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PIGA
Taxation I
VINCENT Q. PIGA
Taxation I
In 1985, the tax exemption was revived. It was again removed in 1987 by virtue of Executive
Order 93 which again provided that upon FIRB recommendation it can again be restored. In
the same year, FIRB resolved to restore the exemption. The same was approved by
President Corazon Aquino through Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig, Jr. acting as her
alter ego. Ernesto Maceda assailed the FIRB resolution averring that the power granted to
the FIRB is an undue delegation of legislative power. Macedas claim was strengthened by
Opinion 77 issued by then DOJ Secretary Sedfrey Ordoez. Macaraig however did not give
credence to the opinion issued by the DOJ secretary.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Executive Secretary can validly ignore the legal opinion of the
Justice Secretary.
RULING: Yes. The Supreme Court first ruled that there is no undue delegation of legislative
power. First of all, since the NAPOCOR is a GOCC and is non-profit it can be exempt from
taxation. Also, Opinion 77 issued by DOJ Secretary Ordoez was validly overruled by
Macaraig. This action by Macaraig is valid because the Executive Secretary, by authority of
the President, has the power to modify, alter or reverse the construction of a statute given by
a department secretary pursuant to the presidents control power.
VINCENT Q. PIGA
Taxation I
On the basis of the tax exemption granted by the Secretary of Finance under Republic Act No. 3050,
petitioner filed with responded on June 21, 1963 a claim for tax at of the compensating taxes amounting to P
83,629.00. The Commissioner's argues that AFC cannot enjoy simultaneous tax exemtions under the two
EOs and refused to issue a letter of tax credit alleging that the 50% tax exemption availed under RA 901
precludes the company from availing full tax credit from RA 3050. Therefore the tax claim should be
adjusted to cover only 50%.
On June 22, 1963, the day after petitioner had filed its for tax credit with respondent, petitioner filed a
petition for review with this Court seek an order to compel respondent to issue the corresponding letter of tax
credit.
The Commissioner's argues that AFC cannot enjoy simultaneous tax exemtions under the two EOs.
ISSUE:
WON PETITIONER HAS IN EFFECT ABANDONED AND GIVEN UP ITS PARTIAL EXEMPTION
PRIVILEGE UNDER REPUBLIC ACT NO. 901 BY SEEKING TO APPLY ITS TAX EXEMPTION UNDER
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3050.
RULING:
The Commissioner's contention is without merit. Department, Order No. 105 issued by the Secretary of
Finance expressly directed fertilizer manufacturers enjoying benefits under R.A. No. 901 to likewise apply for
the benefits of R.A. No. 3050.
In compliance with said directive, AFC filed its application for total exemption under R. A. No. 3050 which
was granted by the Secretary of Finance. R. A. No. 901 grants partial exemption while R. A. 3050 grants
total exemption. Once a manufacturer of fertilizer chose to come under R. A. 3050, his partial exemption
under R. A. 901 ceased. When AFC availed of the total exemption under R. A. No. 3050, it has in effect
given up the partial exemption which it was enjoying under R. A. No. 901. In effect, he enjoyed only one
exemption benefit, the full exemption under R. A. No. 3050.
Therefore, the SC affirmed the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals.
5. Ormoc Sugar Company Inc. vs. The Treasurer of Ormoc City et al.
G.R. No. 23794, February 17, 1968
Facts: The Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance No. 4 imposing on any
and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in
Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to USA
and other foreign countries. Payments for said tax were made, under protest, by Ormoc
Sugar Company, Inc. Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed before the Court of
First Instance of Leyte a complaint against theCity of Ormoc as well as its Treasurer,
Municipal Board and Mayor alleging that the ordinance is unconstitutional for being
violative of the equal protection clause and the rule of uniformity of taxation. The court
rendered a decision that upheld the constitutionality of theordinance. Hence, this appeal.
Issue: Whether or not constitutional limits on the power of taxation, specifically the
equal protection clause and rule of uniformity of taxation, were infringed?
Ruling: Yes. Equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated
and does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a
classification is reasonable where 1) it is based upon substantial distinctions; 2) these are
germane to the purpose of the law; 3) the classification applies not only to present
conditions, but also to future conditions substantially identical to those present; and 4) the
classification applies only to those who belong to the same class. A perusal of the
requisites shows that the questioned ordinance does not meet them, for it taxes only
centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none
other. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any
subsequently established sugar central for the coverage of the tax.
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VINCENT Q. PIGA
Taxation I