Papal Diplomacy: The Holy See in World

Politics
Mariano Barbato, Babes-Bolyai-University, Cluj-Napoca / University of Passau
IPSA XXIInd World Conference of Political Science, July 9 2012, Madrid1
Draft, please do not quote, comments welcome: mariano@barbato.de

Abstract
There are many religious actors in world politics but one of them represents more than one billion
people, has an historical record as a political actor, is the only religious actor with a special status to
the UN, has full diplomatic relations to most states, acts as a norm entrepreneur on the global public
sphere and nevertheless attracts almost no attention from IR scholars: the Holy See. The paper
argues that through the study of this actor one can learn how the international society emerged from
European Christendom, that is, how diplomacy became a rather secular enterprise without excluding
its religious heritage, being thus open for the importance of religion in the process of globalization.
The case of the Holy See can show that religious actors always played a role the international society,
indeed, this actor ensured that a kind of transnational governance was right from the start part of
diplomacy. Mainly against this actor the idea of a sovereign state system without transnational
aspects was fought for but with very limited success. The analysis starts from the perspective of
Hurrells interpretation of the English school and constructivism (2007) which combines the
perspective of international relations and global governance with the focus on norms but misses the
importance of religious actors for both realms. The paper will use historical and contemporary
examples to illuminate the influence of the Holy See on international relation and the global public
sphere

Introduction: The Pope in International Relations

There is an anti-Roman temper that has nourished the struggle against popery, Jesuitism and
clericalism with a host of religious and political forces, that has impelled European history for
centuries.2 Carl Schmitt's remark holds still true for the mainstream of the discipline of international
relations. Whereas it seems that the return of religion in secular politics has reluctantly been
accepted,3 the persistent influence of the Holy See as a player in world politics and its rise in the
emerging global public sphere are still largely neglected. A major exception was the UN Conference
on Population and Development in Cairo in 1994, where the papal influence on the conferences
debate and result attracted wider attention.4 The hostile reaction was however very much in line
1

Earlier versions of the paper have been presented at the ECPR-Conference in Reykjavik 8/11, at the ISA
Convention in San Diego 4/12, to my students at the University of Passau. I am thankful for all comments,
errors are still mine.
2
Schmitt (1996: 3)
3
Petito/ Hatzopoulos (2003), Snyder (2011a).
4
Neale (1998).

with Carl Schmitts observation, lending support to Philipp Jenkins suspicion that anti-Catholicism
might be the last accepted prejudice.5 Over the last forty years there is only a thin strand of literature
in IR which keeps an eye on the eminent role of the Holy See in world politics, most prominently Ivan
Valliers piece in International Organization and Keohane and Nyes seminal book on transnational
actors in the early 1970s 6 and more recently Alan Chong and Jodok Troys study on the Holy See in
the UN in Religion, Politics, and Ideology.7
The limited interest of IR scholarship is particularly astonishing as the Holy See is the transnational
head institution of one billion people, has an historical record as an eminent political actor, is the
only religious actor with a special status to the UN, has full diplomatic relations to almost all states
(China and Saudi-Arabia are the only major powers without such ties) and acts as a norm
entrepreneur on the global public sphere. The Holy See, literally the cathedra, the chair of St. Peter,
means the pope as a person including his higher administrative staff who acts as a sovereign within
his church, within his city state, and particularly within the international society of states. The pope
as a person has the status of a juridical personality in international affairs.8 This makes him a very
special actor in the global political sphere being a peer in the society of states and at the same time a
genuine transnational actor across almost all countries. The emerging global public sphere of the
information age gave this actor, around in the public discourse since the European Medieval Ages, a
global stage which never has existed before. Being able to enter this stage from different angles and
in different roles, the papal soft power is significantly increasing. IR still misses out a vibrant actor
whose soft power was already famously ignored by Stalin. Winston Churchill reported that Stalin
ridiculed: How many divisions has the pope?, and he added in his memories that there might be
some invisible legions that should not be neglected.9 Given the impact of John Paul II on the decline
on communism and the Soviet empire, Churchills advice should have been listened to not only by
Stalin and his successors but by IR scholars and practitioner in general.
Both Jodok Troy and Andreas Sommeregger examine the soft power of the pope. 10 This paper
develops these actor-orientated approaches into a more structural direction, based on a
constructivist methodological agenda and with an interest in the history of the international order in
the tradition of the English School. Soft power is constructed by a praxis of claiming and accepting
authority. This praxis shapes not only the power of the actor but the power structure of the system
itself. From such a structural perspective Jack Snyder made the argument that even neorealists
should care about religion,11 an argument which can be extended to the Holy See. Papal diplomacy
receives its power from its persuasive principles but also from the participation in the praxis of world
politics. The Holy See's principles and its very actorness are shaped by this participation, but at the
same time this actor with its principles also shapes the public sphere of world politics through its
participation. The soft power of the Holy See is rather an Arendtian than a Weberian version of
power. The Holy See has no means at hand to coerce. Its power emerges from the acceptance of its
status by an intertwined social praxis of faithful who accept it as superior and states who accept it as
a peer. As Andrew Hurrell put it: Power is, after all, a social attribute. To understand power in
5

Jenkins, (2003)
Vallier (1971, 1972)
7
Chong/Troy (2011).
8
Arajou (2001). See also Arajou/Lucal (20051-16).
9
Troy (2010:492-493).
10
Troy (2010), Sommeregger (2011).
11
Snyder (2011b: 7-14)
6

international relations, we must place it side by side with other quintessentially social concepts as
prestige, authority, and legitimacy.12 Hurrell adds a quote by Martin Wight to drive this point home
against the flawed power concept of realism: Power is not self-justifying; it must be justified by
reference to some source outside or beyond itself, and thus be transformed into authority. 13 Bruce
Hall showed in an eminent article how papal authority was born out of the conceptual shifts of
Medieval Europe and how it was able to provide a transnational concept of moral authority which
was able to give meaning and direction to military and economic power, for instance by pacifying the
knights and re-inventing them as crusaders.14 I do not claim that the Holy See has such a position or
will gain a comparable standing in the recently proclaimed Gods century15 of today. What I do
claim is the importance of its transnational moral authority for the global age. This continues the
argument of Hall that even in the age of nation states, the transnational legitimization of power was
ubiquitous from Woodrow Wilsons Making the world safe for democracy to the free world vs.
communism contestation of the Cold War.16 The global transformation has of course its ideational
driving forces from cosmopolitanism, human rights, free markets, and the social networks of the
internet community. However, a secular version of cosmopolitanism which places religions at the
position of resistant parochial powers that are particularistic like nations or maybe better clans and
tribes misses out on the vibrant ambition of world religions to be of universal relevance. World
religions in general will compete with the secular ideas of global legitimacy and complement them.
Secularization theory, as we know it, has already been falsified.17
The Holy See with its special status is such an authority from which global governance can gain
legitimacy, both by reference and by its participation as a genuine transnational actor. Actually,
claiming to be the Vicar of Christ, the Holy See understands itself as the highest spiritual authority on
earth legitimized by heaven. While there is no longer a direct claim to political power, this selfconception has indirect political consequences. Less controversially, the Holy See's authority is based
on its influence on more than one billion Catholics who believe in the special status of the Holy See,
and who are addressable in many political questions.18 Moreover, the authority of the Holy See is
based on the ability to engage and persuade secular thinkers as well as adherents of other religions.19
One does not need to believe in the Vicar of Christ to understand that a monarchical figure whose
soft power addresses more than one billion people directly and has in recent decades managed to
keep up with the population growth in the global South might have something to say to remaining
billions. The Holy Sees position in the international arena can indicate the basic rule of the game. Its
importance is not only an indicator for the role religion in general or Catholicism in particular plays in
world politics. The impact of the Holy See shows the structural transformation of world politics from
the European Medieval Ages to the raise of the nation state, Western imperialism and the
emergence of a global public sphere in which the Global South has a voice and speaks sometimes
12

Hurrell (2007: 38)

Wight (1991: 99) quoted after Hurrell (2007: 38).
14
Hall, (1997:605-609).
15
Toft/Philpott/Shah (2011)
16
Hall (1997: 619).
17
Berger (1999), Norris/Inglehart (2004).
18
Not all Catholics support equally the Holy See's positions on capital punishment, abortion, war, and social
justice, particularly in the US there seems to be a gulf between these supportive in the first two and those in
the second two issues.
19
On the funeral of John Paul II not only a huge crowed participated in Rome and maybe two billion saw it via
television, also a huge number of chief of states and religious leader attended it, thus reflecting the huge
impact particularly this pontiff had on global politics. See George Weigel (2010: 392-393).
13

with a pretty Roman accent. The Holy See had its ups and downs, survived all turmoil of the modern
era of the nation states and is very well prepared not only to prevail in a globalized world but to
influence the current age of transformation.
Three reasons for the Holy See's relevance are of particular interest: 1.) Rooted in the European
Medieval Ages, the Holy See has an institutional memory beyond the state system from the past and
a universal missionary perspective for tomorrow. 2.) This universalist perspective has a genuine
program which nevertheless resonates with other universalist competitors. Chong and Troy call it a
Catholic version of Kantian cosmopolitanism.20 Maybe it is a cosmopolitan version which reaches
further back to the Stoics of the Ancient World. Nevertheless it developed an agenda highly up to
date for competitions which can form alliances with Kantian cosmopolitans but also with Muslim
activists for a global ummah, very flexible in some aspects but firm in others. 3.) The Holy See is
based in Rome, its church is called Roman Catholic, and its tiny city state is an Italian enclave.
Nevertheless, this former European power has its faithful increasingly in the Global South as Philip
Jenkins showed with his vision of the Next Christendom.21 This transition of power to the South is a
global phenomenon which has, however, a different perspective from a nation state perspective than
from the perspective of the Holy See. Whereas the Northern nation states have to stay in the North
and watch their decline in population, wealth and power, the Holy See stays in Rome but assembles
the world around it. Jan Ro might be right that one of the few things which remain of us Westerners
is the pope.22 The Holy See might become a crucial arbitrator in this transformation between North
and South. The role of an arbitrator, someone who builds bridges, is genuine for the 'pontiff', a term
that stems from the pagan heritage of Romes Ancient religion thus showing the Catholic ability to
integrate and adjust.
The claim of this paper is that the analysis of the actorness of the Holy See, its past and present
participation in the public sphere, and its structural position in this praxis of world politics illuminate
the transformation of international relations and the emergence of a new world order. To make good
on this claim, the paper addresses in the first section the silence of IR on the Holy See. The secular
perspective of IR has already problems to overcome its general distance to religion, and the Holy See
might be a particular embarrassment. Secondly, to shift the Holy See into the center of the debate,
Hurrells illuminating work on global values, order and agency will be used.23 In contrast to
Sommereggers work on the Holy See24 my focus is less on the soft power capacity of the actor but
more on the structural position of the Holy See within the international society and its
transformation which is close to Hurrells approach and addresses the question of power and how
agents and structure constitute each other. Hurells argumentation about the shifts and
simultaneous persistence of pluralism, solidarism, and global governance based theoretically on
constructivism and the English School provides a suitable framework for the further analysis about
how to understand moral authority and its role in conceptual transformation of global structures.
However, as typical, Hurrell's work ignores religion almost and the Holy See completely. After
anchoring my argument in the debate, I analyze in the first part the actorness of the Holy See. I
identify three major points. 1) The Holy See has a power base of one billion faithful almost all over
20

Chong/Troy (2011:348).
Jenkins (2007).
22
Ro (2008)
23
Hurrell (2007)
24
Sommeregger (2010)
21

the world with not only a territorial structure of dioceses but also with a canonical law and ethical
principles which are meant to constitute order above and on the fundaments of the states as well as
on a global public sphere. 2) The Holy See has a territorial base (the Vatican state) but cannot be
reduced to it. 3) The Holy See is accepted as a sovereign and special peer among states in diplomatic
respects. Together these three characteristics allow the Holy See a powerful multi-level game. The
focus of this actorness on the pope turns him into an international public figure which Forbes ranks
among the ten most influential figures worldwide and which also turns him in a celebrity. Not
underestimated should also be the Holy Sees financial power. There is not only an own bank system
and assets but more crucially the financial power can be understood comparable to a multi-national
non-profit company on a franchise basis. The real financial power of the Holy See stems from its legal
and moral authority as the Holy See decides which organization can rightly be understood as Catholic
and thus deserves the trust of Catholic sponsors and devotees. The second part of the study deals
with the structural aspects of international relations and its historical turning points which show that
the analysis of the Holy See can shed light on structural transformations in the development of
international relations. The Holy See was always engaged in international relations being so the salt
to refer to the biblical metaphor which turns international relations into global governance. In two
subsections the structural importance of this actor is illustrated by examples on the issue of war,
peace and revolution in the context of the Cold War and by crucial events in the emerging global
public sphere such as the UN-Conference on World Population in Cairo and the speech about reason,
religion, and violence Benedict XVI delivered in Regensburg.
The Holy See and IR debates
The Holy See has always been active in world politics to some degree and has become a visible global
player again since at least World War I. However, IR scholarship missed this topic more or less
completely. In the last years when the return of religion came into focus there was some interest in
the Catholic Church but no specific interest in the role of the Holy See. 25 IR Journals increasingly
cover papers on religion, but in the last decades very rarely articles have been devoted to the Holy
See. International Organization had in 1971 a paper by Ivan Vallier on the Catholic Church as a
transnational actor which dealt primarily with the Holy See. 26 This article was also published in
Keohane and Nyes book on world politics and transnational relations.27 David Ryall addresses the
Catholic Church as a transnational actor thirty years later.28 The Review of International Studies
published in 1998 Palenta Neals already mentioned piece on the impact of the Holy See on the UN
Conference in Cairo. The Cambridge historian John F. Pollard published an interesting piece in 2001
in Totalitarian Movements and Political Religion comparing the influence of the Holy See in both
world wars.29 Blandine Chelini-Pont, a historian of International relations, analyzed the papal
program for the European integration project in 2009. 30 Most recently the already mentioned article
of Alan Chong and Jodok Troy delivered an analysis of the relationship of the Holy See and the United
Nations.31 Some shorter pieces have been published of which Scott Applebys take on the foreign
25

Casanova's research is most prominent here (Casanova 1994). Charles Taylor's thinking is informed by his
Catholic position (Taylor 2009). Huntington (1991) claimed an impact of the Second Vatican Council on the
third wave of democratization.
26
Vallier (1971).
27
Vallier (1972).
28
Ryall (2001).
29
Pollard (2001).
30
Chelini-Pont (2009).
31
Chong/Troy (2011).

policy of John Paul II should be mentioned.32 A few articles in Law journals appeared: a rather
normative paper in the Columbian Law Journal argues fiercely for the exclusion of the Holy See from
the UN as a permanent observer.33 There is also a paper in Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 34
and some articles in Catholic law journals.35 As far as monographs are concerned Eric O. Hansens
book from 1987 seems to be the only book from a political scientist. Unfortunately, the reprint from
2006 has no update.36 Otherwise, however, the Holy See was debated only on the margins, if it was
touched at all. The path breaking work of Richard Falk for religion in IR, for instance, devoted a whole
section to Hans Kng, a suspended Catholic theologian, and his noble but rather elitist project of
world ethos, but makes only some marginal remarks about the pope with a negative timbre.37 In
German, maybe due to the German pope Joseph Ratzinger, there is one recent introduction
available38 and one theory-led book, the already mentioned work of Sommeregger on soft power.39
In German political science journals two more recent articles are available.40 Jodok Troys article uses
also the concept of Soft Power to describe the influence of the Holy See as an actor. Despite these
promising developments Scott Thomas is still right that the Holy See is unique among non-states
religious organization, but the importance of this legal status for the Vaticans role in international
affairs is not widely discussed.41 Of course, there is a vast number of publications on the papacy and
politics, however, historians, theologians, and journalist are doing the job. Why are scholars of
International Relations not interested? Instead of probing further the causes for the near absence of
these topics in IR literature, I will concentrate on what there would be to talk about and how these
topics can be engaged with relevant approaches and literature.
As Jack Snyder argued for the analysis of religion in general, realism and liberalism which are
concerned with materialist ends are rather poorly equipped to deal with these issues but should both
take note of religion for their very own conceptual reasons.42 Liberal institutionalism could develop
an interest in the Holy See as an organization despite of the secular attitude of liberalism, and the IOArticle mentioned above would be a good reference point for such a new beginning.43 The English
School with Butterfield and Wight has also a Christian legacy in this respect that is almost forgotten. 44
However, it might be a good starting point primarily for its interest in rules and norms of a pluralist
society of states, maybe changing to a more solidarist version. From the perspective on changing
constitutive rules of world politics constructivism is the most prominent starting point for such a
research agenda. Snyder rightly stated that constructivism in its Wenditan version is nevertheless not
interested in religion.45 Scott Thomas has already criticized constructivism for not being well
equipped for the analysis of religion and pleaded instead for the English School as a point of
32

Appleby (2000), See also: Dunn (1982/1983), Galligan (1985), Franco (2010), Shelledy (2004). I do not claim
to have a comprehensive overview of all book chapters see for instance: Walsh (2000).
33
Abdullah (1996).
34
Bathon (2001).
35
Araujo (2001, 2006).
36
Hanson (1987).
37
Falk (2001: 123-142).
38
Rotte (2007).
39
Sommeregger (2011).
40
Troy (2010), Kallscheuer (2005).
41
Thomas (2000a: 99).
42
Snyder (2011b:7-14, 17-19).
43
Snyder (2011b: 18-19).
44
Dunne (1998).
45
Snyder (2011b: 14-18).

reference for this task.46 However, constructivism is more than Wendt. On this opposite side of the
constructivism spectrum, which Karin Fierke termed consistent in contrast to Wendtian conventional
constructivism,47 is the place where the interest of religion can be found. From this constructivist
point of view but naming it soft constructivism vs. rule orientated constructivism and based mainly in
Nick Onuf's thinking, Vendulka Kublkov developed her approach of International Political
Theology.48 Friedrich Kratochwil together with Nick Onuf, the other founder of the consistent version
of constructivism, contributed widely to this debate on religion in world politics with a specific focus
on the historical and conceptual co-constitution of the political and the religious sphere.49 A focus on
the historical process of communities and societies reproducing and changing themselves and others
by their rule guided praxis, which is offered by the English School and consistent constructivism, is
one good starting point in the theory of International Relations to focus on the impact of religion on
international affairs. The particular advantage of the constructivist approach is the interest in a
political praxis in which the co-constitution of actors and structures takes place.
The work of Andrew Hurrell combines the tradition of the English school and the insights of
constructivism50 to debate fragmented developments from a pluralist to a solidarist society of states
and global governance including both states and transnational actors. The concomitance of
contrasting constitutive rules is crucial for Hurrells approach:
There is a political as well as a legal and moral reality to solidarist and transnational norms and,
even on purely pragmatic grounds, states need to justify their actions in terms of those norms and to
seek the legitimacy from those international bodies that are the repositories and developers of those
norms.
But, on the other side, a state-based pluralism continues to play a fundamental role in the political,
legal, and normative structure of contemporary international society. [] We are therefore not
dealing with a vanished or vanishing Westphalian world, as much transformationist writing suggests,
but rather with a world in which solidarist and cosmopolitan conceptions of governance coexist, often
rather unhappily, with many aspects of the old pluralist order.51
Hurrells concern is about changing patterns of constitutive rules and values of the global order, and
he makes the point that conflicting values and unequal power52 are in the core of his interest. In
line with constructivist and English school thinking norms are central to understanding the power to
mobilize, to justify, and to legitimize action.53 One of these global conflicts about values is the
contestation of secularism directed on the unequal power of the West. 54 There is no doubt that
religious communities with their beliefs and their practices are key entrepreneurs of norms.
However, Hurrell misses this point altogether. Hurrells book has a typical IR secular Western bias.
Religion appears only at the margins in the contexts of nationalism, identity, terrorism55 and the

46

Thomas (2000b).
Fierke (2010: 183-190).
48
Kubalokova (2000:677).
49
Kratochwil (2005), Barbato/Kratochwil (2009).
50
Hurrell (2007: 12, 17).
51
Hurrell (2007: 9).
52
Hurrell (2007: 10).
53
Hurrell (2007:18).
54
Juegensmeyer (1993).
55
Hurrell (2007:139).
47

problem of human rights vis vis a backward religious majority.56 Hurrell provides a perfect research
agenda to integrate religion and its impact on constitutive rules and changes but falls short because
of a secular bias to do this himself. Thus, his approach enables and actually almost calls for an
integration of the Holy See in IR debates of global transformation.
The key to the success of the Holy See in our age of transformation is the Holy Sees ability to play on
several levels concomitantly. The Holy See as an international actor is integrated in the pluralist
concept of the international anarchical society of states. From its internal ideational setting the Holy
See has a straightforward solidarist perspective, focusing as the Vicar of Christ not only on the
faithful on each countrys soil but speaking to all mankind on earth. Nevertheless, the Holy See is well
aware that some elements of the liberal solidarist view are strongly at odds with its perspective of
what the foundations of rules of global solidarism should be. The Holy See is also attentive towards
to the plurality of solidarist versions in general. Secular liberalism, as a child of Christian universalism,
has the same global ambition as any Christian or Muslim interpretation of the world. Each gospel is
meant for everyone. Global solidarist projects are thus not only in contestations with pluralism but
also with other solidarists. Charles Taylor made this point particularly clear in a debate with
Habermas arguing that, say Kantians are not more or less universal in scope of their claims than
Catholics.57 Despite this pluralist perspectives on overarching solidarist narratives it is obvious that an
overlapping consensus to use the Rawlsian term has to be found to deal with global problems, or
to put it in Hurrells words: global governance is best understood as a response to the increasingly
serious collective action problems generated by growing societal, ecological, and economic
interdependence.58 Crucially, Hurrell argues that the state loses its place as the privileged
sovereign institution and instead becomes one of many actors and one participant in a broader and
more complex social and legal process.59 States alone are not capable to deliver results on a global
scale. Transnational legitimacy provided by transnational actors is needed, too. The Holy See is in the
center of these issues because it is the only actor which is part of the society of states but also runs
across all states because its church structure includes faithful from any nation. In addition, the Holy
See develops and strengthens diplomatic and transnational ties to states and other transnational
actors with the clear agenda of fostering global politics and a common agency of mankind. Hence,
the Holy See is of a high relevance as an analytical focus for these changes. This can be underlined
with the three conditions Hurrell provides to foster not only a cosmopolitan vision but how to bring it
about: moral accessibility, institutional stability, and effective political agency.60 To engage this
with the Holy See, it is striking how much the papacy has moral accessibility, institutional stability
and effective political agency. The Holy See is the most centralized elite of a very established,
sophisticated global solidarism which is particularly powerful on the ground with more than one
billion faithful and an audience beyond its flock. Thus, it becomes clear that the cosmopolitan blue
print has to be engaged on a pluralistic basis with those which are already there to foster a global
community. There is already a very pluralist society of transnational solidarist actors alongside with
the pluralist society of states. The papacy forms a powerful part of both, and both are engaged in
global governance. From a straightforward secular perspective, the moral accessibility might be
challenged, adding wrongs the papacy did or failed to prevent in the past to the very recent history
56

Hurrell (2007:158).
Taylor (2011).
58
Hurrell (2007: 15).
59
Hurrell (2007: 7).
60
Hurrell (2007:12).
57

of dealing with child abuse in the church. However, this is a biased picture. For instance, the UN
general secretary Ban Ki-moon made clear that religious leaders are crucial for motivating people.61
Their moral is much more accessible for most inhabitants of the planet even if this seems hard to
imagine or concede for those only familiar with the secular version of Enlightenment. This affects
also the question of stability and agency. Some religious institutions exist since millennia and their
political agency seems to be more effective than secular ideologies or rational self-interest to
motivate people to change their behavior. What is true for religious actors in general is particularly
the case as far as the Holy See is concerned. The rise of religion replaced communism as an
alternative to the secular cosmopolitan liberal project. In contrast to the very egalitarian hierarchy of
the Muslim world, however, the Holy See has a very centralized and institutional stabilized power.
Kemal Atatrk managed to abolish the caliphate, Napoleon and Garibaldi failed to do the same with
the papacy. Thus, the Holy See as a stable institution has a political agency effective enough to foster
its moral accessibility on a global scale. The Holy Sees ambition is higher than to become a chaplain
of globalization, which it probably already is, but to shape its very constitutive rules. The Holy See has
developed a clear teaching on morality aiming at everyone and a clear understanding that global
problems have to be addressed globally within global political structures, ranging from the 1960s
encyclical Pacem in Terris of John XXIII to the encyclical Caritas in Veritate in 2009 of Benedict XVI
concerning globalization directly. In addition, the papacy developed an agenda of how to lead one
billion Catholics globally in a world church without a state like apparatus to force them to obey. The
Holy See continuously addresses the political scene, leaving much room for maneuver in some
aspects, however almost none in others. The Holy Sees political agency is not always successful but
always vocal. It is prepared to challenge other global projects from preemptive war to contraception.
The cosmopolitan project of dealing with global issues and creating a global solidarist community has
in the Holy See a counterpart that is doing the same, sometimes as a partner, sometimes as a
challenger or competitor. Thus, the Holy See is acting as part of the pluralist, the solidarist and the
global governance order and as a major player in the debates of constitutive rules of the global public
sphere. The Holy See has to be studied to understand the ongoing change from pluralist, solidarist
and global governance perspectives, and also because the Holy See itself constitutes a unique
international actor who has to be perceived in the center of the transformation of international
relations.
The Holy Sees Actorness: The Church, the Vatican State, and Diplomacy
The Economist suggested that the Holy See should declare itself as the world largest nongovernmental organization.62 It is true that the Holy See, the Santa Sede of St. Peter, means the pope
himself and not the Vatican state, as sometimes is falsely argued, or the Catholic Church. The pope as
a person has the status of an international legal person. Thus, one has to ask why the pope as a
person is granted such a legal status. The special status of the Holy See has been developing since the
Medieval Ages. It had some setbacks and crises when the Papal State was conquered first by troops
of the French Revolution in 1798, then by Napoleon in 1808 and finally by Italy in 1870. Since the end
of World War I, the Holy See has started to flourish again. After World War II and with the
61

Referring to the problems of climate change while addressing an audience of major faith groups, Ban Kimoon urged these religious leaders to use their persuasive power to convince people. We have know-how and
resources but the only vacuum is political will, that is all that is lacking. You can provoke, challenge and inspire
political leaders. [] Your potential impact is enormous. You are the leaders who can have the longest, widest
and deepest reach." Quoted in http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/nov/03/ban-ki-moon-religiousclimate-change.
62
Economist (2007).

decolonization of the world it gained an observer status at the UN and memberships with some UN
Organizations, and also developed relations to almost all states. The Lateran Treaties which
established the Vatican State in 1929 helped to develop this status, although it does not depend on
it. The pope is the sovereign in the Church and in the Vatican state. The global power and prestige of
the pope is based on its role as leader of the Catholic Church and not on its role as the monarch who
acts as a sovereign of the tiny Vatican City. The diplomatic relations of the society of states are with
the Holy See and not with the Vatican State.
Thus, the Holy See is not a non-governmental organization but actually head of a very specific
governmental organization. The Holy See does not only govern a small state, it governs the Church. It
is accepted as equal among sovereign states and is as such part of global governance processes. The
role of the head of the Catholic Church might be seen as equal to leading a multinational company or
an NGO like Oxfam, equal in structure but larger in seize. However, canonical law, which is different
to state law, international law and religious laws, as it claims not only superior status to state law but
also has a centralized full-fledged juridical system with the pope as its highest judge, makes the
church also unique among transnational actors, even among religious ones. It has its own validity and
is not derived from International Private Law as do multinationals and NGOs. Even though, the pope
rules as a monarch, he has not absolute power over the law but is rather restricted in his moves by
the tradition of the church. The Holy See makes moreover an additional claim, which reaches beyond
the usual interests that representatives of states or transnational actors have. The Holy See
understands itself as the Vicar of Christ and, going back to pagan times of Rome, as the Pontifex
Maximus, the builder of bridges. As such the papacy sees itself as responsible for the whole world
and gives regularly advice in his social teachings to all people of good will. This status limits again the
personal power of the pope but expands the authority of the institution. The papacy does not claim a
political rule over the world as it did at some points during the Medieval Ages, however, the blessing
urbi et orbi, for the city and the world, makes it clear how far reaching its impact is meant to be.
Thus, the Holy See is a unique trans-governmental and transnational, global actor. To understand its
unique institutional structure and the specific impact which drives out of it for the global order it
seems in order to clarify how much its governmental structure has to do with a state, what kind of
role the papacy plays diplomatically in the international society of states, and what impact its
leadership of the Catholic Church has.
The Church the Holy See as a transnational leader
The internal base of the Holy Sees sovereignty is the Catholic Church and its faithful. Since the
1970ies, when the global population almost doubled, the number of Catholic faithful more than
doubled. Almost 20 percent, more than one billion human beings are Catholic and thus, more or less
interested in what the pope says. An increasing majority of them lives in the Global South. Almost 50
percent of them live in the Americas, almost 25 percent in Europe, more than 15 percent in Africa,
more than 10 percent in Asia. It is still the West that is Catholic. However taking the population
growth and the increase of Catholics together, Vietnam is one of the Catholic key countries. There
are no liable figures from China. All global figures on religious data suffer from this one billion black
whole, especially as the Catholic Church of China which is loyal to the pope was forced to go
underground.63

63

Jenkins (2007).

10

Of course, keeping the Catholic flock together is often a heavy task for its shepherd who has
abandoned the help of watchdogs since the alliance of throne and altar has been broken.
Nevertheless, the papacy managed during the 20th century to establish a global reach of coherence
which even exceeds that of the Medieval Ages. Stripped of its temporal power, the decision of the
papacy lost to a certain degree the odor of this-worldly interest. This does not mean that the
papacys decisions were uncontested but that the papacy could defend them on theological grounds.
Two events, standing in contrast just at first glance, were crucial: the First und the Second Vatican
Council. In Vaticanum I, 1869/70 the papacy managed to install the infallibility of the pope under
certain conditions just before his sovereignty over the Papal state was to end. This new dogma
strengthened not only the papacys central command in the church but also its visibility and
popularity. Of course, those not in favor of this new dogma were not amused, however the ordinary
Catholics under pressure from their secular or protestant state had one more reason to look to Rome
for their identity as Catholics. A pilgrimage to Rome became more and more a pilgrimage to the Holy
Father and less to the tombs of St. Peter and Paul or the seven churches each medieval pilgrim had
to visit if he or she wanted to be a real Rome pilgrim. The global expansion beyond the Americas
happened during the time of European imperialism which brought also the Catholic faith to parts of
Africa and Asia which it had not reached before. All this happened under a papacy which was
stripped of its this-worldly powers and thus could much better represent the heavenly power. The
pope was not concerned with Central Italy but with the globe. The second event, the second Vatican
Council from 1962 to 1965, was in many respects the complete opposite of the first one. 64 This time,
the aim was not the building of bastions against the modern world but the breakdown of these
bastions and adjustments to the modern world. In perspective of the global power of the papacy,
however, the effects were comparable. Admittedly, there is no doubt that the contestations about
the interpretations of the outcome of the councils were very rough. The different strands of
Catholicism, not only in the West but also in the global South, particularly liberation theology which
spread from Latin America all over the Catholic world, were not easy to integrate in the teaching of
the papal church. However, Pope John Paul II and his cardinal Ratzinger managed to contain the
spread of Marxist thoughts while still securing the option of the poor 65 in the teaching of the church.
This contestation brought the papacy a very bad press but, given the fall of communism five years
after the controversial decisions, everything else would have embarrassed the Church even more.
The most crucial aspect of the Second Vatican Council from a political perspective was its decision to
favor democracy and religious freedom over an authoritarian but Catholic rule. Bishop Lefebvre
disagreed with this adjustment and separated himself and some supporters from the church in a
community which is now known as the Society of Pius X. On the other side, Huntington stated in his
analysis of a third wave of democratization that this wave had a clear Catholic impact deriving from
the decisions of the council in favor of democracy.66 In the long pontificate of John Paul II, despite of
ongoing critique not only from the liberal West, the Holy See managed to combine social teaching in
favor of the poor, liberal and democratic attitudes towards democracy, a conservative stand in
theology and a centralization of juridical and administrative powers. The compendium of the
canonical law, the Codex Iuris Canonici of 1917, was reviewed in 1983 and in 1992 a new catechism
of the church followed. Different to the Sharia, these codes are not understood to become directly
the law of the land but they are meant to renew the established juridical system of the church in the
64

Nacke (2010).
Option for the poor means that the church has to be side by side with the poor.
66
Samuel P. Huntington (1983).
65

11

case of the Codex Iuris Canonici and to function as a guide for believers but also as the moral back
bone of politics in the case of the catechism. The Codex is particularly interesting insofar as it
provides the legal structure of the relationships within the church to its central leadership in the
Vatican. Particularly, the relationships with the bishops heading the dioceses all over the world and
their appointments by the pope are of relevance to understand the centralized global impact of the
Holy See. In the case of the catechism the impact is less direct but even larger. While some moral
judgments are understood to be not negotiable and it is the duty of every Catholic to defend them, it
is not allowed to use religion for party politics, as was the critique against liberation theology and
other political theologies. For instance, there is some room for interpretation in the just war
question, however there is almost none in questions of abortion or euthanasia. Catholic politicians
and citizens/voters are called to accept these guidelines as binding, excommunication as in the
debate of Senator Kerry might become a public issue with impact on the political results. Different to
Vaticanum I the church does no longer emphasize its role as a societas perfecta. The one true
Church as Robert Bellarmine put it in 1588, is no longer visible and palpable as the Kingdom of
France or the republic of Venice.67 The Second Vaticanum speaks about the church as sharing the
joys and sorrows of the people, stressing the closeness to the concerns of the current situation that
the faithful are in. However the task of the church and particularly the task of the papacy and its
infallibility fosters an understanding which sees the church not as a part of the civil society but as
constitutive for civil society itself. In the perspective of the emerging of a global public sphere the
papacy and the church see itself as genuine actors. Unlike other transnational actors the church
understands itself as constitutive for human society and not just as part of human society.
Notwithstanding the readiness to cooperate with all people of goodwill and being prepared to accept
competing solidarist views and a pluralistic society of states and beliefs, the spiritual dimension of
Gods will is the bottom line of the churchs conception of itself and of its service to the people as the
constitutive force of social rules and conduct. This idea is common to many religious actors and
separates them from other public interest actors within civil society. However, no religious entity has
mastered to project this idea at such a scale, measured in the number of faithful, and in such quality,
measured by the standard of a coherent set of rules administered by one coherent body of final
interpretation. This player seeks to constitute also the political rules of the global polis and has
influence and power enough to participate in this contest. Apart from analyzing what this actor is
doing, the focus on what this actor is brings a lot of insights to the changes of world politics.
Territory the Vatican State
In 1929 the Holy See and Italy agreed on the Lateran Treaty and established the Vatican State in the
Vatican City, a very small territory in Rome around St. Peter which is named after the Vatican Hill, a
name going back to Romes pagan times. This agreement made an end to almost 60 years since the
fall of the Papal State in which the Pope understood himself as a prisoner in the Vatican, which
however never was his position. Instead in this period without territory and in hostile environment of
secular liberalism, the papacy managed to strengthen its global role as a transnational actor
particularly through the internationalization of the church. The incoming fascist regime of Mussolini
in Italy agreed on the Treaty because it sought to use the reputation the Papacy had in Italy and
worldwide to gain legitimacy for itself. Thus the Vatican State has to be understood as a product of
the Holy Sees eminent role, not the other way round.

67

Bellarmine (1588)

12

The territory of the Papal State, dating back to the mists of the early medieval donation of Pipin in
the 8th century, was much larger than the newly created Vatican State. It included the whole center
of the Italian Peninsula. It saw times of a central government which some understand as a prototype
of modern statehood. 68 However, it was in decline since decades before the Italian troops made an
end to it in 1870. Moreover, it should be clear that the Papal State even in its heydays gave the Holy
See just a kind of territorial power base as the emperor of the Holy Roman Empire had at his familys
homeland but the popes political power never has been reduced to a monarch over central Italy. If
the papacy was too much focused on the Papal State, its universal role was under risk to be lost. The
popes political power was based on its ability to command the Church and via this ambition to
influence the political sphere. The surrender of the Papal State can be seen as a breakthrough for the
rise of the modern papacy as a global actor.
Nevertheless, the territory had its function to guarantee independence from other rulers. To that
extent, the Lateran Treatys creation of the Vatican City State supports the international and
independent role of the Holy See, as the medieval role of the papacy was based on the Papal State.
The legally undisturbed territorial integrity since the Lateran Treaty and particularly the practical
freedom from pressure after the end of Fascism in Italy and German occupation of Italy after the end
of World War II, secured the Holy See the energy and agency to act more freely on the international
scene without worrying about being pressured at its doorstep. The integrity of its territory gives the
pope a territorial reference point to its independence. However, it should be clear that even in
comparison with the declined Papal State the Lateran Treatys Vatican state of today is just a shadow
of the old statehood and with no full-fledged state-like impact of its power on territory and
population and thus a rather symbolic capacity: the Swiss Guard needs support from the Italian
police and the Euro coins with the Popes portrait are more or less collectors items only but
nevertheless leave a footprint on the European currency. The pope reigns as sovereign monarch over
the Vatican city but the Papal State of yore and state sovereignty, understood as the ability to
enforce its rule by means of power, including military power, have been lost with the capitulation of
the last Papal troops, an international brigade of Catholics called Papal Zouaves, to the Italian troops
of Garibaldi in September 1870. But the smallness of the state territory and the very limited state
power of the Vatican state of today do not reduce the impact of the Holy See on the international
scene. The Holy Sees diplomatic status in the world of territorial states is underlined with this
symbolic territory. But its diplomatic status derives from the person of the pope who is only
additionally the monarch of a small city state. The Holy See, to use a common phrase, acts from
within the Vatican State, it is not reduced to the Vatican State. The Holy See's claim to sovereignty
would, indeed, persist even if it lost effective control over the Vatican territory.
Diplomacy the pope as peer in the society of states
The Holy Sees status as a sovereign international actor depends foremost on the willingness of the
other sovereign international actors to accept the pope and its curia as a peer. This was always the
case at least for some states, even in its weakest moments without any territorial command. This
development has a long legacy in the feudal time of Europe and developed with state diplomacy in
the 16th century. The Holy Sees status was special insofar as it was understood to have both spiritual
and temporal powers. Temporal powers understood as its very own interests like that of any other
monarch were supplemented by an understanding of intertwined spiritual and temporal power with
a highly political impact. Thus, amongst other things the pope legitimatized otherworldly powers and
68

Mitterauer (2003: 152-234).

13

acted as a mediator or a kind of referee. This role had a global reach as the pope supported the
division of the world between his most loyal kings, the king of Spain and the king of Portugal, in the
Treaty of Tordesillas. As mentioned above in the context of Hurrells approach, the Treaty of
Westphalia was in respect to the role of the pope in international affairs more than the myth of
secularization. Referring to secularization as differentiation and pointing to the pressure this puts on
the papacy as an overwhelming structure of international relations, Timothy Samuel Shan and Daniel
Philpott quote Pope Innocent X who condemned the treaties as null, void, invalid, iniquitous,
unjust, damnable, reprobate, inane, empty of meaning and effect for all time.69 The pope was just
left out. The legal acceptance of non-Catholic denominations within the Holy Roman Empire
weakened his role as a spiritual and political leader dramatically. Nevertheless, soon after he was
back in business, particularly in his contribution to the defense against the Ottoman threat to
Europe. However, the influence in Protestant states was void and the ideas of the Enlightenment and
absolutism marked a time of decline also in Catholic states. In 1773 pope Clemens XIV could no
longer resist the pressure from the European states to close the Societas Jesu, the Jesuits, because of
their transnational influence and their state-like reservations for the indigenous population in South
America (Paraguay). The Jesuits with their special vow of obedience to the pope were one of the
actors which fostered the transnational agency of the pope from Europe to America and China. It is
interesting to see that the Jesuits survived in Protestant Prussia and Orthodox Russia because their
rulers just refused to publish the enforced papal letter. The secularization as differentiation during
the Reformation and the schism with the Orthodox Church were thus supportive for the papal Jesuits
against the pressure of Enlightenment secularization. Anyway, this illustrates that already at the eve
of the French Revolution, the papal influence in the society of states was waning. The decline of the
popes power was certainly most manifest after the first surrender of the papal state to French
troops of the Revolution, being prisoner of Napoleon (Pius VI) and then his extra at the coronation
scene (Pius VII). However in the Vienna Congress, the papal nuncio was the dean of the diplomatic
corps, a role the nuncio has today in one third of the countries which have one. The 19th century
brought finally the end of the Papal State, however, as discussed above, not the end of the Holy See's
status as an international actor. Even in the difficult time of conflict with Italy and with no territory of
its own the Holy See had diplomatic relations with other states. However, its diplomatic international
impact was limited. In World War I, Pope Benedict XVs call for peace had no impact at all.70 However
Pope Pius XII has been harshly criticized for being too cautious in his opposition against NaziGermany, a critique which started prominently with a German theatre play in which a German
dramaturge blamed the silent pope for not being more outspoken in its damnation of Germany. 71
The papacy, even if not successful directly during the First World War, had nourished the
expectations of the international public. This was particularly the case, as we will see in the next
section, because the Catholic Church not only survived the French Revolution but flourished globally
like never before. After World War II, the papacy was in the position to settle its position in Italy by
supporting the rule of the Christian Democrats and the prevention of the communists from power.
Right from the start, the pope was a cold warrior against communism. Even before America accepted
Kennans advice the pope had containment on his agenda.72 Despite close ties with the United States
in this perspective full diplomatic relations with the Nation under God had to wait until 1984 as one

69

Philpott (2011:32).
Pollard (1999).
71
Conway (1965).
72
Troy (2010: 501).
70

14

commentator noted anti-Catholicism was stronger than anti-communism.73 However the bulk of
other nations was less reluctant. The young independent states of the former colonial emperies were
ready to have diplomatic relations with the Holy See. Today the Holy See has diplomatic ties with
almost all countries Malaysia is the most recent new country with diplomatic relations since July
2011. China is the big player who refuses the diplomatic offers of the Holy See. However, it is
interesting to notice that the Holy See is prepared to resist the Chinese governments position to
appoint Catholic bishops by itself, a position completely at odds with the current relationship
between states and the Holy See globally, but not unfamiliar in European history. Saudi-Arabia, North
Korea, Afghanistan and Vietnam are the only major states which have no relations with the Holy See;
Vietnam despite of a large and growing Catholic population percentage, Saudi Arabias king Abdallah
visited the pope in 2007. Other states with a very small Catholic minority maintain diplomatic ties.
Iran, by the way, has never broken its diplomatic relations but has one of the largest corps at its
embassy to the Holy See. Moreover, the Holy See has diplomatic relations with the EU and is present
as permanent observer to the UN and many other international organizations like the UNESCO, the
Council of Europe, the African Union, and the World Trade organization. The Holy See is a full
member in OSCE, IAEA, UNCTAD among many others and has a special member status in the Arab
League, a position which makes the Holy See certainly unique.74 This uniqueness, however, is missed
completely by the economists writer, who suggested a new self-definition of the Holy See in terms
of a big NGO. Particularly, the Holy Sees campaign at the UN-Conference on Population and
Development made its role at the UN for some very unpopular.75 However, the ties with almost all
states of the UN will continue to secure the Holy See its seat at the international table.
Financial influence and global public sphere in the information age
The Holy Sees actorness is characterized by a legal status which comprises three levels and a
genuine agency resulting from the coherent and combined but also differentiated agency on these
levels. This can be driven home by the focus on the financial influence and its role as a public figure in
the global information age. The loss of the Papal State presented a major problem in financial
aspects. However, the Lateran Treaty and an overall sober capitalist investment policy secured its
assets despite several scandals.76 The crucial point here is that the Vaticans banker act inside an
independent state which decides on its own choosing how the legal rules of the financial world are to
be applied. The issue of the right to coin Euro coins with the papal emblem on it, is rather of
numismatic concern but nevertheless also a strong symbol of sovereignty. However, the crucial
aspect is again less the Vatican State than the Catholic Church. Thus, even more important is the
franchise aspect of indirectly channeling money. The label "Catholic" is not a registered trademark
but it works similar. The readiness of Catholic faithful to donate money to Catholic NGOs depends
usually on the approval of their Catholicism. This influence is mainly mitigated to the national bishops
which brings for instance the German Church and its development agencies like Misereor in a strong
global position. But the pope can call for corrections, which he did explicitly in his visit in Germany in
2006. Other relief organizations are under more direct control. Regarding Caritas International,

73

Coppa (2008).
For a full list see the official site of the Vatican:
http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/secretariat_state/documents/rc_seg-st_20010123_holy-seerelations_it.html
75
Abdullah (1996), Neal (1998).
76
Pollard (2005).
74

15

Chong and Troy argue that like the UN, the Holy See does operate a dedicated foreign aid arm.77
In each case, the moral authority is able to direct financial power. This is done rarely like private
equity, but then backed with its own state, but more often and crucially as the ultimate trademark
holder of Catholicism and its ability to make, collect, and channel money.
Another important aspect of the information age is the role of the Holy See in the emerging global
public sphere. The icon of the public appearance of the pope is of course the Vatican Hill and St.
Peter. The Vatican states and its Swiss Guard, the pilgrims from all over the world and the attitude to
greet and bless them in different languages deliver an image of Rome as an historical sight reaching
deeply back into European history and culture but also as a global center of the present and future
world. The pope is a crucial part of global religious tourism which turns him into a celebrity one
wants to visit. Even more important is however the ability to leave Rome and visit the world. This
new concept of a travelling pope invented for modern times by Paul VI was turned into a central
feature of papal appearance by John Paul II. The possibilities of the emerging global information age
fuelled this undertaking. By travelling around the world not only to visit its flock but in order to make
state visits and addressing people of different faiths and world views by speaking to governments, in
parliaments and in the UN assembly the papacy weaves a global net of social fabrics which
constitutes a global public sphere. John Paul II is probably the person who has been seen by more
people live and globally than any other before. The Holy See does not only engage directly with
people around the world but this engagement is seen by many people who then get a country
remote from their own into their focus. This effect is not restricted to the feeling of a world church
inside Catholicism. The media coverage of the papal visits reaches a much broader audience. The
moral principles which the papacy tries to propagate globally experience sometimes fierce resistance
from the liberal media of the West in case of sexual morals and from the various dictators in the case
of human rights, but despite these substantial issues the question of a cosmopolitan moral is
addressed by this contestation. These contestations foster the constitution of a global public sphere.
However, this has a price for the pope. Scandals like the abuse of children through priests do not stay
inside the Catholic communities or inside the national debates but create a global outrage. Despite
the long standing tradition to cope with an international media (the Vatican newspaper
LOsservatore Romano was founded in 1861 and the radio broadcast of Radio Vatican started in 1931
and the television center was established in 1950) the papal administration has problems to get its
message into the press, accept proper critique and defend the pope against less well-meaning
attacks.78 Here it becomes clear that the soft power is not a commodity in the hand of the pope but
depends on the reaction of the emerging public sphere. This became also clear by death of John Paul
II. His global presence through journeys and his intensive work with the media resulted in a mass
pilgrimage of ordinary faithful and chiefs of states and in a media coverage which was larger than the
coverage on 9/11.79

The Holy Sees Agency and the Structure of World Politics: Global Neo-Medievalism
Hedley Bull coined the term of a new medievalism based on the medieval condition of the
contestations about the different rule over people not unified by a territory but by overlapping
functional spheres of influence.80 Jrg Friedrichs emphasized the neo-medieval analogy between the
77

Chong/Troy (2011:351).
Rodari/Tornielli (2011=German version of Attaco a Ratzinger, 2010).
79
http://www.languagemonitor.com/about/media_analysis/pope-john-paul-ii/ See Schlott (2008).
80
Bull (1995: 254-271).
78

16

dichotomy of politics and church (emperor and pope) then and politics and global economy now. 81
The analogy is fruitful, however, I suggest that religion and the pope where not replaced but
supplemented by economic actors. As traders and vendors were already powerful players
particularly during the first beginning of modernity from the Italian Medici to Southern German
Fugger and Welser, the papacy is also part of the game in Westphalian world politics. The neomedieval changes of globalization strengthen a post-medieval papacy which was never out of
business. The papacy survived even the age of the nation state which divided its faithful into
belligerent enemies like never before with the devastating World Wars in which Catholic Europeans
fought on both sides. The neo-medieval transnational conditions of todays globalizing world are
much more in line with the character of the Holy See. It is a commonplace that the heydays of papal
moral authority were in the Medieval ages. Bruce Hall argues that:
The moral authority of the high medieval papacy of the early thirteenth century resulted from
institutionalizing a transnational moral form of authority and order that had been lost since the ninthcentury death of Charlemagne deprived Europe of the imperial administrative form of authority and
order.82
Drawing on Will Durant's characterization of the medieval feudal Europe as an age of faith, 83 Hall
argues that the papal ideas were able to stimulate the emergence of new social institutions.84 In the
newly declared Gods century,85 the Westphalian System comes under a double attack, which does
not need to be reduced to a terrorist assault86 but is rather a deep rooted transformation. The
concept of sovereignty is already contested for a while87 and religious sociology shows that the
modern world was not secularized but is desecularizing.88 Hurrells focus on the Westphalian
settlement can serve as a starting point to address this position of the Holy See in the realm of
international relations. Based on the eminent work of Alexander Osiander which, however, tackles
the Holy See only at the margins,89 Hurrell has a sober understanding of the Westphalian myth
concerning sovereignty as well as the right to intervene for religious minorities but ignores also the
impact of the Westphalian Treaty on the Holy See. 90 The interesting point here is that the secular
impact of the end of the Thirty Years War on the Holy Sees influence was indeed very costly, actually
much more than the shrinking influence of the emperor. However, in contrast to the emperor who in
1806 lost his Holy Roman Empire and after World War I vanished as emperor of Habsburg Reich like
his Prussian-German counterpart, the Holy See managed to survive these changes and challenges
and to adopt its position to the territorial as well as to the nation states society. Thus, I argue that
with the Holy See the pluralist society of states never lost its solidarist rudiments completely and was
always open for aspects of global governance. In the transformation of today towards a global
transnational order the Holy See has a structural advantage in propagating again a transnational
order and fostering a global public sphere and global governance. Being part of the plurarist society
81

Friedrichs (2001).
Hall (1997:595).
83
Hall (1997:596) quotes Will Durant.
84
Hall (1997:596).
85
Toft/Philpott/Shah (2011).
86
Philpott (2002).
87
Lyons (1999).
88
See Peter Berger (1999). For the perspective of a global South and the impact on religion including
Catholicism see also Philip Jenkins (2007) and Jeffrey Haynes (1994).
89
Ossiander (2001).
90
Hurrell (2007: 55).
82

17

of states and having the Church as its power base, the Holy Sees teaching makes it a global player
who acts as a norm entrepreneur strong enough to lend legitimacy to projects of global governance
or withdraw it. The Holy See made it very clear in its teaching that he is very supportive of the aspect
of a global coming together as this is completely in line with the spiritual dimension of one world
under God and the transnational aspect of faithful in each state. The last encyclical of Benedict XVI
added this spiritual dimension of globalization explicitly:
Mans earthly activity, when inspired and sustained by charity, contributes to the building of the
universal city of God, which is the goal of the history of the human family. In an increasingly
globalized society, the common good and the effort to obtain it cannot fail to assume the dimensions
of the whole human family, that is to say, the community of peoples and nations [..], in such a way as
to shape the earthly city in unity and peace, rendering it to some degree an anticipation and a
prefiguration of the undivided city of God.91
The struggle about a solidarist foundation of global politics had narrow limits during the Cold War as
both sides had completely different ideas about what a solidarist globe should look like. The papacy
was prepared to engage with its own agenda in this struggle. After the victory over communism the
Holy See sees its version of solidarism confronted with at least two rival ones, the secular version of
liberalism and the religious version of Islam. The papacys course on this is to be prepared to contest
both parties while being able to make coalitions with both of them to support its own agenda or
rebuff others. The Holy See is prepared to create common agency for global and transnational
governance on a pluralist basis. However, the contestation as to who will draw the solidarist bottom
line and seize the middle ground is just getting started. 92 The next two sections elaborate these
structural changes and the role of the pontiff in them.
Cold Warrior: Waging the Cold War, constraining it and winning it by revolution
The Holy Sees political agency was powerful well before the neo-medieval age of globalization. The
Cold War serves here as an example to illustrate this.93 The Holy See was in the forefront of the Cold
War right from the start. As mentioned above, to some extent one could argue that the papacy
waged the war before the US joint. Churchill, for instance joined him explicitly in combating
communism.94 The Holy See certainly helped the West during the initial phase, it helped however
also to constrain the Cold War, particularly in the Cuba Crisis, and it was crucial to end it through
revolution. Religion played an underestimated role in the Cold War.95 Nevertheless, the Holy See was
not part of the Western block of liberal democracy and capitalism but had always its own position.
Pius XII was a straightforward anticommunist right from the start, however he was fully aware of the
problem of a nuclear war and thus focused on containment policy rather to advocate for the roll back
policy. With John XXIII a seminal figure of peace appeared on the scene and during the Cuban missile
crisis also on the front pages of the Soviet official newspaper Pravda. John Paul II is one of the
historical figures without whom the end of communism might not have happened the way it did. It is
not the place for an in-depth analysis here. However, my crucial point is that while the Cold War is
91

Benedict XVI (2010).

Before 9/11 there was a conservative American call for the global jihad of all faithful Muslim, Jews, and
Christian. See Peter Kreeft (1996). After 9/11 jihad has become associated with terrorism. Such shifts show the
solidarist coalitions of the global village to form a global polis are still in the making.
93
Luxmoore (1999).
94
Coppa (2008: 149).
95
Kirby (2003).
92

18

present in every IR text book and shaped the whole theorizing of IR scholarship, the role of the Holy
See is at the margins or completely left out.
The story of the Holy See in the Cold War can be told in terms of strategic interest and alliances. For
the Holy Sees assessment of communism the obvious factor was its uncompromising anti-religious
and atheistic stand. Thus the USSR could be understood as a natural enemy of the Holy See, even
more so than secular liberalism or fascism. However, from a constructivist point of view being
interested in the constitutive rules which shaped the identity of the actor one should not miss the
spiritual dimension, particularly as the natural story line got supernatural support from a distinct
narrative. For the Cold War and also the Second World War the epic struggle of Communism and
Catholicism had a Marianist metaphysic narrative: the message of Fatima.96 A Marian apparition set
already before the October revolution the course for the spiritual combat against communism and
fascism, warning of a spread of falsities from Russia which would cause massive trouble and a second
war even more devastating than the ongoing world war. The rosary and some other pious rituals
along with a conversion of the heart should win the struggle. The message of Fatima formed the
background for the political actions of both Pius XII and John Paul II. In contrast to Pius XII and John
Paul II, the Fatima story was less important for John XXIII. When confronted with the third secret he
refused to open it and sent it back to the archive. The attempted assassination of John Paul II in
1981, however, was interpreted by John Paul himself as forecasted and prevented by the
intervention of the Virgin Mary. He brought the bullet which hit him almost deadly to Fatima and put
it in the Virgin Mary statues crown. Both Pius and John Paul acted in their consecration of the world
to the immaculate heart of Mary according to their interpretations of the message of Fatima. In both
cases the faithful can point to coincidences with turning points of history. After the consecration of
1942 Hitler lost the turning point battles of El Alamein und Stalingrad. After the consecration of 1984
Gorbachev came to power. As I am not interested in causal relationships but in constitutive rules, I
do not have to tackle question of metaphysics or superstition. This would be more interesting for a
Wendtian agenda how ideas can have causes in the material world.97 Interesting for the research
agenda here is that these consecrations were public acts in which not only bishops from all over the
world were included but which were also based on a Marian mass-movement with a particular type
of devotion like praying the rosary and veneration of statues of the Fatima Virgin Mary that spread all
over the world. This anti-communist Fatima narrative provides one of the constitutive rules which
hold the Holy See and a global community of faithful all over the world together and keep them on a
particular political track. Of course, this was not the only narrative, but one which is so at odds with
secular thinking that it is kept almost completely outside the academic discourse 98 but that can be
found on Wikipedia and on the margins of the discourse.99 Of course, such a story can be neglected
completely in a positivist neorealist discourse, but as soon a constructivist agenda interested in
religious notions which constitute a common mind set for social action is put forward, it cannot be
ignored on the academic level of political science. This is the background of the diplomatic actions of
the Holy See which I would like to focus on now in three short episodes.

96

The Message of Fatima,

http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/cfaith/documents/rc_con_cfaith_doc_20000626_message
-fatima_en.html
97
Wendt (1999)
98
Even George Weigel (2005), the conservative biographer of John Paul, does not have it.
99
Timothy Tindal-Robertson (1998).

19

Pius XII inherited his anti-communist agenda from his predecessor Pius XI. The Holy See had seen its
church prosecuted in Russia from the beginning of the communist rule which was of course openly
hostile to the Opium for the Masses as Lenin reformulated the Marxian quote. Thus, Pius XII was
reluctant to join an anti-Hitler coalition as the Western allies asked for as long as Stalin would then
become his ally, too. Churchills famous quote If Hitler invaded hell I would make at least a favorable
reference to the devil in the House of Commons was not really an option for the pope. He
understood Hitler as well as Stalin as forces from hell.100 However, he was prepared to lift the ban on
communism insofar as he made a differentiation between the government of a state in defense of its
country and communism as such, thus allowing Catholics to participate in the allies support for
Stalin. To the Axis-Powers which urged him to join a crusade against communism he said no.101
Particularly after his death Pius was criticized for being more aware of the problem of Communism
than Nazism. However, right after WWII it was taken as given that he had combated both enemies of
the free West and in the emerging Cold War his anticommunism was very welcomed. As mentioned
above, the pope was a cold warrior avant la lettre who understood already Yalta as a Soviet
betrayal.102 Thus the US was rather joining pope Pius cold war than the other way round. Despite the
popes exclusion from settling the Yalta order, the overwhelming support the papacy gave to the
Italian Christian Democrats which ruled the country and kept the communists at bay greatly helped
Italy, despite its large communist party, to achieve the task of joining NATO and staying within the
Western camp. The papacy did not establish the cold war structures and its international order, but it
played a crucial part in legitimizing Western efforts to contain Soviet power and delegitimizing any
communist backing in the West.
When John XIII took office in 1958, times were changing not only for the church but the nuclear
stalemate changed the whole scenery of the Cold War. The Cuban Missile Crisis which brought the
world closest to an atomic war was a decisive moment for both. The well-known Cuban story does
not need to be re-told in detail. Brinkmanship, contingency, and fortune came together to avoid a
possible nuclear overkill. However, the contribution John XXIII made is not told very often. John F.
Kennedy, being the first Catholic president of the USA, and his administration might have had to
prove to the American public their secular position. Thus, the role of John XXIII is left completely out
of this picture and the thanksgiving message of Kennedy sent to the pope immediately when threat
was over on the eve of 28th October 1962 is rather unknown. As Nikita Khrushchev had nothing to
prove in this respect, he was much more explicit. Nevertheless, on the 23rd of October, the day the
quarantine of Cuba was established, Kennedy contacted Norman Cousin, a Catholic book journalist
and peace activist, to ask the pope to intervene. The Holy See agreed. The intervention was signaled
by Cousin to the Kremlin via a conference with Soviet scientists and by the Holy See itself to the
Soviet embassy in Italy. After it was well received by Khrushchev, John XIII delivered a speech urging
both superpowers for a peaceful resolution of the conflict. This speech was globally broadcasted on
the 24th of October 1962 and featured by Friday October 26 as the cover story of the official Soviet
newspaper Pravda. The papal plea for peace was understood as a possibility to withdraw with less
embarrassment. On the October 28 Khrushchev announced the withdrawal of the missiles.103 After
the crisis, Cousin went to Moscow via Rome taking an oral message from the Holy See to Khrushchev
on the 13th of December 1962 asking for the release of the Ukrainian patriarch Josef Slipyi from
100

In the case of Hitler a very unusual rite of a far distance exorcism has been performed by the pope.
Coppa (2008: 127-131).
102
Luxmoore (1999: xi).
103
Hebbelethwaite (2000: 230-232).
101

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Siberia. Khrushchev released not only the bishop but asked for a continued communication with the
Vatican through private contacts.104 One of the consequences was the visit of Khrushchevs
daughter Rada and her husband Alexis Adzhubei, the editor of Izvestia, to John XXIII in 7th March
1963.105 Johns encyclical Pacis in Terra deliberated during the Cuba Crisis and published in 11th April
1963 continued this policy. The Vatican Ostpolitik of his successor Paul V was created by this pontiff
who died in the same year as Kennedy and one year before Khrushchev was driven out of office.
The first Slavic pope, John Paul II, the Polish pope from a faraway country as he introduced himself
to the Romans, had his own ideas about communism.106 The time for coexistence changed into a
time of revolution. John Paul was elected pope in 1978, seven years before Gorbachev came to
power. In these seven years his support was crucial for the success of Solidarno in Poland. He put
pressure on the Soviet Union to keep out of Poland and also openly criticized the martial law
imposed by general Jaruzelski, supposedly to avoid the Soviet invasion. Before and during martial
law, his visits to his homeland, which the communist government could not prevent, made clear that
the Polish people were fed up with communism. John Paul fostered their resistance and was able to
support Solidarno through his firm stance towards the communist government but also by being
prepared to keep the Polish resistance on a peaceful track. The Polish work for change had not been
possible without the Polish pope. The Reagan administration and its anti-communism stance towards
the empire of evil saw a strong ally in him. When Gorbachev came to power, the pope addressed
him directly in a personal letter to which the General Secretary not only replied but which he took as
an opportunity to visit the pope. Weigel who published a book entitled Final Revolution107 about the
impact of religion in general and the pope in particular on the revolutionary changes that made
possible the end of the Cold War, quoted elsewhere John Gaddis on the popes role in the end of the
Cold War:
Real power rested, during the final decade of the Cold War, with leaders like John Paul II whose
mastery of intangibles of such qualities as courage, eloquence, imagination, determination, and
faith allowed them to expose disparities between what people believed and the system under which
the Cold War obliged them to live [I]t took visionaries saboteurs of the status quo to widen the
range of historical possibility.108
Three popes brought the papacy in crucial positions at the beginning, brink and revolutionary end of
the cold war. The Holy See supported the West from its beginning, helped to avoid nuclear disaster in
the Cuba missile crisis and participated in the policy of dtente. The pope also was a leading figure in
the final act of the cold war during the 1980s, and the peaceful revolutions, which finally brought
about the downfall of the Soviet Union, started in Poland and with its pope. In a secular conflict and
in a time of secularization the Holy See thus managed to play a crucial role. Furthermore, the Holy
See was able to tell its own spiritual narrative about the cold war in which the Fatima story played a
crucial part. All this happened before the so-called return of religion. Actually, at that time
communism rather than Catholicism seemed to win the day. But the Holy See not only survived this
age of secularization but managed to stay in global politics and even to add its very own stamp on it.
The argument here is not that the papacy drove home the cold war by itself. The emphasis is rather
104

Hanson (1987: 10-11).

Hebbelethwaite (2000: 247-248).
106
The most important biography is from George Weigel. George Weigel (2005, 2010).
107
Weigel (1992).
108
Gaddis 195-196. See Weigel (2010: 184).
105

21

on the fact that a crucial conflict for IR had a crucial player which is most of the time not part of the
picture.
Drawing the bottom line and seizing the middle ground: Cairo and Regensburg
During the Cold War the papacy was part of the West but in a unique position. How much so became
clear shortly after the Cold War ended. With the end of the Cold War, the questions of war and
peace took on another shape. The Holy See was strongly engaged in attempts to avoid both US-led
wars in Iraq and at several other occasions. Particularly after 9/11 John Paul II did everything to stop
the crusade ideology and rhetoric, which the US administration was not free of, and some
conservative American Catholics who otherwise admired John Paul took exception to this. 109
Nevertheless the idea of a crusade is historically rooted in the papacy. From an orientalist
perspective the crusades have to do with the re-conquest of the Holy Land only. However, this view
is too narrow. First of all they started as a very special conquest, costly and with no material return
on investment. The crusades were holy wars of Catholic laymen and cleric orders declared by the
pope. They started in the earlier medieval era to re-conquer Jerusalem, but were later waged
throughout Europe against heretics and pagans and had their great secular revivals in the end of the
19th centurys imperialism, which explains why the Arab nations are still very sensitive to the term.
Although the Holy See had its competitors to call for a crusade, it is still the papacy which can claim a
kind of copyright to call to take the cross. 110 Thus, it is crucial that the Holy See developed a pacifistic
teaching on the questions of war and is eager to defend its crusade copyright to safeguard any
misuse.111 The constitutive rules of the global public sphere are still to be laid down, and this also
holds true for the concept of just war with its medieval heritage. The secular human rights discourse
is certainly part of the parcel of global constitutive rules, however the arrangements, say, of free
speech and insulting believers, as it was the issue in the cartoons controversy, have to be
renegotiated. Although the Holy See is avoiding a crusading rhetoric it has in some of these
arguments a very straightforward position which it is prepared to fight for. The arenas of these
disputes vary. The UN is still one of the major fields of contestation. However, the global media
coverage can produce world events out of more random speeches. The virtual forum becomes very
real in action on the ground, as the aforementioned example of the caricatures showed.
The Holy Sees impact on global debates can be illustrated with two events. One is the UNConference in Cairo 1994, the other is the Regensburg Speech in 2006. The first example shows how
the Holy See was able to form a coalition to prevent the UN and the US Administration to constitute
a human right of abortion, which can be understood from the perspective of the Holy See as an
action of drawing the bottom line of a global public sphere. The second example was meant to seize
the middle ground between secular and relativistic reason on the one hand and a voluntaristic
potentially violent version of religion on the other. Both issues are at the center of the global struggle
about constitutive rules of a common public sphere.
Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart stressed in their widely read book Sacred vs. Secular the point
that issues of sexual morals might be one of the dividing lines in the global public discourse.112 The

109

See for instance his biographer George Weigel (2005).

On the history of the crusades and the 19th century see Jonathan Riley-Smith (2005).
111
nd
The self-declared crusader who committed the bloodshed of the 22 of July 2011 in Norway was very aware
of that, criticizing Benedict XVI for being pacifistic instead of calling for a crusade.
112
Norris/Inglehart (2004).
110

22

standing thesis of the so called population explosion, termed by Ehrlich,113 is that a high fertility rate
will soon eat up literally the benefits of development policy, and that it should thus be prevented
for the sake of all. Chinas one-child-policy might be the strongest adaption of this point of view.
However, others like Bauman point out that decline in population at home in Europe and America is
seen as much as a problem as its increase in the global south, 114 thus reflecting a Neo-Malthusian
attitude of the few rich in fear of the many poor. Without taking a normative stand, Norris and
Inglehart also see a confrontation across such lines. This aspect is embedded in their wider argument
of secularization and globalization. They argue that religion is still alive despite of global
modernization which is at odds with the secularization theory that expected a decline of religion as
soon as modernization is going its way. Norris and Inglehart argue that a key factor which
secularization theory overlooked was that the poor stay religious and thus keep their pre-modern
attitude in sexual issues which makes them more fertile than the rich seculars who are declining by
numbers because of their unwillingness to accept sexual intercourse as tied up with reproduction.
Thus, we have a potential confrontation of the many, religious poor and their concept of sexual
identity and the few, secular rich and their notion of sexual freedom.115 This conceptual underpinning
might be a bit too simplistic, however there is something to it. Mara Hvistendahl showed for instance
most recently how the concept of preventing a population explosion by abortion, contraception and
sterilization was forced upon the women of the global south by the US. 116 The Cairo Conference was
meant to be a hallmark in this respect by formulating abortion as a reproductive health right and as a
human right. John Paul II was outraged on this issue.117 He started an unprecedented campaign and
wrote a letters to all heads of state asking them to reject this agenda.118 His argument was very much
in line with Norris and Ingelhardts analysis that reading the draft document of the consensus in
advance of the conference leaves the troubling impression of something being imposed: namely a
lifestyle typical of certain fringes within developed societies, societies which are materially rich and
secularized.119 This rebuff of the Western agenda was echoed by then Pakistan Prime Minister
Benazir Bhutto who criticized the Cairo draft document as an attempt to impose adultery, sex
education and abortion on the world.120 The papal critique that linked moral arguments of family
life with the social argument of a rich North selfishly imposing its agenda of population control on the
South instead of changing unjust imbalances worked out. Supporting also civil society groups on
national as well as transnational level in taking countermeasures, the Holy Sees delegation to Cairo
with the Harvard Law Professor Ann Marie Glendon as its president helped with this typical twin
strategy in the background to change the draft documents wording and spirit. The winning CatholicMuslim alliance was crucial for this but it also raised strong emotions. To the rather limited IR
literature on the Holy See the above mentioned article was added which was very critical in the role
the Holy See played.121 The constitutive rules on these issues are still contested but a solution for the
secular liberal campaigners for population control was pressed to rely on other strategies to come
forward with their agenda. The UN-Conference on Women 1995 in Bejing was to be the next
battleground with similar results.
113

Ehrlich/Ehrlich (1990).
Bauman (2008: 45).
115
Norris/Inglehart (2004: 215-241).
116
Hvistendahl (2011).
117
Weigel (2005: 715-727).
118
Letter printed in Marucci (2007: 199-202).
119
Letter printed in Marucci (2007: 201).
120
Quoted after Weigel (2005: 725).
121
Abdullah (1996), Neal (1998).
114

23

On 9/12 2006, at the University of Regensburg, in a very different setting another contestation about
constitutive rules happened rather randomly at the occasion of a pastoral visit of Pope Benedict XVI
to his Bavarian homeland.122 However, the remarks made in rather random circumstances were very
much in line with the most fundamental notions of Benedict XVIs theology on faith and reason. 123
His speech basically claimed a middle ground for religion which is able to give reasons to convince
others in contrast to secular relativism which abandoned reason and its willingness and capacity to
convince others, but also in contrast to violent religion which is prepared to force others to become
part of their project. According to Benedict XVI, faith and reason should go together to establish
constitutive rules for the global public sphere. The change from a pluralist society of states to a
solidarist perspective to foster global governance is understood as a contested endeavor. Many
voices participate in it, faith and reason should lead this dialogue.
As it is widely known, that speech became very controversial. Benedict delivered his speech at his
alma mater, university in Regensburg, on the 12th September 2006, one day after the fifth
anniversary of 9/11 and exactly on the day the Catholic Church still celebrates Marys help at the
siege and victory of Vienna against the Ottoman army. Benedicts quote of the Byzantine Emperor
Manuel II who some decades before the final fall of Constantinople in 1453 asked bluntly in a debate
with a Muslim scholar if the Prophet Mohammad had brought anything new but religious violence
resulted in outraged reactions in parts of the Islamic world. Many commentators took this as a
diplomatic faux pas or even worse, a kind of verbal crusade against Islam. However, as Eric Fassin
pointed out, this crusade had a different end and called for different means than the project of
American neoconservatives. Nevertheless, the aim was to establish a dominant discourse and seize
the middle ground for its own position. Fassin summarizes this nicely: Religion cannot, should not,
wield a sword: the hegemony of Christianity is purely cultural, rather than military.124 Interestingly,
the pope managed afterwards to further develop his ongoing dialogue with Muslim leaders and
scholars.125 In November of the same year his visit to Turkey and three years later to Jordan were
deemed a success, particularly the visit to Jordan as it managed to establish a Catholic-Muslim
Alliance against violence. The already mentioned visit of the Saudi King to the pope in 2007 has also
to be seen in this respect.
The alliance against violence had a deliberate philosophical backing. It is rooted in Benedictine theme
of faith and reason. The Emperors quote was chosen by the pope because it made the point that
religion can rest on reason and argument and thus does not need violence which can only target the
body but cannot convert the soul. This was meant not only as a critique of violence but aimed at the
notion that reason can bring convincing argument for faith. Faith is not a private idiosyncratic
decision based on a voluntaristic act of feeling and emotions. It is a reasonable and justifiable public
attitude because God himself is not voluntaristic and irrational but logos himself. In this
argumentation, and this was the main theme of the speech at the university of Regensburg, the
Western Protestant and Enlightenment concept of secular reason falls short of the full meaning of
reason which not only includes faith but leads to it.
The idea of this argumentation aims at the foundation of reasonable debates in the global public
sphere and can thus be understood as a continuation of the debate with Jrgen Habermas which
Joseph Ratzinger led as a cardinal shortly before he was elected pope in which they debated the idea
of a postsecular society.126 Habermas was not amused when Ratzinger pointed out a much stronger

122

Benedict (2007).
Joseph Ratzinger (2004). It is however fair to say that Ratzinger has more Asian religions and especially
Western liberalism which he refers to as relativism than Islam in mind when he was analyzing these issues.
124
Fassin (2007: 237).
125
Fischer (2009) .
126
Habermas/ Ratzinger (2005).
123

24

reading of what a postsecular society might be than what Habermas could accept. 127 However,
Muslim scholars were very much in line with the idea of a religious based concept of reason. By
attacking possible Muslim as well as Enlightenment shortcomings Benedict XVI tried to establish the
Catholic faith in the middle of the debate, joined only by the Orthodox Church which was present in
the quote of the Byzantine Orthodox Emperor and was already envisaged for the following trip two
month later to Turkey meeting the patriarch of Constantinople in Istanbul. Fassins term of a Vatican
geopolitics puts it in a nutshell.128

Conclusion: Study the Holy See

The political agency of the papacy is playing a part in the foundations of world politics, not through
enforcement but through an influence which should not be overlooked. Troy and Sommeregger
rightly speak about the soft power of the Holy See.129 The Catholic Church managed to survive
secularization in the West and to become part of the global South. Today the Holy See is one of the
key actors of global governance accepted by Islamic as well as secular regimes as a peer. Thus,
through the lens of the Holy See one can gather crucial insights about continuation and change in
world politics and particularly the endurance of transnational governance from the Pre-Westphalian
to the Post-Westphalian order. Even for those who do not believe in the gospels interpretation that
the pope was meant, as Jesus proclaimed to St. Peter, the rock against which the powers of death
shall not prevail, the Holy See has a unique position in global governance. It derives from the Holy
See's double position as a peer in the society of states, which has its own state but could even do
without, and simultaneously as a very specific transnational actor who constitutes rules and norms
for more than one billion faithful with the ambition to persuade all. The Holy Sees organization does
not only have its territorially defined branches all over the world but also a central structure of
command. The Holy See cannot pressure the global public sphere or the society of states as the
papacy sometimes could in the time of European medieval Christendom but in the struggle of
moving from a pluralist society of states to a solidarist perspective for engaging in global governance,
the Holy See is an actor which is prepared to foster its interpretation of the globalization.
Globalization as such is endorsed fully and Pope Benedict gives the highest possible blessing.
However, the constitutive rules of this project are contested. Given the rise of the South in general
and the Holy See's special alliance with the South, the Holy See will be a crucial player to wage and
mitigate conflicts during these changes, as he is the only player with a history in the north which is
increasingly shifting southwards. The focus on the Holy See provides a burning glass on the
transformation of the international order. Its special actorness allows a deep analysis of the
structural change of international relations and the praxis of diplomacy and the emerging global
public.
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