, to the extent that these distinctions do have validity, they can be
incorporated unproblematically into the Cognitive Grarnmar model. 1
also tentatively point to sorne aspects of the Cognitive Semantics approach that 1 believe are likely to be especially relevant to historical
semantic investigations.
1 begin by observing that although Cognitive Grarnmar and Structuralism have developed independently, with little mutual interaction, the two approaches can be seen to have a cornmon origino Both,
namely, have developed, albeit indifferent ways, sorne basic insights
of Saussure.
1.
20 John R. Taylor
of utterance meanings that an expression lllay have on specific occasions of its use.
1 have emphasised the Saussurian roots of Cognitive Grammar, in
order to better contextualise a comparison with Structural Semantics.
Structural Semantics has al so drawn its inspiration from Saussure,
albeit with an emphasis on other aspects of Saussure's thought.
Saussure, as we all know, asserted that the link between the signifier
and the signified is arbitrary (Saussure 1916: 100-102). There are, to
be sure, slightly different (though not incompatible) ways of understanding "the arbitrariness of the sign". In the rust place, the sign is
arbitrary in the sense that there is no inherent association between
sound and meaning. On this view, arbitrariness contrasts with motivation. A sign may be motivated, to the extent that the language user
can perceive sorne reason why the signifier should have the meaning
that it does (and vice versa). Intemally complex signs are usually
motivated, to varying degrees. On a slight1y different understanding
of arbitrariness (and it is this understanding that is especially emphasised in Cognitive Grammar), the linguistic sign is arbitrary in
the sense that it is the product of conventionalisation. Speakers act in
the belief that the signifier-signified relation (at least for established
units, cf. footnote 3) is shared by other members of a speech community. And, as Saussure (1916: 104) pointed out, a speaker is unable to single-handedly modify the established and shared conventions.
Saussure (1916: 155-157) goes further, and maintains that it is not
onIy the signifier-signified relation that is arbitrary, the signifiers and
the signifieds in any given language are themselves arbitrary, in the
sense that there is no intrinsic reason why just these meanings should
receive syrnbolic expression, nor why just these phonological forms
should serve as signifiers. Saussure emphasised that the signs that
make up a language do not constitute a nomenc1ature, i.e. they are
not labels for an independent1y given list of concepts. It is the language itself that structures cognition, thereby creating the concepts
through the very process of syrnbolising them. Likewise, there is nothing intrinsic to a sound that renders it suitable to function as a linguistic signifier. Sounds have the status of speech sounds only in
22 John R. Taylor
24 John R. Taylor
signified
(linguistic sigo)
sigoifier
,,
designation
~---
----------------(act of speech)
name
referent
2.
26 Jhn R. Taylor
are c1ear-cut, not only on the level of signification, but also on the leveIs of designation and reference. He mentions the example of motion verbs. Spanish venir and ir contrast with respect to 'motion to
the place of the 1st person' vs. 'motion to the place of the 2nd/3rd
person'. In Italian and Catalan, the contrast between venire/andare,
venir/anar, is drawn differently, between 'motion to the place of the
1st/2nd person' vs. 'motion to the place of the 3rd person'. (Hence,
Catalans, speaking Spanish over the telephone, will tend to make the
error of saying *Maana vengo a verte 'Tomorrow I come to see
you', instead of the correct Maana vaya verte 'Tomorrow 1 go to
see you'.) Moreover, the notion of "structure", and of a "structured
lexicon", suggests that a semantic contrast might serve to differentiate more than one word pairo And indeed, the above mentioned contrast in Spanish shows up with verbs of carrying: traer vs. llevar. (In
Italian, though, the contrast is not made: portare serves for both
senses.) It is difficult to imagine, Coseriu remarks, what "prototypes" could be associated with these c1ear-cut meanings, and what
deviations therefrom could look like. There is a further point. This is
that the distinctions in question are language-specific, and therefore
cannot plausibly arise from any natural categorisation of non-linguistic reality. By focussing on the referential possibilities of lexical
items, and on the naming ofreal-world (and therefore universally accessible) categories, Cognitive Semantics has ignored the structured,
language-specific relations that exist between significations. In brief,
Cognitive Semantics falls into the trap that Saussure wamed us
about, of viewing a language' s lexicon as a nomenc1ature, a list of
names for pre-existing categories.
With respect to its allegedly onomasiological orientation, Coseriu
brings in a third player, in addition to Structural Semantics and Cognitive Semantics, namely the theory of word definition by necessary
and sufficient conditions. Although FiUmore (1975) presented prototype semantics in opposition to "check-list" theories of meaning, Coseriu groups both together as examples of onomasiologically oriented approaches, and both stand in contrast to Structuralism, which
looks in the [ust place at relations of contrast between linguistic
units, not at states of affairs in the world. Thus, for Coseriu (1990:
28 John R. Taylor
245), the Katz and Fodor (1963) analysis of bachelor, which defines
the word as a conjunction ofthe features [HUMAN], [ADULT], [MALE],
[NEVER MARRIED], suffers from the same fault as prototype theories,
in that it defines the word in terms ofthe conjunction of(real-world)
features of its potential referents (i.e. in terms of the word's
designation), rather than in terms ofthe word's linguistic value.
In evaluating Coseriu's critique, let us first consider the content of
the proposed contrasts at the level of significations. Let us accept
that day and night stand in a simple two-way contrasto The contrast
has to do, presumably, with the presence vs. absence of sunlight (assuming an open-air environment). Note that the contrast appeals intrinsically to a real-world phenomenon, one that can only be apprehended empirically, through experience of the world. Coseriu, generally, is quite happy to give natural language glosses (in French,
German, Spanish, or whatever) to the content of distinctive semantic
features. Now, Jackendoff (1990: 33) has remarked that one cannot
create a semantic feature simply by taking any old expression and
putting a pair of square brackets around it. Behind JackendofI's quip
is the idea that if linguistic meanings are to be distinct from encyclopedic knowledge, the features that go into the linguistic definitions
must be ontologically distinct from attributes ofthe real world. For if
there is no such distinction between linguistic-semantic features, and
attributes of extra-linguistic reality, the methodological basis of the
distinction becomes vacuous.
And indeed, a cornmon strategy of many two-Ieve! theorists (see
footnote 7) is to propose that semantic features have the special
status of semantic primitives, presumably innate to human cognition,
and that are independent of experience. Jackendoff, for example,
postulates a set of "conceptual constituents", of the kind [THING] ,
[PLACE], [GO], [STAY], [MOVE], [CAUSE], etc., which are combined in
accordance with "conceptual weIl-formedness rules". These generate
the general architecture of all possible concepts, whose substance is
filled in by information derived from acquaintance with the world.
Such an approach wiIl tend to emphasise the universality of semantic structures, at least at a certain level of abstraction. Coseriu,
on the other hand, makes no pretence that distinctive semantic fea-
tures ("semes") might be, or might be built up out of, universal semantic primitives. 8 Distinctive semantic features have to be determined case by case, according to the structural relations obtaining in
a given language, and are as simple or complex as the data requires.
Furthennore, significations are not "built up" out of features; it is the
features that emerge from the contrasts, not vice versa (Coseriu
1977: 17). Coseriu (1990: 261) cites with approval Pottier's (1964)
well-known analysis of seating objects in French, which lists such
real-world features as "avec pieds" [with feet] , "vec bras" [with
arms], "avec dossier" [with back]. Note here that the very notions of
a "(chair)-leg", "(chair)-arm", and "(chair)-back" already presuppose
(encyc1opedic) familiarity with the domain offumiture, and with the
conventional practice of naming parts of fumiture metaphorically in
terms ofanimal (or human) body parts. 9 It would indeed be "patently
ridiculous" (Jackendoff 1990: 33) to propose "avec dossier" as a universal semantic feature. But it is also difficult to imagine what the
"linguistic" meanings of chaise, fauteuil, tabouret, etc., could be, if
not knowledge of what these kinds of objects actually are, and how
they are to be differentiated one from the other. 10
Since, for Structuralist Semantics, the distinction between the linguistic and encyc10pedic levels does not reside in the content of the
distinctive features, we need to ask whether there are other characteristics of significations, which render this level of description ontologically distinct from designation and reference. Two aspects appear to be relevant for Coseriu. The first 1 have already mentioned.
This is that significations (within a given semantic field) are c1early
contrastive, and betray no "fuzziness" or prototype effects. A corollary of contrastiveness, which 1 shall address in the next section, is
that significations are taken to be unitary entities, i.e. betray no polysemy. The second aspect is the possibility of neutralisation (Coseriu
1977: 17-18). The notion is familiar from phonology. In certain environments, the contrast between two otherwise contrastive phonemes is suspended. A well-known example concems the neutralisation of the voicing contrast in word-final obstruents in Gennan and
Russian. Coseriu (1990: 260) views neutralisation as a specifically
linguistic (not a conceptual) phenomenon; consequently, the possibi-
30 John R. Taylor
theless be conceptually related to the "basic" motion sense.) Furthermore, there is no inherent conflict between prototype categorisation
and semantic contrasto On the contrary, Rosch (1978) argued that
"basic level" categories achieve salience largely because their prototypes maxirnise the distinctiveness of the categories (cf. Taylor
1995: 50-51). Neither is it fair to charge Cognitive Semantics with
undue concem with real-world, and hence "universal" (Coseriu
1990: 252) categories, for which a language merely supplies a list of
names. From its very inception, Cognitive Granunar has emphasised
the role of "construal" in semantics; linguistic expressions do not
refer "directly" to states of affairs in the world, but to speakers'
conceptualisations of these states of affairs (Langacker 1987: ch. 3).
Furthermore, it is fully accepted that different languages may make
available to their speakers different sets of "conventionalised"
modes of construal.
Secondly, it is not always the case that words contrast so c1early
as in the examples that structuralists like to quote. This is most obvious in the case of (near) synonyms. Cruse (1986: 266) characterises (near) synonyms as items which have "a low degree of implicit
contrastiveness". Thus, in declaring that a building is "high", one is
not implicitly denying that it is "tall" (and vice versa). Although high
and tal! do not share exactly the same meamng, the difference can
hardly be stated in terms of the presence vs. absence of sorne distinctive semantic feature. II Cruse (1986: 285) also drew attention to
what he called "plesionyms" - sets of words that are only weakly
contrastive, and which stand mid-way, so to speak, between (near)
synonyms on the one hand, and fully contrastive word sets on the
other. Take Cruse's examples fog, mist, haze. Whereas other words
for meteorological phenomena, such as rain, snow, hail, arguably do
form a clearly contrastive set, this is certainly not the case withfog,
mist, haze. Precisely because the words are only weakly contrastive,
the boundaries of their meanings are not clearly defined - either conceptually, or referentially. Even so, 1 still have a fairly clear conception of what a prototypical fog etc. is like. Consequently, if 1 attempt
to apply one of these words to a specific state of affairs, 1 can do no
other than appeal to a conception of a prototypical fog, etc., and as-
32 John R. Taylor
sess how well the actual situation conforms to the prototype(s), and
on this basis, decide which of the three words might be most appropriate. But if this is the case, there is no reason to suppose that a
similar process does not apply when 1 use the words snow and hail,
day and night. The onIy diffe:nce is, that in the Iatter case, the prototypes are c1early distinct, and characterisable in terms of the presence vs. absence of sorne easily statable attribute, whereas the
prototypes ofjog, mist, haze are not.
3.
34 Jahn R. Taylor
36 John R. Taylor
significados es un mundo ordenado; no es el mundo catico y continuo de las 'cosas'" [the word of significations is weIl-otdered; it is
not the chaotic and continuous world of 'things'] (Coseriu 1990:
277). And even if we do succeed to bring sorne structure into the
chaotic world of things, there is no assurance that the categories thus
derived wiIl match up with the categories provided by language, for
"las clases de 'cosas' no coinciden con las categoras mentales" [the
classes of 'things' do not coincide with mental categories] (1990:
262); Coseriu (1977: 12) doubts whether 1inguistic structures can be
based at all on the "structures des contenus d'une pense prlinguistique" [structrures and contents ofprelinguistics thought].
In other theories that postulate a special level of linguistic semantics, such as Jackendofrs, the problem of acquisition does not arise;
if linguistic-conceptual categories (or at least, their basic building
blocks and skeletal structure) are innate and universal, they do not
have to be learned on the basis of experience. Coseriu, however, emphatically rejects the idea of the universal, or even the non-linguistic
basis of linguistic-semantic structuring. He speaks merely of a person coming to recognise the "unidad intuitiva" (1990: 278) of a mental category, while the linguist's task is to "reveal" (revelar), to
"make manifest" (poner de manifesto) the intuitive unity?O While it
might make sense to suppose that a person do es have (or may come
to have) an intuition about the unity of, say, the bird-category, this
probably has as much to do with beliefs about natural kinds as with
the supposedly linguistic meaning of bird. But with respect to vast
areas ofbasic vocabulary, it is surely a nonsense to claim that speakers become intuitively aware of the linguistic-semantic unity of the
items in question, or even to suppose that they need to do so. Different uses of e.g. climb certainly stand in a family resemblance to each
other, and speakers ofEnglish can readily generate mental images of
a person "climbing (up) a tree", "climbing (down) a mountain", or a
plane "climbing into the sky". But the only cornmon denominator to
these states of affairs is the fact that they are designated by the same
phonological form, not that they elaborate a unique semantic content!
18 John R. Tay/or
4.
Concepts
40 Joh" R. Taylor
s.
Conclusion
earlier studies of lexical items within the Cognitive Semantics tradition (e.g. Brugman 1981; Coleman and Kay 1981) probably did tend
to study words in isolation from other lexical items with which they
stand in contrasto But it would certainly not be fair to say that Cognitive Semanticists have in general been insensitive to matters pertaining to lexical fields, and to implicit contrasts between lexical
items. These implicit contrasts belong in the domain-based knowledge against which an entity is profiled. The background knowledge
against which a concept is profiled may comprise riot just "encyc1opedic" knowledge pertaining to a conceptual domain, but equally,
"linguistic" knowledge pertaining to the paradigmatic and syntagmatic relations that the linguistic unit contracts with other linguistic
units.
Notes
1.
2.
3.
4.
42 John R. Taylor
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
This was the principal theoretical import of Berlin and Kay's (1969) work
on colour categories. Essentially, Berlin and Kay demonstrated for a semantic domain (colour) the same kinds ofuniversal constraints that Jakobson (1968) had claimed for phonology.
Terminology, however, is far from uniformo
In maintaining this distinction, Structuralist Semantics aligns itself with a
number of other "two-Ievel" approaches to semantics (e.g. Searle 1980,
Bierwisch 1981, Kirsner 1993, Wunderlich 1993). Although these approaches may differ in their details (especially conceming the manner in
which "linguistic" meanings are represented and get projected onto encyclopedic meanings), a common theme is tbe assumption that linguistic
meanings are unitary, clearly-defined entities, which lack the rich detail derived from experience ofthe world. For discussion, see Taylor (1994; 1995:
ch. 14).
.
For Coseriu, "universals" are to be found, if anywhere, in extralinguistic
reality and its categorisation, not in significations. Thus the label "semntica 'universal''' is applied to both prototype theories and theories of necessary and sufficient conditions (Coseriu 1990: 252). Coseriu (1977: 10-11)
even charges generative grammar with an exclusively onomasiological (and
therefore universalist) perspective: "la grarnmaire gnrative part de la
ralit extra-linguistique dsigne, ou bien d'une pense prlinguistique
'universelle' (c'est-a-dire non encore structure par telle or telle langue), et
passe pour ainsi dire a travers et par-dessus les langues pour aboutir a la
parole." [generative grarnmar stars from designated extra-linguistic reality,
or from 'universal' prelinguistic thought (Le., from thought which is not yet
structured by a particular language), and by-passes, so to speak, the language system, in order to arrive at the utterance.]
The proverbial linguist from Mars, on learning that afauteuil is an object
for sitting on, which has arms, legs, and a back, could be excused for supposing tbat a man giving a piggy-back to his young son, is a fauteuil. The
point of this flippant example, of course, is that word meanings are not the
''minimalist'' (cf. Coseriu 1990: 263) constructs envisaged by Structuralist
Semantics, but are likely to be extremely rich in detail and background
(encyclopedic) assumptions. E.g. knowledge of seating objects pertains not
only to the pars of which they are composed, but also to how humans typically interact with these objects.
Conceming Pottier's analysis, Coseriu and Geckeler (1981: 42) do indeed
raise the question whether we are here dealing with "an analysis of linguistic content" or "a description of a series of ... objects, which is to say, of a
part of extralinguistic reality". The authors. maintain that although Pottier
begins his analysis by considering the objects as such, and the real-world
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
features that distinguish them, he proceeds to eliminate the linguistically irrelevant features, thereby arriving at the (linguisticaIly) "pertinent features".
Still, it is legitimate to ask what these "pertinent features" are supposed to
be, if not the necessary and sufficient features of check-list theories.
For discussion of high and tall, see Dirven and Taylor (1988) and Taylor
(in press b).
Cf. Coseriu (1977: 10): "Poser l'existence des units fonctionneIles ne signifie nuIlement qu'on n'admette dans chaque cas qu'une seule 'signification' (= acception), mais au contraire qu'on s'efforce justement de dfinir
les limites, donnes par la langue, a I'intrieur desqueIles une infmit d'acceptions peuvent se prsenter." [To postulate the existence of functional
units by no means entails that we aIlow, in each case, only one 'signification', or reading; rather, we attempt to circumscribe the limits, set by the
language system, within which an infinity of readings are possible.] (Note
that in this passage, "signification" appears to be used in the sense of "designation", while ''unit fonctionneIle" corresponds to my"signification".)
For sorne observations, see Taylor (1995: 223ss.).
Particularly influential has been Brugman' s (1981) analysis of over, sub sequently elaborated by Lakoff (1987).
In Taylor (1996), I argued, within the Cognitive Grammar framework, for a
unitary, schematic account of the possessive morpheme in English, and
against the adequacy of prototype accounts.
Sirnilarly, for many grammatical categories, it would be fruitless to search
for a unitary phonological representation. In this connection, it is noteworthy that while Jakobson (1936) insisted on the methodological necessity to
assign a constant, albeit highly abstract, semantic value to each of the Russian cases (otherwise, he argued, the linguistic sign would fracture into numerous fonn-meaning relationships), he was quite unperturbed by the absence of a unique phonological representation for each of the cases. If the
absence of a unique representation can be tolerated with regard to signifiers, one wonders why polysemy should be outlawed with signifieds?
Coseriu notes that the phenomenon is not unknown in other languages, cf.
Gennan steigen. Or consider the English verb grow. His debts grow day by
day would be understood to mean that his debts get bigger (Le. that they
grow "upwards"). (The example is mine, not Coseriu's.) But it is equaIly
possible to defeat the default interpretation: His debts are growing smaller
day by day. Coseriu would probably argue, therefore, that "upward motion"
is not intrinsic to the semantics of grow - the word "reaIly" means 'change
in the vertical extent of an entity'. However, still other uses, e.g. The sound
01 the music grew less as the band marched away (LDCE) suggest an even
more schematic sense, i.e. 'become', 'change in state'. But now, the seman-
44 Jo.hn R. Taylor
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
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