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Marcos
G.R. No. L-26100. February 28, 1969
FACTS:
On July 25, 1961, the Director of Lands in the Court of First
Instance of Baguio instituted the reopening of the cadastral
proceedings under Republic Act 931. It is not disputed that the
land here involved was amongst those declared public lands
by final decision rendered in that case on November 13, 1922.
Respondent Belong Lutes petitioned the cadastral court to
reopen said Civil Reservation Case No. 1 as to the parcel of
land he claims and prayed that the land be registered in his
name.
On December 18, 1961, private petitioners Francisco G.
Joaquin, Sr., Francisco G. Joaquin, Jr., and Teresita J.
Buchholz registered opposition to the reopening. The
petitioners questioned the cadastral court's jurisdiction over the
petition to reopen.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the reopening petition was filed outside the 40
year period preceding the approval of Republic Act 931.
HELD:
Yes. The cadastral proceedings sought to be reopened were
instituted on April 12, 1912. Final decision was rendered on
November 13, 1922. Lutes filed the petition to reopen on July
25, 1961. It will be noted that the title of R.A. 931 authorizes
"the filing in the proper court, under certain conditions, of
certain claims of title to parcels of land that have been declared
public land, by virtue of judicial decisions rendered within the
forty years next preceding the approval of this Act." The body
of the statute, however, in its Section 1, speaks of parcels of
land that "have been, or are about to be declared land of the
public domain, by virtue of judicial proceedings instituted within
the forty years next preceding the approval of this Act." There
thus appears to be a seeming inconsistency between title and
body.
It has been observed that "in modern practice the title is
adopted by the Legislature, more thoroughly read than the act
itself. R.A. 931 is a piece of remedial legislation and it should
receive blessings of liberal construction. The court says that
lingual imperfections in the drafting of a statute should never
be permitted to hamstring judicial search for legislative intent,
which can otherwise be discovered. Republic Act 931, claims
of title that may be filed thereunder embrace those parcels of
land that have been declared public land "by virtue of judicial
decisions rendered within the forty years next preceding the
approval of this Act." Therefore, by that statute, the July 25,
1961 petition of respondent Belong Lutes to reopen Civil
Reservation Case No. 1, GLRO Record No. 211 of the
cadastral court of Baguio, the decision on which was rendered
on November 13, 1922, comes within the 40-year period.
Central Capiz v. Ramirez
G.R. No. 16197. March 12, 1920
FACTS:
The petitioner alleges and respondent admits that on or about
July 1, 1919, the latter contracted with the petitioner to supply
to it for a term of thirty years all sugar cane produced upon her
plantation. Said contract was recorded in the Registry of
Property. In the interim the execution of said contract,Act No.
2874 of the Philippine Legislature, known as the "Public Land
Act," became effective. The respondent, while admitting said
contract and her obligation thereunder to execute a deed
pursuant thereto, bases her refusal so to do upon the fact that
more than 61 per cent of the capital stock of the petitioner is
held and owned by persons who are not citizens of the
Philippine Islands or of the United States.
ISSUES:
Section 292 of the Tax Code should be computed from the time
of filing the Adjustment Return or Annual Income Tax Return
and final payment of income tax. The Court states that statutes
should receive a sensible construction, such as will give effect
to the legislative intention and so as to avoid an unjust or an
absurd conclusion. Where there is ambiguity, such
interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be
adopted. The intention of the legislator must be ascertained
from the whole text of the law and every part of the act is to be
taken into view. Section 292 should be interpreted in relation to
the other provisions of the Tax Code in order to give effect to
legislative intent and to avoid an application of the law which
may lead to inconvenience and absurdity.
In the case at bar, the amount of P247,010.00 claimed by
private respondent TMX Sales, Inc. based on its Adjustment
Return required in Section 87, is equivalent to the tax paid
during the first quarter. A literal application of Section 292
would thus pose no problem as the two-year prescriptive
period reckoned from the time the quarterly income tax was
paid can be easily determined. However, if the quarter in which
the overpayment is made, cannot be ascertained, then a literal
application of Section 292 would lead to absurdity and
inconvenience.
The most reasonable and logical application of the law would
be to compute the two-year prescriptive period at the time of
filing the Final Adjustment Return or the Annual Income Tax
Return, when it can be finally ascertained if the taxpayer has
still to pay additional income tax or if he is entitled to a refund
of overpaid income tax.
Florentino v. PNB
G.R. No. L-8782. April 28, 1956
FACTS:
The petitioners and appellants filed a petition for mandamus
against Philippine National Bank to compel it to accept the
backpay certificate of petitioner Marcelino B. Florentino to pay
an indebtedness in the sum of P6,800 secured by real estate
mortgage plus interest. The debt incurred on January 2, 1953,
which is due on January 2, 1954. Petitioner is a holder of
Backpay Acknowledgment No. 1721 dated October 6, 1954, in
the amount of P22,896.33 by virtue of Republic Act No. 897
approved on June 20, 1953. Petitioners offered to pay their
loan with the respondent bank with their backpay certificate,
but the respondent bank, on December 29, 1953, refused to
accept the latter's backpay certificate. Under section 2 of
Republic Act No. 879, respondent-appellee contends that the
qualifying clause refers to all the antecedents, whereas the
appellant's contention is that it refers only to the last
antecedent.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the clause who may be willing to accept the
same for settlement refers to all antecedents mentioned in the
last sentence of section 2 of Republic Act No. 879.
HELD:
No. Grammatically, the qualifying clause refers only to the last
antecedent; that is, "any citizen of the Philippines or any
association or corporation organized under the laws of the
Philippines." It should be noted that there is a comma before
the words "or to any citizen, etc.," which separates said phrase
from the preceding ones. But even disregarding the
grammatical construction, to make the acceptance of the
backpay certificates obligatory upon any citizen, association, or
corporation, which are not government entities or owned or
controlled by the government, would render section 2 of
Republic Act No. 897 unconstitutional for it would amount to an
impairment of the obligation of contracts by compelling private
creditors to accept a sort of promissory note payable within ten
years with interest at a rate very much lower than the current
People v. Subido
G.R. No. L-21734. September 5, 1975.
FACTS:
On September 27, 1958, the accused-appellant filed a motion
praying that (1) the court enter of record that the judgment of
the Court of Appeals has been promulgated and (2) that his
appeal bond be cancelled. Accused-appellant argued that
although he could not pay the fine and the indemnity
prescribed in the judgment of the Court of Appeals, he could
not be required to serve the amount of fine and indemnity in
the form of subsidiary imprisonment because said judgment
did not expressly and specifically provide that he should serve
the fine and indemnity in form of subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency.
On December 10, 1959, the offended party registered its
opposition to accused-appellant's motion for cancellation of
appeal bond and asked the lower court to require accusedappellant to pay the fine of P500.00 and the indemnity of
P5,000.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The lower court issued an order denying the accusedappellant's motion and declared in accordance with the terms
of the judgment of the Court of Appeals that the accusedappellant has to suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case he
could not pay the fine and indemnity prescribed in the decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused-appellant can be required to serve
the fine and indemnity in form of subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency.
HELD:
No. Under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code "a libel
committed by means of writing, printing, litography, engraving,
radio,
phonograph,
paintings,
theatrical
exhibition,
cinematographic exhibition or any similar means, shall be
punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium
period or a fine ranging from 200 to 6000 pesos or both, in
addition to the civil action which may be brought by the
offended party". It is evident from the foregoing provision that
the court is given the discretion to impose the penalty of
imprisonment or fine or both for the crime of libel. It will be
noted that the lower court chose to impose upon the accused:
three months ofarresto mayor; a fine of P500.00;
indemnification of the offended party in the sum of P10,000.00;
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and the
payment of the costs. On the other hand, the Court of Appeals
in the exercise of its discretion decided to eliminate the penalty
of three (3) months arresto mayor and to reduce the indemnity
of P10,000.00 to P5,000.00.
A careful scrutiny of the decision of the trial court reveals that
the clause "with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency"
is separated by a comma from the preceding clause" is hereby
sentenced to three months ofarresto mayor with the accessory
penalties of the law, to pay a fine of five hundred (P500.00)
US v. Hart
G.R. No. L-8848, November 21, 1913
Facts:
The appellants, Hart, Miller, and Natividad, were found guilty
on a charge of vagrancy under theprovisions of Act No. 519. All
three appealed and presented evidence showing that each of
thedefendants was earning a living at a lawful trade or
business sufficient enough to supportthemselves. However, the
Attorney-General defended his clients by arguing that in
Section 1 of Act No. 519, the phrase no visible means of
support only applies to the clause tramping or straying
through the country and not thefirst clause which states that
every person foundloitering about saloons or dram shops or
gambling houses, thus making the 3 appellants guiltyof
vagrancy. He further argued that it been intended for without
visible means of support to qualify the first part of the clause,
either the comma after gambling houses would have been
omitted, or else a comma after country would have been
inserted.
Issue:
WON Hart, Miller and Natividad are guilty of vagrancy under
the Attorney-Generals argument based on a mere grammatical
criticism.
Held:
An argument based upon punctuation alone is not conclusive
and the effect intended by the Legislature should be the
relevant determinant of the interpretation of the law. When the
meaning of a legislative enactment is in question, it is the duty
of the courts to ascertain, if possible, the true legislative
intention, and adopt that construction of the statute which will
give iteffect. Moreover, ascertaining the consequences flowing
from such a construction of the law is also helpful in
determining the soundness of the reasoning. Considering that
the argument of the Attorney-General would suggest a lack of
logical classification on the part of the legislature of the various
classes of vagrants and since it was proven that all three of the
defendants were earning a living by legitimate means at a level
of comfort higher than usual, Hart, Miller and Natividad were
acquitted, with the costs
de oficio.
Fule v. CA
Facts:
FACTS:
The petitioner Colgate-Palmolive Philippines imported from
abroad various materials such as irish moss extract, sodium
benzoate, sodium saccharinate precipitated calcium carbonate
and dicalcium phosphate, for use as stabilizers and flavoring of
the dental cream it manufactures. For every importation made
of these materials, the petitioner paid to the Central Bank of
the Philippines the 17% special excise tax on the foreign
exchange used for the payment of the cost, transportation and
other charges incident thereto, pursuant to Republic Act No.
601, as amended, commonly known as the Exchange Tax Law.
The petitioner filed with the Central Bank three applications for
refund of the 17% special excise tax it had paid. The auditor of
the Central Bank, refused to pass in audit its claims for refund
fixed by the Officer-in-Charge of the Exchange Tax
Administration, on the theory that toothpaste stabilizers and
flavors are not exempt under section 2 of the Exchange Tax
Law.
Petitioner appealed to the Auditor General, but the latter
affirmed the ruling of the auditor of the Central Bank,
maintaining that the term stabilizer and flavors mentioned in
section 2 of the Exchange Tax Law refers only to those used in
the preparation or manufacture of food or food products. Not
satisfied, the petitioner brought the case to the Supreme Court
thru the present petition for review.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the foreign exchange used by petitioner for the
importation of dental cream stabilizers and flavors is exempt
from the 17% special excise tax imposed by the Exchange Tax
Law (Republic Act No. 601).
HELD:
YES. The decision under review was reversed.
RATIO:
General and special terms. The ruling of the Auditor General
that the term stabilizer and flavors as used in the law refers
only to those materials actually used in the preparation or
manufacture of food and food products is based, apparently,
on the principle of statutory construction that general terms
may be restricted by specific words, with the result that the
general language will be limited by the specific language which
indicates the statutes object and purpose. The rule, however,
is applicable only to cases where, except for one general term,
all the items in an enumeration belong to or fall under one
specific class (ejusdem generis). In the case at bar, it is true
that the term stabilizer and flavors is preceded by a number
of articles that may be classified as food or food products, but it
is likewise true that the other items immediately following it do
not belong to the same classification.
The rule of construction that general and unlimited terms are
restrained and limited by particular recitals when used in
connection with them, does not require the rejection of general
terms entirely. It is intended merely as an aid in ascertaining
the intention of the legislature and is to be taken in connection
with other rules of construction.
Issue:
Whether the sale should be nullified on the ground of fraud
Held:
A contract of sale is perfected at the moment there is a
meeting of the minds upon the thing which is the object of the
contract and upon the price. Being consensual, a contract of
sale has the force of law between the contracting parties and
they are expected to abide in good faith by their respective
contractual commitments. It is evident from the facts of the
case that there was a meeting of the minds between petitioner
and Dr. Cruz. As such, they are bound by the contract unless
there are reasons or circumstances that warrant its
nullification.
Contracts that are voidable or annullable, even though there
may have been no damage to the contracting parties are: (1)
those where one of the parties is incapable of giving consent to
a contract; and (2) those where the consent is vitiated by
mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud. The
records, however, are bare of any evidence manifesting that
private respondents employed such insidious words or
machinations to entice petitioner into entering the contract of
barter. It was in fact petitioner who resorted to machinations to
convince Dr. Cruz to exchange her jewelry for the Tanay
property.
Furthermore, petitioner was afforded the reasonable
opportunity required in Article 1584 of the Civil Code within
which to examine the jewelry as he in fact accepted them when
asked by Dr. Cruz if he was satisfied with the same. By taking
the jewelry outside the bank, petitioner executed an act which
was more consistent with his exercise of ownership over it.
This gains credence when it is borne in mind that he himself
had earlier delivered the Tanay property to Dr. Cruz by affixing
his signature to the contract of sale. That after two hours he
later claimed that the jewelry was not the one he intended in
exchange for his Tanay property, could not sever the juridical
tie that now bound him and Dr. Cruz. The nature and value of
the thing he had taken preclude its return after that
supervening period within which anything could have
happened, not excluding the alteration of the jewelry or its
being switched with an inferior kind.
Ownership over the parcel of land and the pair of emerald-cut
diamond earrings had been transferred to Dr. Cruz and
petitioner, respectively, upon the actual and constructive
delivery thereof. Said contract of sale being absolute in nature,
title passed to the vendee upon delivery of the thing sold since
there was no stipulation in the contract that title to the property
sold has been reserved in the seller until full payment of the
price or that the vendor has the right to unilaterally resolve the
contract the moment the buyer fails to pay within a fixed
period.
While it is true that the amount of P40,000.00 forming part of
the consideration was still payable to petitioner, its nonpayment
by Dr. Cruz is not a sufficient cause to invalidate the contract or
bar the transfer of ownership and possession of the things
Each local government unit shall have the power to create its
own source of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and other
charges subject to such guidelines and limitation as the
congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy on local
autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue
exclusively to the local government.
A close reading of the above provision does not violate local
autonomy (particularly on taxing powers) as it was clearly
stated that the taxing power of LGUs are subject to such
guidelines and limitation as Congress may provide.
Further, the City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation
has no inherent right to impose taxes. The Charter of the City
of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be
stressed that municipal corporations are mere creatures of
Congress which has the power to create and abolish
municipal corporations due to its general legislative powers.
Congress, therefore, has the power of control over Local
governments. And if Congress can grant the City of Manila the
power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions
or even take back the power.
Further still, local governments have no power to tax
instrumentalities of the National Government. PAGCOR is a
government owned or controlled corporation with an original
charter, PD 1869. All of its shares of stocks are owned by the
National Government. Otherwise, its operation might be
burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a mere Local
government.
This doctrine emanates from the supremacy of the National
Government over local governments.
Doctrine of Implications. That which is plainly implied in the
language of a statute is as much a part of it as that which is
expressed. Every statute is understand by implication to
contain all such provision as may be necessary to effectuate to
its object and purpose, or to make effective rights, powers,
privileges or jurisdiction which it grants, including all such
collateral and subsidiary consequences as may be fairly and
logically inferred from its terms. The principle is expressed in
the maxim EX NECESSITATE LEGIS or from the necessity of
the law.