Unlawful detainer: possession by tolerance

Santos v. Ayon
G.R. No. 137013, 458 SCRA 83
Facts:
Santos was the registered owner of three lots while the spouses Ayon were the
registered owners of an adjacent parcel of land. The previous occupant of this property
built a building which straddled both the lots of Santos and the Ayons. The Ayons had
been using the building as a warehouse.
When Santos bought the three lots, he informed the Ayons that the building occupies a
portion of his land. However, he allowed them to continue using the building. However,
later he demanded that the Ayons demolish and remove the part of the building
encroaching his property. They refused, continuing to occupy the contested portion.
Santos filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against the Ayons. The MTCC found in
favor of Santos. On appeal, the RTC upheld the finding of the MTCC that the Ayons'
occupation of the contested portion was by mere tolerance. Hence, when Santos
needed the same, he had the right to eject them through court action. The CA reversed
and held that the proper remedy should have been an accion publiciana before the
RTC, not an action for unlawful detainer.
Issue:
Whether or not prior physical possession of the property by tolerance precludes an
action for unlawful detainer
Held/Ratio:
No, prior physical possession of the property by tolerance does not preclude an action
for unlawful detainer. The SC reinstated the RTC decision.
A complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient if it alleges that the withholding of the
possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful without necessarily employing the
terminology of the law. Here, there is an allegation in the complaint that respondents'
occupancy on the portion of his property is by virtue of his tolerance. Possession by
tolerance is lawful, but such possession becomes unlawful when the possessor by
tolerance refuses to vacate upon demand made by the owner. Thus, a person who
occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission, without any contract
between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon
demand, failing which, a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against
him.
Unlawful detainer: against the administrator/manager
Lao v. Lao

G.R. No. 149599, 458 SCRA 539

Facts:
In 1956, the spouses Julian and Anita Lao constructed a building on a parcel of land
owned by Alava. They occupied and leased the same without any written agreement.
In 1982 Alava and Anita Lao executed a lease contract for a 35-year period. However,
the contract of lease was not filed with the Office of the Register of Deeds and the title
to the property did not contain an annotation regarding this lease.
Rudy Lao also leased another portion of the same property where he put up his
business. He knew that Anita Lao and her husband were the owners of the said
building. He also knew that she had leased that portion of the property, and that Jaime
Lao, their son, managed and maintained the building, as well as the business thereon.
In 1995, Rudy Lao purchased the property from Alava.
In 1997, Rudy Lao filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against Jaime Lao, alleging
that the latter had occupied a portion of his property without any lease agreement.
The MCTC rendered judgment in favor of Rudy Lao. The RTC affirmed, holding that he
had the right to terminate the lease between Alava and Anita Lao, since it was not
registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds. The RTC also held that Jaime Lao,
not his mother, was the real party as defendant in the MCTC, since it was he who was
in actual possession of the property. The CA reversed the RTC, holding that that the real
party-in-interest as defendant in the MCTC was Anita Lao, the lessee of the property,
and not Jaime Lao who was merely the administrator/manager of Anita Laos building
and the occupant of the property.
Issues:
Whether or not an action for unlawful detainer may be brought against the
administrator/manager of a building (not its lessee)
Whether or not the continued possession of Jaime Lao of the property was unlawful
Held/Ratio:
No, an action for unlawful detainer may not be brought against the
administrator/manager of a building. The continued possession of Jaime Lao of the
property was lawful. The SC upheld the CA decision.
In an action for unlawful detainer, the real party-in-interest as party-defendant is the
person who is in possession of the property without the benefit of any contract of lease
and only upon the tolerance and generosity of its owner. Such occupant is bound by an
implied promise that he will vacate the premises upon demand. This situation is
analogous to that of a lessee or tenant whose term has expired, but whose occupancy
continued by mere tolerance of the owner. He is the real party-in-interest as defendant.
However, Jaime Lao has been in possession of the property as the manager of his

mother, Anita Lao. Jaime Lao's possession of the property was in behalf of his mother,
the lessee thereof, and not in his own right, independently of that of his mother.
Rudy Lao cannot feign ignorance of the existence of the lease of the subject property by
Anita Lao, the existence of the building and her business thereon, and the fact that
Jaime Lao managed his mothers building and business since during the preliminary
conference of the parties before the MCTC, Rudy Lao admitted his knowledge of the
foregoing facts.
While it is true that the contract of lease between Alava and Anita Lao was not filed in
the Office of the Register of Deeds and annotated at the dorsal portion of the
petitioners title over the property, nevertheless, Rudy Lao was bound by the terms and
conditions of the said contract of lease. The lease, in effect, became a part of the
contract of sale. Rudy Lao had no cause of action for unlawful detainer against Anita
Lao because of the subsisting contract of lease.
Quieting of title: imprescriptibility of reconveyance
Aznar Brothers Realty Company v. Aying
G.R. No. 144773, 458 SCRA 496
Facts:
Crisanta Maloloy-on petitioned for the issuance of a cadastral decree in her favor over a
parcel of land. After her death a decree in the name of her children (Aying siblings) was
issued. The certificate of title was, however, lost during the war. In 1964, all the heirs of
the Aying siblings executed an Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of
Absolute Sale, conveying the parcel of land to the Aznar Brothers Realty Company.
In 1988, the Company filed a Petition for Reconstitution of the Original Title. The petition
was granted and an OCT was issued in the company's name. In 1991 the Company,
claiming to be the rightful owner of the subject property, sent out notices to vacate,
addressed to persons occupying the property. The Company then filed a complaint for
ejectment against the occupants. The MTC ordered the occupants to vacate the
property.
In 1994, the MTC ordered the occupants to vacate the property. The appeal reached the
SC which rendered a decision in favor of the Company.
Meanwhile, the Ayings, along with other persons claiming to be descendants of the
eight Aying siblings (around 220 persons), had filed a complaint for cancellation of the
Extra-Judicial Partition with Absolute Sale. The Ayings alleged they were the owners of
the property and that the extra-judicial partition of real estate with deed of absolute sale
is a fraud and was null and void ab initio because not all the co-owners of subject
property affixed their signature on said document and some of the co-owners who
supposedly signed said document had been dead at the time of the execution thereof.

The RTC dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription and declared the ExtraJudicial Partition as valid and binding. The CA modified the RTC and held that the heirs
of Emiliano Aying, Simeon Aying and Roberta Aying were the lawful owners of 3/8 of the
contested property (because they did not participate in the execution of said document).
Issues:
Whether or not the Ayings cause of action is imprescriptible; and
If their right to bring action is indeed imprescriptible, may the principle of laches apply.
Held/Ratio:
Yes, the prescriptive period applies since the Ayings had never occupied or been in
possession of the land in dispute. Laches cannot be applied against heirs of Emiliano
and Simeon Aying, as they took action to protect their interest well within the period
accorded them by law.
An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust must perforce
prescribe in ten years and not otherwise. An action for reconveyance based on an
implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years from the issuance of the Torrens title
over the property. The ten-year prescriptive period begins to run from the date of
registration of the deed or the date of the issuance of the certificate of title over the
property, but if the person claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual possession of the
property, the right to seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to the
property, does not prescribe.
What is the date from which the ten-year period should be reckoned? Since the ExtraJudicial Partition was registered under Act No. 3344 and not under Act No. 496, the
Land Registration Act, the document is deemed not registered. Accordingly, the ten-year
prescriptive period cannot be reckoned from 1964, the date of registration under Act No.
3344. The prescriptive period only began to run from the time the Ayings had actual
notice of the Extra-Judicial Partition.
Evidence as to the date when the ten-year prescriptive period began exists only as to
the heirs of Roberta Aying (1967). As to the heirs of Emiliano Aying and Simeon Aying,
there is no clear evidence of the date when they discovered the document conveying
the subject land to petitioner. Hence, with regard to said heirs, the Court may consider
the admission in the amended complaint that they learned of the conveyance of the
disputed land only in 1991 when the Company sent notices to vacate to the occupants
of the subject land, as the date from which the ten-year prescriptive period should be
reckoned. Respondents filed their Amended Complaint on December 6, 1993.24 Thus,
with regard to the heirs of Roberta Aying who had knowledge of the conveyance as far
back as 1967, their cause of action is already barred by prescription when said
amended complaint was filed as they only had until 1977 within which to bring action. As
to the respondent heirs of Emiliano and Simeon Aying, they were able to initiate their
action for reconveyance of property based on implied or constructive trust well within
the ten-year prescriptive period reckoned from 1991 when they were sent by the

Company a notice to vacate the subject property.

Possession: writ of possession
Santiago v. Merchants Rural Bank of Talavera Inc.
G.R. No. 147820, 453 SCRA 756
Facts:
The Santiagos obtained loans from the Merchants Rural Bank and as security executed
a Real Estate Mortgage over 2 parcels of land. The Santiagos failed to pay the loan so
the Bank extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage. At the sale at public auction of the
property, the Bank was the highest bidder. The sheriff executed separate certificates of
sale over the properties in the name of the Bank and the certificates were registered
with the Register of Deeds. When the Santiagos failed to redeem the property within the
prescribed period, the titles over the property were then consolidated in its favor. The
Bank filed an Ex Parte Petition with the RTC for the issuance of a writ of possession
over the land. The Santiagos requested the Bank to give them more time to repurchase
their properties but they failed to repurchase the property.
The RTC issued an Order granting the petition and ordered the clerk of court to issue a
writ of possession in favor of the Bank. Hence, the sheriff requested the Santiagos to
vacate the property but they refused. The Santiagos filed a petition for a writ of
certiorari with the CA. The CA dismissed the petition.
Issues:
Whether or not the Bank is entitled to the writ of possession
Held/Ratio:
Yes, the Bank is entitled to the writ of possession.
After the consolidation of title in the name of the respondent as the buyer of the
property, upon failure of the mortgagor to redeem the property, the writ of possession
becomes a matter of right. Its issuance to the purchaser is merely a ministerial function.
As such, the court neither exercises its discretion nor judgment.
The right of the petitioner to the possession of the property is clearly unassailable. It is
founded on its right of ownership. As the purchaser of the properties in the foreclosure
sale, and to which the respective titles thereto have already been issued, petitioners
right over the property has become absolute, vesting upon him the right of possession
over an enjoyment of the property which the Court must aid in effecting its delivery.
After such delivery, the purchaser becomes the absolute owner of the property. The
deed of conveyance entitled the purchaser to have and to hold the purchased property.
This means, that the purchaser is entitled to go immediately upon the real property, and
that it is the Sheriffs inescapable duty to place him in such possession.

Co-ownership: action for ejectment

Resuena v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 128338, 454 SCRA 42
Facts:
Borromeo was the co-owner of 2 lots. He owned 6/8 of lot #1 while the Bascons owned
2/8; lot #2 he owned in common with the heirs of Maneja. The proportion of their
undivided shares was not determined a quo. The Resuenas occupied a portion of lot #1
allegedly under the acquiescence of the Bascons while Rosario occupied a portion of lot
#2 allegedly with the permission of the heirs of Maneja. Borromeo developed portions of
lots #1 and 2 which he occupied into a resort. He wanted to expand the resort so he
demanded that the Resuenas and Rosario vacate the property; they refused.
Borromeo filed a complaint for ejectment. The MTC dismissed the complaint, holding
that Borromeo did not have a preferential right of possession over the portions occupied
by the Resuenas and Rosario, since the lots were not yet partitioned nor the disputed
portions assigned to respondent as his determinate share. Thus, the MTC held that
Borromeo had no right to evict the Resuenas and Rosario therefrom. The RTC reversed
on the basis of Article 487 of the Civil Code. The CA affirmed the RTC.
Issues:
Whether or not possession by mere tolerance of one of the co-owners precludes the
filing of a complaint for ejectment by another co-owner
Held/Ratio:
No, possession by mere tolerance of one of the co-owners does not preclude the filing
of a complaint for ejectment by another co-owner.
Article 487 of the Civil Code provides that "[a]ny one of the co-owners may bring an
action in ejectment." A co-owner may bring an action to exercise and protect the rights
of all. When the action is brought by one co-owner for the benefit of all, a favorable
decision will benefit them; but an adverse decision cannot prejudice their rights.
Here, the lack of authority of the Resuenas and Rosario to occupy the properties,
coupled with Borromeo's right under Article 487, clearly settles his prerogative to eject
the former. Persons who occupy the land of another at the latter's tolerance or
permission, without any contract between them, are necessarily bound by an implied
promise that they will vacate the same upon demand, failing in which a summary action
for ejectment is the proper remedy against them.
Donation: onerous donations and material breach
C-J Yulo & Sons Inc. v. Roman Catholic Bishop of San Pablo, Inc.

G.R. No. 133705, 454 SCRA 279

Facts:
C-J Yulo & Sons Inc. (donor) donated a parcel of land for the construction of a home for
the aged and infirm to Roman Catholic Bishop of San Pablo, Inc. (donee). The Deed of
Donation provided: Except with prior written consent of the Donor, the Donee shall not
use the land except for the [construction of a home for the aged], nor sell or dispose the
land for any reason whatsoever, nor convey any portion of the same, otherwise the said
land with all real improvements thereon shall revert in trust to the Donor.
The donee leased a portion of the donated property to Gomez. The lease agreement
was entered into by the donee without the prior written consent of the donor, as required
in the deed of donation. When the Gomez lease ended the donee leased the property to
another person (Bostre). Again, the donee executed the lease contract without the prior
written consent of the donor. When the Bostre lease ended the donee leased the
property to another person (Caballes). Again, the donee executed the lease contract
without the prior written consent of the donor. The leases had a common purpose: to
raise funds for the construction of the home.
The donor wrote the donee informing the latter that it was revoking the donation due to
the donees material breach of the conditions in the Deed of Donation. The donor filed
in the RTC a complaint for the revocation of the donation and the reconveyance of the
property.
The RTC found in favor for the donor. The CA reversed since the breaches thrice
committed by the donee were merely casual breaches which did not detract from the
purpose of which the onerous donation was made: the establishment of a home for the
aged and the infirm.
Issues:
Whether or not the breaches warranted the revocation of the donation
Held/Ratio:
No, the breaches did not warrant the revocation of the donation. The SC upheld the CA
decision.
The law on contracts instead of the law on donations is applicable in this case because
the donation involved here is onerous, because there is a burden imposed upon the
donee to put up and operate a home for the aged and the infirm.
The violations of the conditions of the donation committed by the donee were merely
casual breaches of the conditions of the donation and did not detract from the purpose
by which the donation was made. In order for a contract which imposes a reciprocal
obligation, which is the onerous donation in this case, may be rescinded per Article 1191
of the New Civil Code, the breach of the conditions thereof must be substantial as to
defeat the purpose for which the contract was perfected

The general rule is that rescission of a contract will not be permitted for a slight or
casual breach, but only for such substantial and fundamental breach as would defeat
the very object of the parties in making the agreement. The question of whether a
breach of a contract is substantial depends upon the attendant circumstances. Thus,
considering that the donees acts did not detract from the very purpose for which the
donation was made but precisely to achieve such purpose, a lack of prior written
consent of the donor would only constitute casual breach of the deed, which will not
warrant the revocation of the donation.