Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila

EN BANC
G.R. No. 190120

November 11, 2014

CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY OF THE PHILIPPINES EMPLOYEES'

UNION
(CAAP-EU)
FORMERLY AIR
TRANSPORTATION
EMPLOYEES' UNION (ATEU), Petitioner, vs.CIVIL AVIATION
AUTHORITY OF THE PHILIPPINES (CAAP); HON. LEANDRO R.
MENDOZA, Secretary, Department of Transportation and
Communications, in his capacity as Ex-Officio CAAP Chairman
of the Board; RUBEN F. CIRON, PhD, Acting Director General, in
his capacity as CAAP Ex Officio Vice Chairman; HON. AGNES
VST. DEV ANADERA, Acting Secretary, Department of Justice,
HON. MARGARITO B. TEVES, Secretary, Department of Finance,
HON. ALBERTO G. ROMULO, Secretary, Department of Foreign
Affairs, HON. RONALDO V. PUNO, Secretary, Department of
Interior and Local Government, HON. MARIANITO D. ROQUE,
Secretary, Department of Labor and Employment, and HON.
JOSEPH ACE H. DURANO, Secretary, Department of Tourism, in
their capacity as Ex-Officio MEMBERS CAAP Board of Directors;
DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT (DBM); HON.
ROLANDO C. ANDAYA, JR., in his capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Budget and Management; CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION (CSC); HON. CESAR D. BUENAFLOR and HON.
MARY Z. FERNANDEZ-MENDOZA, in their capacity as
Commissioners of the Civil Service Commission; EDUARDO E.
KAPUNAN, JR., in his capacity as DeputyDirector General for
Administrationof CAAP and as Chairman, CAAP Selection
Committee; and ROLANDO P. MANLAPIG, in his capacity as
Chairman, CAAP Special Selection Committee, Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before this Court is an Amended Petition for Prohibition with prayer
for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and a Writ
of Preliminary Injunction filed by petitioner Civil Aviation Authority of
the Philippines Employees Union (CAAP-EU) formerly Air
1

Transportation Employees Union (ATEU) (petitioner) a legitimate

union of employees of respondent Civil Aviation Authority of the
Philippines (CAAP). Petitioner prays that the Court direct all
respondents to desist from promulgating and implementing Authority
Orders, Memoranda and all other issuances relating to the filling up of
positions within the CAAP whether existing or newly created, and
praying that the Court nullify and set aside the following:
a. Authority Order No. 77-08;

b. Authority Order No. 118-08;

c. Authority Order No. 139-08;

d. Authority Order No. 163-08;

e. Authority Order No. 172-08;

f. Authority Order No. 173-08;

g. Authority Order No. 181-08;

h. Authority Order No. 81-09;

i. Authority Order No. 82-09; and

10

j. Authority Order No. 83-09

11

all issued by respondent Ruben F. Ciron, former Acting Director

General of the CAAP allegedly with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of or in excess of jurisdiction. Petitioner asserts
that such grave abuse of discretion was shown by the issuances of
said Authority Orders and Memoranda which resulted in the
classification and treatment of the incumbent personnel of the Air
Transportation Office (ATO), now of CAAP, into "hold-over" status,
thus violating the provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9497
otherwise known as the Civil Aviation Authority Act of 2008 and the
security of tenure of government employees guaranteed by the 1987
Constitution and R.A. No. 6656.

12

13

A brief historical background of the CAAP is in order.

14

On November 20, 1931, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No.

3909 providing that the Secretary ofthe Department of Commerce
and Communications has the duty, among others, to foster air
commerce, encourage the establishment of airports, civil airways and
other navigation facilities and investigate causes of air mishaps. As
such, said Secretary has the power to administer and enforce air
traffic rules, issue or revoke licenses and issue regulations necessary
to execute his vested functions.
15

On December 5, 1932, Act No. 3996 amended Act No. 3909 as to

matters concerning the licensing of airmen and aircraft, inspection of
aircraft, air traffic rules, schedules and rates and enforcement of
aviation laws.
16

On December 9, 1932, Act No. 4033 was approved, providing,

among others, that no aviation public service, including those of
foreign aircrafts, shall operate in the Philippines without having first
secured from the Philippine Legislature a franchise to operate an air
service. CAAP narrated that from 1932 to 1936, there were no
standard procedures as to the licensing of airmen, registration of
aircraft and recording of various aeronautical activities connected with
commercial aviation. There were attempts made to register planes
and their owners without ascertaining their airworthiness and to
record names of pilots, airplane mechanics and other details. It was
also narrated that in 1933, the office of Technical Assistant of Aviation
Matters was expanded into the Aeronautics Division under the
Department of Commerce and Industry, the functions of which were
embodied in Administrative Order No. 309, a joint Bulletin issued by
the Department of Public Works and Communications and the
Department of Finance.
17

18

19

On November 12, 1936, the National Assembly passed

Commonwealth Act No. 168, otherwise known as the Civil Aviation
Law of the Philippines, creating the Bureauof Aeronautics and
organizing the same under the Department of Public Works and
Communications. After the liberation of the Philippines in March
1945, the Bureau was reorganized and placed under the Department
of National Defense. Among its functions was to promulgate civil
aviation regulations.
20

21

22

On October, 1947, Executive Order (E.O.) No. 94 which reorganized

the government, transferred the Bureau of Aeronautics to the newly
created Department of Commerce and Industry and renamed the
same as the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA).
23

On June 5, 1948, R.A. No. 224 created the National Airports

Corporation, serving as an agency of the Republic of the Philippines
for the development, administration, operation and management of
government owned landing fields in the country except for those
controlled and/or operated by the Armed Forces.
24

25

On November 10, 1950, the National Airports Corporation was

abolished by E.O. No. 365 and was replaced by the CAA.
26

27

On June 20, 1952, R.A. No. 776, otherwise known as the Civil
Aeronautics Act of the Philippines, was passed, reorganizing the Civil
Aeronautics Board and the CAA, defining their respective powers and
duties, making adjustments as to the funds and personnel and
regulating civil aeronautics. Under R.A. No. 776, the CAA was
charged with the duty of planning, designing, constructing, equipping,
expanding, improving, repairing or altering aerodromes or such other
structures, improvements or air navigation facilities.
28

29

On October 19, 1956, former President Ramon Magsaysay issued

E.O. No. 209, transferring in totothe CAA to the Department of
Public Works, Transportation and Communications from the
Department of Commerce and Industry.
30

31

On January 20, 1975, Letter of Instruction No. 244, series of 1975,

directed that all funds for the preliminary engineering, construction
and maintenance of all national airports appropriated for the fiscal
year 1974-75 be transferred and/or released to the Department of
Public Highways. The responsibilities related to location, planning
design and funding were later returned to the CAA.

32

33

On July 23, 1979, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued E.O.

No. 546, renaming the CAA as the Bureauof Air Transportation (BAT)
and placing the same under the Ministry of Transportation and
Communications.
34

35

Subsequently, BAT, though reorganized, was maintained under E.O.

No. 125 issued by former President Corazon C. Aquino (President

Aquino) on January 30, 1987. Shortly thereafter or on April 13, 1987,
President Aquino issued E.O. No. 125-A renaming BAT to ATO
which would be headed by the Assistant Secretary ofthe Office of Air
Transportation. Section 12 of said E.O. No. 125 which contained
the proviso concerning BAT was deleted by Section 2 of E.O. No.
125-A.
36

37

38

39

40

As duly claimed by petitioner, sometime in the middle of 1995, the

Philippine civil aviation safety oversight capability was downgraded
by the United States of America (USA) through her Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) International Aviation Safety Assessment (IASA)
into a Category 2 status. A Category 2 rating means a country either
lacks laws or regulations necessary to oversee air carriers in
accordance withminimum international standards, or that its civil
aviation authority equivalent to the FAA for aviation safety matters
is deficient inone or more areas, such as technical expertise, trained
personnel, record keeping orinspection procedures. Correlatively, a
Category 1 rating means a countrys civil aviation authority complies
with the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) standards,
thus, her air carriers can add flights and services to the USA and
carry the code of USA carriers. Petitioner attested that sometime in
the first quarter of 1997, the Category 1 status was regained by the
Philippines as it was successfully initiated by the organic/incumbent
personnel of the defunct ATO.
41

42

43

However, sometime in January 2008, the FAA reverted the

Philippines to its 1995 air safety rating of Category 2 from Category 1
because of air safety regulations, practices and personnel that fell
below the standards of the ICAO.
44

Thus, on March 4, 2008, R.A. No. 9497 was passed, whereby ATO
was replaced by CAAP, to be headed by the Director General of Civil
Aviation. Pursuant to Sections 4 and 85 thereof, the ATO was
abolished, and all its powers were transferred to the CAAP. To ensure
the smooth transition from ATO to CAAP, Section 86 of R.A. No.
9497 directed the Assistant Secretary of the ATO to continue to hold
office and assume the powers of the CAAP Director General until his
successor shall have been appointed and inducted into office in
accordance with said law. Likewise, retirement packages were
45

46

47

provided to ATO employees who were willing to retire from the

service.
On July 2, 2008, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
appointed Ruben F. Ciron as Acting Director General of the CAAP.
Immediately upon assumption of office, Ciron issued orders and
memoranda for the active participation of incumbent and organic
personnel of the defunct ATO along with his hired consultants in the
crafting and formulation of the Implementing Rules and Regulations
(IRR) of R.A. No. 9497, the new Organizational Structure and Staffing
Pattern (OSSP) and the Qualification Standards (QS) for the
proposed new plantilla of positions within the CAAP.

48

Accordingly, the Board of Directors of CAAP prepared its OSSP and

the IRR of R.A. No. 9497, both of which were approved in Board
Resolution No. 08-001 dated July 30, 2008. Pursuant to Section 90
of R.A. No. 9497, the IRR was formulated and was subsequently
published in two newspapers of general circulation. Pertinently,
Section 60 (a) of the IRR provides that the incumbent personnel ofthe
former ATO shall continue to hold office in hold-over capacity until
such time as the new Staffing Pattern and Manning shall have been
approved by the Board and implemented by the CAAP Director
General. Thereafter, the management of CAAP endorsed its OSSP
for the approval of respondent Department of Budget and
Management (DBM) in view of the latters authority to review
reorganization details of government agencies. The OSSP was
approved on July 20, 2009. However, petitioner lamented, among
others, that the IRR, OSSP and QS approved by the CAAP Board of
Directors were different from that agreed upon by the incumbent ATO
personnel and Director General Ciron and his consultants.
49

50

51

52

Subsequently, Senate Concurrent Resolution No. 10 and House

Concurrent Resolution No. 27 were issued, which clarified, among
others, the intent of the lawmakers as regards the abolition of ATO;
the hold-over status of qualified employees of ATO and the
preferential status of the said employees with respect to the filling up
of CAAP plantilla positions.
53

54

Aggrieved, on November 20, 2009, petitioner filed the Original

Petition for Prohibition directly before this Court. Said petition was
55

subsequently amended on November 25, 2009. It assails the

aforementioned Authority Orders, Memoranda and other issuances
related to the selection and filling up of positions issued by Director
General Ciron and seeks the nullification thereof including the IRR of
R.A. No. 9497, the OSSP and QS for the employees of CAAP.
Petitioner invokes the following grounds:
I.
RESPONDENTS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
ISSUING
AND
IMPLEMENTING
AUTHORITY
ORDERS,
MEMORANDA AND ALL OTHER ISSUANCES RELATED TO THE
SELECTION AND FILLING UP OFPOSITIONS IN THE CAAP,
WHETHER EXISTING OR NEWLY CREATED, CONSIDERING THE
ABSENCE OF POSITIONS, ITEM NUMBERS, QUALIFICATION
STANDARDS AND PUBLICATION, WHICH ARE INDISPENSABLE
REQUIREMENTS PRIOR TOTHE SELECTION AND APPOINTMENT
TO ANY GOVERNMENT POST [; AND]
II.
RESPONDENTS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
EXPANDING THE APPLICABILITY OF THE "HOLD-OVER" STATUS
IN THE IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS OF R.A.
9497, THUS VIOLATING THE EXPRESS PROVISIONS OF R.A.
9497 AND THE SECURITY OF TENURE OF GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEES GUARANTEED BY THE 1987 CONSTITUTION AND
R.A. 6656.
56

Petitioner explains that it directly sought recourse from this Court

because there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. Even ifthere would be any
remedy, petitioner submits that such would be ineffective given the
brazenness of respondents official actions. Petitioner also claims that
it sought redress from the different agencies of the government butits
actions were an exercise in futility because said agencies failed to act
on its grievances. Petitioner further avers that since it represents
government employees in an agency which is national in scopeand

whose function is highly imbued with public interest affecting national

security and the economy, it would be paramount that its issues be
resolved by this Court.
57

On the merits, petitioner argues, among others, that respondents

committed grave abuse of discretion in the issuance and
implementation of the assailed Authority Orders and Memoranda
because they placed the tenure of the CAAP personnel in jeopardy in
clear violation of the latters security of tenure which is protected by
the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 6656. Petitioner points out that
while Sections 85 and 86 of R.A. No. 9497 literally abolished ATO,
nevertheless, the tenor of the provisions thereof simply perpetuated
and assumed the core of civil aviation regulatory functions, powers,
and authority, including all assets of the defunct ATO. Petitioner also
invokes the Minutes of the Discussion of the Bicameral Conference
Committee on the Disagreeing Provisions of HBN 3156 and the
amendments agreed upon on "The Creation of the Civil Aviation
Authority," and asserts that the real intention of R.A. No. 9497 was
merely reorganization of the agency and notits entire abolition.
Purportedly, abolition of an office cannot have the effect of removing
an officer holding it if the office is restored under another name.
Petitioner further contends that while Section 86 of R.A. No. 9497
categorically states that "the incumbent Assistant Secretary of the
ATO shall continue to hold office and assume the powers of the
Director General until his successor shall have been appointed and
inducted into office," the law made no mention of the status of the
employment of the personnel of the defunct ATO. The employees
hold-over status as indicated in the IRR and in the Joint Senate
Resolutions is opposed to Section 86 of R.A. No. 9497 which merely
limits such status to the incumbent Assistant Secretary of the ATO as
acting CAAP Director General. Likewise, petitioner asserts that the
IRR expanded and modified the law and that the legislature through
the issuance of said Resolutions encroached on the functions of this
Court in interpreting the same. All told, petitioner submits that R.A.
No. 9497 simply mandated that the selection and appointment of the
heads of offices within CAAP are limited to the rank-and-file
employees of the concerned or corresponding offices of the defunct
ATO and that the personnel of the same, unless they opted to retire,
are legally deemed transferred to the newly created CAAP. The holdover status accorded to the incumbent personnel of the ATO deviated
58

59

from the law and the same personnel were placedin a

disadvantageous situation and were stripped of their security of
tenure.
60

On the other hand, CAAP through the Office of the Government

Corporate Counsel (OGCC) counters that the issue regarding the
nullification of the assailed Authority Orders has become moot and
academic. The OGCC asseverates that when the new CAAP Director
General Alfonso G. Cusi (Director General Cusi) assumed office, he
issued a Memorandum dated March 12, 2010 which provided that
coterminous employees, consultants and job-order employees are
deemed not employed under the CAAP unless reappointed
orrenewed, thus terminating the services of all the personnel
appointed by Director General Ciron. The OGCC submits that there
being no justiciable controversy, there is nothing for this Court to
adjudicate. Moreover, the OGCC advances the view that petitioner
failed to establish its right to injunctive relief as its bare and
selfserving allegations failed to overthrow the presumption that CAAP
regularly performed its official functions in the promulgation and/or
implementation of the assailed orders. The OGCC alsosubmits that
petitioner disregarded the basic principle of the hierarchy of courts
and the doctrine that this Court is not a trier of facts when petitioner
directly filed the instant petition before us. The OGCC points out that,
despite petitioners claim that it sought redress from different
government agencies, petitioner failed to substantiate such claim.
The selection processes assailed by petitioner, according to the
OGCC, constitute triable facts and necessitate the determination and
resolution of factual issues. Lastly, the OGCC questions the legal
personality of petitioner to file the petition in behalf of the CAAP
employees. The OGCC posits that while petitioner was registered as
the employees union of the now abolished ATO, petitioner was not
registered with the CSC.
61

62

On this point, respondents DBM and CSC through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) opine that DBM acted within the scope of its
authority when it approved the OSSP ofthe CAAP on July 20, 2009
as the same was done in the performance of DBMs official functions
as provided under E.O. No. 165, series of 1987. With its bare and
unsubstantiated allegations, petitioner failed to prove that DBM acted
with grave abuse of discretion in the approval thereof. Moreover,
63

invoking that ATO was effectively abolished by R.A. No. 9497,the

OSG defends the validity of Section 60(a) of the IRR which states
that the incumbent personnel of the ATO shall continue to hold office
in a "hold[-]over capacity until such time [that a] new [s]taffing
[p]attern and [m]anning [is] approved by the Board." The OSG posits
that while it is true that an incumbent employee of the defunct ATO is
given preference in the filling up of a plantilla position, said employee
does not automatically qualify to the position he is presently holding.
Thus, said employee still has toqualify under the new and approved
staffing pattern and the new QS set by the CSC. Such approved QS
shall be used as the standard minimum qualification requirements for
purposes of appointments per CSC Memorandum Circular No. 03,
series of 1991. However, if the incumbent fails to qualify, the affected
employee may choose from the retirement packages provided under
R.A. No. 9497 itself. The OSG asserts that in this case the
employees right to security of tenure as embodied under Section
2(3), Article IX-B of the 1987 Constitution is not undermined. The
OSG avers thatthe CSC has not yet received any appointments from
the CAAP for attestation; hence, to restrain the CSC is premature.
64

65

66

In essence, the issues for our resolution are:

1. Whether ATO was abolished under R.A. No. 9497;
2. Whether the incumbent ATO employees constitutional right to
security of tenure was impaired; and
3. Whether there was grave abuse of discretion when Section 60 of
the IRR provided a "hold-over" status for ATO employees, which was
not expressly provided for under R.A. No. 9497. Prefatorily, we rule
that petitioner has locus standi. Petitioner impugns the
constitutionality of the IRR of R.A. No. 9497 and assailsthe validity of
the abolition of the ATO and respondents acts in filling up positions
within CAAP. Petitioners members are all employees of the defunct
ATO and are actually covered by the law and its IRR. Thus, they have
a personal and substantial interest in the case, such thatthey will
sustain direct injury as a result of the enforcement of R.A. No. 9497
and its IRR.
67

The Court agrees with the postulation of the OGCC that the

nullification of the assailed Authority Orders has become moot and

academic considering that Director General Cusi already issued a
Memorandum dated March 12, 2010, terminating the services of all
the personnel appointed by Director General Ciron. An issue is said
to have become moot and academic when it ceases to present a
justiciable controversy so that a declaration on the issue would be of
no practical use or value. The Court will therefore abstain from
expressing its opinion in a case where no legal relief is needed or
called for.
68

69

70

Nevertheless, despite this moot issue and the presence of some

procedural flaws in the instant petition, such as petitioners disregard
of the hierarchy of courts and the non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies, we deem it necessary to address the essential issues. It is
in the interest of the State that questions relating to the status and
existence of a public office be settled without delay.
71

That being said, we rule that the petition is bereft of merit.

The first issue is resolved in the affirmative.
Well entrenched in this jurisdiction is the rule that the power to
abolish a public office is lodged with the legislature. This proceeds
from the legal precept that the power to create includes the power to
destroy. A public office is created either by the Constitution, by
statute, or by authority of law. Thus, except where the office was
created by the Constitution itself, it may be abolished by the same
legislature that brought it into existence.
72

Indubitably, this is the case at hand. The legislature through R.A. No.
9497 abolished the ATO as explicitly stated in Sections 4 and 85
thereof, viz:
SEC. 4. Creation of the Authority. There is hereby created an
independent regulatory body with quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative
powers and possessing corporate attributes to be known as the Civil
Aviation Authority of the Philippines (CAAP), hereinafter referred to as
the "Authority", attached to the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC) for the purpose of policy coordination. For
this purpose, the existing Air Transportation Office created under the
provisions of Republic Act No. 776, as amended, is hereby abolished.

xxxx
SEC. 85. Abolition of the Air Transportation Office. The Air
Transportation Office (ATO) created under Republic Act No. 776, a
sectoral office of the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC), is hereby abolished.
All powers, duties and rights vested by law and exercised by the ATO
is hereby transferred to the Authority.
All assets, real and personal properties, funds and revenues owned
by or vested in the different officesof the ATO are transferred to the
Authority. All contracts, records and documents relating to the
operations of the abolished agency and its offices and branches are
likewise transferred to the Authority. Any real property owned by the
national government or government-owned corporation or authority
which is being used and utilized as office or facility by the ATO shall
be transferred and titled in favor of the Authority. (Emphasis supplied)
Verily, the question whether a law abolishes an office is a question of
legislative intent. In this case, petitioner tries to raise doubts as to the
real intention of Congress. However, there should not be any
controversy if there is an explicit declaration of abolition in the law
itself. For where a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it
must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempt to
interpret. Verba legis non est recedendum, index animi sermo est.
There should be no departure from the words of the statute, for
speech is the index of intention. The legislature, through Sections 4
and 85 of R.A. No. 9497, has so clearly provided. As the Court merely
interprets the law as it is, we have no discretion to give statutes a
meaning detached from the manifest intendment and language
thereof.
73

74

75

It is worth mentioning that this is not the first time for this Court to rule
regarding the abolition of the ATO and the emergence of the CAAP by
virtue of R.A. No. 9497. Holding thatthe CAAP, as the legal successor
of the ATO, is liable to respondents therein for obligations incurred by
ATO, this Court in Air Transportation Office v. Ramos, in no uncertain
terms, held that the ATO was abolished by virtue of Sections 4 and 85
of R.A. No. 9497.
76

Thus, we find petitioners assertion thatthe real intention of R.A. No.

9497 was merely the reorganization ofthe ATO and not its abolition
devoid of merit.
Correlatively, we resolve the second issue in the negative.
For the ATO employees security of tenure to be impaired, the
abolition of the ATO must be done in bad faith.
At this juncture, our ruling in Kapisanan ng mga Kawani ng Energy
Regulatory Board v. Barin is instructive, to wit:
77

A valid order of abolition must not only come from a legitimate body, it
must also be made in good faith. An abolition is made in good faith
when it is not made for political or personal reasons, or when it does
not circumvent the constitutional security of tenure of civil service
employees. Abolition of an office may be brought about by reasons of
economy, or to remove redundancy of functions, or a clear and
explicit
constitutional
mandate for
such termination
of
employment.Where one office is abolished and replaced with another
office vested with similar functions, the abolition is a legal nullity.
When there is a void abolition, the incumbent is deemed to have
never ceased holding office.
We have also held that, other thanthe aforestated reasons of
economy, making the bureaucracy more efficient is also indicative of
the exercise of good faith in, and a valid purpose for, the abolition of
an office.
78

The purpose for the abolition of the ATO is clearly manifested in

Section 2 of R.A. No. 9497: SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is
hereby declared the policy of the State to provide safe and efficient
air transport and regulatory services in the Philippines by providing
for the creation of a civil aviation authority with jurisdiction over the
restructuring of the civil aviation system, the promotion, development
and regulation of the technical, operational, safety, and aviation
security functions under the civil aviation authority. (Emphasis
supplied)
It cannot be disregarded that in January 2008, before the enactment
of R.A. No. 9497, the Philippines was again downgraded by the FAA

to a Category 2 status because of air safety regulations, practices

and personnel which fell below the ICAOs standards. Hence, it is but
reasonable to state that the purpose for the abolition of the ATO, as
posited by petitioner itself, was "to create a much more effective
Agency in order to address the problems that go along with the fast
emerging developments in the field of the globally-competitive
aviation industry."
79

On the other hand, circumstances evidencing bad faith are

enumerated in Section 2 of R.A. No. 6656 which provides:
SEC. 2. No officer or employee in the career service shall be
removed except for a valid cause and after due notice and hearing. A
valid cause for removal exists when, pursuant to a bona fide
reorganization, a position has been abolished or rendered redundant
or there is a need to merge, divide, or consolidate positions in order
to meet the exigencies of the service, or other lawful causes allowed
by the Civil Service Law. The existence of any or some of the
following circumstances may be considered as evidence of bad faith
in the removals made as a result of reorganization, giving rise toa
claim for reinstatement or reappointment by an aggrieved party: (a)
Where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the
new staffing pattern of the department or agency concerned;
(b) Where an office is abolished and another performing substantially
the same functions is created;
(c) Where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms of
status of appointment, performance and merit;
(d) Where there is a reclassification of offices in the department or
agency concerned and the reclassified offices perform substantially
the same functions as the original offices;
(e) Where the removal violates the order of separation provided in
Section 3 hereof. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner posits that abolition of an office cannot have the effect of
removing an officer holding it if the office is restored under another
name. However, we find no bad faith in the abolition of the ATO as
the latter was not simply restored in another name in the person of

the CAAP. Thus, we compare the ATO and the CAAP.

ATO was merely a sectoral office of the Department of Transportation
and Communications (DOTC) and as suchacted within the
supervision of the latter and budgeted under it. As Section 2 of E.O.
No. 125-A, series of 1987 deleted Section 12 of E.O. No. 125,
seriesof 1987 which delineated the functions of the former BAT,
werely on R.A. No. 776 in citing the functions of the CAA which were
succeeded by the ATO through the powers and duties of the CAA
Administrator. Section 32 of R.A. No. 776 provides:
80

SEC. 32. Powers and duties of the Administrator. Subject to the

general control and supervision of the Department Head, the
Administrator shall have among others, the following powers and
duties:
(1) To carry out the purposes and policies established in this Act; to
enforce the provisions of, the rules and regulations issued in
pursuance to, said Act; and he shall primarily be vested with authority
to take charge of the technical and operational phase of civil aviation
matters.
(2) To designate and establish civil airways, and to acquire, control,
operate and maintain along such airways, air navigation facilities and
to chart such airways and arrange for their publication including the
aeronautical charts or maps required by the international aeronautical
agencies by utilizing the equipment, supplies or assistance of existing
agencies of the government as far as practicable.
(3) To issue airmans certificate specifying the capacity in which the
holder thereof is authorized to serve as airman in connection with
aircraft and shall be issued only upon the finding that the applicant is
properly qualified and physically able to perform the duties of the
position. The certificate shall contain such terms, conditions and
limitations as the Administrator may determine to be necessary to
assure safety in air commerce: Provided, however,That the airmans
license shall be issued only to qualified persons who are citizens of
the Philippines or qualified citizens of countries granting similar rights
and privileges to citizens of the Philippines.
(4) To issue airworthiness certificate for aircraft which shall prescribe

the duration of such certificate, the type of service for which the
aircraft may be used, and such other terms and conditions and
limitations as are required.
(5) To issue air carrier operating certificate and to establish minimum
safety standards for the operation of the air carrier to whom such
certificate is issued. The air carrier operating certificate shall be
issued only to aircrafts registered under the provisions of this Act.
(6) To issue type certificate for aircraft, aircraft engine, propellers and
appliances.
(7) To inspect, classify and rateany air navigation facilities and
aerodromes available for the use of aircraft as to its suitability for
such use and to issue a certificate for such air navigation facility and
aerodrome; and to determine the suitability offoreign aerodromes, air
navigation facilities as well as air routes to be used prior to the
operation of Philippine registered aircraft in foreign air transportation
and from time to time thereafter as may be required in the interest of
safety in air commerce.
(8) To issue certificates of persons or civil aviation schools giving
instruction in flying, repairstations, and other air agencies and provide
for the examination and rating thereof.
(9) To promulgate rules and regulations as may be necessary in the
interest of safety in air commerce pertaining to the issuance of the
airmans certificate, including licensing of operating and mechanical
personnel, type certificate for aircraft, aircraft engines, propellers and
appliances, airworthiness certificate, air carrier operating certificate,
air agency certificate, navigation facilityand aerodrome certificate; air
traffic routes; radio and aeronautical telecommunications and air
navigation aids; aircraft accident inquiry; aerodromes, both public and
private owned; construction of obstructions to aerodromes;
registration of aircraft; search and rescue; facilitation of air transport;
operations of aircraft, both for domestic and international, including
scheduled and non-scheduled; meteorology in relation to civil
aviation; rules of the air; air traffic services; rules for prevention of
collision of aircraft; identification of aircraft; rules for safe altitudes of
flight; and such other rules, regulations, standards, governing other

practices, methods, procedures as the Administrator may find

necessary and appropriate to provide adequately for safety, regularity
and efficiency in air commerce and air navigation.
(10) To provide for the enforcement of the rules and regulations
issued under the provisions of this Act and to conduct investigations
for violations thereto. In undertaking such investigation, to require by
subpoena or subpoena duces tecum, the attendance and testimony
of witness, the production of books, papers, documents, exhibit
matters, evidence, or the taking of depositions before any person
authorized to administer oath. Refusal to submit tothe reasonable
requirements of the investigation committee shall be punishable in
accordance with the provisions of this Act.
(11) To investigate accidents involving aircraft and report to the Civil
Aeronautics Board the facts, conditions and circumstances relating to
the accidents and the probable cause thereof; and to make such
recommendations to the Civil Aeronautics Board as may tend to
prevent similar accidents in the future: Provided, That when any
accident has resulted in serious or fatal injury, the Civil Aeronautics
Board shall make public such report and recommendations: And
provided, further, That no report on any accident or any statement
made during any investigation or during hearing relative to such
accident may be admitted as evidence or used for any purpose in any
civil suitgrowing out of any matter revealed within any such report,
statement, investigation or hearing.
(12) To collect and disseminate information relative to civil
aeronautics and the development of air commerce and the
aeronautical industry; to exchange with foreign governments,
information pertaining to civil aeronautics; and to provide for direct
communication all matters relating to the technical or operational
phase of aeronautics with international aeronautical agencies.
(13) To acquire and operate such aircraft as may be necessary to
execute the duties and functions of the Civil Aeronautics
Administration prescribed in this Act.
(14) To plan, design, acquire, establish, construct, operate, improve,
maintain, and repair necessary aerodromes and other air navigation

facilities.
(15) To impose and fix, except those mentioned in section forty,
paragraph twenty-five and hereinafter provided, reasonable charges
and fees for the use of government aerodromes or air navigation
facilities; for services rendered by the Civil Aeronautics Administration
in the rating of any aerodrome or air navigation facilities, civil aviation
schools and instructions, aircraft repair stations, and aircraft radio and
aeronautical telecommunications stations. To collectand receive
charges and fees for the registration of aircraft and for the issuance
and/or renewal of licenses or certificates for aircraft, aircraft engines,
propellers and appliances, and airmen as provided in this Act.
(16) To fix the reasonable charges to be imposed in the use of
privately owned air navigation facilities and aerodromes.
(17) To impose fines and/or civil penalties and make compromises in
respect thereto.
(18) To adopt a system for registration of aircraft as hereinafter
provided.
(19) To participate actively with the largest possible degree in the
development of international standardization of practices in aviation
matters important to safe, expeditious, and easy navigation, and to
implement as far as practicable the international standards,
recommended practices, and policies adopted by appropriate
international aeronautical agencies.
(20) To exercise and perform itspowers and duties under this Act
consistent with any obligation assumed by the Republic of the
Philippines in any treaty, convention or agreement on civil aviation
matters.
(21) To cooperate, assist and coordinate with any research and
technical agency of the Government on matters relating to research
and technical studies on design, materials, workmanship,
construction, performance, maintenance and operation of aircraft,
aircraft engines, propellers, appliances, and air navigation facilities
including aircraft fuel and oil: Provided, That nothing in this Act shall
be construed to authorize the duplication of the laboratory research,

activities or technical studies of any existing governmental agency.

(22) To designate such prohibited and danger areas, in consonance
with the requirements of the international aeronautical agencies and
national security.
(23) To issue, deny, cancel or revoke any certificate, permit or license
pertaining to aircraft, airmen, and air agencies: Provided, That any
order denying, cancelling, revoking the certificate, permit or license
may be appealed to the Civil Aeronautics Board, whose decisions
shall be final within fifteen days from the dateof notification of such
denial, cancellation, or revocation.
(24) To administer, operate, manage, control, maintain and develop
the Manila International Airport and all government-owned
aerodromes except those controlled or operated by the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, including such powers and duties as: (a) to plan,
design, construct, equip, expand, improve, repair or alter aerodromes
or such structures, improvements, or air navigation facilities; (b) to
enter into, make and execute contracts of any kind with any person,
firm, or public or private corporation or entity; (c) to acquire, hold,
purchase, or lease any personal or real property, right of ways, and
easements which may be proper or necessary: Provided, That no real
property thus acquired and any other real property of the Civil
Aeronautics Administration shall be sold without the approval of the
President of the Philippines; (d) to grant to any person, such
concession or concession rights on space or property within or upon
the aerodrome for purposes essential or appropriate to the operation
of the aerodrome upon such terms and conditionsas the Administrator
may deem proper: Provided, however, That the exclusive use of any
landing strip or runway within the aerodrome shall not be granted to
any person; (e) to determine the types of aircraft that may be allowed
to use any of the aerodromes under its management and control in
the interest of public safety; (f) to prescribe, adopt, establish and
enforce such rules and regulations consistent with existing laws, rules
and regulations, as may be necessary for the safety, health and
welfare of the public within the aerodrome.
(25) To determine, fix, impose, collect and receive landing fees,
parking space fees, royalties on sales or deliveries, direct or indirect,

to any aircraft for its use of aviation gasoline, oil and lubricants, spare
parts, accessories, and supplies, tools, other royalties, fees or rentals
for the use of any of the property under its management and control.
As used in this sub-section:
(1) "Landing fees" refer to all charges for the use of any landing strip
or runway by any aircraft landing or taking off at an aerodrome.
(2) "Terminal fees" refer to charges for parking at or near the ramp,
terminal area, or building, for the purposes of loading or unloading
passengers and/or cargo.
(3) "Royalties" refer to all charges based on gross business or sales,
or gross or net profit.
(4) "Supplies" include any and all items of whatever nature or
description which may be necessary for, or incidental to, the
operation of an aircraft.
(26) To grant permit to civil aircraft or persons to carry instrument or
photographic device to be used for aerial photography or taking of
pictures by photograph or sketching of any part of the Philippines.
On the other hand, the CAAP is anindependent regulatory body with
quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative powers and possessing corporate
attributes, having an authorized capitalstock of fifty billion pesos
(P50,000,000,000.00) which shall be fully subscribed by the Republic
of the Philippines. It is attached to the DOTC only for the purpose of
policy coordination. While the Director General is responsible for the
exercise of all powers and the discharge of all duties including the
control over all personnel and activities of the CAAP, the latters
corporate powers are vested in its Board of Directors. It enjoys fiscal
autonomy to fund its operations. With quasi-judicial powers, the
Director General has the power and authority to inspect aviation
equipment and also from time to time, for any reason, re-inspect or
reexamine the same. If, as a result of any such re-inspection or
reexamination, or if, as a result of any other investigation made by the
Director General,he determines that safety in civil aviation or
commercial air transport and the public interest requires, the Director
General may issue an order amending, modifying, suspending or
81

82

83

84

85

86

87

revoking, in whole or in part, any airworthiness certificate, airman

certificate, air operator certificate or certificate for any airport, school,
or approved maintenance organization. Possessing quasi-legislative
powers, CAAPs Board may authorize the Director General to issue
or amend rules of procedures and practice as may be required, or
issue and adopt rules and regulations and other issuances of the
ICAO. Vested with corporate attributes, said Board, through a
resolution, may empower the Director General to enter into, make
and execute contracts of any kind with any person, firm, or public or
private corporation.
88

89

90

Moreover, notable under R.A. No. 9497 is the establishment of

permanent offices like the (a) Air Traffic Service; (b) Air Navigation
Service; (c) Aerodrome Development and Management Service; (d)
Administrative and Finance Service; (e) the Office of Enforcement
and Legal Service; and (f) the Flight Standards Inspectorate
Service. The law also mandated the Director General to organize the
Aircraft Accident Investigation and Inquiry Board.
91

92

93

94

Furthermore, R.A. No. 9497 manifested the adherence ofthe country

to, and the adoption of, the Chicago Convention and ICAO
standards and other international conventions with respect to
matters relating to civil aviation.
95

96

After comparing the features and functions of the ATO and the CAAP,
we find that CAAP indeed assumed the functions of the ATO.
However, the overlap in their functions does not mean there was no
valid abolition of the ATO. The CAAP has new and expanded
features and functions which are intended to meetthe growing needs
of a globally competitive civil aviation industry, adherent to
internationally recognized standards. Thus, in National Land Titles
and Deeds Registration Administration v. Civil Service Commission,
we held that:
97

98

if the newly created office has substantially new, different or

additional functions, duties or powers, so that itmay be said in fact to
create an office different from the one abolished, even though it
embraces all or some of the duties of the old office it will be
considered as an abolition of one office and the creation of a new or
different one. The same is true if one office is abolished and its

duties,for reasons of economy are given to an existing officer or

office.
To be precise, the case before us deals only with the issue of
abolition and not removal. Besides, petitioner has failed to provide in
detail any ATO personnel who had been removed from office on
account of R.A. No. 9497.
Apropos then is our ruling in Kapisanan ng mga Kawani ng Energy
Regulatory Board v. Barin, to wit:
99

However, abolition of an office and itsrelated positions is different

from removal of an incumbent from his office. Abolition and removal
are mutually exclusive concepts. From a legal standpoint, there is no
occupant in an abolished office. Where there is no occupant, there is
no tenure to speak of. Thus, impairment of the constitutional
guarantee of security of tenure doesnot arise in the abolition of an
office.On the other hand, removal implies that the office and its
related positions subsist and that the occupants are merely separated
from their positions.
Based on the premise that there was a valid abolition of ATO, in the
absence of any bad faith, we rule thatthe ATO employees right to
security of tenure was not violated.
The Court cannot agree to petitioners supposition that there should
be automatic absorption of all ATO employees to the CAAP. Indeed,
there is no such thing as a vested interest in a public office, let alone
an absolute right to hold it. Except constitutional offices which provide
for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no one can be said
to have any vested right in an office or its salary. Public office is not
property but a "public trust or agency." While their right to due
process may be relied upon by public officials to protect their security
of tenure which, in a limited sense, is analogous to property, such
fundamental right to security of tenure cannot be invoked against a
valid abolition of office effected by the legislature itself.
100

101

However, it bears stressing that former ATO employees are not left
without succor. Aside from the retirement packages provided for by
R.A. No. 9497, the same law mandates that former qualified ATO
employees should be accorded preference in filling up CAAP plantilla

positions. Section 12 of R.A. No. 9497 provides:

SEC. 12. Personnel. Qualified existing personnel of the Air
Transportation Office (ATO) shall be given preference in the filling up
of plantilla positions created inthe Authority, subject to existing civil
service rules and regulations.
This preference is resonated in Section 59(b), Rule IX of the IRR,
which provides:
SECTION 59. Abolition of the Air Transportation Office.
xxxx
b. Qualified Air Transportation Office (ATO) personnel shall be given
preference in the filling-up of CAAP plantilla positions subject to
existing civil service rules and regulations.
Inasmuch as we accorded respect to the mandate of the law in
abolishing the ATO, such preference in favor of qualified ATO
employees, subject to existing civil service rules and regulations,
should likewise be strictly heeded in favor of the said employees. All
respondents must abide by this directive. No less than R.A. No. 9497
requires it.
Finally, we resolve the third issue in the negative.
A petition for prohibition will prosper only if grave abuse of discretion
is manifested. Mere abuse ofdiscretion is not enough; it must be
grave. The term grave abuse of discretion is defined as a capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform
a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner because of passion or hostility.
1avvphi1

102

We hold that there is no grave abuse of discretion when Section 60 of

the IRR provided for a "hold-over" status on the part of ATO
employees.
A careful perusal of Section 86 of R.A. No. 9497 reveals that the
transfer of ATO personnel, unless they opted to retire from the

service, to the CAAP implies the application of the hold-over principle.

There being no express, much less implied prohibition of the
application of the hold-over principle in R.A. No. 9497 per se, such
proviso in the latters IRR does not amount to grave abuse of
discretion.
In Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, we held:
103

Absent an express or implied constitutional or statutory provision to

the contrary, an officer is entitled to stay in office until his successor is
appointed or chosen and has qualified.The legislative intent of not
allowing holdover must be clearly expressed or at least implied in the
legislative enactment, otherwise it is reasonable to assume that the
law-making body favors the same.
The reason for the application of the hold-over principle is clearly
stated also in Lecaroz, to wit:
104

Indeed, the law abhors a vacuum in public offices, and courts

generally indulge in the strong presumption against a legislative intent
to create, by statute, a condition which may result in an executive or
administrative office becoming, for any period of time, wholly vacant
or unoccupied by one lawfully authorized to exercise its functions.
This is founded on obvious considerations ofpublic policy, for the
principle of holdover is specifically intended to prevent public
convenience from suffering because of a vacancy and to avoid a
hiatus in the performance of government functions.
Indeed, the application of the hold-over principle preserves continuity
in the transaction of official business and prevents a hiatus in
government. Thus, cases of extreme necessity justify the application
of the hold-over principle.
105

Petitioner itself states and this Court, without doubt, agrees that the
CAAP is an agency highly imbued with public interest. It is of rational
inference that a hiatus therein would be disastrous not only to the
economy, tourism and trade of the country but more so on the safety
and security of aircraft passengers, may they be Filipino citizens or
foreign nationals.
1wphi1

A final note.

On April 9, 2014, based on a March 2014 FAA review of the CAAP,

the FAA opined that the Republic ofthe Philippines complies with the
international safety standards set by the ICAO and has been granted
a Category 1 rating. The European Union also lifted the ban on
Philippine carriers. Thus, it cannot be ignored that the creation of
the CAAP through R.A. No. 9497, in one way or another, helped in
upgrading the countrys status in the arena of civil aviation. Absent
any violation of the Constitution and the other pertinent laws, rules
and regulations, this Court would not hinder in the continuous growth
and improvement of the civil aviation industry of the country.
106

107

WHEREFORE, the present petition for prohibition with prayer for

injunctive reliefs is DISMISSED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
(On official leave)MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO Chief Justice
*

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Acting Chief Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELA
Associate Justic

**

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice
(On official leave)
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice
(No Part)

ARTURO D. BRI
Associate Justic

(On official leav

LUCAS P. BERSA
Associate Justic

JOSE PORTUGAL P
Associate Justic

BIENVENIDO L. RE

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

***

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

Associate Justic

MARVIC M.V.F. LEO

Associate Justic

FRANCIS H. JARDELEZAAssociate Justice

C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, it is
hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court.
ANTONIO T. CARPIOActing Chief Justice
Footnotes
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 203974

April 22, 2014

AURELIO M. UMALI, Petitioner, vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

JULIUS CESAR V. VERGARA, and THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF
CABANATUAN, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 204371
J.V. BAUTISTA, Petitioner, vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:

Before the Court is the consolidated case for Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition with prayer for injunctive relief, docket as G.R. No.
203974, assailing Minute Resolution No. 12-0797 and Minute
Resolution No. 12-0925 dated September 11, 2012 and October 16,
2012, respectively, both promulgated by public respondent
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), and Petition for Mandamus,
docketed G.R. No. 204371, seeking to compel public respondent to
implement the same.
1

The Facts
On July 11, 2011, the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cabanatuan City
passed Resolution No. 183-2011, requesting the President to declare
the conversion of Cabanatuan City from a component city of the
province of Nueva Ecija into a highly urbanized city (HUC). Acceding
to the request, the President issued Presidential Proclamation No.
418, Series of 2012, proclaiming the City of Cabanatuan as an HUC
subject to "ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified voters therein, as
provided for in Section 453 of the Local Government Code of 1991."
Respondent COMELEC, acting on the proclamation, issued the
assailed Minute Resolution No. 12-0797 which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby
RESOLVES, that for purposes of the plebiscite for the conversion of
Cabanatuan City from component city to highly-urbanized city, only
those registered residents of Cabanatuan City should participate in
the said plebiscite.
The COMELEC based this resolution on Sec. 453 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 (LGC), citing conversion cases involving
Puerto Princesa City in Palawan, Tacloban City in Southern Leyte,
and Lapu-Lapu City in Cebu, where only the residents of the city
proposed to be converted were allowed to vote in the corresponding
plebiscite.
In due time, petitioner Aurelio M. Umali, Governor of Nueva Ecija,
filed a Verified Motion for Reconsideration, maintaining that the
proposed conversion in question will necessarily and directly affect
the mother province of Nueva Ecija. His main argument is that
Section 453 of the LGC should be interpreted in conjunction with Sec.

10, Art. X of the Constitution. He argues that while the conversion in

question does not involve the creation of a new or the dissolution of
an existing city, the spirit of the Constitutional provision calls for the
people of the local government unit (LGU) directly affected to vote in
a plebiscite whenever there is a material change in their rights and
responsibilities. The phrase "qualified voters therein" used in Sec.
453 of the LGC should then be interpreted to refer to the qualified
voters of the units directly affected by the conversion and not just
those in the component city proposed to be upgraded. Petitioner
Umali justified his position by enumerating the various adverse
effects of the Cabanatuan Citys conversion and how it will cause
material change not only in the political and economic rights of the
city and its residents but also of the province as a whole.
To the Verified Motion for Reconsideration, private respondent Julius
Cesar Vergara, city mayor of Cabanatuan, interposed an opposition
on the ground that Sec. 10, Art. X does not apply to conversions,
which is the meat of the matter. He likewise argues that a specific
provision of the LGC, Sec. 453, as couched, allows only the qualified
voters of Cabanatuan City to vote in the plebiscite. Lastly, private
respondent pointed out that when Santiago City was converted in
1994 from a municipality to an independent component city pursuant
to Republic Act No. (RA) 7720, the plebiscite held was limited to the
registered voters of the then municipality of Santiago.
Following a hearing conducted on October 4, 2012, the COMELEC
En Banc on October 16, 2012, in E.M No. 12-045 (PLEB), by a vote
of 5-2 ruled in favor of respondent Vergara through the assailed
Minute Resolution 12-0925. The dispositive portion reads:
3

The Commission, taking into consideration the arguments of counsels

including the Reply-memorandum of Oppositor, after due deliberation,
RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, as follows:
1) To DENY the Motion for Reconsideration of oppositor Governor
Aurelio M. Umali; and
2) To SCHEDULE the conduct of Plebiscite for the conversion of
Cabanatuan City from component city into highly-urbanized city with
registered residents only of Cabanatuan City to participate in said

plebiscite.
Let the Deputy Executive Director for Operations implement this
resolution.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, the Petition for Certiorari with prayer for injunctive relief,
docketed as G.R. No. 203974, on substantially the same arguments
earlier taken by petitioner Umali before the poll body. On the other
hand, public respondent COMELEC, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, maintained in its Comment that Cabanatuan City is
merely being converted from a component city into an HUC and that
the political unit directly affected by the conversion will only be the
city itself. It argues that in this instance, no political unit will be
created, merged with another, or will be removed from another LGU,
and that no boundaries will be altered. The conversion would merely
reinforce the powers and prerogatives already being exercised by the
city, with the political units probable elevation to that of an HUC as
demanded by its compliance with the criteria established under the
LGC. Thus, the participation of the voters of the entire province in the
plebiscite will not be necessary.
Private respondent will later manifest that it is adopting the Comment
of the COMELEC.
Meanwhile, on October 25, 2012, respondent COMELEC
promulgated Resolution No. 9543, which adopted a calendar of
activities and periods of prohibited acts in connection with the
conversion of Cabanatuan City into an HUC. The Resolution set the
conduct of the plebiscite on December 1, 2012. Thereafter, a certain
Dr. Rodolfo B. Punzalan filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief which
was raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 40 in Palayan
City. In the said case, Punzalan prayed that Minute Resolution No.
12-0797 be declared unconstitutional, that the trial court decree that
all qualified voters of the province of Nueva Ecija be included in the
plebiscite, and that a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) be issued
enjoining public respondent from implementing the questioned
resolution. On October 19, 2012, the RTC granted the prayer for a
TRO.

On November 6, 2012, public respondent through Minute Resolution

No. 12-0989 suspended the preparations for the event in view of the
TRO issued by the RTC. On November 27, 2012, the plebiscite was
once again rescheduled to give way to the May 13, 2013 national,
local and ARMM regional elections as per Resolution No. 9563.
After this development, petitioner J.V. Bautista, on December 3,
2012, filed a case before this Court for Mandamus, docketed as G.R.
No. 204371, praying that public respondent be ordered to schedule
the plebiscite either on December 15 or 22, 2012. Petitioner Bautista
argued that since the TRO issued by the RTC has already expired,
the duty of the public respondent to hold the plebiscite has become
mandatory and ministerial. Petitioner Bautista also alleged that the
delay in holding the plebiscite is inexcusable given the requirement
that it should be held within a period of 120 days form the date of the
Presidents declaration.
In its Comment to the Bautista petition, public respondent justified its
position by arguing that mandamus will not issue to enforce a right
which is in substantial dispute. With all the legal conflicts surrounding
the case, it cannot be said that there is a clear showing of petitioner
Bautistas entitlement to the relief sought. Respondent COMELEC
likewise relied on Sec. 5 of the Omnibus Election Code to justify the
postponements, citing incidents of violence that ensued in the locality
during the plebiscite period.
After the conclusion of the 2013 elections, public respondent issued
Resolution No. 1353 scheduling the plebiscite to January 25, 2014.
However, a TRO was issued by this Court on January 15, 2014 in
G.R. No. 203974 to suspend the conduct of the plebiscite for
Cabanatuan Citys conversion. Given the intertwining factual milieu of
the two petitions before the Court, both cases were consolidated on
March 18, 2014.
The Issue
The bone of contention in the present controversy boils down to
whether the qualified registered voters of the entire province of Nueva
Ecija or only those in Cabanatuan City can participate in the
plebiscite called for the conversion of Cabanatuan City from a

component city into an HUC.

Resolving the Petition for Certiorari either way will necessarily render
the Petition for Mandamus moot and academic for ultimately, the
public respondent will be ordered to hold the plebiscite. The only
variation will be as regards its participants.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition for Certiorari is meritorious.
Sec. 453 of the LGC should be interpreted in accordance with Sec.
10, Art. X of the Constitution
Petitioner Umali asseverates that Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution
should be the basis for determining the qualified voters who will
participate in the plebiscite to resolve the issue. Sec. 10, Art. X reads:
Section 10, Article X. No province, city, municipality, or barangay
may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary
substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and subject to approval by
a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected. (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner Umali elucidates that the phrase "political units directly
affected" necessarily encompasses not only Cabanatuan City but the
entire province of Nueva Ecija. Hence, all the registered voters in the
province are qualified to cast their votes in resolving the proposed
conversion of Cabanatuan City.
On the other hand, respondents invoke Sec. 453 of the LGC to
support their claim that only the City of Cabanatuan should be
allowed to take part in the voting. Sec. 453 states:
Section 453. Duty to Declare Highly Urbanized Status. It shall be
the duty of the President to declare a city as highly urbanized within
thirty (30) days after it shall have met the minimum requirements
prescribed in the immediately preceding Section, upon proper
application therefor and ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified
voters therein. (emphasis supplied)

Respondents take the phrase "registered voters therein" in Sec. 453

as referring only to the registered voters in the city being converted,
excluding in the process the voters in the remaining towns and cities
of Nueva Ecija.
Before proceeding to unravel the seeming conflict between the two
provisions, it is but proper that we ascertain first the relationship
between Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution and Sec. 453 of the LGC.
First of all, we have to restate the general principle that legislative
power cannot be delegated. Nonetheless, the general rule barring
delegation is subject to certain exceptions allowed in the Constitution,
namely:
(1) Delegation by Congress to the President of the power to fix "tariff
rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and
other duties or imposts within the framework of the national
development program of the Government" under Section 28(2) of
Article VI of the Constitution; and
(2) Delegation of emergency powers by Congress to the President "to
exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared
national policy" in times of war and other national emergency under
Section 23(2) of Article VI of the Constitution.
The power to create, divide, merge, abolish or substantially alter
boundaries of provinces, cities, municipalities or barangays, which is
pertinent in the case at bar, is essentially legislative in nature. The
framers of the Constitution have, however, allowed for the delegation
of such power in Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution as long as (1) the
criteria prescribed in the LGC is met and (2) the creation, division,
merger, abolition or the substantial alteration of the boundaries is
subject to the approval by a majority vote in a plebiscite.
5

True enough, Congress delegated such power to the Sangguniang

Panlalawigan or Sangguniang Panlungsod to create barangays
pursuant to Sec. 6 of the LGC, which provides:
Section 6. Authority to Create Local Government Units. - A local
government unit may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its
boundaries substantially altered either by law enacted by Congress in

the case of a province, city, municipality, or any other political

subdivision, or by ordinance passed by the sangguniang
panlalawigan or sangguniang panlungsod concerned in the case of a
barangay located within its territorial jurisdiction, subject to such
limitations and requirements prescribed in this Code." (emphasis
supplied)
The guidelines for the exercise of this authority have sufficiently been
outlined by the various LGC provisions detailing the requirements for
the creation of barangays , municipalities , cities , and provinces .
Moreover, compliance with the plebiscite requirement under the
Constitution has also been directed by the LGC under its Sec. 10,
which reads:
6

Section 10. Plebiscite Requirement. No creation, division, merger,

abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government
units shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the votes cast
in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the political unit or units
directly affected." (emphasis supplied)
With the twin criteria of standard and plebiscite satisfied, the
delegation to LGUs of the power to create, divide, merge, abolish or
substantially alter boundaries has become a recognized exception to
the doctrine of non-delegation of legislative powers.
Likewise, legislative power was delegated to the President under
Sec. 453 of the LGC quoted earlier, which states:
Section 453. Duty to Declare Highly Urbanized Status. It shall be
the duty of the President to declare a city as highly urbanized within
thirty (30) days after it shall have met the minimum requirements
prescribed in the immediately preceding Section, upon proper
application therefor and ratification in a plebiscite by the qualified
voters therein.
In this case, the provision merely authorized the President to make a
determination on whether or not the requirements under Sec. 452 of
the LGC are complied with. The provision makes it ministerial for the
President, upon proper application, to declare a component city as
highly urbanized once the minimum requirements, which are based
on certifiable and measurable indices under Sec. 452, are satisfied.
10

The mandatory language "shall" used in the provision leaves the

President with no room for discretion.
In so doing, Sec. 453, in effect, automatically calls for the conduct of
a plebiscite for purposes of conversions once the requirements are
met. No further legislation is necessary before the city proposed to be
converted becomes eligible to become an HUC through ratification,
as the basis for the delegation of the legislative authority is the very
LGC.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the Court concludes that the
source of the delegation of power to the LGUs under Sec. 6 of the
LGC and to the President under Sec. 453 of the same code is none
other than Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution.
Respondents, however, posit that Sec. 453 of the LGC is actually
outside the ambit of Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution, considering
that the conversion of a component city to an HUC is not "creation,
division, merge, abolition or substantial alternation of boundaries"
encompassed by the said constitutional provision.
This proposition is bereft of merit.
First, the Courts pronouncement in Miranda vs. Aguirre is apropos
and may be applied by analogy. While Miranda involves the
downgrading, instead of upgrading, as here, of an independent
component city into a component city, its application to the case at
bar is nonetheless material in ascertaining the proper treatment of
conversions. In that seminal case, the Court held that the
downgrading of an independent component city into a component city
comes within the purview of Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution.
11

In Miranda, the rationale behind the afore-quoted constitutional

provision and its application to cases of conversion were discussed
thusly:
A close analysis of the said constitutional provision will reveal that the
creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of
boundaries of local government units involve a common denominator
- - - material change in the political and economic rights of the local
government units directly affected as well as the people therein. It is

precisely for this reason that the Constitution requires the approval of
the people "in the political units directly affected." It is not difficult to
appreciate the rationale of this constitutional requirement. The 1987
Constitution, more than any of our previous Constitutions, gave more
reality to the sovereignty of our people for it was borne out of the
people power in the 1986 EDSA revolution. Its Section 10, Article X
addressed the undesirable practice in the past whereby local
government units were created, abolished, merged or divided on the
basis of the vagaries of politics and not of the welfare of the people.
Thus, the consent of the people of the local government unit directly
affected was required to serve as a checking mechanism to any
exercise of legislative power creating, dividing, abolishing, merging or
altering the boundaries of local government units. It is one instance
where the people in their sovereign capacity decide on a matter that
affects them - - - direct democracy of the people as opposed to
democracy thru peoples representatives. This plebiscite requirement
is also in accord with the philosophy of the Constitution granting more
autonomy to local government units.
12

It was determined in the case that the changes that will result from
the conversion are too substantial that there is a necessity for the
plurality of those that will be affected to approve it. Similar to the
enumerated acts in the constitutional provision, conversions were
found to result in material changes in the economic and political rights
of the people and LGUs affected. Given the far-reaching ramifications
of converting the status of a city, we held that the plebiscite
requirement under the constitutional provision should equally apply to
conversions as well. Thus, RA 8528 was declared unconstitutional in
Miranda on the ground that the law downgraded Santiago City in
Isabela without submitting it for ratification in a plebiscite, in
contravention of Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution.
13

Second, while conversion to an HUC is not explicitly provided in Sec.

10, Art. X of the Constitution we nevertheless observe that the
conversion of a component city into an HUC is substantial alteration
of boundaries.
As the phrase implies, "substantial alteration of boundaries" involves
and necessarily entails a change in the geographical configuration of
a local government unit or units. However, the phrase "boundaries"

should not be limited to the mere physical one, referring to the metes
and bounds of the LGU, but also to its political boundaries. It also
connotes a modification of the demarcation lines between political
subdivisions, where the LGUs exercise of corporate power ends and
that of the other begins. And as a qualifier, the alteration must be
"substantial" for it to be within the ambit of the constitutional
provision.
Pertinent is Art. 12(c) of the LGCs Implementing Rules and
Regulations, which reads:
Art. 12. Conversion of a Component City into a Highly Urbanized City.

xxxx
(c) Effect of Conversion The conversion of a component city into a
highly-urbanized city shall make it independent of the province where
it is geographically located. (emphasis added)
Verily, the upward conversion of a component city, in this case
Cabanatuan City, into an HUC will come at a steep price. It can be
gleaned from the above-cited rule that the province will inevitably
suffer a corresponding decrease in territory brought about by
Cabanatuan Citys gain of independence. With the citys newfound
autonomy, it will be free from the oversight powers of the province,
which, in effect, reduces the territorial jurisdiction of the latter. What
once formed part of Nueva Ecija will no longer be subject to
supervision by the province. In more concrete terms, Nueva Ecija
stands to lose 282.75 sq. km. of its territorial jurisdiction with
Cabanatuan Citys severance from its mother province. This is
equivalent to carving out almost 5% of Nueva Ecijas 5,751.3 sq. km.
area. This sufficiently satisfies the requirement that the alteration be
"substantial."
Needless to stress, the alteration of boundaries would necessarily
follow Cabanatuan Citys conversion in the same way that creations,
divisions, mergers, and abolitions generally cannot take place without
entailing the alteration. The enumerated acts, after all, are not
mutually exclusive, and more often than not, a combination of these
acts attends the reconfiguration of LGUs.

In light of the foregoing disquisitions, the Court rules that conversion

to an HUC is substantial alternation of boundaries governed by Sec.
10, Art. X and resultantly, said provision applies, governs and prevails
over Sec. 453 of the LGC.
Moreover, the rules of statutory construction dictate that a particular
provision should be interpreted with the other relevant provisions in
the law The Court finds that it is actually Sec. 10 of the LGC which is
undeniably the applicable provision on the conduct of plebiscites. The
title of the provision itself, "Plebiscite Requirement", makes this
obvious. It requires a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called
for the purpose in the political unit or units directly affected. On the
other hand, Sec. 453 of the LGC, entitled "Duty to Declare Highly
Urbanized Status", is only on the duty to declare a city as highly
urbanized. It mandates the Office of the President to make the
declaration after the city has met the requirements under Sec. 452,
and upon proper application and ratification in a plebiscite. The
conduct of a plebiscite is then a requirement before a declaration can
be made. Thus, the Court finds that Sec. 10 of the LGC prevails over
Sec. 453 of the LGC on the plebiscite requirement.
We now take the bull by the horns and resolve the issue whether
Sec. 453 of the LGC trenches on Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution.
Hornbook doctrine is that neither the legislative, the executive, nor
the judiciary has the power to act beyond the Constitutions mandate.
The Constitution is supreme; any exercise of power beyond what is
circumscribed by the Constitution is ultra vires and a nullity. As
elucidated by former Chief Justice Enrique Fernando in Fernandez v.
Cuerva:
14

Where the assailed legislative or executive act is found by the

judiciary to be contrary to the Constitution, it is null and void. As the
new Civil Code puts it: "When the courts declare a law to be
inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the
latter shall govern." Administrative or executive acts, orders and
regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws
or the Constitution. The above provision of the civil Code reflects the
orthodox view that an unconstitutional act, whether legislative or
executive, is not a law, confers no rights, imposes no duties, and

affords no protection. x x x
Applying this orthodox view, a law should be construed in harmony
with and not in violation of the Constitution. In a long line of cases,
the cardinal principle of construction established is that a statute
should be interpreted to assure its being in consonance with, rather
than repugnant to, any constitutional command or prescription. If
there is doubt or uncertainty as to the meaning of the legislative, if the
words or provisions are obscure or if the enactment is fairly
susceptible of two or more constitution, that interpretation which will
avoid the effect of unconstitutionality will be adopted, even though it
may be necessary, for this purpose, to disregard the more usual or
apparent import of the language used.
15

16

17

Pursuant to established jurisprudence, the phrase "by the qualified

voters therein" in Sec. 453 should be construed in a manner that will
avoid conflict with the Constitution. If one takes the plain meaning of
the phrase in relation to the declaration by the President that a city is
an HUC, then, Sec. 453 of the LGC will clash with the explicit
provision under Sec. 10, Art. X that the voters in the "political units
directly affected" shall participate in the plebiscite. Such construction
should be avoided in view of the supremacy of the Constitution. Thus,
the Court treats the phrase "by the qualified voters therein" in Sec.
453 to mean the qualified voters not only in the city proposed to be
converted to an HUC but also the voters of the political units directly
affected by such conversion in order to harmonize Sec. 453 with Sec.
10, Art. X of the Constitution.
The Court finds that respondents are mistaken in construing Sec. 453
in a vacuum. Their interpretation of Sec. 453 of the LGC runs afoul of
Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution which explicitly requires that all
residents in the "political units directly affected" should be made to
vote.
Respondents make much of the plebiscites conducted in connection
with the conversion of Puerto Princesa City, Tacloban City and LapuLapu City where the ratification was made by the registered voters in
said cities alone. It is clear, however, that the issue of who are entitled
to vote in said plebiscites was not properly raised or brought up in an
actual controversy. The issue on who will vote in a plebiscite involving

a conversion into an HUC is a novel issue, and this is the first time
that the Court is asked to resolve the question. As such, the past
plebiscites in the aforementioned cities have no materiality or
relevance to the instant petition. Suffice it to say that conversion of
said cities prior to this judicial declaration will not be affected or
prejudiced in any manner following the operative fact doctrinethat
the actual existence of a statute prior to such a determination is an
operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be
erased by a new judicial declaration.
18

The entire province of Nueva Ecija will be directlyaffected by

Cabanatuan Citys conversion
After the Court has resolved the seeming irreconcilability of Sec. 10,
Art. X of the Constitution and Sec. 453 of the LGC, it is now time to
elucidate the meaning of the phrase "political units directly affected"
under Sec. 10, Art. X.
a. "Political units directly affected" defined
In identifying the LGU or LGUs that should be allowed to take part in
the plebiscite, what should primarily be determined is whether or not
the unit or units that desire to participate will be "directly affected" by
the change. To interpret the phrase, Tan v. COMELEC and Padilla v.
COMELEC are worth revisiting.
19

20

We have ruled in Tan, involving the division of Negros Occidental for

the creation of the new province of Negros del Norte, that the LGUs
whose boundaries are to be altered and whose economy would be
affected are entitled to participate in the plebiscite. As held:
It can be plainly seen that the aforecited constitutional provision
makes it imperative that there be first obtained "the approval of a
majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected"
whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there is
substantial alteration of the boundaries. It is thus inescapable to
conclude that the boundaries of the existing province of Negros
Occidental would necessarily be substantially altered by the division
of its existing boundaries in order that there can be created the
proposed new province of Negros del Norte. Plain and simple logic
will demonstrate than that two political units would be affected.

The first would be the parent province of Negros Occidental because

its boundaries would be substantially altered. The other affected
entity would be composed of those in the area subtracted from the
mother province to constitute the proposed province of Negros del
Norte.
21

xxxx
To form the new province of Negros del Norte no less than three
cities and eight municipalities will be subtracted from the parent
province of Negros Occidental. This will result in the removal of
approximately 2,768.4 square kilometers from the land area of an
existing province whose boundaries will be consequently substantially
altered. It becomes easy to realize that the consequent effects of the
division of the parent province necessarily will affect all the people
living in the separate areas of Negros Occidental and the proposed
province of Negros del Norte. The economy of the parent province as
well as that of the new province will be inevitably affected, either for
the better or for the worse. Whatever be the case, either or both of
these political groups will be affected and they are, therefore, the unit
or units referred to in Section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution which
must be included in the plebiscite contemplated therein. (emphasis
added)
22

Sec. 3, Art. XI of the 1973 Constitution, as invoked in Tan, states:

SEC. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created,
divided, merged abolished, or its boundary substantially altered,
except in accordance with the criteria established in the local
government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the
votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected. (emphasis added)
Despite the change in phraseology compared to what is now Sec. 10,
Art. X, we affirmed our ruling in Tan in the latter case of Padilla. As
held, the removal of the phrase "unit or" only served to sustain the
earlier finding that what is contemplated by the phase "political units
directly affected" is the plurality of political units which would
participate in the plebiscite. As reflected in the journal of the
Constitutional Commission:
23

Mr. Maambong: While we have already approved the deletion of "unit

or," I would like to inform the Committee that under the formulation in
the present Local Government Code, the words used are actually
"political unit or units." However, I do not know the implication of the
use of these words. Maybe there will be no substantial difference, but
I just want to inform the Committee about this.
Mr. Nolledo: Can we not adhere to the original "unit or units"? Will
there be no objection on the part of the two Gentlemen from the
floor?
Mr. Davide: I would object. I precisely asked for the deletion of the
words "unit or" because in the plebiscite to be conducted, it must
involve all the units affected. If it is the creation of a barangay
plebiscite because it is affected. It would mean a loss of a territory.
(emphasis added)
The same sentiment was shared by the Senate during its
deliberations on Senate Bill No. 155the predecessor of the LGC
thus:
Senator Guingona. Can we make that clearer by example? Let us
assume that a province has municipalities and there is a merger of
two municipalities. Would this therefore mean that the plebiscite will
be conducted within the two merged municipalities and not in the
eight other municipalities?
Senator Pimentel. The whole province, Mr. President, will be affected,
and that is the reason we probably have to involve the entire
province.
Senator Guingona. So the plebiscite will not be held only in the two
municipalities which are being merged, but the entire province will
now have to undergo.
Senator Pimentel. I suppose that was the ruling in the Negros del
Norte case.
Senator Guingona. Supposing it refers to barangays, will the entire
municipality have to vote? There are two barangays being merged,
say, out of 100 barangays. Would the entire municipality have to
participate in the plebiscite?

Senator Pimentel. Yes, Mr. President, because the municipality is

affected directly by the merger of two of its barangay.
Senator Guingona. And, if, out of 100 barangay, 51 are being
merged, abolished, whatever, would the rest of the municipality not
participate in the plebiscite?
Senator Pimentel. Do all the 51 barangay that the Gentleman
mentioned, Mr. President, belong to one municipality?
Senator Guingona. Yes.
Senator Pimentel. Then it will only involve the municipality where the
51 barangays belong.
Senator Guingona. Yes. So, the entire municipality will now have to
undergo a plebiscite.
Senator Pimentel. That is correct, Mr. President.
Senator Guingona. In the earlier example, if it is only a merger of two
municipalities, let us say, in a province with 10 municipalities the
entire province will the other municipalities although not affected
also have to participate in the plebiscite?
Senator Pimentel. Yes. The reason is that the municipalities are
within the territorial boundaries of the province itself, it will have to be
altered as a result of the two municipalities that the Gentleman
mentioned.
24

In the more recent case of Miranda, the interpretation in Tan and

Padilla was modified to include not only changes in economic but
also political rights in the criteria for determining whether or not an
LGU shall be considered "directly affected." Nevertheless, the
requirement that the plebiscite be participated in by the plurality of
political units directly affected remained.
b. Impact on Economic Rights
To recall, it was held in Miranda that the changes that will result in the
downgrading of an LGU from an independent component city to a

component city cannot be categorized as insubstantial, thereby

necessitating the conduct of a plebiscite for its ratification. In a similar
fashion, herein petitioner Umali itemized the adverse effects of
Cabanatuan Citys conversion to the province of Nueva Ecija to justify
the provinces participation in the plebiscite to be conducted.
Often raised is that Cabanatuan Citys conversion into an HUC and
its severance from Nueva Ecija will result in the reduction of the
Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) to the province based on Sec. 285
of the LGC. The law states:
Section 285. Allocation to Local Government Units. - The share of
local government units in the internal revenue allotment shall be
collected in the following manner:
(a) Provinces - Twenty-three percent (23%);
(b) Cities - Twenty-three percent (23%);
(c) Municipalities - Thirty-four percent (34%); and
(d) Barangays - Twenty percent (20%)
Provided, however, That the share of each province, city, and
municipality shall be determined on the basis of the following formula:
(a) Population - Fifty percent (50%);
(b) Land Area - Twenty-five percent (25%); and
(c) Equal sharing - Twenty-five percent (25%)
In our earlier disquisitions, we have explained that the conversion into
an HUC carries the accessory of substantial alteration of boundaries
and that the province of Nueva Ecija will, without a doubt, suffer a
reduction in territory because of the severance of Cabanatuan City.
The residents of the city will cease to be political constituencies of the
province, effectively reducing the latters population. Taking this
decrease in territory and population in connection with the above
formula, it is conceded that Nueva Ecija will indeed suffer a reduction
in IRA given the decrease of its multipliers values. As assessed by

the Regional Director of the Department of Budget and Management

(DBM) for Region III:
25

Basis for IRA

Computation

Province of
Nueva Ecija

Cabanatuan
City

Provin
Nueva Ec
of Caban
Cit

No. of PopulationCY
2007 Census

1,843,853

259,267

259,2

Land Area
(sq. km.)

5,751.33

282.75

5,468

IRA Share of
Nueva Ecija

Actual IRA
Share

Estimated IRA
share excluding
Cabanatuan
City

Reduc

Based on
Population

P800,772,618.45

P688,174,751.66

P112,597

Based on Land
Area

P263,470,472.62

P250,517,594.56

P 12,952

Total
Clear as crystal is that the province of Nueva Ecija will suffer a
substantial reduction of its share in IRA once Cabanatuan City attains
autonomy. In view of the economic impact of Cabanatuan Citys
conversion, petitioner Umalis contention, that its effect on the
province is not only direct but also adverse, deserves merit.
Moreover, his claim that the province will lose shares in provincial
taxes imposed in Cabanatuan City is well-founded. This is based on
Sec. 151 of the LGC, which states:
SECTION 151. Scope of Taxing Powers. Except as otherwise
provided in this Code, the city, may levy the taxes, fees, and charges
which the province or municipality may impose: Provided, however,

P125,550,7

That the taxes, fees and charges levied and collected by highly
urbanized and independent component cities shall accrue to them
and distributed in accordance with the provisions of this Code.
(emphasis added)
Once converted, the taxes imposed by the HUC will accrue to itself.
Prior to this, the province enjoys the prerogative to impose and collect
taxes such as those on sand, gravel and other quarry resources,
professional taxes, and amusement taxes over the component city.
While, it may be argued that this is not a derogation of the provinces
taxing power because it is in no way deprived of its right to collect the
mentioned taxes from the rest of its territory, the conversion will still
reduce the provinces taxing jurisdiction, and corollary to this, it will
experience a corresponding decrease in shares in local tax
collections. This reduction in both taxing jurisdiction and shares
poses a material and substantial change to the provinces economic
rights, warranting its participation in the plebiscite.

26

27

28

To further exemplify the impact of these changes, a perusal of Secs.

452(a) and 461(a) of the LGC is in order, viz:
Section 452. Highly Urbanized Cities.
(a) Cities with a minimum population of two hundred thousand
(200,000) inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office, and
within the latest annual income of at least Fifty Million Pesos
(P50,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices, as certified by the
city treasurer, shall be classified as highly urbanized cities.
Section 461. Requisites for Creation.
(a) A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as
certified by the Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million
pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991 constant prices and either of
the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square
kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000)
inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office:

Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area,
population, and income of the original unit or units at the time of said
creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein.
A component citys conversion into an HUC and its resultant
autonomy from the province is a threat to the latters economic
viability. Noteworthy is that the income criterion for a component city
to be converted into an HUC is higher than the income requirement
for the creation of a province. The ensuing reduction in income upon
separation would clearly leave a crippling effect on the provinces
operations as there would be less funding to finance infrastructure
projects and to defray overhead costs. Moreover, the quality of
services being offered by the province may suffer because of looming
austerity measures. These are but a few of the social costs of the
decline in the provinces economic performance, which Nueva Ecija is
bound to experience once its most progressive city of Cabanatuan
attains independence.
c. Impact on Political Rights
Aside from the alteration of economic rights, the political rights of
Nueva Ecija and those of its residents will also be affected by
Cabanatuans conversion into an HUC. Notably, the administrative
supervision of the province over the city will effectively be revoked
upon conversion. Secs. 4 and 12, Art. X of the Constitution read:
Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general
supervision over local governments. Provinces with respect to
component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with
respect to component barangays shall ensure that the acts of their
component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and
functions.
Sec 12. Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law, and
component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for
provincial elective officials, shall be independent of the province. The
voters of component cities within a province, whose charters contain
no such prohibition, shall not be deprived of their right to vote for
elective provincial officials.
Duties, privileges and obligations appertaining to HUCs will attach to

Cabanatuan City if it is converted into an HUC. This includes the right

to be outside the general supervision of the province and be under
the direct supervision of the President. An HUC is not subject to
provincial oversight because the complex and varied problems in an
HUC due to a bigger population and greater economic activity require
greater autonomy. The provincial government stands to lose the
power to ensure that the local government officials of Cabanatuan
City act within the scope of its prescribed powers and functions, to
review executive orders issued by the city mayor, and to approve
resolutions and ordinances enacted by the city council. The province
will also be divested of jurisdiction over disciplinary cases concerning
the elected city officials of the new HUC, and the appeal process for
administrative case decisions against barangay officials of the city will
also be modified accordingly. Likewise, the registered voters of the
city will no longer be entitled to vote for and be voted upon as
provincial officials.
29

30

31

32

33

In cutting the umbilical cord between Cabanatuan City and the

province of Nueva Ecija, the city will be separated from the territorial
jurisdiction of the province, as earlier explained. The provincial
government will no longer be responsible for delivering basic services
for the city residents benefit. Ordinances and resolutions passed by
the provincial council will no longer cover the city. Projects queued by
the provincial government to be executed in the city will also be
suspended if not scrapped to prevent the LGU from performing
functions outside the bounds of its territorial jurisdiction, and from
expending its limited resources for ventures that do not cater to its
constituents.
1wphi1

In view of these changes in the economic and political rights of the

province of Nueva Ecija and its residents, the entire province certainly
stands to be directly affected by the conversion of Cabanatuan City
into an HUC. Following the doctrines in Tan and Padilla, all the
qualified registered voters of Nueva Ecija should then be allowed to
participate in the plebiscite called for that purpose.
Respondents apprehension that requiring the entire province to
participate in the plebiscite will set a dangerous precedent leading to
the failure of cities to convert is unfounded. Their fear that provinces
will always be expected to oppose the conversion in order to retain

the citys dependence is speculative at best. In any event, any vote of

disapproval cast by those directly affected by the conversion is a valid
exercise of their right to suffrage, and our democratic processes are
designed to uphold the decision of the majority, regardless of the
motive behind the vote. It is unfathomable how the province can be
deprived of the opportunity to exercise the right of suffrage in a matter
that is potentially deleterious to its economic viability and could
diminish the rights of its constituents. To limit the plebiscite to only the
voters of the areas to be partitioned and seceded from the province is
as absurd and illogical as allowing only the secessionists to vote for
the secession that they demanded against the wishes of the majority
and to nullify the basic principle of majority rule.
34

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari,

docketed as G.R. No. 203974, is hereby GRANTED. COMELEC
Minute Resolution No. 12-0797 dated September 11, 2012 and
Minute Resolution No. 12-0925 dated October 16, 2012 are hereby
declared NULL and VOID. Public respondent COMELEC is hereby
enjoined from implementing the said Resolutions. Additionally,
COMELEC is hereby ordered to conduct a plebiscite for the purpose
of converting Cabanatuan City into a Highly Urbanized City to be
participated in by the qualified registered voters of Nueva Ecij a within
120 days from the finality of this Decision. The Petition for
Mandamus, docketed as G.R. No. 204371, is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
I join Dissent of J. LeonenMA. LOURDES P. A. SERENOChief
Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDOAssociate Justic

DIOSDADO M. PER
Associate Justic

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CA
Associate Justic

Took no part.
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

I join the Dissent of J.

MARTIN S. VILLARA
Associate Justic

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

I join the dissent of J.

JOSE CATRAL MEN
Associate Justic

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

ESTELA M. PERLAS-B
Associate Justic

I dissent. See Separate OpinionMARVIC MARIO VICTOR F.

LEONENAssociate Justice
C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court.
MA. LOURDES P. A. SERENOChief Justice
CERTIFIED TRUE COPYENRIQUE ESGUERRA-VIDALClerk of
CourtOCC-En BancSupreme Court
Footnotes
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 188179

January 22, 2013

HENRY R. GIRON, Petitioner, vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

Respondent,
ALMARIO E. FRANCISCO, FEDERICO S. JONG JR., and
RICARDO L. BAES JR., Petitioners-in-Intervention.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ.:
Before the Court is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition
assailing the constitutionality of Section 12 (Substitution of
Candidates) and Section 14 (Repealing Clause) of Republic Act No.
(R.A.) 9006, otherwise known as the Fair Election Act. The present
Petition also seeks to prohibit the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) from further implementing the aforesaid sections of the
Fa1r Election Act, on the ground that these provisions would enable
elective officials to gain campaign advantage and allow them to
disburse public funds from the time they file their certificates of
candidacy until after the elections.
On the one hand, petitioner Henry R. Giron (Giron) asserts that the
insertion of Sections 12 and 14 in the Fair Election Act violates
Section 26(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which specifically
requires: "Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof." Petitioner avers
that these provisions are unrelated to the main subject of the Fair
Election Act: the lifting of the political ad ban. Section 12 refers to the
treatment of the votes cast for substituted candidates after the official
ballots have been printed, while Section 14 pertains to the repeal of
Section 67 (Candidates holding elective office) of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code. Section 67
of this law concerns the ipso facto resignation of elective officials
immediately after they file their respective certificates of candidacy for
an office other than that which they are currently holding in a
permanent capacity.
On the other hand, respondent Jose Melo, then chairperson of the
COMELEC, opposes the Petition and argues inter alia that this Court
has already resolved the matter in Farias v. Executive Secretary.1
Almario E. Francisco, Federico S. Jong Jr., and Ricardo L. Baes Jr.

filed their respective petitions-in-intervention, 2 which essentially

reiterated the ratiocinations of Giron.
Issue
Whether or not the inclusion of Sections 12 and 14 in the Fair
Election Act violates Section 26(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution,
or the "one subject-one title" rule.
Ruling
It is a well-settled rule that courts are to adopt a liberal interpretation
in favor of the constitutionality of a legislation, 3 as Congress is
deemed to have enacted a valid, sensible, and just law. 4 Because of
this strong presumption, the one who asserts the invalidity of a law
has to prove that there is a clear, unmistakable, and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution; otherwise, the petition must fail. 5
After a thorough review of the arguments raised, we find that
petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention were unable to present a
compelling reason that would surpass the strong presumption of
validity and constitutionality in favor of the Fair Election Act. They
have not put forward any gripping justification to reverse our ruling in
Farias, in which we have already ruled that the title and the
objectives of R.A. 9006 are comprehensive enough to include
subjects other than the lifting of the ban on the use of media for
election propaganda. Below is a reproduction of our exhaustive
exposition on the matter in the 10 December 2003 En Banc
Decision:6
At the core of the controversy is Section 14, the repealing clause of
Rep. Act No. 9006, which provides:
SECTION 14. Repealing Clause. Sections 67 and 85 of the
Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881) and Sections 10
and 11 of Republic Act No. 6646 are hereby repealed. As a
consequence, the first proviso in the third paragraph of Section 11 of
Republic Act No. 8436 is rendered ineffective. All laws, presidential
decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations, or any part thereof
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed or
modified or amended accordingly.

The repealed provision, Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code,

quoted earlier, reads:
SECTION 67. Candidates holding elective office.
Any elective official, whether national or local, running for any
office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity,
except for President and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso
facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy.
xxxx
The proscription under Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution is
aimed against the evils of the so-called omnibus bills and log-rolling
legislation as well as surreptitious and/or unconsidered encroaches.
The provision merely calls for all parts of an act relating to its subject
finding expression in its title.
To determine whether there has been compliance with the
constitutional requirement that the subject of an act shall be
expressed in its title, the Court laid down the rule that
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of
statutes should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede
the power of legislation. The requirement that the subject of an act
shall be expressed in its title should receive a reasonable and not a
technical construction. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive
enough reasonably to include the general object which a statute
seeks to effect, without expressing each and every end and means
necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that object. Mere
details need not be set forth. The title need not be an abstract or
index of the Act.
The title of Rep. Act No. 9006 reads: "An Act to Enhance the Holding
of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through
Fair Election Practices." Section 2 of the law provides not only the
declaration of principles but also the objectives thereof:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Principles. The State shall, during the
election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of

all franchises or permits for the operation of media of communication

or information to guarantee or ensure equal opportunity for public
service, including access to media time and space, and the equitable
right to reply, for public information campaigns and for among
candidates and assure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible
elections.
The State shall ensure that bona fide candidates for any public office
shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination.
The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of Rep. Act
No. 9006 are comprehensive enough to include the repeal of Section
67 of the Omnibus Election Code within its contemplation. To require
that the said repeal of Section 67 of the Code be expressed in the
title is to insist that the title be a complete index of its content.
The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election
Code, which imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an
office other than the one they are holding, to the other provisions of
Rep. Act No. 9006, which deal with the lifting of the ban on the use of
media for election propaganda, does not violate the "one subject-one
title" rule. This Court has held that an act having a single general
subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions,
no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not
inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be
considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method
and means of carrying out the general subject.
xxxx
Moreover, the avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the
subject of a bill should be embraced in its title is to apprise the
legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions,
and prevent the enactment into law of matters which have not
received the notice, action and study of the legislators and the public.
In this case, it cannot be claimed that the legislators were not
apprised of the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as
the same was amply and comprehensively deliberated upon by the
members of the House. (Emphases supplied and citations omitted)
The reasoning behind Farias similarly applies to the claim of

unconstitutionality with respect to Section 12 of the Fair Election Act.

The questioned provision reads:
SECTION 12. Substitution of Candidates. In case of valid
substitutions after the official ballots have been printed, the votes cast
for the substituted candidates shall be considered as stray votes but
shall not invalidate the whole ballot. For this purpose, the official
ballots shall provide spaces where the voters may write the name of
the substitute candidates if they are voting for the latter: Provided,
however, That if the substitute candidate is of the same family name,
this provision shall not apply.
To give a contextual background, we observe that Congress
consciously looked for a more generic title in order to express the
thrust of the law. Below is an excerpt from the Bicameral Conference
Committee deliberations:7
CHAIRMAN SYJUCO. x x x x. First of all, we will need to answer
when we get back to our own chamber what it is that there seems to
be a rider here that does not seem to be pertinent or relevant to
the...germane to the spirit. And in fact that title and the purpose for
this very Act -It is an Act to enhance the holding of free, orderly,
honest, peaceful, and credible elections through fair election
practices.
It is the opinion of many of us in the House that this should be the
subject of another legislation rather than a rider "kuno" on legislation
that is...that refers totally to a different subject matter. So thats one. x
xxx
CHAIRMAN SYJUCO. Okay. May we jump a little ahead of ourselves,
no. But I think its necessary to get a little ahead so that we can be
enlightened as to how this will fit, these particular things will fit into
the whole pie, no. So, what sort of title then would emanate so as to
accommodate a subject matter which under the present title or the
proposed titles or the title from the House or the title from the Senate
would seem to be more appropriately the subject of another
legislation?
May I draw on the experience of the Chairman for this, please?

CHAIRMAN ROCO. Yes. We really studied that very carefully and we

weighed, and thats why we recommended as a last thing was fair
election practices, and we combed in fact the laws. It becomes fair
election practices. We went through all the different laws pa kung
meron pa kaming maii-spot na unfairness para ipapasok pa, pero
wala na eh. The unfairness were in the opportunity lang to run and
then youre disqualified when you run for something else. Ngayon we
restrict it only for President and Vice President. You forfeit...its the
reverse really of the present law. x x x x.
CHAIRMAN SYJUCO. Okay. So do you believe, Mr. Chairman, that
we can find an appropriate title for this so that it will not stick out like a
sword and seem to be inappropriate as part of the whole body?
CHAIRMAN ROCO. Will you feel comfortable with fair election
practices? Baka okey na because its really fair na. x x x x.
CHAIRMAN SYJUCO. So if the scope can be widened so as to cover
this as well, then it should be all right.
SEN. LEGARDA-LEVISTE. Yes, Mr. Chairman. I just wanted to
clarify. So all were looking for now is appropriate title to make it
broader so that it would cover this provision. Is that correct?
CHAIRMAN SYJUCO. Were looking for an appropriate coverage
which will result in the nomenclature.
SEN. LEGARDA-LEVISTE. Because I really do not believe that it is
out-of-place. I think that even with the term FAIR ELECTION
PRACTICE it really covers it. Because as expressed by Sen. Roco,
those conditions stated earlier seemed unfair and it is an election
practice and therefore, I think Im very comfortable with the title FAIR
ELECTION PRACTICE so that we can get over with these things so
that we dont come back again until we find the title. I mean its one
provision which I think is fair for everybody. It may seem like a
limitation but this limitation actually provides for fairness in election
practices as the title implies. x x x x.
CHAIRPERSON MARCOS. Mr. Chairman, may I just make the
observation that although it is true that the bulk of provisions deals
with the area of propaganda and political advertising, the complete
title is actually one that indulge full coverage. It says, AN ACT TO

ENHANCE THE HOLDING OF FREE, ORDERLY, HONEST, etcetera

ELECTIONS through fair election practices. But as we said we will
put that aside to discuss later on.
Secondly, I think the declaration of principles contained in Section 2,
paragraph 2, is perfectly adequate and that it says that it shall ensure
candidates for public office that be free from any form of harassment
and discrimination. Surely, this provision in Section 67 of the old
Election
Code of the existing Omnibus Election Code is a form of harassment
or discrimination. And so I think that in the effort at leveling the
playing field, we can cover this and it should not be considered a
rider. x x x x.
1wphi1

CHAIRMAN ROCO. Yeah, I think what is on the table is that we are

not disputing this but we are looking for a title that is more generic so
that then we have less x x x of an objection on constitutionality. I think
thats the theory. So, there is acceptance of this. Maybe we should
not call it nga limitation on elected officials. Maybe we should say,
special provision on elected officials. So, how is that? Now, also, then
we say On the short title of the Act, we say (unfinished) x x x x.
CHAIRMAN ROCO. It's done. So, okay na iyun. The title will be FAIR
ELECTION ACT. The rest are wala nang problema, ana? Wala na.
Wala na. (Italics and boldface supplied)
What the above discussion tells us is that Congress did not limit the
law to the lifting of the political ad ban. After combing through various
laws, they found other election practices that they considered
inequitable. Some of these practices included the appreciation of the
votes cast in case of a late substitution of candidates and the ipso
facto resignation of certain elective officials upon the filing of their
certificates of candidacy. Thus, to "level the playing field," Congress
fashioned a law that would address what they determined were unfair
election practices; hence, the birth of the Fair Election Act.
After a careful analysis of the foregoing, we find that the assailed
Section 12 (Substitution of Candidates) and Section 14 (Repealing
Clause) are indeed germane to the subject expressed in the title of
R.A. 9006: An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest,

Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices. The

title was worded broadly enough to include the measures embodied
in the assailed sections. Consequently, we dismiss the Petition and
the petitions-in-intervention for failure to establish a clear breach of
the Constitution.
On a final note, we observe that petitioner and petitioners-inintervention raise various arguments that we deem are matters of
policy. Whether or not those ratiocinations are valid, we reiterate that
the power of this Court is limited to the interpretation of the law.
Judicial power does not include the determination of the wisdom,
fairness, soundness, or expediency of a statute. Otherwise, the Court
may be accused of engaging in judicial legislation. As it is Congress
that is empowered by the Constitution to determine state policies and
to enact laws, we feel that petitioner's reasoning would be best
addressed by the legislature.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENOChief Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIOAssociate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
(On wellness leave)
ARTURO D. BRION*
Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDOAssociate Justic

DIOSDADO M. PER
Associate Justic

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CA
Associate Justic

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARA
Associate Justic

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MEN

Associate Justic

ESTELA M. PERLAS-B
Associate Justic

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONENAssociate Justice

C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that
the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENOChief Justice
Footnotes

EN BANC
VICTORINO B. ALDABA, G.R No. 188078
CARLO JOLETTE S. FAJARDO,
JULIO G. MORADA, and Present:
MINERVA ALDABA MORADA,
Petitioners, PUNO, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
CARPIO
MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
- versus - PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD,
VILLARAMA,
JR.,
PEREZ, and
MENDOZA, JJ.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Promulgated:

Respondent. January 25, 2010
x-------------------------------------- - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is an original action for Prohibition to declare
unconstitutional Republic Act No. 9591 (RA 9591),

creating a legislative district for the city of Malolos,

Bulacan, for violating the minimum population
requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a
city.
Antecedents
Before 1 May 2009, the province of Bulacan was
represented in Congress through four legislative
districts. The First Legislative District comprised of the
city of Malolos[1] and the municipalities of Hagonoy,
Calumpit, Pulilan, Bulacan, and Paombong. On 1 May
2009, RA 9591 lapsed into law, amending Malolos City
Charter,[2] by creating a separate legislative district for
the city. At the time the legislative bills for RA 9591
were filed in Congress in 2007, namely, House Bill No.
3162 (later converted to House Bill No. 3693) and
Senate Bill No. 1986, the population of Malolos City
was 223,069. The population of Malolos City on 1 May
2009 is a contested fact but there is no dispute that
House Bill No. 3693 relied on an undated certification
issued by a Regional Director of the National Statistics
Office (NSO) that the projected population of the
Municipality of Malolos will be 254,030 by the year
2010 using the population growth rate of 3.78 between
1995 to 2000.[3]
Petitioners, taxpayers, registered voters and residents of
Malolos City, filed this petition contending that RA

9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum

population threshold of 250,000 for a city to merit
representation in Congress as provided under Section
5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3
of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution.
In its Comment to the petition, the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) contended that Congress use of
projected population is non-justiciable as it involves a
determination on the wisdom of the standard adopted by
the legislature to determine compliance with [a
constitutional requirement].[4]
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petition and declare RA 9591
unconstitutional for being violative of Section 5(3),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution
The 1987 Constitution requires that for a city to have a
legislative district, the city must have a population of at
least two hundred fifty thousand.[5] The only issue
here is whether the City of Malolos has a population of
at least 250,000, whether actual or projected, for the
purpose of creating a legislative district for the City of
Malolos in time for the 10 May 2010 elections. If not,
then RA 9591 creating a legislative district in the City of
Malolos is unconstitutional.

House Bill No. 3693 cites the undated

Certification of Regional Director Alberto N.
Miranda of Region III of the National Statistics
Office (NSO) as authority that the population of the
City of Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010. The
Certification states that the population of Malolos,
Bulacan as of May 1, 2000 is 175,291. The Certification
further states that it was issued upon the request of
Mayor Danilo A. Domingo of the City of Malolos in
connection with the proposed creation of Malolos City
as a lone congressional district of the Province of
Bulacan.[6]
The Certification of Regional Director Miranda,
which is based on demographic projections, is without
legal effect because Regional Director Miranda has no
basis and no authority to issue the Certification. The
Certification is also void on its face because based on its
own growth rate assumption, the population of Malolos
will be less than 250,000 in the year 2010. In addition,
intercensal demographic projections cannot be made for
the entire year. In any event, a city whose population has
increased to 250,000 is entitled to have a legislative
district only in the immediately following election[7]
after the attainment of the 250,000 population.
First, certifications on demographic projections
can be issued only if such projections are declared

official by the National Statistics Coordination Board

(NSCB). Second, certifications based on demographic
projections can be issued only by the NSO
Administrator or his designated certifying officer.
Third, intercensal population projections must be as of
the middle of every year.
Section 6 of Executive Order No. 135[8] dated 6
November 1993 issued by President Fidel V. Ramos
provides:
SECTION 6. Guidelines on the Issuance of
Certification of Population sizes Pursuant to Section
7, 386, 442, 450, 452, and 461 of the New Local
Government Code.
(a) The National Statistics Office shall issue
certification on data that it has collected and
processed as well as on statistics that it has
estimated.
(b) For census years, certification on population size
will be based on actual population census counts;
while for the intercensal years, the certification
will be made on the basis of a set of demographic
projections or estimates declared official by the
National Statistical Coordination Board (NSCB).
(c) Certification of population census counts will be
made as of the census reference date, such as May
1, 1990, while those of intercensal population
estimates will be as of middle of every year.

(d) Certification of population size based on

projections may specify the range within which the
true count is deemed likely to fall. The range will
correspond to the official low and high population
projections.
(e) The smallest geographic area for which a
certification on population size may be issued will
be the barangay for census population counts, and
the city or municipality for intercensal estimates. If
an LGU wants to conduct its own population
census, during offcensus years, approval must be
sought from the NSCB and the conduct must be
under the technical supervision of NSO from
planning to data processing.
(f) Certifications of population size based on
published census results shall be issued by the
Provincial Census Officers or by the Regional
Census Officers. Certifications based on
projections or estimates, however, will be issued
by the NSO Administrator or his designated
certifying officer. (Emphasis supplied)

The Certification of Regional Director Miranda

does not state that the demographic projections he
certified have been declared official by the NSCB. The
records of this case do not also show that the
Certification of Regional Director Miranda is based on
demographic projections declared official by the NSCB.
The Certification, which states that the population of
Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010, violates the

requirement that intercensal demographic projections

shall be as of the middle of every year. In addition, there
is no showing that Regional Director Miranda has been
designated by the NSO Administrator as a certifying
officer for demographic projections in Region III. In the
absence of such official designation, only the
certification of the NSO Administrator can be given
credence by this Court.
Moreover, the Certification states that the total
population of Malolos, Bulacan as of May 1, 2000 is
175,291. The Certification also states that the population
growth rate of Malolos is 3.78% per year between 1995
and 2000. Based on a growth rate of 3.78% per year, the
population of Malolos of 175,291 in 2000 will grow to
only 241,550 in 2010.
Also, the 2007 Census places the population of
Malolos at 223,069 as of 1 August 2007.[9] Based on a
growth rate of 3.78%, the population of Malolos will
grow to only 248,365 as of 1 August 2010. Even if the
growth rate is compounded yearly, the population of
Malolos of 223,069 as of 1 August 2007 will grow to
only 249,333 as of 1 August 2010.[10]
All these conflict with what the Certification
states that the population of Malolos will be 254,030 by
the year 2010. Based on the Certifications own growth
rate assumption, the population of Malolos will be less
than 250,000 before the 10 May 2010 elections.

Incidentally, the NSO has no published population

projections for individual municipalities or cities but
only for entire regions and provinces.[11]
Executive Order No. 135 cannot simply be
brushed aside. The OSG, representing respondent
Commission on Elections, invoked Executive Order No.
135 in its Comment, thus:
Here, based on the NSO projection, the population
of the Municipality of Malolos will be 254,030 by
the year 2010 using the population growth rate of
3.78 between 1995-2000. This projection issued
by the authority of the NSO Administrator is
recognized under Executive Order No. 135 (The
Guidelines on the Issuance of Certification of
Population Sizes), which states:
xxx
(d) Certification of population size based
on projections may specify the range
within which the true count is deemed
likely to fall. The range will correspond to
the official low and high population
projections.
xxx
(f) Certifications of population size based
on published census results shall be issued
by the Provincial Census Officers or by the
Regional Census Officers. Certifications

based on projections or estimates,

however, will be issued by the NSO
Administrator or his designated certifying
officer.[12] (Emphasis supplied)

Any population projection forming the basis for the

creation of a legislative district must be based on an
official and credible source. That is why the OSG cited
Executive Order No. 135, otherwise the population
projection would be unreliable or speculative.
Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987
Constitution provides:
Any province that may be created, or any city
whose population may hereafter increase to more
than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in
the immediately following election to at least one
Member or such number of members as it may be
entitled to on the basis of the number of its
inhabitants and according to the standards set forth
in paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of the
Constitution. xxx. (Emphasis supplied)

A city that has attained a population of 250,000 is

entitled to a legislative district only in the immediately
following election. In short, a city must first attain the
250,000 population, and thereafter, in the immediately
following election, such city shall have a district
representative. There is no showing in the present case
that the City of Malolos has attained or will attain a
population of 250,000, whether actual or projected,

before the 10 May 2010 elections.

Clearly, there is no official record that the
population of the City of Malolos will be at least
250,000, actual or projected, prior to the 10 May
2010 elections, the immediately following election after
the supposed attainment of such population. Thus, the
City of Malolos is not qualified to have a legislative
district of its own under Section 5(3), Article VI of the
1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the 1987 Constitution.
On the OSGs contention that Congress choice of
means to comply with the population requirement in the
creation of a legislative district is non-justiciable, suffice
it to say that questions calling for judicial determination
of compliance with constitutional standards by other
branches of the government are fundamentally
justiciable. The resolution of such questions falls within
the checking function of this Court under the 1987
Constitution to determine whether there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government.[13]
Even under the 1935 Constitution, this Court had
already ruled, The overwhelming weight of authority is
that district apportionment laws are subject to review by
the courts.[14] Compliance with constitutional standards

on the creation of legislative districts is important

because the aim of legislative apportionment is to
equalize population and voting power among districts.
[15]
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We
DECLARE
Republic
Act
No.
9591
UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being violative of Section
5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3
of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution.
SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

CONCH

ANTONIO

LU

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

JOSE C. MENDOZA
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution,
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 160261

November 10, 2003

ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner, NAGMAMALASAKIT

NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG
PILIPINO, INC., ITS OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, petitioner-inintervention,WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention, vs.THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATE
PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE
GILBERTO C. TEODORO, JR. AND REPRESENTATIVE FELIX
WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, respondents.JAIME N. SORIANO,
respondent-in-Intervention,SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL,
respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160262 November 10, 2003
SEDFREY M. CANDELARIA, CARLOS P. MEDINA, JR. AND
HENEDINA RAZON-ABAD, petitioners,ATTYS. ROMULO B.
MACALINTAL AND PETE QUIRINO QUADRA, petitioners-inintervention,WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention, vs.THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR ACTING
SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G. DE
VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR.,
REPRESENTA-TIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT,
SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents,JAIME
N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,SENATOR AQUILINO Q.
PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.

x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160263 November 10, 2003
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO AND SOLEDAD M. CAGAMPANG,
petitioners,WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioners-in-intervention, vs.FRANKLIN M.
DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SENATE PRESIDENT, AND JOSE
G. DE VENECIA, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS SPEAKER OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents,JAIME N.
SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,SENATOR AQUILINO Q.
PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160277 November 10, 2003
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,WORLD WAR II VETERANS
LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-inintervention, vs.JOSE G. DE VENECIA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, FRANKLIN
M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE
OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, GILBERT TEODORO,
JR., FELIX WILLIAM FUENTEBELLA, JULIO LEDESMA IV,
HENRY LANOT, KIM BERNARDO-LOKIN, MARCELINO LIBANAN,
EMMYLOU TALIO-SANTOS, DOUGLAS CAGAS, SHERWIN
GATCHALIAN, LUIS BERSAMIN, JR., NERISSA SOON-RUIZ,
ERNESTO NIEVA, EDGAR ERICE, ISMAEL MATHAY, SAMUEL
DANGWA, ALFREDO MARAON, JR., CECILIA CARREONJALOSJOS, AGAPITO AQUINO, FAUSTO SEACHON, JR.,
GEORGILU YUMUL-HERMIDA, JOSE CARLOS LACSON,
MANUEL ORTEGA, ULIRAN JUAQUIN, SORAYA JAAFAR,
WILHELMINO SY-ALVARADO, CLAUDE BAUTISTA, DEL DE
GUZMAN, ZENAIDA CRUZ-DUCUT, AUGUSTO BACULIO,
FAUSTINO DY III, AUGUSTO SYJUCO, ROZZANO RUFINO
BIAZON, LEOVIGILDO BANAAG, ERIC SINGSON, JACINTO
PARAS, JOSE SOLIS, RENATO MATUBO, HERMINO TEVES,
AMADO ESPINO, JR., EMILIO MACIAS, ARTHUR PINGOY, JR.,
FRANCIS NEPOMUCENO, CONRADO ESTRELLA III, ELIAS
BULUT, JR., JURDIN ROMUALDO, JUAN PABLO BONDOC,

GENEROSO TULAGAN, PERPETUO YLAGAN, MICHAEL DUAVIT,

JOSEPH DURANO, JESLI LAPUS, CARLOS COJUANGCO,
GIORGIDI AGGABAO, FRANCIS ESCUDERRO, RENE VELARDE,
CELSO LOBREGAT, ALIPIO BADELLES, DIDAGEN
DILANGALEN, ABRAHAM MITRA, JOSEPH SANTIAGO,
DARLENE ANTONIO-CUSTODIO, ALETA SUAREZ, RODOLF
PLAZA, JV BAUTISTA, GREGORIO IPONG, GILBERT REMULLA,
ROLEX SUPLICO, CELIA LAYUS, JUAN MIGUEL ZUBIRI,
BENASING MACARAMBON, JR., JOSEFINA JOSON, MARK
COJUANGCO, MAURICIO DOMOGAN, RONALDO ZAMORA,
ANGELO MONTILLA, ROSELLER BARINAGA, JESNAR FALCON,
REYLINA NICOLAS, RODOLFO ALBANO, JOAQUIN CHIPECO,
JR., AND RUY ELIAS LOPEZ, respondents,JAIME N. SORIANO,
respondent-in-intervention,SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL,
respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160292 November 10, 2003
HERMINIO HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN, MA.
CECILIA PAPA, NAPOLEON C. REYES, ANTONIO H. ABAD, JR.,
ALFREDO C. LIGON, JOAN P. SERRANO AND GARY S.
MALLARI, petitioners,WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES
OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention, vs.HON.
SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, JR. AND ROBERTO P.
NAZARENO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY GENERAL OF
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, AND THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, respondents,JAIME N. SORIANO,
respondent-in-intervention,SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL,
respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160295 November 10, 2003
SALACNIB F. BATERINA AND DEPUTY SPEAKER RAUL M.
GONZALES, petitioners,WORLD WAR II VETERANS
LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-inintervention,vs.THE HOUSE OF REPRESEN-TATIVES, THROUGH
THE SPEAKER OR ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER,

SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO

G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B.
FUENTEBELLA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH
ITS PRESIDENT, SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON,
respondents,JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160310 November 10, 2003
LEONILO R. ALFONSO, PETER ALVAREZ, SAMUEL DOCTOR,
MELVIN MATIBAG, RAMON MIQUIBAS, RODOLFO MAGSINO,
EDUARDO MALASAGA, EDUARDO SARMIENTO, EDGARDO
NAOE, LEONARDO GARCIA, EDGARD SMITH, EMETERIO
MENDIOLA, MARIO TOREJA, GUILLERMO CASTASUS, NELSON
A. LOYOLA, WILFREDO BELLO, JR., RONNIE TOQUILLO, KATE
ANN VITAL, ANGELITA Q. GUZMAN, MONICO PABLES, JR.,
JAIME BOAQUINA, LITA A. AQUINO, MILA P. GABITO, JANETTE
ARROYO, RIZALDY EMPIG, ERNA LAHUZ, HOMER CALIBAG,
DR. BING ARCE, SIMEON ARCE, JR., EL DELLE ARCE, WILLIE
RIVERO, DANTE DIAZ, ALBERTO BUENAVISTA, FAUSTO
BUENAVISTA, EMILY SENERIS, ANNA CLARISSA LOYOLA,
SALVACION LOYOLA, RAINIER QUIROLGICO, JOSEPH
LEANDRO LOYOLA, ANTONIO LIBREA, FILEMON SIBULO,
MANUEL D. COMIA, JULITO U. SOON, VIRGILIO LUSTRE, AND
NOEL ISORENA, MAU RESTRIVERA, MAX VILLAESTER, AND
EDILBERTO GALLOR, petitioners,WORLD WAR II VETERANS
LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-inintervention, vs.THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
REPRESENTED BY HON. SPEAKER JOSE C. DE VENECIA, JR.,
THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY HON. SENATE PRESIDENT
FRANKLIN DRILON, HON. FELIX FUENTEBELLA, ET AL.,
respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160318 November 10, 2003
PUBLIC INTEREST CENTER, INC., CRISPIN T. REYES, petitioners,
vs.HON. SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, ALL MEMBERS,

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON. SENATE PRESIDENT

FRANKLIN M. DRILON, AND ALL MEMBERS, PHILIPPINE
SENATE, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160342 November 10, 2003
ATTY. FERNANDO P.R. PERITO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS A MEMBER
OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, MANILA III,
AND ENGR. MAXIMO N. MENEZ JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS A
TAXPAYER AND MEMBER OF THE ENGINEERING PROFESSION,
petitioners, vs.THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES
REPRESENTED BY THE 83 HONORABLE MEMBERS OF THE
HOUSE LED BY HON. REPRESENTATIVE WILLIAM
FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160343 November 10, 2003
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR
ACTING SPEAKER OR PRESIDING OFFICER, SPEAKER JOSE G.
DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR.,
REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELLA, THE
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES THROUGH ITS PRESIDENT,
SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160360 November 10, 2003
CLARO B. FLORES, petitioner, vs.THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES THROUGH THE SPEAKER, AND THE
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THROUGH THE SENATE
PRESIDENT, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160365 November 10, 2003

U.P. LAW ALUMNI CEBU FOUNDATION, INC., GOERING G.C.

PADERANGA, DANILO V. ORTIZ, GLORIA C. ESTENZO-RAMOS,
LIZA D. CORRO, LUIS V. DIORES, SR., BENJAMIN S. RALLON,
ROLANDO P. NONATO, DANTE T. RAMOS, ELSA R.
DIVINAGRACIA, KAREN B. CAPARROS-ARQUILLANO, SYLVA G.
AGUIRRE-PADERANGA, FOR THEMSELVES AND IN BEHALF OF
OTHER CITIZENS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
petitioners, vs.THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES, SPEAKER
JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON, HOUSE
REPRESENTATIVES FELIX FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERTO
TEODORO, BY THEMSELVES AND AS REPRESENTATIVES OF
THE GROUP OF MORE THAN 80 HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES
WHO SIGNED AND FILED THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT
AGAINST SUPREME COURT CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G.
DAVIDE, JR. respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160370 November 10, 2003
FR. RANHILIO CALLANGAN AQUINO, petitioner, vs.THE
HONORABLE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, THE HONORABLE
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160376 November 10, 2003
NILO A. MALANYAON, petitioner, vs.HON. FELIX WILLIAM
FUENTEBELLA AND GILBERT TEODORO, IN REPRESENTATION
OF THE 86 SIGNATORIES OF THE ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT
AGAINST CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR. AND THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, CONGRESS OF THE
PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY ITS SPEAKER, HON. JOSE G.
DE VENECIA, respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160392 November 10, 2003

VENICIO S. FLORES AND HECTOR L. HOFILEA, petitioners, vs.

THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH SPEAKER
JOSE G. DE VENECIA, AND THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
THROUGH SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN DRILON,
respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160397 November 10, 2003
IN THE MATTER OF THE IMPEACHMENT COMPLAINT AGAINST
CHIEF JUSTICE HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR., ATTY. DIOSCORO U.
VALLEJOS, JR., petitioner.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160403 November 10, 2003
PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, petitioner, vs.THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, THROUGH THE SPEAKER OR PRESIDING
OFFICER, HON. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, REPRESENTATIVE
GILBERTO G. TEODORO, JR., REPRESENTATIVE FELIX
WILLIAM B. FUENTEBELA, THE SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
THROUGH SENATE PRESIDENT, HON. FRANKLIN DRILON,
respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 160405 November 10, 2003
DEMOCRITO C. BARCENAS, PRESIDENT OF IBP, CEBU CITY
CHAPTER, MANUEL M. MONZON, PRESIDING OF IBP, CEBU
PROVINCE, VICTOR A. MAAMBONG, PROVINCIAL BOARD
MEMBER, ADELINO B. SITOY, DEAN OF THE COLLEG EOF LAW,
UNIVERSITY OF CEBU, YOUNG LAWYERS ASSOCAITION OF
CEBU, INC. [YLAC], REPRSEENTED BY ATTY. MANUEL
LEGASPI, CONFEDERATION OF ACCREDITED MEDIATORS OF
THE PHILIPPINES, INC. [CAMP, INC], REPRESENTED BY
RODERIC R. POCA, MANDAUE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION,
[MANLAW], REPRESENTED BY FELIPE VELASQUEZ,
FEDERACION INTERNACIONAL DE ABOGADAS [FIDA],

REPRESENTED BY THELMA L. JORDAN, CARLOS G. CO,

PRESIENT OF CEBU CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY
AND CEBU LADY LAWYERS ASSOCIATION, INC. [CELLA, INC.],
MARIBELLE NAVARRO AND BERNARDITO FLORIDO, PAST
PRESIDENT CEBU CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, CEBU CHAPTER,
petitioners, vs.THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-TIVES,
REPRESENTED BY REP. JOSE G. DE VENECIA, AS HOUSE
SPEAKER AND THE SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATOR
FRANKLIN DRILON, AS SENATE PRESIDENT, respondents.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
There can be no constitutional crisis arising from a conflict, no matter
how passionate and seemingly irreconcilable it may appear to be,
over the determination by the independent branches of government
of the nature, scope and extent of their respective constitutional
powers where the Constitution itself provides for the means and
bases for its resolution.
Our nation's history is replete with vivid illustrations of the often
frictional, at times turbulent, dynamics of the relationship among
these co-equal branches. This Court is confronted with one such
today involving the legislature and the judiciary which has drawn legal
luminaries to chart antipodal courses and not a few of our
countrymen to vent cacophonous sentiments thereon.
There may indeed be some legitimacy to the characterization that the
present controversy subject of the instant petitions whether the
filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives falls within
the one year bar provided in the Constitution, and whether the
resolution thereof is a political question has resulted in a political
crisis. Perhaps even more truth to the view that it was brought upon
by a political crisis of conscience.
In any event, it is with the absolute certainty that our Constitution is
sufficient to address all the issues which this controversy spawns that
this Court unequivocally pronounces, at the first instance, that the
feared resort to extra-constitutional methods of resolving it is neither

necessary nor legally permissible. Both its resolution and protection

of the public interest lie in adherence to, not departure from, the
Constitution.
In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this
Court is ever mindful of the essential truth that the inviolate doctrine
of separation of powers among the legislative, executive or judicial
branches of government by no means prescribes for absolute
autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of the governmental
power assigned to it by the sovereign people.
At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances
which has been carefully calibrated by the Constitution to temper the
official acts of each of these three branches must be given effect
without destroying their indispensable co-equality.
Taken together, these two fundamental doctrines of republican
government, intended as they are to insure that governmental power
is wielded only for the good of the people, mandate a relationship of
interdependence and coordination among these branches where the
delicate functions of enacting, interpreting and enforcing laws are
harmonized to achieve a unity of governance, guided only by what is
in the greater interest and well-being of the people. Verily, salus
populi est suprema lex.
Article XI of our present 1987 Constitution provides:
ARTICLE XI
Accountability of Public Officers
SECTION 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and
employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve
them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act
with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
SECTION 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the
Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and
the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for,
and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason,
bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of public

trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from
office as provided by law, but not by impeachment.
SECTION 3. (1) The House of Representatives shall have the
exclusive power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member
of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of
endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the
Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper
Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after
hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its
report to the House within sixty session days from such referral,
together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be
calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days
from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall
be necessary either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of
Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution.
The vote of each Member shall be recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed
by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall
constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall
forthwith proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same
official more than once within a period of one year.
(6) The Senate shall have the sole power to try and decide all cases
of impeachment. When sitting for that purpose, the Senators shall be
on oath or affirmation. When the President of the Philippines is on
trial, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court shall preside, but shall
not vote. No person shall be convicted without the concurrence of
two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
(7) Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than
removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the
Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless
be liable and subject to prosecution, trial, and punishment according

to law.
(8) The Congress shall promulgate its rules on impeachment to
effectively carry out the purpose of this section. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Following the above-quoted Section 8 of Article XI of the Constitution,
the 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and
approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings
(House Impeachment Rules) on November 28, 2001, superseding the
previous House Impeachment Rules1 approved by the 11th Congress.
The relevant distinctions between these two Congresses' House
Impeachment Rules are shown in the following tabulation:
11TH CONGRESS RULES

12TH CONGRESS NEW RULES

RULE II

RULE V

INITIATING IMPEACHMENT

BAR AGAINST INITIATION OF

IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDINGS
AGAINST THE SAME OFFICIAL

Section 2. Mode of Initiating

Impeachment. Impeachment shall
be initiated only by a verified
complaint for impeachment filed by
any Member of the House of
Representatives or by any citizen
upon a resolution of endorsement by
any Member thereof or by a verified
complaint
or
resolution
of
impeachment filed by at least onethird (1/3) of all the Members of the
House.

Section 16. Impeachment

Proceedings Deemed Initiated.
In cases where a Member of the
House files a verified complaint of
impeachment or a citizen files a
verified complaint that is endorsed
by a Member of the House through
a resolution of endorsement
against an impeachable officer,
impeachment proceedings against
such official are deemed initiated
on the day the Committee on
Justice finds that the verified
complaint and/or resolution against
such official, as the case may be,
is sufficient in substance, or on the
date the House votes to overturn

or affirm the finding of the said

Committee that the verified
complaint and/or resolution, as the
case may be, is not sufficient in
substance.
In cases where a verified
complaint or a resolution of
impeachment is filed or endorsed,
as the case may be, by at least
one-third (1/3) of the Members of
the
House,
impeachment
proceedings
are
deemed
initiated at the time of the filing
of such verified complaint or
resolution of impeachment with
the Secretary General.

RULE V
BAR AGAINST IMPEACHMENT
Section 14. Scope of Bar. No
impeachment proceedings shall be
initiated against the same official
more than once within the period of
one (1) year.

Section
17.
Bar
Against
Initiation
Of
Impeachment
Proceedings. Within a period of
one (1) year from the date
impeachment proceedings are
deemed initiated as provided in
Section
16
hereof,
no
impeachment proceedings, as
such, can be initiated against the
same official. (Italics in the original;
emphasis
and
underscoring
supplied)

On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a

Resolution,2 sponsored by Representative Felix William D.
Fuentebella, which directed the Committee on Justice "to conduct an
investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements
and expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the
Judiciary Development Fund (JDF)."3

On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an

impeachment complaint4 (first impeachment complaint) against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices 5 of this
Court for "culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public
trust and other high crimes."6 The complaint was endorsed by
Representatives Rolex T. Suplico, Ronaldo B. Zamora and Didagen
Piang Dilangalen,7 and was referred to the House Committee on
Justice on August 5, 20038 in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article
XI of the Constitution which reads:
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by
any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon
a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be
included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and
referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter.
The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its
Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session
days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution.
The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House
within ten session days from receipt thereof.
The House Committee on Justice ruled on October 13, 2003 that the
first impeachment complaint was "sufficient in form," 9 but voted to
dismiss the same on October 22, 2003 for being insufficient in
substance.10 To date, the Committee Report to this effect has not yet
been sent to the House in plenary in accordance with the said
Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.
Four months and three weeks since the filing on June 2, 2003 of the
first complaint or on October 23, 2003, a day after the House
Committee on Justice voted to dismiss it, the second impeachment
complaint11 was filed with the Secretary General of the House 12 by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. (First District, Tarlac) and
Felix William B. Fuentebella (Third District, Camarines Sur) against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of
the legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution.
This second impeachment complaint was accompanied by a
"Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment" signed by at least onethird (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives. 13

Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of

Representatives, et. al., most of which petitions contend that the filing
of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it violates
the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that "[n]o
impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official
more than once within a period of one year."
In G.R. No. 160261, petitioner Atty. Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr., alleging
that he has a duty as a member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines to use all available legal remedies to stop an
unconstitutional impeachment, that the issues raised in his petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus are of transcendental
importance, and that he "himself was a victim of the capricious and
arbitrary changes in the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings introduced by the 12th Congress," 14 posits that his right
to bring an impeachment complaint against then Ombudsman Aniano
Desierto had been violated due to the capricious and arbitrary
changes in the House Impeachment Rules adopted and approved on
November 28, 2001 by the House of Representatives and prays that
(1) Rule V, Sections 16 and 17 and Rule III, Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9
thereof be declared unconstitutional; (2) this Court issue a writ of
mandamus directing respondents House of Representatives et. al. to
comply with Article IX, Section 3 (2), (3) and (5) of the Constitution, to
return the second impeachment complaint and/or strike it off the
records of the House of Representatives, and to promulgate rules
which are consistent with the Constitution; and (3) this Court
permanently enjoin respondent House of Representatives from
proceeding with the second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160262, petitioners Sedfrey M. Candelaria, et. al., as
citizens and taxpayers, alleging that the issues of the case are of
transcendental
importance,
pray,
in
their
petition
for
Certiorari/Prohibition, the issuance of a writ "perpetually" prohibiting
respondent House of Representatives from filing any Articles of
Impeachment against the Chief Justice with the Senate; and for the
issuance of a writ "perpetually" prohibiting respondents Senate and
Senate President Franklin Drilon from accepting any Articles of
Impeachment against the Chief Justice or, in the event that the
Senate has accepted the same, from proceeding with the
impeachment trial.

In G.R. No. 160263, petitioners Arturo M. de Castro and Soledad

Cagampang, as citizens, taxpayers, lawyers and members of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, alleging that their petition for
Prohibition involves public interest as it involves the use of public
funds necessary to conduct the impeachment trial on the second
impeachment complaint, pray for the issuance of a writ of prohibition
enjoining Congress from conducting further proceedings on said
second impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160277, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, alleging that this
Court has recognized that he has locus standi to bring petitions of this
nature in the cases of Chavez v. PCGG15 and Chavez v. PEA-Amari
Coastal Bay Development Corporation,16 prays in his petition for
Injunction that the second impeachment complaint be declared
unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160292, petitioners Atty. Harry L. Roque, et. al., as
taxpayers and members of the legal profession, pray in their petition
for Prohibition for an order prohibiting respondent House of
Representatives from drafting, adopting, approving and transmitting
to the Senate the second impeachment complaint, and respondents
De Venecia and Nazareno from transmitting the Articles of
Impeachment to the Senate.
In G.R. No. 160295, petitioners Representatives Salacnib F. Baterina
and Deputy Speaker Raul M. Gonzalez, alleging that, as members of
the House of Representatives, they have a legal interest in ensuring
that only constitutional impeachment proceedings are initiated, pray
in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that the second impeachment
complaint and any act proceeding therefrom be declared null and
void.
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso et al., claiming that
they have a right to be protected against all forms of senseless
spending of taxpayers' money and that they have an obligation to
protect the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice, and the integrity of the
Judiciary, allege in their petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that it is
instituted as "a class suit" and pray that (1) the House Resolution
endorsing the second impeachment complaint as well as all
issuances emanating therefrom be declared null and void; and (2)

this Court enjoin the Senate and the Senate President from taking
cognizance of, hearing, trying and deciding the second impeachment
complaint, and issue a writ of prohibition commanding the Senate, its
prosecutors and agents to desist from conducting any proceedings or
to act on the impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160318, petitioner Public Interest Center, Inc., whose
members are citizens and taxpayers, and its co-petitioner Crispin T.
Reyes, a citizen, taxpayer and a member of the Philippine Bar, both
allege in their petition, which does not state what its nature is, that the
filing of the second impeachment complaint involves paramount
public interest and pray that Sections 16 and 17 of the House
Impeachment Rules and the second impeachment complaint/Articles
of Impeachment be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160342, petitioner Atty. Fernando P. R. Perito, as a
citizen and a member of the Philippine Bar Association and of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and petitioner Engr. Maximo N.
Menez, Jr., as a taxpayer, pray in their petition for the issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and Permanent Injunction to enjoin the
House of Representatives from proceeding with the second
impeachment complaint.
In G.R. No. 160343, petitioner Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
alleging that it is mandated by the Code of Professional
Responsibility to uphold the Constitution, prays in its petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V and
Sections 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 of Rule III of the House Impeachment Rules be
declared unconstitutional and that the House of Representatives be
permanently enjoined from proceeding with the second impeachment
complaint.
In G.R. No. 160360, petitioner-taxpayer Atty. Claro Flores prays in his
petition for Certiorari and Prohibition that the House Impeachment
Rules be declared unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 160365, petitioners U.P. Law Alumni Cebu Foundation
Inc., et. al., in their petition for Prohibition and Injunction which they
claim is a class suit filed in behalf of all citizens, citing Oposa v.
Factoran17 which was filed in behalf of succeeding generations of

Filipinos, pray for the issuance of a writ prohibiting respondents

House of Representatives and the Senate from conducting further
proceedings on the second impeachment complaint and that this
Court declare as unconstitutional the second impeachment complaint
and the acts of respondent House of Representatives in interfering
with the fiscal matters of the Judiciary.
In G.R. No. 160370, petitioner-taxpayer Father Ranhilio Callangan
Aquino, alleging that the issues in his petition for Prohibition are of
national and transcendental significance and that as an official of the
Philippine Judicial Academy, he has a direct and substantial interest
in the unhampered operation of the Supreme Court and its officials in
discharging their duties in accordance with the Constitution, prays for
the issuance of a writ prohibiting the House of Representatives from
transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate and the
Senate from receiving the same or giving the impeachment complaint
due course.
In G.R. No. 160376, petitioner Nilo A. Malanyaon, as a taxpayer,
alleges in his petition for Prohibition that respondents Fuentebella
and Teodoro at the time they filed the second impeachment
complaint, were "absolutely without any legal power to do so, as they
acted without jurisdiction as far as the Articles of Impeachment assail
the alleged abuse of powers of the Chief Justice to disburse the
(JDF)."
In G.R. No. 160392, petitioners Attorneys Venicio S. Flores and
Hector L. Hofilea, alleging that as professors of law they have an
abiding interest in the subject matter of their petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition as it pertains to a constitutional issue "which they are
trying to inculcate in the minds of their students," pray that the House
of Representatives be enjoined from endorsing and the Senate from
trying the Articles of Impeachment and that the second impeachment
complaint be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160397, petitioner Atty. Dioscoro Vallejos, Jr., without
alleging his locus standi, but alleging that the second impeachment
complaint is founded on the issue of whether or not the Judicial
Development Fund (JDF) was spent in accordance with law and that
the House of Representatives does not have exclusive jurisdiction in

the examination and audit thereof, prays in his petition "To Declare
Complaint Null and Void for Lack of Cause of Action and Jurisdiction"
that the second impeachment complaint be declared null and void.
In G.R. No. 160403, petitioner Philippine Bar Association, alleging
that the issues raised in the filing of the second impeachment
complaint involve matters of transcendental importance, prays in its
petition for Certiorari/Prohibition that (1) the second impeachment
complaint and all proceedings arising therefrom be declared null and
void; (2) respondent House of Representatives be prohibited from
transmitting the Articles of Impeachment to the Senate; and (3)
respondent Senate be prohibited from accepting the Articles of
Impeachment and from conducting any proceedings thereon.
In G.R. No. 160405, petitioners Democrit C. Barcenas et. al., as
citizens and taxpayers, pray in their petition for Certiorari/Prohibition
that (1) the second impeachment complaint as well as the resolution
of endorsement and impeachment by the respondent House of
Representatives be declared null and void and (2) respondents
Senate and Senate President Franklin Drilon be prohibited from
accepting any Articles of Impeachment against the Chief Justice or, in
the event that they have accepted the same, that they be prohibited
from proceeding with the impeachment trial.
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262 and
160263, the first three of the eighteen which were filed before this
Court,18 prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
and/or preliminary injunction to prevent the House of Representatives
from transmitting the Articles of Impeachment arising from the second
impeachment complaint to the Senate. Petition bearing docket
number G.R. No. 160261 likewise prayed for the declaration of the
November 28, 2001 House Impeachment Rules as null and void for
being unconstitutional.
Petitions bearing docket numbers G.R. Nos. 160277, 160292 and
160295, which were filed on October 28, 2003, sought similar relief.
In addition, petition bearing docket number G.R. No. 160292 alleged
that House Resolution No. 260 (calling for a legislative inquiry into the
administration by the Chief Justice of the JDF) infringes on the
constitutional doctrine of separation of powers and is a direct violation

of the constitutional principle of fiscal autonomy of the judiciary.

On October 28, 2003, during the plenary session of the House of
Representatives, a motion was put forth that the second
impeachment complaint be formally transmitted to the Senate, but it
was not carried because the House of Representatives adjourned for
lack of quorum,19 and as reflected above, to date, the Articles of
Impeachment have yet to be forwarded to the Senate.
Before acting on the petitions with prayers for temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction which were filed on or
before October 28, 2003, Justices Puno and Vitug offered to recuse
themselves, but the Court rejected their offer. Justice Panganiban
inhibited himself, but the Court directed him to participate.
Without necessarily giving the petitions due course, this Court in its
Resolution of October 28, 2003, resolved to (a) consolidate the
petitions; (b) require respondent House of Representatives and the
Senate, as well as the Solicitor General, to comment on the petitions
not later than 4:30 p.m. of November 3, 2003; (c) set the petitions for
oral arguments on November 5, 2003, at 10:00 a.m.; and (d)
appointed distinguished legal experts as amici curiae.20 In addition,
this Court called on petitioners and respondents to maintain the
status quo, enjoining all the parties and others acting for and in their
behalf to refrain from committing acts that would render the petitions
moot.
Also on October 28, 2003, when respondent House of
Representatives through Speaker Jose C. De Venecia, Jr. and/or its
co-respondents, by way of special appearance, submitted a
Manifestation asserting that this Court has no jurisdiction to hear,
much less prohibit or enjoin the House of Representatives, which is
an independent and co-equal branch of government under the
Constitution, from the performance of its constitutionally mandated
duty to initiate impeachment cases. On even date, Senator Aquilino
Q. Pimentel, Jr., in his own behalf, filed a Motion to Intervene (Ex
Abudante Cautela)21 and Comment, praying that "the consolidated
petitions be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction of the Court over the
issues affecting the impeachment proceedings and that the sole
power, authority and jurisdiction of the Senate as the impeachment

court to try and decide impeachment cases, including the one where
the Chief Justice is the respondent, be recognized and upheld
pursuant to the provisions of Article XI of the Constitution." 22
Acting on the other petitions which were subsequently filed, this Court
resolved to (a) consolidate them with the earlier consolidated
petitions; (b) require respondents to file their comment not later than
4:30 p.m. of November 3, 2003; and (c) include them for oral
arguments on November 5, 2003.
On October 29, 2003, the Senate of the Philippines, through Senate
President Franklin M. Drilon, filed a Manifestation stating that insofar
as it is concerned, the petitions are plainly premature and have no
basis in law or in fact, adding that as of the time of the filing of the
petitions, no justiciable issue was presented before it since (1) its
constitutional duty to constitute itself as an impeachment court
commences only upon its receipt of the Articles of Impeachment,
which it had not, and (2) the principal issues raised by the petitions
pertain exclusively to the proceedings in the House of
Representatives.
On October 30, 2003, Atty. Jaime Soriano filed a "Petition for Leave
to Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262, 160263, 160277, 160292,
and 160295, questioning the status quo Resolution issued by this
Court on October 28, 2003 on the ground that it would unnecessarily
put Congress and this Court in a "constitutional deadlock" and
praying for the dismissal of all the petitions as the matter in question
is not yet ripe for judicial determination.
On November 3, 2003, Attorneys Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete
Quirino Quadra filed in G.R. No. 160262 a "Motion for Leave of Court
to Intervene and to Admit the Herein Incorporated Petition in
Intervention."
On November 4, 2003, Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng
mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc. filed a Motion for Intervention in
G.R. No. 160261. On November 5, 2003, World War II Veterans
Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. also filed a "Petition-inIntervention with Leave to Intervene" in G.R. Nos. 160261, 160262,
160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310.

The motions for intervention were granted and both Senator

Pimentel's Comment and Attorneys Macalintal and Quadra's Petition
in Intervention were admitted.
On November 5-6, 2003, this Court heard the views of the amici
curiae and the arguments of petitioners, intervenors Senator Pimentel
and Attorney Makalintal, and Solicitor General Alfredo Benipayo on
the principal issues outlined in an Advisory issued by this Court on
November 3, 2003, to wit:
Whether the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court may be
invoked; who can invoke it; on what issues and at what time; and
whether it should be exercised by this Court at this time.
In discussing these issues, the following may be taken up:
a) locus standi of petitioners;
b) ripeness(prematurity; mootness);
c) political question/justiciability;
d) House's "exclusive" power to initiate all cases of impeachment;
e) Senate's "sole" power to try and decide all cases of impeachment;
f) constitutionality of the House Rules on Impeachment vis-a-vis
Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution; and
g) judicial restraint (Italics in the original)
In resolving the intricate conflux of preliminary and substantive issues
arising from the instant petitions as well as the myriad arguments and
opinions presented for and against the grant of the reliefs prayed for,
this Court has sifted and determined them to be as follows: (1) the
threshold and novel issue of whether or not the power of judicial
review extends to those arising from impeachment proceedings; (2)
whether or not the essential pre-requisites for the exercise of the
power of judicial review have been fulfilled; and (3) the substantive
issues yet remaining. These matters shall now be discussed in
seriatim.

Judicial Review
As reflected above, petitioners plead for this Court to exercise the
power of judicial review to determine the validity of the second
impeachment complaint.
This Court's power of judicial review is conferred on the judicial
branch of the government in Section 1, Article VIII of our present
1987 Constitution:
SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme
Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government. (Emphasis supplied)
Such power of judicial review was early on exhaustively expounded
upon by Justice Jose P. Laurel in the definitive 1936 case of Angara
v. Electoral Commission23 after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution
whose provisions, unlike the present Constitution, did not contain the
present provision in Article VIII, Section 1, par. 2 on what judicial
power includes. Thus, Justice Laurel discoursed:
x x x In times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great
landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not
entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is
the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to
determine the proper allocation of powers between the several
departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof.
As any human production, our Constitution is of course lacking
perfection and perfectibility, but as much as it was within the power of
our people, acting through their delegates to so provide, that
instrument which is the expression of their sovereignty however
limited, has established a republican government intended to operate
and function as a harmonious whole, under a system of checks and
balances, and subject to specific limitations and restrictions provided

in the said instrument. The Constitution sets forth in no uncertain

language the restrictions and limitations upon governmental
powers and agencies. If these restrictions and limitations are
transcended it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had
not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of
government along constitutional channels, for then the distribution
of powers would be mere verbiage, the bill of rights mere expressions
of sentiment, and the principles of good government mere political
apothegms. Certainly, the limitations and restrictions embodied in our
Constitution are real as they should be in any living constitution. In
the United States where no express constitutional grant is found in
their constitution, the possession of this moderating power of the
courts, not to speak of its historical origin and development there,
has been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of more
than one and a half centuries. In our case, this moderating power is
granted, if not expressly, by clear implication from section 2 of
article VIII of our Constitution.
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is
to determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The
Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the
judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to
allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or
invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and
sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine
conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to
establish for the parties in an actual controversy the rights
which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is
in truth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy"
which properly is the power of judicial review under the
Constitution. Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to
actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity
of argument by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional
question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at
abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions
and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its
function is in this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions
of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts
accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments,

not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the

Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of
actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of
the people as expressed through their representatives in the
executive and legislative departments of the government. 24 (Italics in
the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this "moderating power" to
"determine the proper allocation of powers" of the different branches
of government and "to direct the course of government along
constitutional channels" is inherent in all courts25 as a necessary
consequence of the judicial power itself, which is "the power of the
court to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable."26
Thus, even in the United States where the power of judicial review is
not explicitly conferred upon the courts by its Constitution, such
power has "been set at rest by popular acquiescence for a period of
more than one and a half centuries." To be sure, it was in the 1803
leading case of Marbury v. Madison27 that the power of judicial review
was first articulated by Chief Justice Marshall, to wit:
It is also not entirely unworthy of observation, that in declaring what
shall be the supreme law of the land, the constitution itself is first
mentioned; and not the laws of the United States generally, but those
only which shall be made in pursuance of the constitution, have that
rank.
Thus, the particular phraseology of the constitution of the United
States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be
essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the
constitution is void; and that courts, as well as other
departments, are bound by that instrument. 28 (Italics in the
original; emphasis supplied)
In our own jurisdiction, as early as 1902, decades before its express
grant in the 1935 Constitution, the power of judicial review was
exercised by our courts to invalidate constitutionally infirm acts. 29 And
as pointed out by noted political law professor and former Supreme
Court Justice Vicente V. Mendoza,30 the executive and legislative

branches of our government in fact effectively acknowledged this

power of judicial review in Article 7 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their
violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse, or
custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the
Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be
valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the
Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)
As indicated in Angara v. Electoral Commission,31 judicial review is
indeed an integral component of the delicate system of checks and
balances which, together with the corollary principle of separation of
powers, forms the bedrock of our republican form of government and
insures that its vast powers are utilized only for the benefit of the
people for which it serves.
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our
system of government. It obtains not through express provision but
by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the
government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its
jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not
follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate and
distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely
unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has
provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to
secure coordination in the workings of the various departments
of the government. x x x And the judiciary in turn, with the
Supreme Court as the final arbiter, effectively checks the other
departments in the exercise of its power to determine the law,
and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if
violative of the Constitution.32 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice
Florentino Feliciano, "x x x judicial review is essential for the
maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and the

balancing of powers among the three great departments of

government through the definition and maintenance of the boundaries
of authority and control between them." 33 To him, "[j]udicial review is
the chief, indeed the only, medium of participation or instrument of
intervention of the judiciary in that balancing operation." 34
To ensure the potency of the power of judicial review to curb grave
abuse of discretion by "any branch or instrumentalities of
government," the afore-quoted Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution engraves, for the first time into its history, into block letter
law the so-called "expanded certiorari jurisdiction" of this Court, the
nature of and rationale for which are mirrored in the following excerpt
from the sponsorship speech of its proponent, former Chief Justice
Constitutional Commissioner Roberto Concepcion:
xxx
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former
Constitutions. It says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first
and explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part or instrumentality of the government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of
our experience during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some
antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary during the
deposed regime was marred considerably by the circumstance
that in a number of cases against the government, which then
had no legal defense at all, the solicitor general set up the
defense of political questions and got away with it. As a

consequence, certain principles concerning particularly the writ of

habeas corpus, that is, the authority of courts to order the release of
political detainees, and other matters related to the operation and
effect of martial law failed because the government set up the
defense of political question. And the Supreme Court said: "Well,
since it is political, we have no authority to pass upon it." The
Committee on the Judiciary feels that this was not a proper
solution of the questions involved. It did not merely request an
encroachment upon the rights of the people, but it, in effect,
encouraged further violations thereof during the martial law
regime. x x x
xxx
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of
the agencies and offices of the government as well as those of
its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the
question whether or not a branch of government or any of its
officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of
jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass
judgment on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that
the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle matters of
this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political
question.35 (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions,
this Court must necessarily turn to the Constitution itself which
employs the well-settled principles of constitutional construction.
First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the
Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed. Thus, in J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v.
Land Tenure Administration,36 this Court, speaking through Chief
Justice Enrique Fernando, declared:
We look to the language of the document itself in our search for

its meaning. We do not of course stop there, but that is where

we begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which
constitutional provisions are couched express the objective
sought to be attained. They are to be given their ordinary
meaning except where technical terms are employed in which
case the significance thus attached to them prevails. As the
Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document, it being essential for
the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be present in the people's
consciousness, its language as much as possible should be
understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says
according to the text of the provision to be construed compels
acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on
the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say.
Thus these are the cases where the need for construction is reduced
to a minimum.37 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of
the Constitution should be interpreted in accordance with the intent of
its framers. And so did this Court apply this principle in Civil Liberties
Union v. Executive Secretary38 in this wise:
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention
underlying the provision under consideration. Thus, it has been held
that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the
object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if
any, sought to be prevented or remedied. A doubtful provision will be
examined in the light of the history of the times, and the condition and
circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object
is to ascertain the reason which induced the framers of the
Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose
sought to be accomplished thereby, in order to construe the
whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and
calculated to effect that purpose. 39 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
As it did in Nitafan v. Commissioner on Internal Revenue 40 where,
speaking through Madame Justice Amuerfina A. Melencio-Herrera, it
declared:
x x x The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the

fundamental principle of constitutional construction that the

intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people
adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in
constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the
realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the
adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that
the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by
the explanation offered by the framers.41 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be
interpreted as a whole. Thus, in Chiongbian v. De Leon,42 this Court,
through Chief Justice Manuel Moran declared:
x x x [T]he members of the Constitutional Convention could not
have dedicated a provision of our Constitution merely for the
benefit of one person without considering that it could also
affect others. When they adopted subsection 2, they permitted, if
not willed, that said provision should function to the full extent
of its substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in
conjunction with all other provisions of that great document. 43
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Likewise, still in Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary,44 this
Court affirmed that:
It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no
one provision of the Constitution is to be separated from all the
others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions
bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view
and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of
the instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should
be considered and interpreted together as to effectuate the
whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be
allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the
two can be made to stand together.
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and
must lean in favor of a construction which will render every word
operative, rather than one which may make the words idle and

nugatory.45 (Emphasis supplied)

If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear,
resort to other aids is available. In still the same case of Civil
Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, this Court expounded:
While it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and
proceedings of the constitutional convention in order to arrive at the
reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may
be had only when other guides fail as said proceedings are
powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the
meaning is clear. Debates in the constitutional convention "are of
value as showing the views of the individual members, and as
indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to
the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less of the
mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that
instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to
construe the constitution from what appears upon its face." The
proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it was
understood by the people adopting it than in the framers's
understanding thereof.46 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It is in the context of the foregoing backdrop of constitutional
refinement and jurisprudential application of the power of judicial
review that respondents Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor
Senator Pimentel raise the novel argument that the Constitution has
excluded impeachment proceedings from the coverage of judicial
review.
Briefly stated, it is the position of respondents Speaker De Venecia
et. al. that impeachment is a political action which cannot assume a
judicial character. Hence, any question, issue or incident arising at
any stage of the impeachment proceeding is beyond the reach of
judicial review.47
For his part, intervenor Senator Pimentel contends that the Senate's
"sole power to try" impeachment cases48 (1) entirely excludes the
application of judicial review over it; and (2) necessarily includes the
Senate's power to determine constitutional questions relative to
impeachment proceedings.49

In furthering their arguments on the proposition that impeachment

proceedings are outside the scope of judicial review, respondents
Speaker De Venecia, et. al. and intervenor Senator Pimentel rely
heavily on American authorities, principally the majority opinion in the
case of Nixon v. United States.50 Thus, they contend that the exercise
of judicial review over impeachment proceedings is inappropriate
since it runs counter to the framers' decision to allocate to different
fora the powers to try impeachments and to try crimes; it disturbs the
system of checks and balances, under which impeachment is the
only legislative check on the judiciary; and it would create a lack of
finality and difficulty in fashioning relief. 51 Respondents likewise point
to deliberations on the US Constitution to show the intent to isolate
judicial power of review in cases of impeachment.
Respondents' and intervenors' reliance upon American jurisprudence,
the American Constitution and American authorities cannot be
credited to support the proposition that the Senate's "sole power to try
and decide impeachment cases," as provided for under Art. XI, Sec.
3(6) of the Constitution, is a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of all issues pertaining to impeachment to the
legislature, to the total exclusion of the power of judicial review to
check and restrain any grave abuse of the impeachment process. Nor
can it reasonably support the interpretation that it necessarily confers
upon the Senate the inherently judicial power to determine
constitutional questions incident to impeachment proceedings.
Said American jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American
Constitution, are of dubious application for these are no longer
controlling within our jurisdiction and have only limited persuasive
merit insofar as Philippine constitutional law is concerned. As held in
the case of Garcia vs. COMELEC,52 "[i]n resolving constitutional
disputes, [this Court] should not be beguiled by foreign jurisprudence
some of which are hardly applicable because they have been dictated
by different constitutional settings and needs." 53 Indeed, although the
Philippine Constitution can trace its origins to that of the United
States, their paths of development have long since diverged. In the
colorful words of Father Bernas, "[w]e have cut the umbilical cord."
The major difference between the judicial power of the Philippine
Supreme Court and that of the U.S. Supreme Court is that while the

power of judicial review is only impliedly granted to the U.S. Supreme

Court and is discretionary in nature, that granted to the Philippine
Supreme Court and lower courts, as expressly provided for in the
Constitution, is not just a power but also a duty, and it was given an
expanded definition to include the power to correct any grave abuse
of discretion on the part of any government branch or instrumentality.
There are also glaring distinctions between the U.S. Constitution and
the Philippine Constitution with respect to the power of the House of
Representatives over impeachment proceedings. While the U.S.
Constitution bestows sole power of impeachment to the House of
Representatives without limitation,54 our Constitution, though vesting
in the House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate
impeachment cases,55 provides for several limitations to the exercise
of such power as embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI
thereof. These limitations include the manner of filing, required vote
to impeach, and the one year bar on the impeachment of one and the
same official.
Respondents are also of the view that judicial review of
impeachments undermines their finality and may also lead to conflicts
between Congress and the judiciary. Thus, they call upon this Court
to exercise judicial statesmanship on the principle that "whenever
possible, the Court should defer to the judgment of the people
expressed legislatively, recognizing full well the perils of judicial
willfulness and pride."56
But did not the people also express their will when they instituted the
above-mentioned safeguards in the Constitution? This shows that the
Constitution did not intend to leave the matter of impeachment to the
sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for certain welldefined limits, or in the language of Baker v. Carr,57 "judicially
discoverable standards" for determining the validity of the exercise of
such discretion, through the power of judicial review.
The cases of Romulo v. Yniguez58 and Alejandrino v. Quezon,59 cited
by respondents in support of the argument that the impeachment
power is beyond the scope of judicial review, are not in point. These
cases concern the denial of petitions for writs of mandamus to
compel the legislature to perform non-ministerial acts, and do not

concern the exercise of the power of judicial review.

There is indeed a plethora of cases in which this Court exercised the
power of judicial review over congressional action. Thus, in Santiago
v. Guingona, Jr.,60 this Court ruled that it is well within the power and
jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether the Senate or its officials
committed a violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion
in the exercise of their functions and prerogatives. In Tanada v.
Angara,61 in seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the
ground that it contravened the Constitution, it held that the petition
raises a justiciable controversy and that when an action of the
legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the
judiciary to settle the dispute. In Bondoc v. Pineda,62 this Court
declared null and void a resolution of the House of Representatives
withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding the election, of a
congressman as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal for being
violative of Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution. In Coseteng v.
Mitra,63 it held that the resolution of whether the House representation
in the Commission on Appointments was based on proportional
representation of the political parties as provided in Section 18, Article
VI of the Constitution is subject to judicial review. In Daza v.
Singson,64 it held that the act of the House of Representatives in
removing the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments is
subject to judicial review. In Tanada v. Cuenco,65 it held that although
under the Constitution, the legislative power is vested exclusively in
Congress, this does not detract from the power of the courts to pass
upon the constitutionality of acts of Congress. In Angara v. Electoral
Commission,66 it ruled that confirmation by the National Assembly of
the election of any member, irrespective of whether his election is
contested, is not essential before such member-elect may discharge
the duties and enjoy the privileges of a member of the National
Assembly.
Finally, there exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the
exercise of judicial review over impeachment proceedings would
upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the Constitution is to
be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to
defeat another."67 Both are integral components of the calibrated
system of independence and interdependence that insures that no

branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to it by the

Constitution.
Essential Requisites for Judicial Review
As clearly stated in Angara v. Electoral Commission, the courts'
power of judicial review, like almost all powers conferred by the
Constitution, is subject to several limitations, namely: (1) an actual
case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the
person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge; he
must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that
he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at
the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality
must be the very lis mota of the case.
x x x Even then, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases
and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument
by the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised
or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only
lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile
conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this
manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom,
justice or expediency of legislation. More than that, courts accord the
presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only
because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but
also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and
controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as
expressed through their representatives in the executive and
legislative departments of the government.68 (Italics in the original)
Standing
Locus standi or legal standing or has been defined as a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or
will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is
being challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a
party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy
as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination

of difficult constitutional questions.69

Intervenor Soriano, in praying for the dismissal of the petitions,
contends that petitioners do not have standing since only the Chief
Justice has sustained and will sustain direct personal injury. Amicus
curiae former Justice Minister and Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza
similarly contends.
Upon the other hand, the Solicitor General asserts that petitioners
have standing since this Court had, in the past, accorded standing to
taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, legislators in cases involving
paramount public interest70 and transcendental importance,71 and that
procedural matters are subordinate to the need to determine whether
or not the other branches of the government have kept themselves
within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have
not abused the discretion given to them. 72 Amicus curiae Dean Raul
Pangalangan of the U.P. College of Law is of the same opinion, citing
transcendental importance and the well-entrenched rule exception
that, when the real party in interest is unable to vindicate his rights by
seeking the same remedies, as in the case of the Chief Justice who,
for ethical reasons, cannot himself invoke the jurisdiction of this
Court, the courts will grant petitioners standing.
There is, however, a difference between the rule on real-party-ininterest and the rule on standing, for the former is a concept of civil
procedure73 while the latter has constitutional underpinnings. 74 In view
of the arguments set forth regarding standing, it behooves the Court
to reiterate the ruling in Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Morato75 to clarify what is
meant by locus standi and to distinguish it from real party-in-interest.
The difference between the rule on standing and real party in interest
has been noted by authorities thus: "It is important to note . . . that
standing because of its constitutional and public policy underpinnings,
is very different from questions relating to whether a particular plaintiff
is the real party in interest or has capacity to sue. Although all three
requirements are directed towards ensuring that only certain parties
can maintain an action, standing restrictions require a partial
consideration of the merits, as well as broader policy concerns
relating to the proper role of the judiciary in certain areas.

Standing is a special concern in constitutional law because in some

cases suits are brought not by parties who have been personally
injured by the operation of a law or by official action taken, but by
concerned citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public
interest. Hence the question in standing is whether such parties have
"alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as
to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation
of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions."
xxx
On the other hand, the question as to "real party in interest" is
whether he is "the party who would be benefited or injured by the
judgment, or the 'party entitled to the avails of the suit.'" 76 (Citations
omitted)
While rights personal to the Chief Justice may have been injured by
the alleged unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives,
none of the petitioners before us asserts a violation of the personal
rights of the Chief Justice. On the contrary, they invariably invoke the
vindication of their own rights as taxpayers; members of Congress;
citizens, individually or in a class suit; and members of the bar and of
the legal profession which were supposedly violated by the alleged
unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives.
In a long line of cases, however, concerned citizens, taxpayers and
legislators when specific requirements have been met have been
given standing by this Court.
When suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner assailing the
constitutionality of a statute must be direct and personal. He must be
able to show, not only that the law or any government act is invalid,
but also that he sustained or is in imminent danger of sustaining
some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that
he suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must appear that the
person complaining has been or is about to be denied some right or
privilege to which he is lawfully entitled or that he is about to be
subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or
act complained of.77 In fine, when the proceeding involves the

assertion of a public right,78 the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies

the requirement of personal interest.
In the case of a taxpayer, he is allowed to sue where there is a claim
that public funds are illegally disbursed, or that public money is being
deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is a wastage of
public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional
law.79 Before he can invoke the power of judicial review, however, he
must specifically prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the
illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation and that he would
sustain a direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the questioned
statute or contract. It is not sufficient that he has merely a general
interest common to all members of the public.80
At all events, courts are vested with discretion as to whether or not a
taxpayer's suit should be entertained. 81 This Court opts to grant
standing to most of the petitioners, given their allegation that any
impending transmittal to the Senate of the Articles of Impeachment
and the ensuing trial of the Chief Justice will necessarily involve the
expenditure of public funds.
As for a legislator, he is allowed to sue to question the validity of any
official action which he claims infringes his prerogatives as a
legislator.82 Indeed, a member of the House of Representatives has
standing to maintain inviolate the prerogatives, powers and privileges
vested by the Constitution in his office. 83
While an association has legal personality to represent its members, 84
especially when it is composed of substantial taxpayers and the
outcome will affect their vital interests, 85 the mere invocation by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any member of the legal
profession of the duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing more,
although undoubtedly true, does not suffice to clothe it with standing.
Its interest is too general. It is shared by other groups and the whole
citizenry. However, a reading of the petitions shows that it has
advanced constitutional issues which deserve the attention of this
Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and weight as
precedents.86 It, therefore, behooves this Court to relax the rules on
standing and to resolve the issues presented by it.

In the same vein, when dealing with class suits filed in behalf of all
citizens, persons intervening must be sufficiently numerous to fully
protect the interests of all concerned 87 to enable the court to deal
properly with all interests involved in the suit, 88 for a judgment in a
class suit, whether favorable or unfavorable to the class, is, under the
res judicata principle, binding on all members of the class whether or
not they were before the court. 89 Where it clearly appears that not all
interests can be sufficiently represented as shown by the divergent
issues raised in the numerous petitions before this Court, G.R. No.
160365 as a class suit ought to fail. Since petitioners additionally
allege standing as citizens and taxpayers, however, their petition will
stand.
The Philippine Bar Association, in G.R. No. 160403, invokes the sole
ground of transcendental importance, while Atty. Dioscoro U. Vallejos,
in G.R. No. 160397, is mum on his standing.
There being no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, the
following instructive determinants formulated by former Supreme
Court Justice Florentino P. Feliciano are instructive: (1) the character
of the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of
a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by
the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government;
and (3) the lack of any other party with a more direct and specific
interest in raising the questions being raised. 90 Applying these
determinants, this Court is satisfied that the issues raised herein are
indeed of transcendental importance.
In not a few cases, this Court has in fact adopted a liberal attitude on
the locus standi of a petitioner where the petitioner is able to craft an
issue of transcendental significance to the people, as when the
issues raised are of paramount importance to the public. 91 Such
liberality does not, however, mean that the requirement that a party
should have an interest in the matter is totally eliminated. A party
must, at the very least, still plead the existence of such interest, it not
being one of which courts can take judicial notice. In petitioner
Vallejos' case, he failed to allege any interest in the case. He does
not thus have standing.
With respect to the motions for intervention, Rule 19, Section 2 of the

Rules of Court requires an intervenor to possess a legal interest in

the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an
interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by
a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the
court or of an officer thereof. While intervention is not a matter of
right, it may be permitted by the courts when the applicant shows
facts which satisfy the requirements of the law authorizing
intervention.92
In Intervenors Attorneys Romulo Macalintal and Pete Quirino
Quadra's case, they seek to join petitioners Candelaria, et. al. in G.R.
No. 160262. Since, save for one additional issue, they raise the same
issues and the same standing, and no objection on the part of
petitioners Candelaria, et. al. has been interposed, this Court as
earlier stated, granted the Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and
Petition-in-Intervention.
Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang
Pilipino, Inc., et. al. sought to join petitioner Francisco in G.R. No.
160261. Invoking their right as citizens to intervene, alleging that
"they will suffer if this insidious scheme of the minority members of
the House of Representatives is successful," this Court found the
requisites for intervention had been complied with.
Alleging that the issues raised in the petitions in G.R. Nos. 160261,
160262, 160263, 160277, 160292, 160295, and 160310 were of
transcendental importance, World War II Veterans Legionnaires of the
Philippines, Inc. filed a "Petition-in-Intervention with Leave to
Intervene" to raise the additional issue of whether or not the second
impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice is valid and based
on any of the grounds prescribed by the Constitution.
Finding that Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga
Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc., et al. and World War II Veterans
Legionnaires of the Philippines, Inc. possess a legal interest in the
matter in litigation the respective motions to intervene were hereby
granted.
Senator Aquilino Pimentel, on the other hand, sought to intervene for
the limited purpose of making of record and arguing a point of view

that differs with Senate President Drilon's. He alleges that submitting

to this Court's jurisdiction as the Senate President does will
undermine the independence of the Senate which will sit as an
impeachment court once the Articles of Impeachment are transmitted
to it from the House of Representatives. Clearly, Senator Pimentel
possesses a legal interest in the matter in litigation, he being a
member of Congress against which the herein petitions are directed.
For this reason, and to fully ventilate all substantial issues relating to
the matter at hand, his Motion to Intervene was granted and he was,
as earlier stated, allowed to argue.
Lastly, as to Jaime N. Soriano's motion to intervene, the same must
be denied for, while he asserts an interest as a taxpayer, he failed to
meet the standing requirement for bringing taxpayer's suits as set
forth in Dumlao v. Comelec,93 to wit:
x x x While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the
expenditure of public moneys, nowhere in their Petition do said
petitioners allege that their tax money is "being extracted and spent in
violation of specific constitutional protection against abuses of
legislative power," or that there is a misapplication of such funds by
respondent COMELEC, or that public money is being deflected to any
improper purpose. Neither do petitioners seek to restrain respondent
from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law.94 (Citations omitted)
In praying for the dismissal of the petitions, Soriano failed even to
allege that the act of petitioners will result in illegal disbursement of
public funds or in public money being deflected to any improper
purpose. Additionally, his mere interest as a member of the Bar does
not suffice to clothe him with standing.
Ripeness and Prematurity
In Tan v. Macapagal,95 this Court, through Chief Justice Fernando,
held that for a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, "it is a
prerequisite that something had by then been accomplished or
performed by either branch before a court may come into the
picture."96 Only then may the courts pass on the validity of what was
done, if and when the latter is challenged in an appropriate legal

proceeding.
The instant petitions raise in the main the issue of the validity of the
filing of the second impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice
in accordance with the House Impeachment Rules adopted by the
12th Congress, the constitutionality of which is questioned. The
questioned acts having been carried out, i.e., the second
impeachment complaint had been filed with the House of
Representatives and the 2001 Rules have already been already
promulgated and enforced, the prerequisite that the alleged
unconstitutional act should be accomplished and performed before
suit, as Tan v. Macapagal holds, has been complied with.
Related to the issue of ripeness is the question of whether the instant
petitions are premature. Amicus curiae former Senate President
Jovito R. Salonga opines that there may be no urgent need for this
Court to render a decision at this time, it being the final arbiter on
questions of constitutionality anyway. He thus recommends that all
remedies in the House and Senate should first be exhausted.
Taking a similar stand is Dean Raul Pangalangan of the U.P. College
of Law who suggests to this Court to take judicial notice of on-going
attempts to encourage signatories to the second impeachment
complaint to withdraw their signatures and opines that the House
Impeachment Rules provide for an opportunity for members to raise
constitutional questions themselves when the Articles of
Impeachment are presented on a motion to transmit to the same to
the Senate. The dean maintains that even assuming that the Articles
are transmitted to the Senate, the Chief Justice can raise the issue of
their constitutional infirmity by way of a motion to dismiss.
The dean's position does not persuade. First, the withdrawal by the
Representatives of their signatures would not, by itself, cure the
House Impeachment Rules of their constitutional infirmity. Neither
would such a withdrawal, by itself, obliterate the questioned second
impeachment complaint since it would only place it under the ambit of
Sections 3(2) and (3) of Article XI of the Constitution 97 and, therefore,
petitioners would continue to suffer their injuries.
Second and most importantly, the futility of seeking remedies from

either or both Houses of Congress before coming to this Court is

shown by the fact that, as previously discussed, neither the House of
Representatives nor the Senate is clothed with the power to rule with
definitiveness on the issue of constitutionality, whether concerning
impeachment proceedings or otherwise, as said power is exclusively
vested in the judiciary by the earlier quoted Section I, Article VIII of
the Constitution. Remedy cannot be sought from a body which is
bereft of power to grant it.
Justiciability
In the leading case of Tanada v. Cuenco,98 Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion defined the term "political question," viz:
[T]he term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it
means in ordinary parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other
words, in the language of Corpus Juris Secundum, it refers to "those
questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the Legislature or
executive branch of the Government." It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure. 99
(Italics in the original)
Prior to the 1973 Constitution, without consistency and seemingly
without any rhyme or reason, this Court vacillated on its stance of
taking cognizance of cases which involved political questions. In
some cases, this Court hid behind the cover of the political question
doctrine and refused to exercise its power of judicial review. 100 In other
cases, however, despite the seeming political nature of the therein
issues involved, this Court assumed jurisdiction whenever it found
constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon
political bodies.101 Even in the landmark 1988 case of Javellana v.
Executive Secretary102 which raised the issue of whether the 1973
Constitution was ratified, hence, in force, this Court shunted the
political question doctrine and took cognizance thereof. Ratification
by the people of a Constitution is a political question, it being a
question decided by the people in their sovereign capacity.
The frequency with which this Court invoked the political question

doctrine to refuse to take jurisdiction over certain cases during the

Marcos regime motivated Chief Justice Concepcion, when he
became a Constitutional Commissioner, to clarify this Court's power
of judicial review and its application on issues involving political
questions, viz:
MR. CONCEPCION. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.
I will speak on the judiciary. Practically, everybody has made, I
suppose, the usual comment that the judiciary is the weakest among
the three major branches of the service. Since the legislature holds
the purse and the executive the sword, the judiciary has nothing with
which to enforce its decisions or commands except the power of
reason and appeal to conscience which, after all, reflects the will of
God, and is the most powerful of all other powers without exception. x
x x And so, with the body's indulgence, I will proceed to read the
provisions drafted by the Committee on the Judiciary.
The first section starts with a sentence copied from former
Constitutions. It says:
The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.
I suppose nobody can question it.
The next provision is new in our constitutional law. I will read it first
and explain.
Judicial power includes the duty of courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part or instrumentality of the government.
Fellow Members of this Commission, this is actually a product of our
experience during martial law. As a matter of fact, it has some
antecedents in the past, but the role of the judiciary during the
deposed regime was marred considerably by the circumstance
that in a number of cases against the government, which then
had no legal defense at all, the solicitor general set up the

defense of political questions and got away with it. As a

consequence, certain principles concerning particularly the writ
of habeas corpus, that is, the authority of courts to order the
release of political detainees, and other matters related to the
operation and effect of martial law failed because the
government set up the defense of political question. And the
Supreme Court said: "Well, since it is political, we have no authority
to pass upon it." The Committee on the Judiciary feels that this
was not a proper solution of the questions involved. It did not
merely request an encroachment upon the rights of the people,
but it, in effect, encouraged further violations thereof during the
martial law regime. I am sure the members of the Bar are familiar
with this situation. But for the benefit of the Members of the
Commission who are not lawyers, allow me to explain. I will start with
a decision of the Supreme Court in 1973 on the case of Javellana vs.
the Secretary of Justice, if I am not mistaken. Martial law was
announced on September 22, although the proclamation was dated
September 21. The obvious reason for the delay in its publication was
that the administration had apprehended and detained prominent
newsmen on September 21. So that when martial law was
announced on September 22, the media hardly published anything
about it. In fact, the media could not publish any story not only
because our main writers were already incarcerated, but also
because those who succeeded them in their jobs were under mortal
threat of being the object of wrath of the ruling party. The 1971
Constitutional Convention had begun on June 1, 1971 and by
September 21 or 22 had not finished the Constitution; it had barely
agreed in the fundamentals of the Constitution. I forgot to say that
upon the proclamation of martial law, some delegates to that 1971
Constitutional Convention, dozens of them, were picked up. One of
them was our very own colleague, Commissioner Calderon. So, the
unfinished draft of the Constitution was taken over by representatives
of Malacaang. In 17 days, they finished what the delegates to the
1971 Constitutional Convention had been unable to accomplish for
about 14 months. The draft of the 1973 Constitution was presented to
the President around December 1, 1972, whereupon the President
issued a decree calling a plebiscite which suspended the operation of
some provisions in the martial law decree which prohibited
discussions, much less public discussions of certain matters of public
concern. The purpose was presumably to allow a free discussion on

the draft of the Constitution on which a plebiscite was to be held

sometime in January 1973. If I may use a word famous by our
colleague, Commissioner Ople, during the interregnum, however, the
draft of the Constitution was analyzed and criticized with such a
telling effect that Malacaang felt the danger of its approval. So, the
President suspended indefinitely the holding of the plebiscite and
announced that he would consult the people in a referendum to be
held from January 10 to January 15. But the questions to be
submitted in the referendum were not announced until the eve of its
scheduled beginning, under the supposed supervision not of the
Commission on Elections, but of what was then designated as
"citizens assemblies or barangays." Thus the barangays came into
existence. The questions to be propounded were released with
proposed answers thereto, suggesting that it was unnecessary to
hold a plebiscite because the answers given in the referendum
should be regarded as the votes cast in the plebiscite. Thereupon, a
motion was filed with the Supreme Court praying that the holding of
the referendum be suspended. When the motion was being heard
before the Supreme Court, the Minister of Justice delivered to the
Court a proclamation of the President declaring that the new
Constitution was already in force because the overwhelming majority
of the votes cast in the referendum favored the Constitution.
Immediately after the departure of the Minister of Justice, I proceeded
to the session room where the case was being heard. I then informed
the Court and the parties the presidential proclamation declaring that
the 1973 Constitution had been ratified by the people and is now in
force.
A number of other cases were filed to declare the presidential
proclamation null and void. The main defense put up by the
government was that the issue was a political question and that the
court had no jurisdiction to entertain the case.
xxx
The government said that in a referendum held from January 10 to
January 15, the vast majority ratified the draft of the Constitution.
Note that all members of the Supreme Court were residents of
Manila, but none of them had been notified of any referendum in their
respective places of residence, much less did they participate in the

alleged referendum. None of them saw any referendum proceeding.

In the Philippines, even local gossips spread like wild fire. So, a
majority of the members of the Court felt that there had been no
referendum.
Second, a referendum cannot substitute for a plebiscite. There is a
big difference between a referendum and a plebiscite. But
another group of justices upheld the defense that the issue was
a political question. Whereupon, they dismissed the case. This
is not the only major case in which the plea of "political
question" was set up. There have been a number of other cases
in the past.
x x x The defense of the political question was rejected because
the issue was clearly justiciable.
xxx
x x x When your Committee on the Judiciary began to perform its
functions, it faced the following questions: What is judicial power?
What is a political question?
The Supreme Court, like all other courts, has one main function: to
settle actual controversies involving conflicts of rights which are
demandable and enforceable. There are rights which are guaranteed
by law but cannot be enforced by a judiciary party. In a decided case,
a husband complained that his wife was unwilling to perform her
duties as a wife. The Court said: "We can tell your wife what her
duties as such are and that she is bound to comply with them, but we
cannot force her physically to discharge her main marital duty to her
husband. There are some rights guaranteed by law, but they are so
personal that to enforce them by actual compulsion would be highly
derogatory to human dignity."
This is why the first part of the second paragraph of Section I
provides that:
Judicial power includes the duty of courts to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable or
enforceable . . .

The courts, therefore, cannot entertain, much less decide,

hypothetical questions. In a presidential system of government,
the Supreme Court has, also another important function. The
powers of government are generally considered divided into
three branches: the Legislative, the Executive and the Judiciary.
Each one is supreme within its own sphere and independent of
the others. Because of that supremacy power to determine
whether a given law is valid or not is vested in courts of justice.
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of
the agencies and offices of the government as well as those of
its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the
question whether or not a branch of government or any of its
officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction, or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of
jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass
judgment on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which
means that the courts cannot hereafter evade the duty to settle
matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a
political question.
I have made these extended remarks to the end that the
Commissioners may have an initial food for thought on the subject of
the judiciary.103 (Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)
During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, Chief
Justice Concepcion further clarified the concept of judicial power,
thus:
MR. NOLLEDO. The Gentleman used the term "judicial power"
but judicial power is not vested in the Supreme Court alone but
also in other lower courts as may be created by law.
MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.
MR. NOLLEDO. And so, is this only an example?
MR. CONCEPCION. No, I know this is not. The Gentleman seems

to identify political questions with jurisdictional questions. But

there is a difference.
MR. NOLLEDO. Because of the expression "judicial power"?
MR. CONCEPCION. No. Judicial power, as I said, refers to
ordinary cases but where there is a question as to whether the
government had authority or had abused its authority to the
extent of lacking jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction, that is not
a political question. Therefore, the court has the duty to decide.
xxx
FR. BERNAS. Ultimately, therefore, it will always have to be decided
by the Supreme Court according to the new numerical need for votes.
On another point, is it the intention of Section 1 to do away with
the political question doctrine?
MR. CONCEPCION. No.
FR. BERNAS. It is not.
MR. CONCEPCION. No, because whenever there is an abuse of
discretion, amounting to a lack of jurisdiction. . .
FR. BERNAS. So, I am satisfied with the answer that it is not
intended to do away with the political question doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION. No, certainly not.
When this provision was originally drafted, it sought to define
what is judicial power. But the Gentleman will notice it says,
"judicial power includes" and the reason being that the
definition that we might make may not cover all possible areas.
FR. BERNAS. So, this is not an attempt to solve the problems
arising from the political question doctrine.
MR. CONCEPCION. It definitely does not eliminate the fact that
truly political questions are beyond the pale of judicial power. 104

(Emphasis supplied)
From the foregoing record of the proceedings of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, it is clear that judicial power is not only a
power; it is also a duty, a duty which cannot be abdicated by the
mere specter of this creature called the political question doctrine.
Chief Justice Concepcion hastened to clarify, however, that Section 1,
Article VIII was not intended to do away with "truly political
questions." From this clarification it is gathered that there are two
species of political questions: (1) "truly political questions" and (2)
those which "are not truly political questions."
Truly political questions are thus beyond judicial review, the reason
for respect of the doctrine of separation of powers to be maintained.
On the other hand, by virtue of Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution, courts can review questions which are not truly political
in nature.
As pointed out by amicus curiae former dean Pacifico Agabin of the
UP College of Law, this Court has in fact in a number of cases taken
jurisdiction over questions which are not truly political following the
effectivity of the present Constitution.
In Marcos v. Manglapus,105 this Court, speaking through Madame
Justice Irene Cortes, held:
The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine
and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into areas which the Court,
under previous constitutions, would have normally left to the political
departments to decide.106 x x x
In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,107 through Justice
Teodoro Padilla, this Court declared:
The "allocation of constitutional boundaries" is a task that this Court
must perform under the Constitution. Moreover, as held in a recent
case, "(t)he political question doctrine neither interposes an
obstacle to judicial determination of the rival claims. The
jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given
to this Court. It cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by the
1987 Constitution, although said provision by no means does

away with the applicability of the principle in appropriate

cases."108 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
And in Daza v. Singson,109 speaking through Justice Isagani Cruz, this
Court ruled:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even
less tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to
assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we
would still not be precluded from resolving it under the expanded
jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers, in proper cases, even
the political question.110 x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
Section 1, Article VIII, of the Court does not define what are
justiciable political questions and non-justiciable political questions,
however. Identification of these two species of political questions may
be problematic. There has been no clear standard. The American
case of Baker v. Carr111 attempts to provide some:
x x x Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political
question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment
of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a
kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the
respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need
for questioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by
various departments on one question.112 (Underscoring supplied)
Of these standards, the more reliable have been the first three: (1) a
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; (2) the lack of judicially discoverable
and manageable standards for resolving it; and (3) the impossibility of
deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for
non-judicial discretion. These standards are not separate and distinct
concepts but are interrelated to each in that the presence of one
strengthens the conclusion that the others are also present.
The problem in applying the foregoing standards is that the American

concept of judicial review is radically different from our current

concept, for Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution provides our
courts with far less discretion in determining whether they should
pass upon a constitutional issue.
In our jurisdiction, the determination of a truly political question from a
non-justiciable political question lies in the answer to the question of
whether there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or
functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts
are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or instrumentality of
the government properly acted within such limits. This Court shall
thus now apply this standard to the present controversy.
These petitions raise five substantial issues:
I. Whether the offenses alleged in the Second impeachment
complaint constitute valid impeachable offenses under the
Constitution.
II. Whether the second impeachment complaint was filed in
accordance with Section 3(4), Article XI of the Constitution.
III. Whether the legislative inquiry by the House Committee on Justice
into the Judicial Development Fund is an unconstitutional
infringement of the constitutionally mandated fiscal autonomy of the
judiciary.
IV. Whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the Rules on
Impeachment adopted by the 12th Congress are unconstitutional for
violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution.
V. Whether the second impeachment complaint is barred under
Section 3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.
The first issue goes into the merits of the second impeachment
complaint over which this Court has no jurisdiction. More importantly,
any discussion of this issue would require this Court to make a
determination of what constitutes an impeachable offense. Such a
determination is a purely political question which the Constitution has
left to the sound discretion of the legislation. Such an intent is clear
from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission. 113

Although Section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution enumerates six

grounds for impeachment, two of these, namely, other high crimes
and betrayal of public trust, elude a precise definition. In fact, an
examination of the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission
shows that the framers could find no better way to approximate the
boundaries of betrayal of public trust and other high crimes than by
alluding to both positive and negative examples of both, without
arriving at their clear cut definition or even a standard therefor. 114
Clearly, the issue calls upon this court to decide a non-justiciable
political question which is beyond the scope of its judicial power
under Section 1, Article VIII.
Lis Mota
It is a well-settled maxim of adjudication that an issue assailing the
constitutionality of a governmental act should be avoided whenever
possible. Thus, in the case of Sotto v. Commission on Elections,115
this Court held:
x x x It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass upon a
constitutional question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or
invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it
is raised, if the record also presents some other ground upon
which the court may rest its judgment, that course will be
adopted and the constitutional question will be left for
consideration until a case arises in which a decision upon such
question will be unavoidable.116 [Emphasis and underscoring
supplied]
The same principle was applied in Luz Farms v. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform,117 where this Court invalidated Sections 13 and 32 of
Republic Act No. 6657 for being confiscatory and violative of due
process, to wit:
It has been established that this Court will assume jurisdiction
over a constitutional question only if it is shown that the
essential requisites of a judicial inquiry into such a question are
first satisfied. Thus, there must be an actual case or controversy
involving a conflict of legal rights susceptible of judicial determination,
the constitutional question must have been opportunely raised by the

proper party, and the resolution of the question is unavoidably

necessary to the decision of the case itself.118 [Emphasis supplied]
Succinctly put, courts will not touch the issue of constitutionality
unless it is truly unavoidable and is the very lis mota or crux of the
controversy.
As noted earlier, the instant consolidated petitions, while all seeking
the invalidity of the second impeachment complaint, collectively raise
several constitutional issues upon which the outcome of this
controversy could possibly be made to rest. In determining whether
one, some or all of the remaining substantial issues should be passed
upon, this Court is guided by the related cannon of adjudication that
"the court should not form a rule of constitutional law broader than is
required by the precise facts to which it is applied."119
In G.R. No. 160310, petitioners Leonilo R. Alfonso, et al. argue that,
among other reasons, the second impeachment complaint is invalid
since it directly resulted from a Resolution 120 calling for a legislative
inquiry into the JDF, which Resolution and legislative inquiry
petitioners claim to likewise be unconstitutional for being: (a) a
violation of the rules and jurisprudence on investigations in aid of
legislation; (b) an open breach of the doctrine of separation of
powers; (c) a violation of the constitutionally mandated fiscal
autonomy of the judiciary; and (d) an assault on the independence of
the judiciary.121
Without going into the merits of petitioners Alfonso, et. al.'s claims, it
is the studied opinion of this Court that the issue of the
constitutionality of the said Resolution and resulting legislative inquiry
is too far removed from the issue of the validity of the second
impeachment complaint. Moreover, the resolution of said issue would,
in the Court's opinion, require it to form a rule of constitutional law
touching on the separate and distinct matter of legislative inquiries in
general, which would thus be broader than is required by the facts of
these consolidated cases. This opinion is further strengthened by the
fact that said petitioners have raised other grounds in support of their
petition which would not be adversely affected by the Court's ruling.
En passant, this Court notes that a standard for the conduct of

legislative inquiries has already been enunciated by this Court in

Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Commttee,122 viz:
The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both
houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Thus,
Section 21, Article VI thereof provides:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance
with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation is not, therefore absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is
circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision of the Constitution. Thus,
as provided therein, the investigation must be "in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure" and that "the
rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected." It follows then that the right rights of persons under the
Bill of Rights must be respected, including the right to due process
and the right not be compelled to testify against one's self. 123
In G.R. No. 160262, intervenors Romulo B. Macalintal and Pete
Quirino Quadra, while joining the original petition of petitioners
Candelaria, et. al., introduce the new argument that since the second
impeachment complaint was verified and filed only by
Representatives Gilberto Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella,
the same does not fall under the provisions of Section 3 (4), Article XI
of the Constitution which reads:
Section 3(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of
impeachment is filed by at least one-third of all the Members of the
House, the same shall constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and
trial by the Senate shall forthwith proceed.
They assert that while at least 81 members of the House of
Representatives signed a Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment,
the same did not satisfy the requisites for the application of the aforementioned section in that the "verified complaint or resolution of
impeachment" was not filed "by at least one-third of all the Members
of the House." With the exception of Representatives Teodoro and

Fuentebella, the signatories to said Resolution are alleged to have

verified the same merely as a "Resolution of Endorsement."
Intervenors point to the "Verification" of the Resolution of
Endorsement which states that:
"We are the proponents/sponsors of the Resolution of Endorsement
of the abovementioned Complaint of Representatives Gilberto
Teodoro and Felix William B. Fuentebella x x x" 124
Intervenors Macalintal and Quadra further claim that what the
Constitution requires in order for said second impeachment complaint
to automatically become the Articles of Impeachment and for trial in
the Senate to begin "forthwith," is that the verified complaint be
"filed," not merely endorsed, by at least one-third of the Members of
the House of Representatives. Not having complied with this
requirement, they concede that the second impeachment complaint
should have been calendared and referred to the House Committee
on Justice under Section 3(2), Article XI of the Constitution, viz:
Section 3(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by
any Member of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon
a resolution of endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be
included in the Order of Business within ten session days, and
referred to the proper Committee within three session days thereafter.
The Committee, after hearing, and by a majority vote of all its
Members, shall submit its report to the House within sixty session
days from such referral, together with the corresponding resolution.
The resolution shall be calendared for consideration by the House
within ten session days from receipt thereof.
Intervenors' foregoing position is echoed by Justice Maambong who
opined that for Section 3 (4), Article XI of the Constitution to apply,
there should be 76 or more representatives who signed and verified
the second impeachment complaint as complainants, signed and
verified the signatories to a resolution of impeachment. Justice
Maambong
likewise
asserted
that
the
Resolution
of
Endorsement/Impeachment signed by at least one-third of the
members of the House of Representatives as endorsers is not the
resolution of impeachment contemplated by the Constitution, such
resolution of endorsement being necessary only from at least one

Member whenever a citizen files a verified impeachment complaint.

While the foregoing issue, as argued by intervenors Macalintal and
Quadra, does indeed limit the scope of the constitutional issues to the
provisions on impeachment, more compelling considerations militate
against its adoption as the lis mota or crux of the present controversy.
Chief among this is the fact that only Attorneys Macalintal and
Quadra, intervenors in G.R. No. 160262, have raised this issue as a
ground for invalidating the second impeachment complaint. Thus, to
adopt this additional ground as the basis for deciding the instant
consolidated petitions would not only render for naught the efforts of
the original petitioners in G.R. No. 160262, but the efforts presented
by the other petitioners as well.
Again, the decision to discard the resolution of this issue as
unnecessary for the determination of the instant cases is made easier
by the fact that said intervenors Macalintal and Quadra have joined in
the petition of Candelaria, et. al., adopting the latter's arguments and
issues as their own. Consequently, they are not unduly prejudiced by
this Court's decision.
In sum, this Court holds that the two remaining issues, inextricably
linked as they are, constitute the very lis mota of the instant
controversy: (1) whether Sections 15 and 16 of Rule V of the House
Impeachment Rules adopted by the 12th Congress are
unconstitutional for violating the provisions of Section 3, Article XI of
the Constitution; and (2) whether, as a result thereof, the second
impeachment complaint is barred under Section 3(5) of Article XI of
the Constitution.
Judicial Restraint
Senator Pimentel urges this Court to exercise judicial restraint on the
ground that the Senate, sitting as an impeachment court, has the sole
power to try and decide all cases of impeachment. Again, this Court
reiterates that the power of judicial review includes the power of
review over justiciable issues in impeachment proceedings.
On the other hand, respondents Speaker De Venecia et. al. argue
that "[t]here is a moral compulsion for the Court to not assume
jurisdiction over the impeachment because all the Members thereof

are subject to impeachment."125 But this argument is very much like

saying the Legislature has a moral compulsion not to pass laws with
penalty clauses because Members of the House of Representatives
are subject to them.
The exercise of judicial restraint over justiciable issues is not an
option before this Court. Adjudication may not be declined, because
this Court is not legally disqualified. Nor can jurisdiction be renounced
as there is no other tribunal to which the controversy may be
referred."126 Otherwise, this Court would be shirking from its duty
vested under Art. VIII, Sec. 1(2) of the Constitution. More than being
clothed with authority thus, this Court is duty-bound to take
cognizance of the instant petitions.127 In the august words of amicus
curiae Father Bernas, "jurisdiction is not just a power; it is a solemn
duty which may not be renounced. To renounce it, even if it is
vexatious, would be a dereliction of duty."
Even in cases where it is an interested party, the Court under our
system of government cannot inhibit itself and must rule upon the
challenge because no other office has the authority to do so. 128 On the
occasion that this Court had been an interested party to the
controversy before it, it has acted upon the matter "not with
officiousness but in the discharge of an unavoidable duty and, as
always, with detachment and fairness." 129 After all, "by [his]
appointment to the office, the public has laid on [a member of the
judiciary] their confidence that [he] is mentally and morally fit to pass
upon the merits of their varied contentions. For this reason, they
expect [him] to be fearless in [his] pursuit to render justice, to be
unafraid to displease any person, interest or power and to be
equipped with a moral fiber strong enough to resist the temptations
lurking in [his] office."130
The duty to exercise the power of adjudication regardless of interest
had already been settled in the case of Abbas v. Senate Electoral
Tribunal.131 In that case, the petitioners filed with the respondent
Senate Electoral Tribunal a Motion for Disqualification or Inhibition of
the Senators-Members thereof from the hearing and resolution of
SET Case No. 002-87 on the ground that all of them were interested
parties to said case as respondents therein. This would have reduced
the Tribunal's membership to only its three Justices-Members whose

disqualification was not sought, leaving them to decide the matter.

This Court held:
Where, as here, a situation is created which precludes the
substitution of any Senator sitting in the Tribunal by any of his other
colleagues in the Senate without inviting the same objections to the
substitute's competence, the proposed mass disqualification, if
sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Tribunal no alternative but
to abandon a duty that no other court or body can perform, but which
it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the participation of its entire
membership of Senators.
To our mind, this is the overriding consideration that the Tribunal
be not prevented from discharging a duty which it alone has the
power to perform, the performance of which is in the highest public
interest as evidenced by its being expressly imposed by no less than
the fundamental law.
It is aptly noted in the first of the questioned Resolutions that the
framers of the Constitution could not have been unaware of the
possibility of an election contest that would involve all Senators
elect, six of whom would inevitably have to sit in judgment thereon.
Indeed, such possibility might surface again in the wake of the 1992
elections when once more, but for the last time, all 24 seats in the
Senate will be at stake. Yet the Constitution provides no scheme or
mode for settling such unusual situations or for the substitution of
Senators designated to the Tribunal whose disqualification may be
sought. Litigants in such situations must simply place their trust and
hopes of vindication in the fairness and sense of justice of the
Members of the Tribunal. Justices and Senators, singly and
collectively.
Let us not be misunderstood as saying that no Senator-Member of
the Senate Electoral Tribunal may inhibit or disqualify himself from
sitting in judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every Member
of the Tribunal may, as his conscience dictates, refrain from
participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely feels that
his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an
objective and impartial judgment. What we are merely saying is that
in the light of the Constitution, the Senate Electoral Tribunal cannot

legally function as such, absent its entire membership of Senators

and that no amendment of its Rules can confer on the three JusticesMembers alone the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial
election contest.
More recently in the case of Estrada v. Desierto,132 it was held that:
Moreover, to disqualify any of the members of the Court, particularly a
majority of them, is nothing short of pro tanto depriving the Court itself
of its jurisdiction as established by the fundamental law.
Disqualification of a judge is a deprivation of his judicial power. And if
that judge is the one designated by the Constitution to exercise the
jurisdiction of his court, as is the case with the Justices of this Court,
the deprivation of his or their judicial power is equivalent to the
deprivation of the judicial power of the court itself. It affects the very
heart of judicial independence. The proposed mass disqualification, if
sanctioned and ordered, would leave the Court no alternative but to
abandon a duty which it cannot lawfully discharge if shorn of the
participation of its entire membership of Justices. 133 (Italics in the
original)
Besides, there are specific safeguards already laid down by the Court
when it exercises its power of judicial review.
In Demetria v. Alba,134 this Court, through Justice Marcelo Fernan
cited the "seven pillars" of limitations of the power of judicial review,
enunciated by US Supreme Court Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v.
TVA135 as follows:
1. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a
friendly, non-adversary proceeding, declining because to decide such
questions 'is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity in
the determination of real, earnest and vital controversy between
individuals. It never was the thought that, by means of a friendly suit,
a party beaten in the legislature could transfer to the courts an inquiry
as to the constitutionality of the legislative act.'
2. The Court will not 'anticipate a question of constitutional law in
advance of the necessity of deciding it.' . . . 'It is not the habit of the
Court to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely
necessary to a decision of the case.'

3. The Court will not 'formulate a rule of constitutional law broader

than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.'
4. The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although
properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other
ground upon which the case may be disposed of. This rule has found
most varied application. Thus, if a case can be decided on either of
two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a
question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide
only the latter. Appeals from the highest court of a state challenging
its decision of a question under the Federal Constitution are
frequently dismissed because the judgment can be sustained on an
independent state ground.
5. The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon
complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by its operation.
Among the many applications of this rule, none is more striking than
the denial of the right of challenge to one who lacks a personal or
property right. Thus, the challenge by a public official interested only
in the performance of his official duty will not be entertained . . . In
Fairchild v. Hughes, the Court affirmed the dismissal of a suit brought
by a citizen who sought to have the Nineteenth Amendment declared
unconstitutional. In Massachusetts v. Mellon, the challenge of the
federal Maternity Act was not entertained although made by the
Commonwealth on behalf of all its citizens.
6. The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the
instance of one who has availed himself of its benefits.
7. When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question,
and even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a
cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a
construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may
be avoided (citations omitted).
The foregoing "pillars" of limitation of judicial review, summarized in
Ashwander v. TVA from different decisions of the United States
Supreme Court, can be encapsulated into the following categories:
1. that there be absolute necessity of deciding a case

2. that rules of constitutional law shall be formulated only as required

by the facts of the case
3. that judgment may not be sustained on some other ground
4. that there be actual injury sustained by the party by reason of the
operation of the statute
5. that the parties are not in estoppel
6. that the Court upholds the presumption of constitutionality.
As stated previously, parallel guidelines have been adopted by this
Court in the exercise of judicial review:
1. actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power
2. the person challenging the act must have "standing" to challenge;
he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such
that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement
3. the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
possible opportunity
4. the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case.136
Respondents Speaker de Venecia, et. al. raise another argument for
judicial restraint the possibility that "judicial review of impeachments
might also lead to embarrassing conflicts between the Congress and
the [J]udiciary." They stress the need to avoid the appearance of
impropriety or conflicts of interest in judicial hearings, and the
scenario that it would be confusing and humiliating and risk serious
political instability at home and abroad if the judiciary countermanded
the vote of Congress to remove an impeachable official. 137 Intervenor
Soriano echoes this argument by alleging that failure of this Court to
enforce its Resolution against Congress would result in the diminution
of its judicial authority and erode public confidence and faith in the
judiciary.

Such an argument, however, is specious, to say the least. As

correctly stated by the Solicitor General, the possibility of the
occurrence of a constitutional crisis is not a reason for this Court to
refrain from upholding the Constitution in all impeachment cases.
Justices cannot abandon their constitutional duties just because their
action may start, if not precipitate, a crisis.
Justice Feliciano warned against the dangers when this Court refuses
to act.
x x x Frequently, the fight over a controversial legislative or executive
act is not regarded as settled until the Supreme Court has passed
upon the constitutionality of the act involved, the judgment has not
only juridical effects but also political consequences. Those political
consequences may follow even where the Court fails to grant the
petitioner's prayer to nullify an act for lack of the necessary number of
votes. Frequently, failure to act explicitly, one way or the other, itself
constitutes a decision for the respondent and validation, or at least
quasi-validation, follows." 138
Thus, in Javellana v. Executive Secretary139 where this Court was split
and "in the end there were not enough votes either to grant the
petitions, or to sustain respondent's claims," 140 the pre-existing
constitutional order was disrupted which paved the way for the
establishment of the martial law regime.
Such an argument by respondents and intervenor also presumes that
the coordinate branches of the government would behave in a
lawless manner and not do their duty under the law to uphold the
Constitution and obey the laws of the land. Yet there is no reason to
believe that any of the branches of government will behave in a
precipitate manner and risk social upheaval, violence, chaos and
anarchy by encouraging disrespect for the fundamental law of the
land.
Substituting the word public officers for judges, this Court is well
guided by the doctrine in People v. Veneracion, to wit:141
Obedience to the rule of law forms the bedrock of our system of
justice. If [public officers], under the guise of religious or political
beliefs were allowed to roam unrestricted beyond boundaries within

which they are required by law to exercise the duties of their office,
then law becomes meaningless. A government of laws, not of men
excludes the exercise of broad discretionary powers by those acting
under its authority. Under this system, [public officers] are guided by
the Rule of Law, and ought "to protect and enforce it without fear or
favor," resist encroachments by governments, political parties, or
even the interference of their own personal beliefs. 142
Constitutionality of the Rules of Procedurefor Impeachment
Proceedingsadopted by the 12th Congress
Respondent House of Representatives, through Speaker De Venecia,
argues that Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment
Rules do not violate Section 3 (5) of Article XI of our present
Constitution, contending that the term "initiate" does not mean "to
file;" that Section 3 (1) is clear in that it is the House of
Representatives, as a collective body, which has the exclusive power
to initiate all cases of impeachment; that initiate could not possibly
mean "to file" because filing can, as Section 3 (2), Article XI of the
Constitution provides, only be accomplished in 3 ways, to wit: (1) by a
verified complaint for impeachment by any member of the House of
Representatives; or (2) by any citizen upon a resolution of
endorsement by any member; or (3) by at least 1/3 of all the
members of the House. Respondent House of Representatives
concludes that the one year bar prohibiting the initiation of
impeachment proceedings against the same officials could not have
been violated as the impeachment complaint against Chief Justice
Davide and seven Associate Justices had not been initiated as the
House of Representatives, acting as the collective body, has yet to
act on it.
The resolution of this issue thus hinges on the interpretation of the
term "initiate." Resort to statutory construction is, therefore, in order.
That the sponsor of the provision of Section 3(5) of the Constitution,
Commissioner Florenz Regalado, who eventually became an
Associate Justice of this Court, agreed on the meaning of "initiate" as
"to file," as proffered and explained by Constitutional Commissioner
Maambong during the Constitutional Commission proceedings, which
he (Commissioner Regalado) as amicus curiae affirmed during the

oral arguments on the instant petitions held on November 5, 2003 at

which he added that the act of "initiating" included the act of taking
initial action on the complaint, dissipates any doubt that indeed the
word "initiate" as it twice appears in Article XI (3) and (5) of the
Constitution means to file the complaint and take initial action on it.
"Initiate" of course is understood by ordinary men to mean, as
dictionaries do, to begin, to commence, or set going. As Webster's
Third New International Dictionary of the English Language concisely
puts it, it means "to perform or facilitate the first action," which jibes
with Justice Regalado's position, and that of Father Bernas, who
elucidated during the oral arguments of the instant petitions on
November 5, 2003 in this wise:
Briefly then, an impeachment proceeding is not a single act. It is a
comlexus of acts consisting of a beginning, a middle and an end. The
end is the transmittal of the articles of impeachment to the Senate.
The middle consists of those deliberative moments leading to the
formulation of the articles of impeachment. The beginning or the
initiation is the filing of the complaint and its referral to the Committee
on Justice.
Finally, it should be noted that the House Rule relied upon by
Representatives Cojuangco and Fuentebella says that impeachment
is "deemed initiated" when the Justice Committee votes in favor of
impeachment or when the House reverses a contrary vote of the
Committee. Note that the Rule does not say "impeachment
proceedings" are initiated but rather are "deemed initiated." The
language is recognition that initiation happened earlier, but by legal
fiction there is an attempt to postpone it to a time after actual
initiation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As stated earlier, one of the means of interpreting the Constitution is
looking into the intent of the law. Fortunately, the intent of the framers
of the 1987 Constitution can be pried from its records:
MR. MAAMBONG. With reference to Section 3, regarding the
procedure and the substantive provisions on impeachment, I
understand there have been many proposals and, I think, these
would need some time for Committee action.

However, I would just like to indicate that I submitted to the

Committee a resolution on impeachment proceedings, copies of
which have been furnished the Members of this body. This is borne
out of my experience as a member of the Committee on Justice,
Human Rights and Good Government which took charge of the last
impeachment resolution filed before the First Batasang Pambansa.
For the information of the Committee, the resolution covers
several steps in the impeachment proceedings starting with
initiation, action of the Speaker committee action, calendaring of
report, voting on the report, transmittal referral to the Senate,
trial and judgment by the Senate.
xxx
MR. MAAMBONG. Mr. Presiding Officer, I am not moving for a
reconsideration of the approval of the amendment submitted by
Commissioner Regalado, but I will just make of record my thinking
that we do not really initiate the filing of the Articles of Impeachment
on the floor. The procedure, as I have pointed out earlier, was that
the initiation starts with the filing of the complaint. And what is
actually done on the floor is that the committee resolution
containing the Articles of Impeachment is the one approved by
the body.
As the phraseology now runs, which may be corrected by the
Committee on Style, it appears that the initiation starts on the floor. If
we only have time, I could cite examples in the case of the
impeachment proceedings of President Richard Nixon wherein the
Committee on the Judiciary submitted the recommendation, the
resolution, and the Articles of Impeachment to the body, and it was
the body who approved the resolution. It is not the body which
initiates it. It only approves or disapproves the resolution. So, on
that score, probably the Committee on Style could help in rearranging
these words because we have to be very technical about this. I have
been bringing with me The Rules of the House of Representatives of
the U.S. Congress. The Senate Rules are with me. The proceedings
on the case of Richard Nixon are with me. I have submitted my
proposal, but the Committee has already decided. Nevertheless, I just
want to indicate this on record.

xxx
MR. MAAMBONG. I would just like to move for a reconsideration of
the approval of Section 3 (3). My reconsideration will not at all affect
the substance, but it is only in keeping with the exact formulation of
the Rules of the House of Representatives of the United States
regarding impeachment.
I am proposing, Madam President, without doing damage to any of
this provision, that on page 2, Section 3 (3), from lines 17 to 18, we
delete the words which read: "to initiate impeachment
proceedings" and the comma (,) and insert on line 19 after the word
"resolution" the phrase WITH THE ARTICLES, and then capitalize the
letter "i" in "impeachment" and replace the word "by" with OF, so that
the whole section will now read: "A vote of at least one-third of all the
Members of the House shall be necessary either to affirm a resolution
WITH THE ARTICLES of Impeachment OF the Committee or to
override its contrary resolution. The vote of each Member shall be
recorded."
I already mentioned earlier yesterday that the initiation, as far as
the House of Representatives of the United States is concerned,
really starts from the filing of the verified complaint and every
resolution to impeach always carries with it the Articles of
Impeachment. As a matter of fact, the words "Articles of
Impeachment" are mentioned on line 25 in the case of the direct filing
of a verified compliant of one-third of all the Members of the House. I
will mention again, Madam President, that my amendment will not
vary the substance in any way. It is only in keeping with the uniform
procedure of the House of Representatives of the United States
Congress. Thank you, Madam President. 143 (Italics in the original;
emphasis and udnerscoring supplied)
This amendment proposed by Commissioner Maambong was
clarified and accepted by the Committee on the Accountability of
Public Officers.144
It is thus clear that the framers intended "initiation" to start with the
filing of the complaint. In his amicus curiae brief, Commissioner
Maambong explained that "the obvious reason in deleting the phrase

"to initiate impeachment proceedings" as contained in the text of

the provision of Section 3 (3) was to settle and make it understood
once and for all that the initiation of impeachment proceedings
starts with the filing of the complaint, and the vote of one-third of
the House in a resolution of impeachment does not initiate the
impeachment proceedings which was already initiated by the filing
of a verified complaint under Section 3, paragraph (2), Article XI
of the Constitution."145
Amicus curiae Constitutional Commissioner Regalado is of the same
view as is Father Bernas, who was also a member of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, that the word "initiate" as used in Article
XI, Section 3(5) means to file, both adding, however, that the filing
must be accompanied by an action to set the complaint moving.
During the oral arguments before this Court, Father Bernas clarified
that the word "initiate," appearing in the constitutional provision on
impeachment, viz:
Section 3 (1) The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive
power to initiate all cases of impeachment.
xxx
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same
official more than once within a period of one year, (Emphasis
supplied)
refers to two objects, "impeachment case" and "impeachment
proceeding."
Father Bernas explains that in these two provisions, the common
verb is "to initiate." The object in the first sentence is "impeachment
case." The object in the second sentence is "impeachment
proceeding." Following the principle of reddendo singuala sinuilis, the
term "cases" must be distinguished from the term "proceedings." An
impeachment case is the legal controversy that must be decided by
the Senate. Above-quoted first provision provides that the House, by
a vote of one-third of all its members, can bring a case to the Senate.
It is in that sense that the House has "exclusive power" to initiate all
cases of impeachment. No other body can do it. However, before a

decision is made to initiate a case in the Senate, a "proceeding" must

be followed to arrive at a conclusion. A proceeding must be "initiated."
To initiate, which comes from the Latin word initium, means to begin.
On the other hand, proceeding is a progressive noun. It has a
beginning, a middle, and an end. It takes place not in the Senate but
in the House and consists of several steps: (1) there is the filing of a
verified complaint either by a Member of the House of
Representatives or by a private citizen endorsed by a Member of the
House of the Representatives; (2) there is the processing of this
complaint by the proper Committee which may either reject the
complaint or uphold it; (3) whether the resolution of the Committee
rejects or upholds the complaint, the resolution must be forwarded to
the House for further processing; and (4) there is the processing of
the same complaint by the House of Representatives which either
affirms a favorable resolution of the Committee or overrides a
contrary resolution by a vote of one-third of all the members. If at
least one third of all the Members upholds the complaint, Articles of
Impeachment are prepared and transmitted to the Senate. It is at this
point that the House "initiates an impeachment case." It is at this
point that an impeachable public official is successfully impeached.
That is, he or she is successfully charged with an impeachment
"case" before the Senate as impeachment court.
Father Bernas further explains: The "impeachment proceeding" is not
initiated when the complaint is transmitted to the Senate for trial
because that is the end of the House proceeding and the beginning of
another proceeding, namely the trial. Neither is the "impeachment
proceeding" initiated when the House deliberates on the resolution
passed on to it by the Committee, because something prior to that
has already been done. The action of the House is already a further
step in the proceeding, not its initiation or beginning. Rather, the
proceeding is initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed
and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. This is the
initiating step which triggers the series of steps that follow.
The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its
ordinary meaning. Thus when a proposal reached the floor proposing
that "A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall
be necessary to initiate impeachment proceedings," this was met
by a proposal to delete the line on the ground that the vote of the

House does not initiate impeachment proceeding but rather the filing
of a complaint does.146 Thus the line was deleted and is not found in
the present Constitution.
Father Bernas concludes that when Section 3 (5) says, "No
impeachment proceeding shall be initiated against the same official
more than once within a period of one year," it means that no second
verified complaint may be accepted and referred to the Committee on
Justice for action. By his explanation, this interpretation is founded on
the common understanding of the meaning of "to initiate" which
means to begin. He reminds that the Constitution is ratified by the
people, both ordinary and sophisticated, as they understand it; and
that ordinary people read ordinary meaning into ordinary words and
not abstruse meaning, they ratify words as they understand it and not
as sophisticated lawyers confuse it.
To the argument that only the House of Representatives as a body
can initiate impeachment proceedings because Section 3 (1) says
"The House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to
initiate all cases of impeachment," This is a misreading of said
provision and is contrary to the principle of reddendo singula singulis
by equating "impeachment cases" with "impeachment proceeding."
From the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus
curiae briefs of two former Constitutional Commissioners, it is without
a doubt that the term "to initiate" refers to the filing of the
impeachment complaint coupled with Congress' taking initial action of
said complaint.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and
referral or endorsement of the impeachment complaint to the House
Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the
members of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General
of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes
clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another
impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official
within a one year period.
Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment
Rules, impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a

finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint

and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House
itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that
the verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance
or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of
the House of Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution
of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House. These
rules clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI since the rules give
the term "initiate" a meaning different meaning from filing and referral.
In his amicus curiae brief, Justice Hugo Gutierrez posits that this
Court could not use contemporaneous construction as an aid in the
interpretation of Sec.3 (5) of Article XI, citing Vera v. Avelino147
wherein this Court stated that "their personal opinions (referring to
Justices who were delegates to the Constitution Convention) on the
matter at issue expressed during this Court's our deliberations stand
on a different footing from the properly recorded utterances of
debates and proceedings." Further citing said case, he states that
this Court likened the former members of the Constitutional
Convention to actors who are so absorbed in their emotional roles
that intelligent spectators may know more about the real meaning
because
of
the
latter's
balanced
perspectives
and
148
disinterestedness.
Justice Gutierrez's statements have no application in the present
petitions. There are at present only two members of this Court who
participated in the 1986 Constitutional Commission Chief Justice
Davide and Justice Adolf Azcuna. Chief Justice Davide has not taken
part in these proceedings for obvious reasons. Moreover, this Court
has not simply relied on the personal opinions now given by members
of the Constitutional Commission, but has examined the records of
the deliberations and proceedings thereof.
Respondent House of Representatives counters that under Section 3
(8) of Article XI, it is clear and unequivocal that it and only it has the
power to make and interpret its rules governing impeachment. Its
argument is premised on the assumption that Congress has absolute
power to promulgate its rules. This assumption, however, is
misplaced.

Section 3 (8) of Article XI provides that "The Congress shall

promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the
purpose of this section." Clearly, its power to promulgate its rules on
impeachment is limited by the phrase "to effectively carry out the
purpose of this section." Hence, these rules cannot contravene the
very purpose of the Constitution which said rules were intended to
effectively carry out. Moreover, Section 3 of Article XI clearly provides
for other specific limitations on its power to make rules, viz:
Section 3. (1) x x x
(2) A verified complaint for impeachment may be filed by any Member
of the House of Representatives or by any citizen upon a resolution of
endorsement by any Member thereof, which shall be included in the
Order of Business within ten session days, and referred to the proper
Committee within three session days thereafter. The Committee, after
hearing, and by a majority vote of all its Members, shall submit its
report to the House within sixty session days from such referral,
together with the corresponding resolution. The resolution shall be
calendared for consideration by the House within ten session days
from receipt thereof.
(3) A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall
be necessary to either affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of
Impeachment of the Committee, or override its contrary resolution.
The vote of each Member shall be recorded.
(4) In case the verified complaint or resolution of impeachment is filed
by at least one-third of all the Members of the House, the same shall
constitute the Articles of Impeachment, and trial by the Senate shall
forthwith proceed.
(5) No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same
official more than once within a period of one year.
It is basic that all rules must not contravene the Constitution which is
the fundamental law. If as alleged Congress had absolute rule making
power, then it would by necessary implication have the power to alter
or amend the meaning of the Constitution without need of
referendum.

In Osmea v. Pendatun,149 this Court held that it is within the province

of either House of Congress to interpret its rules and that it was the
best judge of what constituted "disorderly behavior" of its members.
However, in Paceta v. Secretary of the Commission on
Appointments,150 Justice (later Chief Justice) Enrique Fernando,
speaking for this Court and quoting Justice Brandeis in United States
v. Smith,151 declared that where the construction to be given to a rule
affects persons other than members of the Legislature, the question
becomes judicial in nature. In Arroyo v. De Venecia,152 quoting United
States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co., 153 Justice Vicente Mendoza, speaking
for this Court, held that while the Constitution empowers each house
to determine its rules of proceedings, it may not by its rules ignore
constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and further that
there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method
of proceeding established by the rule and the result which is sought
to be attained. It is only within these limitations that all matters of
method are open to the determination of the Legislature. In the same
case of Arroyo v. De Venecia, Justice Reynato S. Puno, in his
Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, was even more emphatic as he
stressed that in the Philippine setting there is even more reason for
courts to inquire into the validity of the Rules of Congress, viz:
With due respect, I do not agree that the issues posed by the
petitioner are non-justiciable. Nor do I agree that we will trivialize
the principle of separation of power if we assume jurisdiction
over he case at bar. Even in the United States, the principle of
separation of power is no longer an impregnable impediment against
the interposition of judicial power on cases involving breach of rules
of procedure by legislators.
Rightly, the ponencia uses the 1891 case of US v Ballin (144 US 1)
as a window to view the issues before the Court. It is in Ballin where
the US Supreme Court first defined the boundaries of the power of
the judiciary to review congressional rules. It held:
"x x x
"The Constitution, in the same section, provides, that each house
may determine the rules of its proceedings." It appears that in
pursuance of this authority the House had, prior to that day, passed

this as one of its rules:

Rule XV
3. On the demand of any member, or at the suggestion of the
Speaker, the names of members sufficient to make a quorum in the
hall of the House who do not vote shall be noted by the clerk and
recorded in the journal, and reported to the Speaker with the names
of the members voting, and be counted and announced in
determining the presence of a quorum to do business. (House
Journal, 230, Feb. 14, 1890)
The action taken was in direct compliance with this rule. The
question, therefore, is as to the validity of this rule, and not what
methods the Speaker may of his own motion resort to for determining
the presence of a quorum, nor what matters the Speaker or clerk may
of their own volition place upon the journal. Neither do the
advantages or disadvantages, the wisdom or folly, of such a rule
present any matters for judicial consideration. With the courts the
question is only one of power. The Constitution empowers each
house to determine its rules of proceedings. It may not by its
rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental
rights, and there should be a reasonable relation between the
mode or method of proceedings established by the rule and the
result which is sought to be attained. But within these limitations
all matters of method are open to the determination of the House, and
it is no impeachment of the rule to say that some other way would be
better, more accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to the
validity of a rule that a different one has been prescribed and in force
for a length of time. The power to make rules is not one which once
exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power, always subject to be
exercised by the House, and within the limitations suggested,
absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body or tribunal."
Ballin, clearly confirmed the jurisdiction of courts to pass upon
the validity of congressional rules, i.e, whether they are
constitutional. Rule XV was examined by the Court and it was found
to satisfy the test: (1) that it did not ignore any constitutional restraint;
(2) it did not violate any fundamental right; and (3) its method had a
reasonable relationship with the result sought to be attained. By

examining Rule XV, the Court did not allow its jurisdiction to be
defeated by the mere invocation of the principle of separation of
powers.154
xxx
In the Philippine setting, there is a more compelling reason for
courts to categorically reject the political question defense when
its interposition will cover up abuse of power. For section 1,
Article VIII of our Constitution was intentionally cobbled to
empower courts "x x x to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government." This power is new and was not granted to our courts
in the 1935 and 1972 Constitutions. It was not also xeroxed from
the US Constitution or any foreign state constitution. The
CONCOM granted this enormous power to our courts in view of
our experience under martial law where abusive exercises of
state power were shielded from judicial scrutiny by the misuse
of the political question doctrine. Led by the eminent former Chief
Justice Roberto Concepcion, the CONCOM expanded and
sharpened the checking powers of the judiciary vis--vis the
Executive and the Legislative departments of government. 155
xxx
The Constitution cannot be any clearer. What it granted to this
Court is not a mere power which it can decline to exercise.
Precisely to deter this disinclination, the Constitution imposed it
as a duty of this Court to strike down any act of a branch or
instrumentality of government or any of its officials done with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Rightly or wrongly, the Constitution has elongated the
checking powers of this Court against the other branches of
government despite their more democratic character, the President
and the legislators being elected by the people. 156
xxx
The provision defining judicial power as including the 'duty of the
courts of justice. . . to determine whether or not there has been a

grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction

on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government'
constitutes the capstone of the efforts of the Constitutional
Commission to upgrade the powers of this court vis--vis the other
branches of government. This provision was dictated by our
experience under martial law which taught us that a stronger and
more independent judiciary is needed to abort abuses in government.
xxx
xxx
In sum, I submit that in imposing to this Court the duty to annul acts
of government committed with grave abuse of discretion, the new
Constitution transformed this Court from passivity to activism. This
transformation, dictated by our distinct experience as nation, is not
merely evolutionary but revolutionary. Under the 1935 and the 1973
Constitutions, this Court approached constitutional violations by
initially determining what it cannot do; under the 1987 Constitution,
there is a shift in stress this Court is mandated to approach
constitutional violations not by finding out what it should not do
but what it must do. The Court must discharge this solemn duty by
not resuscitating a past that petrifies the present.
I urge my brethren in the Court to give due and serious consideration
to this new constitutional provision as the case at bar once more calls
us to define the parameters of our power to review violations of the
rules of the House. We will not be true to our trust as the last
bulwark against government abuses if we refuse to exercise this
new power or if we wield it with timidity. To be sure, it is this
exceeding timidity to unsheathe the judicial sword that has
increasingly emboldened other branches of government to
denigrate, if not defy, orders of our courts. In Tolentino, I endorsed
the view of former Senator Salonga that this novel provision
stretching the latitude of judicial power is distinctly Filipino and its
interpretation should not be depreciated by undue reliance on
inapplicable foreign jurisprudence. In resolving the case at bar, the
lessons of our own history should provide us the light and not the
experience of foreigners.157 (Italics in the original emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Thus, the ruling in Osmena v. Pendatun is not applicable to the

instant petitions. Here, the third parties alleging the violation of private
rights and the Constitution are involved.
Neither may respondent House of Representatives' rely on Nixon v.
US158 as basis for arguing that this Court may not decide on the
constitutionality of Sections 16 and 17 of the House Impeachment
Rules. As already observed, the U.S. Federal Constitution simply
provides that "the House of Representatives shall have the sole
power of impeachment." It adds nothing more. It gives no clue
whatsoever as to how this "sole power" is to be exercised. No
limitation whatsoever is given. Thus, the US Supreme Court
concluded that there was a textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment of a constitutional power to the House of
Representatives. This reasoning does not hold with regard to
impeachment power of the Philippine House of Representatives since
our Constitution, as earlier enumerated, furnishes several provisions
articulating how that "exclusive power" is to be exercised.
The provisions of Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House
Impeachment Rules which state that impeachment proceedings are
deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on
Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in
substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the
finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or
resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or
endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of
Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of
impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House thus
clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI as they give the term
"initiate" a meaning different from "filing."
Validity of the Second Impeachment Complaint
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing of
the impeachment complaint and referral to the House Committee on
Justice, the initial action taken thereon, the meaning of Section 3 (5)
of Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has
been initiated in the foregoing manner, another may not be filed
against the same official within a one year period following Article XI,

Section 3(5) of the Constitution.

In fine, considering that the first impeachment complaint, was filed by
former President Estrada against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr.,
along with seven associate justices of this Court, on June 2, 2003
and referred to the House Committee on Justice on August 5, 2003,
the second impeachment complaint filed by Representatives Gilberto
C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William Fuentebella against the Chief
Justice on October 23, 2003 violates the constitutional prohibition
against the initiation of impeachment proceedings against the same
impeachable officer within a one-year period.
Conclusion
If there is anything constant about this country, it is that there is
always a phenomenon that takes the center stage of our individual
and collective consciousness as a people with our characteristic flair
for human drama, conflict or tragedy. Of course this is not to demean
the seriousness of the controversy over the Davide impeachment. For
many of us, the past two weeks have proven to be an exasperating,
mentally and emotionally exhausting experience. Both sides have
fought bitterly a dialectical struggle to articulate what they
respectively believe to be the correct position or view on the issues
involved. Passions had ran high as demonstrators, whether for or
against the impeachment of the Chief Justice, took to the streets
armed with their familiar slogans and chants to air their voice on the
matter. Various sectors of society - from the business, retired military,
to the academe and denominations of faith offered suggestions for
a return to a state of normalcy in the official relations of the
governmental branches affected to obviate any perceived resulting
instability upon areas of national life.
Through all these and as early as the time when the Articles of
Impeachment had been constituted, this Court was specifically asked,
told, urged and argued to take no action of any kind and form with
respect to the prosecution by the House of Representatives of the
impeachment complaint against the subject respondent public official.
When the present petitions were knocking so to speak at the
doorsteps of this Court, the same clamor for non-interference was
made through what are now the arguments of "lack of jurisdiction,"

"non-justiciability," and "judicial self-restraint" aimed at halting the

Court from any move that may have a bearing on the impeachment
proceedings.
This Court did not heed the call to adopt a hands-off stance as far as
the question of the constitutionality of initiating the impeachment
complaint against Chief Justice Davide is concerned. To reiterate
what has been already explained, the Court found the existence in full
of all the requisite conditions for its exercise of its constitutionally
vested power and duty of judicial review over an issue whose
resolution precisely called for the construction or interpretation of a
provision of the fundamental law of the land. What lies in here is an
issue of a genuine constitutional material which only this Court can
properly and competently address and adjudicate in accordance with
the clear-cut allocation of powers under our system of government.
Face-to-face thus with a matter or problem that squarely falls under
the Court's jurisdiction, no other course of action can be had but for it
to pass upon that problem head on.
The claim, therefore, that this Court by judicially entangling itself with
the process of impeachment has effectively set up a regime of judicial
supremacy, is patently without basis in fact and in law.
This Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and
resolved on the merits only the main issue of whether the
impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice
transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule.
Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction where it had
none, nor indiscriminately turn justiciable issues out of decidedly
political questions. Because it is not at all the business of this Court to
assert judicial dominance over the other two great branches of the
government. Rather, the raison d'etre of the judiciary is to
complement the discharge by the executive and legislative of their
own powers to bring about ultimately the beneficent effects of having
founded and ordered our society upon the rule of law.
It is suggested that by our taking cognizance of the issue of
constitutionality of the impeachment proceedings against the Chief
Justice, the members of this Court have actually closed ranks to
protect a brethren. That the members' interests in ruling on said issue

is as much at stake as is that of the Chief Justice. Nothing could be

farther from the truth.
The institution that is the Supreme Court together with all other courts
has long held and been entrusted with the judicial power to resolve
conflicting legal rights regardless of the personalities involved in the
suits or actions. This Court has dispensed justice over the course of
time, unaffected by whomsoever stood to benefit or suffer therefrom,
unfraid by whatever imputations or speculations could be made to it,
so long as it rendered judgment according to the law and the facts.
Why can it not now be trusted to wield judicial power in these
petitions just because it is the highest ranking magistrate who is
involved when it is an incontrovertible fact that the fundamental issue
is not him but the validity of a government branch's official act as
tested by the limits set by the Constitution? Of course, there are rules
on the inhibition of any member of the judiciary from taking part in a
case in specified instances. But to disqualify this entire institution now
from the suit at bar is to regard the Supreme Court as likely incapable
of impartiality when one of its members is a party to a case, which is
simply a non sequitur.
No one is above the law or the Constitution. This is a basic precept in
any legal system which recognizes equality of all men before the law
as essential to the law's moral authority and that of its agents to
secure respect for and obedience to its commands. Perhaps, there is
no other government branch or instrumentality that is most zealous in
protecting that principle of legal equality other than the Supreme
Court which has discerned its real meaning and ramifications through
its application to numerous cases especially of the high-profile kind in
the annals of jurisprudence. The Chief Justice is not above the law
and neither is any other member of this Court. But just because he is
the Chief Justice does not imply that he gets to have less in law than
anybody else. The law is solicitous of every individual's rights
irrespective of his station in life.
The Filipino nation and its democratic institutions have no doubt been
put to test once again by this impeachment case against Chief
Justice Hilario Davide. Accordingly, this Court has resorted to no
other than the Constitution in search for a solution to what many
feared would ripen to a crisis in government. But though it is indeed

immensely a blessing for this Court to have found answers in our

bedrock of legal principles, it is equally important that it went through
this crucible of a democratic process, if only to discover that it can
resolve differences without the use of force and aggression upon
each other.
WHEREFORE, Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were approved by the
House of Representatives on November 28, 2001 are
unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint
against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. which was filed by
Representatives Gilberto C. Teodoro, Jr. and Felix William B.
Fuentebella with the Office of the Secretary General of the House of
Representatives on October 23, 2003 is barred under paragraph 5,
section 3 of Article XI of the Constitution.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo and Tinga, JJ., see separate opinion.Puno, and YnaresSantiago, J., see concurring and dissenting opinion.Vitug,
Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez and Callejo, Sr., JJ., see separate
concurring opinion.Quisumbing, J., concurring separate opinion
received.Carpio, J., concur.Austria-Martinez, J., concur in the majority
opinion and in the separate opinion of J. Vitug.Corona, J., will write a
separate concurring opinion.Azcuna, J., concur in the separate
opinion.
Footnotes

THIRD DIVISION

THE HEIRS OF GEORGE Y.

POE,
Petitioners,

G.R. No. 156302

Present:

- versus -

YNARES-SANTIAGO,
Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES,*
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.

MALAYAN
INSURANCE
Promulgated:
COMPANY, INC.,
Respondent.
April 7, 2009
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
The instant Petition for Review under Rule 45[1]of the
Rules of Court assails the Decision[2] dated 26 June
2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67297,
which granted the Petition for Certiorari of respondent
Malayan Insurance Company, Inc. (MICI) and recalled
and set aside the Order[3] dated 6 September 2001 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 73, of Antipolo
City, in Civil Case No. 93-2705. The RTC, in its

recalled Order, denied the Notice of Appeal of MICI and

granted the Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of
Execution filed by petitioners Heirs of George Y. Poe.
The present Petition also challenges the Resolution[4]
dated 29 November 2002 of the appellate court denying
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
Records show that on 26 January 1996 at about 4:45
a.m., George Y. Poe (George) while waiting for a ride to
work in front of Capital Garments Corporation, Ortigas
Avenue Extension, Barangay Dolores, Taytay, Rizal,
was run over by a ten-wheeler Isuzu hauler truck with
Plate No. PMH-858 owned by Rhoda Santos (Rhoda),
and then being driven by Willie Labrador (Willie).[5]
The said truck was insured with respondent MICI under
Policy No. CV-293-007446-8.
To seek redress for Georges untimely death, his heirs
and herein petitioners, namely, his widow Emercelinda,
and their children Flerida and Fernando, filed with the
RTC a Complaint for damages against Rhoda and
respondent MICI, docketed as Civil Case No. 93-2705.
[6] Petitioners identified Rhoda and respondent MICI,
as follows:
Defendant RHODA SANTOS is likewise of legal
age, Filipino and a resident of Real Street,
Pamplona, Las Pias, Metro Manila where she may
be served with summons and other court processes.

[Herein respondent] MALAYAN INSURANCE

COMPANY, INC. (hereinafter [MICI] for brevity)
is a corporation duly organized and existing under
Philippine law with address at Yuchengco Bldg.,
484 Q. Paredes Street, Binondo, Manila where it
may be served with summons and other processes
of this Honorable Court;
Defendant Rhoda Santos, who is engaged in the
business, among others, of selling gravel and sand is
the registered owner of one Isuzu Truck, with Plate
No. PMH-858 and is the employer of Willie
Labrador the authorized driver of the aforesaid
truck.
[Respondent MICI] on the other hand is the insurer
of Rhoda Santos under a valid and existing
insurance policy duly issued by said [MICI], Policy
No. CV-293-007446-8 over the subject vehicle
owned by Rhoda Santos, Truck-Hauler Isuzu 10
wheeler with plate no. PMH-858, serial no.
SRZ451-1928340 and motor no. 10PA1-403803.
Under said insurance policy, [MICI] binds itself,
among others, to be liable for damages as well as
any bodily injury to third persons which may be
caused by the operation of the insured vehicle.[7]

And prayed that:

[J]udgment issue in favor of [herein petitioners]
ordering [Rhoda and herein respondent MICI]
jointly and solidarily to pay the [petitioners] the
following:

1. Actual damages in the total amount of THIRTY

SIX THOUSAND (P36,000.00) PESOS for funeral
and burial expenses;
2. Actual damages in the amount of EIGHT
HUNDRED FIVE THOUSAND NINE HUNDRED
EIGHTY FOUR (P805,984.00) PESOS as loss of
earnings and financial support given by the
deceased by reason of his income and employment;
3. Moral damages in the amount of FIFTY
THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS;
4. Exemplary damages in the amount of FIFTY
THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS;
5. Attorneys fees in the amount of FIFTY
THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS and litigation
expense in the amount of ONE THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED (P1,500.00) PESOS for each court
appearance;
6. The costs of suit.
Other reliefs just and equitable in the premises are
likewise prayed for.[8]

Rhoda and respondent MICI made the following

admissions in their Joint Answer[9]:
That [Rhoda and herein respondent MICI] admit
the allegations in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the

complaint;
That [Rhoda and respondent MICI] admit the
allegations in paragraph 5 of the complaint that the
cargo truck is insured with [respondent] Malayan
Insurance Company, Inc. [(MICI)] however, the
liability of the insured company attached only if
there is a judicial pronouncement that the insured
and her driver are liable and moreover, the liability
of the insurance company is subject to the
limitations set forth in the insurance policy.[10]

Rhoda and respondent MICI denied liability for Georges

death averring, among other defenses, that: a) the
accident was caused by the negligent act of the victim
George, who surreptitiously and unexpectedly crossed
the road, catching the driver Willie by surprise, and
despite the latters effort to swerve the truck to the right,
the said vehicle still came into contact with the victim;
b) the liability of respondent MICI, if any, would attach
only upon a judicial pronouncement that the insured
Rhoda and her driver Willie are liable; c) the liability of
MICI should be based on the extent of the insurance
coverage as embodied in Rhodas policy; and d) Rhoda
had always exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of her driver
Willie.
After the termination of the pre-trial proceedings, trial
on the merits ensued.

Petitioners introduced and offered evidence in support

of their claims for damages against MICI, and then
rested their case. Thereafter, the hearings for the
reception of the evidence of Rhoda and respondent
MICI were scheduled, but they failed to adduce their
evidence despite several postponements granted by the
trial court. Thus, during the hearing on 9 June 1995, the
RTC, upon motion of petitioners counsel, issued an
Order[11] declaring that Rhoda and respondent MICI
had waived their right to present evidence, and ordering
the parties to already submit their respective
Memorandum within 15 days, after which, the case
would be deemed submitted for decision.
Rhoda and respondent MICI filed a Motion for
Reconsideration[12] of the Order dated 9 June 1995, but
it was denied by the RTC in another Order dated 11
August 1995.[13]
Consequently, Rhoda and respondent MICI filed a
Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus,[14] Prohibition and
Injunction with Prayer for a Temporary Restraining
Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction, assailing the
Orders dated 9 June 1995 and 11 August 1995 of the
RTC foreclosing their right to adduce evidence in
support of their defense. The Petition was docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 38948.

The Court of Appeals, through its Third Division,

promulgated a Decision[15] on 29 April 1996, denying
due course to the Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 38948.
Rhoda and respondent MICI elevated the matter to the
Supreme Court via a Petition for Certiorari,[16]
docketed as G.R. No. 126244. This Court likewise
dismissed the Petition in G.R. No. 126244 in a
Resolution dated 30 September 1996.[17] Entry of
Judgment was made in G.R. No. 126244 on 8 November
1996.[18]
On 28 February 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision in
Civil Case No. 93-2705, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
Wherefore, [Rhoda and herein respondent MICI]
are hereby ordered to pay jointly and solidarily to
the [herein petitioners] the following:
1. Moral damages amounting to P100,000.00;
2. Actual damages for loss of earning capacity
amounting to P805,984.00;
3. P36,000.00 for funeral expenses;
4. P50,000.00 as exemplary damages;
5. P50,000.00 for attorneys fees plus P1,500 per
court appearance; and
6. Cost of suit.[19]

Rhoda and respondent MICI received their copy of the

foregoing RTC Decision on 14 March 2000.[20] On 22
March 2000, respondent MICI and Rhoda filed a
Motion for Reconsideration[21] of said Decision,
averring therein that the RTC erred in ruling that the
obligation of Rhoda and respondent MICI to petitioners
was solidary or joint and several; in computing Georges
loss of earning capacity not in accord with established
jurisprudence; and in awarding moral damages although
it was not buttressed by evidence.
Resolving the Motion of respondent MICI and Rhoda,
the RTC issued an Order[22] on 24 January 2001
modifying and amending its Decision dated 28 February
2000, and dismissing the case against respondent MICI.
The RTC held that:
After a careful evaluation of the issues at hand, the
contention of the [herein respondent MICI] as far
as the solidary liability of the insurance company
with the other defendant [Rhoda] is meritorious.
However, the assailed Decision can be modified or
amended to correct the same honest inadvertence
without necessarily reversing it and set aside to
conform with the evidence on hand.

The RTC also re-computed Georges loss of earning

capacity, as follows:
The computation of actual damages for loss of
earning capacity was determined by applying the
formula adopted in the American Expectancy Table
of Mortality or the actuarial of Combined
Experience Table of Mortality applied in x x x
Villa Rey Transit, Inc. v. Court of Appeals (31
SCRA 521). Moral damages is awarded in
accordance with Article 2206 of the New Civil
Code of the Philippines. While death indemnity in
the amount of P50,000.00 is automatically awarded
in cases where the victim had died (People v. Sison,
September 14, 1990 [189 SCRA 643]).[23]

In the end, the RTC decreed:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing
consideration, the Decision of this Court dated 28
February 2000 is hereby amended or modified.
Said Decision should read as follows:
Wherefore, defendant Rhoda Santos
is hereby ordered to pay to the
[herein petitioners] the following:
1. Moral damages amounting to
P100,000.00;
2. Actual damages for loss of earning
capacity
amounting
to
P102,106.00;

3. P36,000.00 for funeral expenses;

4. P50,000.00 as death indemnity;
5. P50,000.00 for attorneys fees plus
P1,500.00
per
court
appearance;
6. Costs of the suit.
The case against Malayan Insurance
Company, Inc. is hereby dismissed.
[24]

It was petitioners turn to file a Motion for

Reconsideration[25] of the 24 January 2001 Order, to
which respondent MICI filed a Vigorous Opposition to
the Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration.[26]
On 15 June 2001, the RTC issued an Order reinstating
its Decision dated 28 February 2000, relevant portions
of which state:
Finding the arguments raised by the [herein
petitioners] in their Motion for Reconsideration of
the Order of this Court dated January 24, 2001 to be
more meritorious to [herein respondents] Malayan
Insurance Co., Inc. (sic) arguments in its vigorous
opposition thereto, said motion is hereby granted.
Accordingly, the Order under consideration is
hereby reconsidered and set aside. The decision of

this Court dated February 28, 2000 is hereby

reinstated.
Notify parties herein.[27]

Respondent MICI received a copy of the 15 June 2001

Order of the RTC on 27 June 2001.
Aggrieved by the latest turn of events, respondent
MICI filed on 9 July 2001 a Notice of Appeal[28] of the
28 February 2000 Decision of the RTC, reinstated by the
15 June 2001 Resolution of the same court. Rhoda did
not join respondent MICI in its Notice of Appeal.[29]
Petitioners filed their Opposition[30] to the Notice of
Appeal of respondent MICI, with a Motion for the
Issuance of Writ of Execution.
After considering the recent pleadings of the parties, the
RTC, in its Order dated 6 September 2001, denied the
Notice of Appeal of respondent MICI and granted
petitioners Motion for the Issuance of Writ of
Execution. The RTC reasoned in its Order:
The records disclosed that on February 28, 2000
this Court rendered a Decision in favor of the
[herein petitioners] and against [Rhoda and herein
respondent MICI]. The Decision was said to have
been received by MICI on March 14, 2000. Eight
days after or on March 22, 2000, MICI mailed its

Motion for Reconsideration to this Court and

granted the same in the Order dated January 24,
2001. From this Order, [petitioners] filed a Motion
for Reconsideration on February 21, 2001 to which
MICI filed a vigorous opposition. On June 15, 2001
this Court granted [petitioners] motion reinstating
the Decision dated February 28, 2000. According to
MICI, the June 15, 2001 order was received by it on
June 27, 2001. MICI filed a Notice of Appeal on
July 9, 2001 or twelve (12) days from receipt of
said Order.
[Petitioners] contend that the Notice of Appeal was
filed out of time while [respondent] MICI opposes,
arguing otherwise. The latter interposed that the
Order dated June 15, 2001 is in reality a new
Decision thereby giving it a fresh fifteen (15) days
within which to file notice of appeal.
[Respondent] MICIs contention is not meritorious.
The fifteen (15) day period within which to file a
notice of appeal should be reckoned from the date it
received the Decision on March 14, 2000. So that
when MICI mailed its Motion for Reconsideration
on March 22, 2000, eight (8) days had already
lapsed, MICI has remaining seven (7) days to file a
notice of appeal. However, when it received the last
Order of this Court it took [respondent] MICI
twelve (12) days to file the same. Needless to say,
MICIs Notice of Appeal was filed out of time. The
Court cannot countenance the argument of MICI
that a resolution to a motion for a final order or
judgment will have the effect of giving a fresh
reglementary period. This would be contrary to
what was provided in the rules of procedure.[31]

Accordingly, the RTC adjudged:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, [herein
respondent] MICIs Notice of Appeal is hereby
Denied for having filed out of time making the
Decision of this Court dated February 28, 2000 as
final and executory. Accordingly, the Motion for
Issuance of Writ of Execution filed by [herein
petitioners] is hereby Granted.
Notify parties herein.[32]

Respondent MICI filed a Petition for Certiorari[33]

under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the Court of
Appeals, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
67297. The Petition assailed, for having been rendered
by the RTC with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, the following: (1) the
Order dated 6 September 2001, denying the Notice of
Appeal of respondent MICI and granting petitioners
Motion for the Issuance of Writ of Execution; (2) the
Decision dated 28 February 2000, holding Rhoda and
respondent MICI jointly and severally liable for Georges
death; and (3) the Order dated 15 June 2001, reinstating
the Decision dated 28 February 2000.
The Court of Appeals granted the Petition for Certiorari
of respondent MICI in a Decision dated 26 June 2000,

ratiocinating thus:
Prescinding therefrom, we hold that the fifteen
(15) day period to appeal must be reckoned from
the time the [herein respondent] Malayan
received the order dated 15 June 2001 reversing
in toto the order of 24 January 2000 and
reinstating in full the Decision dated 28
February 2000. Thus, [respondent] Malayan had
until 12 July 2001 within which to file its notice
of appeal. Therefore, when [respondent]
Malayan filed its notice of appeal on 09 July
2001, it was well within the reglementary period
and should have been given due course by the
public respondent court.
It was therefore, an excess of jurisdiction on the part
of the public respondent court when it reckoned the
[respondent] Malayans period to appeal on the date
it received on 14 March 2000 the formers decision
dated 28 February 2000. As earlier expostulated, the
said decision was completely vacated insofar as the
[respondent] Malayan is concerned when the public
respondent court in its order dated 24 January 2001
dismissed the case against the former. Thus, to
reckon the fifteen (15) days to appeal from the day
the [respondent] Malayan received the said decision
on 14 March 2000, is the height of absurdity
because there was nothing for the [respondent]
Malayan to appeal inasmuch as the public
respondent court vacated the said decision in favor
of the former.
The aforesaid conclusion finds support in Sta.

Romana vs. Lacson (104 SCRA 93), where the

court, relying on the case of Magdalena Estate, Inc.
vs. Caluag, 11 SCRA 334, held that where the court
of origin made a thoroughly (sic) restudy of the
original judgment and rendered the amended and
clarified judgment only after considering all the
factual and legal issues, the amended and clarified
decision was an entirely new decision which
superseded (sic). For all intents and purposes, the
court concluded the trial court rendered a new
judgment from which the time to appeal must be
reckoned.
In the instant case, what is involved is not merely a
substantial amendment or modification of the
original decision, but the total reversal thereof in the
order dated 24 January 2000. Given the rationale in
the aforecited cases, it is only logical that the period
of appeal be counted from 27 June 2001, the date
that [respondent] Malayan received the order dated
15 June 2001 reversing in toto the order of 24
January 2000 and reinstating the Decision dated 28
February 2000.[34] (Emphasis supplied.)

The fallo of the Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing
premises, the petition for certiorari is partially
GRANTED. Accordingly, the public respondent
courts order dated 06 September 2001 is hereby
RECALLED and SET ASIDE.
Public respondent court is hereby directed to

approve the petitioner Malayans notice of appeal

and to refrain from executing the writ of execution
granted on 06 September 2001.[35]

The Court of Appeals denied petitioners Motion

for Reconsideration in a Resolution dated 29 November
2002.
Understandably distraught, petitioners come before this
Court in this Petition for Review, which raise the
following issues:
I.
Whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals
committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled
that private respondent could file a Petition for
Certiorari even though its Motion for
Reconsideration was still pending resolution with
the lower court.
II.
Whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals
committed grave abuse of discretion when it ruled
that the private respondent had filed its Notice of
Appeal with the trial court within the reglementary
period.[36]

The Court first turns its attention to the primary

issue for its resolution: whether the Notice of Appeal

filed by respondent MICI before the RTC was filed out

of time.
The period for filing a Notice of Appeal is set by
Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Court:
SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. The
appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from
notice of the judgment or final order appealed from.
Where a record on appeal is required, the appellants
shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal
within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment
or final order. x x x.
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by
a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No
motion for extension of time to file a motion for
new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed.

It
is
clear
under
the
Rules
that an appeal should be taken within 15 days from the
notice of judgment or final order appealed from.[37] A
final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a
case, leaving nothing more for the court to do with
respect to it. It is an adjudication on the merits which,
considering the evidence presented at the trial, declares
categorically what the rights and obligations of the
parties are; or it may be an order or judgment that
dismisses an action.[38]
Propitious to petitioners is Neypes v. Court of

Appeals,[39] which the Court promulgated on 14

September 2005, and wherein it laid down the fresh
period rule:
To standardize the appeal periods provided
in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity
to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to
allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to
file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial
Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing
a motion for a new trial or motion for
reconsideration.
Henceforth, this fresh period rule shall
also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the
Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts;
Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional
Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on
appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of
Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by
certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims
to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to
be counted from receipt of the order denying the
motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration
(whether full or partial) or any final order or
resolution. (Emphases ours.)

The fresh period of 15 days becomes significant

when a party opts to file a motion for new trial or
motion for reconsideration. In this manner, the trial
court which rendered the assailed decision is given
another opportunity to review the case and, in the

process, minimize and/or rectify any error of judgment.

[40] With the advent of the fresh period rule, parties
who availed themselves of the remedy of motion for
reconsideration are now allowed to file a notice of
appeal within fifteen days from the denial of that
motion.[41]
The Court has accentuated that the fresh period
rule is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the
Rules of Court which states that the appeal shall be
taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of judgment
or final order appealed from. The use of the disjunctive
word or signifies disassociation and independence of
one thing from another. It should, as a rule, be
construed in the sense which it ordinarily implies.[42]
Hence, the use of or in the above provision supposes
that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days
from the notice of judgment or within 15 days from
notice of the final order in the case.
Applying the fresh period rule, the Court agrees
with the Court of Appeals and holds that respondent
MICI seasonably filed its Notice of Appeal with the
RTC on 9 July 2001, just 12 days from 27 June 2001,
when it received the denial of its Motion for
Reconsideration of the 15 June 2001 Resolution
reinstating the 28 February 2000 Decision of the RTC.
The fresh period rule may be applied to the case

of respondent MICI, although the events which

transpired concerning its Notice of Appeal took place in
June and July 2001, inasmuch as rules of procedure may
be given retroactive effect on actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage. The Court
notes that Neypes was promulgated on 14 September
2005, while the instant Petition was still pending before
this Court.
Reference may be made to Republic v. Court of
Appeals,[43] involving the retroactive application of
A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC which provided that the 60-day
period within which to file a petition for certiorari shall
be reckoned from receipt of the order denying the
motion for reconsideration. In said case, the Court
declared that rules of procedure may be given
retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined
at the time of their passage and this will not violate any
right of a person who may feel that he is adversely
affected, inasmuch as there is no vested rights in rules of
procedure.
Hence, the fresh period rule laid down in Neypes
was applied by the Court in resolving the subsequent
cases of Sumaway v. Urban Bank, Inc.,[44] Elbia v.
Ceniza,[45] First Aqua Sugar Traders, Inc. v. Bank of
the Philippine Islands,[46] even though the antecedent
facts giving rise to said cases transpired before the
promulgation of Neypes.

In De los Santos v. Vda de Mangubat,[47]

particularly, the Court applied the fresh period rule,
elucidating that procedural law refers to the adjective
law which prescribes rules and forms of procedure in
order that courts may be able to administer justice.
Procedural laws do not come within the legal conception
of a retroactive law, or the general rule against the
retroactive operation of statutes. The fresh period rule is
irrefragably procedural, prescribing the manner in which
the appropriate period for appeal is to be computed or
determined and, therefore, can be made applicable to
actions pending upon its effectivity without danger of
violating anyone elses rights.
Since the Court affirms the ruling of the Court of
Appeals that respondent MICI filed its Notice of Appeal
with the RTC within the reglementary period, the
appropriate action, under ordinary circumstances, would
be for the Court to remand the case to the RTC so that
the RTC could approve the Notice of Appeal of
respondent MICI and respondent MICI could already
file its appeal with the Court of Appeals.
However, considering that the case at bar has been
pending for almost sixteen years,[48] and the records of
the same are already before this Court, remand is no
longer necessary.

Jurisprudence dictates that remand of a case to a lower

court does not follow if, in the interest of justice, the
Supreme Court itself can resolve the dispute based on
the records before it. As a rule, remand is avoided in the
following instances: (a) where the ends of justice would
not be subserved by a remand; or (b) where public
interest demands an early disposition of the case; or (c)
where the trial court has already received all the
evidence presented by both parties, and the Supreme
Court is in a position, based upon said evidence, to
decide the case on its merits.[49] In Lao v. People,[50]
the Supreme Court, in consideration of the years that it
had taken for the controversy therein to reach it,
concluded that remand of the case to a lower court was
no longer the more expeditious and practical route to
follow, and it then decided the said case based on the
evidentiary record before it.
The consistent stand of the Court has always been that a
case should be decided in its totality, resolving all
interlocking issues in order to render justice to all
concerned and to end the litigation once and for all.
Verily, courts should always strive to settle the entire
controversy in a single proceeding, leaving no root or
branch to bear the seed of future litigation.[51] Where
the public interest so demands, the court will broaden its
inquiry into a case and decide the same on the merits
rather than merely resolve the procedural question
raised.[52] Such rule obtains in this case.

The Court is convinced that the non-remanding of

the case at bar is absolutely justified. Petitioners have
already suffered from the tragic loss of a loved one, and
must not be made to endure more pain and uncertainty
brought about by the continued pendency of their claims
against those liable. The case has been dragging on for
almost 16 years now without the petitioners having been
fully compensated for their loss. The Court cannot
countenance such a glaring indifference to petitioners
cry for justice. To be sure, they deserve nothing less
than full compensation to give effect to their substantive
rights.[53]
The complete records of the present case have
been elevated to this Court, and the pleadings and
evidence therein could fully support its factual
adjudication. Indeed, after painstakingly going over the
records, the Court finds that the material and decisive
facts are beyond dispute: George was killed when he
was hit by the truck driven by Willie, an employee of
Rhoda; and the truck is insured with respondent MICI.
The only issue left for the Court to resolve is the extent
of the liability of Rhoda and respondent MICI for
Georges death and the appropriate amount of the
damages to be awarded to petitioners.
The Court now turns to the issue of who is liable
for damages for the death of George.

Respondent MICI does not deny that it is the insurer of

the truck. Nevertheless, it asserts that its liability is
limited, and it should not be held solidarily liable with
Rhoda for all the damages awarded to petitioners.
A solidary or joint and several obligation is one in
which each debtor is liable for the entire obligation, and
each creditor is entitled to demand the whole obligation.
In a joint obligation, each obligor answers only for a
part of the whole liability and to each obligee belongs
only a part of the correlative rights. Well-entrenched is
the rule that solidary obligation cannot lightly be
inferred. There is solidary liability only when the
obligation expressly so states, when the law so provides
or when the nature of the obligation so requires.[54]
It is settled that where the insurance contract provides
for indemnity against liability to third persons, the
liability of the insurer is direct and such third persons
can directly sue the insurer. The direct liability of the
insurer under indemnity contracts against third party
liability does not mean, however, that the insurer can be
held solidarily liable with the insured and/or the other
parties found at fault, since they are being held liable
under different obligations. The liability of the insured
carrier or vehicle owner is based on tort, in accordance
with the provisions of the Civil Code;[55] while that of
the insurer arises from contract, particularly, the

insurance policy. The third-party liability of the insurer

is only up to the extent of the insurance policy and that
required by law; and it cannot be held solidarily liable
for anything beyond that amount.[56] Any award
beyond the insurance coverage would already be the
sole liability of the insured and/or the other parties at
fault.[57]
In Vda. de Maglana v. Consolacion,[58] it was ruled
that an insurer in an indemnity contract for third-party
liability is directly liable to the injured party up to the
extent specified in the agreement, but it cannot be held
solidarily liable beyond that amount. According to
respondent MICI, its liability as insurer of Rhodas truck
is limited. Following Vda. de Maglana, petitioners
would have had the option either (1) to claim the
amount awarded to them from respondent MICI, up to
the extent of the insurance coverage, and the balance
from Rhoda; or (2) to enforce the entire judgment
against Rhoda, subject to reimbursement from
respondent MICI to the extent of the insurance
coverage. The Court, though, is precluded from
applying its ruling in Vda. de Maglana by the difference
in one vital detail between the said case and the one at
bar. The insurer was able to sufficiently establish its
limited liability in Vda. de Maglana, while the same
cannot be said for respondent MICI herein.
The Court highlights that in this case, the insurance

policy between Rhoda and respondent MICI, covering

the truck involved in the accident which killed George,
was never presented. There is no means, therefore, for
this Court to ascertain the supposed limited liability of
respondent MICI under said policy. Without the
presentation of the insurance policy, the Court cannot
determine the existence of any limitation on the liability
of respondent MICI under said policy, and the extent or
amount of such limitation.
It should be remembered that respondent MICI readily
admits that it is the insurer of the truck that hit and
killed George, except that it insists that its liability
under the insurance policy is limited. As the party
asserting its limited liability, respondent MICI then has
the burden of evidence to establish its claim. In civil
cases, the party that alleges a fact has the burden of
proving it. Burden of proof is the duty of a party to
present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to prove
its claim or defense by the amount of evidence required
by law.[59] Regrettably, respondent MICI failed to
discharge this burden.[60] The Court cannot rely on
mere allegations of limited liability sans proof.
The failure of respondent MICI to present the
insurance policy which, understandably, is not in
petitioners possession, but in the custody and absolute
control of respondent MICI as the insurer and/or Rhoda
as the insured gives rise to the presumption that its

presentation is prejudicial to the cause of respondent

MICI.[61] When the evidence tends to prove a material
fact which imposes a liability on a party, and he has it in
his power to produce evidence which, from its very
nature, must overthrow the case made against him if it is
not founded on fact, and he refuses to produce such
evidence, the presumption arises that the evidence, if
produced, would operate to his prejudice and support
the case of his adversary.[62]
Respondent MICI had all the opportunity to prove
before the RTC that its liability under the insurance
policy it issued to Rhoda, was limited; yet, respondent
MICI failed to do so. The failure of respondent MICI to
rebut that which would have naturally invited an
immediate, pervasive, and stiff opposition from it
created an adverse inference that either the
controverting evidence to be presented by respondent
MICI would only prejudice its case, or that the
uncontroverted evidence of petitioners indeed speaks of
the truth. And such adverse inference, recognized and
adhered to by courts in judging the weight of evidence
in all kinds of proceedings, surely is not without basis
its rationale and effect rest on sound, logical and
practical considerations, viz:
The presumption that a man will do that which
tends to his obvious advantage, if he possesses the
means, supplies a most important test for judging of
the comparative weight of evidence x x x If, on the

supposition that a charge or claim is unfounded, the

party against whom it is made has evidence within
his reach by which he may repel that which is
offered to his prejudice, his omission to do so
supplies a strong presumption that the charge or
claim is well founded; it would be contrary to every
principle of reason, and to all experience of human
conduct, to form any other conclusion. (Starkie on
Evidence, p. 846, Moore on Facts, Vol. I, p. 544)
xxxx
The ordinary rule is that one who has knowledge
peculiarly within his own control, and refuses to
divulge it, cannot complain if the court puts the
most unfavorable construction upon his silence, and
infers that a disclosure would have shown the fact
to be as claimed by the opposing party." (Societe,
etc., v. Allen, 90 Fed. Rep. 815, 817, 33 C.C.A. 282,
per Taft, C.J., Moore on Facts, Vol. I, p. 561).[63]

The inference still holds even if it be assumed, for

argument's sake, that the solidary liability of respondent
MICI with Rhoda is improbable, for it has likewise been
said that:
Weak evidence becomes strong by the neglect of the
party against whom it is put in, in not showing by
means within the easy control of that party that the
conclusion drawn from such evidence is untrue.
(Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v. Callaghan, 50 III. App.
676, 681, Moore on Facts, Vol. I, p. 572).[64]

Given the admission of respondent MICI that it is

the insurer of the truck involved in the accident that
killed George, and in the utter absence of proof to
establish both the existence and the extent/amount of the
alleged limited liability of respondent MICI as insurer,
the Court could only conclude that respondent MICI had
agreed to fully indemnify third-party liabilities.
Consequently, there is no more difference in the
amounts of damages which petitioners can recover from
Rhoda or respondent MICI; petitioners can recover the
said amounts in full from either of them, thus, making
their liabilities solidary or joint and several.
The Court now comes to the issue of the amounts
of the damages awarded.
In its Decision dated 22 February 2000, the RTC
awarded petitioners moral and actual damages, as well
as funeral expenses and attorneys fees. Subsequently, in
its Order dated 24 January 2001, the RTC reduced the
amount of actual damages from P805,984.00 to
P102,106.00, but additionally awarded death indemnity
in the amount of P50,000.00. Its award of moral
damages and funeral expenses as well as attorneys fees
remained constant in its 28 February 2000 decision and
was carried over to its 24 January 2001 Order.
The Court shall now proceed to scrutinize said award of
damages.

As regards the award of actual damages, Article 2199 of

the Civil Code provides that [e]xcept as provided by law
or by stipulation one is entitled to an adequate
compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by
him as he has duly proved x x x.
The RTC awarded P36,000.00 for burial expenses. The
award of P36,000.00 for burial expenses is duly
supported by receipts evidencing that petitioners did
incur this expense. The petitioners held a wake for two
days at their residence and another two days at the
Loyola Memorial Park.[65] The amount covered the
expenses by petitioners for the wake, funeral and burial
of George.[66]
As to compensation for loss of earning capacity, the
RTC initially awarded P805,984.00 in its 28 February
2000 Decision, which it later reduced to P102,106.00 on
24 January 2001.
Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides that in addition
to the indemnity for death caused by a crime or quasidelict, the defendant shall be liable for the loss of the
earning capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity
shall be paid to the heirs of the latter, x x x.
Compensation of this nature is awarded not for loss of
earnings but for loss of capacity to earn money. Hence,
it is proper that compensation for loss of earning

capacity should be awarded to the petitioners in

accordance with the formula established in decided
cases for computing net earning capacity, to wit:
The formula for the computation of unearned
income is:
Net Earning Capacity = life expectancy x (gross
annual income -reasonable and necessary living
expenses).
Life expectancy is determined in accordance with
the formula:
2 / 3 x [80 - age of deceased at the time of death]

[67]
Jurisprudence provides that the first factor, i.e., life
expectancy, shall be computed by applying the formula
(2/3 x [80 - age at death]) adopted in the American
Expectancy Table of Mortality or the Actuarial of
Combined Experience Table of Mortality.
The second factor is computed by multiplying the life
expectancy by the net earnings of the deceased, i.e., the
total earnings less expenses necessary in the creation of
such earnings or income and less living and other
incidental expenses. The loss is not equivalent to the
entire earnings of the deceased, but only such portion
that he would have used to support his dependents or

heirs. Hence, the Court deducts from his gross earnings

the necessary expenses supposed to be used by the
deceased for his own needs. The Court explained in
Villa Rey Transit v. Court of Appeals[68]:
[The award of damages for loss of
earning capacity is] concerned with
the determination of the losses or
damages sustained by the private
respondents, as dependents and
intestate heirs of the deceased, and
that said damages consist, not of the
full amount of his earnings, but of
the support they received or would
have received from him had he not
died in consequence of the
negligence of petitioner's agent. In
fixing the amount of that support,
we must reckon with the necessary
expenses of his own living, which
should be deducted from his
earnings. Thus, it has been
consistently held that earning
capacity, as an element of damages
to one's estate for his death by
wrongful act is necessarily his net
earning capacity or his capacity to
acquire money, less necessary
expense for his own living. Stated
otherwise, the amount recoverable is
not the loss of the entire earning, but
rather the loss of that portion of the
earnings which the beneficiary
would have received. In other

words, only net earnings, and not

gross earnings are to be considered
that is, the total of the earnings less
expenses necessary in the creation
of such earnings or income and less
living and other incidental expenses.

Applying the aforestated jurisprudential guidelines in

the computation of the amount of award for damages set
out in Villa Rey, the Court computes the award for the
loss of Georges earning capacity as follows:
Life expectancy = 2/3 x [80 - age of deceased at the
time of death]
2/3 x [80 56]
2/3 x [24]
FORMULA NET EARNING CAPACITY (NEC)
If:
Age at time of death of George Poe = 58[69]
Monthly Income at time of death = P6,946[70]
Gross Annual Income (GAI) = [(6,946) (12)] = P83,352
Reasonable/Necessary Living Expenses (R/NLE) =
50%[71] of GAI = P41,676

NEC = [2/3 (80-58)] [83,352-41,676]

= [2/3 (22)] [41,676]
= [14.67] [41,676]
= P611,386.92

Therefore, Georges lost net earning capacity is

equivalent to P611,386.92
The RTC awarded moral damages[72] in the amount of
P100,000.00. With respect to moral damages, the same
are awarded under the following circumstances:
The award of moral damages is aimed at a
restoration, within the limits of the possible, of the
spiritual status quo ante. Moral damages are
designed to compensate and alleviate in some way
the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and
similar injury unjustly caused a person. Although
incapable of pecuniary computation, they must be
proportionate to the suffering inflicted. The amount
of the award bears no relation whatsoever with the
wealth or means of the offender.

In the instant case, petitioners testimonies reveal

the intense suffering which they continue to experience
as a result of Georges death.[73] It is not difficult to
comprehend that the sudden and unexpected loss of a
husband and father would cause mental anguish and
serious anxiety in the wife and children he left behind.
Moral damages in the amount of P100,000.00 are proper
for Georges death.[74]
The RTC also awarded P50,000.00 as death indemnity

which the Court shall not disturb. The award of

P50,000.00 as death indemnity is in accordance with
current rulings of the Court.[75]
Finally, the RTC awarded attorneys fees to petitioners.
Petitioners are entitled to attorneys fees. Under Article
2008 of the Civil Code, attorneys fees may be granted
when a party is compelled to litigate or incur expenses
to protect his interest by reason of an unjustified act of
the other party.[76] In Metro Manila Transit
Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[77] the Court held that
an award of P50,000.00 as attorneys fees was
reasonable. Hence, petitioners are entitled to attorneys
fees in that amount.[78]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. While the Court
AFFIRMS the Decision, dated 26 June 2002, and
Resolution, dated 29 November 2002, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67297, granting the Petition
for Certiorari of respondent Malayan Insurance
Company, Inc., the Court, nonetheless, RESOLVES, in
consideration of the speedy administration of justice,
and the peculiar circumstances of the case, to give DUE
COURSE to the present Petition and decide the same
on its merits.
Rhoda Santos and respondent Malayan Insurance
Company, Inc. are hereby ordered to pay jointly and

severally the petitioners Heirs of George Y. Poe the

following:
(1) Funeral expenses P36,000.00;
(2) Actual damages for loss of earning capacity
P611,386.92;
(3) Moral damages amounting to P100,000.00;
(4) Death indemnity P50,000.00; and
(5) Attorneys fees P50,000.00 plus P1,500.00 per
court appearance.
No costs.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice
Chairperson

CON
CHIT
A
CAR
PIO
MOR
ALES
ANT
ONI
O
EDU
ARD
O B.
NAC
HUR
A
Associate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution,
and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REY

NATO S.
PUNO
Chief Justice
epublic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 190529

March 22, 2011

PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC., represented by

its Secretary-General GEORGE "FGBF GEORGE" DULDULAO,
Petitioner, vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
BRION, J.:
We resolve in this Resolution all the pending incidents in this case,
specifically:
(a) the contempt charge1 against the respondent Commission on
Elections (Comelec) for its alleged disobedience to this Courts Status
Quo Order2 dated February 2, 2010; and
(b) the issue of whether the petitioner, Philippine Guardians
Brotherhood, Inc. (PGBI), should be declared to have participated in
the party-list elections of May 10, 2010, in light of the Comelecs
failure to obey our Status Quo Order and our subsequent Resolution 3
granting PGBIs petition to annul its delisting from the roster of
accredited party-list groups or organizations.4
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
These incidents arose from our Status Quo Order directing the
Comelec to restore and maintain the PGBI to its situation prior to the
issuance of Comelec Resolution No. 8679, pending the resolution of
the petition for certiorari that PGBI filed to challenge this Comelec
Resolution. Our Status Quo Order, in short, directly ordered the

Comelec to include PGBI in the list of candidates under the party-list

system in the May 10, 2010 elections pending the final determination
of PGBIs qualification to be voted upon as a party-list organization.
We issued the Status Quo Order on February 2, 2010. It was served
on the Comelec on the same date, 5 i.e., within the period that the
Comelec itself gave for the correction of any error or omission in its
published official list of party-list participants in the May 10, 2010
elections. The Comelec itself declared:
On January 30, 2010 at 3:00 oclock (sic) in the afternoon, pursuant
to Comelec Minute Resolution No. 10-0042 dated January 19, 2010,
the Information Technology Department of Comelec published a list of
candidates with the instruction that "(s)hould there be any
misspelling, omission or other errors, the concerned candidate must
call the Law Departments attention within five (5) days from this
publication for the purpose of correction. Thereafter, Comelec shall
be relieved from liability"6 and the final list shall then be prepared for
printing.7
The Comelec responded the next day (February 3, 2010) to our
Status Quo Order by asking for its reconsideration and/or recall,
based on the following grounds/arguments:
1) There will be insurmountable and tremendous operational
constraints and costs implications in complying with the status quo
order.
2) To add the petitioners party/acronym in the database of the List of
Candidates for sectoral party/organization or coalition participating in
the party-list system of representation will have a critical impact on
the already tight and overstretched election timelines of the
Commission. Copy of the Revised Automation Implementation
Calendar is hereto attached as Annex "1".
3) Printing of the ballots is an intricate and complicated process. It is
not a simple process of encoding data in a computer and printing the
ballots using a printer attached to the computer.
4) Prior to the printing of the ballots, several technical and mechanical
preparatory activities have to be done which include among other

things:
a. Generation and back-up of database containing the candidates[]
information;
b. Configuration of Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machines
and Consolidation and Canvassing System (CCS);
c. Creation and design of one thousand six hundred seventy-four
(1,674) ballot templates;
d. Production of the ballot templates;
e. Verification of each and every ballot template to ensure that it
contains the accurate names of candidates for the national positions
and acronyms of sectoral party/organization or coalition participating
in the party-list system of representation and their corresponding
assignments to the correct districts, provinces, municipalities/cities,
and clustered precincts. Since the ballots are precinct-specific to
ensure the security of the voting and counting, this means verification
of seventy six thousand three hundred forty (76,340) variations of the
one thousand six hundred seventy-four (1,674) ballot templates; and
f. Placing several security markings in the ballots.
5) In fact, the installation of the Election Management System, which
is used to generate the PCOS machines configuration and ballot
templates production have already been in place as of January 25,
2010.
6) To comply with the status quo order will not only affect the printing
of the ballots but also have serious implications on other activities of
the Commission, such as:
a. The setting of configuration of the PCOS and CCS machines;
b. Testing of PCOS machines in their actual configuration with the
ballots;
c. Deployment of PCOS and CCS machines and transmission
equipments;

d. Checking/testing, demos, and sealing of the PCOS and CCS

machines; and
e. Shipment of the ballots to all parts of the country.
7) Due to several re-scheduling of the timelines of the Commission,
Smartmatic-TIM cautioned that it is extremely risky to change the
database containing the candidates information at this point in time.
Any change in the database and other preparatory activities would
mean:
a. Twelve thousand (12,000) PCOS might not be configured and
dispatched to the field on time; and
b. Four million eight hundred thousand (4,800,000) ballots might not
be printed before the deadline and shipped out on time.
Even if the Commission will resort to contingency measures to
configure and ship out the twelve thousand (12,000) PCOS machines
on time, the printing of the ballots cannot be completed before May
10, 2010. This means that four million eight hundred thousand
(4,800,000) voters might not be able to vote due to lack of ballots,
thus disenfranchising them.
xxx

xxx

xxx

10) Hence, the Commission fervently requests the understanding and

forbearance of the Honorable Court which is the bastion of our justice
system, protector of the democratic processes and our last resort in
ensuring a clean, peaceful, orderly and credible May 10, 2010
elections, to take a second look on the status quo order issued on
February 2, 2010.8
In its Comment to Comelecs Motion for Reconsideration with
Manifestation,9 PGBI essentially alleged that the Comelec posited
seemingly misleading and innocuous reasons in seeking
reconsideration. Among other arguments, it claimed that the Comelec
had been less than candid in its submissions: first, compliance with
the Status Quo Order at that point would not disrupt the timetable or
entail additional and costly expenditures given that the Comelec had
yet to terminate all related activities and preparations for the May 10,

2010 elections;10 second, the Comelec had yet to promulgate, on

February 11, 2010, its decisions on several pending disqualification
cases and recently accredited six other party-list organizations to add
to the more than 154 previously accredited sectoral parties and/or
organizations. PGBI also manifested that the ballot template that the
Comelec published in its website on February 8, 2010 did not include
the name or acronym of PGBI, in contravention of the Status Quo
Order; and third, the Comelecs blatant disregard of the Status Quo
Order reeked of official arrogance, given this Courts determination
that it should be included in the ballot pending resolution of PGBIs
petition for certiorari.11
In our Resolution of April 29, 2010, 12 we granted PGBIs petition and,
accordingly, annulled the assailed Comelec Resolutions in SPP No.
09-004 (MP)13 which delisted PGBI from the roster of duly registered
national, regional and sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions. We
declared at the same time that PGBI is qualified to be voted upon as
a party-list group or organization in the May 10, 2010 elections.
Despite the Status Quo Order and the Resolution, however, PGBI
was never included in the ballot as one of the accredited party-list
groups or organizations eligible for election under the party-list
system. Hence, PGBI was never voted upon as a party-list candidate
in the May 10, 2010 elections.
Before the elections or on April 28, 2010, PGBI filed a Manifestation
(of Continuing Objection to Comelecs Defiance of the Order of the
Honorable Supreme Court).14 It claimed that Comelec Resolution No.
8815, dated April 5, 2007, excluded the nominees of PGBI in the
official list of party-list/coalitions/sectoral organizations participating in
the May 10, 2010 Automated National and Local Elections. Acting on
this Manifestation, we required the Comelec, via our Resolution of
May 7, 2010, to explain and show cause, within a non-extendible
period of ten (10) days from receipt of the Resolution, why it should
not be held in CONTEMPT of COURT for its alleged defiance of our
Status Quo Order.15
In its Compliance16 to the Show Cause Order (submitted on May 21,
2010), the Comelec reiterated the arguments it raised in its Extreme
Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and To Lift Status Quo Order.
Specifically, it reiterated that there were "insurmountable and

tremendous operational constraints and cost implications in

complying with the status quo order," which order (referring to the
Status Quo Order) is tantamount to technical, legal, and physical
impossibility for respondents to comply.17 The Comelec asked the
Court to note the explanation and accept it as sufficient compliance
with the Show Cause Order.
Required to comment on the Comelecs Compliance, PGBI filed a
Manifestation Cum Comment,18 asserting that a careful reading of the
Compliance reveals that the Comelec simply deftly skirted and,
ultimately, never obeyed the Status Quo Order, and thus wantonly
and contumaciously disregarded the same. The PGBI additionally
manifested that via a letter to the Comelec on May 4, 2010, it raised
the following concerns:
The preceding pronouncement [referring to the Courts Resolution
granting PGBIs petition] may appear to be inconsequential and a
pyrrhic victory in view of the error and omission to include the name
of the petitioner in the ballots for the scheduled elections. How this
Honorable Commission will find the means and/or alternative to
comply with and/or implement the directive in said decision is a
matter left to its judgment and discretion.
Be that as it may, it is the petitioners considered view that a definitive
ruling, including the grant of its Motion for Reconsideration in SPP
No. 09-004 (MP), be expressly made in order that the limitation
prescribed in Section 6(8) of R.A. No. 7941, replicated in COMELEC
Resolution No. 2847, promulgated on June 25, 1996, will not apply to
herein petitioner for purposes of the May 2013 elections.
While the implementation of the dispositions in the said Resolution
has become a physical impossibility, it is petitioners respectful
submittal that it should not be penalized for not being able to
participate in the coming May 10, 2010 party-list election.
[parenthetical note at 1st paragraph supplied; underscoring in the
original].
Based on its apprehension that it might end up twice in jeopardy of
not being able to participate in the party-list elections of 2013 in view
of Section 6(8) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7941, PGBI requested that

the matter of its participation in the May 2013 party-list elections be

given a categorical ruling.19
In its Reply,20 the Comelec asserted that a discussion on PGBIs
eligibility for the 2013 elections i.e., whether its declared eligibility
for the 2010 elections and its eventual inability to participate thereto
should be considered as a failure to participate in the last two (2)
elections, as defined in R.A. No. 7941 is purely academic, and is
purely an advisory opinion that this Court has no jurisdiction to grant.
Judicial power, the Comelec claimed, is limited to the determination
and resolution of actual cases and controversies involving existing
conflicts that are appropriate or ripe for judicial determination; it does
not extend to hypothetical, conjectural or anticipatory questions. It
claimed additionally that as the specialized constitutional body
charged with the enforcement and administration of all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum and recall, PGBIs question is a matter within its
competence and primary jurisdiction to decide once it becomes ripe
for adjudication.
OUR RULING
After due consideration of the attendant facts and the law, we
find the Comelec guilty of indirect contempt of this Court.
The Comelec Chair and Members are guilty of indirect contempt of
Court
We explained in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v.
COMELEC21 the Courts contempt power as follows:
The power to punish contempt is inherent in all courts, because it is
essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to
the enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates of the courts;
and, consequently, to the due administration of justice.
Under our Rules of Court, contempt is classified into direct and
indirect. Direct contempt, which may be summary, is committed "in
the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt the
proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the court,
offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to

answer as a witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when

lawfully required to do so."
Indirect contempt, on the other hand, is not committed in the
presence of the court and can be punished only after notice and
hearing. Disobedience or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order or
judgment of a court or injunction granted by a court or judge
constitutes indirect contempt. We quote Section 3, Rule 71 of the
Rules of Court, enumerating the acts punishable as indirect
contempt, as follows:
"SEC. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing.
After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to
the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may be
fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person
guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect
contempt:
(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his
official duties or in his official transactions;
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or
judgment of a court, including the act of a person who, after being
dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the judgment or
process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or attempts or
induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the
purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any
manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to be
entitled thereto;
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or
proceedings of a court not constituting direct contempt under section
1 of this Rule;
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede,
obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice;
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as
such without authority;
(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served;

(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the

custody of an officer by virtue of an order or process of a court held
by him.
But nothing in this section shall be so construed as to prevent the
court from issuing process to bring the respondent into court, or from
holding him in custody pending such proceedings."
Based on the recited antecedent facts, it cannot be disputed that the
Comelec did not comply with our Status Quo Order; it simply pleaded
insurmountable and tremendous operational constraints and costs
implications as reasons for its avoidance of our Order. It essentially
posited that compliance with our Status Quo Order was rendered
impossible by the automation of the May 10, 2010 elections.
However, we find this explanation unacceptable, given the Comelecs
own self-imposed deadline of February 4, 2010 for the correction of
errors and omissions, prior to printing, of the published list of
participating party-list groups and organizations in the May 10, 2010
elections.
The Comelec deadline could only mean that the Comelec had
determined that changes in the official ballot could still be made at
any time prior to the deadline. In the context of the cases then
pending involving the registration of party-list organizations, the
deadline was a clear signal from the Comelec that the cases would
have to be resolved before the deadline; otherwise, the Comelec
could not be held liable for their non-inclusion.
We fully read and respected the Comelecs signal, fully aware that we
have to balance the interests the Comelec has to protect, with PGBIs
intent to be voted as a party-list organization. Thus, on February 2,
2010, we issued our Status Quo Order after a preliminary but
judicious evaluation of the merits of PGBIs motion for
reconsideration, only to receive the Comelecs response on February
3, 2010 manifesting that it could no longer change the ballots
because of the nature of an automated election.
In an exercise as important as an election, the Comelec cannot make
a declaration and impose a deadline, and, thereafter, expect
everyone to accept its excuses when it backtracks on its announced

declaration. The Comelec knew very well that there were still cases
pending for judicial determination that could have been decided
before the deadline was set.
Although the recent case of Liberal Party v. Commission on
Elections,22 involved the registration of political parties, we found that
the Comelec gravely abused its discretion in allowing the out of time
registration of the NP-NPC coalition despite the mandatory deadline
the Comelec itself had set. In this case, we underscored the
significance of the Comelecs compliance with its self-imposed
deadlines, particularly in the implementation of the first-ever
automated elections of May 10, 2010.
To be excused, the Comelec needed more than its generalized
descriptions of the process of ballot printing and the alleged problems
it faced. We needed reasons on how and why the deadline was set,
as well as detailed and specific reasons why PGBI could no longer be
listed while other errors and omissions could still be remedied.
Unfortunately for the Comelec, we did not see that kind of justification
in its Compliance before us. Like the Comelec, we expect obedience
to and respect for our Orders and Resolutions, and we cannot be
sidetracked based solely on supposed operational constraints caused
by the automated polls. Its treatment of our Status Quo Order simply
meant that even before the Comelec deadline, a definitive ruling that
a party-list organization should be included in the list to be voted
upon would have been for naught as the Comelec would have
anyway pleaded automation constraints. Even if its excuse had been
meritorious, the Comelec effectively would have been guilty of
misrepresentation on an election matter and in dealing with this
Court.
Although we have recognized the validity of the automation of the
May 10, 2010 elections in Roque, Jr. v. Comelec,23 we stress that
automation is not the end-all and be-all of an electoral process. An
equally important aspect of a democratic electoral exercise is the
right of free choice of the electorates on who shall govern them; the
party-list system, in the words of Ang Bagong BayaniOFW Labor
Party v. Comelec,24 affords them this choice, as it gives the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors the opportunity to

participate in governance. Wittingly or unwittingly, the Comelec took

this freedom of choice away and effectively disenfranchised the
members of the sector that PGBI sought to represent when it did not
include PGBI in the list of qualified parties vying for a seat under the
party-list system of representation. This is a consideration no less
weighty than the automation of the election and cannot be simply
disregarded on mere generalized allegations of automation
difficulties.
The Appropriate Penalty
Section 7, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court provides the penalty for
indirect contempt. Section 7 of Rule 71 reads:
SEC. 7. Punishment for indirect contempt. - If the respondent is
adjudged guilty of indirect contempt committed against a Regional
Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank, he may be
punished by a fine not exceeding thirty thousand pesos or
imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months, or both. x x x
In the past, we have found the Chairman and members of the
Comelec guilty of indirect contempt in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
Labor Party v. COMELEC.25 In that case, we held that the Chairman
and members of the COMELEC guilty of contempt and required them
to pay a fine in the amount of P20, 000.00 for "degrading the dignity
of th[e] Court;26 for brazen disobedience to its lawful directives, in
particular its Temporary Restraining Order dated May 9, 2001; and for
delaying the ultimate resolution of the many incidents of the case, to
the prejudice of the litigants and of the country." We also warned the
Comelec that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt
with more severely in the future.27
Evidently, the Rule cited above does not provide that reprimand may
be imposed on one found guilty of indirect contempt. However, we
have in recent cases imposed a penalty less than what is provided
under the Rules if the circumstances merit such.28
In Alcantara v. Ponce,29 the Court, instead of citing the respondent
Atty. Escareal-Sandejas for contempt, chose to reprimand her (and
warned her that her commission of the same act would be more
drastically dealt with) noting her apparent inexperience in practice of

the profession, especially in appellate proceedings before the Court.

Similarly, in Racines v. Judge Morallos,30 the Court, after finding
Jaime Racines guilty of indirect contempt, merely reprimanded him
because "he is not learned in the intricacies of the law."
In the present case, special circumstances exist which call for our
leniency and compel us to impose the penalty of severe reprimand
instead of of imprisonment and/or fine under Section 7, of Rule 71 of
the Rules of Court as we have ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
Labor Party. We emphasize that although automation is a special
circumstance that should be considered in the present incidental
matter, however, its effect on the Comelecs non-compliance is
merely to mitigate, not to totally exculpate, the Comelec from liability
for its failure to comply with our Status Quo Order. In other words,
even if we grant that automation might have posed some difficulty in
including a new party in the party-list listing, the Comelec still failed to
prove to our satisfaction that the PGBIs inclusion was technically
impossible and could not have been done even if the Comelec had
wanted to. Thus, at the most, we can give the Comelec the benefit of
the doubt to the extent of recognizing its excuse as a mitigating
factor.
Therefore, instead of imposing the penalty of imprisonment and/or
fine provided under Section 7, Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court,
we deem it proper to impose upon the Comelec, particularly on its
Chair and Members the penalty of severe reprimand, with a stern
warning that a repetition of the same offense shall be dealt with more
severely.
At this juncture, we take judicial notice of Comelec Chairperson Jose
A.R. Melos resignation effective January 15, 201131 and
Commissioners Nicodemo T. Ferrer and Gregorio Y. Larrazabals
retirement on February 2, 2011.32 We hasten to clarify that their
departure from government service, however, do not render moot and
academic their liability for indirect contempt, since "contempt of court
applies to all persons, whether in or out of government." Thus, in
Curata v. Philippine Ports Authority,33 we held:
Contempt of court applies to all persons, whether in or out of
government. Thus, it covers government officials or employees who

retired during the pendency of the petition for contempt. Otherwise, a

civil servant may strategize to avail himself of an early retirement to
escape the sanctions from a contempt citation, if he perceives that he
would be made responsible for a contumacious act. The higher
interest of effective and efficient administration of justice dictates that
a petition for contempt must proceed to its final conclusion despite
the retirement of the government official or employee, more so if it
involves a former member of the bench.
PGBIs Participation in the May 10, 2010 Party-List Elections
We partly agree with the Comelec that we cannot recognize PGBI to
be a party-list organization fully qualified to run under the party-list
system in the coming 2013 party-list elections. The question of full
and total qualification is not ripe for judicial determination as this is
not before us for resolution. Participation in a previous election and
the level of votes in favor of a participating organization are not the
only qualification issues that can arise in a party-list election, and we
cannot assume that PGBI shall meet all other legal standards to
qualify as a party-list organization in the 2013 elections. 34
But separate from the question of PGBIs overall qualification is the
narrower question of its participation in the May 10, 2010 elections
an issue that is subsumed by the issues in the main certiorari case.
As shown above, PGBI intended to participate in the May 10, 2010
elections but it was not able to do so because the Comelec did not
contrary to our express directive include it in the list of party-list
organizations to be voted upon in the May 10, 2010 elections. As it
was the Comelec itself which prevented PGBI from participating in
the May 10, 2010 party-list elections when it deleted PGBI, with grave
abuse of discretion, from the list of accredited party-list groups or
organizations and, thereafter, refused to return it to the list despite our
directive, PGBI should, at the very least, be deemed to have
participated in the May 10, 2010 elections, and cannot be disqualified
for non-participation or for failure to garner the votes required under
Section 6(8) of R.A. No. 7941. To conclude otherwise is to effectively
recognize the ineffectiveness of our Status Quo Order, of our April 29,
2010 Decision, and of this Court.
As a final note, the subject of the Courts action is the COMELECs

disobedience to our Status Quo Order of February 2, 2010 in the

case in caption. The composition of the COMELEC has since then
changed. We therefore clarify that this Resolution affects and reflects
on the COMELEC and its membership as then constituted as they
were the ones directly responsible for the disobedience.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Comelec Chair 35 and
Members36 are hereby found GUILTY of CONTEMPT of the Supreme
Court for their disobedience to our lawful directive, specifically the
Status Quo Order dated February 2, 2010. They are accordingly
SEVERELY REPRIMANDED for this disobedience. They are further
WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt
with more severely in the future.
The Philippine Guardians Brotherhood, Inc. shall be deemed not to
have transgressed the participation and level of votes requirements
under Section 6(8) of Republic Act No. 7941 with respect to the May
10, 2010 elections.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRIONAssociate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONAChief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO M
Associate Justic

ANTONIO EDUARDO B.
Associate Justic

DIOSDADO M. PER
Associate Justic

MARIANO C. DEL CA
Associate Justic

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARA
Associate Justic

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

(ON LEAVE)
JOSE CATRAL MEN
Associate Justic

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENOAssociate Justice

C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court.
RENATO C. CORONAChief Justice
Footnotes
Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 189793

April 7, 2010

SENATOR BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III and MAYOR JESSE

ROBREDO, Petitioners, vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
represented by its Chairman JOSE A.R. MELO and its
Commissioners, RENE V. SARMIENTO, NICODEMO T. FERRER,
LUCENITO N. TAGLE, ARMANDO VELASCO, ELIAS R. YUSOPH
AND GREGORIO LARRAZABAL, Respondents.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This case comes before this Court by way of a Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. In this original

action, petitioners Senator Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III and Mayor

Jesse Robredo, as public officers, taxpayers and citizens, seek the
nullification as unconstitutional of Republic Act No. 9716, entitled "An
Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second
(2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur and
Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From Such
Reapportionment." Petitioners consequently pray that the respondent
Commission on Elections be restrained from making any issuances
and from taking any steps relative to the implementation of Republic
Act No. 9716.
Republic Act No. 9716 originated from House Bill No. 4264, and was
signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo on 12 October
2009. It took effect on 31 October 2009, or fifteen (15) days following
its publication in the Manila Standard, a newspaper of general
circulation.1 In substance, the said law created an additional
legislative district for the Province of Camarines Sur by reconfiguring
the existing first and second legislative districts of the province.
Prior to Republic Act No. 9716, the Province of Camarines Sur was
estimated to have a population of 1,693,821, 2 distributed among four
(4) legislative districts in this wise:
District

Municipalities/Cities

Populati
on

1st
District

Del
Gallego
Ragay
Lupi
Sipocot
Cabusao

Libmanan
Minalabac
Pamplona
Pasacao
San Fernando

417,304

2nd
District

Gainza
Milaor
Naga
Pili
Ocampo

Canaman
Camaligan
Magarao
Bombon
Calabanga

474,899

Caramoan

Sangay

372,548

3rd

District

Garchitore
na
Goa
Lagonoy
Presentaci
on

San Jose
Tigaon
Tinamba
Siruma

4th
District

Iriga
Baao
Balatan
Bato

Buhi
Bula
Nabua

429,070

Following the enactment of Republic Act No. 9716, the first and
second districts of Camarines Sur were reconfigured in order to
create an additional legislative district for the province. Hence, the
first district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac, Pamplona,
Pasacao, and San Fernando were combined with the second district
municipalities of Milaor and Gainza to form a new second legislative
district. The following table3 illustrates the reapportionment made by
Republic Act No. 9716:
District

Municipalities/Cities

Populati
on

1st District

Del
Gallego
Ragay
Lupi
Sipocot
Cabusao

176,383

2nd District

Libmanan
Minalabac
Pamplona
Pasacao

San Fernando
Gainza
Milaor

276,777

3rd District (formerly 2nd

District)

Naga
Pili
Ocampo
Canaman

Camaligan
Magarao
Bombon
Calabanga

439,043

4th District (formerly 3rd

District)

Caramoan
Garchitore
na
Goa
Lagonoy
Presentaci
on

Sangay
San Jose
Tigaon
Tinamba
Siruma

372,548

5th District (formerly 4th

District)

Iriga
Baao
Balatan
Bato

Buhi
Bula
Nabua

429,070

Republic Act No. 9716 is a well-milled legislation. The factual recitals

by both parties of the origins of the bill that became the law show
that, from the filing of House Bill No. 4264 until its approval by the
Senate on a vote of thirteen (13) in favor and two (2) against, the
process progressed step by step, marked by public hearings on the
sentiments and position of the local officials of Camarines Sur on the
creation of a new congressional district, as well as argumentation and
debate on the issue, now before us, concerning the stand of the
oppositors of the bill that a population of at least 250,000 is required
by the Constitution for such new district.4
Petitioner Aquino III was one of two senators who voted against the
approval of the Bill by the Senate. His co-petitioner, Robredo, is the
Mayor of Naga City, which was a part of the former second district
from which the municipalities of Gainza and Milaor were taken for
inclusion in the new second district. No other local executive joined
the two; neither did the representatives of the former third and fourth
districts of the province.
Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by Republic
Act No. 9716, runs afoul of the explicit constitutional standard that
requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty thousand
(250,000) for the creation of a legislative district. 5 The petitioners
claim that the reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716 of the first
and second districts of Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because
the proposed first district will end up with a population of less than
250,000 or only 176,383.

Petitioners rely on Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as

basis for the cited 250,000 minimum population standard. 6 The
provision reads:
Article VI
Section 5. (1) x x x x
(2) x x x x
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable,
contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province,
shall have at least one representative.
(4) x x x x (Emphasis supplied).
The petitioners posit that the 250,000 figure appearing in the abovecited provision is the minimum population requirement for the creation
of a legislative district.7 The petitioners theorize that, save in the case
of a newly created province, each legislative district created by
Congress must be supported by a minimum population of at least
250,000 in order to be valid. 8 Under this view, existing legislative
districts may be reapportioned and severed to form new districts,
provided each resulting district will represent a population of at least
250,000. On the other hand, if the reapportionment would result in the
creation of a legislative seat representing a populace of less than
250,000 inhabitants, the reapportionment must be stricken down as
invalid for non-compliance with the minimum population requirement.
In support of their theory, the petitioners point to what they claim is
the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution to adopt a
population minimum of 250,000 in the creation of additional legislative
seats.9 The petitioners argue that when the Constitutional
Commission fixed the original number of district seats in the House of
Representatives to two hundred (200), they took into account the
projected national population of fifty five million (55,000,000) for the
year 1986.10 According to the petitioners, 55 million people
represented by 200 district representatives translates to roughly
250,000 people for every one (1) representative. 11 Thus, the 250,000
population requirement found in Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987

Constitution is actually based on the population constant used by the

Constitutional Commission in distributing the initial 200 legislative
seats.
Thus did the petitioners claim that in reapportioning legislative
districts independently from the creation of a province, Congress is
bound to observe a 250,000 population threshold, in the same
manner that the Constitutional Commission did in the original
apportionment.
Verbatim, the submission is that:
1. Republic Act 9716 is unconstitutional because the newly
apportioned first district of Camarines Sur failed to meet the
population requirement for the creation of the legislative district as
explicitly provided in Article VI, Section 5, Paragraphs (1) and (3) of
the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended thereto;
and
2. Republic Act 9716 violates the principle of proportional
representation as provided in Article VI, Section 5 paragraphs (1), (3)
and (4) of the Constitution.12
The provision subject of this case states:
Article VI
Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of
not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed
by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned
among the provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on
the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as
provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) x x x x
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable,
contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province,

shall have at least one representative.

(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the
Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based
on the standards provided in this section.
On the other hand, the respondents, through the Office of the
Solicitor General, seek the dismissal of the present petition based on
procedural and substantive grounds.
On procedural matters, the respondents argue that the petitioners are
guilty of two (2) fatal technical defects: first, petitioners committed an
error in choosing to assail the constitutionality of Republic Act No.
9716 via the remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court; and second, the petitioners have no locus standi to
question the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716.
On substantive matters, the respondents call attention to an apparent
distinction between cities and provinces drawn by Section 5(3), Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution. The respondents concede the existence
of a 250,000 population condition, but argue that a plain and simple
reading of the questioned provision will show that the same has no
application with respect to the creation of legislative districts in
provinces.13 Rather, the 250,000 minimum population is only a
requirement for the creation of a legislative district in a city.
In sum, the respondents deny the existence of a fixed population
requirement for the reapportionment of districts in provinces.
Therefore, Republic Act No. 9716, which only creates an additional
legislative district within the province of Camarines Sur, should be
sustained as a perfectly valid reapportionment law.
We first pass upon the threshold issues.
The respondents assert that by choosing to avail themselves of the
remedies of Certiorari and Prohibition, the petitioners have committed
a fatal procedural lapse. The respondents cite the following reasons:
1. The instant petition is bereft of any allegation that the respondents
had acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion.
1avvphi1

2. The remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition must be directed against

a tribunal, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasijudicial, or ministerial functions. Respondents maintain that in
implementing Republic Act No. 9716, they were not acting as a
judicial or quasi-judicial body, nor were they engaging in the
performance of a ministerial act.
3. The petitioners could have availed themselves of another plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Considering that the main thrust of the instant petition is the
declaration of unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 9716, the same
could have been ventilated through a petition for declaratory relief,
over which the Supreme Court has only appellate, not original
jurisdiction.
The respondents likewise allege that the petitioners had failed to
show that they had sustained, or is in danger of sustaining any
substantial injury as a result of the implementation of Republic Act
No. 9716. The respondents, therefore, conclude that the petitioners
lack the required legal standing to question the constitutionality of
Republic Act No. 9716.
This Court has paved the way away from procedural debates when
confronted with issues that, by reason of constitutional importance,
need a direct focus of the arguments on their content and substance.
The Supreme Court has, on more than one occasion, tempered the
application of procedural rules,14 as well as relaxed the requirement of
locus standi whenever confronted with an important issue of
overreaching significance to society.15
Hence, in Del Mar v. Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation
(PAGCOR)16 and Jaworski v. PAGCOR,17 this Court sanctioned
momentary deviation from the principle of the hierarchy of courts, and
took original cognizance of cases raising issues of paramount public
importance. The Jaworski case ratiocinates:
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated
as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental importance of the
issues involved in this case warrants that we set aside the technical
defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One

cannot deny that the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive
influence on the social and moral well being of this nation, specially
the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an imperative
need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that
rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay,
but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict
and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to
frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must always be
eschewed. (Emphasis supplied)
Anent the locus standi requirement, this Court has already uniformly
ruled in Kilosbayan v. Guingona,18 Tatad v. Executive Secretary,19
Chavez v. Public Estates Authority20 and Bagong Alyansang
Makabayan v. Zamora,21 just to name a few, that absence of direct
injury on the part of the party seeking judicial review may be excused
when the latter is able to craft an issue of transcendental importance.
In Lim v. Executive Secretary,22 this Court held that in cases of
transcendental importance, the cases must be settled promptly and
definitely, and so, the standing requirements may be relaxed. This
liberal stance has been echoed in the more recent decision on
Chavez v. Gonzales.23
Given the weight of the issue raised in the instant petition, the
foregoing principles must apply. The beaten path must be taken. We
go directly to the determination of whether or not a population of
250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the
creation of a new legislative district in a province.
We deny the petition.
We start with the basics. Any law duly enacted by Congress carries
with it the presumption of constitutionality.24 Before a law may be
declared unconstitutional by this Court, there must be a clear showing
that a specific provision of the fundamental law has been violated or
transgressed. When there is neither a violation of a specific provision
of the Constitution nor any proof showing that there is such a
violation, the presumption of constitutionality will prevail and the law
must be upheld. To doubt is to sustain.25
There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000

minimum population that must compose a legislative district.

As already mentioned, the petitioners rely on the second sentence of
Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, coupled with what
they perceive to be the intent of the framers of the Constitution to
adopt a minimum population of 250,000 for each legislative district.
The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution,
succinctly provides: "Each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative."
The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the
entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and the entitlement of a
province to a district on the other. For while a province is entitled to at
least a representative, with nothing mentioned about population, a
city must first meet a population minimum of 250,000 in order to be
similarly entitled.
The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase
"each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand"
from the phrase "or each province" point to no other conclusion than
that the 250,000 minimum population is only required for a city, but
not for a province. 26
Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000
minimum population only for a city to be entitled to a representative,
but not so for a province.
The 250,000 minimum population requirement for legislative districts
in cities was, in turn, the subject of interpretation by this Court in
Mariano, Jr. v. COMELEC.27
In Mariano, the issue presented was the constitutionality of Republic
Act No. 7854, which was the law that converted the Municipality of
Makati into a Highly Urbanized City. As it happened, Republic Act No.
7854 created an additional legislative district for Makati, which at that
time was a lone district. The petitioners in that case argued that the
creation of an additional district would violate Section 5(3), Article VI
of the Constitution, because the resulting districts would be supported
by a population of less than 250,000, considering that Makati had a

total population of only 450,000. The Supreme Court sustained the

constitutionality of the law and the validity of the newly created
district, explaining the operation of the Constitutional phrase "each
city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand," to wit:
Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district
in Makati is not in accord with section 5(3), Article VI of the
Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population
of Makati stands at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000). Said
section provides, inter alia, that a city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at least one
representative. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the
1990 census stood at four hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its
legislative district may still be increased since it has met the minimum
population requirement of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In
fact, Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the Constitution
provides that a city whose population has increased to more than two
hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at least one
congressional representative.28 (Emphasis supplied)
The Mariano case limited the application of the 250,000 minimum
population requirement for cities only to its initial legislative district. In
other words, while Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution requires
a city to have a minimum population of 250,000 to be entitled to a
representative, it does not have to increase its population by another
250,000 to be entitled to an additional district.
There is no reason why the Mariano case, which involves the creation
of an additional district within a city, should not be applied to
additional districts in provinces. Indeed, if an additional legislative
district created within a city is not required to represent a population
of at least 250,000 in order to be valid, neither should such be
needed for an additional district in a province, considering moreover
that a province is entitled to an initial seat by the mere fact of its
creation and regardless of its population.
Apropos for discussion is the provision of the Local Government
Code on the creation of a province which, by virtue of and upon
creation, is entitled to at least a legislative district. Thus, Section 461
of the Local Government Code states:

Requisites for Creation. (a) A province may be created if it has an

average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of
not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991
constant prices and either of the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least two thousand (2,000) square
kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000)
inhabitants as certified by the National Statistics Office.
Notably, the requirement of population is not an indispensable
requirement, but is merely an alternative addition to the indispensable
income requirement.
Mariano, it would turn out, is but a reflection of the pertinent ideas
that ran through the deliberations on the words and meaning of
Section 5 of Article VI.
The whats, whys, and wherefores of the population requirement of "at
least two hundred fifty thousand" may be gleaned from the records of
the Constitutional Commission which, upon framing the provisions of
Section 5 of Article VI, proceeded to form an ordinance that would be
appended to the final document. The Ordinance is captioned
"APPORTIONING
THE
SEATS
OF
THE
HOUSE
OF
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CONGRESS OF THE PHILIPPINES
TO THE DIFFERENT LEGISLATIVE DISTRICTS IN PROVINCES
AND CITIES AND THE METROPOLITAN MANILA AREA." Such
records would show that the 250,000 population benchmark was
used for the 1986 nationwide apportionment of legislative districts
among provinces, cities and Metropolitan Manila. Simply put, the
population figure was used to determine how many districts a
province, city, or Metropolitan Manila should have. Simply discernible
too is the fact that, for the purpose, population had to be the
determinant. Even then, the requirement of 250,000 inhabitants was
not taken as an absolute minimum for one legislative district. And,
closer to the point herein at issue, in the determination of the precise
district within the province to which, through the use of the population
benchmark, so many districts have been apportioned, population as a
factor was not the sole, though it was among, several determinants.

From its journal,29 we can see that the Constitutional Commission

originally divided the entire country into two hundred (200) districts,
which corresponded to the original number of district representatives.
The 200 seats were distributed by the Constitutional Commission in
this manner: first, one (1) seat each was given to the seventy-three
(73) provinces and the ten (10) cities with a population of at least
250,000;30 second, the remaining seats were then redistributed
among the provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Area "in accordance
with the number of their inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio."31 Commissioner Davide, who later became a
Member and then Chief Justice of the Court, explained this in his
sponsorship remark32 for the Ordinance to be appended to the 1987
Constitution:
Commissioner Davide: The ordinance fixes at 200 the number of
legislative seats which are, in turn, apportioned among provinces and
cities with a population of at least 250, 000 and the Metropolitan Area
in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants on the
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio. The population is based on
the 1986 projection, with the 1980 official enumeration as the point of
reckoning. This projection indicates that our population is more or
less 56 million. Taking into account the mandate that each city with at
least 250, 000 inhabitants and each province shall have at least one
representative, we first allotted one seat for each of the 73 provinces,
and each one for all cities with a population of at least 250, 000,
which are the Cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay, Caloocan, Cebu,
Iloilo, Bacolod, Cagayan de Oro, Davao and Zamboanga. Thereafter,
we then proceed[ed] to increase whenever appropriate the number of
seats for the provinces and cities in accordance with the number of
their inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio.
(Emphasis supplied).
Thus was the number of seats computed for each province and city.
Differentiated from this, the determination of the districts within the
province had to consider "all protests and complaints formally
received" which, the records show, dealt with determinants other than
population as already mentioned.
Palawan is a case in point. Journal No. 107 of the Constitutional
Commission narrates:

INTERPELLATION OF MR. NOLLEDO:

Mr. Nolledo inquired on the reason for including Puerto Princesa in
the northern towns when it was more affinity with the southern town
of Aborlan, Batarasa, Brookes Point, Narra, Quezon and Marcos. He
stated that the First District has a greater area than the Second
District. He then queried whether population was the only factor
considered by the Committee in redistricting.
Replying thereto, Mr. Davide explained that the Committee took into
account the standards set in Section 5 of the Article on the Legislative
Department, namely: 1) the legislative seats should be apportioned
among the provinces and cities and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with their inhabitants on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio; and 2) the legislative district must be compact,
adjacent and contiguous.
Mr. Nolledo pointed out that the last factor was not met when Puerto
Princesa was included with the northern towns. He then inquired what
is the distance between Puerto Princesa from San Vicente.
xxxx
Thereupon, Mr. Nolledo stated that Puerto Princesa has a population
of 75,480 and based on the apportionment, its inclusion with the
northern towns would result in a combined population of 265,000 as
against only 186,000 for the south. He added that Cuyo and Coron
are very important towns in the northern part of Palawan and, in fact,
Cuyo was the capital of Palawan before its transfer to Puerto
Princesa. He also pointed out that there are more potential
candidates in the north and therefore if Puerto Princesa City and the
towns of Cuyo and Coron are lumped together, there would be less
candidates in the south, most of whose inhabitants are not interested
in politics. He then suggested that Puerto Princesa be included in the
south or the Second District.
Mr. Davide stated that the proposal would be considered during the
period of amendments. He requested that the COMELEC staff study
said proposal.33
"PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF MR. NOLLEDO

On the districting of Palawan, Mr. Nolledo pointed out that it was

explained in the interpellations that District I has a total population of
265,358 including the City of Puerto Princesa, while the Second
District has a total population of 186,733. He proposed, however, that
Puerto Princesa be included in the Second District in order to satisfy
the contiguity requirement in the Constitution considering that said
City is nearer the southern towns comprising the Second District.
In reply to Mr. Monsods query, Mr. Nolledo explained that with
proposed transfer of Puerto Princesa City to the Second District,
First District would only have a total population of 190,000 while
Second District would have 262,213, and there would be
substantial changes.

the
the
the
no

Mr. Davide accepted Mr. Nolledos proposal to insert Puerto Princesa

City before the Municipality of Aborlan.
There being no objection on the part of the Members the same was
approved by the Body.
APPROVAL OF THE APPORTIONMENT AND DISTRICTING OF
PALAWAN
There being no other amendment, on motion of Mr. Davide, there
being no objection, the apportionment and districting for the province
of Palawan was approved by the Body.34
The districting of Palawan disregarded the 250,000 population figure.
It was decided by the importance of the towns and the city that
eventually composed the districts.
Benguet and Baguio are another reference point. The Journal further
narrates:
At this juncture, Mr. Davide informed the Body that Mr. Regalado
made a reservation with the Committee for the possible reopening of
the approval of Region I with respect to Benguet and Baguio City.
REMARKS OF MR. REGALADO
Mr. Regalado stated that in the formulation of the Committee, Baguio

City and Tuba are placed in one district. He stated that he was toying
with the idea that, perhaps as a special consideration for Baguio
because it is the summer capital of the Philippines, Tuba could be
divorced from Baguio City so that it could, by itself, have its own
constituency and Tuba could be transferred to the Second District
together with Itogon. Mr. Davide, however, pointed out that the
population of Baguio City is only 141,149.
Mr. Regalado admitted that the regular population of Baguio may be
lower during certain times of the year, but the transient population
would increase the population substantially and, therefore, for
purposes of business and professional transactions, it is beyond
question that population-wise, Baguio would more than qualify, not to
speak of the official business matters, transactions and offices that
are also there.
Mr. Davide adverted to Director de Limas statement that unless Tuba
and Baguio City are united, Tuba will be isolated from the rest of
Benguet as the place can only be reached by passing through Baguio
City. He stated that the Committee would submit the matter to the
Body.
Upon inquiry of the Chair whether he is insisting on his amendment,
Mr. Regalado stated that the Body should have a say on the matter
and that the considerations he had given are not on the demographic
aspects but on the fact that Baguio City is the summer capital, the
venue and situs of many government offices and functions.
On motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the Body
approved the reconsideration of the earlier approval of the
apportionment and districting of Region I, particularly Benguet.
Thereafter, on motion of Mr. Davide, there being no objection, the
amendment of Mr. Regalado was put to a vote. With 14 Members
voting in favor and none against, the amendment was approved by
the Body.
Mr. Davide informed that in view of the approval of the amendment,
Benguet with Baguio City will have two seats. The First District shall
comprise of the municipalities of Mankayan, Buguias, Bakun,
Kabayan, Kibungan, Bokod, Atok, Kapangan, Tublay, La Trinidad,

Sablan, Itogon and Tuba. The Second District shall comprise of

Baguio City alone.
There being no objection, the Body approved the apportionment and
districting of Region I.35
Quite emphatically, population was explicitly removed as a factor.
It may be additionally mentioned that the province of Cavite was
divided into districts based on the distribution of its three cities, with
each district having a city: one district "supposed to be a fishing area;
another a vegetable and fruit area; and the third, a rice growing area,"
because such consideration "fosters common interests in line with the
standard of compactness."36 In the districting of Maguindanao, among
the matters discussed were "political stability and common interest
among the people in the area" and the possibility of "chaos and
disunity" considering the "accepted regional, political, traditional and
sectoral leaders."37 For Laguna, it was mentioned that municipalities
in the highland should not be grouped with the towns in the lowland.
For Cebu, Commissioner Maambong proposed that they should
"balance the area and population."38
Consistent with Mariano and with the framer deliberations on district
apportionment, we stated in Bagabuyo v. COMELEC 39 that:
x x x Undeniably, these figures show a disparity in the population
sizes of the districts. The Constitution, however, does not require
mathematical exactitude or rigid equality as a standard in gauging
equality of representation. x x x. To ensure quality representation
through commonality of interests and ease of access by the
representative to the constituents, all that the Constitution requires is
that every legislative district should comprise, as far as practicable,
contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. (Emphasis supplied).
This 2008 pronouncement is fresh reasoning against the
uncompromising stand of petitioner that an additional provincial
legislative district, which does not have at least a 250,000 population
is not allowed by the Constitution.
The foregoing reading and review lead to a clear lesson.

Neither in the text nor in the essence of Section 5, Article VI of the

Constitution can, the petition find support. And the formulation of the
Ordinance in the implementation of the provision, nay, even the
Ordinance itself, refutes the contention that a population of 250,000 is
a constitutional sine qua non for the formation of an additional
legislative district in a province, whose population growth has
increased beyond the 1986 numbers.
Translated in the terms of the present case:
1. The Province of Camarines Sur, with an estimated population of
1,693,821 in 2007 is based on the formula and constant number of
250,000 used by the Constitutional Commission in nationally
apportioning legislative districts among provinces and cities entitled
to two (2) districts in addition to the four (4) that it was given in the
1986 apportionment. Significantly, petitioner Aquino concedes this
point.40 In other words, Section 5 of Article VI as clearly written allows
and does not prohibit an additional district for the Province of
Camarines Sur, such as that provided for in Republic Act No. 9786;
2. Based on the pith and pitch of the exchanges on the Ordinance on
the protests and complaints against strict conformity with the
population standard, and more importantly based on the final
districting in the Ordinance on considerations other than population,
the reapportionment or the recomposition of the first and second
legislative districts in the Province of Camarines Sur that resulted in
the creation of a new legislative district is valid even if the population
of the new district is 176,383 and not 250,000 as insisted upon by the
petitioners.
3. The factors mentioned during the deliberations on House Bill No.
4264, were:
(a) the dialects spoken in the grouped municipalities;
(b) the size of the original groupings compared to that of the
regrouped municipalities;
(c) the natural division separating the municipality subject of the
discussion from the reconfigured District One; and

(d) the balancing of the areas of the three districts resulting from the
redistricting of Districts One and Two. 41
Each of such factors and in relation to the others considered together,
with the increased population of the erstwhile Districts One and Two,
point to the utter absence of abuse of discretion, much less grave
abuse of discretion,42 that would warrant the invalidation of Republic
Act No. 9716.
To be clear about our judgment, we do not say that in the
reapportionment of the first and second legislative districts of
Camarines Sur, the number of inhabitants in the resulting additional
district should not be considered. Our ruling is that population is not
the only factor but is just one of several other factors in the
composition of the additional district. Such settlement is in accord
with both the text of the Constitution and the spirit of the letter, so
very clearly given form in the Constitutional debates on the exact
issue presented by this petition.
1avvphi1

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Republic Act No.

9716 entitled "An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First
(1st) and Second (2nd) Legislative Districts in the Province of
Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative District From
Such Reapportionment" is a VALID LAW.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZAssociate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNOChief Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORO
Associate Justic

PRESBITERO J. VELA
Associate Justic

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDOAssociate Justic

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PER
Associate Justic

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CA
Associate Justic

(On Official Leave)

ROBERTO A. ABAD*
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARA
Associate Justic

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZAAssociate Justice

C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNOChief Justice
Footnotes

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManila

EN BANC
G.R. No. 180643

September 4, 2008

ROMULO L. NERI, petitioner, vs.SENATE COMMITTEE ON

ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND
INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE
AND COMMERCE, AND SENATE COMMITTEE ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY, respondents.

RESOLUTION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Executive privilege is not a personal privilege, but one that
adheres to the Office of the President. It exists to protect
public interest, not to benefit a particular public official. Its
purpose, among others, is to assure that the nation will
receive the benefit of candid, objective and untrammeled
communication and exchange of information between the
President and his/her advisers in the process of shaping or
forming policies and arriving at decisions in the exercise of
the functions of the Presidency under the Constitution. The
confidentiality of the Presidents conversations and
correspondence is not unique. It is akin to the confidentiality
of judicial deliberations. It possesses the same value as the
right to privacy of all citizens and more, because it is dictated
by public interest and the constitutionally ordained
separation of governmental powers.
In these proceedings, this Court has been called upon to
exercise its power of review and arbitrate a hotly, even
acrimoniously, debated dispute between the Courts co-equal
branches of government. In this task, this Court should
neither curb the legitimate powers of any of the co-equal and
coordinate branches of government nor allow any of them to
overstep the boundaries set for it by our Constitution. The
competing interests in the case at bar are the claim of
executive privilege by the President, on the one hand, and
the respondent Senate Committees assertion of their power
to conduct legislative inquiries, on the other. The particular
facts and circumstances of the present case, stripped of the
politically and emotionally charged rhetoric from both sides
and viewed in the light of settled constitutional and legal
doctrines, plainly lead to the conclusion that the claim of

executive privilege must be upheld.

Assailed in this motion for reconsideration is our Decision
dated March 25, 2008 (the "Decision"), granting the petition
for certiorari filed by petitioner Romulo L. Neri against the
respondent Senate Committees on Accountability of Public
Officers and Investigations,1 Trade and Commerce,2 and
National Defense and Security (collectively the "respondent
Committees").3
A brief review of the facts is imperative.
On September 26, 2007, petitioner appeared before
respondent Committees and testified for about eleven (11)
hours on matters concerning the National Broadband Project
(the "NBN Project"), a project awarded by the Department of
Transportation and Communications ("DOTC") to Zhong
Xing Telecommunications Equipment ("ZTE"). Petitioner
disclosed that then Commission on Elections ("COMELEC")
Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered him P200 Million in
exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He further
narrated that he informed President Gloria Macapagal
Arroyo ("President Arroyo") of the bribery attempt and that
she instructed him not to accept the bribe. However, when
probed further on President Arroyo and petitioners
discussions relating to the NBN Project, petitioner refused to
answer, invoking "executive privilege." To be specific,
petitioner refused to answer questions on: (a) whether or not
President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,4 (b) whether
or not she directed him to prioritize it,5 and (c) whether or not
she directed him to approve it.6
Respondent Committees persisted in knowing petitioners
answers to these three questions by requiring him to appear
and testify once more on November 20, 2007. On November

15, 2007, Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita wrote to

respondent Committees and requested them to dispense
with petitioners testimony on the ground of executive
privilege.7 The letter of Executive Secretary Ermita
pertinently stated:
Following the ruling in Senate v. Ermita, the foregoing
questions fall under conversations and correspondence
between the President and public officials which are
considered executive privilege (Almonte v. Vasquez, G.R.
95637, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. PEA, G.R. 133250, July 9,
2002). Maintaining the confidentiality of conversations of the
President is necessary in the exercise of her executive and
policy decision making process. The expectation of a
President to the confidentiality of her conversations and
correspondences, like the value which we accord deference
for the privacy of all citizens, is the necessity for protection of
the public interest in candid, objective, and even blunt or
harsh opinions in Presidential decision-making. Disclosure of
conversations of the President will have a chilling effect on
the President, and will hamper her in the effective discharge
of her duties and responsibilities, if she is not protected by
the confidentiality of her conversations.
The context in which executive privilege is being invoked is
that the information sought to be disclosed might impair our
diplomatic as well as economic relations with the Peoples
Republic of China. Given the confidential nature in which
these information were conveyed to the President, he cannot
provide the Committee any further details of these
conversations, without disclosing the very thing the privilege
is designed to protect.
In light of the above considerations, this Office is constrained
to invoke the settled doctrine of executive privilege as

refined in Senate v. Ermita, and has advised Secretary Neri

accordingly.
Considering that Sec. Neri has been lengthily interrogated
on the subject in an unprecedented 11-hour hearing, wherein
he has answered all questions propounded to him except the
foregoing questions involving executive privilege, we
therefore request that his testimony on 20 November 2007
on the ZTE / NBN project be dispensed with.
On November 20, 2007, petitioner did not appear before
respondent Committees upon orders of the President
invoking executive privilege. On November 22, 2007, the
respondent Committees issued the show-cause letter
requiring him to explain why he should not be cited in
contempt. On November 29, 2007, in petitioners reply to
respondent Committees, he manifested that it was not his
intention to ignore the Senate hearing and that he thought
the only remaining questions were those he claimed to be
covered by executive privilege. He also manifested his
willingness to appear and testify should there be new
matters to be taken up. He just requested that he be
furnished "in advance as to what else" he "needs to clarify."
Respondent Committees found petitioners explanations
unsatisfactory. Without responding to his request for
advance notice of the matters that he should still clarify, they
issued the Order dated January 30, 2008; In Re: P.S. Res.
Nos. 127,129,136 & 144; and privilege speeches of Senator
Lacson and Santiago (all on the ZTE-NBN Project), citing
petitioner in contempt of respondent Committees and
ordering his arrest and detention at the Office of the Senate
Sergeant-at-Arms until such time that he would appear and
give his testimony.

On the same date, petitioner moved for the reconsideration

of the above Order.8 He insisted that he had not shown "any
contemptible conduct worthy of contempt and arrest." He
emphasized his willingness to testify on new matters, but
respondent Committees did not respond to his request for
advance notice of questions. He also mentioned the petition
for certiorari he previously filed with this Court on December
7, 2007. According to him, this should restrain respondent
Committees from enforcing the order dated January 30,
2008 which declared him in contempt and directed his arrest
and detention.
Petitioner then filed his Supplemental Petition for Certiorari
(with Urgent Application for TRO/Preliminary Injunction) on
February 1, 2008. In the Courts Resolution dated February
4, 2008, the parties were required to observe the status quo
prevailing prior to the Order dated January 30, 2008.
On March 25, 2008, the Court granted his petition for
certiorari on two grounds: first, the communications elicited
by the three (3) questions were covered by executive
privilege; and second, respondent Committees committed
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt order.
Anent the first ground, we considered the subject
communications as falling under the presidential
communications privilege because (a) they related to a
quintessential and non-delegable power of the President, (b)
they were received by a close advisor of the President, and
(c) respondent Committees failed to adequately show a
compelling need that would justify the limitation of the
privilege and the unavailability of the information elsewhere
by an appropriate investigating authority. As to the second
ground, we found that respondent Committees committed
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt order
because (a) there was a valid claim of executive privilege,

(b) their invitations to petitioner did not contain the questions

relevant to the inquiry, (c) there was a cloud of doubt as to
the regularity of the proceeding that led to their issuance of
the contempt order, (d) they violated Section 21, Article VI of
the Constitution because their inquiry was not in accordance
with the "duly published rules of procedure," and (e) they
issued the contempt order arbitrarily and precipitately.
On April 8, 2008, respondent Committees filed the present
motion for reconsideration, anchored on the following
grounds:
I
CONTRARY TO THIS HONORABLE COURTS DECISION,
THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THE ASSAILED ORDERS
WERE ISSUED BY RESPONDENT COMMITTEES
PURSUANT TO THE EXERCISE OF THEIR LEGISLATIVE
POWER, AND NOT MERELY THEIR OVERSIGHT
FUNCTIONS.
II
CONTRARY TO THIS HONORABLE COURTS DECISION,
THERE CAN BE NO PRESUMPTION THAT THE
INFORMATION WITHHELD IN THE INSTANT CASE IS
PRIVILEGED.
III
CONTRARY TO THIS HONORABLE COURTS DECISION,
THERE IS NO FACTUAL OR LEGAL BASIS TO HOLD
THAT THE COMMUNICATIONS ELICITED BY THE
SUBJECT THREE (3) QUESTIONS ARE COVERED BY
EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE, CONSIDERING THAT:

A. THERE IS NO SHOWING THAT THE MATTERS FOR

WHICH
EXECUTIVE
PRIVILEGE
IS
CLAIMED
CONSTITUTE STATE SECRETS.
B. EVEN IF THE TESTS ADOPTED BY THIS
HONORABLE COURT IN THE DECISION IS APPLIED,
THERE IS NO SHOWING THAT THE ELEMENTS OF
PRESIDENTIAL COMMUNICATIONS PRIVILEGE ARE
PRESENT.
C. ON THE CONTRARY, THERE IS ADEQUATE SHOWING
OF A COMPELLING NEED TO JUSTIFY THE
DISCLOSURE OF THE INFORMATION SOUGHT.
D. TO UPHOLD THE CLAIM OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
IN THE INSTANT CASE WOULD SERIOUSLY IMPAIR THE
RESPONDENTS PERFORMANCE OF THEIR PRIMARY
FUNCTION TO ENACT LAWS.
E. FINALLY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF THE
PEOPLE
TO
INFORMATION,
AND
THE
CONSTITUTIONAL
POLICIES
ON
PUBLIC
ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY OUTWEIGH
THE CLAIM OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE.
IV
CONTRARY TO THIS HONORABLE COURTS DECISION,
RESPONDENTS DID NOT COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN ISSUING THE ASSAILED CONTEMPT
ORDER, CONSIDERING THAT:
A. THERE IS NO LEGITIMATE CLAIM OF EXECUTIVE
PRIVILEGE IN THE INSTANT CASE.
B. RESPONDENTS DID NOT VIOLATE THE SUPPOSED

REQUIREMENTS LAID DOWN IN SENATE V. ERMITA.

C. RESPONDENTS DULY ISSUED THE CONTEMPT
ORDER IN ACCORDANCE WITH THEIR INTERNAL
RULES.
D.
RESPONDENTS
DID
NOT
VIOLATE
THE
REQUIREMENTS UNDER ARTICLE VI, SECTION 21 OF
THE CONSTITUTION REQUIRING THAT ITS RULES OF
PROCEDURE BE DULY PUBLISHED, AND WERE
DENIED
DUE
PROCESS
WHEN
THE
COURT
CONSIDERED THE OSGS INTERVENTION ON THIS
ISSUE
WITHOUT
GIVING
RESPONDENTS
THE
OPPORTUNITY TO COMMENT.
E. RESPONDENTS ISSUANCE OF THE CONTEMPT
ORDER IS NOT ARBITRARY OR PRECIPITATE.
In his Comment, petitioner charges respondent Committees
with exaggerating and distorting the Decision of this Court.
He avers that there is nothing in it that prohibits respondent
Committees from investigating the NBN Project or asking
him additional questions. According to petitioner, the Court
merely applied the rule on executive privilege to the facts of
the case. He further submits the following contentions: first,
the assailed Decision did not reverse the presumption
against executive secrecy laid down in Senate v. Ermita;
second, respondent Committees failed to overcome the
presumption of executive privilege because it appears that
they could legislate even without the communications elicited
by the three (3) questions, and they admitted that they could
dispense with petitioners testimony if certain NEDA
documents would be given to them; third, the requirement of
specificity applies only to the privilege for State, military and
diplomatic secrets, not to the necessarily broad and all-

encompassing presidential communications privilege;

fourth, there is no right to pry into the Presidents thought
processes or exploratory exchanges; fifth, petitioner is not
covering up or hiding anything illegal; sixth, the Court has
the power and duty to annul the Senate Rules; seventh, the
Senate is not a continuing body, thus the failure of the
present Senate to publish its Rules of Procedure Governing
Inquiries in Aid of Legislation (Rules) has a vitiating effect on
them; eighth, the requirement for a witness to be furnished
advance copy of questions comports with due process and
the constitutional mandate that the rights of witnesses be
respected; and ninth, neither petitioner nor respondent has
the final say on the matter of executive privilege, only the
Court.
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General maintains that:
(1) there is no categorical pronouncement from the Court
that the assailed Orders were issued by respondent
Committees pursuant to their oversight function; hence,
there is no reason for them "to make much" of the distinction
between Sections 21 and 22, Article VI of the Constitution;
(2) presidential communications enjoy a presumptive
privilege against disclosure as earlier held in Almonte v.
Vasquez9 and Chavez v. Public Estates Authority (PEA)10; (3)
the communications elicited by the three (3) questions are
covered by executive privilege, because all the elements of
the presidential communications privilege are present; (4)
the subpoena ad testificandum issued by respondent
Committees to petitioner is fatally defective under existing
law and jurisprudence; (5) the failure of the present Senate
to publish its Rules renders the same void; and (6)
respondent Committees arbitrarily issued the contempt
order.
Incidentally, respondent

Committees objection

to

the

Resolution dated March 18, 2008 (granting the Office of the

Solicitor Generals Motion for Leave to Intervene and to
Admit Attached Memorandum) only after the promulgation of
the Decision in this case is foreclosed by its untimeliness.
The core issues that arise from the foregoing respective
contentions of the opposing parties are as follows:
(1) whether or not there is a recognized presumptive
presidential communications privilege in our legal system;
(2) whether or not there is factual or legal basis to hold that
the communications elicited by the three (3) questions are
covered by executive privilege;
(3) whether or not respondent Committees have shown that
the communications elicited by the three (3) questions are
critical to the exercise of their functions; and
(4) whether or not respondent Committees committed grave
abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt order.
We shall discuss these issues seriatim.
I
There Is a Recognized PresumptivePresidential
Communications Privilege
Respondent Committees ardently argue that the Courts
declaration
that
presidential
communications
are
presumptively privileged reverses the "presumption" laid
down in Senate v. Ermita11 that "inclines heavily against
executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure." Respondent
Committees then claim that the Court erred in relying on the
doctrine in Nixon.

Respondent Committees argue as if this were the first time

the
presumption
in
favor
of
the
presidential
communications privilege is mentioned and adopted in our
legal system. That is far from the truth. The Court, in the
earlier case of Almonte v. Vasquez,12 affirmed that the
presidential communications privilege is fundamental to
the operation of government and inextricably rooted in the
separation of powers under the Constitution. Even Senate v.
Ermita,13 the case relied upon by respondent Committees,
reiterated this concept. There, the Court enumerated the
cases in which the claim of executive privilege was
recognized, among them Almonte v. Chavez, Chavez v.
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG),14
and Chavez v. PEA.15 The Court articulated in these cases
that "there are certain types of information which the
government may withhold from the public,16" that there is a
"governmental privilege against public disclosure with
respect to state secrets regarding military, diplomatic and
other national security matters";17 and that "the right to
information does not extend to matters recognized as
privileged information under the separation of powers,
by which the Court meant Presidential conversations,
correspondences, and discussions in closed-door
Cabinet meetings."18
Respondent Committees observation that this Courts
Decision reversed the "presumption that inclines heavily
against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure" arises
from a piecemeal interpretation of the said Decision. The
Court has repeatedly held that in order to arrive at the true
intent and meaning of a decision, no specific portion thereof
should be isolated and resorted to, but the decision must be
considered in its entirety.19
Note that the aforesaid presumption is made in the context

of the circumstances obtaining in Senate v. Ermita, which

declared void Sections 2(b) and 3 of Executive Order (E.O.)
No. 464, Series of 2005. The pertinent portion of the decision
in the said case reads:
From the above discussion on the meaning and scope of
executive privilege, both in the United States and in this
jurisprudence, a clear principle emerges. Executive privilege,
whether asserted against Congress, the courts, or the public,
is recognized only in relation to certain types of information
of a sensitive character. While executive privilege is a
constitutional concept, a claim thereof may be valid or not
depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context
in which it is made. Noticeably absent is any recognition that
executive officials are exempt from the duty to disclose
information by the mere fact of being executive officials.
Indeed, the extraordinary character of the exemptions
indicates that the presumption inclines heavily against
executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure. (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
Obviously, the last sentence of the above-quoted paragraph
in Senate v. Ermita refers to the "exemption" being claimed
by the executive officials mentioned in Section 2(b) of E.O.
No. 464, solely by virtue of their positions in the Executive
Branch. This means that when an executive official, who is
one of those mentioned in the said Sec. 2(b) of E.O. No.
464, claims to be exempt from disclosure, there can be no
presumption of authorization to invoke executive
privilege given by the President to said executive official,
such that the presumption in this situation inclines heavily
against executive secrecy and in favor of disclosure.
Senate v. Ermita 20 expounds on the premise of the foregoing
ruling in this wise:

Section 2(b) in relation to Section 3 virtually provides that,

once the head of office determines that a certain information
is privileged, such determination is presumed to bear the
Presidents authority and has the effect of prohibiting the
official from appearing before Congress, subject only to the
express pronouncement of the President that it is allowing
the appearance of such official. These provisions thus allow
the President to authorize claims of privilege by mere
silence.
Such presumptive authorization, however, is contrary to the
exceptional nature of the privilege. Executive privilege, as
already discussed, is recognized with respect to information
the confidential nature of which is crucial to the fulfillment of
the unique role and responsibilities of the executive branch,
or in those instances where exemption from disclosure is
necessary to the discharge of highly important executive
responsibilities. The doctrine of executive privilege is thus
premised on the fact that certain information must, as a
matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the
public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an
exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this
case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high
degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that
obligation in a particular case.
In light of this highly exceptional nature of the privilege, the
Court finds it essential to limit to the President the power to
invoke the privilege. She may of course authorize the
Executive Secretary to invoke the privilege on her behalf, in
which case the Executive Secretary must state that the
authority is "By order of the President", which means that he
personally consulted with her. The privilege being an
extraordinary power, it must be wielded only by the highest
official in the executive hierarchy. In other words, the

President may not authorize her subordinates to exercise

such power. There is even less reason to uphold such
authorization in the instant case where the authorization is
not explicit but by mere silence. Section 3, in relation to
Section 2(b), is further invalid on this score.
The constitutional infirmity found in the blanket authorization
to invoke executive privilege granted by the President to
executive officials in Sec. 2(b) of E.O. No. 464 does not
obtain in this case.
In this case, it was the President herself, through Executive
Secretary Ermita, who invoked executive privilege on a
specific matter involving an executive agreement between
the Philippines and China, which was the subject of the three
(3) questions propounded to petitioner Neri in the course of
the Senate Committees investigation. Thus, the factual
setting of this case markedly differs from that passed upon in
Senate v. Ermita.
Moreover, contrary to the claim of respondents, the Decision
in this present case hews closely to the ruling in Senate v.
Ermita,21 to wit:
Executive privilege
The phrase "executive privilege" is not new in this
jurisdiction. It has been used even prior to the promulgation
of the 1986 Constitution. Being of American origin, it is best
understood in light of how it has been defined and used in
the legal literature of the United States.
Schwart defines executive privilege as "the power of the
Government to withhold information from the public, the
courts, and the Congress. Similarly, Rozell defines it as
"the right of the President and high-level executive branch

officers to withhold information from Congress, the courts,

and ultimately the public." x x x In this jurisdiction, the
doctrine of executive privilege was recognized by this Court
in Almonte v. Vasquez. Almonte used the term in reference to
the same privilege subject of Nixon. It quoted the following
portion of the Nixon decision which explains the basis for the
privilege:
"The expectation of a President to the confidentiality of his
conversations and correspondences, like the claim of
confidentiality of judicial deliberations, for example, he
has all the values to which we accord deference for the
privacy of all citizens and, added to those values, is the
necessity for protection of the public interest in candid,
objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential
decision-making. A President and those who assist him must
be free to explore alternatives in the process of shaping
policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many
would be unwilling to express except privately. These are
the considerations justifying a presumptive privilege for
Presidential
communications.
The
privilege
is
fundamental to the operation of government and
inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under
the Constitution x x x " (Emphasis and italics supplied)
Clearly, therefore, even Senate v. Ermita adverts to "a
presumptive privilege for Presidential communication," which
was recognized early on in Almonte v. Vasquez. To construe
the passage in Senate v. Ermita adverted to in the Motion for
Reconsideration of respondent Committees, referring to the
non-existence of a "presumptive authorization" of an
executive official, to mean that the "presumption" in favor of
executive privilege "inclines heavily against executive
secrecy and in favor of disclosure" is to distort the ruling in
the Senate v. Ermita and make the same engage in self-

contradiction.
Senate v. Ermita22 expounds on the constitutional
underpinning of the relationship between the Executive
Department and the Legislative Department to explain why
there should be no implied authorization or presumptive
authorization to invoke executive privilege by the Presidents
subordinate officials, as follows:
When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only
way for department heads to exempt themselves
therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not
exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads.
Only one executive official may be exempted from this power
- the President on whom executive power is vested, hence,
beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of
impeachment. It is based on he being the highest official of
the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a coequal branch of governments which is sanctioned by a longstanding custom. (Underscoring supplied)
Thus, if what is involved is the presumptive privilege of
presidential communications when invoked by the President
on a matter clearly within the domain of the Executive, the
said presumption dictates that the same be recognized and
be given preference or priority, in the absence of proof of a
compelling or critical need for disclosure by the one assailing
such presumption. Any construction to the contrary will
render meaningless the presumption accorded by settled
jurisprudence in favor of executive privilege. In fact, Senate
v. Ermita reiterates jurisprudence citing "the considerations
justifying a presumptive privilege for Presidential
communications."23
II

There Are Factual and Legal Bases toHold that the

Communications Elicited by theThree (3) Questions Are
Covered by Executive Privilege
Respondent Committees claim that the communications
elicited by the three (3) questions are not covered by
executive privilege because the elements of the presidential
communications privilege are not present.
A. The power to enter into an executive agreement is a
"quintessential and non-delegable presidential power."
First, respondent Committees contend that the power to
secure a foreign loan does not relate to a "quintessential and
non-delegable presidential power," because the Constitution
does not vest it in the President alone, but also in the
Monetary Board which is required to give its prior
concurrence and to report to Congress.
This argument is unpersuasive.
The fact that a power is subject to the concurrence of
another entity does not make such power less executive.
"Quintessential" is defined as the most perfect embodiment
of something, the concentrated essence of substance.24 On
the other hand, "non-delegable" means that a power or duty
cannot be delegated to another or, even if delegated, the
responsibility remains with the obligor.25 The power to enter
into an executive agreement is in essence an executive
power. This authority of the President to enter into executive
agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has
traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. 26
Now, the fact that the President has to secure the prior
concurrence of the Monetary Board, which shall submit to
Congress a complete report of its decision before contracting

or guaranteeing foreign loans, does not diminish the

executive nature of the power.
The inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the
legislative, executive and judicial branches of government by
no means prescribes absolute autonomy in the discharge by
each branch of that part of the governmental power assigned
to it by the sovereign people. There is the corollary doctrine
of checks and balances, which has been carefully calibrated
by the Constitution to temper the official acts of each of
these three branches. Thus, by analogy, the fact that certain
legislative acts require action from the President for their
validity does not render such acts less legislative in nature. A
good example is the power to pass a law. Article VI, Section
27 of the Constitution mandates that every bill passed by
Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the
President who shall approve or veto the same. The fact that
the approval or vetoing of the bill is lodged with the President
does not render the power to pass law executive in nature.
This is because the power to pass law is generally a
quintessential and non-delegable power of the Legislature.
In the same vein, the executive power to enter or not to enter
into a contract to secure foreign loans does not become less
executive in nature because of conditions laid down in the
Constitution. The final decision in the exercise of the said
executive power is still lodged in the Office of the President.
B. The "doctrine of operational proximity" was laid
down precisely to limit the scope of the presidential
communications privilege but, in any case, it is not
conclusive.
Second, respondent Committees also seek reconsideration
of the application of the "doctrine of operational proximity" for
the reason that "it maybe misconstrued to expand the scope

of
the
presidential
communications
privilege
to
communications between those who are operationally
proximate to the President but who may have "no direct
communications with her."
It must be stressed that the doctrine of "operational
proximity" was laid down in In re: Sealed Case27precisely to
limit the scope of the presidential communications privilege.
The U.S. court was aware of the dangers that a limitless
extension of the privilege risks and, therefore, carefully
cabined its reach by explicitly confining it to White House
staff, and not to staffs of the agencies, and then only to
White House staff that has "operational proximity" to direct
presidential decision-making, thus:
We are aware that such an extension, unless carefully
circumscribed to accomplish the purposes of the privilege,
could pose a significant risk of expanding to a large swath of
the executive branch a privilege that is bottomed on a
recognition of the unique role of the President. In order to
limit this risk, the presidential communications privilege
should be construed as narrowly as is consistent with
ensuring that the confidentiality of the Presidents decisionmaking process is adequately protected. Not every person
who plays a role in the development of presidential
advice, no matter how remote and removed from the
President, can qualify for the privilege. In particular, the
privilege should not extend to staff outside the White
House in executive branch agencies. Instead, the
privilege should apply only to communications authored or
solicited and received by those members of an immediate
White House advisors staff who have broad and significant
responsibility for investigation and formulating the advice to
be given the President on the particular matter to which the
communications relate. Only communications at that level

are close enough to the President to be revelatory of his

deliberations or to pose a risk to the candor of his
advisers. See AAPS, 997 F.2d at 910 (it is "operational
proximity" to the President that matters in determining
whether "[t]he Presidents confidentiality interests" is
implicated). (Emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, the danger of expanding the privilege "to a
large swath of the executive branch" (a fear apparently
entertained by respondents) is absent because the official
involved here is a member of the Cabinet, thus, properly
within the term "advisor" of the President; in fact, her alter
ego and a member of her official family. Nevertheless, in
circumstances in which the official involved is far too remote,
this Court also mentioned in the Decision the organizational
test laid down in Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Department of
Justice.28 This goes to show that the operational proximity
test used in the Decision is not considered conclusive in
every case. In determining which test to use, the main
consideration is to limit the availability of executive privilege
only to officials who stand proximate to the President, not
only by reason of their function, but also by reason of their
positions in the Executives organizational structure. Thus,
respondent Committees fear that the scope of the privilege
would be unnecessarily expanded with the use of the
operational proximity test is unfounded.
C. The Presidents claim of executive privilege is not
merely based on a generalized interest; and in balancing
respondent Committees and the Presidents clashing
interests, the Court did not disregard the 1987
Constitutional provisions on government transparency,
accountability and disclosure of information.
Third, respondent Committees claim that the Court erred in

upholding the Presidents invocation, through the Executive

Secretary, of executive privilege because (a) between
respondent Committees specific and demonstrated need
and the Presidents generalized interest in confidentiality,
there is a need to strike the balance in favor of the former;
and (b) in the balancing of interest, the Court disregarded
the provisions of the 1987 Philippine Constitution on
government transparency, accountability and disclosure of
information, specifically, Article III, Section 7;29 Article II,
Sections 2430 and 28;31 Article XI, Section 1;32 Article XVI,
Section 10;33 Article VII, Section 20;34 and Article XII, Sections
9,35 21,36 and 22.37
It must be stressed that the Presidents claim of executive
privilege is not merely founded on her generalized interest in
confidentiality. The Letter dated November 15, 2007 of
Executive Secretary Ermita specified
presidential
communications privilege in relation to diplomatic and
economic relations with another sovereign nation as the
bases for the claim. Thus, the Letter stated:
The context in which executive privilege is being
invoked is that the information sought to be disclosed
might impair our diplomatic as well as economic
relations with the Peoples Republic of China. Given the
confidential nature in which this information were conveyed
to the President, he cannot provide the Committee any
further details of these conversations, without disclosing the
very thing the privilege is designed to protect. (emphasis
supplied)
Even in Senate v. Ermita, it was held that Congress must not
require the Executive to state the reasons for the claim with
such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information
which the privilege is meant to protect. This is a matter of

respect for a coordinate and co-equal department.

It is easy to discern the danger that goes with the disclosure
of the Presidents communication with her advisor. The NBN
Project involves a foreign country as a party to the
agreement. It was actually a product of the meeting of minds
between officials of the Philippines and China. Whatever the
President says about the agreement - particularly while
official negotiations are ongoing - are matters which China
will surely view with particular interest. There is danger in
such kind of exposure. It could adversely affect our
diplomatic as well as economic relations with the Peoples
Republic of China. We reiterate the importance of secrecy in
matters involving foreign negotiations as stated in United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 38 thus:
The nature of foreign negotiations requires caution, and their
success must often depend on secrecy, and even when
brought to a conclusion, a full disclosure of all the measures,
demands, or eventual concessions which may have been
proposed or contemplated would be extremely impolitic, for
this might have a pernicious influence on future negotiations
or produce immediate inconveniences, perhaps danger and
mischief, in relation to other powers. The necessity of such
caution and secrecy was one cogent reason for vesting the
power of making treaties in the President, with the advice
and consent of the Senate, the principle on which the body
was formed confining it to a small number of members. To
admit, then, a right in the House of Representatives to
demand and to have as a matter of course all the papers
respecting a negotiation with a foreign power would be to
establish a dangerous precedent.
US jurisprudence clearly guards against the dangers of
allowing Congress access to all papers relating to a

negotiation with a foreign power. In this jurisdiction, the

recent case of Akbayan Citizens Action Party, et al. v.
Thomas G. Aquino, et al.39 upheld the privileged character of
diplomatic negotiations. In Akbayan, the Court stated:
Privileged character of diplomatic negotiations
The privileged character of diplomatic negotiations has been
recognized in this jurisdiction. In discussing valid limitations
on the right to information, the Court in Chavez v. PCGG
held that "information on inter-government exchanges prior
to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements may
be subject to reasonable safeguards for the sake of national
interest." Even earlier, the same privilege was upheld in
Peoples Movement for Press Freedom (PMPF) v.
Manglapus wherein the Court discussed the reasons for the
privilege in more precise terms.
In PMPF v. Manglapus, the therein petitioners were seeking
information from the Presidents representatives on the state
of the then on-going negotiations of the RP-US Military
Bases Agreement. The Court denied the petition, stressing
that "secrecy of negotiations with foreign countries is
not violative of the constitutional provisions of freedom of
speech or of the press nor of the freedom of access to
information." The Resolution went on to state, thus:
The nature of diplomacy requires centralization of
authority and expedition of decision which are inherent
in executive action. Another essential characteristic of
diplomacy is its confidential nature. Although much has
been said about "open" and "secret" diplomacy, with
disparagement of the latter, Secretaries of State Hughes and
Stimson have clearly analyzed and justified the practice. In
the words of Mr. Stimson:

"A complicated negotiation cannot be carried through

without many, many private talks and discussion, man
to man; many tentative suggestions and proposals.
Delegates from other countries come and tell you in
confidence of their troubles at home and of their
differences with other countries and with other
delegates; they tell you of what they would do under
certain circumstances and would not do under other
circumstances If these reports should become
public who would ever trust American Delegations in
another conference? (United States Department of State,
Press Releases, June 7, 1930, pp. 282-284)
xxxx
There is frequent criticism of the secrecy in which
negotiation with foreign powers on nearly all subjects is
concerned. This, it is claimed, is incompatible with the
substance of democracy. As expressed by one writer, "It
can be said that there is no more rigid system of silence
anywhere in the world." (E.J. Young, Looking Behind the
Censorship, J. B. Lipincott Co., 1938) President Wilson in
starting his efforts for the conclusion of the World War
declared that we must have "open covenants, openly arrived
at." He quickly abandoned his thought.
No one who has studied the question believes that such a
method of publicity is possible. In the moment that
negotiations are started, pressure groups attempt to
"muscle in." An ill-timed speech by one of the parties or
a frank declaration of the concession which are exacted
or offered on both sides would quickly lead to a
widespread propaganda to block the negotiations. After
a treaty has been drafted and its terms are fully
published, there is ample opportunity for discussion

before it is approved. (The New American Government and

Its Works, James T. Young, 4th Edition, p. 194) (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
Still in PMPF v. Manglapus, the Court adopted the doctrine in
U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. that the President is the
sole organ of the nation in its negotiations with foreign
countries,viz:
"x x x In this vast external realm, with its important,
complicated, delicate and manifold problems, the President
alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of
the nation. He makes treaties with the advice and consent of
the Senate; but he alone negotiates. Into the field of
negotiation the Senate cannot intrude; and Congress itself is
powerless to invade it. As Marshall said in his great
arguments of March 7, 1800, in the House of
Representatives, "The President is the sole organ of the
nation in its external relations, and its sole
representative with foreign nations." Annals, 6th Cong.,
col. 613 (Emphasis supplied; underscoring in the original)
Considering that the information sought through the three (3)
questions subject of this Petition involves the Presidents
dealings with a foreign nation, with more reason, this Court
is wary of approving the view that Congress may
peremptorily inquire into not only official, documented acts of
the President but even her confidential and informal
discussions with her close advisors on the pretext that said
questions serve some vague legislative need. Regardless of
who is in office, this Court can easily foresee unwanted
consequences of subjecting a Chief Executive to
unrestricted congressional inquiries done with increased
frequency and great publicity. No Executive can effectively
discharge constitutional functions in the face of intense and

unchecked legislative incursion into the core of the

Presidents decision-making process, which inevitably would
involve her conversations with a member of her Cabinet.
With respect to respondent Committees invocation of
constitutional prescriptions regarding the right of the people
to information and public accountability and transparency,
the Court finds nothing in these arguments to support
respondent Committees case.
There is no debate as to the importance of the constitutional
right of the people to information and the constitutional
policies on public accountability and transparency. These are
the twin postulates vital to the effective functioning of a
democratic government. The citizenry can become prey to
the whims and caprices of those to whom the power has
been delegated if they are denied access to information. And
the policies on public accountability and democratic
government would certainly be mere empty words if access
to such information of public concern is denied.
In the case at bar, this Court, in upholding executive privilege
with respect to three (3) specific questions, did not in any
way curb the publics right to information or diminish the
importance of public accountability and transparency.
This Court did not rule that the Senate has no power to
investigate the NBN Project in aid of legislation. There is
nothing in the assailed Decision that prohibits respondent
Committees from inquiring into the NBN Project. They could
continue the investigation and even call petitioner Neri to
testify again. He himself has repeatedly expressed his
willingness to do so. Our Decision merely excludes from the
scope of respondents investigation the three (3) questions
that elicit answers covered by executive privilege and rules

that petitioner cannot be compelled to appear before

respondents to answer the said questions. We have
discussed the reasons why these answers are covered by
executive privilege. That there is a recognized public interest
in the confidentiality of such information is a recognized
principle in other democratic States. To put it simply, the right
to information is not an absolute right.
Indeed, the constitutional provisions cited by respondent
Committees do not espouse an absolute right to information.
By their wording, the intention of the Framers to subject such
right to the regulation of the law is unmistakable. The
highlighted portions of the following provisions show the
obvious limitations on the right to information, thus:
Article III, Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on
matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to
official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to
official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to
official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such
limitations as may be provided by law.
Article II, Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions
prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a
policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving
public interest. (Emphasis supplied)
In Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good
Government,40 it was stated that there are no specific laws
prescribing the exact limitations within which the right may
be exercised or the correlative state duty may be obliged.
Nonetheless, it enumerated the recognized restrictions to
such rights, among them: (1) national security matters, (2)

trade secrets and banking transactions, (3) criminal matters,

and (4) other confidential information. National security
matters include state secrets regarding military and
diplomatic matters, as well as information on intergovernment exchanges prior to the conclusion of treaties
and executive agreements. It was further held that even
where there is no need to protect such state secrets,
they must be "examined in strict confidence and given
scrupulous protection."
Incidentally, the right primarily involved here is the right of
respondent Committees to obtain information allegedly in aid
of legislation, not the peoples right to public information.
This is the reason why we stressed in the assailed Decision
the distinction between these two rights. As laid down in
Senate v. Ermita, "the demand of a citizen for the production
of documents pursuant to his right to information does not
have the same obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum
issued by Congress" and "neither does the right to
information grant a citizen the power to exact testimony from
government officials." As pointed out, these rights belong to
Congress, not to the individual citizen. It is worth mentioning
at this juncture that the parties here are respondent
Committees and petitioner Neri and that there was no prior
request for information on the part of any individual citizen.
This Court will not be swayed by attempts to blur the
distinctions between the Legislature's right to information in a
legitimate legislative inquiry and the public's right to
information.
For clarity, it must be emphasized that the assailed
Decision did not enjoin respondent Committees from
inquiring into the NBN Project. All that is expected from
them is to respect matters that are covered by executive
privilege.

III.
Respondent Committees Failed to Show Thatthe
Communications Elicited by the Three QuestionsAre
Critical to the Exercise of their Functions
In their Motion for Reconsideration, respondent Committees
devote an unusually lengthy discussion on the purported
legislative nature of their entire inquiry, as opposed to an
oversight inquiry.
At the outset, it must be clarified that the Decision did not
pass upon the nature of respondent Committees inquiry into
the NBN Project. To reiterate, this Court recognizes
respondent Committees power to investigate the NBN
Project in aid of legislation. However, this Court cannot
uphold the view that when a constitutionally guaranteed
privilege or right is validly invoked by a witness in the course
of a legislative investigation, the legislative purpose of
respondent Committees questions can be sufficiently
supported by the expedient of mentioning statutes and/or
pending bills to which their inquiry as a whole may have
relevance. The jurisprudential test laid down by this Court in
past decisions on executive privilege is that the presumption
of privilege can only be overturned by a showing of
compelling need for disclosure of the information covered
by executive privilege.
In the Decision, the majority held that "there is no adequate
showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation
of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information
elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority." In the
Motion for Reconsideration, respondent Committees argue
that the information elicited by the three (3) questions are
necessary in the discharge of their legislative functions,

among them, (a) to consider the three (3) pending Senate

Bills, and (b) to curb graft and corruption.
We remain unpersuaded by respondents assertions.
In U.S. v. Nixon, the U.S. Court held that executive privilege
is subject to balancing against other interests and it is
necessary to resolve the competing interests in a manner
that would preserve the essential functions of each branch.
There, the Court weighed between presidential privilege and
the legitimate claims of the judicial process. In giving more
weight to the latter, the Court ruled that the President's
generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the
demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending
criminal trial.
The Nixon Court ruled that an absolute and unqualified
privilege would stand in the way of the primary constitutional
duty of the Judicial Branch to do justice in criminal
prosecutions. The said Court further ratiocinated, through its
ruling extensively quoted in the Honorable Chief Justice
Puno's dissenting opinion, as follows:
"... this presumptive privilege must be considered in light of
our historic commitment to the rule of law. This is nowhere
more profoundly manifest than in our view that 'the twofold
aim (of criminal justice) is that guild shall not escape or
innocence suffer.' Berger v. United States, 295 U.S., at 88,
55 S.Ct., at 633. We have elected to employ an adversary
system of criminal justice in which the parties contest all
issues before a court of law. The need to develop all
relevant facts in the adversary system is both
fundamental and comprehensive. The ends of criminal
justice would be defeated if judgments were to be
founded on a partial or speculative presentation of the

facts. The very integrity of the judicial system and public

confidence in the system depend on full disclosure of all
the facts, within the framework of the rules of evidence.
To ensure that justice is done, it is imperative to the
function of courts that compulsory process be available
for the production of evidence needed either by the
prosecution or by the defense.
xxx xxx xxx
The right to the production of all evidence at a criminal trial
similarly has constitutional dimensions. The Sixth
Amendment explicitly confers upon every defendant in a
criminal trial the right 'to be confronted with the witness
against him' and 'to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor.' Moreover, the Fifth
Amendment also guarantees that no person shall be
deprived of liberty without due process of law. It is the
manifest duty of the courts to vindicate those
guarantees, and to accomplish that it is essential that all
relevant and admissible evidence be produced.
In this case we must weigh the importance of the general
privilege
of
confidentiality
of
Presidential
communications in performance of the President's
responsibilities against the inroads of such a privilege
on the fair administration of criminal justice. (emphasis
supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
...the allowance of the privilege to withhold evidence that is
demonstrably relevant in a criminal trial would cut
deeply into the guarantee of due process of law and
gravely impair the basic function of the courts. A

President's acknowledged need for confidentiality in the

communications of his office is general in nature, whereas
the constitutional need for production of relevant
evidence in a criminal proceeding is specific and central
to the fair adjudication of a particular criminal case in
the administration of justice. Without access to specific
facts a criminal prosecution may be totally frustrated. The
President's broad interest in confidentiality of
communication will not be vitiated by disclosure of a
limited number of conversations preliminarily shown to
have some bearing on the pending criminal cases.
We conclude that when the ground for asserting privilege as
to subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal trial is
based only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it
cannot prevail over the fundamental demands of due
process of law in the fair administration of criminal
justice. The generalized assertion of privilege must yield to
the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending
criminal trial. (emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, we are not confronted with a courts need
for facts in order to adjudge liability in a criminal case but
rather with the Senates need for information in relation to its
legislative functions. This leads us to consider once again
just how critical is the subject information in the discharge of
respondent Committees functions. The burden to show this
is on the respondent Committees, since they seek to intrude
into the sphere of competence of the President in order to
gather information which, according to said respondents,
would "aid" them in crafting legislation.
Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign
Activities v. Nixon41 expounded on the nature of a legislative
inquiry in aid of legislation in this wise:

The sufficiency of the Committee's showing of need has

come to depend, therefore, entirely on whether the
subpoenaed materials are critical to the performance of its
legislative functions. There is a clear difference between
Congress' legislative tasks and the responsibility of a grand
jury, or any institution engaged in like functions. While factfinding by a legislative committee is undeniably a part of
its task, legislative judgments normally depend more on
the predicted consequences of proposed legislative
actions and their political acceptability, than on precise
reconstruction of past events; Congress frequently
legislates on the basis of conflicting information provided in
its hearings. In contrast, the responsibility of the grand jury
turns entirely on its ability to determine whether there is
probable cause to believe that certain named individuals did
or did not commit specific crimes. If, for example, as in Nixon
v. Sirica, one of those crimes is perjury concerning the
content of certain conversations, the grand jury's need for
the most precise evidence, the exact text of oral statements
recorded in their original form, is undeniable. We see no
comparable need in the legislative process, at least not
in the circumstances of this case. Indeed, whatever force
there might once have been in the Committee's argument
that the subpoenaed materials are necessary to its
legislative judgments has been substantially undermined by
subsequent events. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the need for hard facts in crafting legislation cannot
be equated with the compelling or demonstratively critical
and specific need for facts which is so essential to the
judicial power to adjudicate actual controversies. Also, the
bare standard of "pertinency" set in Arnault cannot be lightly
applied to the instant case, which unlike Arnault involves a
conflict between two (2) separate, co-equal and coordinate
Branches of the Government.

Whatever test we may apply, the starting point in resolving

the conflicting claims between the Executive and the
Legislative Branches is the recognized existence of the
presumptive presidential communications privilege. This is
conceded even in the Dissenting Opinion of the Honorable
Chief Justice Puno, which states:
A hard look at Senate v. Ermita ought to yield the
conclusion that it bestowed a qualified presumption in favor
of the Presidential communications privilege. As shown in
the previous discussion, U.S. v. Nixon, as well as the other
related Nixon cases Sirica and Senate Select Committee
on Presidential Campaign Activities, et al., v. Nixon in the
D.C. Court of Appeals, as well as subsequent cases all
recognize that there is a presumptive privilege in favor of
Presidential communications. The Almonte case quoted
U.S. v. Nixon and recognized a presumption in favor of
confidentiality of Presidential communications.
The presumption in favor of Presidential communications
puts the burden on the respondent Senate Committees to
overturn the presumption by demonstrating their specific
need for the information to be elicited by the answers to the
three (3) questions subject of this case, to enable them to
craft legislation. Here, there is simply a generalized assertion
that the information is pertinent to the exercise of the power
to legislate and a broad and non-specific reference to
pending Senate bills. It is not clear what matters relating to
these bills could not be determined without the said
information sought by the three (3) questions. As correctly
pointed out by the Honorable Justice Dante O. Tinga in his
Separate Concurring Opinion:
If respondents are operating under the premise that
the president and/or her executive officials have

committed wrongdoings that need to be corrected or

prevented from recurring by remedial legislation, the
answer to those three questions will not necessarily
bolster or inhibit respondents from proceeding with
such legislation. They could easily presume the worst of
the president in enacting such legislation.
For sure, a factual basis for situations covered by bills is not
critically needed before legislatives bodies can come up with
relevant legislation unlike in the adjudication of cases by
courts of law. Interestingly, during the Oral Argument before
this Court, the counsel for respondent Committees impliedly
admitted that the Senate could still come up with legislations
even without petitioner answering the three (3) questions. In
other words, the information being elicited is not so critical
after all. Thus:
CHIEF JUSTICE PUNO
So can you tell the Court how critical are these questions to
the lawmaking function of the Senate. For instance, question
Number 1 whether the President followed up the NBN
project. According to the other counsel this question has
already been asked, is that correct?
ATTY. AGABIN
Well, the question has been asked but it was not answered,
Your Honor.
CHIEF JUSTICE PUNO
Yes. But my question is how critical is this to the lawmaking
function of the Senate?
ATTY. AGABIN

I believe it is critical, Your Honor.

CHIEF JUSTICE PUNO
Why?
ATTY. AGABIN
For instance, with respect to the proposed Bill of Senator
Miriam Santiago, she would like to indorse a Bill to include
Executive Agreements had been used as a device to the
circumventing the Procurement Law.
CHIEF JUSTICE PUNO
But the question is just following it up.
ATTY. AGABIN
I believe that may be the initial question, Your Honor,
because if we look at this problem in its factual setting as
counsel for petitioner has observed, there are intimations of
a bribery scandal involving high government officials.
CHIEF JUSTICE PUNO
Again, about the second question, were you dictated to
prioritize this ZTE, is that critical to the lawmaking function of
the Senate? Will it result to the failure of the Senate to
cobble a Bill without this question?
ATTY. AGABIN
I think it is critical to lay the factual foundations for a
proposed amendment to the Procurement Law, Your Honor,
because the petitioner had already testified that he was

offered a P200 Million bribe, so if he was offered a P200

Million bribe it is possible that other government officials who
had something to do with the approval of the contract would
be offered the same amount of bribes.
CHIEF JUSTICE PUNO
Again, that is speculative.
ATTY. AGABIN
That is why they want to continue with the investigation, Your
Honor.
CHIEF JUSTICE PUNO
How about the third question, whether the President said to
go ahead and approve the project after being told about the
alleged bribe. How critical is that to the lawmaking function
of the Senate? And the question is may they craft a Bill a
remedial law without forcing petitioner Neri to answer this
question?
ATTY. AGABIN
Well, they can craft it, Your Honor, based on mere
speculation. And sound legislation requires that a proposed
Bill should have some basis in fact.42
The failure of the counsel for respondent Committees to
pinpoint the specific need for the information sought or how
the withholding of the information sought will hinder the
accomplishment of their legislative purpose is very evident in
the above oral exchanges. Due to the failure of the
respondent Committees to successfully discharge this
burden, the presumption in favor of confidentiality of

presidential communication stands. The implication of the

said presumption, like any other, is to dispense with the
burden of proof as to whether the disclosure will significantly
impair the Presidents performance of her function. Needless
to state this is assumed, by virtue of the presumption.
Anent respondent Committees bewailing that they would
have to "speculate" regarding the questions covered by the
privilege, this does not evince a compelling need for the
information sought. Indeed, Senate Select Committee on
Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon43 held that while
fact-finding by a legislative committee is undeniably a part of
its task, legislative judgments normally depend more on the
predicted consequences of proposed legislative actions and
their political acceptability than on a precise reconstruction of
past events. It added that, normally, Congress legislates on
the basis of conflicting information provided in its hearings.
We cannot subscribe to the respondent Committees selfdefeating proposition that without the answers to the three
(3) questions objected to as privileged, the distinguished
members of the respondent Committees cannot intelligently
craft legislation.
Anent the function to curb graft and corruption, it must be
stressed that respondent Committees need for information
in the exercise of this function is not as compelling as in
instances when the purpose of the inquiry is legislative in
nature. This is because curbing graft and corruption is
merely an oversight function of Congress. 44 And if this is the
primary objective of respondent Committees in asking the
three (3) questions covered by privilege, it may even
contradict their claim that their purpose is legislative in
nature and not oversight. In any event, whether or not
investigating graft and corruption is a legislative or oversight
function of Congress, respondent Committees investigation

cannot transgress bounds set by the Constitution.

In Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,45 this
Court ruled:
The "allocation of constitutional boundaries" is a task
that this Court must perform under the Constitution.
Moreover, as held in a recent case, "the political question
doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to judicial
determination of the rival claims. The jurisdiction to delimit
constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court. It
cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by the 1987
Constitution, although said provision by no means does
away with the applicability of the principle in appropriate
cases.46 (Emphasis supplied)
There, the Court further ratiocinated that "the contemplated
inquiry by respondent Committee is not really in aid of
legislation because it is not related to a purpose within
the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the
investigation is to find out whether or not the relatives
of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated
Section 5 of R.A. No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, a matter that appears more within the
province of the courts rather than of the Legislature."47
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The general thrust and the tenor of the three (3) questions is
to trace the alleged bribery to the Office of the President. 48
While it may be a worthy endeavor to investigate the
potential culpability of high government officials, including
the President, in a given government transaction, it is simply
not a task for the Senate to perform. The role of the
Legislature is to make laws, not to determine anyones guilt
of a crime or wrongdoing. Our Constitution has not bestowed

upon the Legislature the latter role. Just as the Judiciary

cannot legislate, neither can the Legislature adjudicate or
prosecute.
Respondent Committees claim that they are conducting an
inquiry in aid of legislation and a "search for truth," which in
respondent Committees view appears to be equated with
the search for persons responsible for "anomalies" in
government contracts.
No matter how noble the intentions of respondent
Committees are, they cannot assume the power reposed
upon our prosecutorial bodies and courts. The determination
of who is/are liable for a crime or illegal activity, the
investigation of the role played by each official, the
determination of who should be haled to court for
prosecution and the task of coming up with conclusions and
finding of facts regarding anomalies, especially the
determination of criminal guilt, are not functions of the
Senate. Congress is neither a law enforcement nor a trial
agency. Moreover, it bears stressing that no inquiry is an end
in itself; it must be related to, and in furtherance of, a
legitimate task of the Congress, i.e. legislation.
Investigations conducted solely to gather incriminatory
evidence and "punish" those investigated are indefensible.
There is no Congressional power to expose for the sake of
exposure.49 In this regard, the pronouncement in Barenblatt
v. United States50 is instructive, thus:
Broad as it is, the power is not, however, without
limitations. Since Congress may only investigate into the
areas in which it may potentially legislate or appropriate, it
cannot inquire into matters which are within the exclusive
province of one of the other branches of the government.
Lacking the judicial power given to the Judiciary, it cannot

inquire into matters that are exclusively the concern of the

Judiciary. Neither can it supplant the Executive in what
exclusively belongs to the Executive. (Emphasis supplied.)
At this juncture, it is important to stress that complaints
relating to the NBN Project have already been filed against
President Arroyo and other personalities before the Office of
the Ombudsman. Under our Constitution, it is the
Ombudsman who has the duty "to investigate any act or
omission of any public official, employee, office or
agency when such act or omission appears to be illegal,
unjust, improper, or inefficient."51 The Office of the
Ombudsman is the body properly equipped by the
Constitution and our laws to preliminarily determine whether
or not the allegations of anomaly are true and who are liable
therefor. The same holds true for our courts upon which the
Constitution reposes the duty to determine criminal guilt with
finality. Indeed, the rules of procedure in the Office of the
Ombudsman and the courts are well-defined and ensure
that the constitutionally guaranteed rights of all
persons, parties and witnesses alike, are protected and
safeguarded.
Should respondent Committees uncover information related
to a possible crime in the course of their investigation, they
have the constitutional duty to refer the matter to the
appropriate agency or branch of government. Thus, the
Legislatures need for information in an investigation of graft
and corruption cannot be deemed compelling enough to
pierce the confidentiality of information validly covered by
executive privilege. As discussed above, the Legislature can
still legislate on graft and corruption even without the
information covered by the three (3) questions subject of the
petition.

Corollarily, respondent Committees justify their rejection of

petitioners claim of executive privilege on the ground that
there is no privilege when the information sought might
involve a crime or illegal activity, despite the absence of an
administrative or judicial determination to that effect.
Significantly, however, in Nixon v. Sirica,52 the showing
required
to
overcome
the
presumption
favoring
confidentiality turned, not on the nature of the presidential
conduct that the subpoenaed material might reveal, but,
instead, on the nature and appropriateness of the
function in the performance of which the material was
sought, and the degree to which the material was
necessary to its fulfillment.
Respondent Committees assert that Senate Select
Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon
does not apply to the case at bar because, unlike in the said
case, no impeachment proceeding has been initiated at
present. The Court is not persuaded. While it is true that no
impeachment proceeding has been initiated, however,
complaints relating to the NBN Project have already been
filed against President Arroyo and other personalities before
the Office of the Ombudsman. As the Court has said earlier,
the prosecutorial and judicial arms of government are the
bodies equipped and mandated by the Constitution and our
laws to determine whether or not the allegations of anomaly
in the NBN Project are true and, if so, who should be
prosecuted and penalized for criminal conduct.
Legislative inquiries, unlike court proceedings, are not
subject to the exacting standards of evidence essential to
arrive at accurate factual findings to which to apply the law.
Hence, Section 10 of the Senate Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation provides that
"technical rules of evidence applicable to judicial

proceedings which do not affect substantive rights need not

be observed by the Committee." Court rules which prohibit
leading, hypothetical, or repetitive questions or questions
calling for a hearsay answer, to name a few, do not apply to
a legislative inquiry. Every person, from the highest public
official to the most ordinary citizen, has the right to be
presumed innocent until proven guilty in proper proceedings
by a competent court or body.
IV
Respondent Committees Committed GraveAbuse of
Discretion in Issuing the Contempt Order
Respondent Committees insist that they did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt order
because (1) there is no legitimate claim of executive
privilege; (2) they did not violate the requirements laid down
in Senate v. Ermita; (3) they issued the contempt order in
accordance with their internal Rules; (4) they did not violate
the requirement under Article VI, Section 21 of the
Constitution requiring the publication of their Rules; and (5)
their issuance of the contempt order is not arbitrary or
precipitate.
We reaffirm our earlier ruling.
The legitimacy of the claim of executive privilege having
been fully discussed in the preceding pages, we see no
reason to discuss it once again.
Respondent Committees second argument rests on the view
that the ruling in Senate v. Ermita, requiring invitations or
subpoenas to contain the "possible needed statute which
prompted the need for the inquiry" along with the "usual
indication of the subject of inquiry and the questions relative

to and in furtherance thereof" is not provided for by the

Constitution and is merely an obiter dictum.
On the contrary, the Court sees the rationale and necessity
of compliance with these requirements.
An unconstrained congressional investigative power, like an
unchecked Executive, generates its own abuses.
Consequently, claims that the investigative power of
Congress has been abused (or has the potential for abuse)
have been raised many times.53 Constant exposure to
congressional subpoena takes its toll on the ability of the
Executive to function effectively. The requirements set forth
in Senate v. Ermita are modest mechanisms that would not
unduly limit Congress power. The legislative inquiry must be
confined to permissible areas and thus, prevent the "roving
commissions" referred to in the U.S. case, Kilbourn v.
Thompson.54 Likewise, witnesses have their constitutional
right to due process. They should be adequately informed
what matters are to be covered by the inquiry. It will also
allow them to prepare the pertinent information and
documents. To our mind, these requirements concede too
little political costs or burdens on the part of Congress when
viewed vis--vis the immensity of its power of inquiry. The
logic of these requirements is well articulated in the study
conducted by William P. Marshall,55 to wit:
A second concern that might be addressed is that the current
system allows committees to continually investigate the
Executive without constraint. One process solution
addressing this concern is to require each investigation
be tied to a clearly stated purpose. At present, the charters
of some congressional committees are so broad that virtually
any matter involving the Executive can be construed to fall
within their province. Accordingly, investigations can proceed

without articulation of specific need or purpose. A

requirement for a more precise charge in order to begin an
inquiry should immediately work to limit the initial scope of
the investigation and should also serve to contain the
investigation once it is instituted. Additionally, to the extent
clear statements of rules cause legislatures to pause
and seriously consider the constitutional implications of
proposed courses of action in other areas, they would
serve that goal in the context of congressional
investigations as well.
The key to this reform is in its details. A system that
allows a standing committee to simply articulate its
reasons to investigate pro forma does no more than
imposes minimal drafting burdens. Rather, the system
must be designed in a manner that imposes actual
burdens on the committee to articulate its need for
investigation and allows for meaningful debate about
the merits of proceeding with the investigation.
(Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, petitioners request to be furnished an advance copy
of questions is a reasonable demand that should have been
granted by respondent Committees.
Unfortunately, the Subpoena Ad Testificandum dated
November 13, 2007 made no specific reference to any
pending Senate bill. It did not also inform petitioner of the
questions to be asked. As it were, the subpoena merely
commanded him to "testify on what he knows relative to the
subject matter under inquiry."
Anent the third argument, respondent Committees contend
that their Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation (the "Rules") are beyond the reach of this Court.

While it is true that this Court must refrain from reviewing the
internal processes of Congress, as a co-equal branch of
government, however, when a constitutional requirement
exists, the Court has the duty to look into Congress
compliance therewith. We cannot turn a blind eye to possible
violations of the Constitution simply out of courtesy. In this
regard, the pronouncement in Arroyo v. De Venecia56 is
enlightening, thus:
"Cases both here and abroad, in varying forms of
expression, all deny to the courts the power to inquire into
allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress
failed to comply with its own rules, in the absence of showing
that there was a violation of a constitutional provision or the
rights of private individuals.
United States v. Ballin, Joseph & Co., the rule was stated
thus: The Constitution empowers each House to determine
its rules of proceedings. It may not by its rules ignore
constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights,
and there should be a reasonable relation between the
mode or method of proceeding established by the rule
and the result which is sought to be attained."
In the present case, the Courts exercise of its power of
judicial review is warranted because there appears to be a
clear abuse of the power of contempt on the part of
respondent Committees. Section 18 of the Rules provides
that:
"The Committee, by a vote of majority of all its members,
may punish for contempt any witness before it who disobey
any order of the Committee or refuses to be sworn or to
testify or to answer proper questions by the Committee or
any of its members." (Emphasis supplied)

In the assailed Decision, we said that there is a cloud of

doubt as to the validity of the contempt order because during
the deliberation of the three (3) respondent Committees, only
seven (7) Senators were present. This number could hardly
fulfill the majority requirement needed by respondent
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations which has a membership of seventeen (17)
Senators and respondent Committee on National Defense
and Security which has a membership of eighteen (18)
Senators. With respect to respondent Committee on Trade
and Commerce which has a membership of nine (9)
Senators, only three (3) members were present.57 These
facts prompted us to quote in the Decision the exchanges
between Senators Alan Peter Cayetano and Aquilino
Pimentel, Jr. whereby the former raised the issue of lack of
the required majority to deliberate and vote on the contempt
order.
When asked about such voting during the March 4, 2008
hearing before this Court, Senator Francis Pangilinan stated
that any defect in the committee voting had been cured
because two-thirds of the Senators effectively signed for the
Senate in plenary session.58
Obviously the deliberation of the respondent Committees
that led to the issuance of the contempt order is flawed.
Instead of being submitted to a full debate by all the
members of the respondent Committees, the contempt order
was prepared and thereafter presented to the other
members for signing. As a result, the contempt order which
was issued on January 30, 2008 was not a faithful
representation of the proceedings that took place on said
date. Records clearly show that not all of those who signed
the contempt order were present during the January 30,
2008 deliberation when the matter was taken up.

Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution states that:

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its
respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. The rights of person appearing in or affected
by such inquiries shall be respected. (Emphasis supplied)
All the limitations embodied in the foregoing provision form
part of the witness settled expectation. If the limitations are
not observed, the witness settled expectation is shattered.
Here, how could there be a majority vote when the members
in attendance are not enough to arrive at such majority?
Petitioner has the right to expect that he can be cited in
contempt only through a majority vote in a proceeding in
which the matter has been fully deliberated upon. There is a
greater measure of protection for the witness when the
concerns and objections of the members are fully articulated
in such proceeding. We do not believe that respondent
Committees have the discretion to set aside their rules
anytime they wish. This is especially true here where what is
involved is the contempt power. It must be stressed that the
Rules are not promulgated for their benefit. More than
anybody else, it is the witness who has the highest stake in
the proper observance of the Rules.
Having touched the subject of the Rules, we now proceed to
respondent Committees fourth argument. Respondent
Committees argue that the Senate does not have to publish
its Rules because the same was published in 1995 and in
2006. Further, they claim that the Senate is a continuing
body; thus, it is not required to republish the Rules, unless
the same is repealed or amended.
On the nature of the Senate as a "continuing body," this

Court sees fit to issue a clarification. Certainly, there is no

debate that the Senate as an institution is "continuing", as it
is not dissolved as an entity with each national election or
change in the composition of its members. However, in the
conduct of its day-to-day business the Senate of each
Congress acts separately and independently of the Senate
of the Congress before it. The Rules of the Senate itself
confirms this when it states:
RULE XLIVUNFINISHED BUSINESS
SEC. 123. Unfinished business at the end of the session
shall be taken up at the next session in the same status.
All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate
upon the expiration of one (1) Congress, but may be
taken by the succeeding Congress as if present for the first
time. (emphasis supplied)
Undeniably from the foregoing, all pending matters and
proceedings, i.e. unpassed bills and even legislative
investigations, of the Senate of a particular Congress are
considered terminated upon the expiration of that Congress
and it is merely optional on the Senate of the succeeding
Congress to take up such unfinished matters, not in the
same status, but as if presented for the first time. The
logic and practicality of such a rule is readily apparent
considering that the Senate of the succeeding Congress
(which will typically have a different composition as that of
the previous Congress) should not be bound by the acts and
deliberations of the Senate of which they had no part. If the
Senate is a continuing body even with respect to the conduct
of its business, then pending matters will not be deemed
terminated with the expiration of one Congress but will, as a
matter of course, continue into the next Congress with the

same status.
This dichotomy of the continuity of the Senate as an
institution and of the opposite nature of the conduct of its
business is reflected in its Rules. The Rules of the Senate
(i.e. the Senates main rules of procedure) states:
RULE LIAMENDMENTS TO, OR REVISIONS OF, THE
RULES
SEC. 136. At the start of each session in which the Senators
elected in the preceding elections shall begin their term of
office, the President may endorse the Rules to the
appropriate committee for amendment or revision.
The Rules may also be amended by means of a motion
which should be presented at least one day before its
consideration, and the vote of the majority of the Senators
present in the session shall be required for its approval.
(emphasis supplied)
RULE LIIDATE OF TAKING EFFECT
SEC. 137. These Rules shall take effect on the date of their
adoption and shall remain in force until they are amended or
repealed. (emphasis supplied)
Section 136 of the Senate Rules quoted above takes into
account the new composition of the Senate after an election
and the possibility of the amendment or revision of the Rules
at the start of each session in which the newly elected
Senators shall begin their term.
However, it is evident that the Senate has determined that its
main rules are intended to be valid from the date of their
adoption until they are amended or repealed. Such language

is conspicuously absent from the Rules. The Rules simply

state "(t)hese Rules shall take effect seven (7) days after
publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation." 59
The latter does not explicitly provide for the continued
effectivity of such rules until they are amended or repealed.
In view of the difference in the language of the two sets of
Senate rules, it cannot be presumed that the Rules (on
legislative inquiries) would continue into the next Congress.
The Senate of the next Congress may easily adopt different
rules for its legislative inquiries which come within the rule on
unfinished business.
The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution
requiring that the inquiry be conducted in accordance with
the duly published rules of procedure is categorical. It is
incumbent upon the Senate to publish the rules for its
legislative inquiries in each Congress or otherwise make the
published rules clearly state that the same shall be effective
in subsequent Congresses or until they are amended or
repealed to sufficiently put public on notice.
If it was the intention of the Senate for its present rules on
legislative inquiries to be effective even in the next
Congress, it could have easily adopted the same language it
had used in its main rules regarding effectivity.
Lest the Court be misconstrued, it should likewise be
stressed that not all orders issued or proceedings conducted
pursuant to the subject Rules are null and void. Only those
that result in violation of the rights of witnesses should be
considered null and void, considering that the rationale for
the publication is to protect the rights of witnesses as
expressed in Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. Sans
such violation, orders and proceedings are considered valid
and effective.

Respondent Committees last argument is that their issuance

of the contempt order is not precipitate or arbitrary. Taking
into account the totality of circumstances, we find no merit in
their argument.
As we have stressed before, petitioner is not an unwilling
witness, and contrary to the assertion of respondent
Committees, petitioner did not assume that they no longer
had any other questions for him. He repeatedly manifested
his willingness to attend subsequent hearings and respond
to new matters. His only request was that he be furnished a
copy of the new questions in advance to enable him to
adequately prepare as a resource person. He did not attend
the November 20, 2007 hearing because Executive
Secretary Ermita requested respondent Committees to
dispense with his testimony on the ground of executive
privilege. Note that petitioner is an executive official under
the direct control and supervision of the Chief Executive.
Why punish petitioner for contempt when he was merely
directed by his superior? Besides, save for the three (3)
questions, he was very cooperative during the September
26, 2007 hearing.
On the part of respondent Committees, this Court observes
their haste and impatience. Instead of ruling on Executive
Secretary Ermitas claim of executive privilege, they curtly
dismissed it as unsatisfactory and ordered the arrest of
petitioner. They could have informed petitioner of their ruling
and given him time to decide whether to accede or file a
motion for reconsideration. After all, he is not just an ordinary
witness; he is a high- ranking official in a co-equal branch of
government. He is an alter ego of the President. The same
haste and impatience marked the issuance of the contempt
order, despite the absence of the majority of the members of
the respondent Committees, and their subsequent disregard

of petitioners motion for reconsideration alleging the

pendency of his petition for certiorari before this Court.
On a concluding note, we are not unmindful of the fact that
the Executive and the Legislature are political branches of
government. In a free and democratic society, the interests
of these branches inevitably clash, but each must treat the
other with official courtesy and respect. This Court
wholeheartedly concurs with the proposition that it is
imperative for the continued health of our democratic
institutions that we preserve the constitutionally mandated
checks and balances among the different branches of
government.
In the present case, it is respondent Committees contention
that their determination on the validity of executive privilege
should be binding on the Executive and the Courts. It is their
assertion that their internal procedures and deliberations
cannot be inquired into by this Court supposedly in
accordance with the principle of respect between co-equal
branches of government. Interestingly, it is a courtesy that
they appear to be unwilling to extend to the Executive (on
the matter of executive privilege) or this Court (on the matter
of judicial review). It moves this Court to wonder: In
respondent Committees paradigm of checks and balances,
what are the checks to the Legislatures all-encompassing,
awesome power of investigation? It is a power, like any
other, that is susceptible to grave abuse.
While this Court finds laudable the respondent Committees
well-intentioned efforts to ferret out corruption, even in the
highest echelons of government, such lofty intentions do not
validate or accord to Congress powers denied to it by the
Constitution and granted instead to the other branches of
government.

There is no question that any story of government

malfeasance deserves an inquiry into its veracity. As
respondent Committees contend, this is founded on the
constitutional command of transparency and public
accountability. The recent clamor for a "search for truth" by
the general public, the religious community and the academe
is an indication of a concerned citizenry, a nation that
demands an accounting of an entrusted power. However, the
best venue for this noble undertaking is not in the political
branches of government. The customary partisanship and
the absence of generally accepted rules on evidence are too
great an obstacle in arriving at the truth or achieving justice
that meets the test of the constitutional guarantee of due
process of law. We believe the people deserve a more
exacting "search for truth" than the process here in question,
if that is its objective.
WHEREFORE, respondent Committees Motion
Reconsideration dated April 8, 2008 is hereby DENIED.

for

SO ORDERED.
Puno, C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, AustriaMartinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, ChicoNazario, Velasco, Jr., Nachura, Reyes, Brion, JJ., concur.
Dissenting Opinion - C.J. PunoSeparate Opinion on the
Motion for Reconsideration - J. QuisumbingSeparate
Dissenting Opinion - J. AzcunaSeparate Opinion - J.
Reyes
Footnotes

EN BANC

REGHIS M. ROMERO II, G.R. No. 174105

EDMOND Q. SESE,
LEOPOLDO T. SANCHEZ, Present:
REGHIS M. ROMERO III,
MICHAEL L. ROMERO, PUNO, C.J.,
NATHANIEL L. ROMERO, QUISUMBING,
and JEROME R. CANLAS, YNARES-SANTIAGO,
Petitioners, CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
- versus - TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
SENATOR JINGGOY E. ESTRADA BRION, and
and SENATE COMMITTEE ON PERALTA, JJ.
LABOR, EMPLOYMENT
AND HUMAN RESOURCES Promulgated:
DEVELOPMENT,
Respondents. April 2, 2009
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

At issue once again is Section 21, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution which provides:
The Senate or the House of Representatives
or any of its respective committees may conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its
duly published rules of procedure. The rights of
persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries
shall be respected.

The Case
This is a petition for prohibition with application
for temporary restraining order (TRO) and preliminary
injunction under Rule 65, assailing the constitutionality
of the invitations and other compulsory processes issued
by the Senate Committee on Labor, Employment, and
Human Resources Development (Committee) in
connection with its investigation on the investment of
Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA)
funds in the Smokey Mountain project.
The Facts
On August 15, 2006, petitioner Reghis Romero II, as

owner of R-II Builders, Inc., received from the

Committee an invitation,[1] signed by the Legislative
Committee Secretary, which pertinently reads as
follows:
Dear Mr. Romero:
Pursuant to P.S. Resolution No. 537, entitled:
RESOLUTION
DIRECTING
THE
LABOR
COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE, IN AID OF
LEGISLATION, THE LIABILITY FOR PLUNDER
OF THE FORMER PRESIDENT RAMOS AND
OTHERS, FOR THE ILLEGAL INVESTMENT OF
OWWA FUNDS IN THE SMOKEY MOUNTAIN
PROJECT, CAUSING A LOSS TO OWWA OF
P550.86 MILLION and P.S. Resolution No. 543,
entitled: RESOLUTION DIRECTING THE
COMMITTEE ON LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT,
IN ITS ONGOING INQUIRY IN AID OF
LEGISLATION, ON THE ALLEGED OWWA LOSS
OF P480 MILLION TO FOCUS ON THE
CULPABILITY OF THEN PRESIDENT FIDEL
RAMOS, THEN OWWA ADMINISTRATOR
WILHELM SORIANO, AND R-II BUILDERS
OWNER REGHIS ROMERO II, x x x the
Committee on Labor, Employment and Human
Resources Development chaired by Sen. Jinggoy
Ejercito Estrada will conduct a public hearing at
1:00 p.m. on the 23rd day of August 2006 at the Sen.
G.T. Pecson Room, 2nd floor, Senate of the
Philippines, Pasay City.
The inquiry/investigation is specifically intended to
aid the Senate in the review and possible

amendments to the pertinent provisions of R.A.

8042, the Migrant Workers Act and to craft a
much needed legislation relative to the stated
subject matter and purpose of the aforementioned
Resolutions.
By virtue of the power vested in Congress by
Section 21, Article VI of 1987 Constitution
regarding inquiries in aid of legislation, may we
have the privilege of inviting you to the said hearing
to shed light on any matter, within your knowledge
and competence, covered by the subject matter and
purpose of the inquiry. Rest assured that your rights,
when properly invoked and not unfounded, will be
duly respected. (Emphasis in the original.)

In his letter-reply[2] dated August 18, 2006, petitioner

Romero II requested to be excused from appearing and
testifying before the Committee at its scheduled
hearings of the subject matter and purpose of Philippine
Senate (PS) Resolution Nos. 537 and 543. He predicated
his request on grounds he would later substantially
reiterate in this petition for prohibition.
On August 28, 2006, the Committee sent
petitioner Romero II a letter informing him that his
request, being unmeritorious, was denied.[3] On the
same date, invitations were sent to each of the other six
petitioners, then members of the Board of Directors of
R-II Builders, Inc., requesting them to attend the
September 4, 2006 Committee hearing. The following

day, Senator Jinggoy Estrada, as Chairperson of the

Committee, caused the service of a subpoena ad
testificandum[4] on petitioner Romero II directing him
to appear and testify before the Committee at its hearing
on September 4, 2006 relative to the aforesaid Senate
resolutions. The Committer later issued separate
subpoenas[5] to other petitioners, albeit for a different
hearing date.
On August 30, 2006, petitioners filed the instant
petition, docketed as G.R. No. 174105, seeking to bar
the Committee from continuing with its inquiry and to
enjoin it from compelling petitioners to appear before it
pursuant to the invitations thus issued.
Failing to secure the desired TRO sought in the petition,
petitioner Romero II appeared at the September 4, 2006
Committee investigation.
Two days after, petitioner Romero II filed a
Manifestation with Urgent Plea for a TRO[6] alleging,
among others, that: (1) he answered questions
concerning the investments of OWWA funds in the
Smokey Mountain project and how much of OWWAs
original investment had already been paid; (2) when
Senator Estrada called on Atty. Francisco I. Chavez, as
resource person, the latter spoke of the facts and issues
he raised with the Court in Chavez v. National Housing
Authority,[7] none of which were related to the subject

of the inquiry; and (3) when Senator Estrada adjourned

the investigation, he asked petitioners Romero II and
Canlas to return at the resumption of the investigation.
The manifestation was followed by the filing on
September 19, 2006 of another urgent motion for a TRO
in which petitioners imputed to the Committee the
intention to harass them as, except for petitioner
Romero II, none of them had even been mentioned in
relation to the subject of the investigation.
Meanwhile, respondents, in compliance with our
September 5, 2006 Resolution that ordered them to
submit a comment on the original plea for a TRO,
interposed an opposition,[8] observing that the Senates
motives in calling for an investigation in aid of
legislation were a political question. They also averred
that the pendency of Chavez is not sufficient ground to
divest the respondents of their jurisdiction to conduct an
inquiry into the matters alleged in the petition.
In this petition, petitioners in gist claim that: (1)
the subject matter of the investigation is sub judice
owing to the pendency of the Chavez petition; (2) since
the investigation has been intended to ascertain
petitioners criminal liability for plunder, it is not in aid
of legislation; (3) the inquiry compelled them to appear
and testify in violation of their rights against selfincrimination; and (4) unless the Court immediately

issues a TRO, some or all of petitioners would be in

danger of being arrested, detained, and forced to give
testimony against their will, before the Court could
resolve the issues raised in G.R. No. 164527.
In their Comment dated October 17, 2006,[9]
respondents made a distinction between the issues raised
in Chavez and the subject matter of the Senate
resolutions, nixing the notion of sub judice that
petitioners raised at every possible turn. Respondents
averred that the subject matter of the investigation
focused on the alleged dissipation of OWWA funds and
the purpose of the probe was to aid the Senate determine
the propriety of amending Republic Act No. 8042 or
The Migrant Workers Act of 1995 and enacting laws to
protect OWWA funds in the future. They likewise raised
the following main arguments: (1) the proposed
resolutions were a proper subject of legislative inquiry;
and (2) petitioners right against self-incrimination was
well-protected and could be invoked when incriminating
questions were propounded.
On December 28, 2006, petitioners filed their
Reply[10] reiterating the arguments stated in their
petition, first and foremost of which is: Whether or not
the subject matter of the Committees inquiry is sub
judice.
The Courts Ruling

The Court resolves to dismiss the instant petition.

The Subject Matter of the Senate Inquiry Is no
Longer Sub Judice
Petitioners contend that the subject matter of the
legislative inquiry is sub judice in view of the Chavez
petition.
The sub judice rule restricts comments and
disclosures pertaining to judicial proceedings to avoid
prejudging the issue, influencing the court, or
obstructing the administration of justice. A violation of
the sub judice rule may render one liable for indirect
contempt under Sec. 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.
[11] The rationale for the rule adverted to is set out in
Nestle Philippines v. Sanchez:
[I]t is a traditional conviction of civilized society
everywhere that courts and juries, in the decision of
issues of fact and law should be immune from every
extraneous influence; that facts should be decided
upon evidence produced in court; and that the
determination of such facts should be uninfluenced
by bias, prejudice or sympathies.[12]

Chavez, assuming for argument that it involves issues

subject of the respondent Committees assailed

investigation, is no longer sub judice or before a court or

judge for consideration.[13] For by an en banc
Resolution dated July 1, 2008, the Court, in G.R. No.
164527, denied with finality the motion of Chavez, as
the petitioner in Chavez, for reconsideration of the
Decision of the Court dated August 15, 2007. In fine, it
will not avail petitioners any to invoke the sub judice
effect of Chavez and resist, on that ground, the assailed
congressional invitations and subpoenas. The sub judice
issue has been rendered moot and academic by the
supervening issuance of the en banc Resolution of July
1, 2008 in G.R. No. 164527. An issue or a case becomes
moot and academic when it ceases to present a
justiciable controversy, so that a determination of the
issue would be without practical use and value. In such
cases, there is no actual substantial relief to which the
petitioner would be entitled and which would be negated
by the dismissal of the petition.[14] Courts decline
jurisdiction over such cases or dismiss them on the
ground of mootness, save in certain exceptional
instances,[15] none of which, however, obtains under
the premises.
Thus, there is no more legal obstacleon the ground of
sub judice, assuming it is invocableto the continuation
of the Committees investigation challenged in this
proceeding.
At any rate, even assuming hypothetically that

Chavez is still pending final adjudication by the Court,

still, such circumstance would not bar the continuance
of the committee investigation. What we said in Sabio v.
Gordon suggests as much:
The same directors and officers contend that
the Senate is barred from inquiring into the same
issues being litigated before the Court of Appeals and
the Sandiganbayan. Suffice it to state that the Senate
Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation provide that the filing or pendency of any
prosecution or administrative action should not stop
or abate any inquiry to carry out a legislative purpose.
[16]

A legislative investigation in aid of legislation and

court proceedings has different purposes. On one hand,
courts conduct hearings or like adjudicative procedures
to settle, through the application of a law, actual
controversies arising between adverse litigants and
involving demandable rights. On the other hand,
inquiries in aid of legislation are, inter alia, undertaken
as tools to enable the legislative body to gather
information and, thus, legislate wisely and effectively;
[17] and to determine whether there is a need to improve
existing laws or enact new or remedial legislation,[18]
albeit the inquiry need not result in any potential
legislation. On-going judicial proceedings do not
preclude congressional hearings in aid of legislation.
Standard Chartered Bank (Philippine Branch) v. Senate

Committee on Banks, Financial Institutions and

Currencies (Standard Chartered Bank) provides the
following reason:
[T]he mere filing of a criminal or an
administrative complaint before a court or quasijudicial body should not automatically bar the
conduct of legislative investigation. Otherwise, it
would be extremely easy to subvert any intended
inquiry by Congress through the convenient ploy of
instituting a criminal or an administrative
complaint. Surely, the exercise of sovereign
legislative authority, of which the power of
legislative inquiry is an essential component, cannot
be made subordinate to a criminal or administrative
investigation.
As succinctly stated in x x x Arnault v.
Nazareno
[T]he power of inquirywith process to
enforce itis an essential and appropriate
auxiliary to the legislative function. A
legislative body cannot legislate wisely or
effectively in the absence of information
respecting the conditions which the
legislation is intended to affect or change;
and where the legislative body does not
itself possess the requisite informationwhich
is not infrequently truerecourse must be had
to others who possess it.[19]

While Sabio and Standard Chartered Bank advert

only to pending criminal and administrative cases before

lower courts as not posing a bar to the continuation of a
legislative inquiry, there is no rhyme or reason that these
cases doctrinal pronouncement and their rationale
cannot be extended to appealed cases and special civil
actions awaiting final disposition before this Court.
The foregoing consideration is not all. The denial
of the instant recourse is still indicated for another
compelling reason. As may be noted, PS Resolution
Nos. 537 and 543 were passed in 2006 and the letterinvitations and subpoenas directing the petitioners to
appear and testify in connection with the twin
resolutions were sent out in the month of August 2006
or in the past Congress. On the postulate that the Senate
of each Congress acts separately and independently of
the Senate before and after it, the aforesaid invitations
and subpoenas are considered functos oficio and the
related legislative inquiry conducted is, for all intents
and purposes, terminated. In this regard, the Court
draws attention to its pronouncements embodied in its
Resolution of September 4, 2008 in G.R. No. 180643
entitled Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of
Public Officers and Investigations:
Certainly, x x x the Senate as an institution
is continuing, as it is not dissolved as an entity with
each national election or change in the composition
of its members. However, in the conduct of its dayto-day business, the Senate of each Congress acts

separately and independently of the Senate before it.

The Rules of the Senate itself confirms this when it
states:

xxxx
SEC. 123. Unfinished business at the end of
the session shall be taken up at the next
session in the same status.
All pending matters and proceedings shall
terminate upon the expiration of one (1)
Congress, but may be taken by the
succeeding Congress as if present[ed] for the
first time.
Undeniably from the foregoing, all pending
matters and proceedings, i.e., unpassed bills and
even legislative investigations, of the Senate of a
particular Congress are considered terminated
upon the expiration of that Congress and it is
merely optional on the Senate of the succeeding
Congress to take up such unfinished matters, not
in the same status, but as if presented for the first
time. The logic and practicality of such rule is
readily apparent considering that the Senate of the
succeeding Congress (which will typically have a
different composition as that of the previous
Congress) should not be bound by the acts and
deliberations of the Senate of which they had no
part. x x x (Emphasis added.)

Following the lessons of Neri, as reiterated in

Garcillano v. The House of Representatives Committees

on Public Information, Public Order and Safety, et al.,

[20] it can very well be stated that the termination of the
assailed investigations has veritably mooted the instant
petition. This disposition becomes all the more
impeccable, considering that the Senate of the present
Congress has not, per available records, opted to take up
anew, as an unfinished matter, its inquiry into the
investment of OWWA funds in the Smokey Mountain
project.
With the foregoing disquisition, the Court need
not belabor the other issues raised in this recourse.
Suffice it to state that when the Committee issued
invitations and subpoenas to petitioners to appear before
it in connection with its investigation of the
aforementioned investments, it did so pursuant to its
authority to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. This
is clearly provided in Art. VI, Sec. 21 of the
Constitution, which was quoted at the outset. And the
Court has no authority to prohibit a Senate committee
from requiring persons to appear and testify before it in
connection with an inquiry in aid of legislation in
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.
[21] Sabio emphasizes the importance of the duty of
those subpoenaed to appear before the legislature, even
if incidentally incriminating questions are expected to
be asked:
Anent the right against self-incrimination, it
must be emphasized that [this right may be] invoked

by the said directors and officers of Philcomsat x x

x only when the incriminating question is being
asked, since they have no way of knowing in
advance the nature or effect of the questions to
be asked of them. That this right may possibly be
violated or abused is no ground for denying
respondent Senate Committees their power of
inquiry. The consolation is that when this power is
abused, such issue may be presented before the
courts.
xxxx
Let it be stressed at this point that so long as
the constitutional rights of witnesses x x x will be
respected by respondent Senate Committees, it [is]
their duty to cooperate with them in their efforts to
obtain the facts needed for intelligent legislative
action. The unremitting obligation of every
citizen is to respond to subpoenae, to respect the
dignity of the Congress and its Committees, and
to testify fully with respect to matters within the
realm of proper investigation.[22] (Emphasis
supplied.)

As a matter of long and sound practice, the Court

refrains from touching on the issue of constitutionality
except when it is unavoidable and is the very lis
mota[23] of the controversy. So it must be here. Indeed,
the matter of the constitutionality of the assailed
Committee invitations and subpoenas issued vis--vis the
investigation conducted pursuant to PS Resolution Nos.

537 and 543 has ceased to be a justiciable controversy,

having been rendered moot and academic by
supervening events heretofore indicated. In short, there
is no more investigation to be continued by virtue of
said resolutions; there is no more investigation the
constitutionality of which is subject to a challenge.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO J.
VELASCO, JR.
Associate
Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO

YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIAMARTINEZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA CONCHITA CARPIO

MORALES
Associate Justice Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA TERESITA J.

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution,
it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision were reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 163756. January 26, 2005]

GEORGIDI B. AGGABAO, petitioner, vs. THE

COMMISSION
ON
ELECTIONS,
the
PROVINCIAL BOARD of CANVASSERS of
ISABELA, and ANTHONY MIRANDA,
respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This Petition for Certiorari[1] seeks to annul and set aside

as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
Resolution No. 7233 of the COMELEC En Banc and the
proclamation of private respondent Anthony Miranda as
Congressman for the 4th District of Isabela.[2]
Petitioner Georgidi B. Aggabao and private respondent
Anthony Miranda were rival congressional candidates for the
4th District of Isabela during the May 10, 2004 elections.
During the canvassing of the certificates of canvass of votes
(COCV) for the municipalities of Cordon and San Agustin,
Miranda moved for the exclusion of the 1st copy of the COCV
on grounds that it was tampered with; prepared under
duress; differed from other authentic copies and contained

manifest errors.[3]
Aggabao objected arguing that the grounds raised by
Miranda are proper only for a pre-proclamation controversy
which is not allowed in elections for Members of the House
of Representatives.[4]
On May 22, 2004, the reconstituted Provincial Board of
Canvassers (PBC) excluded from canvass the contested
COCVs and used instead the 4th and 7th copies of the
COCVs.[5] Based on the results, Miranda garnered the
highest number of votes for the position of Congressman.
On appeal with the COMELEC,[6] petitioner asserted that
the PBC acted without jurisdiction[7] when it heard Mirandas
Petition for Exclusion. Even assuming that the PBC had
jurisdiction over the petition, it still erred in excluding the
contested COCVs as they appeared regular and properly
authenticated.[8]
On June 6, 2004, private respondent filed a Very Urgent
Motion for Proclamation[9] which was opposed[10] by
petitioner who contended that the pendency of his appeal
with the COMELEC Second Division is a bar to Mirandas
proclamation.
In a Memorandum dated June 8, 2004, Commissioner
Mehol K. Sadain, commissioner in-charge for Regions II and
III, approved the proclamation of the remaining winning
candidates for the province of Isabela.[11]
On June 9, 2004, the COMELEC En Banc issued
Resolution No. 7233 likewise directing the proclamation of
the remaining winning candidates in Isabela.[12] On the same
day, petitioner filed with the COMELEC an Urgent Motion to
Set Aside the Notice of Proclamation with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order.[13]

On June 14, 2004, Miranda was proclaimed as the duly

elected Congressman for the 4th District of Isabela.[14]
Two days after the proclamation, Aggabao filed this
petition assailing Resolution No. 7233. He claimed that the
COMELEC En Banc acted without jurisdiction when it
ordered Mirandas proclamation considering that the Second
Division has not yet resolved the appeal.
In his Comment,[15] Miranda moved for the dismissal of
the petition considering that the issue raised by Aggabao is
best addressed to the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET).[16]
On August 27, 2004, the petitioner filed a Consolidated
Motion for Early Resolution; Manifestation that the
COMELEC Second Division Issued a Resolution Sustaining
the Appeal of the Petitioner; and Reply to the Comment.[17]
He manifested that on August 16, 2004, the COMELEC
Second Division gave due course to his pending appeal. [18]
At the same time, he bewailed the failure of the COMELEC
Second Division to annul the proclamation.[19]
The basic issue for resolution is whether we can take
cognizance of this petition.
Certiorari as a special civil action can be availed of only
if there is concurrence of the essential requisites, to wit: (a)
the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions has
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and (b) there is
no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law for the purpose of annulling or
modifying the proceeding. There must be capricious,
arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power for it to prosper.[20]
Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Sec.17.TheSenateandtheHouseofRepresentativesshalleach
haveanElectoralTribunalwhichshallbethesolejudgeofall
contestsrelatingtotheelection,returns,andqualificationsoftheir
respectiveMembers.EachElectoralTribunalshallbecomposedof
nineMembers,threeofwhomshallbeJusticesoftheSupreme
CourttobedesignatedbytheChiefJustice,andtheremainingsix
shallbeMembersoftheSenateortheHouseofRepresentatives,as
thecasemaybe,whoshallbechosenonthebasisofproportional
representationfromthepoliticalpartiesandthepartiesor
organizationregisteredunderthepartylistsystemrepresented
therein.TheseniorJusticeintheElectoralTribunalshallbeits
Chairman.
In Pangilinan v. Commission on Elections [21] we ruled
that:
TheSenateandtheHouseofRepresentativesnowhavetheir
respectiveElectoralTribunalswhicharethesolejudgeofall
contestsrelatingtotheelection,returns,andqualificationsoftheir
respectiveMembers,therebydivestingtheCommissionon
Electionsofitsjurisdictionunderthe1973Constitutionover
electioncasespertainingtotheelectionoftheMembersofthe
BatasangPambansa(Congress).ItfollowsthattheCOMELECis
nowbereftofjurisdictiontohearanddecidepreproclamation
controversiesagainstmembersoftheHouseofRepresentativesas
wellasoftheSenate.
The HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all
contests relative to the election, returns, and qualifications of
members of the House of Representatives. Thus, once a
winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and
assumed office as a Member of the House of
Representatives, COMELECs jurisdiction over election
contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications

ends, and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins.[22]

It is undisputed that Miranda has already been
proclaimed, taken his oath and assumed office on June 14,
2004. As such, petitioners recourse would have been to file
an electoral protest before the HRET. His remedy is not this
petition for certiorari. Thus:
Finally,theprivaterespondentFelicianoBelmonte,Jr.hasalready
beenproclaimedasthewinnerinthecongressionalelectionsinthe
fourthdistrictofQuezonCity.Hehastakenhisoathofofficeand
assumedhisdutiesasrepresentative;hence,theremedyopentothe
petitionerwastohavefiledanelectoralprotestwiththeElectoral
TribunaloftheHouseofRepresentatives.[23]
The allegation that Mirandas proclamation is null and
void ab initio does not divest the HRET of its jurisdiction.
Thus:
(I)nanelectoralcontestwherethevalidityoftheproclamationofa
winningcandidatewhohastakenhisoathofofficeandassumed
hispostasCongressmanisraised,thatissueisbestaddressedto
theHRET.Thereasonforthisrulingisselfevident,foritavoids
duplicityofproceedingsandaclashofjurisdictionbetween
constitutionalbodies,withdueregardtothepeoplesmandate.[24]
In Lazatin v. Commission on Elections[25] we ruled that,
upon proclamation of the winning candidate and despite its
alleged invalidity, the COMELEC is divested of its jurisdiction
to hear the protest. Thus:
Thepetitionisimpressedwithmeritbecausethepetitionerhas
beenproclaimedwinneroftheCongressionalelectionsinthefirst
districtofPampanga,hastakenhisoathofofficeassuch,and
assumedhisdutiesasCongressman.ForthisCourttotake
cognizanceoftheelectoralprotestagainsthimwouldbetousurp

thefunctionsoftheHouseElectoralTribunal.Thealleged
invalidityoftheproclamation(whichhasbeenpreviouslyordered
bytheCOMELECitself)despiteallegedirregularitiesin
connectiontherewith,anddespitethependencyoftheprotestsof
therivalcandidates,isamatterthatisalsoaddressed,considering
thepremises,tothesoundjudgmentoftheElectoralTribunal.
In this case, certiorari will not lie considering that there is
an available and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law for the purpose of annulling or modifying the
proceedings before the COMELEC. After the proclamation,
petitioners remedy was an electoral protest before the
HRET. The resolution of the issues presented in this petition
is best addressed to the sound judgment and discretion of
the electoral tribunal.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant
Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona,
Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, and Garcia,
JJ., concur.
Callejo, Sr., J., on official leave.

EN BANC
BARANGAY ASSOCIATION FOR G.R. No.
179271

NATIONAL ADVANCEMENT
AND TRANSPARENCY (BANAT),
Petitioner,
- versus COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
(sitting as the National Board of
Canvassers),
Respondent.
ARTS BUSINESS AND SCIENCE
PROFESSIONALS,
Intervenor.
AANGAT TAYO,
Intervenor.
COALITION OF ASSOCIATIONS
OF SENIOR CITIZENS IN THE
PHILIPPINES, INC. (SENIOR
CITIZENS),
Intervenor.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
BAYAN MUNA, ADVOCACY FOR G.R. No. 179295
TEACHER EMPOWERMENT
THROUGH ACTION, COOPERATION Present:
AND HARMONY TOWARDS
EDUCATIONAL REFORMS, INC., PUNO, C.J.,

and ABONO, QUISUMBING,

Petitioners, YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
- versus - CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
CHICONAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA, and
BERSAMIN, JJ.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Promulgated:
Respondent.
____________________
___
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Petitioner in G.R. No. 179271 Barangay Association for
National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) in a
petition for certiorari and mandamus,[1] assails the
Resolution[2] promulgated on 3 August 2007 by the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in NBC No. 07041 (PL). The COMELECs resolution in NBC No. 07041 (PL) approved the recommendation of Atty. Alioden
D. Dalaig, Head of the National Board of Canvassers
(NBC) Legal Group, to deny the petition of BANAT for
being moot. BANAT filed before the COMELEC En
Banc, acting as NBC, a Petition to Proclaim the Full
Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by the
Constitution.
The following are intervenors in G.R. No. 179271: Arts
Business and Science Professionals (ABS), Aangat Tayo
(AT), and Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in
the Philippines, Inc. (Senior Citizens).
Petitioners in G.R. No. 179295 Bayan Muna, Abono,
and Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment Through
Action, Cooperation and Harmony Towards Educational
Reforms (A Teacher) in a petition for certiorari with
mandamus and prohibition,[3] assails NBC Resolution

No. 07-60[4] promulgated on 9 July 2007. NBC No. 0760 made a partial proclamation of parties, organizations
and coalitions that obtained at least two percent of the
total votes cast under the Party-List System. The
COMELEC announced that, upon completion of the
canvass of the party-list results, it would determine the
total number of seats of each winning party,
organization, or coalition in accordance with Veterans
Federation Party v. COMELEC[5] (Veterans).
Estrella DL Santos, in her capacity as President and First
Nominee of the Veterans Freedom Party, filed a motion
to intervene in both G.R. Nos. 179271 and 179295.
The Facts
The 14 May 2007 elections included the elections for
the party-list representatives. The COMELEC counted
15,950,900 votes cast for 93 parties under the Party-List
System.[6]
On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim
the Full Number of Party-List Representatives Provided
by the Constitution, docketed as NBC No. 07-041 (PL)
before the NBC. BANAT filed its petition because [t]he
Chairman and the Members of the [COMELEC] have
recently been quoted in the national papers that the
[COMELEC] is duty bound to and shall implement the
Veterans ruling, that is, would apply the Panganiban
formula in allocating party-list seats.[7] There were no

intervenors in BANATs petition before the NBC.

BANAT filed a memorandum on 19 July 2007.
On 9 July 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the NBC,
promulgated NBC Resolution No. 07-60. NBC
Resolution No. 07-60 proclaimed thirteen (13) parties as
winners in the party-list elections, namely: Buhay
Hayaan Yumabong (BUHAY), Bayan Muna, Citizens
Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC), Gabrielas Women
Party (Gabriela), Association of Philippine Electric
Cooperatives (APEC), A Teacher, Akbayan! Citizens
Action Party (AKBAYAN), Alagad, Luzon Farmers
Party (BUTIL), Cooperative-Natco Network Party
(COOP-NATCCO), Anak Pawis, Alliance of Rural
Concerns (ARC), and Abono. We quote NBC
Resolution No. 07-60 in its entirety below:
WHEREAS, the Commission on Elections sitting
en banc as National Board of Canvassers, thru its
Sub-Committee for Party-List, as of 03 July 2007,
had officially canvassed, in open and public
proceedings, a total of fifteen million two hundred
eighty three thousand six hundred fifty-nine
(15,283,659) votes under the Party-List System of
Representation, in connection with the National and
Local Elections conducted last 14 May 2007;
WHEREAS, the study conducted by the Legal and
Tabulation Groups of the National Board of
Canvassers reveals that the projected/maximum
total party-list votes cannot go any higher than
sixteen million seven hundred twenty three

thousand one hundred twenty-one (16,723,121)

votes given the following statistical data:
Projected/Maximum Party-List Votes for May
2007 Elections
i. Total party-list votes already canvassed/tabulated

15,283,659

ii. Total party-list votes remaining uncanvassed/

untabulated (i.e. canvass deferred)

1,337,032

iii. Maximum party-list votes (based on 100%

outcome) from areas not yet submitted for canvass
(Bogo, Cebu; Bais City; Pantar, Lanao del Norte; and
Pagalungan, Maguindanao)

102,430

Maximum Total Party-List Votes

WHEREAS, Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7941
(Party-List System Act) provides in part:
The parties, organizations, and
coalitions receiving at least two
percent (2%) of the total votes cast for
the party-list system shall be entitled
to one seat each: provided, that those
garnering more than two percent (2%)
of the votes shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their
total number of votes: provided,
finally, that each party, organization,
or coalition shall be entitled to not
more than three (3) seats.
WHEREAS, for the 2007 Elections, based on the
above projected total of party-list votes, the

16,723,121

presumptive two percent (2%) threshold can be

pegged at three hundred thirty four thousand
four hundred sixty-two (334,462) votes;
WHEREAS, the Supreme Court, in Citizens Battle
Against Corruption (CIBAC) versus COMELEC,
reiterated its ruling in Veterans Federation Party
versus COMELEC adopting a formula for the
additional seats of each party, organization or
coalition receving more than the required two
percent (2%) votes, stating that the same shall be
determined only after all party-list ballots have been
completely canvassed;
WHEREAS, the parties, organizations, and
coalitions that have thus far garnered at least three
hundred thirty four thousand four hundred
sixty-two (334,462) votes are as follows:
RANK

PARTY/ORGANIZATION/
COALITION

VOTES
RECEIVED

BUHAY

1,163,218

BAYAN MUNA

972,730

CIBAC

760,260

GABRIELA

610,451

APEC

538,971

A TEACHER

476,036

AKBAYAN

470,872

ALAGAD

423,076

BUTIL

405,052

10

COOP-NATCO

390,029

11

BATAS

386,361

12

ANAK PAWIS

376,036

13

ARC

338,194

14

ABONO

337,046

WHEREAS, except for Bagong Alyansang

Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan
(BATAS), against which an URGENT PETITION
FOR
CANCELLATION/REMOVAL
OF
REGISTRATION AND DISQUALIFICATION OF
PARTY-LIST NOMINEE (With Prayer for the
Issuance of Restraining Order) has been filed
before the Commission, docketed as SPC No. 07250, all the parties, organizations and coalitions
included in the aforementioned list are therefore
entitled to at least one seat under the party-list
system of representation in the meantime.
NOW, THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers
vested in it by the Constitution, the Omnibus
Election Code, Executive Order No. 144, Republic
Act Nos. 6646, 7166, 7941, and other election laws,
the Commission on Elections, sitting en banc as the
National Board of Canvassers, hereby RESOLVES
to PARTIALLY PROCLAIM, subject to certain
conditions set forth below, the following parties,
organizations and coalitions participating under the
Party-List System:
1 Buhay Hayaan Yumabong
2 Bayan Muna

BUHAY
BAYAN MUNA

3 Citizens Battle Against Corruption

CIBAC

4 Gabriela Womens Party

5 Association
Cooperatives

of

Philippine

GABRIELA
Electric

6 Advocacy for Teacher Empowerment

Through Action, Cooperation and Harmony
Towards Educational Reforms, Inc.

APEC
A TEACHER

7 Akbayan! Citizens Action Party

AKBAYAN

8 Alagad

ALAGAD

9 Luzon Farmers Party

10 Cooperative-Natco Network Party
11 Anak Pawis
12 Alliance of Rural Concerns
13 Abono

BUTIL
COOP-NATCCO
ANAKPAWIS
ARC
ABONO

This is without prejudice to the proclamation of

other parties, organizations, or coalitions which may
later on be established to have obtained at least two
percent (2%) of the total actual votes cast under the
Party-List System.
The total number of seats of each winning party,
organization or coalition shall be determined
pursuant to Veterans Federation Party versus
COMELEC formula upon completion of the canvass
of the party-list results.
The proclamation
of Bagong Alyansang
Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan
(BATAS) is hereby deferred until final resolution of

SPC No. 07-250, in order not to render the

proceedings therein moot and academic.
Finally, all proclamation of the nominees of
concerned parties, organizations and coalitions with
pending disputes shall likewise be held in abeyance
until final resolution of their respective cases.
Let the Clerk of the Commission implement this
Resolution, furnishing a copy thereof to the Speaker
of the House of Representatives of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.[8] (Emphasis in the original)

Pursuant to NBC Resolution No. 07-60, the COMELEC,

acting as NBC, promulgated NBC Resolution No. 0772, which declared the additional seats allocated to the
appropriate parties. We quote from the COMELECs
interpretation of the Veterans formula as found in NBC
Resolution No. 07-72:
WHEREAS, on July 9, 2007, the Commission on
Elections sitting en banc as the National Board of
Canvassers proclaimed thirteen (13) qualified
parties, organization[s] and coalitions based on the
presumptive two percent (2%) threshold of 334,462
votes from the projected maximum total number of
party-list votes of 16,723,121, and were thus given
one (1) guaranteed party-list seat each;
WHEREAS, per Report of the Tabulation Group
and Supervisory Committee of the National Board

of Canvassers, the projected maximum total partylist votes, as of July 11, 2007, based on the votes
actually canvassed, votes canvassed but not
included in Report No. 29, votes received but
uncanvassed, and maximum votes expected for
Pantar, Lanao del Norte, is 16,261,369; and that the
projected maximum total votes for the thirteen (13)
qualified parties, organizations and coalition[s] are
as follows:
Party-List

Projected total number of votes

BUHAY

1,178,747

BAYAN MUNA

977,476

CIBAC

755,964

GABRIELA

621,718

APEC

622,489

A TEACHER

492,369

AKBAYAN

462,674

ALAGAD

423,190

BUTIL

409,298

10

COOP-NATCO

412,920

11

ANAKPAWIS

370,165

12

ARC

375,846

13

ABONO

340,151

WHEREAS, based on the above Report, Buhay

Hayaan Yumabong (Buhay) obtained the highest
number of votes among the thirteen (13) qualified
parties, organizations and coalitions, making it the

first party in accordance with Veterans Federation

Party versus COMELEC, reiterated in Citizens
Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) versus
COMELEC;
WHEREAS, qualified parties, organizations and
coalitions participating under the party-list system
of representation that have obtained one guaranteed
(1) seat may be entitled to an additional seat or seats
based on the formula prescribed by the Supreme
Court in Veterans;
WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for
the first party, the correct formula as expressed in
Veterans, is:
Number of votes of first party Proportion of votes
of first
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - = party relative to
total votes for
Total votes for party-list system party-list system
wherein the proportion of votes received by the first
party (without rounding off) shall entitle it to
additional seats:
Proportion of votes received
by the first party
Equal to or at least 6%

Additional seats
Two (2) additional seats

Equal to or greater than 4% but less than 6% One (1) additional seat
Less than 4%

No additional seat

WHEREAS, applying the above formula, Buhay

obtained the following percentage:

1,178,747
- - - - - - - - = 0.07248 or 7.2%
16,261,369
which entitles it to two (2) additional seats.
WHEREAS, in determining the additional seats for
the other qualified parties, organizations and
coalitions, the correct formula as expressed in
Veterans and reiterated in CIBAC is, as follows:
No. of votes of
concerned party No. of additional
Additional seats for = ------------------- x seats
allocated to
a concerned party No. of votes of first party
first party
WHEREAS, applying the above formula, the results
are as follows:
Party List

Percentage

Additional Seat

BAYAN MUNA

1.65

CIBAC

1.28

GABRIELA

1.05

APEC

1.05

A TEACHER

0.83

AKBAYAN

0.78

ALAGAD

0.71

BUTIL

0.69

COOP-NATCO

0.69

ANAKPAWIS

0.62

ARC

0.63

ABONO

0.57

NOW THEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested

in it by the Constitution, Omnibus Election Code,
Executive Order No. 144, Republic Act Nos. 6646,
7166, 7941 and other elections laws, the
Commission on Elections en banc sitting as the
National Board of Canvassers, hereby RESOLVED,
as it hereby RESOLVES, to proclaim the following
parties, organizations or coalitions as entitled to
additional seats, to wit:
Party List

Additional Seats

BUHAY

BAYAN MUNA

CIBAC

GABRIELA

APEC

1
This is without prejudice to the proclamation of
other parties, organizations or coalitions which may
later on be established to have obtained at least two
per cent (2%) of the total votes cast under the partylist system to entitle them to one (1) guaranteed
seat, or to the appropriate percentage of votes to

entitle them to one (1) additional seat.

Finally, all proclamation of the nominees of
concerned parties, organizations and coalitions with
pending disputes shall likewise be held in abeyance
until final resolution of their respective cases.
Let the National Board of Canvassers Secretariat
implement this Resolution, furnishing a copy hereof
to the Speaker of the House of Representatives of
the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.[9]

Acting on BANATs petition, the NBC promulgated

NBC Resolution No. 07-88 on 3 August 2007, which
reads as follows:
This pertains to the Petition to Proclaim the Full
Number of Party-List Representatives Provided by
the Constitution filed by the Barangay Association
for National Advancement and Transparency
(BANAT).
Acting on the foregoing Petition of the Barangay
Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT) party-list, Atty. Alioden D.
Dalaig, Head, National Board of Canvassers Legal
Group submitted his comments/observations and
recommendation thereon [NBC 07-041 (PL)],
which reads:
COMMENTS / OBSERVATIONS:

Petitioner Barangay Association for

National
Advancement
and
Transparency (BANAT), in its
Petition to Proclaim the Full Number
of
Party-List
Representatives
Provided by the Constitution prayed
for the following reliefs, to wit:
1. That the full number -- twenty
percent (20%) -- of Party-List
representatives as mandated by
Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution shall be proclaimed.
2. Paragraph (b), Section 11 of RA
7941 which prescribes the 2%
threshold
votes,
should
be
harmonized with Section 5, Article
VI of the Constitution and with
Section 12 of the same RA 7941 in
that it should be applicable only to
the first party-list representative seats
to be allotted on the basis of their
initial/first ranking.
3. The 3-seat limit prescribed by RA
7941 shall be applied; and
4. Initially, all party-list groups shall
be given the number of seats
corresponding to every 2% of the
votes they received and the
additional seats shall be allocated in
accordance with Section 12 of RA
7941, that is, in proportion to the

percentage of votes obtained by each

party-list group in relation to the total
nationwide votes cast in the party-list
election,
after
deducting
the
corresponding votes of those which
were allotted seats under the 2%
threshold rule. In fine, the
formula/procedure prescribed in the
ALLOCATION OF PARTY-LIST
SEATS, ANNEX A of COMELEC
RESOLUTION 2847 dated 25 June
1996, shall be used for [the] purpose
of determining how many seats shall
be proclaimed, which party-list
groups are entitled to representative
seats and how many of their
nominees shall seat [sic].
5. In the alternative, to declare as
unconstitutional Section 11 of
Republic Act No. 7941 and that the
procedure in allocating seats for
party-list representative prescribed
by Section 12 of RA 7941 shall be
followed.
RECOMMENDATION:
The petition of BANAT is now moot
and academic.
The Commission En Banc in NBC
Resolution No. 07-60 promulgated
July 9, 2007 re In the Matter of the
Canvass of Votes and Partial

Proclamation
of
the
Parties,
Organizations
and
Coalitions
Participating Under the Party-List
System During the May 14, 2007
National and Local Elections
resolved among others that the total
number of seats of each winning
party, organization or coalition shall
be determined pursuant to the
Veterans Federation Party versus
COMELEC
formula
upon
completion of the canvass of the
party-list results.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the National
Board of Canvassers RESOLVED, as it hereby
RESOLVES, to approve and adopt the
recommendation of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head,
NBC Legal Group, to DENY the herein petition of
BANAT for being moot and academic.
Let the Supervisory Committee implement this
resolution.
SO ORDERED.[10]

BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus

assailing the ruling in NBC Resolution No. 07-88.
BANAT did not file a motion for reconsideration of
NBC Resolution No. 07-88.
On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher

asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC, to reconsider its

decision to use the Veterans formula as stated in its NBC
Resolution No. 07-60 because the Veterans formula is
violative of the Constitution and of Republic Act No.
7941 (R.A. No. 7941). On the same day, the COMELEC
denied reconsideration during the proceedings of the
NBC.[11]
Aside from the thirteen party-list organizations
proclaimed on 9 July 2007, the COMELEC proclaimed
three other party-list organizations as qualified parties
entitled to one guaranteed seat under the Party-List
System: Agricultural Sector Alliance of the Philippines,
Inc. (AGAP),[12] Anak Mindanao (AMIN),[13] and An
Waray.[14] Per the certification[15] by COMELEC, the
following party-list organizations have been proclaimed
as of 19 May 2008:
Party-List

No. of Seat(s)

1.1

Buhay

1.2

Bayan Muna

1.3

CIBAC

1.4

Gabriela

1.5

APEC

1.6

A Teacher

1.7

Akbayan

1.8

Alagad

1.9

Butil

1.10

Coop-Natco [sic]

1.11

Anak Pawis

1.12

ARC

1.13

Abono

1.14

AGAP

1.15

AMIN

The
proclamation
of
Bagong
Alyansang
Tagapagtaguyod ng Adhikaing Sambayanan (BATAS),
against
which
an
Urgent
Petition
for
Cancellation/Removal
of
Registration
and
Disqualification of Party-list Nominee (with Prayer for
the Issuance of Restraining Order) has been filed before
the COMELEC, was deferred pending final resolution
of SPC No. 07-250.
Issues
BANAT brought the following issues before this Court:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list
representatives provided in Section 5(2), Article VI
of the Constitution mandatory or is it merely a
ceiling?
2. Is the three-seat limit provided in Section 11(b)
of RA 7941 constitutional?
3. Is the two percent threshold and qualifier votes
prescribed by the same Section 11(b) of RA 7941
constitutional?

4. How shall the party-list representatives be

allocated?[16]

Bayan Muna, A Teacher, and Abono, on the other hand,

raised the following issues in their petition:
I. Respondent Commission on Elections, acting as
National Board of Canvassers, committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it promulgated NBC Resolution
No. 07-60 to implement the First-Party Rule in the
allocation of seats to qualified party-list
organizations as said rule:
A. Violates the constitutional
proportional representation.

principle

of

B. Violates the provisions of RA 7941 particularly:

1. The 2-4-6 Formula used by the First Party Rule
in allocating additional seats for the First Party
violates the principle of proportional representation
under RA 7941.
2. The use of two formulas in the allocation of
additional seats, one for the First Party and another
for the qualifying parties, violates Section 11(b) of
RA 7941.
3. The proportional relationships under the First
Party Rule are different from those required under
RA 7941;

C. Violates the Four Inviolable Parameters of the

Philippine party-list system as provided for under
the same case of Veterans Federation Party, et al. v.
COMELEC.
II. Presuming that the Commission on Elections did
not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when it implemented
the First-Party Rule in the allocation of seats to
qualified party-list organizations, the same being
merely in consonance with the ruling in Veterans
Federations Party, et al. v. COMELEC, the instant
Petition is a justiciable case as the issues involved
herein are constitutional in nature, involving the
correct interpretation and implementation of RA
7941, and are of transcendental importance to our
nation.[17]

Considering the allegations in the petitions and the

comments of the parties in these cases, we defined the
following issues in our advisory for the oral arguments
set on 22 April 2008:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list
representatives in Section 5(2), Article VI of the
Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling?
2. Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA
7941 constitutional?
3. Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section
11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for one seat
constitutional?

4. How shall the party-list representative seats be

allocated?
5. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political
parties from participating in the party-list elections?
If not, can the major political parties be barred from
participating in the party-list elections?[18]

The Ruling of the Court

The petitions have partial merit. We maintain that a
Philippine-style party-list election has at least four
inviolable parameters as clearly stated in Veterans. For
easy reference, these are:
First, the twenty percent allocation the combined
number of all party-list congressmen shall not
exceed twenty percent of the total membership of
the House of Representatives, including those
elected under the party list;
Second, the two percent threshold only those parties
garnering a minimum of two percent of the total
valid votes cast for the party-list system are
qualified to have a seat in the House of
Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit each qualified party,
regardless of the number of votes it actually
obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats;
that is, one qualifying and two additional seats;
Fourth, proportional representation the additional

seats which a qualified party is entitled to shall be

computed in proportion to their total number of
votes.[19]

However, because the formula in Veterans has flaws in

its mathematical interpretation of the term proportional
representation, this Court is compelled to revisit the
formula for the allocation of additional seats to party-list
organizations.
Number of Party-List Representatives:
The Formula Mandated by the Constitution
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides:
Section 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall
be composed of not more than two hundred and
fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who
shall be elected from legislative districts
apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the
number of their respective inhabitants, and on the
basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those
who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a
party-list system of registered national, regional,
and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute
twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party-list.
For three consecutive terms after the ratification of

this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to

party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided
by law, by selection or election from the labor,
peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, women, youth, and such other sectors
as may be provided by law, except the religious
sector.

The first paragraph of Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941

reads:
Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives.
The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty
per centum (20%) of the total number of the
members of the House of Representatives including
those under the party-list.
xxx

Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution states that

the House of Representatives shall be composed of not
more than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law. The House of Representatives
shall be composed of district representatives and partylist representatives. The Constitution allows the
legislature to modify the number of the members of the
House of Representatives.
Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution, on the other
hand, states the ratio of party-list representatives to the
total number of representatives. We compute the number
of seats available to party-list representatives from the

number of legislative districts. On this point, we do not

deviate from the first formula in Veterans, thus:
Number of seats available
to legislative districts

x .20 =

Number of seats available to

party-list representatives

.80

This formula allows for the corresponding increase in

the number of seats available for party-list
representatives whenever a legislative district is created
by law. Since the 14th Congress of the Philippines has
220 district representatives, there are 55 seats available
to party-list representatives.
220

x .20 =

55

.80

After prescribing the ratio of the number of party-list

representatives to the total number of representatives,
the Constitution left the manner of allocating the
seats available to party-list representatives to the
wisdom of the legislature.
Allocation of Seats for Party-List Representatives:
The Statutory Limits Presented by the Two Percent
Threshold
and the Three-Seat Cap

All parties agree on the formula to determine the

maximum number of seats reserved under the Party-List
System, as well as on the formula to determine the
guaranteed seats to party-list candidates garnering at
least two-percent of the total party-list votes. However,
there are numerous interpretations of the provisions of
R.A. No. 7941 on the allocation of additional seats
under the Party-List System. Veterans produced the First
Party Rule,[20] and Justice Vicente V. Mendozas dissent
in Veterans presented Germanys Niemeyer formula[21]
as an alternative.
The Constitution left to Congress the determination of
the manner of allocating the seats for party-list
representatives. Congress enacted R.A. No. 7941,
paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 11 and Section 12 of
which provide:
Section 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. x
xx
In determining the allocation of seats for the second
vote,[22] the following procedure shall be observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall
be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on
the number of votes they garnered during the
elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions
receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes

cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one

seat each: Provided, That those garnering more
than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be
entitled to additional seats in proportion to their
total number of votes: Provided, finally, That each
party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to
not more than three (3) seats.
Section 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for PartyList Representatives. The COMELEC shall tally all
the votes for the parties, organizations, or coalitions
on a nationwide basis, rank them according to the
number of votes received and allocate party-list
representatives proportionately according to the
percentage of votes obtained by each party,
organization, or coalition as against the total
nationwide votes cast for the party-list system.
(Emphasis supplied)

In G.R. No. 179271, BANAT presents two

interpretations through three formulas to allocate partylist representative seats.
The first interpretation allegedly harmonizes the
provisions of Section 11(b) on the 2% requirement with
Section 12 of R.A. No. 7941. BANAT described this
procedure as follows:
(a) The party-list representatives shall constitute
twenty percent (20%) of the total Members of the
House of Representatives including those from the
party-list groups as prescribed by Section 5, Article

VI of the Constitution, Section 11 (1 st par.) of RA

7941 and Comelec Resolution No. 2847 dated 25
June 1996. Since there are 220 District
Representatives in the 14th Congress, there shall be
55 Party-List Representatives. All seats shall have
to be proclaimed.
(b) All party-list groups shall initially be allotted
one (1) seat for every two per centum (2%) of the
total party-list votes they obtained; provided, that no
party-list groups shall have more than three (3) seats
(Section 11, RA 7941).
(c) The remaining seats shall, after deducting the
seats obtained by the party-list groups under the
immediately preceding paragraph and after
deducting from their total the votes corresponding
to those seats, the remaining seats shall be allotted
proportionately to all the party-list groups which
have not secured the maximum three (3) seats under
the 2% threshold rule, in accordance with Section
12 of RA 7941.[23]

Forty-four (44) party-list seats will be awarded under

BANATs first interpretation.
The second interpretation presented by BANAT assumes
that the 2% vote requirement is declared
unconstitutional, and apportions the seats for party-list
representatives by following Section 12 of R.A. No.
7941. BANAT states that the COMELEC:

(a) shall tally all the votes for the parties,

organizations, or coalitions on a nationwide basis;
(b) rank them according to the number of votes
received; and,
(c) allocate party-list representatives proportionately
according to the percentage of votes obtained by
each party, organization or coalition as against the
total nationwide votes cast for the party-list system.
[24]

BANAT used two formulas to obtain the same results:

one is based on the proportional percentage of the votes
received by each party as against the total nationwide
party-list votes, and the other is by making the votes of a
party-list with a median percentage of votes as the
divisor in computing the allocation of seats.[25] Thirtyfour (34) party-list seats will be awarded under BANATs
second interpretation.
In G.R. No. 179295, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A
Teacher criticize both the COMELECs original 2-4-6
formula and the Veterans formula for systematically
preventing all the party-list seats from being filled up.
They claim that both formulas do not factor in the total
number of seats alloted for the entire Party-List System.
Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher reject the three-seat
cap, but accept the 2% threshold. After determining the
qualified parties, a second percentage is generated by
dividing the votes of a qualified party by the total votes
of all qualified parties only. The number of seats
allocated to a qualified party is computed by multiplying

the total party-list seats available with the second

percentage. There will be a first round of seat allocation,
limited to using the whole integers as the equivalent of
the number of seats allocated to the concerned party-list.
After all the qualified parties are given their seats, a
second round of seat allocation is conducted. The
fractions, or remainders, from the whole integers are
ranked from highest to lowest and the remaining seats
on the basis of this ranking are allocated until all the
seats are filled up.[26]
We examine what R.A. No. 7941 prescribes to allocate
seats for party-list representatives.
Section 11(a) of R.A. No. 7941 prescribes the ranking of
the participating parties from the highest to the lowest
based on the number of votes they garnered during the
elections.
Table 1. Ranking of the participating parties from
the highest to the lowest based on the number of
votes garnered during the elections.[27]

Rank

Party

Votes
Rank
Garnered

1 BUHAY

1,169,234

2 BAYAN
MUNA

979,039

Party

Votes
Garnered

48 KALAHI

88,868

49 APOI

79,386

3 CIBAC

755,686

50 BP

78,541

4 GABRIELA

621,171

51 AHONBAYAN

78,424

5 APEC

619,657

52 BIGKIS

77,327

6 A TEACHER

490,379

53 PMAP

75,200

7 AKBAYAN

466,112

54 AKAPIN

74,686

8 ALAGAD

423,149

55 PBA

71,544

9 COOPNATCCO

409,883

56 GRECON

62,220

10 BUTIL

409,160

57 BTM

60,993

11 BATAS

385,810

58 A SMILE

58,717

12 ARC

374,288

59 NELFFI

57,872

13 ANAKPAWIS

370,261

60 AKSA

57,012

14 ABONO

339,990

61 BAGO

55,846

15 AMIN

338,185

62 BANDILA

54,751

16 AGAP

328,724

63 AHON

54,522

17 AN WARAY

321,503

64 ASAHAN MO

51,722

18 YACAP

310,889

65 AGBIAG!

50,837

19 FPJPM

300,923

66 SPI

50,478

20 UNI-MAD

245,382

67 BAHANDI

46,612

21 ABS

235,086

68 ADD

45,624

22 KAKUSA

228,999

69 AMANG

43,062

23 KABATAAN

228,637

70 ABAY PARAK

42,282

24 ABA-AKO

218,818

71 BABAE KA

36,512

25 ALIF

217,822

72 SB

34,835

26 SENIOR

213,058

73 ASAP

34,098

CITIZENS
27 AT

197,872

74 PEP

33,938

28 VFP

196,266

75 ABA
ILONGGO

33,903

29 ANAD

188,521

76 VENDORS

33,691

30 BANAT

177,028

77 ADD-TRIBAL

32,896

31 ANG
KASANGGA

170,531

78 ALMANA

32,255

32 BANTAY

169,801

79 AANGAT
PILIPINO

33 ABAKADA

166,747

80 AAPS

26,271

34 1-UTAK

164,980

81 HAPI

25,781

35 TUCP

162,647

82 AAWAS

22,946

36 COCOFED

155,920

83 SM

20,744

37 AGHAM

146,032

84 AG

16,916

38 ANAK

141,817

85 AGING PINOY

16,729

39 ABANSE!
PINAY

130,356

86 APO

16,421

40 PM

119,054

87 BIYAYANG
BUKID

16,241

41 AVE

110,769

88 ATS

14,161

42 SUARA

110,732

89 UMDJ

9,445

43 ASSALAM

110,440

90 BUKLOD
FILIPINA

8,915

44 DIWA

107,021

91 LYPAD

8,471

45 ANC

99,636

92 AA-KASOSYO

8,406

46 SANLAKAS

97,375

93 KASAPI

6,221

KA

29,130

47 ABC

90,058

TOTAL

15,950,900

The first clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 states

that parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at
least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the
party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each. This
clause guarantees a seat to the two-percenters. In Table 2
below, we use the first 20 party-list candidates for
illustration purposes. The percentage of votes garnered
by each party is arrived at by dividing the number of
votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total
number of votes cast for all party-list candidates.
Table 2. The first 20 party-list candidates and their
respective percentage of votes garnered over the
total votes for the party-list.[28]

Rank

Party

1 BUHAY

Votes Garnered
Votes
over Total Votes Guaranteed
Garnered for Party-List,
Seat
in %
1,169,234

7.33%

2 BAYAN MUNA

979,039

6.14%

3 CIBAC

755,686

4.74%

4 GABRIELA

621,171

3.89%

5 APEC

619,657

3.88%

6 A TEACHER

490,379

3.07%

7 AKBAYAN

466,112

2.92%

8 ALAGAD

423,149

2.65%

9 COOP-NATCCO

409,883

2.57%

10 BUTIL

409,160

2.57%

11 BATAS[29]

385,810

2.42%

12 ARC

374,288

2.35%

13 ANAKPAWIS

370,261

2.32%

14 ABONO

339,990

2.13%

15 AMIN

338,185

2.12%

16 AGAP

328,724

2.06%

17 AN WARAY

321,503

2.02%

Total

17

18 YACAP

310,889

1.95%

19 FPJPM

300,923

1.89%

20 UNI-MAD

245,382

1.54%

From Table 2 above, we see that only 17 party-list

candidates received at least 2% from the total number of
votes cast for party-list candidates. The 17 qualified
party-list candidates, or the two-percenters, are the
party-list candidates that are entitled to one seat each, or
the guaranteed seat. In this first round of seat allocation,
we distributed 17 guaranteed seats.
The second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941
provides that those garnering more than two percent
(2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes. This is
where petitioners and intervenors problem with the
formula in Veterans lies. Veterans interprets the clause

in proportion to their total number of votes to be in

proportion to the votes of the first party. This
interpretation is contrary to the express language of R.A.
No. 7941.
We rule that, in computing the allocation of additional
seats, the continued operation of the two percent
threshold for the distribution of the additional seats as
found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No.
7941 is unconstitutional. This Court finds that the two
percent threshold makes it mathematically impossible to
achieve the maximum number of available party list
seats when the number of available party list seats
exceeds 50. The continued operation of the two percent
threshold in the distribution of the additional seats
frustrates the attainment of the permissive ceiling that
20% of the members of the House of Representatives
shall consist of party-list representatives.
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats.
Suppose there are 50 million votes cast for the 100
participants in the party list elections. A party that has
two percent of the votes cast, or one million votes, gets
a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the first 50
parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get a
seat despite the availability of 55 seats. Because of the
operation of the two percent threshold, this situation will
repeat itself even if we increase the available party-list
seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the votes cast to

100 million. Thus, even if the maximum number of

parties get two percent of the votes for every party, it is
always impossible for the number of occupied party-list
seats to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent
threshold is present.
We therefore strike down the two percent threshold only
in relation to the distribution of the additional seats as
found in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No.
7941. The two percent threshold presents an
unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of
Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents
the attainment of the broadest possible representation of
party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives.[30]
In determining the allocation of seats for party-list
representatives under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the
following procedure shall be observed:
1.
The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be
ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the
number of votes they garnered during the elections.
2.
The parties, organizations, and coalitions
receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast
for the party-list system shall be entitled to one
guaranteed seat each.
3.

Those garnering sufficient number of votes,

according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled

to additional seats in proportion to their total number of
votes until all the additional seats are allocated.
4.
Each party, organization, or coalition shall be
entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats
shall no longer be included because they have already
been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter.
Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as
additional seats are the maximum seats reserved under
the Party List System less the guaranteed seats.
Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a
provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off
of fractional seats.
In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional,
we do not limit our allocation of additional seats in
Table 3 below to the two-percenters. The percentage of
votes garnered by each party-list candidate is arrived at
by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party
by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for partylist candidates. There are two steps in the second round
of seat allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by
the remaining available seats, 38, which is the difference
between the 55 maximum seats reserved under the
Party-List System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the
two-percenters. The whole integer of the product of the

percentage and of the remaining available seats

corresponds to a partys share in the remaining available
seats. Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of
the parties next in rank until all available seats are
completely distributed. We distributed all of the
remaining 38 seats in the second round of seat
allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to
determine the number of seats each qualified party-list
candidate is entitled. Thus:

Table 3. Distribution of Available Party-List Seats

Rank

Party

Votes
Garnered

Votes
Guaranteed
Garnered
Seat
over

TotalVotes

forParty

List,in%

(FirstRound)

(B)
(A)

Additional
Seats

(Second
Round)

(C)

BUHAY

1,169,234

7.33%

2.79

BAYAN
MUNA

979,039

6.14%

2.33

CIBAC

755,686

4.74%

1.80

(B)plu
(C),in
whole
integer

(D)

GABRIELA

621,171

3.89%

1.48

APEC

619,657

3.88%

1.48

ATeacher

490,379

3.07%

1.17

AKBAYAN

466,112

2.92%

1.11

ALAGAD

423,149

2.65%

1.01

9[31]

COOP
NATCCO

409,883

2.57%

10

BUTIL

409,160

2.57%

11

BATAS

385,810

2.42%

12

ARC

374,288

2.35%

13

ANAKPAWI
S

370,261

2.32%

14

ABONO

339,990

2.13%

15

AMIN

338,185

2.12%

16

AGAP

328,724

2.06%

17

ANWARAY

321,503

2.02%

18

YACAP

310,889

1.95%

19

FPJPM

300,923

1.89%

20

UNIMAD

245,382

1.54%

21

ABS

235,086

1.47%

22

KAKUSA

228,999

1.44%

23

KABATAAN

228,637

1.43%

24

ABAAKO

218,818

1.37%

25

ALIF

217,822

1.37%

26

SENIOR
CITIZENS

213,058

1.34%

27

AT

197,872

1.24%

28

VFP

196,266

1.23%

29

ANAD

188,521

1.18%

30

BANAT

177,028

1.11%

31

ANG
KASANGGA

170,531

1.07%

32

BANTAY

169,801

1.06%

33

ABAKADA

166,747

1.05%

34

1UTAK

164,980

1.03%

35

TUCP

162,647

1.02%

36

COCOFED

155,920

0.98%

17

Total

Applying the procedure of seat allocation as illustrated

in Table 3 above, there are 55 party-list representatives
from the 36 winning party-list organizations. All 55
available party-list seats are filled. The additional seats
allocated to the parties with sufficient number of votes
for one whole seat, in no case to exceed a total of three
seats for each party, are shown in column (D).
Participation of Major Political Parties in Party-List
Elections
The Constitutional Commission adopted a multi-party
system that allowed all political parties to participate
in the party-list elections. The deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission clearly bear this out, thus:

MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to

say that we suggested or proposed the party list
system because we wanted to open up the political
system to a pluralistic society through a multiparty
system. x x x We are for opening up the system,
and we would like very much for the sectors to
be there. That is why one of the ways to do that is
to put a ceiling on the number of representatives
from any single party that can sit within the 50
allocated under the party list system. x x x.
xxx
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, the candidacy
for the 198 seats is not limited to political parties.
My question is this: Are we going to classify for
example Christian Democrats and Social Democrats
as political parties? Can they run under the party list
concept or must they be under the district legislation
side of it only?
MR. VILLACORTA. In reply to that query, I think
these parties that the Commissioner mentioned can
field candidates for the Senate as well as for the
House of Representatives. Likewise, they can also
field sectoral candidates for the 20 percent or 30
percent, whichever is adopted, of the seats that
we are allocating under the party list system.
MR. MONSOD. In other words, the Christian
Democrats can field district candidates and can also
participate in the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. Why not? When they come
to the party list system, they will be fielding only

sectoral candidates.
MR. MONSOD. May I be clarified on that? Can
UNIDO participate in the party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. Yes, why not? For as long as
they field candidates who come from the
different marginalized sectors that we shall
designate in this Constitution.
MR. MONSOD. Suppose Senator Taada wants to
run under BAYAN group and says that he represents
the farmers, would he qualify?
MR. VILLACORTA. No, Senator Taada would not
qualify.
MR. MONSOD. But UNIDO can field candidates
under the party list system and say Juan dela Cruz is
a farmer. Who would pass on whether he is a farmer
or not?
MR. TADEO. Kay Commissioner Monsod, gusto
ko lamang linawin ito. Political parties,
particularly minority political parties, are not
prohibited to participate in the party list election
if they can prove that they are also organized
along sectoral lines.
MR. MONSOD. What the Commissioner is saying
is that all political parties can participate because it
is precisely the contention of political parties that
they represent the broad base of citizens and that all
sectors are represented in them. Would the
Commissioner agree?

MR. TADEO. Ang punto lamang namin, pag

pinayagan mo ang UNIDO na isang political party,
it will dominate the party list at mawawalang saysay
din yung sector. Lalamunin mismo ng political
parties ang party list system. Gusto ko lamang
bigyan ng diin ang reserve. Hindi ito reserve seat sa
marginalized sectors. Kung titingnan natin itong
198 seats, reserved din ito sa political parties.
MR. MONSOD. Hindi po reserved iyon kasi
anybody can run there. But my question to
Commissioner Villacorta and probably also to
Commissioner Tadeo is that under this system,
would UNIDO be banned from running under the
party list system?
MR. VILLACORTA. No, as I said, UNIDO may
field sectoral candidates. On that condition
alone, UNIDO may be allowed to register for the
party list system.
MR. MONSOD. May I inquire from Commissioner
Tadeo if he shares that answer?
MR. TADEO. The same.
MR. VILLACORTA. Puwede po ang UNIDO,
pero sa sectoral lines.
xxxx
MR. OPLE. x x x In my opinion, this will also
create the stimulus for political parties and mass
organizations to seek common ground. For

example, we have the PDP-Laban and the UNIDO.

I see no reason why they should not be able to make
common goals with mass organizations so that the
very leadership of these parties can be transformed
through the participation of mass organizations.
And if this is true of the administration parties, this
will be true of others like the Partido ng Bayan
which is now being formed. There is no question
that they will be attractive to many mass
organizations. In the opposition parties to which we
belong, there will be a stimulus for us to contact
mass organizations so that with their participation,
the policies of such parties can be radically
transformed because this amendment will create
conditions that will challenge both the mass
organizations and the political parties to come
together. And the party list system is certainly
available, although it is open to all the parties. It is
understood that the parties will enter in the roll of
the COMELEC the names of representatives of
mass organizations affiliated with them. So that we
may, in time, develop this excellent system that they
have in Europe where labor organizations and
cooperatives, for example, distribute themselves
either in the Social Democratic Party and the
Christian Democratic Party in Germany, and their
very presence there has a transforming effect upon
the philosophies and the leadership of those parties.
It is also a fact well known to all that in the United
States, the AFL-CIO always vote with the
Democratic Party. But the businessmen, most of
them, always vote with the Republican Party,
meaning that there is no reason at all why political
parties and mass organizations should not combine,

reenforce, influence and interact with each other so

that the very objectives that we set in this
Constitution for sectoral representation are achieved
in a wider, more lasting, and more institutionalized
way. Therefore, I support this [Monsod-Villacorta]
amendment. It installs sectoral representation as a
constitutional gift, but at the same time, it
challenges the sector to rise to the majesty of being
elected representatives later on through a party list
system; and even beyond that, to become actual
political parties capable of contesting political
power in the wider constitutional arena for major
political parties.
x x x [32] (Emphasis supplied)

R.A. No. 7941 provided the details for the concepts put
forward by the Constitutional Commission. Section 3 of
R.A. No. 7941 reads:
Definition of Terms. (a) The party-list system is a
mechanism of proportional representation in the
election of representatives to the House of
Representatives from national, regional and sectoral
parties or organizations or coalitions thereof
registered with the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC). Component parties or organizations
of a coalition may participate independently
provided the coalition of which they form part does
not participate in the party-list system.
(b) A party means either a political party or a
sectoral party or a coalition of parties.
(c) A political party refers to an organized group of
citizens advocating an ideology or platform,

principles and policies for the general conduct of

government and which, as the most immediate
means of securing their adoption, regularly
nominates and supports certain of its leaders and
members as candidates for public office.
It is a national party when its constituency is spread
over the geographical territory of at least a majority
of the regions. It is a regional party when its
constituency is spread over the geographical
territory of at least a majority of the cities and
provinces comprising the region.
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of
citizens belonging to any of the sectors enumerated
in Section 5 hereof whose principal advocacy
pertains to the special interests and concerns of their
sector,
(e) A sectoral organization refers to a group of
citizens or a coalition of groups of citizens who
share similar physical attributes or characteristics,
employment, interests or concerns.
(f) A coalition refers to an aggrupation of duly
registered national, regional, sectoral parties or
organizations for political and/or election purposes.

Congress, in enacting R.A. No. 7941, put the three-seat

cap to prevent any party from dominating the party-list
elections.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits
major political parties from participating in the party-list

system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution

clearly intended the major political parties to participate
in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. In
fact, the members of the Constitutional Commission
voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats, and in
the alternative the reservation of the party-list system to
the sectoral groups.[33] In defining a party that
participates in party-list elections as either a political
party or a sectoral party, R.A. No. 7941 also clearly
intended that major political parties will participate in
the party-list elections. Excluding the major political
parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the
Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional
Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot
engage in socio-political engineering and judicially
legislate the exclusion of major political parties from the
party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution
and the law.
Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of
the Constitutional Commission state that major political
parties are allowed to establish, or form coalitions with,
sectoral organizations for electoral or political purposes.
There should not be a problem if, for example, the
Liberal Party participates in the party-list election
through the Kabataang Liberal ng Pilipinas (KALIPI),
its sectoral youth wing. The other major political parties
can thus organize, or affiliate with, their chosen sector
or sectors. To further illustrate, the Nacionalista Party

can establish a fisherfolk wing to participate in the

party-list election, and this fisherfolk wing can field its
fisherfolk nominees. Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino
(KAMPI) can do the same for the urban poor.
The qualifications of party-list nominees are prescribed
in Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941:
Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person
shall be nominated as party-list representative
unless he is a natural born citizen of the Philippines,
a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a
period of not less than one (1) year immediately
preceding the day of the elections, able to read and
write, bona fide member of the party or organization
which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90)
days preceding the day of the election, and is at
least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the
election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at
least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty
(30) years of age on the day of the election. Any
youth sectoral representative who attains the age of
thirty (30) during his term shall be allowed to
continue until the expiration of his term.

Under Section 9 of R.A. No. 7941, it is not necessary

that the party-list organizations nominee wallow in
poverty, destitution and infirmity[34] as there is no
financial status required in the law. It is enough that the
nominee of the sectoral party/organization/coalition

belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented

sectors,[35] that is, if the nominee represents the
fisherfolk, he or she must be a fisherfolk, or if the
nominee represents the senior citizens, he or she must be
a senior citizen.
Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates
the filling-up of the entire 20% allocation of party-list
representatives found in the Constitution. The
Constitution, in paragraph 1, Section 5 of Article VI, left
the determination of the number of the members of the
House of Representatives to Congress: The House of
Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by
law, x x x. The 20% allocation of party-list
representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list
representatives cannot be more than 20% of the
members of the House of Representatives. However, we
cannot allow the continued existence of a provision in
the law which will systematically prevent the
constitutionally allocated 20% party-list representatives
from being filled. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to
the number of seats that a qualified party-list
organization may occupy, remains a valid statutory
device that prevents any party from dominating the
party-list elections. Seats for party-list representatives
shall thus be allocated in accordance with the procedure
used in Table 3 above.

However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to

continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing major
political parties from participating in the party-list
elections, directly or indirectly. Those who voted to
continue disallowing major political parties from the
party-list elections joined Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno
in his separate opinion. On the formula to allocate partylist seats, the Court is unanimous in concurring with this
ponencia.
WHEREFORE, we PARTIALLY GRANT the
petition. We SET ASIDE the Resolution of the
COMELEC dated 3 August 2007 in NBC No. 07-041
(PL) as well as the Resolution dated 9 July 2007 in NBC
No. 07-60. We declare unconstitutional the two percent
threshold in the distribution of additional party-list seats.
The allocation of additional seats under the Party-List
System shall be in accordance with the procedure used
in Table 3 of this Decision. Major political parties are
disallowed from participating in party-list elections.
This Decision is immediately executory. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice

CONSUELO YNARES
Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VEL
Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONA
Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M
Associate

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution,
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice