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SLANG, EUPHENISMS, AND SEMANTIC MEANING - A PRELIMINARY
STUDY OF LANGUAGE IN POPULAR PUBLICATIONS
1 INTRODUCTION
According to the hoary old chestnut, language changes constantly; it is in a state of
never-ending flux. New terms and expressions make their way into spoken and
written language, partly because new concepts require new "words", partly because
language and people as its users are both creative.
Traditionally, the onus of language is to make communication possible. This is
undoubtedly the view shared by the majority of people. It is, however, arguable
whether people or organisations always wish to just transfer information. Language is
an unique human property, which is well manifested in the fact that as well as being a
creative devicse, language can be used to delude and misguide. This "abuse" is
sometimes a conscious choice, as in an attempt to amuse or hide; more often than not,
we unconsciously employ words and expressions that are, strictly speaking,
ambiguious.
The aim of this paper is to show, if not prove, that language is, more often then we
realize, a vehicle forto misscommunication. Most of what we say does not make an
awful lot of sense - yet we seem to be able to function in the everyday life which,
naturally, is vitally dependent on language. The causes for possible
miscommunication are diverse, stemming, for example, from a poor trans-Atlantic
connection to poor choice of words.
Usually, as native speakers of the same language, people manage to convey the things
they wish to their hearers. Nothing exists in a vacuum - and when it comes to
communication, it is the context of the situation that comes to the rescue. Still, many
stylistic choices are crucial for understanding the message correctly. The usage of
slang and euphemnisms, for example, can sometimes attribute(contribute?) to the
breakdown of communication. In this respect, political correctness is a blood relative
to the above-mentioned terms. It, too, can be used to disguise a less flattering state of
affairs with the help of a neutral term. All three share another common characteristic:
they are examples of innovative language development.
As for the relationship between slang, euphenisms, PC and popular publications, it is
quite clear that when lacking access to recorded spoken speech, popular publications
(women's magazines, music and film magazines, Gentlemen Quarterly) are probably
the best source to look for new linguistic features.
To make the soup even saltier, some semantico-philosophical theories will be
presented. It is often the case that our linguistic intuition tells us what is being
"meant" by a particular word or phrase, but sometimes it is helpful to bring forth
semantic considerations (as in cases where speaker meaning is not the sentence
meaning. These problems will be dealt with later in the essay.)
2. SLANG

Most people know a "slangy" expression when they hear it. Defining, however, is not
the same thing as identifying. Regardless of this, many linguists have offered various
explanations. For example, Partridge( 1970) states the following: "slang has, from
about 1850, been the accepted term for "illegimate" colloquial speech..." Anderson, on
the other hand, claims that slang is all those things ( sounds, words and phrases) that
may be dangerous to use. He goes on to say that "slang..."refers to words or uses or
expressions which are extremely informal and which are very fashionable and
therefore rather temporary..." According to dictionary definition, slang is defined
either as very informal usage in vocabulary and idiom that is characteristically more
metaphorical, playful, elliptical, vivid and ephemeral than ordinary language or as
speech and writing characterized by the use of vulgar and socially taboo vocabulary
and idiomatic expressions. Sornig (1981) mentions in passing that slang is a form of
substandard language.
All in all, nearly all the definitions seem to include the notion of informality. It is
certainly the case that when the situation is less formal, the language becomes more
informal and vice versa. The problem, however, is how to decide when a lexical item
is used in a "slangy" sense and when it maintains its more "neutral" sense? To
illustrate this problem, one could think of the following words: 'a screw' and 'to screw'
in the following contexts:
1. Where's the lag screw?
2. Screw the bulb in.
3. He's such a screw.
4.Sheila says she didn't screw Tom.
In 1 and 2, the noun/verb refer to a metal fastener having a tapered shank with a
helical thread/ the action of changing a light bulb by a twisting motion or something
along that line. In 3 and 4, however, the lexical items in question have quite different
connotations. This highlights the importance of context. What becomes also evident is
that words as such, are neither 'good' or 'bad', nor insulting or complimenting. This is
noted by Fromkin ( 1988 ) .( When it comes to defining speech and language,
basically all that happens while we speak are changes in pulmonic pressure in relation
to atmospheric pressure. But this(?) would require the dichtomy between speech and
language.)
Why, then, is slang used? The reasons are yet again numerous. According to Partridge
( 1970), there are at least 15 more or less differing reasons for employing slang. As
some of the points Partridge mentions are somewhat overlapping, here are included
only few, in somewhat amputated form:
1. the wish to behave playfully, waggishly; to exercise one's wit and
ingeniuty
One of the best examples of such a language use is Lewis Carroll's
Alice
in Wonderland and Through the Looking Glass, both of which contain,
if not straight forward slang, at least one feature of slang.
2. to be pictoresque or different
This one is closely related to number 1; though to be different does not
necessarily presuppose any ingenuity.
3. to escape from cliches, or to enrich the language
In order to maintain this goal, however, slang and the person using
slang both need to innovate constantly; many slang expressions become
cliched at the course of time and stay in the language as frozen
slangisms.

4. to make excessively solemn things to appear more light


This notion is in fact in the territory of euphenisms as will be shown
later.
5.to fit in/ to not to fit in; to be"in the swim"/to not be "in the swim"
One may consciously avoid using certain "vogue" words to stress
that they do not belong to a particular social group and vice
versa.
6. to adapt to a particular social setting
One may wish to flaunt or downplay one's social status according to the
situation
7. to be secretive
As noted before, language need not always be a form of communicating.
However, it should be kept in mind that whether the purpose of a given
discourse is to block the information or to aid its course, SOMETHING is
always being encoded - a hostile or patronising attitude, for example.
But if language and its use are restricted to use of words and phrases,
it is easier to see how this "secretive" code is achieved.
Who, or what, initiates the emergence of slang? The answer is not easily found. One
thing is quite obvious. Slang is a very old convention, hailing back to the appearance
of language in the first place Sornig (1981). Besides being an old convention, slang
also changes through time, this meaning that what for one person is slang, may be
perfectly standard for some one else Anderson ( ?? ) For example:
X: Did you see 'Pulp Fiction'?
Y: Yeah. It was bad.
X: Oh, I thought you were a fan of Tarantino's.
Y: Well, I what I meant was that it was like "baaaad", man!
X: So you did like it after all?
Y: That's what I've been trying to say, ya square!
X: A what..?
(continue ad finitum)
(Though one can probably tell by the speaker's tone of voice what is being conveyed.)
When looking for reasons for the emergence of slang, one could probably list down
the same motives as in 1 - 7. As for who are the creators of slang, one has to resort to
pure speculation. Barinoff (1981) mentions in her pro gradu paper that traditionally,
men have been claimed to be responsible for the emanation of slang because men
more often than women belong in subgroups (whatever these groups may be).
In the dawn of sociolinguistic studies, views about who is responsible for language
change or innovation, are diverse. Men were given the credit for innovation whenever
a renewal was considered a positive idea; when women were considered the
innovators, however, introducing something novel on linguistic level was viewed as
"corruption". This is the essence of The Androcentric Rule:
Men will be seen to behave linguistically in a way that fits
the writer's ( linguist's) view of what is admirable and correct;
women on the other hand will be blamed for any linguistic
state or development which is regarded by the writer (linguist)
as negative or repreihensible.
(sociolinguistics lecture, Jan 25th)
It is quite safe to say that rules like these hardly apply; still, when it comes to slang,
the popular belief is that women do not use as much slang ( and swear words in

particular) as men. Spears (1981) remarks that "...decency in womanhood in many


areas of contemporary society is determined in part by whether a woman uses foul
language." Spears goes on to discuss 'double standard' which is in essence the same as
The Andrrdocentric Rule and concludes his remarks by stating that "nevertheless
males are regarded as more frequent users of taboo language." He may be partially
right but his argument is hard to prove. Who knows what is being discussed and how
in all-female groups? Not Spears, one would suspect.
In approaching the end of this section concerning slang, it could be said that
1. slang is an old invention., used by everybody, conciously or not,
2. slang is innovative and emerges as a result of a social demand,
3. slang is not good or bad, right or wrong,
4. slang is defined by context of discourse.
Finally, to lend an sympathetic ear to those distressed about the colourfulness of
language, a quote from Harris (1980) in his foreword to the Dictionary of the Vulgar
Tongue:
It is all ironic, but predictable. The age in which we
have advanced to all manner of instant communication
systems was bound to be the age in which the individual
capacity to communicate would antrophy...for the most
part, people have become sad anonymous creatures.
Not quite zombies. But nearly.
...To communicate by the present method of grunts,
cliches, stammers, "y'knows", "likes", painful lurching
illiteracies is to define ourselves as spastic personalities.
...Enough...I must get my catch-fart to bring me a mug of
scandal broth.
3. EUPHENISMS AND POLITICAL CORRECTNESS
Euphenisms are defined as follows: a substitution of a milder expression for a harsh
and unacceptable one (Spears 1981); mild, agreeable, or roundabout words used in
place of coarse, painful or offensive ones (Rawson 1981); verbal prudery, or the
avoidance of the unpleasant word (Marckwardt 1980); substitution of an inoffensive
or pleasant term for a more explicit, offensive one, thereby veneering the truth by
using kind words (Neaman & Silver 1983).
The term itself is of Greek origin, 'eu' meaning "good"(fair?) and
meaning "speech". Historically speaking, many linguists (including those mentioned
above) attribute the emergence of euphenisms to religion. Deities have been
worshipped ever since the beginning of time itself. Deities have been respected and
feared - and fear caused people to speak cautiously of Gods and Goddesses. Better yet
not to mention their real names at all but to find an indirect form of address. This is
how the first euphemnisms were probably created.
Religion may not be as popular in the land of euphenisms as earlier, but there are
numerous subjects that are still considered taboo or embarrassing. These include, for
example, death, bodily functions, diseases, disadvantages, sex and sex organs and a
littlebit surprisingly, money, politics and war (Marckwardt 1981). Usually the
motivation behind "verbal prudery" is the wish not to offend or the wish to make
something not quite impressive seem more classy or appealing (Rawson 1981). When
the reason for glorifying language is to avoid insulting some one euphenisms have a
meaningful discoursal function. For example:

X: I heard about your aunt. It is so very tragic, for some one


so young to pass away...They say it was an accident...
Y: Well, not really in that sense. The Big C, you know...
is perhaps more coarselysublimly puted as
X: So, good old aunt Helga has dropped dead, hasn't she?
Y: Yeah. Cancer, y'know. Very malignant.
Still, the idea gets across - someone died and they had cancer. The difference between
the two dialogues lies ion the fact that the latter dialogue contains lexical items with
stronger emotional charge.
Rawson (1981) divides euphenisms into sub-classes: negative and positive. The
positive ones are used to make something appear grander and more impressive by
substituting a more truthful word with another. Many occupational titles are positive
euphenisms, for example 'mortician' and 'custodian'. Other kinds of positive
euphenisms include personal honorifics and institutional names.
Negative euphenisms are usually quite old and defensive in nature. These include, for
example, names of deities (the original name is seen as an extension of the thing
itself) and the Anglo-Saxon "four-letter words". Sometimes the excessive usage of
euphenisms turns against itself, resulting in unintentional comedy. For example:
bender for knee
ablutions for washing
metabolically challenged for fat
linguistically challenged for monoglot
People use euphenisms (like slang) both consciously and unconsciously. Rawson
describes conscious euphenisms as potentially dangerous: the euphenism can be
applied more or less honestly, this meaning that the euphenism may lead to social
double thinking." The euphenism stands for "something else" and everyone pretends
that this "something else" does not exist." (ibid.)
It is the essentially duplicitious nature of euphenisms
that makes them so attractive to those people
and institutions who have something to hide,
who don't want to say what they are thinking,
and who find it conveniant to lie about what
they are doing.
Euphenisms can therefore be used as circumlocations and doubletalk. Institutions such
as the military, CIA and FBI use terms like executive action = murder, selective
ordnance = napalm and plausible denial = lie. Such ecoterisms(?) can also be found in
advertising, politics, prison system and atomic(nuclear? a euphemism?) power
business.
The history of euphenisms is an interesting one. Generally the concept of verbal
prudery is associated with the pre-Victorian era. This time from about 1830--1900 was
characterised by an extraordinarily strict moral code (Spears 1981) which naturally
was reflected by the language. Nineteenth century England went through important
changes: such phenomena as religious revival, industriualization, increasing literacy,
improvement of the status of women and especially the emergence of a new
prosperous middle class (Rawson 1981)
In the USA, Marckwardt (1981) notes similar development: the Puritan settlement of
New England (which naturally happened partially prior to the Victorian era) was
much concerned with linguistic propriety, causing for example laws to be directed
against profanity. Furthermore, the rough pioneer life and the status of women had a

peculiar effect on the language. Since women were a scarcity in those days at those
areas, verbal discreteness was among other things promoted. Since then, this
development has died or provided counter effects;, for example, some branches of the
1970's feminist movement have rejected such attitudes.However, language has the
tendency to repeat itself. Could it be the case, that the 1990's once again mark a
change in the nature of language? Nowadays political correctness is applied at least in
the formal contexts.
Other factors moulding the linguistic behaviour were the development of Methodism
in England, the invention of steam-powered press and the spirit of egalitarianism
(Rawson 1981). However, there are some more abstract reasons for the usage of
euphenisms:
1. foreign languages sound better
'enceinte' vs.'pregnant'
2. abbreviations sound less offensive
'snafu' vs. 'situation normal - all fucked up'
3. abstractions can not insult any one
'it', 'thing', 'situation'
4. it is better to be indirect than direct
'bottom', 'rear' or 'behind' for 'ass' (fanny?)
5. understatement is safe
'active defense' for 'attack'; 'senior citizen'
for 'old man/woman'
6. the longer the euphenism, the better
'plausible denial' vs. 'lie' (ibid.)
The last motivation can be illustrated in terms of theFog orPomposity Index (FOP).
The index compares the length of the original word and its euphenism; the longer the
euphenism the higher the score. (ibid.)
How, then, are slang and euphenisms connected or is there any similarity between
them?
Slang and euphenisms ARE related in a sense that they both are innovative linguistic
processes. some linguists include euphenisms in the sphere of slang. Anderson groups
both slang and euphenisms under the heading of "bad language", though maintaining
that it is more often the persons or institutions using slang/euphenisms that are
disliked, rather than the language used.
One could say that slang increases when the situation becomes less formal and that
euphenisms increase when the context becomes more formal. Spears (1981)
exemplifies the process with the following examplely: a young man might use
'goobers' in a peer group, 'pimples' with his parents (supposing he is willing to share
that with them), 'acne' with his doctor and 'acne vulgaris' in his Health Science term
paper. Neaman & Silver acknowledge the slippery distinction between the two terms
stating that "much depends on the speaker and his (sic) audience" and that "
vulgarisms, slang, acronyms, jargon and technical terminology may indeed be
euphemistic."Also, it is possible that arcane slang is especially suitable for
euphemisation. In this case the once "offending" word has lost its former power and is
donsidered mild enough to become an euphenism. For example, the adverbial 'bloody'
is becoming (?) an euphenism for the stronger adjective 'fucking'. As with slang, the
factor which ultimately decides whether an euphenism is an euphenism or not is the
context; the conditions under which the word is uttered and the person to whom it is
addressed to.

Euphenisms are formulated by much the same processes than "normal words".
Neaman & silver quote Williams and list down the following:
1. borrowing from other languages
2. widening ie. abstraction, whereby 'cancer' becomes 'growth'
3. semantic sift: substitution of the whole for the specific part we
do not wish to discuss; accordingly, 'to go to bed with' for 'having
sex' even though the bed does not necessarily have anything to
do with the actual activity
4. metaphorical transfer; for example, using 'cherry' for 'hymen'
('cherry' was, as reported by Neaman & Silver, once considered
as poetic, but is nowadays a vulgarism.)
5. phonetic distortion which includes for example the following:
apocopation, blend, back formation. For example, 'gezunda' is
a form of phonetic distortion and is derived from ' goes under'
which, naturally, stands for 'a potty'.
So, clearly slang and euphenisms overlap as categories. As for political correctness
(PC), the concept is quite a recent discovery and is defined in a dictionary (which?) as
follows:
politically correct: marked by or adhering to a typically progressive
orthodoxy on issues involving especially race, gender, sexual
affinity or ecology.
and is somewhat vague. It would seem proper to include PC in the category of
euphenisms, since a PC-word aspires to be a neutral (or positive?) term used in topics
concerning especially race and gender. It could be claimed that PC as a term is itself
an euphenism for 'euphenism', since euphenisms are usually considered to be "prissy"
os "decorative". This would then be an example of widening.
As examples of PC-terms, one could mention African American, Caucasian, Asian,
chairperson, police officer, the usage of s/he, his/hers, him/her, humankind,
spokesperson and the like.
In spite of the admirable intentions behind the usage of PC-terminology, things are
bound to go wild at times. For example, the following piece of text was picked up by
Cosmopolitan (Sep. 1993):
A certain Guy Chapman, attending a politically correct function,
recently found himself addressed as "Person Personperson". He
might well hve been forgiven for wondering whether "man"
was becoming a dirty word.
Similarly, everybody remembers the unfortunate "best candidate will be appointed
regardless of his sex". Sometimes PC is used in an attempt to be consciously
humorous, and undoubtedly, some of the attempts are amusing. Consider the
following:'metabolically/vertically/linguistically/vitally challenged'for 'fat', short',
'monoglot', and 'dead' (!), respectively.
It should be noted, however, that again, words as such are not sexist, incorrect or such
like, but the attitudes (and practices) associated with them. The reason why PC is
included in the category of euphenisms is that they have one function in common:
both are used with a neutral or positive connotation.
4. MEANING OF A WORD
Semantics is the study of meaning or alternatively, the study of linguistic development
by classifying and examining changes in meaning and form. This leads to the question

"what is meaning?" Philosophy has traditionally tackled with questions resulting from
words and their meanings. For example, words such as 'democracy', 'motive' and
'truth' have been (and are) essential concepts which have acquired various
interpretations according to who is doing the defining. Cooper (1973) quotes Russell
as follows:
the point of philosophy is to start with something so simple
as not to seem worth stating and to end with something so
paradoxical that no one will believe it.
Semantics and philosophy are closely related, for what is philosophy if not a synthetic
science exploring the meaning and meaningfulness of words and hypothesis?
However, it is probably wise to keep in mind the difference between 'philosophy of
language' and 'linguistic philosophy'. The former is concerned with the study of
crucial linguistic concepts such as meaning, reference and truth. The latter , on the
other hand, stresses the ideology according to which philosophical problems can be
solvef after due concern with aspects of language. Branches of linguistic philosophy
include for example logical atomism and logical positivism (Cooper 1973).
Cooper discusses the various meanings of 'meaning' and puts forward questions that
can be asked about it:
1. Are meanings of expressions abstract entities of some sort?
2.What conditions must an expression meet to be meaningful?
3. What it is for two expressions to mean the same?
4. What factors cause words to alter meaning?
5. What are the minimal linguistic units to possess meaning?
Questions 2-3 are relevant in linguistic study of meaning. Traditonally, meaning has
been associated with reference. When we utter an expression, we refer to something
that exists in the world. This is not quite correct, as Cooper concludes. He introduces
and rejects three theories that have attempted to explain the relationship of utterance
and reference. The first theory is called the mentalistic theory and according to it, an
expression is meaningful if and only if it is associated with a certain mental image,
thought or idea. Synonymy in this respect would then result from the same images
being prompted by two expressions. The behaviouristic theory argues that an
expression is meaningful if and only if uttering it produces certain behavioural
responses in people. The use theory claims that an expression is meaningful if and
only if people can use it to achieve certain goals.
According to these theories, meaning can be defined by mental images or by the
results of its usage. However, Cooper argues that 'meaning' is not some entity that
exists in the world and that one should not assume that meaning refers to anything at
all. His view is basically the same than that of Austin's (1970). Austin strongly rejects
the theory that words have meaning and suggests that only sentences are meaningful.
He also argues that it is spurious to ask "what is the meaning of a word". He
exemplifies this by formulating the question "What is the meaning of (the word)
'foggy'?" and is forced to answer that it is the concept of 'fogginess'. This proves that
the formulation of the question is an important factor. Austin concludes that the
correct way to inquire about the nature of semantic and syntactic relationships of an
expression is to ask: what-is-the-meaning-of (the word) 'x'?
Kempson (1977) suggests that there are at least three possible starting points for the
investigation of meaning. These are
1. the signification of words
2. the interpretation of sentences and
3. the intention of the speaker.

Hurford & Heasley (1983) agree and use the preliminary dicthotomy between
sentence meaning and speaker meaning. Acording to them, the former is "what the
speaker means (i.e. intends to convey) when he uses a piece of language" and the
latter " what the sentence or word means, i.e. what it counts as the equivalent of in the
language concerned." So, sentence meaning would then be the ideal or convential
abstract meaning of a piece of language, whereas speaker meaning would be defined
by the speaker him/herself according to the situation. This dicthomy is a very helpful
one.It does seem to be mixing together both semantics and pragmatics, however.
Strictly speaking, one could argue that a semantic theory should be able to define
meanings simply by virtue of language alone - this, however, is not possible in natural
languages while mathematical language and the language of logic are free of
pragmatical considerations (ie. mathematical language does not refer to anything in
the "real" world unlike all natural languages).
Many semantic theories are inadequate in that respect that they presume an expression
- reference relation. Cooper (1973) shows how this view is false by discussing the
theories mentioned above.
The mentalistic theory of meaning maintains that words or sentences are meaningful
in virtue of associated mental images. The popular version of this view (sometimes
called the 'Fido' - Fido theory) claims that the meaning of a word is the thing, or the
set of things, which that word refers to or names. Yet this fails because there are words
that refer to nothing in the surrounding world, for example 'unicorn' or 'three eyed
man'. The second objection to this theory is that concerning images. There are many
meaningful words to which there are no corresponding images, for example 'if', 'that',
'may' etc. (There is of course the additional problem of "meaningfulness": 'meaning' is
a slippery term, Cooper stresses. If something has no meaning, it does not follow that
it is meaningless. Cooper exemplifies this by "my nose has no meaning but it is
certainly not meaningless." Nevertheless, there are some philosophical branches
according to which something that is not meaningful must be meaningless. Thus
Sartre argued that life has no meaning and is therefore meaningless and absurd.
Cooper attacks this view by retorting that "you may as well argue that stones have no
meaning and are therefore absurd, the poor things.")
Returning back to linguistic considerations, the mentalistic theory is insufficent also
in that respect that the relationship between an object and its image changes from
situation to situation and from speaker to speaker. What for me would be an image of
a tree might be something quite different for some one living in the Bahamas.
Similarly, a painting of the Eiffel Tower might not necessarily bear no resemblance to
the actual tower; but it can still be called 'the Eiffel Tower'.
The behaviourist theory fails as spectacularly. Cooper quotes Bloomfield followingly:
the meaning of an expression is "the situation in which the speaker utters it and the
responses which it calls forth in the hearer." This is, natually, how a psychologist
would define meaning: in terms of stimuli and responses. The similar view is
presented by Coulthard (1985) who quotes Firth (1951): "language is a way of
behaving and making others behave." This view, however, tempting as it might sound,
is not fully correct.
The behaviourist theory is elaborated in terms of preparatory stimulus, which does not
itself elicit any responses but which sets up the disposition in somebody to react to
future stimuli. This view avoids the obvious pitfall that for example the word 'dog'
might produce different responses at different occasions, or might produce no
responses at all. Yet it not reasonable to suppose that on those occasions, 'dog' is
meaningless.

However, the problem of function words appears once again. How can words like 'if',
'at', 'or' or 'each' have any connection with some distinctive goal-directed behaviour?
Well, Cooper's rejections could be nullified by taking into consideration Austin's
arguement about words having meaning only in sentences. However, a sentence is
formed by joining together meaningful bits of language. In this compomentialist
view it would be reasonable to expect every word to have a meaning of some sort.
A plausible objection to the behaviourist theory is, however, the fact that some of the
actual responses to words are irrelevant to their meanings. If this is not kept in mind,
one would have to maintain the absurd view that the meaning of the word alters each
time that its utterances cause different responses. This is the main objection to the
behaviourist theory; how to distinguish between those dispositions which are relevant
to meaning and those that are not. For example, the utterance "John had a cup of tea
with Cindy Crawford in the Humanists' coffee bar" would presumably produce
responses ranging from disbelief to amusement in potential hearers, yet neither of
these responses are part of the meaning of the sentence.
The use theory of meaning does seem to have more going for itself than the first two
theories. This view is based on the so-called "ordinary language" philosophy,
according to which it is crucial to understand how words are used in their everyday
environment. The use theory maintains that words can be explained by showing how
they are employed in life. Therefore, "if meaning is use, meaning is no more abstract
than the use of spade is." (Cooper 1973). 'The meaning is use'-slogan receives
Cooper's approval, save some objections. The first problem is that there are many
types of linguistic use which are not relevant to questions about meaning. For
example:
one can use the words 'good evening' to terrify the living
daylights out of some one if uttered in a Boris Karloff-voice
on a lonely path at midnight. But the use of 'good evening'
is unconnected with its meaning.
or
most people know when to use 'amen' but do not know
what it means. (ibid.)
The use theory has its complications, mainly because people, as language users, are
both creative and mischievious. Language can be exploited by numerous ways: lying,
making up word plays, metaphors, euphenisms and slang. In short, the concept of
'truth' gets often very muddled. To create a network between word usage and meaning
would appear to be rather a formidable task. And to top that, Cooper concludes that
the use theory suffers from circularity:
since not all aspects of use are relevant to meaning,
the use theory is reduced to claiming that meaning can
be explained in terms of those uses which are relevant
to meaning.
However, Cooper suggests that in studying meaning, it is best to study the use of the
meaning.
5. EMOTIVISM AND MEANING
Philosophical fields such as aesthetics and ethics have been concerned with the
'emotive meaning' of a word. This is because certain utterances typically produce
responses that could be described as "emotional" (Cooper 1973). It would seem that

slang words, and therefore also euphenisms, would be good canditates for words like
these. The emotive meaning of a word is the word's tendency to produce affective
responses in people, either "pro-" or "con-". This is the result that arises through the
history of the word's usage (ibid.).
There seems to be good reason for the emotivist theory to be accepted. Since not all
perfectly sensible (meaningful) expressions can be argued to be analytic or verifiable,
they should be, by the principle of verification, meaningless. An utterance like "my
love is like a red, red rose" is not analytic - and trying to verify it by the help of some
botanical instruments would be missing the point (ibid.). The same goes for ethical
utterances. "Stealing is bad" is not analytic, nor it is empirically verifiable. So, if an
utterance lacks cognitive meaning, it does not follow that it is meaningless.
The difference of some utterances lies in the type of meaning: emotive vs. cognitive.
Consider example on page five. Another utterance can be added to the list - a meaning
having a cognitive meaning, ie. "X died."Now two of the utterances can be defined in
terms of emotive factors while "died" does not have such an emotive content.
The concept of "emotional" meaning is, however, quite an unclear one. Cooper (1973)
maintains that it would be absurd to deny that some utterances and words have
emotive force but goes on to say that it is debatable whether "reference to emotive
factors enters into the meanings of words in the central sense of "meaning" with
which we are concerned?" Cooper attacks the emotivist theory by stating the
following:
the mere fact that a given utterance, on some occasion, produces an
emotive effect upon a person is no reason for introducing
reference to that effect into the meaning of the utterance
and
that "no one could ever know what a sentence means since no one could know of all
the possible effects it might have upon people." This would cause ambiguity, resulting
from the changing interlocuters and contexts.
However, it could be said that there are sentences which are typically associated with
emotive factors. Words like 'kraut', 'nigger', 'faggot', 'dyke', Nazi','whore', and 'son of
a bitch' typically either cause or express emotive attitudes. Cooper's most salient
objection to emotivism is that emotive meaning would lack the most essential
characteristics of meaning. He argues that "some properties belong to a thing in virtue
of the meaning of the word used to refer to it". He exemplifies this by the word
'triangle'. The triangle has the property (and necessary condition) of being trilateral, in
virtue of what 'triangle' means. Other properties, like the redness of some triangles, do
not belong to triangles in virtue of meaning. So, "where a property belongs to
something, x, in virtue of what 'x' means, it is impossible to refer to something as
being x and then deny that it has the property in question". So to say that "this is a
triangle but it is not trilateral" would be absurd and necessarily false. To say "this is a
triangle but it is not red" would not be absurd (although it might be false). The fact
that one cannot deny that a thing has those properties which belong to it by virtue of
meaning shows what is an essential part of meaning (ibid.).
This would seem to prove that connection between a word and the attitudes it
produces is not an essential part of meaning. It is possible to say
a) Harry is an Englishman but he is not male
but that would be absurd whereas
b) Harry is a limey but I like Harry and other Englishmen
which would not be absurd, though possibly misleading. (ibid.). If then the emotivist
theory was true, sentence b) would also be self-contradictory, absurd and necessarily

false because it would be denying what is being entailed by the very meaning of
'limey'. The connection between 'limey' and attitudes it can bring forth is then nothing
like the connection between 'triangle' and trilateralness. In conclucion, Cooper states:
1.there are no good reasons for introducing emotive meaning
2. if we did introduce it, the value of the concept of meaning would
be completely undermined
3. talking of emotive meaning would contradict a most salient and
essential feature of our concept of meaning.
Furthermore, "we should keep apart meaning from emotional force or impact." How
force or meaning are mutually exclusive Cooper does not mention.
For example, the sentence "Jack is a real bastard" is a perfectly meaningful piece of
language, being roughly the equivalent of "Jack is an unpleasant person". How is this
conclucion reached? It creates no specific image of a prototype of 'bastard'. It may
produce various responses, varying from anger to amusement. It can be used to insult
or perhaps to comfort (if used in discussion with a girl that Jack has just jilted). If
emotive meaning is not a part of the'meaning' of 'bastard', then defining it would be
rather hard. To say "Jack is a bastard but I like unpleasant people" would sound a tad
odd.
Leaving the muddled concept of meaning for future (?) papers, there are some
particularly problematic areas in semantic theories. Presuming the meaning of an
expression can be somehow explained, there are the concepts of polysemy,
homonymy, structural and lexical ambiguity, and a third type of ambiguity, namely
that of referential versatility/vagueness.
6. AMBIGUITY IN MEANING
The final part of my paper will try to show that even though language is used in
communication and that even if our linguistic conduct was truth-oriented, some
aspects of language amount to ambiguity.
According to the Co-operative Principle by Grice (in Coulthard 1985), speakers have
four maxims according to which they operate, namely those of relation, quality,
quantity and manner. The last concept refers to clearness of expression: be brief,
orderly, avoid ambiguity and obscurity of expression. Naturally the maxims are (for
the most of the time) abused; good examples are can be found earlier in the essay in
sections concerning slang and euphenisms.
Hurford and Heasley (1983) discuss ambiguity of expression in terms of the forementioned concepts.
A case of homonymy is when two (identical) word forms have senses that are distant
from each other. For example, 'square' is a homonym. A case of polysemy is a case
where two identical word forms have closely related senses; for example, 'mouth' has
the senses of 'mouth of a river' and 'a person's mouth'. It is sometimes hard to
distinguish whether a word is polysemous or homomymous. It is also diffcult to tell
whether the question is about one word being polysemous/homonymous or whether
one should consider there being several distinct words, ie. bank(1), bank(2) etc.
(ibid.).
Structural ambiguity results from grammatical relations. For example, to use a
potentally "slangy" expression "It takes two people to screw in a light bulb" it is clear
that it can be interpreted in two different ways, depending whether one sees "to" and
"screw" as belonging together or whether "to screw in" is considered an entity. In the

same manner, "visiting relatives can be boring" and "old men and women hear
poorly" are structurally ambigious.
Lexical ambiguity depends, logically enough, on words having more than one
interpretation and is therefore caused by homonymy/polysemy.
Referential vagueness is a feature concerning expressions such as 'hill' - 'mountain',
'short' - 'tall'. The vagueness results from the unclear division between what
constitutes 'mountain' - how much bigger than 'a hill' it must be in order to be dubbed
'a mountain'; the same goes for 'short' and 'tall'.
Referential versatility is a characteristic of words like 'she' and 'it'. These words can
refer to million different 'shes' and 'its' in the world. This, however, is not the same as
referential vagueness and causes usually no ambiguity (though the potential is
present).
How does all this tie in with the lengthy discussion concerning slang and euphenisms?
Well, slang and euphenisms contain ambigious elements and are therefore sometimes
ambigious. Occasionally the ambiguity results from metaphorical usage of words that
normally bear no metaphorical function. For example, to say "all men are dogs" or
"all women are bitches" does not mean that men and women have four legs and tail;
the words have acquired contemporary connotations which are somewhat negative.
So, most words and expressions are in principle ambigious. Slang is, I believe, an
idiolect of a kind - and people are very skilled in manipulating language. For example:
X: I feel kinda dirty
could produce the following responses:
A: Well take a shower.
B: Well apologize to her, then.
C: Well come here, big boy
reflecting the various meanings of the utterance. Other examples of ambigious
utterances are for example "he's a terrible flirt", "she's wicked", "my uncle is sad", or
"Sally is a peach/a banana."(The ambiguity of the last example lies on the fact that
there is no way of knowing what fruit have positive connotations and what have
negative connotations. And while we're at it, what can be said about the
difference/similarity of the gradable antonyms 'good' and 'bad' in the following: "that
was a good scare/ that was a bad scare?")
It would seem that sometimes it is impossible, even with a given context, to judge
what is the 'meaning' of an expression. Even if nothing ambigious is intended, the
receiving end of an utterance may interpret it according to his/her choice. Those
familiar with the film 'In Bed with Madonna' might remember that during a back stage
meet and greet, Kevin Costner told Madonna that her show was really neat. The
response? "No one calls my show "neat" and gets away with it!"
Putting this paper out of its misery, the following conclusions could be made:
1. language is comunication
2. language is miscommunication
3. but something is always communicated
4. communication is dependent on meaning
5. 'meaning' has many "meanings" and a word has many senses
6. this causes ambiguity
7. slang and euphenisms are vehicles for ambiguity
8. ambiguity usually disappears in context
9. except when it does not
10. it is a miracle people understand each other
11. expect that they do not, really.

One has to agree with Cooper (1973) that to study the meaning of a word requires
studying its usage. This is, as noted before, a potentially impossible task. So discourse
analysis was invented; the study of meaning in use will undoubtedly keep hundreds of
linguists employed for hundreds of years.
As for the preliminary study of popular publications and the relationship of slang,
euphenisms and resulting semantic meaning, it would appear that popular publications
indeed contain a lot of material that could be describes as slang. The presence of slang
does not exclude euphenisms or PC-terminology, although it is sometimes impossible
to categorize an expression; it is not standard language but whether it is slang,
euphenism or PC is up to the reader him/herself. Another interesting feature is that
while PC is diligently applied whenever the text revolves around gender and race
issues, it is used for humorous effects as well, as in "linguistically challenged" and
"vitally challenged". In addition, though the generic 'he' is nowhere to be found,
women, and occasionally men, are referred to as "babes", "super babes", "sex kittens"
and the like, especially in magazines directed to young people. (Sky Magazine, for
example). Other magazines studied, namely Premiere, Empire and Cosmopolitan, all
contain usage of non-standard language; euphenisms are common as well, markedly
more so than in Sky Magazine.
Perhaps contrary to the general (and my own) presupposition, women's magazines do
not contain any more euphemistic expressions than the other publications; neither are
they exceedingly PC - quite the contrary. In no cases did the usage of slang or
euphenisms result to ambiguity. This is probably the effect brought forth by the usage
of the written forum - the context is never ambigious and the newest "vogue words"
are created among the speakers of the language and reach the written forum after their
usage loses some of the ambiguity.
As for future enterprises, one could focus on the relationships between PC, slang,
euphenisms and the usefulness of semantic theory. Is it possible to explain the
possible violations of 'meaningfulness' and 'sense' found in PC, slang and euphenisms
with reference to semantic theory? Or should one just save the trouble and argue that
language is arbitrary and the study of meaning is a wasted effort, resulting from the
fact that an expression has as many "meanings" as there are speakers or contexts.
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various copies of The Observer.

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